UDĀNAVAGA - Desire

Chapter II

1. O desire, I know your root; it is from imagination that you spring. I will not imagine you, and you will not arise in me.

2. From desires springs grief, from desires springs fear; men free from desires have no grief; whence could fear (come to them)?

3. From pleasures springs grief, from pleasures springs fear; men freed from pleasures have no grief; whence could fear (come to them)?

4. At first sweet, but bitter in their maturity... desires burn the madman, as a torch burns the hand, if it is not relinquished.

5. It is not the bond of iron, of wood, of bāka grass, that the venerable ones have declared solid. (The solid bond) is the attention which attaches the mind to earrings of precious stones, to children, to women.

6. This is the bond that the venerable ones have declared solid, everywhere rigid, difficult to unbind. But men without desires, even breaking that bond, devote themselves to the wandering life, renouncing the joys of desire.

7. The brilliant things of this world are not desires, man's desire is coloured by imagination. Brilliant things exist in this world, and here below, the wise tame their desires.

8. Desires are not eternal among men. And transitory are the things to which men subject to desire are attached. He who renounces this in order to avoid being reborn, I say that he will not go the kingdom of death.

9. Of the man in whom the aspiration (for Nirvāṇa) is born, who has escaped impurity (?), whose mind is calm, whose thought is not attached to desire, it is said: He is above the stream (ardhvaerotaḥ).

10. Gradually, little by little, tirelessly, the wise man should cast out the defilement in himself, like the workman that in silver.

11. Like the cartwright (?) cutting out shoes from leather... as one cuts out desires, things take a more favourable turn.

12. He who seeks complete happiness, let him renounce all desires; having renounced all desires, he attains supreme happiness.
13. As long as desire is pursued, mental contentment is not found; then, those find contentment, who find it in wisdom.

14. It is better to have contentment in wisdom; for desire does not content; the man who finds contentment in wisdom does not fall under the spell of a (second) existence.

15. Men distracted by desires, in truth delight in the wrong; they do not perceive the danger, even if their life is near its end.

16. Possessions cause the downfall of the fool, but not of him who seeks by himself. The fool through his possessions and his cravings causes his own downfall as well as that of others.

17. Even a shower of kāraṇāsāna does not bring the satisfaction of desires; there is only a faint taste of happiness in desires, the wise man knows this.

18. Even in the heavenly enjoyments, delight is not found. The Buddha's disciple finds his pleasure in the suppression of craving.

19. Even a golden mountain such as the Himalaya could not be treasure enough for a single man; knowing this, one goes in peace.

20. The man who knows what suffering is and what its origin is, how could he find delight in desire? Attachment, in this world, is wretchedness; with this thought, the wise man would learn to cast it out.

(Translated by Sara Boin-Jebb from the French of W.P. Chakravarti)

NOTES ON PĀLI CANONIC STYLE

A. Sujata

Notwithstanding certain re-evaluations of the views of the older Anglo-German school on the authentic value of the Pāli Canon, this preserves its importance as the most complete and consecutive exposition of earlier Buddhist dogmatics, the presentation exposing a source, irreplaceable both from a historical and literary point of view. Within the frames of the Canon, the Dhammapadā (DN) - "the book of longer sayings" - opens the second of the three Paññās - dedicated first of all to ethics and containing the best artistic specimens of Pāli. The genre of sūtra is represented in DN by the longest (cf. the title of the book) and the relatively complex texts, a regula's plot and composition. At the same time DN is evidently one of the oldest parts of the Pāli Canon, compiled during the first two-three centuries after the Buddha's death. The analysis of DN style seems, therefore, to be significant for the study of earlier Pāli artistic style and, wider, of classical Indian poetics, including non-Buddhist tradition. The language of DN excels by a rich vocabulary (surpassing in this respect none of the Hindu canonical texts - e.g. the Upaniṣads) and together with some other Tipitaka books, can be regarded as a model of classical Pāli.¹

DN is divided into three parts (vagga) containing, respectively, 13, 10 and 11 suttas unified according to rather different principles. The first part, Sīla-kammavagga ("A section referring to ethical rules"), includes I - XIII suttas² with common content each of which presents certain rules of moral conduct (siṭṭha), speaks about knowing the truth and degrees of perfection (ābhava), leading to the highest concentration (samādhi). Corresponding admonitions repeat themselves with certain abbreviations and variants (such as different refrains) addresses that change according to the personality of the interlocutor; use of synonyms - e.g. siṭṭha - caṇha etc.) in II-XIII: beginning with the words āyaṃ Paññāto loke upekkhī - "There appears in the world... an arahant" (II 40 a.o.) - and ending with nācana itthā bhojita - "After this present life there will be no beyond..." (II 70 a.o.).³ This repetition, divided in different suttas into a different number of paragraphs (see 26.1) comprises II 40-96 = III 2.2 = IV 23 = V 27 = VI 16-19 = VII 2-5 = VIII 19-20 = IX 7-13 = X 1.7-2, 36 = XI 9-66 = XII 19-77 = XIII 40-75. As for other parts of these suttas, some of them include independent narratives with various precepts (III, V, XIII), while some present strictly speaking only more or less original frames of the repetition mentioned (cf. below). Most of them contain in the last lines (though sometimes a little earlier) stereotype words of the Buddha's converted opponent, who sought to be accepted into the
Order. We find here this formula in 8 out of 13 suttas (II-IV, VIII-XI, XII, XIII), and only three times in all the other 21 suttas of SN (XVI 5-20; XXIII 29; XXXI 35).

The next section, Mahāvagga ("A large section"), though containing less suttas than the first and the third part of SN (10, i.e. XIV-XXIII), is indeed the largest - thanks to the size of XVI Mahāparinibbāna (other suttas of this part are much shorter and approximately equal to other SN suttas). In seven of them (XIV-XVII, XIX, XX, XXII) the title begins with Mahā-, which is not used in the other parts. This definition, reflected in the title of the second part, was explained partially by the supposition, that corresponding suttas existed previously in larger versions and were abridged in the extant text. In any case, the principles of unification seem to be quite formal here. At the same time some traits differentiate XIV-XXIII suttas from I-XIII: certain developed techniques of narrative, use of mythological plots, evolution of certain concepts. We find here much more narrative interpolations (aññadatta) than in the first part (34 to 3). Within the frames of the second part of SN, perhaps only XV and XXIII (incidentally, containing only a few verses) are more similar to the suttas of the first part.

The third part of SN, Pāṭiṇāvagga - XXIV-XXXIV, is deliberately named after the Buddha's unsuccessful adversary from the first sutta of this part (XXIV - Pāṭiṇa Sutta), which occurs only in this portion of SN. The narrative element is also relatively developed here and the number of aññadatta is still larger (146). It was supposed that some traits of this part are connected with addressing rather big audiences. The third part is heterogeneous enough in respect of its didactic and the ways of presentation. Purely didactic texts like XXVIII, XXXII, XXXIV alternate here with those reflecting ritual procedures (XXXI - a peculiar charm against evil forces), views on cosmogony, natural history, social relations (XXVI,XXVII). The didactic themselves are not confined to Buddhist doctrine and the Order but refer also to the life of the householder (cf.XXXI). In XXIV the Buddha's precepts are combined with a vivid portrait of his opponent, Pāṭiṇa, and probably contain certain elements of humour (see below). XVI and especially XXVII are perhaps influenced by legends of the Burmese type. In separate suttas (cf.XXX,XXXII,XXXIV) the major part of the text consists of verses. On the other hand, XXXII and XXXIV (excepting 1.1) are written entirely in prose and stand apart from other suttas of SN, with respect to their composition (see below; cf.also XXXI 6-12; 15-19; 21-25; 26-33). XXV is relatively near to the suttas of the first part (cf.VII) whereas XXVIII presents an expanded variant of XVI 1.15-17. We shall return again to certain peculiarities, which distinguish separate parts of SN.

The verses (aññadatta) of SN, based on the syllabic principle, are mostly represented (with certain digressions) by metres containing eight (āvīka, anāvīka) or eleven (āvīka) syllables in each of four (or six) parts (āvīka). As stated, these verses are almost absent in the first part of SN.

Notes on Pali Canon Style

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R.O. Frank suggests that the supposed unity and completeness of SN indicates a single man's authorship and literary competence. Such unity, however, seems to be somewhat exaggerated by his and is rejected by some scholars. As we see, within the framework of different parts the narrative is different enough with respect both to style and composition. It has already been observed (F.Rapat, G.Pande a.o.) that a lack of uniformity can be perceived not only in separate parts of SN, but in separate suttas as well. At the same time, one cannot deny certain traits which are common to the whole book. In particular, some textual and thematic (cf. below) parallels between neighbouring suttas (cf. already mentioned repetitions in I-XIII, description of different professions in I-II, evidences on Māmantaka in IV-V, connection between events described in XVI and XVII (death of the Buddha) etc.) another trait is that of consequent "fastenings" (Verknüpfer) between I and II, II and III, III and IV etc. with the help of specific formulas. These observations are quite correct, though it remains very probable that such parallelisms were, for the major part, stimulated not so much by the redactor's premeditated unification of the text, as by more general and impersonal traits of Pali canonical style such as use of stereotype expressions, formulas, repetitions (see below) etc. These traits permit one to establish numerous textual coincidences, not only within the framework of SN but, e.g. between different Nikāyas of the Sutta Pitaka itself.

Among such common principles, important for the structure of the text, one can mention the description based on the enumeration (exhaustive or sa-
lective) of logical possibilities or of qualities combined within a definite set - a device which goes beyond the Buddhist or Hindu tradition and leads us to a more general problem of the history of scientific language. For example, we find it already in 1 where the following possibilities are enumerated: "Whether there is another world?" - "Whether there is not another world?" - "Whether both are and is not another world?" and so on, concerning other phenomena (2, 27) of similar constructions of the type P, not P (as opposite to P), P and not P, neither P nor not P, in VI 6 sq.; VIII 4; IX 27, 31 etc. One can see that a major part of these enumerations is necessarily based on fourfold sets, which can be correlated with an evidently predominant role of tetrad and its multiples in Buddhist canonical texts. Each e., e.g., a number of precepts connected with "four grounds" (vatthu) in I 1.30; 2.1 sq.; 16 sq.; 23 eq. sq. The 62 doctrines (diṭṭhi, i.e. the wrong views described by the Buddha in IX 1 10a classified according to these grounds are distributed thus: 10 (4+4+4+4) + 44 (4+4+4+4) + 8 (4+4) + 8 (4+4) + 7 (4+4). We can see in this connection II 9.4 sq.; II 5-12; IX 57 sq.; XIII 76-77; XXXI 6 etc. The corresponding principle is perhaps the most important in traditional Buddhist dogmatism as, such concepts, mentioned in MN, as also the four noble truths (aripu saha), the four degrees of perfection (jātihīya), the eightfold path (āyatantika vissuto), the thirty-two signs of the Buddha (lokganip) etc.

The principle of tris is relatively less important, though we can trace it on different levels as well. Apart from more general regularities (cf. division of the Tipitaka itself), we find it consecutively in the triple structure of MN, in I and in I.1 (1.1-10; 11-20; 21-27). This principle is used in the structure of repetitions (see below) of threefold addresses in XI 1.3; XIV 3.3-6; XVI 5.24 etc.; questions in II 1.20; XI 81-83; XIII 11 etc. Concerning dogmatism, one can be reminded here of numerous references to the Three Refugees (Tissasat; Buddha, Dharma, Sangha), used for joining the Order. Of, also three kinds of self (attpa) - IX 39 eq.; three bodies of doctrine - X 1.6; three kinds of wonders - XI 1 etc.

