MULAPARIYAYA SUTTA

The Root of all Dhammas
(translated by Nāgamoli Thera)

1. Thus I heard.

On one occasion the Blessed One was living at Ukkatthā at the root of a King Sāla tree in the Subhaga Grove. There he addressed the bhikkhus thus “Bhikkhus” “Venerable Sir” they replied. The Blessed One said this:

2. “Bhikkhus, I shall expound to you a discourse on the root of all dhammas; listen and heed well what I shall say.” “Yes, Venerable Sir” they replied. The Blessed One said this:

(The Ordinary Man)

3. Here, bhikkhus, an untaught ordinary man who has no regard for Noble Ones and is unconversant with their Dhamma and undisciplined in it, who has no regard for True Men and is unconversant with their Dhamma and undisciplined in it:

4. From earth he has a percept of earth; having had from earth a percept of earth, he conceives (that to be) earth, he conceives (that to be) in earth, he conceives (that to be apart) from earth, he conceives earth to be ‘mine’, he delights (a)in earth, Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

5. From water he has a percept of water; having had from water a percept of water, he conceives (that to be) water, he conceives (that to be) in water, he conceives (that to be apart) from water, he conceives water to be ‘mine’, he delights in water, Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

6. From fire he has a percept of fire; having had from fire a percept of fire, he conceives (that to be) fire, he conceives (that to be) in fire, he conceives (that to be apart) from fire, he conceives fire to be ‘mine’, he delights in fire. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

7. From air he has a percept of air; having had from air a percept of air, he conceives (that to be) air, he conceives (that to be) in air, he conceives (that to be apart) from air, he conceives air to be ‘mine’, he delights in air. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

8. From beings he has a percept of beings; having had from beings a percept of beings, he conceives (that to be) beings, he conceives (that to be) in beings, he conceives (that to be apart) from beings, he conceives
beings to be 'mine', he delights in beings. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

9. From gods he has a percept of gods, having had from gods a percept of gods, he conceives (that to be) gods, he conceives (that to be) in gods, he conceives (that to be apart) from gods, he conceives gods to be 'mine', he delights in gods. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

10. From the Lord of the Race (Pajāpati) (b) he has a percept of the Lord of the Race; having had from the Lord of the Race a percept of the Lord of the Race, he conceives (that to be) the Lord of the Race, he conceives (that to be) in the Lord of the Race, he conceives (that to be apart) from the Lord of the Race, he conceives the Lord of the Race to be 'mine', he delights in the Lord of the Race. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

11. From the Divinity (Brahmā) he has a percept of the Divinity; having had from the Divinity a percept of the Divinity, he conceives (that to be) the Divinity, he conceives (that to be) in the Divinity, he conceives (that to be apart) from the Divinity, he conceives the Divinity to be 'mine', he delights in the Divinity. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

12. From those of Streaming Radiance (Ābhāsara) he has a percept of those of Streaming Radiance; having had from those of Streaming Radiance a percept of those of Streaming Radiance, he conceives (that to be) those of Streaming Radiance, he conceives (that to be apart) from those of Streaming Radiance, he conceives those of Streaming Radiance to be 'mine', he delights in those of Streaming Radiance. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

13. From those of Refulgent Glory (Subhākānha) he has a percept of those of Refulgent Glory; having had from those of Refulgent Glory a percept of those of Refulgent Glory, he conceives (that to be) those of Refulgent Glory, he conceives (that to be apart) from those of Refulgent Glory, he conceives those of Refulgent Glory to be 'mine', he delights in those of Refulgent Glory. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

14. From those of Great Fruit (Vehapphala) he has a percept of those of Great Fruit; having had from those of Great Fruit a percept of those of Great Fruit, he conceives (that to be) those of Great Fruit, he conceives (that to be apart) from those of Great Fruit, he conceives those of Great Fruit to be 'mine', he delights in those of Great Fruit. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

15. From Transcendent Being (c) (Abhībhu) he has a percept of Transcendent Being; having had from Transcendent Being a percept of Transcendent Being, he conceives (that to be) Transcendent Being, he conceives (that to be apart) from Transcendent Being, he conceives (that to be) in Transcendent Being, he conceives (that to be) the Transcendent Being. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

16. From the base consisting of infinity of space he has a percept of the base consisting of infinity of space; having had from the base consisting of infinity of space a percept of the base consisting of infinity of space, he conceives (that to be) the base consisting of infinity of space, he conceives (that to be apart) from the base consisting of infinity of space, he conceives the base consisting of infinity of space to be 'mine', he delights in the base consisting of infinity of space. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

17. From the base consisting of infinity of consciousness, he has a percept of the base consisting of infinity of consciousness; having had from the base consisting of infinity of consciousness a percept of the base consisting of infinity of consciousness, he conceives (that to be) the base consisting of infinity of consciousness, he conceives (that to be apart) from the base consisting of infinity of consciousness, he conceives the base consisting of infinity of consciousness to be 'mine', he delights in the base consisting of infinity of consciousness. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