Other number complexes, though not so important, were often used in Buddhist tradition - numerous examples are presented in XXXII and XXXIV built on corresponding principles. The analysis of separate lists, however, delineate they may seem, can also show certain regularities - cf., for example, the role of sevenfold sets in II 20 (seven kinds of gods, of men, of demons, of great lakes etc.). Some of these examples have noteworthy parallels in other traditions. At the same time separate fragments can be probably regarded as a tribute to a kind of "number automation" - for example in the exposition of XXXIII and XXXIV, already mentioned above, where we find a consecutive gradation from 1 to 10 (relatively more required in XXXIV, which gives ten examples of every separate number complex - cf. also XXXII). A similar principle serves as a basis for a much larger Pali canonical text - Abhavata Nikāya, compiled evidently later. We find other examples of such automation in I 1.31 sq. where the Buddha speaks consecutively of one, two, three, four, five, etc. former births.23

The character and role of number symbolism in MN is connected with another characteristic trait of the text - that of repetitions. The latter is also typical of classical Indian texts beyond the Buddhist tradition (cf. e.g. Brahmaśāstra Upanishad II 4.4.5; Brahmā Upanishad II 1; Kaṭhakalpa Upanishad IV etc.) and has numerous analogies in other cultures (for example, in the synoptic Gospels). One can see, however, that in Pali canonical texts (and particularly in MN) this device is employed almost to the extent of cliché in the greater part of certain sutras. A tendency towards repetition can be discerned in different levels of the text - from separate morphological, lexical, phonological units to relatively long fragments including, sometimes, scores of paragraphs. E.g. a characteristic of classical Buddhist prose is the repetition of certain words in different combinations (objects with the same verb, attributes with noun, etc.). In the very beginning of MN we find such stereotype descriptions of the Buddha, his followers etc.: bhikkhu bhikkhu = saccagāna saddhi pañca -attah bhikkhu attha (with a great company of the brethren, with about five hundred brethren - I 1.1 etc.): Buddhassa avagga bhūsati... Buddhassa bhūsati (speaking in discourse of the Buddha, in discourse of the Doctrine, in discourse of the Order... in praise of the Buddha, in praise of the Doctrine, in praise of the Order... - I 1.1) saṃsāraṃ kāmaṃ = rato samsāraṃ - suññatā bhūsati = karaniya bhūsati (as a peacemaker, a lover of peace, impressed for peace... - I 1.1) kāla = vāsā bhūsati = vāsā bhūsati = vāsā bhūsati = vāsā bhūsati = vāsā bhūsati = vāsā bhūsati = vāsā bhūsati = vāsā bhūsati (in season he speaks, in accordance with the facts he speaks, words meaning he speaks, on religion he speaks, on the discipline of the Order he speaks - I 1.1). Of, also I 3.74: Attha = Jālam... Pārma = Jālam... Dhamman = Jālam... Dīpāni = Jālam... I 2: Āsavamāna... ruttis, abbhāsita... ruttis, āsavamāna... ruttis, āsavamāna... ruttis, āsavamāna... ruttis, āsavamāna... ruttis; I 102: kathākappā bhikkhave rāma, upakhāyā bhikkhave rāma. In this connection another similar device can be mentioned - a consecutive use of words, synonymically close to each other, with possible sound repetitions on lesser (particularly morphological) levels - for example abhiññatā parinibbāna parinibbāna paripārami (this very body does he so pervade, pervade, permeate and subsume with joy - I 75 sq.; cf. XXXI 10 etc.). On the other hand the anonymous pairs are
also usual — some of them enter the enumerations of logical possibilities (see above) and for their part certain repetitions on different levels. Cf. for example: "nāṇavānaṁ orāthāyanaṁ or āsakṣāṁ or āsakṣaṁ on "(rising up and passing away...sweet taste...danger" — I 1.36 sq.); ekākha = āsakṣākha = āsakṣīkha (mathematics; non = Eternals = I 2.1 sq.); sukha dukkhe "(and ease and pain" — II 89); dibbe na māsāma na, ye duve māntike on "(both human and celestial, whether far or near" — II 89); ma = ūkam... viha = ūkam... "(the passionate... the calm..., - II 91-92 etc.)

Such constructions, when "unfolded", can often result in a certain parallelism of separate paragraphs and parts of the sutta, which differ one from another only by corresponding elements (cf. below).

Besides certain formulas common to different texts (like e.g. e overflow a non-speech in the very beginning) IN contains numerous phrase repetitions, within the frames of separate sutta and their fragments. Such are anaphoras rathā vi parvēka bhante samagga = bhikkhu... in every paragraph of I 111-27; idhā bhikkhave ekacca āsakṣaṁ vi bhikkhuṁ vi (in I 31-34) and so on. There are reading like: iṁ vi hi bhikkhave pathāyanaṁ pathāyanaṁ vamagga vadamano vadamana (I 1.8-27); idam piṁ hi hiti ñamama (I 42-63 etc.). A stereotype description of the Buddha’s qualities often is repeated: ākāsa khāna bhikkhantu gotamam eva kāyānā kiti = suddo abhikkacchato... "(And this is the good report that has been noise abroad as to Gotama the Blessed One" — II 6; III 1.1; IV 6; XIII 7 etc. of XXVI 23 etc.) Some repetitions evidently fulfill certain narrative functions, ensuring a kind of repetition in descriptions of personages and situations; in admonitions, speeches and replies, which are repeated partially or in full, sometimes with certain variations — cf. for example: I 1.4-4; 2.7-20, 24-25; 3.32-44, 45-57, 50-70; II 2.7-16, 19-29, 22-22 etc. (there in the exposition of different doctrines only intermediate paragraphs — 17, 20, in the exposition of different doctrines only intermediate paragraphs — 26, 24, 29, 32 differ more substantially); 83-84, 85-88, 87-88, 89-90, 91-92 etc.; III 1.12-15; 2.1-5; 5-7 = V 6-7; V 12, 16 sq; VI 6-7, 9-9, 10-11; VIII 6-12, 1.2-4; XI 6-21, 6; XI 6-81; XII 2, 4-6, 8, 16-20; XIII 4-5, 8 sq., 31-32, 80; XV 4 sq.; XVI 3.2-5 sq. etc. Some of these variations are, for their part, connected with certain devices. Such is the gradual addition of the elements enumerated in V 23 sq. ("perpetual gift" — "perpetual gift" + "putting up of a dwelling place" + "putting up of a dwelling place" "taking the Buddha and the Truth and the Order as one’s guide etc.). In a similar manner VIII 22 repeats in progression (from 1 to 10) the qualities of the Buddha’s sermon. As was mentioned above separate repetitions include rather large parts of the text, sometimes unifying different sutta — cf. the sīla sections in II-XIII (see above); IX 35 = XII 19; IX 37 = XIII 21; XVI 1.16-17— XXVIII 1-2 etc. Corresponding variations often refer to a specific set of concepts, pertinent to the admonition. This principle was already testified in respect of other PAI texts30 and beyond the Buddhist tradition as well.31

The device of repetition is closely connected with the functions of the PAI Canon and the character of its tradition. We must remember that a major part of the Canon served an admonition transmitted orally.32 To keep it in mind one had to resort to mnemonic devices, doubtlessly fulfilled by some of these repetitions — particularly of specific formulas and rules of logmatic importance. At the same time, the repetition of separate fragments led to a certain monotony which could presumably result in a kind of “fascinating” effect and thus facilitate the listener’s concentration.33 Such repetitions, generally typical of sacred texts, can also lead to certain elements of magical practice — particularly in cases where their composition is motivated by a certain number symbolisms: cf. for example some threefold repetitions mentioned above (III 1.20; XI 1.3; 81-83; XIII 11 sq. etc.).

All this certainly does not exclude the factor of the redactor’s work as the possible cause of some repetitions. In order to make the exposition more complete, the redactor could use different versions of the same text one after the other — cf. for example VII presenting an abridged variant of VI; VI 1.15-17 and XXVIII 1-2, or beyond the frames of IN — sutta 124-125 and 191-192 of the Saṁyutta Nikāya. The material of different collections could also be plagiarized which helps to explain certain parallels between separate canonical books (e.g. between the second part of IN and separate sutta of the Saṁyutta Nikāya).34

IN abounds with comparisons that make the Buddha’s admonitions rather vivid and picturesque.35 One can divide them conditionally into two classes (both are frequent enough but it is not always easy to make a fine distinction between them). The first is represented by short laconic similes close to metaphors; the second by a more or less developed situation, sometimes "unfolded" into a kind of parable illustrating a specific precept. Among the examples of the first kind one can mention the image of the lion’s roar (aṭṭhānā — describing the Buddha’s sermon: VIII 22, 24; XXVIII 1), a string of blind men clinging one to the other (about the bhikkhus versed in the three Vedas — XIII 15), a waterless desert, a pathless jungle etc. (XXIX 16), a lotus flower (XIV 1.34; cf. XXI 5 etc.), a tangled skein, a matted ball of thread etc. (XV 1), a mirror (XVI 2.8), a lamp (XVI 2.26), a figure made of gold (XVIII 17), different animals (XXVII 20), butter, honey, etc. etc. (XXVII 14), moonshine (XXXI 6), brigands (XXXII 3) etc. A number of metaphors occur among the Buddha’s 32 signs — rounded shells, antelope’s legs, lion’s jaw, cow’s eyelashes etc. (cf. XIV 1.32; XXI 12).
"Unfolded" comparisons are often introduced by a formula: paccaya 24 
...evan ava... ("just...as when...just so..."). Such is the image of a fisherman (I 3,72). A man freed from passions is likened to a debtor who has paid off his debt; a patient who has recovered from disease; a prisoner who is set free from his bonds; etc. (II 69). The bhikkhunī who does not know the way to Brahman, but tries to speak of it, is like a man who speaks about his love for the most beautiful woman in the land, but can say nothing about her regency or her name and does not know whether she is tall or short, dark or blonde, etc. - in other words, who loves a woman he has not seen and does not know. He is likened, further, to an architect who begins to erect a staircase at the crossroads in order to mount to the upper story of the mansion, but does not know where this mansion will be situated, how high it will be etc. (IX 35,37; cf. XIII 19,21). We find here comparisons with products received from the cow (IX 52); with a bird that helps sailors find land in the open sea (XI 85); with crossing the river (XII 24 sq.); with a precious stone through which a string is threaded (II 84; XIV 1,21 etc.); with a man plunged in a pit of fire (XIII 9 sq.); with a gauntlet who has swallowed poisoned dices (XIII 27); etc. Some of these comparisons are in fact similar to short tales of a parable type - cf. for example XIII 13 - about the bhikkhunī wife who killed an unborn infant in her own womb; XIII 29 - about a man seeking for treasure; etc. Such digressions can be placed in a successive line (cf. II 6 sq.; XIII 9 sq.). Some of them are correlated, presenting positive and negative variants of the same image - cf. for example IX 37 and 46 concerning the already mentioned ignorant architect and an expert one who knows all about the building.

Apart from the artistic function of this device, one should pay attention to the cultural importance of separate comparisons. We find here interesting data on ancient Indian life, on customs and occupations of different estates - bhikkhunī, warriors, merchants, artisans etc. At the same time, the choice of certain objects is evidently not arbitrary but motivated by Buddhist symbolism. Such are the images of a lotus (II 80; XXI 1,5 etc.); the crossing of a river (XIII 24, 26, 29); a gem (gana - cf. II 84 etc.); an elephant (XII 1,5); etc.

Suttas of VII present examples of relatively developed narrative techniques. An important function is performed here by dialogue, sometimes rather lively and dramatic. Such is, for example, the Buddhist conversation with young Anathapindika (III). It is not restricted to pure didactic, but passes through different stages in the course of which Anathapindika's pride and arrogance is replaced first by fear and finally by respect. The mood of his followers changes respectively, while the Buddha's replies are, accordingly, charged with emotion and are connected with these states. At the same time the general tendency and function of the dialogue remains the same: teaching genuine knowledge. The Buddha's discourses can be compared in this respect with the exposition in the early Upanisads - where the dialogue, likewise, develops into a monologue preaching the Truth.

Each sūtra begins with the stereotype words, evaṃ anāthaṃ ("Thus have I heard"). According to tradition, eva refers here to the Buddha's favourite pupil, Ānanda, which cannot be incorrect in the case of certain sūtras: e.g. in X the preceptor is not the Buddha, but Ānanda himself; while in XXIII this function is fulfilled by another pupil of the Buddha, Kassapa, whom Ānanda could scarcely esteem as his teacher (cf. also XXXIII and XXXIV). He can evidently refer here to different persons who followed corresponding traditions of the doctrine, from preceptor to pupil - a process testified by the formula itself.