18. From the base consisting of nothingness he has a percept of the base consisting of nothingness; having had from the base consisting of nothingness a percept of the base consisting of nothingness, he conceives (that to be) the base consisting of nothingness, he conceives (that to be apart) from the base consisting of nothingness, he conceives the base consisting of nothingness to be 'mine', he delights in the base consisting of nothingness. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

19. From the base consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception he has a percept of the base consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception; having had from the base consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception a percept of the base consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, he conceives (that to be) the base consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, he conceives (that to be apart) from the base consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, he conceives the base consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception to be 'mine', he delights in the base consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

20. From the seen he has a percept of the seen; having had from the seen a percept of the seen, he conceives (that to be) the seen, he conceives (that to be apart) from the seen, he conceives the seen to be 'mine', he delights in the seen. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.
21. From the heard he has a percept of the heard; having had from the heard a percept of the heard, he conceives (that to be) the heard, he conceives (that to be) in the heard, he conceives (that to be apart) from the heard, he conceives the heard to be 'mine', he delights in the heard. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

22. From the sensed he has a percept of the sensed; having had from the sensed a percept of the sensed, he conceives (that to be) the sensed, he conceives (that to be) in the sensed, he conceives (that to be apart) from the sensed, he conceives the sensed to be 'mine', he delights in the sensed. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

23. From the cognised he has a percept of the cognised; having had from the cognised a percept of the cognised, he conceives (that to be) the cognised, he conceives (that to be) in the cognised, he conceives (that to be apart) from the cognised, he conceives the cognised to be 'mine', he delights in the cognised. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

24. From unity he has a percept of unity; having had from unity a percept of unity, he conceives (that to be) unity, he conceives (that to be) in unity, he conceives (that to be apart) from unity, he conceives unity to be 'mine', he delights in unity. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

25. From difference (d) he has a percept of difference; having had from difference a percept of difference, he conceives (that to be) difference, he conceives (that to be) in difference, he conceives (that to be apart) from difference, he conceives difference to be 'mine', he delights in difference. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

26. From all he has a percept of all; having had from all a percept of all, he conceives (that to be) all, he conceives (that to be) in all, he conceives (that to be apart) from all, he conceives all to be 'mine', he delights in all. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

27. From Nibbāna he has a percept of Nibbāna; having had from Nibbāna a percept of Nibbāna, he conceives (that to be) Nibbāna, he conceives (that to be) in Nibbāna, he conceives (that to be apart) from Nibbāna, he conceives Nibbāna to be 'mine', he delights in Nibbāna. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

(One In The Higher Training)

28. Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu who is one in the (higher) training, whose mind has not yet reached (deliverance) and who is still aspiring to the supreme sucese of bondage:

29. From earth he has direct knowledge of earth; having had from earth direct knowledge of earth, he ought not to conceive (that to be) earth, he ought not to conceive (that to be apart) from earth, he ought not to conceive earth to be 'mine', he ought to know fully, I say.

30-51. From water...fire...air...beings...gods...Lord of the Race...Divinity...those of Streaming Radiance...those of Refulgent Glory...those of Great Fruit...Transcendent Being...infinity of space...infinity of consciousness...nothingness...neither-perception-nor-non-perception...seen...heard...sensed...cognised...unity...difference...all...He ought to know fully, I say.

52. From Nibbāna he has direct knowledge of Nibbāna; having had from Nibbāna direct knowledge of Nibbāna, he ought not to conceive (that to be) Nibbāna, he ought not to conceive (that to be) in Nibbāna, he ought not to conceive Nibbāna to be 'mine', he ought not to delight in Nibbāna. Why is that? He has not fully known, I say.

(The Arahant—I)

53. Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu who is an arahant with the taints exhausted, who has lived out the life, done what was to be done, laid down the burden reached the highest goal, destroyed the fetters of being, and is rightly liberated through final knowledge:

54. From earth he has direct knowledge of earth; having had from earth direct knowledge of earth, he does not conceive (that to be) earth, he does not conceive (that to be) in earth, he does not conceive (that to be apart) from earth, he does not delight in earth. Why is that? He has fully known, I say.

55-76. From water...fire...air...beings...gods...Lord of the Race...Divinity...those of Streaming Radiance...those of Refulgent Glory...those of Great Fruit...Transcendent Being...infinity of space...infinity of consciousness...nothingness...neither-perception-nor-non-perception...seen...heard...sensed...cognised...unity...difference...all...He has fully known, I say.

77. From Nibbāna he has direct knowledge of Nibbāna; having had from Nibbāna direct knowledge of Nibbāna, he does not conceive (that to be) Nibbāna, he does not conceive (that to be) in Nibbāna, he does not conceive (that to be apart) from Nibbāna, he does not conceive Nibbāna to be 'mine', he does not delight in Nibbāna. Why is that? He has fully known, I say.

(The Arahant—II)

78. Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu who is an arahant, rightly liberated through final knowledge:

79. From earth he has direct knowledge of earth; he does not delight in earth. Why is that? Because of lustlessness with the exhaustion of lust.

80-102. From water...from Nibbāna...Why is that? Because of lustlessness with the exhaustion of lust.
(The Arahant—III)

103. Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu who is an arahant,...rightly liberated through final knowledge:

104. From earth he has direct knowledge of earth...he does not delight in earth. Why is that? Because of hatelessness with the exhaustion of hate.

105-127. From water...from Nibbāna...Why is that? Because of hatelessness with exhaustion of hate.

(The Arahant—IV)

128. Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu who is an arahant,...rightly liberated through final knowledge:

129. From earth he has direct knowledge of earth...he does not delight in earth. Why is that? Because of delusionlessness with the exhaustion of delusion.

130-152. From water...from Nibbāna...Why is that? Because of delusionlessness with the exhaustion of delusion.

(The Tathāgata—I)

153. Bhikkhus, a Tathāgata, arahant and Fully Enlightened One:

154. From earth he has direct knowledge of earth; having had from earth direct knowledge of earth, he does not conceive (that to be) earth he does not conceive (that to be) in earth, he does not conceive (that to be apart) from earth, he does conceive earth to be ‘mine’, he does no, delight in earth. Why is that? A Tathāgata has fully known to the end, I say.

155-177 From water...from Nibbāna ...Why is that? A Tathāgata has fully known to the end, I say.

(The Tathāgata—II)

178. Bhikkhus, a Tathāgata, arahant and Fully Enlightened One:

179. From earth he has direct knowledge of earth; having had from earth direct knowledge of earth, he does not conceive (that to be) earth, he does not conceive (that to be) in earth, he does not conceive (that to be apart) from earth, he does not conceive earth to be ‘mine’, he does no, delight in earth, Why is that? A Tathāgata knows that delight is the root of suffering, and that with being there is birth, and the ageing and death of whatever is; and therefore it is with craving’s exhaustion, fading out, cessation, being given up and relinquished in all ways that he has discovered the supreme Full Enlightenment, I say.

203. That is what the Blessed One said. Those bhikkhus did not delight in the Blessed One's words.

Notes

§2. According to the Comy the rendering should be 'a discourse on the root of all dhammas', and no connection is made between the word sabba (all) in sabbadhamma and sabba in §26, which has a special emphasis in Sutta 49.

§3: The following scheme shows the differences between the four kinds of person.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The ordinary man has a percept</th>
<th>conceives (that has not fully (pahissāya)</th>
<th>(soṇāṇā) to be (mahā) known (apariñāma)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One in the higher training (ekha)</td>
<td>lead (pahissāya)</td>
<td>does not conceive (mā)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The arahant</td>
<td>has fully known (pariñāma)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Tathāgata</td>
<td>has fully known to the end (pariñāmah)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

§4. Paṭisamā pahissāya saṇḍīti—'From earth he has a percept of earth'; this presents the first of many problems, most of which seem to be ontological. This ablative construction would normally be freely renderable by 'he perceives earth as earth' (i.e. perceives it for what it really is); but that takes the ablative in a different sense to the one that follows (pahissāya maṇṭāti—he conceives (that to be apart) from earth), which seems hard to justify, and perhaps not necessary. The strongest argument against this is that 'perceives' (saṇḍīti) is used only of the ordinary man. Consequently it must be taken that in the act of perceiving, a basic slight distortion takes place (cf. definition of saṇḍī—perception in Visuddhi-magga Ch. XIV as abhinivesa—interpretation), which is absent in abhiñā—direct knowledge. The perceiving has already made an interpretation from the base object of evaṇḍī (buddhāyāto). Perceiving has the uraustiquis (both ways/kinds) sense of the act of perceiving and the, and that is deliberately implied here, apparently.
that his self is ‘in earth’. Next he ‘conceives’ that his or another’s self is different ‘from earth’. Lastly, he ‘conceives’ earth as ‘mine’ simply out of craving.

§8: Bhūtā bhūtato sañjānāto...bhūtato maññāti; the use of the ablative suffix—to in a plural sense is unusual, but it cannot be taken in any other way. Such a rendering as ‘recognises the beings from nature (i.e. from the fact of being nature)’ (PED under bhūtā) is quite untenable. This emphasises the use of the ablative—to rather than the more usual-a, -asma, -asmā (pl. -eśi), and seems a further indication in favour of the view that the two occurrences in each clause—here bhūtā sañjānāti...bhūtato maññāti have the same significance (i.e. ‘from’) rather than ‘as’ in the first case and ‘apart from’ in the second.

§26: For sābhā—all; see Sutta 49.