The most usual initial point of the plot (especially in the first part of VII) is the arrival of the Buddha and the monks following him (their traditional number is five hundred) at a certain place - Kosala, Māgada, Kassapa etc. One of the local inhabitants - often a certain bhikkhunī authority or his pupil (Pākkharaśāri, Kassapa, Subha etc.) - this figure is represented also by Ajītasutta, King of Māgada - bears of the Buddha's arrival and approaches him in order to elucidate a certain question. As a rule, he supports a wrong view. The Buddha begins to admonish him and eventually refutes his delusions, whereas the opponent, being satisfied, asks for reception into the Order. This general scheme is subject to specific variations. Thus, in III the Buddha admonishes young Anathapindika first and then the latter's teacher, Ānathapindika. Sometimes he teaches two interlocutors at the same time: Kandaliya in VII, Vaścikā and Mahāvīra in XIII. As we have previously stated, the teaching in XIII is presented by Ānanda and in XIII by Kassapa. Usually, the Buddha is not only surrounded by pupils and attendants but by opponents as well, and the latter are not always passive - at times they react quite emphatically to the Buddha's teaching (cf. XIII). So, for example, some bhikkhunīs are discussing whether their colleague Somandika should approach the Buddha or not (V 4 sq.; cf. V 5 sq.), while Somandika himself is afraid of their disapproval (V 6 sq.).

In his sermons the Buddha often inserts tales about the origin of the Sakya tribe (III 6), the sacrifice of King Mahāvīra (V 10-20); etc. Sometimes he refers to a corresponding precedent in his own life (cf. VIII 23; XXIII 1,7 sq.; 11 sq.). One can easily trace here the frame-composition which is subject to certain variations. Such, for example, in the Buddha's repeated precept of II-XIII. In II 40-50 this precept is inserted into an adoration...
to King Ajātaśatru, while in III 1.2 sq.; IV 23 sq.; and VIII 10 sq. it is exposed in a similar manner, when illustrating the image of the brahman who has reached the perfect state (cf. also X 1.7-2.16 where the narration is divided into three parts). In other suttas we find variants ensuring additional functions of the precept repeated. In V 27 it is inserted into the tale about the "sacrifice" which is more fruitful than all other traditional sacrifices (of similar motifs in Upānaśaṅga dogmatics). In VI 16-19 (— VII 2-5) it is the part of the conversation with Nahāli — the Buddha recalls here one of his previous sermons to two wanderers to whom he depicted, with the help of this precept, the state of a monk who does not ask improper questions (as these wanderers did, by questioning him about the difference between the life principle — ātman and the body). IX 7-17 uses it as an exposition of self-training leading to certain states of consciousness and in the end — to the cessation of consciousness. In XI 8 sq. the realization of this precept is the third and the highest of the Buddha's wonders (in the exposition of the three kinds of his wonders). In XII 19 sq. it serves as the admonition of a preceptor, belonging to the highest sort (in the narrative about four kinds of teachers). Finally, in XII 40 sq. it illustrates the state of an adept knowing the way to union with Brahman and having the same signs as Brahman (in dialogue with Yasokha where the Buddha expresses the imperfection of brahmans versed in the three Vedas but not knowing the right way to Brahman).

The frame-composition is generally preserved in the second and third parts of IN (particularly thanks to traditional initial points and tailpieces). At the same time, in comparison with the first part, we find here certain new traits. The role of narration, its specific gravity, grows here considerably. Accordingly, XIV contains the story of the Buddha's previous births (nearer to the genre of sūtra) — a new detail of dogmatics, absent in the first part. XVI speaks of the last days of the Buddha and of events that followed immediately after his death — the text being perhaps a combination of different legends, reminding one of the genre of chronicle (separate fragments of which it probably preserved); the dogmatics is interwoven here with narration that is somewhat dramatic and emotional. XVII is closely associated with the previous sutta. The device of a frame is executed by talk between the Buddha and Ānanda regarding the place of the Buddha's future burial. During this conversation the Buddha relates the story of one of his previous births, containing elements of a fairy tale (cf. the description of the town Kuśavatī). Similar traits are found in the next XVIII-XXII suttas, where a prominent role is played by mythological personages (in the first part such personages are introduced but rarely — cf. the appearance of the yaksha Vajra-paññī before Ānathā in III 1.21 or of different gods in XI 68). Another pecu-

Notes on Pāli Canonic Style

liarity can be observed in the exposition of XXI, the first section of which alternates prose and verses and includes a love episode (1-6-7).

As we see in IN suttas, the node of exposition, the development of plot, and certain compositional traits suffer considerable changes in separate parts. One can add that these differences concern also the principles of denotation. Cutting more specific details, we can distinguish here two particular principles: that pertaining to certain traits of the contents, and that pertaining to the hero's name. In the first part the former principle is used only in I (Sāraṇīya containing a metaphorical description), II (Sākāraśhapale) and III (Te-
vijaya), while in IV-III the titles are based on the names of the Buddha's interlocutors (Ānathā, Sonanda, Khotados etc.) with a single complication in VIII (Karānapa = abhakka: name + a metaphor of the Buddha's sermon). In the second part the situation is to a certain extent reversed: the majority of its suttas (6) are, in one or another way, denominated after their contents (XIV-
XVI, XX-XXIII — cf. above on abhakka) and four after heroes' names (XVII-XX; XXIII: Mahāvihāra, Janavasī, Mahāvihāra, etc.). Such names are still more rare in the titles of the third part — cf. XXI (Mātikā and XXII (Sāgāvāra). The other titles are somehow or other connected with contents, being at the same time (like the corresponding suttas themselves) rather heterogeneous. So, for example, we find here geographical names (the park Kāmarukita in XXV, presumably the town Ānathā in XXIII), figurative expressions (abhakka in XXV, XXVI; cf. also XXVIII, XXIX etc.), the titles of XXIII (Jagaditā) and XXIV (Jātisattā) are based, strictly speaking, not on the principle of exposition than on the contents. As it was said, the parts themselves (Śīkhākhānavagga — Mahāvihāra — Pāthikavagga) are named after different principles.

This variety, however, is combined with a certain constancy of motifs and heroes' images, which repeat themselves throughout the whole book. Such is, for example, the motif of the quest for Truth that makes people seek the Buddha. Some of his interlocutors are full of obedience and respect from the very beginning (like Ajātaśatru). Others cling to their delusions and first oppose him (like Ānathā), though in the end they are all converted by him. Certain scenes, evidently characteristic of the Buddha's way of life and his surroundings, are repeated constantly — cf., for example, greeting the Buddha, approaching him, suggesting entertainment to him and his monks (III 2.19; V 30; XVI 4.5; etc.).

The stereotype characteristic of the Buddha, already mentioned above, constantly calls him an incomparable tutor of men, full of compassion and tolerance, abounding in wisdom etc. Among typical traits of his behaviour one can note Mahāsilence (abhakka) as a sign of consent — cf. III 2.19; IV 24; etc. A
certain ambiguity is characteristic of him, his benevolence sometimes alternates with threats (e.g. to Ambattha; cf. evidently a traditional spell: *saṁgha śuddha piṇṇaṣi: - "his head splits into pieces on the spot") pronounced by the Buddha in III 1.20 (cf. also V 21; XXIV 4.12 - a scene of *piṇika's humiliation). Such an attitude, traced also in some Upāsikadī texts (where it is expressed even more strongly), lends a kind of ambiguity to the image of the founder of Buddhism.

At the same time, different sutras of *KN depict the Buddha in various different manners (though somewhat consecutively). While in the first part of the book the Buddha's image is based mainly on the traits of "earthly", "everyday" character, the second (cf. already in XIV) adds the motif of his previous births. His attitude towards wonders also varies - cf. a negative approach in XI (see also VI 5 sq.) and, on the other hand, the plot of XXIV. The second and third parts present a kind of Buddha's "deflection", in this process (still more typical of later Mahāyāna trends) one can suggest - apart from possible typological affinities - certain influences of someharma (particularly Vedic) mythological motifs and concepts. These details do not exclude, however, numerous signs of everyday life, with which they are intertwined (e.g. in the list of the Buddha's 32 signs - XIV 1.12; XXI 1.21, cf. above). All this provides, within the frames of *KN, rich material on the earlier evolution of the Buddha's image and doctrine. It is worthwhile to add here that, as regards corresponding analysis, we should be careful in speaking of the Buddha's "deflection", since we inevitably use here such distinctive features as "man-god" and introduce, thus, certain theistic concepts evidently alien to Buddhism. As A. Prince puts it, the Buddha is not more "sacralised" in Mahāyāna than "humanised" in Hinayāna. The concept of "Buddha-hood" as a complex of the Buddha's qualities cannot be explained by this opposition ("godhood - godhead") - it is a specific concept, sui generis, within the frames of the corresponding system.

*KN also contains interesting characteristics of other personages - pupils and followers of the Buddha (Aṇanda, Kasapa, lamen converted by his (Gopindaka, Pākkharaṇī) etc., presenting a combination of stereotypic and individual traits. Vidy in the image of King Ajitaśatru in II, who adores the moonlight, is not satisfied with his teachers, trembles before the Buddha, adores his son, and repents of his sins. We have already spoken about the dynamics of Ambattha's image, whose change of attitude is accompanied by changes in his followers' attitude towards him, that is, from support to criticism (III 1.17-22). His teacher Pākkharaṇī suffers analogous evolution - from mistrust of the Buddha to entering the Buddha's Order. Corresponding characteristics reflect the ambiguity marked above in respect of the Buddha. It has already been noted that some images are depicted with certain humour - e.g. the son of *piṇika wanting to rise from his seat and being unable to do so (XXIV 1.20).

Some of the stylistic and compositional traits noted above seem to be typical of the earlier stage of "scientific" description in ancient Indian literature, as reflected in its ethical and philosophical texts - cf. for example, certain parallels in Vedic canonic style, particularly that of the early Upāsikadī. At the same time some of these devices - such as frame-composition, a system of definite metaphors etc. - are developed in later Indian literary tradition - both Buddhist (cf. genre of Jātakas) and Hindu ("framed story", certain poetic genres etc.).

NOTES


4 Cf. P.V. Nages "The different strata in the literary material of the Dhamma Nikāya", Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Part i, 1926, p. 1 sq. These principles are different in the other canonical books as well (e.g. in Mahābhārata - cf. M. Hartmann's *A History of Indian Literature* II, Calcutta 1931, p. 56).

5 Bṛhadārāmāya, II; Śānka-nātha, III; Ānathapindīya, IV; Somadatta, V; Rāma-danta, VI; Mahā-v, VII; Jūliya, VIII; Kāsapa-mahā, IX; Posatha, X; Suvasa, XI; Āyathanā, XII; Lokeśvara, XIII; Āruvīja, XIV; Kakṣapāda, XV; Mahā-kṣīna, XVI; Mahāparinibbāna, XVII; Mahāvamsa, XVIII; Jana-vasabha, XIX; Mahāsvana, XX; Mahāsagāya, XXI; Sākāraṇa, XXII; Mahāsāti-pattabhā, XXIII; Padma, XXIV; Phāti, XXV; Mahāparīkṣā, XXVI; Cakkavattī-saṅghā, XXVII; Agga, XXVIII; Sampadaṇa, XXIX; Phāsa, XXX; Lakkha, XXXI; Signovāda, XXXII; Assāna, XXXIII - Sadāti, XXXIV - Rāsamatra.


7 Cf. about these repetitions, MN I, p. 59.


9 Āmethya (BK III, p. xi) remarks that a more correct title should sound sāhiha (i.e. part beginning with Pāthaka Sutta) and that sāhiha is evidently used here in this sense.