§28: For sekhā—one in the higher training’ see Sutta 53. The term applies to the first seven of the ‘Eight Persons’. None of them have sakkāyadāthi (embodiment-view) but all have still asmi—maṇḍa (the concept I am).

§29E: The prohibitive mā maññāti can only signify that in the case of those in the higher training, they can but ought not to, indulge in conceiving. They can do so because they still have asmi-maṇḍa, which is only eliminated by arahantship. This should show that, in spite of what the Comy says, the fourfold sakkāyadāthi in Sutta 44 is not directly connectable, for a sekhā does not have sakkāyadāthi at all.

§29: N.B. abhiñāna—‘has direct knowledge’ instead of sañjānāti—‘has perception of’—Mā maññāti—‘ought not to conceive’: the form is the normal negative imperative or prohibitive.

§154: Reading pariññātento—‘fully known to the end’: with Comy, etc.

§155: Emphasises the ontological aspect.

§203: So all editions, apparently, except the P.T.S. edn.

General Notes

(1) For abhiññyaya and pariññyaya, see Vbh. 426 and VbhA. 322.

(11) For asmi, see S. iii 46 and 128-30. (The latter confirms the differences between the pathujjana, sekhā and asakhā, with attā and asminānā.

(111) For conceiving and being see L’Etre et le Néant (Sartre) p. 122.

(IV) Bhādārānayaka Upāsas (Compare M I, and S. XXXV 30, 31) III 7.38f. (c)

3. Yoḥ prthiviyāṁ śāriroṁ prthiviyāṁ antarōk, yoḥ prthvi ni na ved, yaśa prthvī śāriram yoḥ prthvīṁ antaro yamayati, eṣātā atmaṁ tiṣayantyām uparāt. (He who inhabits the earth is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, and who controls the earth from within, this is the Internal Ruler, your own immortal Self).
3. Bhikkhus, were I to say of whatever in the world... with its kings and men, is seen, heard, sensed or cognised, is reached, sought out, or followed, with the mind, that I know it not, that would be falsely spoken by me; and were I to say of it that I know it and know it not, that would be the same; and were I to say of it that I neither know it nor know it not, that would be incorrect on my part.

4. So, bhikkhus, having seen what can be seen, the Tathāgata does not conceive what is seen (to be), he does not conceive what is unseen (to be), he does not conceive what can be seen (to be), he does not conceive a seer (to be); hearing what can be heard... having sensed what can be sensed... having cognised what can be cognised, the Tathāgata does not conceive what is cognised (to be), he does not conceive what is uncognised (to be), he does not conceive what can be cognised (to be), he does not conceive a cogniser (to be).

5. So, bhikkhus, towards dhammas which can be seen, heard, sensed, cognised, the Tathāgata being equipoised remains equipoised; and there is no other equipoise that is beyond or superior than that equipoise, I say.

Notes by Ven. Khantipalo

(a) Later changed to 'relish'. 'Delights' (abhivaññatā) implies craving (tanha).
(b) Identified by the Comy with Māra, the ruler of the realms of sensual desire.
(c) Explained in the Comy as those things which consist of subtle form only but have no perception (asaṅkhatā)—a class found in the Brahma world.
(d) Usually translated as 'diversity'.
(e) For this passage (p. 50 fn.) and comments on M 1, see Bhikkhu Nāṇānanda, Concept and Reality, BPS, Kandy 1971, p. 45f.
(f) For an exposition of this Sutta, see Bhikkhu Nāṇānanda, The Magic of the Mind, BPS, Kandy 1974.

Editor

This translation was offered to the Review by Ven. Khantipalo who has edited a further 90 suttas from the Majjhima Nikāya whose complete translation was found amongst the papers left by the late English bhikkhu, Nāṇānoli (1905-60). Ven. Khantipalo’s anthology has recently been published in three volumes by Mahāmakut, Bangkok, under the title, A Treasury of the Buddha’s Words, which will be reviewed in a future issue.

THE MEANING OF “ABHIDHAMMA” IN THE PALI CANON

Terry C. Muck

Students of Theravāda Buddhist Philosophy usually find the third section of the three-part Pali Buddhist texts, the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, the hardest to understand. The first section of the Pali texts, the Vinaya Piṭaka, lists the rules by which Buddhist monks (bhikkhus) live. The second, the Sutta Piṭaka, contains the sermons and teachings of the Buddha. But the third, the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, consists of an analytical dissection of all reality into its constituent dharmas, or moments of being. To profit from this section of the Buddhist Canon the student must fully understand the fundamental teachings of the Buddha, teachings which are found in the Sutta Piṭaka.

A good place to begin a study of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka is with the word “abhidhamma” itself. An understanding of this word leads one to more fully understand why the Abhidhamma Piṭaka was written.

We will argue in this paper that “abhidhamma” translates into English best as “essence of the teaching”. We arrive at this translation through a study of the various uses of the word “abhidhamma” in the Pali Canon. By studying these uses we can arrive at a consensus of what the early Buddhists were thinking when they used the word, and why they used it to name one of the sections of their authoritative

As a preliminary to this examination, we should look at what the two parts of this word, “abhī” and “dhamma” mean separately. “Dhamma” has been translated into English many ways, due in part to its rather global meaning in the Pali texts, at times meaning the “way things are,” or “the Buddha’s teaching,” or “the individual moments of being.” Each of these may be correct, and the diversity of meaning only serves to underscore the importance of the word “dhamma” in Buddhist philosophy. The general term “teaching” very often represents word well and can be substituted provisionally in most cases.

The prefix “abhī” determines the total meaning of “abhidhamma” and we need to examine its meaning more closely to understand the full word. Trying to determine the meaning of a prefix in Pali is a tenuous proposition. Warder says in his Pali grammar:

The prefixes are regarded as a separate part of speech in Pali (whose characteristic is that it cannot stand alone, but only be

1. So much research has been done on the meaning of “dhamma” that it is beyond the scope of this article to examine the question thoroughly. Suffice it to say that the term refers to everything as it really is, and because the Buddha recognized the way things really are, his teaching, which reflects that understanding, can be called Dhamma. See the following discussions: David Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy (Honolul: University Press of Hawaii, 1976), pp. 318-319; Nyanatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary (Colombo: Lake House Press, 1972), s.v.; Walpole Rahula, What the Buddha Taught (New York: Grove Press, 1974), pp. 58ff.

preixed to another word). The various verbs (and nouns), consisting of prefix plus root, have all to be learned separately as regards meanings. Although the separate prefixes and roots can be assigned meanings—usually rather broad and vague ones—the meaning of a prefix plus root cannot usually be accounted for adequately as simply the product of the two separate meanings.

Buddhaghosa assigns some general meanings to the prefix “abhī” in The Expositor. He says it means “growth, proper attributes, reverence, clear differentiation, and surpassing worth.” Rhys Davids, in the Pali-English Dictionary, says the primary meaning of “abhī” is that of taking possession and mastering which, he says, leads to the figurative meaning of increasing or intensifying of the root word. These two scholars, of course, have arrived at these very similar opinions through a study of what the prefix “abhī” does to a wide variety of words in the Pali texts. But, as Warder has pointed out, each word must be viewed in its own context. While we must accept this general intensifying function of “abhī” for the “Dhamma”, we are constrained to go further and examine just what this intensification does in the specific case of “abhidhamma”.

Although “essence of the teaching” is the best translation of “abhidhamma”, there have been several other renderings of the word in English translations of Pali Buddhist works. These previous translations do not seem to really get at the meaning of the word. While we would err in saying they are incorrect (because they all have a modicum of truth), there exist better words to translate “abhidhamma”.

Buddhaghosa, when he does not identify the word with the Piṭaka, says it means “differentiation”, apparently implying that one knows enough about the Dhamma to differentiate it from other sets of knowledge. He defines it in the phrase “abhidhamma, abhinivāyā” as:

In sentences such as “he is able to master the abhidhamma, abhinivāyā” it (abhī-) expresses differentiation; the sentence, that is to say means “He is able to master the Dhamma and Vinaya without confusing either with the other.”

None of these translations seem really to get at the meaning of “abhidhamma.” To do that we must examine the uses of the word in the Pali canonical texts where the true meaning for the Theravāda Buddhist is found.

What does the word “abhidhamma” mean in the Pali Canon of Theravāda Buddhism? Immediately we can see two main usages. The word has a non-technical meaning which appears to go back to the very origins of the texts, the time of the Buddha or shortly thereafter.

5. The Expositor (PTS), p. 23.
However, before we can deal specifically with that meaning, the other usage must be properly understood. “Abhidhamma” has a technical meaning as a designation of one of the three main divisions of the Tipiṭaka, the threefold Pali Canon. In order to discern the non-technical meaning of “abhidhamma”, we must be able to isolate and recognize when the technical meaning, a later usage, occurs in the texts. This discernment rests on the argument that the Abhidhamma Piṭaka represents an advanced (and thus later) development of the Theravāda doctrine.

As a title, “abhidhamma” refers to seven books highly respected by Buddhists past and present. Their respect evidence itself in two ways: historical study and veneration, and an attempt to ascribe these books to the Buddha himself. We read in the Cullavamsa, the second portion of the great chronicle of Ceylon, the Mahāvamsa, of King Kassapa V (10th century A.C.) who had the whole of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka inscribed on gold plates, and who had the Dhammasanggaṇī, the first book of this seven book collection, set in jewels. A more modern Buddhist scholar, Cassius Pereira (the late Bhikkhu Kassapa), describes the Abhidhamma Piṭaka this way:

It is to such a student (one seeking the true vision of a Buddha) that the Abhidhamma comes as a wonderful revelation, for even the Buddha can only be that, a revelation and not a realization for a worldly, however high he may have climbed up this ladder of knowledge. Here he feels he at last enjoys a picture of the Truth. It is not seeing truth face to face; it is a picture; but it is a true picture, a glimpse, however faint, of the Truth that the Noble Ones have attained.