10 Cfr. Bapat, p. 8 sq.


12 Hartman, 1967, p. 34.

13 Ibid., p. 256.


16 Franke "Der Verknüpfung", p. 414 sq. (cf. his commentary in DE).

17 Ibid., p. 414 sq.

18 Concerning similar enumerations see also A. Syrkin "On the beginning of the Sutta Piṭaka (Dhamma-Dipika Sutta)", *Buddhist Studies, Ancient and Modern*, ed. D. Lamond and A. Platt, London 1953, p. 150. For the device of such combinations is characteristic of other classical Indian treatises beyond the Buddhist tradition as well (cf. A. Syrkin "Notes on the Khau Sutra", *Buddhist* II, No. 1, 1974, p. 35 sq.).


24 Cf. R.H. Thompson "Significance of numbers in Hindu philosophical texts", *Journal of the Indian Society of Oriental Art*, 1960, p. 36 sq.; Syrkin, Toporov, p. 10. Cf. also notes on the structure of the Kuṇḍakārīṇī (Kundakārīṇī), where similar gradation (1-10) is found, and some other texts - V.N. Toporov "Es nachbätei nach der struktur der skaman jātakārī in buddhistischer nachkultur", Materialy po istorii i filologii, Central'nyi Azii 3, Ulan-Ude 1960, p. 59 sq.


27 Cf. A. Syrkin "On the beginning", p. 163.


31 E.g. in description of "vital forces" (vīra) in Brhadāraṇyaka Up. IV 3.23-30; in Śākyana Up. 9-14, etc. (Syrkin, "Zemetski", p.94-5).

32 Cf. Geiger, p.11-12; A. Gomaroway, Buddha and the Gospel of Buddha, London 1916, p.260; 274, etc.

33 Cf. Odenberg, Zur Geschichte, p.46 sq.

34 Geiger, p.12; cf. also concerning parallels in verses: Franke "Die Gathā", p.311 sq.


36 Winternitz A History II, p.75 sq.


48 Cf. also Senart, \\textit{Faussette}, Die Buddhahlaren, 1915, p. 455 sq.; J.R. Haldar, \"Link between early and later Buddhist mythology, Calcutta 1972, etc.\"

We are discussing here only certain traits of the Buddha’s traditional image as reflected in canonical texts (cf. in this connection refer to the pragmatic approach in Kern, p. 12 sq.; P. Ullmann, \"L’histoire des idées théosophiques dans l’Inde II, Paris 1923; A. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, Oxford 1923; B. Lacoutte \"La personnalité et l’esprit de Šākyamuni, Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et de Sciences Morales et Politiques de l’Académie Royale de Belgique XLII, 5, 1955, p. 199 sq.; A. Poucher \"La vie du Bouddha, Paris 1949, etc.) and do not dwell on the problem of his historical existence – the question which, independently of the authenticity of separate biographical data and of the evolution mentioned, must be solved positively. (See Vihare-Dirita, p. 220 sq.; Renou, Pillonat, II, p. 10 sq.; Lacoutte \"La légende\", p. 10 sq.; R. Smith, \"On the ancient chronology of India\", JAC 77, 4, 1957, p. 266 sq.; A. Barea, \"Recherches sur la vie de Bouddha dans les Sutra-pâkas et les Vijnânapâkas anciens I-III, Paris 1965-70, etc.\"

49 A. Prince, \"The concept of Buddhism in early and later Buddhism\", Journal of the Asiatic Society of India 1, 2, 1970, p. 116 sq. The author (ibid, p. 117) remarks in this connection of E. Conze’s \"Saviour\" applied to Buddhism (cf. the latter’s article \"Buddhist Saviours\" in his Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, p. 32-47) and notes that the character of \"saviour\" in Buddhism and Christianity is entirely different. Cf. also R. Weert, \"Problems of the application of Western terminology to Theravada Buddhism, with special reference to the relationship between the Buddha and the gods\", Pali Jittap, 1972, p. 37 sq.


52 Concerning these analogies, cf., for example, S. S. \"Samštika,\" p. 23 (repetition), 99 (comparisons), 39 (compound composition), 49 sq. (ambiguity of the teacher’s image), etc. Cf. remarks of M. Vinnattha (A History II, p. 20) about distinctive traits of Pali and Sanskrit texts, particularly about certain parallels connecting them with the Spanish and Purana respectively.

\textit{Notes on Pali Canonical Style}
The Place of Ahimsā in Buddha-Dhammo

Shikhu Was, Vivako

(In memory of Richard Abeyasekara)

nekhamma-sattappo evdhpai-sattappo
svihimā-sattappo. sam vacassati bhikkhave
sāmā sattappo.

Mahāsatipāthcona-suttanta (D XXII 21)
The intention of renunciation,
the intention free of ill-will,
the intention of non-violence,
this is called, bhikkhus, the right intention.

In Pali, non-violence is designated by the term ahimsā, as in Sanskrit (cf. Bdp 225, 261, 270, 300; D XXIX 1, 6, 8; I 165, etc.), or by av-ahimsā, an etymologically stronger term of the same stem, as in the definition of the second component of the Eightfold Path Leading to the Cessation of Suffering, quoted above (cf. D XXII 21; D XXXII 1, 9, 10; 2.1 [XXIV]; Th 292; It IV 4, 9, etc.).

In the short definition quoted above and most often in other texts on the Noble Eightfold Path, ahimsā is the climax of a threefold gradation of the same basic virtue of right intention.

In Jainism, the religion closest to Buddhism, considering itself to be the oldest on the high level of universal cultures (as it is still extant also in the pre-Biblical and pre-Islamic tradition of the ancient Arabia Felix), "ahimsā is the highest law" (ahimsā paramo dharma). This is the only essential tenet which could be considered as its exclusive dogma. All the rest of its normative teaching are maxims deduced from this categorical imperative, tolerating also exceptions, since Jainism is the religion of extreme tolerance, defined as the "toleration of many modes of truth": "The faith in one truth or even in a plurality of truths, each simply given as determinate, would be rejected by it as a species of intolerance."

The eightfold path of the Buddha starts from the stance taken against "the pursuit of views, adherence to views, jungle of views, posteriority of views, vacillation of views, fetter of views" (N 2 and several other texts).

This critical prerequisite is the reason why the setting of world-views (dītthi) and dogmatisms is placed before ahimsā as a preliminary step on the eightfold path of the Buddha. His "right views" do not consist of any dogmatically infallible propositions and beliefs, such as are dismissed in the oft-repeated warning against the affirmation "this only is true, all the rest is false". The best analysis of the shortcoming of his authoritarian opponents is given in Cattā-sutta (H 95). The basic definition of "right views" (sāmā dītthi) in our context underscores the purely existential restriction of the problem to which the intention of this first decisive step refers: "The understanding of suffering, the understanding of the origin of suffering, the understanding of the cessation of suffering, the understanding of the path leading to the cessation of suffering. This, bhikkhus, is called right view" (D 22 and other texts).

The Buddha often warned his worldly minded interlocutors (putthajañjams) against "untrustworthy teachers" who are used to "take and apply the correct criterion in such a way that, while it extend only to one side it excludes other...right criteria concerning good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct and good mental conduct". The Buddha taught the method of detecting such "unripe criteria" by independent nature thinking (apanāhi-sutta, H 60) - the best known instance of such advice is contained in the Kāśā-sutta (A III 65), in the Buddha's answer to the complaint:

- Some anānā and bhikkhaṁ...exploit only their own tenets while they abuse and rend and concourse and rail at the tenets of others.

- Kāśā, do not be satisfied with hearsay or with tradition or with legendary lore or with what has come down in your scriptures or with conjecture or with logical inference or with weighing evidence or with liking for a view after pondering over it or with someone else's ability or with the thought "The monk is our teacher". Then you know in yourselves these things are wholesome, blameless...then you should practise them and abide in them.

Such was the original teaching of the Buddha's Noble Truth on acquiring correct standpoint in an historical epoch of Indian culture considered still by modern scholars in comparison with the highest standard of European culture as an age of "Renaissance".

Swami Vivekananda, in a talk on "Buddha's Message to the World" (in San Francisco, 1900) boldly affirmed that 500 years B.C., "Indian civilization had already completed its growth." A few decades later the same assessment was confirmed by the best known European sociologist, Max Weber, who considered the atheist and caste-free Jainist and Buddhist movements at that time as "intellectualist heterodox soteriology" characteristic of the "drawing-room" elitist ideology in the cultural ambience of royal courts and cities.
In the later twentieth century a new and most brutal wave of Western penetration to the Asian East, reafﬁrming with its authoritarian dogmatism that "this only is truth, all the rest is false", often threatens with a direct attack the ﬁrst step of our Noble Path. At the other end, the last and highest eighth step and attainment of anālayosya, is being capped by the new wave of Western fashion in "meditation", advertising "shortcuts to Nirvāṇa" by eliminating not only the beginning but also the end of this Noble Path for the convenience of hippies. The next immediately endangered stage are the second - ajīvita - and the sixth, in the concluding section of the Path dealing with the contemplative attainment of jhāna, "right effort" - dhamma viññāṇa. On this point I wish to underscore a recently ripened statement (evena dhamma) of one of the eldest gurus (or rather anti-guru in up-to-date anti-cultural terms), Krishnamurti: "Meditation is hard work. It demands the highest form of discipline - not conformity, not imitation, not obedience - but a discipline which comes through constant awareness... Without laying the foundation of a righteous life, meditation becomes an escape and therefore has no value whatsoever. A righteous life is not the following of social morality, but the freedom from envy, greed and the search of power." 4

II

Historically, on the ground of several discourses of the Buddha, I consider the origin of Buddhism as an apostasy of Jainism at the time of Mahāvīra's conservative reform aiming at a purely formalistic rigorism. In his discourses with and about Jains, a resolute break with their overloaded tradition is always strongly underscored, not to speak of the often obsessive exhortation of Jainism, in background stories. In comparison therewith, the Buddha's criticism of Brahmanic traditions appears most often as a mild irony or rebuke for some more or less dangerous stupidity. 5

On the other hand, the Buddha's renunciation of the inner kind of ascetic penances, described even in formal details in terms identical with the practices of Jain mendicats, is still today most often superficially understood and discussed as an episode of exclusively negative and even misleading Jain inﬂuences on the gāmagotama, who before he became a buddha, had to break through them and liberate himself from this last "error" after all the years of strenuous endeavours to attain his ultimate perfection.

Richard Abeyasekera, in the course of 25 years of his dedicated work for the Buddhist Publication Society in Kandy, has published only one tiny booklet of his own. His recent death shocked us over the value and relevance of his meditation on "The Master's Quest for Light" for the subject of my long years of studies of the historical relations between Jainism and Buddhism.

The Place of Ānāpānā in Buddha-Dhamma

The origin of the bad faith, praising Buddhism as an anti-ascetic religion appears at our time to be prevalently, though not exclusively, of "modern" Western origin. Richard Leentvaer begins his "Reflections" with singling out "some of the great characteristics of the Buddha... his boundless compassion, his indomitable courage and his answering allegiance to truth. To achieve the supreme knowledge of the Buddha, the master had to perfect himself through severe ordeal of suffering in his innumerable past lives."

All this superman's power personiﬁed in ascetic heroism was essential and imperative for the attainment of "true control of mind" with which "he checked all inclinations to indolence..." Only through a relentless increasing of the ordain of such self-inflicted penances "right through those long years of trial, this power to surmount every obstacle on his path to Enlightenment grew stronger in him."

Richard Abeyasekera quotes a discourse with Sāriputta in which the Buddha confesses "to have practised the four kinds of ascetic life and discipline. Rigorous have I been in my ascetic discipline, rigorous beyond all others. Repulsive have I been in my ascetic practice: repulsive beyond measure. Scrupulous have I been in my ascetic life: I have practised the height of scrupulousness. Solitude have I sought in my practice of asceticism: the utmost extreme of solitude."