Because Theravādins recognize Truth in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, they believe in its authoritativeness, and since there exists a tradition that only Enlightened Ones teach Abhidhamma, Theravāda tradition claims the Buddha taught the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. Buddhaghosa tells us in the Expositor that the Buddha realised and understood Abhidhamma at the foot of the bo-tree on the full moon day of Vesakha. He first taught it to the Tavatimsa devas, for only those freed from the intoxicants can understand it. Probationers and good worldlings may attempt to learn Abhidhamma but will not do so until they attain freedom.

Nyāṇatiloka Mahāthera, in his Guide Through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, says that like other writings of this early Buddhist period, the seven books of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka cannot be precisely dated. Internal evidence indicates that the Dhammasanggaṇī, the Vibhanga, and the Paṭṭhāna are the oldest and were probably recited at the Second Council of Arahants, held in the first quarter of the 4th century B.C. The Dhātu-Kathā, the Puggala-Paṭākā, and Yamaṇa were recited at the

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other Abhidhamma works (Dhammasangāti, Dhātu-Kathā, Puggalapaññatti) but there is no evidence to justify separating these mātikas from the main works. In other words, they are nothing more than tables of contents for those works.

A more reasonable argument appears when we consider the nature of this tradition making the Buddha the author of books written down three or four centuries after his death. The purpose of the tradition rests in an attempt to sanction the Abhidhamma Pitaka as a valid aid in finding the truth; indeed, it represents the highest textual achievement of the religious tradition.

In a traditional sense, the Buddha may be seen as the author of the Abhidhamma Pitaka because more than any other writing it does point to the path which his teaching set forth. Which is the reality of the Dhamma in the Abhidhamma, although it is not itself the Dhamma. Further, the words and teachings of the Buddha represent authority to Theravādins because they accurately describe the "way things are" and not simply because the Buddha taught them.

This unique historical sense, which differs from the Judeo-Christian need to firmly root God's actions in specific history, allows us to understand the Buddha's desire to ascribe the later Abhidhamma Pitaka works to the Buddha and at the same time accept the fruits of historical-critical research. It leaves us free from a historical-critical point of view to accept the later date of composition of the texts without any injustice to the reality expressed by the traditional viewpoint.

The consequences of this later date of the Abhidhamma Pitaka for our study of the earlier, non-technical meaning of "abhidhamma" lie in the evaluation of the seventeen occurrences of the term in the Sutta Pitaka and the Vinaya Pitaka. Our first task in trying to determine the meaning of "abhidhamma" consists of removing the passages where "abhidhamma" refers to the later third of the Tipitaka. Of the seventeen occurrences, four appear to be used in this technical sense.

All four appear in the Vinaya Pitaka in sections which represent later additions to the original text. The Parivara, the Abhidhamma-like summary of the Vinaya Pitaka, probably written in Ceylon, is based on the Sutta Pitaka. A passage which attributes all three sections of the Tipitaka to the great lion (the Buddha). The Old Commentary (padabhājana) contains an exegetical explanation of the words used in the statement of each rule, contains two references to Abhidhamma which obviously mean the third division of the Tipitaka.

The Old Commentary has become part of the standard Vinaya text and probably did not become fixed until the text reached written form in Ceylon. The final case to be considered is found in one of the word keys which frequently follow sections of the Vinaya added later to the text as mnemonic devices. This one is at the end of the "Great Section" of the Mahāvagga. These four uses of "abhidhamma" may all be considered later additions to the text and as such do not affect the early meaning of "abhidhamma."

Of the thirteen remaining instances of "abhidhamma", all used in the non-technical, early sense, nine occur in the phrase, "abhidhamma, abhivinaya." All nine are used to describe a virtuous bhikkhu or what a virtuous bhikkhu studies. Five of the nine occur in a formula saying:

He loves the Dhamma, the utterance of it is dear to him, he
finds exceeding joy in the teaching of both abhidhamma and
abhivinaya.

Two of the nine occur in similes describing good bhikkhus, used twice in the Gradual Sayings. Good bhikkhus resemble good coals with regard to speed (four noble truths), good proportions (offerings), and beauty (abhidhamma, abhivinaya). In the Middle Length Sayings Commentary, the Gilavāna Sutta, a sutta which gives rules for forest dwelling bhikkhus, bhikkhus who choose to dwell in the forest should study abhidhamma and abhivinaya in order to justify their withdrawal from society.