Unlike our age of badalininga degeneration, when all non-pleasant efforts to improve one's character are labelled as the worst disease of "masochism", while its opposite, "sadism", is considered as the safest and preventive "panacea" against all suffering, the age in which the Buddha was born is sketched also by Richard Leentvaer as "an age of intense intellectual and spiritual activity. A time of religious unrest... of bold investigation and high achievement - meat in the realm of man's thought. Naturally too it was no backward age. But it was essentially a time when the things of the spirit... ranked higher than the seen, the material and the gross.... It was in fact the eight of an ascetic in yellow garb that showed the Master the way to solve life's misery and urged his renunciation... His courage in these experiments (as described in the Mahāsaccaka-sutta, II 36) was marvellous... Then followed the supreme expression of strength in that last act of his struggle for Light, when he realised to have attained the utmost limit of asceticism and courageously abandoned them in the face of ridicule of his erstwhile admirers" (an allusion to the Sāma-śakavatātā-sutta, S V xii 11). And then he "took his seat of grass under the Bodhi tree at Gaya and boldly resolved: 'Let my flesh, bones and skin shrivel and wither... and my blood dry up, yet I shall not lose strength in my endeavours. Never from this seat all I stir until I have attained full Enlightenment'."

Obviously the result of his attainment was strictly proportioned, up
to the last moment of his struggle, to the climax of extreme efforts in ascetic self-mortification of the Bodhisatta "who had to perfect himself through severe ordeals of suffering in his innumerable past lives" and not simply realizing of his worst "mistake" at the last moment. This was explicitly admitted and underscored as the essential prerequisite in the Buddha's discourse on beaving "the fears and terrors" of the forest-life (Bhavavacasutta, N 4):

"Suppose some monk or brahman is unpurified in bodily, verbal or mental conduct... is subject to fright and horror, unconcentrated and confused in mind, devoid of understanding... when such a monk or brahman resorts to a remote jungle-thicket in the forest, then using to those faults he evokes unwholesome fear and dread. But... I have none of those defects, I resort to a remote jungle-thicket in the forest as one of the Noble Ones, who are free from these defects. Seeing in myself this freedom from such defects, I find great solace in living in the forest... I thought: But there are the specially holy nights... suppose I spent those nights in such awe-inspiring abodes... which make the hair stand up - perhaps I should encounter that fear and dread. And later... I thought: Why do I dwell in constant expectation of the fear and dread? Why not subdue that fear and dread while maintaining the posture I am in when it comes to me? And while I walked... sat... lay down... the fear and dread came upon me; but neither I stood nor sat... till I had subdued that fear and dread."

In the archaically deepest and most beautiful (and therefore most neglected) poem ascribed to the Buddha, on the symbol of "The Rinnoceros", the first, middle (21) and last (41) stanzas form the essential knots on which the whole texture is harmoniously knitted and woven. The climax is reached on the central point in the statement:

"Escaped from the exhibitions of views, arrived to the clearing, take the straight way:
"I have attained the wisdom not guided by others".
- Go alone as the rhinoceros.
(Sn 55)

Without having reached this point of clear orientation at the end of the thorny and torturous pathless passage through the "jungle of views" and of misleading opinions, one will necessarily still remain with the lost orientation within the vicious circle of eternal reproduction and renewal of interdependent causes and intricate relations of antecedence-predom: for all the currents of the stream of events, unable to swim across and ultimately strand ed "pines away like old cranes in a lake without fish" (Dhp 195). Even a casual visit to a Buddha and a talk with him will remain useless and annoying - as in the classic case of Kandakayagutta (M 61), or recently in the most famous and romantically most attractive novel skilfully shaped for the taste of our hippie youth by Hermann Hesse in the "Buddhagram" ideal of his Siddhartha.

III

(1) In the Buddha's discourses on the subject of ahimsa with Jain nisandhins (followers of his opponent Mahavira) the most conspicuous topic of discussion was the question of "the nature of action in doing evil deeds, merely acts of body, of word and of mind" (analyzed most extensively in the Upaneeth-sutta, M 56).

Ugha-Tappasi, the naked ascetic, a follower of Nisandha Nisaputta, the Mahavira, on one occasion visited the Buddha in Milinda, and the latter asked him:
- Well, Tappasi, how many acts of action does Nisandha Nisaputta declare are in evil acting and behaving?
- No, friend Gotama; the performed action is not declared by Nisandha Nisaputta to be an action, it is declared to be an offense.
- Well, Tappasi, how many acts of offense does he declare there are in evil acting and behaving?
- ... offenses of body, of speech and of mind... Of these three offenses... bodily offense is the most blamable, verbal offense and mental offense are not so blamable.

On the contrary, according to the Buddha,
- Of these three actions (kamma), thus analyzed and differentiated, mental action, I declare, is the most blamable. Bodily action and verbal action are not so blamable....

When, on a later occasion, another follower of Mahavira, Upali, insisted again on the same standpoint as Tappasi, the Buddha asked him:
- What do you think, householder? Suppose there were a naked ascetic with the four kinds of restraint; restrained as regards all evil... He, while walking up and down, inflicts destruction upon many tiny creatures. Now, what does Nisandha Nisaputta declare is the result of this?
- He declares that what is unintentional is not blamable....
- And in what offense does Nisaputta recognize intention?
- In mental offense.
- Householder, householder, think carefully before you reply. This latter does not agree with your former statement that bodily offense is the most blamable, not so the mental and the verbal offenses....
In my attempts to verify this statement on the gradation of evil deeds in Jain scriptures or oral tradition I have never come across any confirmation of the sequence insulantly upon Bāgha-Vāpaśāṇa in the quoted text and repeated in other Buddhist references. The sequence confirmed in the subsequent Jaina tradition is always just the same as the Buddhist: mind-word-body, and there is no mention of its debatability at any time. As this was the time of deep religious reforms in several Jaina communities (among which that of Pārśwāna, preceding Mahāvīra only about two centuries was the most authentic), we should not exclude the possibility that such discussions with the Buddha and his followers might have influenced the contemporary Jaina reformers - a problem that still might be worthy of further investigation in comparative studies of these two closely related and therefore historically antagonistic religions of *ahimsā*.

In the Jain *Aṇḍāsāna-nayya* (Sk. *Lośāna-nātraṇa*), in the first book, *Bhūta-cetāna* (3,4,3), dealing with the training in ascetic discipline (*brahma-cīroma*), the concluding statement - "There are degrees in injurious act, but there are no degrees in non-violence" - indicates, in its context, a deeper approach to the whole problem discussed in our context from the standpoint of the *buddhā* circle of morally reprehensible effects.

(2) The Dharmapadā is the most popular collection of aphoristic verses attributed to the Buddha, occasionally taken out of his more extensive discourses. Like the *Jātaka* tales, some of these verses convey the archetypal symbols and their meaning from ancient Indian wisdom applied to Buddhist contexts. In Jainism, the *Uṭtarārajāya-saṇaya* (Sk. *Uṭtarāsiṇāya-nātraṇa*) in its 36 chapters comes closest to the genre of both the 26 chapters of the Dharmapadā and the more extensive collection of 1149 stanzas, interwoven with tales and dialogues, in the *Sutta-nikāya*. Some of these verses, contained sometimes in chapters under analogous headings in both the Dharmapadā and *Uṭtarārajāya-saṇaya*, correspond to each other not only in analogous but also in homologous sequences of several stanzas. In the following selection of Dharmapadā verses we shall begin with a few examples confirming this analogy.

The title of the eighth chapter of the Dharmapadā is "The Thousands" (*Sahasra-vagga*). The following stanzas correspond closely to the same style and contents of utterances ascribed to King Hāka, a *pattana-buddha* (*Bali paccak-buddha*) of Jaina tradition, after his *parajājī* (*Pali pabbajī*; "escape" from the world) at the beginning of chapter IX of *Uṭtarārajāya-saṇaya*:

**Dharmapadā**

If a man were to conquer in battle a thousand times a thousand men, and another conquer one, himself,

**Uṭtarārajāya-saṇaya**

Though a man were to conquer thousands and thousands enemies, greater will be his victory

he indeed is the greatest of conquerors.

Conquest of self is indeed better than the conquest of other persons; he who conquers of one who has disciplined himself, will obtain happiness.

(34-15)

If a man after month after month for a hundred years should sacrifice a thousand offerings, and if he only for one moment would honour a man with a developed self, that honour is, indeed, better than a century of sacrifice.

(305)

Let a fool after month after month eat his food with a *kusa*-grass blade; nevertheless he is not worth the sixteenth part of those who have well understood the Truth (*sāmaṇa*).

(44)

The last, XXVI. chapter of the Dharmapadā (*Sahasra-vagga*) contains a sequence of stanzas ending with the refrain "Him I call a *brahmā*" (Sa. *aṇīna brahmāṇa*). In the XXVII. chapter of the *Uṭtarārajāya-saṇaya* a sequence of 16 stanzas (39-34) end with the refrain "Him we call a *brahmāna*. The following few samples are characteristic for our analogy:

Him I call a *brahmā* who does not hurt by body, speech or mind, who is controlled in these three things.

(391)

Him I call a *brahmā* who has laid aside the rod with regard to beings, whether weak or strong, who neither kills nor lets others kill.

(405)

Independently of such implications the word *ahimsa* occurs in the following aphorisms of the Dharmapadā:

The silent sages abstaining from violence (āhimsā), always restrained in body, go to the state from which they never relapse, whither gone they never return.

(222)
He who dwells in truth, virtue, non-violence, restraint, control, in whom is free from impurity and in whom, he is called an elder (āri一事).

A man is not noble because he harms (skimpā) living beings.

He is called noble because he does not harm any living being.

The disciples of Gotama are always well awake;

their mind, day and night, diligent in abstinence from harm (āri一事).

In the Digha-nikāya the following references are worthy of being singled out:

In the Luṣṭana-suttacon (S.XX.1.6), on "the marks of the great man" (mahā-puttika-ākāśamani), it is stated in the first section of verses praising the virtues of a bhikkhu:

Harming no living being (āri一事āri), not violent, solicitous in almsgiving, with no violence (āri一事),

showing great mildness, consistent in principles,

wholehearted in action, he always proceeds impartially...

In the second part of the same discourse (S.XX.2.7), it is said that "in whatever former birth, former state of being, formerasansing, such men (āri一事-cūta), as a human being acquired the virtue of not harming any living being, either by hand or by eye or by word, he by the doing and by accomplishing of that kamma, by its fruitful and advantage, after his death was born holyly in a heavenly world".

The last two discourses of the Digha-nikāya, XXIII and XXIV, "shouted in accord by all" the Buddha's disciples under the guidance of Āciṣṇika, "are compiled as catachumās". The first, Safa-vi-cittavāna, from which the verses on abhaya are quoted in the sequel, was recited in Pāli soon after the death of Kālábhīska, when his followers "have become divided and have fallen into opposite parties and into strife"; to prevent a similar misfortune of the Buddha's disciples after his death, this recitation of his basic teachings was performed.

In the group of "doable doctrines" (1.3), containing 23 tenets, bhikkū and moral purity (cakkata) are praised as two perfect virtues. In the group of "triple doctrines" (1.4), "three good thoughts" form the sixth triplet: "thoughts of renunciation, thoughts free of ill-will, and thoughts of non-violence (ārīṇī的事). In the group of 26 "fivefold doctrines" the group of 24 contains "five elements tending to deliverance (nibbānaka)" from senseless desires, ill-will, casualty, external objects (ācarā) and motion (nācakāra). The third of these five elements refers to avici-bhāva (ārīṇī的事 in this text):

"Then a bhikkhu contemplates violence (pīramā), his mind does not rush violently into it, nor enjoy it, nor remain raised by it. His mentality is properly directed by him, well developed, well turned away and detached from violence, he is freed from those destructive, passionate intoxicants which break out due to violence. He is not attracted by such feelings. This is called the deliverance from violence."

(4) In Sutta-nipāta VII (Brahmān-naṇuykham), the title of the fifth discourse is: "In accordance with your name, may you be non-violent! He who does not commit violence either by body, or by word, or by mind, in non-violent, he does not hurt any other being".

(5) Theravāda IV 3 describes those bad (ākāla) and three opposite, good, thoughts (kumala-vitakka). This group is the same as that quoted in J. XXIII in section (3) above. The context in Theravāda is the following:

"Three virtuous kinds of thought do not cause blindness, but light, knowledge, strength of wisdom. They are not on the side of destruction, but leading to extinction (nibbāna). These three thoughts are the thought of renunciation, the thought of goodness and the thought of non-violence (ākāla-vitakka).

Three virtuous thoughts should be pondered over, and three unvirtuous should be avoided.

In this way is able to appease his grasping and eliciting thought, as a rain-shower lays down gentle as dust, with a mind able to ally the thought, even so will reach the state of appeasement."

(6) In Sutta-nipāta II, the seventh section contains the Buddha's sermon to the brahmans from Kosala who wished to know better the traditional way of righteous living as it was followed by brahmans (brahmāna-saṃgha) at the time of "risks of old, wasters, restrained of self". Their virtue of abhināma is praised in stanzas 22: "They praised chastity and virtue and righteousness, ascetic ardour, gentleness, non-violence (ākāla) and forbearance."
(7) Some Jātaka tales were also motivated by the same virtue and intention to illustrate the application of ahimsā in daily life.

NOTES


3. Max Weber Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie II. Hindeuismus and Buddhismus, Tiibingen 1921, pp. 170-290. (Cf. a recent English translation.)


5. My main Yugoslav work on "the medians of Asian philosophies" (Razmada azijnih filozofij, Part 2 on "Jainism and Buddhism", chapter 5 a-0, pp. 173-95. Ed., "Liber", Zagreb 1978) contains a survey of Pāli texts on the Buddha's discussions with Jains and some texts characteristic of his attitude to brahmans. Jaina most characteristic of the sharpness of their controversy are: M 56 Upāli, M 99 Abhayasājakumāra, and M 104 Sāmaṅgāna (on the occasion of Mahāvīra's death). Discussions and critiques of the Jaina doctrine of unlimited and always present absolute knowledge of a tirthākarah (kevala-kāna) and the extreme limits of ascetic restraint (sapphāra) are described in M 71 Tīvra-viha-bhogottā, M 76 Sandaka, M 101 Devadatta and some minor texts in Māroottara and Sāmputta-nikāyan. Characteristic of the Buddha's ironic rebuke of brāhmans are, amongst others: M 51 Kondaraka - on the four types of men (the first, torturer of himself and others) in the Jain ascetic, the second, torturer of himself and others) is the brāhman performing sacrifices for a king and the king himself); D 31 Sigālovāna (the stupidity of literal understanding of ritualistic texts), and D 4 Jopadanda (the self-conceit of a mighty brāhman).

6. Most of the specific penances practiced by the Buddha immediately before his spiritual awakening at Uruvela were specifically and peculiarly according to the Jain tradition. They are described in M 12 Kaśa-sīhanā-sutta and other texts from the same period of his struggle for awakening. The similarities of both teachings, Jain and Buddhist, are most strikingly presented in two beautiful poems included in the Sutta-nipāta: "The Rhinoceros" (Paggavīha) and Mani suttas - describing the ascetic attitude of a Jain muni (silent sage) as opposed to the traditional and institutionalized Buddhist "priest".

7. This and some of the preceding quotations are from Dhamma Nāmamoli's The Life of the Buddha (MPO, Kandy 1972). Underlinings are mine.

8. The texts in the sequel are taken from H. Jacobst Jaina Sūtras, SEM 22 and 45, 2nd ed., Delhi 1954. Discrepancies between translations from Pāli and Pāli in analogous texts are partly due to my impossibility of consulting original Pāli editions.


UDDAKA RĀMAPUTTA AND KĀMA

Peter Skilling

The story of the Bodhisatta's quest for Enlightenment is related in identical terms in four Pāli discourses of the Middle Collection: the Discourse on the Exalted Quest (Ariya-pariy Camposutta), the Greater Discourse to Saccaka (Mañca-saccaka-sutta), the Discourse to Prince Bodhi (Bodhi-saṁjñā-kathā-sutta) and the Discourse to Saṅghārāma (Saṅghārāma-sutta) (Majjhima Nikāya 26, 36, 85 and 100).

An important section of this account deals with the Bodhisatta's meeting with and study under two contemporary teachers of yogic or ecstatic techniques, Āra Mahāsa and Uddaka Rāmaputta. The similarities of the accounts of these meetings in the Pāli have led several translators to gloss over important differences between them and treat them as virtually identical, with a mere substitution of names. Such is entirely the case with the late R. H. Horner's English translation of the Discourse on the Exalted Quest (Middle Length Sayings I, PTS 1967, pp. 207-210), and, to a lesser degree, with Dhamma Nāmamoli's translations of the Discourse to Prince Bodhi and the Discourse on the Exalted Quest (A Treasury of the Buddha's Words, Mahābodhi Society,Press, Bangkok I pp. 273-283, III pp. 201-4 - see book review on p. 17).

The main difference is one of tense change: while in the account of the first meeting Āra Mahāsa is spoken of in the present tense, in the account of the second meeting Uddaka Rāmaputta is spoken of in the present, but Kāma is spoken of in the past tense; and in the present tense. This tense change makes it clear that Uddaka Rāmaputta and Kāma are not one and the same person, as given in the above-mentioned translations, but that Uddaka is the disciple, either the spiritual or real son (putta) of the deceased teacher Kāma.

In the passage in question, the Buddha relates how he, as a bodhisatta, met Āra Mahāsa, mastered his teaching - the attainment of the plane of nothingness - and then, because he did not lead to Enlightenment, rejected it. He then went to Uddaka Rāmaputta on being accepted into Uddaka's community, he quickly mastered the teaching verbally and intellectually. The Buddha then goes on to relate - the whole account is in the first person, as follows: "I, then thought, 'It was not out of mere faith that Kāma taught (paved) this dharma, saying, 'I dwell having attained, having realized by my own direct knowledge'; I am certain that Kāma dwelt (vihitā pattavātātā) in the dharma that Kāma (Kāma, nominative) taught, having attained it, having realized it by his own direct knowledge!" On being asked this, Uddaka Rāmaputta instructed me in the plane of neither perception nor non-perception.
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In the passage in question, the Buddha relates how he, as a bodhisatta, met Āḷāra Kalāma, mastered his teaching - the attainment of the plane of nothingness - and then, because it did not lead to Enlightenment, rejected it. He then went to Uddaka Rāmaputta as being accepted into Uddaka's community; he quickly mastered the teaching verbally and intellectually. The Buddha then goes on to relate - the whole account is in the first person - as follows: "I then thought, 'It was not out of mere faith that Rāma taught (pavārajā pavāro disā) this dharma, saying "I dwell having attained, having realized by my own direct knowledge"; I am certain that Rāma dwelt (sabbhavī-vipākā) knowing and seeing this dharma,' I then went to Uddaka Rāmaputta and asked, 'What is the extent, sir (bhikkhu, vocative), of the dharma that Rāma (Rāma, nominative) taught, having attained it, having realized it by his own direct knowledge?' On being asked this, Uddaka Rāmaputta instructed me in the plane of neither perception nor non-perception.
I then thought, 'Nāma had (ahosi/āththi) no monopoly on faith: I too possess faith; Nāma had no monopoly on energy, mindfulness, concentration or wisdom: I too possess energy, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom. Let me then act myself in order to realise the dharma that Nāma taught, saying 'I dwell having attained, having realised by my own direct knowledge'. And not long afterwards, indeed quickly, I dwell having attained to that dharma, having realised it by my own direct knowledge, I then went to Udāka Rāmaputta, and asked, 'Is this the extent, sir (āvagga, voc.), of the dharma that Nāma (Nāma, nom.) taught, having attained it, having realised it by his own direct knowledge?' Then he answered in the affirmative, I said, 'I too dwell having attained to this dharma to the same extent, having realised it by my own direct knowledge'. (And Udāka Rāmaputta said,) 'It is a blessing, sir, it is indeed a blessing that I should meet with a companion in the spiritual life such as you! You now dwell having attained to, having realised by your own direct knowledge, the dharma that Nāma taught, having attained to it and having realised it by his own direct knowledge... the dharma that Nāma knew (ānātha/ānāthi), you know... as was (ahosi/--) Nāma, so are you... Come then, sir: may you lead this community!'

A difference in status between the two individuals, Āḷāra and Udāka, is revealed in the concluding parts of the accounts of the two meetings, where another important difference occurs. When the Bodhisatta informs Āḷāra Kālam, that he has mastered the latter's teaching, Āḷāra, after proclaiming the Bodhisatta to be his equal, says, 'Come then, sir, let the two of us lead this community together'. In his narration of this event, the Buddha remarks, 'Thus Āḷāra Kālam, my teacher (ārāmīrī), set me, his disciple (antevāsin) on equal footing with himself, and honoured me with the highest of honours'. In the account of the second meeting, however, after Udāka has proclaimed the Bodhisatta to be the equal of Nāma, he says, 'Come then, sir: may you lead this community' (see translation above). Of this the Buddha remarks, 'Thus Udāka Rāmaputta, my companion in the spiritual life (sahadhāsa) established me in the position of teacher (ācāryabhūme), and honoured me with the highest of honours'. This implies that, while Āḷāra was accepted as a teacher in his own right, Udāka was simply the leader of a community through succession, by virtue of his teacher's death.

The relationship between Udāka Rāmaputta and Nāma is borne out by two accounts of the second meeting preserved in Chinese. The first, from a discourse of the Sarvāstivāda school, describes Nāma as the father of Udāka; the second, from the Vinaya of the Dharmaguptaka school, describes Nāma as Udāka's teacher, and states specifically that Udāka started teaching after the death of his teacher, Nāma (both passages translated and discussed by A. Burnouf in Recherches sur la biographie du Bouddha dans les Šāstrīciyaka et les Vinayapīṭaka anciens I.

Of the extant Sanskrit texts dealing with the Bodhisattva's meeting with Udāka, who is variously referred to in Buddhist Sanskrit texts as Udāka, Udāka, Udraka and Udaraku, the Mahāvastu of the Lokottaravādin school, in which is certainly an ancient passage, also makes this relationship clear. While the Bodhisatta addresses Udāka as 'bhīma Udraka' (good Udraka), the latter speaks of "the good Nāma" in a way that clearly implies that Nāma was his teacher. Thus he says, 'Just so much, good Gautama, was attained, realised and taught by the good Nāma (bhūnāma) the plane of neither perception nor non-perception'. When the Bodhisatta announces that he has also attained to this plane, Udāka replies, 'Then the good Gautama knows the same dharma which the good Nāma (bhūnāma) knew (āvati) third person, "historical present")'. (Mahāvastu Aṭṭhān, ed. R. Burck, Sanskrit College, Calcutta 1955, pp.167-9). Unfortunately, the English translation of this passage is faulty, and implies that Udāka and Nāma are one person, as do the translations from Pali (J. Jones The Mahāvastu 2, 2nd, London 1952, p.116-7).

The account given in the Lalita-vistara (ed.F. Vajja, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, Mithila Institute, Bardia) 1956, p.160-1) seems to have undergone the same confusion as that of some modern translators. When the Bodhisatta asks Udāka (here Udraka), "Who is your teacher, whose teaching do you profess?", the latter replies, "I do not have any teacher: I have realised (this teaching) correctly by myself and on my own". This account differs widely in style and content from the Pali, Chinese and Mahāvastu accounts, which are generally similar, and is clearly later.

Two accounts, virtually identical in their translated form, are preserved in Tibetan translation in the Abhidhamma-piṭaka of an unknown school (but, because of the close agreement of this and other passages with the following, presumably Sarvāstivāda or Māra-sarvāstivāda (967), vol.39, p.16.41.), and in the Vinaya of the Mind-sarvāstivāda (9130), vol.42, p.34.4.1f. Oh.17, Dharma-bheda-vatika). Although older than that of the Lalita-vistara, and closer in style to the other early accounts, the narration of the two meetings in these texts fails to preserve any differences: the two meetings are described identically, the only difference being the names and attainments of the two teachers.