The ninth occurrence appears in the Vinaya in a section describing the qualities a bhikkhu should have in order to ordain younger bhikkhus. He should be able to:

18. The question naturally arises: Who added these insertions? Although this question lies beyond the scope of our task here, we can make two observations. First, it is instructive that all four occur in the Vinaya because we remember that the Buddha not only changed certain portions of the Vinaya during his lifetime, but at the time of his death, instructed Ananda to allow changes in the minor precepts as new conditions demanded (see Dialogues of the Buddha, PTS, II, p. 171). As the Abhidhamma became an accepted part of Buddhist monastic tradition, Vinaya rules and instructions would become necessary regarding its use. Second, a logical selection for the later relocator would be Buddhaghosa, the fifth century A.C. commentator in Ceylon. In his commentaries on the Sutta Pitaka, Buddhaghosa frequently identifies the non-technical early use of "abhidhamma" with the later Pitaka of the same name (see for example, the Vinaya Commentary (Sangamagāthikī), pp. 361, 742; Dialogues of the Buddha (PTS), II, p. 246; Middle Length Sayings Commentary, II, p. 256, III, p. 185, IX, p. 29). He obviously had an interest in reading back into these early texts these later developed body of doctrine. That he does not appear to play a role of relocator with the Sutta as he (perhaps) did with the Vinaya, but limits himself to the commentaries, may be seen as a reflection of his different attitudes to the two branches of scripture.
19. Dialogues of the Buddha (PTS), III, p. 246; Gradual Sayings (PTS), I, p. 267, IV, p. 266, V, pp. 19, 64, 139, 217; Middle Length Sayings (PTS), II, p. 145, Book of the Discipline (PTS), IV, 84.
20. Dialogues of the Buddha (PTS), III, p. 246; Gradual Sayings (PTS), V, pp. 19, 64, 139, 217.
22. Middle Length Sayings (PTS), II, p. 145.
to train pupils in abhidhamma (conduit), adibrahmacaryika (brahma-
saring), abhidhamma, and abhivinaya.23

What does the phrase “abhidhamma, abhivinaya” mean?24 We can
be quite sure that the two words refer to the early two-fold division
of the Buddha’s teaching, the Dhamma and Vinaya. The Buddha himself
distinguished between his discourses and the special organisational rules
he was finally compelled to draw up when increasing numbers of follower
made it impossible for him to deal personally with all the problems which
came up between bhikkhus. This distinction between Dhamma and
Vinaya was formalised at the First Council held immediately following
the Buddha’s death, where Upali recited Vinaya and Ananda recited Dhamma.
The question for these uses now becomes what does the prefix “abhi-”
do to these words?25

Our most important clue in determining the meaning of “abhidhamma,
abhivinaya”26 lie in the almost uniform contexts in which the phrase
occurs, the general meaning of the prefix “abhi-”, and the one divergent
context where it appears in the Vinaya Pitaka. We have examined the
uniform contexts where the phrase “abhidhamma, abhivinaya” occurs
and from this study know “abhidhamma” refers to something all virtuous
bhikkhus can and should comprehend. We have also seen that the
prefix “abhi-” generally intensifies its root word; in this case it clearly
defines Buddhist doctrine. The one divergent context we must now
look at occurs in the Vinaya Pitaka (IV:84). Even in this context refers
to what qualifies a good bhikkhu should have but it talks of a special
bhikkhu, the preceptor, the instructor of novices. The passage says a
preceptor should be able to train a novice in abhisamādārika (fundamentals
of moral life), adibrahmacaryika (fundamentals of the brahma life),
abhidhamma, and abhivinaya. We can legitimately extend the meaning
of these first two words to the second pair so that they read fundamentals
of doctrine and fundamentals of monastic discipline. We can do this
not only because of the obvious parallelism but because this is what we
would expect a teacher to be able to impart to a young recruit: funda-
mentals.

What word can we find that covers these ingredients: a trait of all
good bhikkhus, and the intensified, clearly defined teaching which is at
the same time fundamental to the Buddhist life? It seems a good to
represent this rich meaning of “abhidhamma” is “essence of the teaching.”

The “essence of the teaching” is accessible to all to a certain degree.
We saw earlier that “abhidhamma” when applied to the Pitaka refers
to an advanced body of doctrine that only a privileged few were able to
master.27 But the phrase as used in the Sutta Pitaka and the Vinaya

Pitaka applies to all virtuous bhikkhus. All virtuous bhikkhus were
expected to make great strides in mastering the inward substance of
what the Buddha taught. While a detailed knowledge of every sutta
perhaps was out of reach, a knowledge of the essence of Dhamma was a
realistic goal.

Does a translation of “abhidhamma, abhivinaya” as “essence of the
teaching and monastic discipline” square with the four remaining
occurrences of “abhidhamma” in the Canon? Yes it does. In the
Mahāsāgāra Sutta, a group of prominent disciples were sitting around
one evening in a wooded grove discussing the ideal bhikkhu. Each
of these bhikkhus had gained fame for some outstanding virtue they
possessed and each in turn described a virtuous bhikkhu in terms of this
personally outstanding trait. Moggallāna described the ideal bhikkhu
as a “man who know abhidhamma”, asking one another questions; in
answering one another’s questions they respond and do not fail, and
their talk on Dhamma goes forward.”28 Moggallāna had gained a
reputation as a talker on Dhamma. Here we find him describing
situation where two bhikkhus discuss Dhamma and appear to be in
general agreement; “they respond and do not fail.” Such agreement
would come only if the fundamental outlook and concepts of what they
were discussing were familiar to both. They surely cannot be discussing
most, difficult philosophical points, but basic, essential truths. Thus
“essence of the teaching” here would be a good translation of “abhi-
dhamma.”