Of the extant texts as a whole, the concluding portions of the Pali version bring out the difference in status between the two individuals the most clearly. The Mahāvastu version, though briefer than the Pali, is also quite clear. There the Buddha relates that Āḷāra Kālam suggested that the two of them lead the community of disciples together, and thus set the Bodhisatta on equal footing with himself (samāsthātāya atthācayet), while Udāka asked the Bodhi-
satta to take over the community of disciples, and thus established the Bodhisatta in the position of teacher (Akhya-sthāne āthākāra). The two Chinese versions are less clear, but still preserve some differences. The Lalita-vistara, in its account of the second meeting, combines elements from both meetings, generally using the vocabulary of the Mahāvastu: Uddaka says, "Come then, let you and I lead this community," thus setting the Bodhisatta on equal footing with himself (mahābhārata athākāra) and establishing him in the position of teacher (Akhya-sthāne āthākāra). The Abhinigakrama-āśātra and the Vinaya-vastu again fail to preserve any difference whatsoever.

Finally, it should be noted that Uddaka Māmaputta is never addressed or referred to as Mahārāja, as is given in the English translations of the Pali and implied by the English translations of the Mahāvastu in Pali, but in the Chinese, he is addressed simply as Akuo, in the Mahāvastu as bhū-Mahārāja or simply Mahārāja, in the Lalita-vistara as Mahārāja. In Pali he is referred to as Uddaka Māmaputta, in the Mahāvastu as Uddaka Māmaputta, and in the Lalita-vistara as Uddaka Māmaputta or simply Mahārāja. Elsewhere in Sanskrit texts he is referred to as Uddaka, not Mahārāja (Śrīvīravāda, ed.P.Vidyā, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, Berkeley 1979, p.267: Śākaśa-saṃñāna, ed.O.Bendall, Indo-Iranian Reprints, The Hague 1957, p.195.17; etc.). In the Pali commentaries as well as in the Mahasūtra (Mahamāyā-prākārama, Mahāvastu Mahāvyūhā, Bangkok, Vol.1, p.75; Mahāvastu Mahāvyūhā, Mahābalo Bhikkhu Foundation, Bangkok 1979, pp.12, 34, 110, 17.7). The material given above is sufficient to make it clear that Uddaka Māmaputta and Mahārāja were two different persons, and that Mahārāja, Uddaka's teacher, had died by the time of the Bodhisatta's meeting with Uddaka. It does not, however, tell us whether or not Uddaka was the actual son of Mahārāja, as implied by his name and one Chinese translation. It is also not clear whether or not Uddaka had himself attained to the plane of neither perception nor non-perception. The texts that treat Uddaka and Mahārāja as different persons, and give the difference in status between Mahārāja and Uddaka, imply that he had not; otherwise, why the difference in status? Thus the sub-commentary on the Pali version of this passage states that only Mahārāja had attained to this āthākāra, not Uddaka. The other texts imply that Uddaka, as a teacher in his own right, had attained to the state that he taught; on their side is the fact that in Indian Yogic systems attainment is held to be one of the prerequisites of teaching; later Sanskrit Buddhist traditions certainly held that Uddaka had attained, and give him as an example of one who had reached the summit of existence (bhavākara - the plane of neither perception nor non-perception) and been reborn there, but was bound, because of past karmas, to fall once more into the realm of Mahārāja, to the animal- or even the hell-planes. For example, the Samvatarama-kāya of Avalokiteśvara states that "even though the sage Uddaka attained to the Forrester's sumit of exist-ence, he will depart from there when his karma is exhausted, and fall to the animal-plane." 9.

As regards the age of the passages studied here, the Pali and the Mahāvastu accounts are clearly the oldest; the latter, as simpler and less stereotyped, may be the older of the two. The Lalita-vistara, like the Mahāvastu in general, contains material from various strata mixed with verses that form the bulk of the account of the meeting with Mahārāja, given in the first person, is quite early in style, and strongly resembles that of the Mahāvastu, while the account of the Mahāvastu, while the account of the meeting with Uddaka, given in the third person and opening with an explanation of how the Bodhisatta studied under Uddaka only as an expedient (ātā-mahā-pañca), in order to demonstrate that mundane meditations do not lead to release (laukika-mahā-prākārama, is clearly much later. The accounts of the Abhinigakrama-āśātra and the Vinaya-vastu, though preserving a relatively ancient style, underwent alteration at a later date.

NOTES

1 In the PTS edition only the account of the Ārya-pariyayama is given in full; the others are virtually abbreviated out of existence. The Thai, Burmese and Nileanda editions give the account in full in each case. M 26 quite the sections on the three similes and the austerities.

2 In order to show the difference of tense clearly, the past forms of the verbs in the account of the second meeting are given in parentheses, followed by the present forms that occur in the account of the first meeting, that with Mahārāja.

3 In the account of the first meeting, Mahārāja is addressed in the vocative by his nāma as Akuo Mahārāja; cf. Poppe-Samueli (Mahasūtra Mahāvyūhā, Bangkok, Vol.1, p.227): Mahārājāṁ nāma... Mahārājāṁ nāma. Unfortunately, the commentary does not give any such information for Uddaka.

4 While Bhikkhu Māmapoli has translated this portion of the narrative correctly, I.B.Romer has simply repeated the passage dealing with Mahārāja with the names changed.

5 The text of the Mahāvastu is somewhat corrupt. In Basak's edition, p.169.12, correct bhū-Udraka to bhū-Udraka, at p.169.1 correct ātā-mahā-pañca to ātā-pañca, at p.169.13, correct bhū-mahāprākārama to bhū-mahāpariyayama; the whole phrase should probably read: bhū-pañca: pāya-bhū-pañca: bhū-mahāpariyayama. A lacuna occurs in the account of the meeting with Mahārāja, p.166.8-10, and should be corrected on the basis of the account of the meeting with Udraka, p.166.8-11; cf. also Lalita-vistara 174.19-22.

6 This portion of the narrative has been mistranslated by Jones (loc.cit.).
THE THREE SIMILES

Peter Skilling

After leaving Udbaka Rāmaputta, the Bodhisatta went to Travela, where, on the banks of the Narajara river, three similes (upama) occurred to him. These similes are given in three of the above-mentioned discourses of the Middle Collection: the Greater Discourse to Saccaka, the Discourse to Prince Bothi and the Discourse to Sāṅgharāja (l. 36, 85, 100). Here an error in the romanized Pali text (I p.241), though noted by the editor himself (152, p.550), has led to errors of translation. The initial reason for assuming that there is an error is one of context: three different similes are given, but the applications of the first two similes are exactly the same, with only the last being different. The error in fact occurs in the application of the second simile which fits neither the simile itself nor the progression of thought. Another problem involves variant readings in different versions of the Pali text; here it is less simple to speak of "error", a point which will be discussed below. To start with, a translation of the corrected Pali text, in which some of the variant readings have been adopted, will be given, with the correction and the variants underlined.

"Three similes, Aṅgivesana, never heard before at any point in the past, came to me spontaneously:

(1) Suppose there is a piece of wet, sappy wood lying in the water, and someone happens along with a fire-stick, thinking, 'I will make a fire and produce heat'. Do you think that he will be able to do so, by rubbing the fire-stick against this piece of wet, sappy wood, lying in the water?"

"Certainly not, good Gotama, for that piece of wood is wet and sappy, and, more than that, is lying in the water; the person in question would only end up weakening and frustrating himself."

"Such is the case, Aṅgivesana, with nāmappa and brāhmaṇa who dwell neither physically nor mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures, and whose tendency towards sense-pleasures, desire for sense-pleasures, infatuation with sense-pleasures, thirst for sense-pleasures, and burning for sense-pleasures is neither inwardly well-abandoned nor well-subdued; even if, as a result of their striving, these respected nāmappa and brāhmaṇa undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, they will be incapable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment, and even if they do not undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, resulting from their striving, they will still be incapable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment. This, Aṅgivesana, is the first simile, never heard before at any point in the past, that came to me spontaneously."
(ii) "Then, Aggivessana, another, a second, smile, never heard before at any point in the past, came to me spontaneously. Suppose there is a piece of wet, sappy wood, lying well away from the water on dry land, and someone happens along with a fire-stick, thinking, 'I will make a fire and produce heat'. Do you think that he will be able to do so, by rubbing the fire-stick against this piece of wet, sappy wood, lying well away from the water on dry land?"

"Certainly not, good Nettima; even though it is lying well away from the water on dry land, that piece of wood is wet and sappy: the person in question would only end up wounding and frustrating himself."

"Such is the case, Aggivessana, with anagha and bhikkhu who shall only physically withdraw from sense-pleasures, but whose tendency towards sense-pleasures...(as above)...is neither inwardly well-abandoned nor well-subdued; even if, as a result of their striving, these respected anagha and bhikkhu undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, they will be incapable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment, and even if they do not undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, resulting from their striving, they will still be incapable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment. This, Aggivessana, is the second smile, never heard before at any point in the past, that came to me spontaneously."

(iii) "Then, Aggivessana, another, a third, smile, never heard before at any point in the past, came to me spontaneously. Suppose there is a piece of dry, sappy-Hood, lying well away from the water on dry land, and someone happens along with a fire-stick, thinking, 'I will make a fire and produce heat'. Do you think that he will be able to do so, by rubbing the fire-stick against this piece of dry, sappy wood, lying well away from the water on dry land?"

"Indeed he would, good Nettima, for that piece of wood is dry and sappy, and, more than that, is lying well away from the water on dry land."

"Such is the case, Aggivessana, with anagha and bhikkhu who shall both physically and mentally withdraw from sense-pleasures, and whose tendency towards sense-pleasures, desire for sense-pleasures, infatuation with sense-pleasures, thirst for sense-pleasures and burning for sense-pleasures is both inwardly well-abandoned and well-subdued; even if, as a result of their striving, these respected anagha and bhikkhu undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, they will be capable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment, and even if they do not undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, resulting from their striving, they will still be capable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment. This, Aggivessana, is the third smile, never heard before at any point in the past, that came to me spontaneously."

In the application of the second smile, the Pali edition reads, as in the application of the first smile, anagha o'rasa sittam eva vihamika vibhavanti, "and shall physically withdraw from sense-pleasures"; however, as noted by Bernbaum himself and as given in the first edition, the reading should be anagha o'rasa vihamika vibhavanti, "and shall physically withdraw from sense-pleasures". This is demanded by the context: here the piece of wood, the mind, though still not, saturated with sensual desires, is in dry land, that is, withdrawn physically from sense-pleasures. This error in the Pali edition has given rise to faulty translations in W.F. Burn's Middle length sermons I (p. 176) and in Dhammo's Rebirths... I (p. 177).

The second problem, that of variant readings, is more complex. The Pali script edition and the corrected 2nd edition give the part of the application of the three similes under discussion as follows:

(i) do not shall physically withdraw from sense-pleasures (anagha o'rasa sitta vihamika vibhavanti);
(ii) shall physically withdraw from sense-pleasures (anagha o'rasa sitta nihamika vibhavanti);
(iii) = (ii)

This quite the context and could stand as it is; however, the Burmese and Sinhalese editions, introducing a further element, read as follows:

(i) shall neither physically nor mentally withdraw from sense-pleasures (anagha o'rasa sitta vihamika vibhavanti);
(ii) shall both physically and mentally withdraw from sense-pleasures (anagha o'rasa sitta nihamika vibhavanti);
(iii) = (i)

Here again, only the first and the last statements fit the context: "not being mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures", in the first simile, summarises "their tendency towards sense-pleasures...is neither inwardly well-abandoned nor well-subdued"; "being mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures", in the third simile, summarises "their tendency towards sense-pleasures...is both inwardly well-abandoned and well-subdued". But in the second application, "being mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures" contradicts "their tendency towards sense-pleasures is neither well-abandoned nor well-subdued", and further contradicts the simile itself, for the piece of wood, the mind, is still wet, that is saturated by sense desires.

Equivalent Sanskrit-Tibetan texts (according to A.Barnes, op.cit., p. 43; the Chinese texts studied by him do not give the passage on the three similes) give the following readings:
A. Lalita-vistara (op.cit., p.361-2, Sanskrit; the Tibetan translation gives the same readings)

(i) dwell neither physically nor mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures (kāmehi avyabhātā-kūya vihayantī sam kāmehi avyakrātā-cittānā vihayantī sam)

(ii) dwell both physically and mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures (kāmehi vyakrātā-kūya-cittā vihāranti)

(iii) = (ii)

B. Mahāvastu 2 (op.cit., pp.169-173, Sanskrit only)

(i) dwell neither physically nor mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures (kāmehi avyabhātā-kūya vihayantī avyakrātā-cittānā)

(ii) dwell physically withdrawn but not mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures (kāmehi vyakrātā-kūya vihāranti avyakrātā-cittānā)

(iii) dwell both physically and mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures (kāmehi vyakrātā-kūya vihāranti vyakrātā-cittānā)

C. Abhinirbhrama-nātisa (op.cit., p.18.5.2f, Tibetan) and Vinayavastu (op.cit., ch.17, p.37.1.2, Tibetan)

(i) dwell neither physically nor mentally withdrawn (the phrase ba-vyakrātā- citthā) from sense-pleasures

(ii) dwell having abandoned (upagā ba-vyakrātā) sense-pleasures physically but not mentally

(iii) dwell both mentally and physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures.

Firstly, it may be noted that all Sanskrit-Tibetan versions give both body and mind, as do the Burmese and Mālāndā editions; the Lalita-vistara agrees entirely with the latter two texts - with the same vocabulary but different phrasing - and thus does not solve the problem of the application of the second simile. The Mahāvastu, the Abhinirbhrama-nātisa and the Vinayavastu versions, however, fit both the context and the progression of thought; in the second simile, "physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures" is equivalent to "on dry land", out of the "water" of sense-pleasures; "mentally not withdrawn from sense-pleasures" corresponds to the piece of wet wood, the mind still saturated by sensual desires.

The main problem now becomes whether or not the Pāli text should include the phrase "(not) mentally withdrawn" in addition to "(not) physically withdrawn", and if so, how to resolve the problem of the application of the second simile. It may be argued that the addition of "mentally withdrawn" is redundant, since it is difficult to take it as anything other than an equivalent of the list of near-synonyms beginning with "tendency towards sense-pleasures". However, redundancies abound in both Pāli and Sanskrit texts; it is given in the majority of texts studied and may be further supported by other canonical texts, which, both in Pāli (D III 285 = A IV 152, 285.67) and Sanskrit (Rāmatāra-nātisa, ed. K.Mittal, in Doctrinal Backgrounds in Śākyan Buddhism, Berlin 1957, p. 84), mention physical and mental withdrawal (kāya-, citta- bhāvānā- / vyākṛta- svarūpa-) together. Non-canonical texts of the Sanskrit tradition also deal with these two, but give them broader definitions (cf. Abhinirbhrama-kosas, Nāgāyana and Vyākhyā, sūtras Artha-vinīcaya-nātisa-nibandha, ed. N.Sastri, Patna 1971, p. 294, Śrīvāka-bhāni of Aṣaṅga, ed. K.Shukla, Patna 1973, p.362). Further, one of the Pāli discourses that contains this passage, the Greater Discourse to Saccaka, opens with the question of "physical and mental development" (kāya-, citta-

bhāvanā). Thus it seems likely that both physical and mental withdrawal should be included in the Pāli text.

It is, however, difficult to include both in the application of the second simile as it stands. Adhering as closely as possible to the extant manuscript tradition, the only possible reading would be kṣāya c'eva na cittana kāmehi vyākṛta-cittā vihāranti, which sounds unidiomatic. The only acceptable solution for the time being is to omit the reference to mental withdrawal in the application of the second simile, a solution which is not entirely satisfactory, but at least can be supported by available manuscripts. Thus we get, as translated above,

(i) kṣāya c'eva cittana ca kāmehi avyabhātā c'evānti

(ii) kṣāya c'eva kāmehi vyākṛta c'evānti (see P.E. ed. p.550 and Bhikkhu Nissaloli, op.cit., Vol.3, p.195, notes, for other suggested readings; Nissaloli suggests the same readings as here for (i) and (iii))

(iii) kṣāya c'eva cittana ca kāmehi vyākṛta c'evānti.

Numerous other differences occur in the various versions of this passage. While the Pāli texts situate this incident at Āruvelā, Saṇṇīgama, on the banks of the Nerañjana-river, after the Bodhisatta has left Uddaka Rāma and before his practice of self-mortification, the Abhinirbhrama-nātisa and the Vinayavastu situate it "south of the Gaṅga" (Abhinirbhrama, doubtless an error for the following) or "south of Gaṅga" (Vinayavastu), at Uruvilī-Kāyāna's (Kāyāna, given by both texts, probably an error) Saṇṇīgama, by the Nerañjana-river, after the practice of austerity (Abhinirbhrama) or after the practice of the bulk of the austerities (Vinayavastu). The Mahāvastu and the Lalita-vistara situate the event on Gaṅgīsīrīs mountain, after the Bodhisatta has left Uddaka Rāma; at the three similes have occurred to him he then proceeds to Uruvilī Saṇṇīgama(ka) and the Nerañjana-river, and begins his practice of austerities.

The latter two texts, which agree with the Pāli in situating the three
emotions before the austerities, give a passage, not found in Pāli; after the
emotions but before the austerities, which connects the two: "Then, O monks, I
thought, 'I shall dwell both physically and mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures;
and have thoughts about sense-pleasures, desire for sense-pleasures, burning
for sense-pleasures and attachment to sense-pleasures will under control (pahati-
vinta) even if I should undergo unpleasant feelings - acute, harsh and rack-
ing; that tortures the self and tortures the body - I will yet be capable of
knowledge, insight and understanding of that which transcends the human state"" ( añānata p.173): Lalita-vistara gives a similar passage, worded
differently).

Another difference is in the string of synonyms for sensual desire, begin-
ning in Pāli with "tendency towards sense-pleasures", and in the partici-
pli deigning their (non-) relinquishment; these differ from text to text, but need
dont us here as the differences do not affect the meaning. The similarities
themselves are also varied differently in the various texts: the only signifi-
cant difference here being that in the Abhidharma and Vinaya-pāda the first
two similes are exactly the same - 'a piece of wet, soggy wood, taken from the
water and placed on dry land' - which raises the reverse of the main problem
dealt with above the same simile with two different applications. Another dif-
fERENCE which does not affect the meaning concerns the order of the mater-
ials: while the Pāli, the Abhidharma and Vinaya-pāda give the similes first, foll-
own by their applications, the Mahāvagga and Lalita-vistara give the "appli-
cation" first, followed by the similes, then by a repetition of the applica-
tions (the Mahāvagga gives the text in full throughout, with one omission in
the first simile, probably a lacuna or misprint, while the Lalita-vistara abbrevi-
ates the second and third similes considerably). Further, in the Pāli and the
Mahāvagga, no doubt the most ancient versions, the narrative is in the first
person; in the other texts it is related of the Bodhisatta in the third person.

All the texts studied here give a follow-up passage, after the practice
of self-mortification, that refers back to the applications of the three sim-
iles. The Pāli version (III, p.246.2) reads as follows, "Then, Āgghavasena, I
thought, 'This is the limit (āśīla-pāramāra) of unpleasant feeling - acute and
harsh, resulting from striving - undergone by any āparamāna or brāhmaṇa in the
past, the future, or the present; there is nothing beyond this!'" (summarized
translation). The Mahāvagga (p.102.3) reads "Then, monks, I thought, 'This is
the limit of unpleasant feeling - acute, severe and harsh, that tortures the
self and tortures the body - undergone by any respected āparamāna or brāhmaṇa
in the past or of present; no one is capable of surpassing this!'".

The one major difference that occurs in the applications of the similes

is that all Sanskrit-Tibetan versions mention only that, even should the āparama-
a and brāhmaṇa be tormented by pain as a result of their self-mortification,
they will or will not be capable of enlightenment, while the Pāli version alone
introduces a second alternative: whether or not they are tormented by pain as a
result of their self-mortification, they will or will not be capable of enlighten-
ment. Although the Pāli version cannot be rejected offhand, it seems unneces-
sary to include this second alternative. The general application of the similes,
here as well as in other contexts (cf. N 119, III p.95; M 126, III pp.141-144;
Patakāda, p.1-2) is impossibility/ possibility: in this context only when the
mind, the place of wood, is both physically and mentally withdrawn or re-
moved from sense-pleasures can it give birth to the "spark of enlightenment";
thus the practice of self-mortification can only be effective when the practit-
ioner is so withdrawn. It would seem that, had the Bodhisatta further realized
that enlightenment could be realized without the practice of self-mortification
- the second alternative to the third simile in the Pāli - he would not have
embarked upon such practice, for no less than six years, according to common
tradition. That at that point the Bodhisatta believed the practice of austeri-
ties to be necessary, is clearly given in one of the Pāli discourses that
contains the passage in question, the Bhikkhu to Prince Bodi (M 25; P 31), where the
Buddha introduces the narration of the quest for enlightenment and the practice
of self-mortification with the statement, "before my enlightenment, when I was
an enlightened bodhisatta, I thought that ‘happiness is not to be attained by
means of happiness; happiness is to be attained through suffering!’ The rela-
tion of the austerities itself confirms this: it is only when the Bodhisatta
realizes that he has reached the limit of suffering to be attained through self-
mortification that he sees that this practice has not led him to enlightenment.
Wondering if there is another path to enlightenment, he reflects upon a past
experience of meditation (ñāṇa, dhāraṇa), and realizes that this is the path. He
then reflects, ‘Why should I fear a happiness that is free of sense-pleasure and
free of unhealthy states of mind?’ and goes on to reject self-mortification,
adopt a healthy diet, practice meditation and attain enlightenment. (M 246-257;
the Sanskrit-Tibetan texts studied here all contain this passage, with the usual
differences of phrasing.) Thus the second alternative given in the Pāli
seems unlikely, and may well be a later interpolation; it brings to mind the
interpolations in the Lalita-vistara, where it is said that the Bodhisatta al-
ready knew the futility of self-mortification but practised it to the limit in
order to demonstrate this futility (op.cit., p.162-3, etc.).

In this case the Mahāvagga seems to give the most ancient and the clean-
est version of this event; the other versions all present difficulties and ap-
pear to have become corrupted with the passage of time.
CONFERENCE ON NIHAYANIST SANSKRIT LITERATURE

The third conference sponsored by the Kommission für buddhistische Studien der Akademie der Wissenschaften was held in Göttingen between 13th-16th July 1982. The occasion was also made to coincide with the 85th birthday of Ernest Walser, the dean of researchers in Central Asian literature.

An indication of the scope of the proceedings is provided by the titles of those papers (all of which will be published in 1983) which are likely to prove of most interest to our readers: S. K. Diets "Zur Frage der Schülgehörigkeit der Fragmente der Abhidhammasaṃcādaññāstra und der Lokapāraññāstra", E. Miyado "Schools of the Chinese Poa Agamas. Studies in Japan", Bhikkhu Phaedikā "Berechtigt über die Sammlung von Kanon-Zitate aus dem Abhidhamma", M. Schmitt "Stand der Arbeiten am Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der Turfan-Funde", L. Schmidt "Kundalavasavastu and the Origin of the philosophical schools of the Buddhismus" and Ch. Tripati "Saddharmapusthaka. Rigpka II and Bhuddhājñāna-Parallelen hierzu".

The fifth conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies was held at Hartford College, Oxford, between 16th-21st August 1982, under the presidency of Venerable Walpole, This is the second conference of the journal (and is under the Secretary of the Pali Text Society) in London, 1982.

All aspects of Buddhism were covered, including special sessions on Buddhist Logic and Epistemology, Art and Iconography, Anthropology of Buddhism, Tibetan Religion and Philosophical Thought, and Contemporary Japanese Buddhism. Reports were received on the Critical Pali Dictionary, Pali-English Dictionary (proposed revised edition) and the Journal of the Pali Text Society (by the Editor-in-Chief, the GPO and President of the PTS, K. R. Norman), PHAVAMITRA (French-language encyclopaedia of Buddhism based in Kyoto - Robert Dutt), "Sanskrit Dictionary of Buddhist Texts from the Turfan Finds" (Siglinde Dietz), Systematic Survey of Buddhist Sanskrit Literature (Akira Yuyama - who presented the same report in German in Göttingen), and "Group for Buddhist and Jain Philological Studies" in France (Gérard Peusson).