We read in the Kinti Sutta, evidence that further supports this inter-
pretation of “abhidhamma”.29 In this sutta the Buddha describes how
essential it is for the bhikkhus to be in agreement on matters of “abhi-
dhamma.” From the context it is obvious that “abhidhamma” here
refers back to the thirty-seven factors of Enlightenment.30

Wherefore, bhikkhus, those things taught to you by me out
of superknowledge, that is to say the four applications of mindfulness,
the four right efforts, the four bases of psychic power, the
five controlling faculties, the five powers, the seven links in
awakening, the Aryan eightfold path—all together, in harmony
and without contention you should train yourselves in each and
each of these. But when you, bhikkhus, all together, in harmony
and without contention have trained yourselves in these, there
might be two bhikkhus speaking differently about abhidhamma.30

The thirty-seven factors of Enlightenment form the basic, essential
core of Buddhist teaching. Many scholars, in the idealistic search for
what the Buddha actually taught (the words of the Buddha), point
to these factors as that beyond which we cannot go.30 The Buddha

23. Book of the Discipline (PTS), IV, p. 84.
24. See also H. H. Hoering, “Abhidhamma, Abhivinaya,” IHQ XII, No. 3,
(September 1941).
25. Walpola Rahula, in his book History of Buddhism in Ceylon (Colombo, Ceylon:
M. D. Gunasena & Co. 1950), says, “Proficiency in the Abhidhamma, which excited
a person to the revered position of a philosopher, was difficult achievement coveted
by all.” (p. 291)
in this sūtra made it clear that contention and disagreement on this core of his teaching must be avoided. He demanded of his bhikkhus a harmonious outlook on both the denotation and connotation of these basic teachings. While we suspect that institutional harmony constituted a large, if not to say the major, reason for this demand, for our purposes it is most useful to notice that the word “abhidhamma” is used to describe this essential teaching.

Many passages indicate the unique nature of these early Buddhist discussions. In the Gradual Sayings a story tells us of a young man named Citta who constantly interrupted a group of elder bhikkhus who were discussing “abhidhamma.”132 We know from other sources that Citta prided himself on his keenness in distinguishing subtle differences in the meaning of words.133 Most likely his interruptions in this story were attempts to make his keenness felt. Mahā Kṣetrapāla rebukes him and asks him not to interrupt. The Elder Kṣetrapāla then goes on to give a series of similes describing one who has a contentious spirit (like Citta’s) and the fate of such a person (he frequently enters and leaves the Order). From this story we can deduce that these discussions on “abhidhamma” were not so much disputations as recitals of those ideas which they held in common. We have throughout the Dīgha Nikāya discussions between the Buddha and various disciples which can only be described as disputations. But it is interesting that the word “abhidhamma” is not used to describe these discussions. In the passages where “abhidhamma” occurs, harmony, and accord compromise the main point expressed.

Finally, the word “abhidhamma” occurs in a passage in the Gradual Sayings which deals with dangers the Buddha sees threatening the purity of the teaching.9 The live dangers of this section all deal with the corruptions of the Dhamma and discipline; bhikkhus who have not paid the price in cultivating sīla, samādhi, and panna will: 1) by association contaminate other bhikkhus adversely; 2) give poor guidance to younger bhikkhus; 3) teach doctrine while not fully understanding what they teach; 4) pay more attention to teachings not by the Buddha than by the Buddha; 5) become lazy in making spiritual progress. “Abhidhamma” occurs in the third danger: “abhidhammakathāṇa vaddallakkhattham kathenta kathāṇa dhammāna ākāmama no kathāțasati.” Hare in the PTS edition of the Gradual Sayings translates “abhidhamma” as more-dhamma and “vaddalla” (one of the literary genres used in the Buddhist scriptures) as runes. He sets them as on equal footing by translating it! “When giving a talk (kathaṇa) on more-dhamma or runes...” A better translation would not set them off by “or” (in the Pali, “va” is not present); Hare’s translation leaves the impression that “abhidhamma” is one of the nine “āgās” (literary genres), which it is not.9 Instead, vaddalla should be seen as modifying “abhidhamma”, “When giving a talk on “abhidhamma” which is vaddalla...” A vaddalla is a sūtra in the form of questions, a catechetical discourse. This passage refers to the way in which the “essence of the teaching” (abhidhamma) came to be disseminated to the younger bhikkhus through a prescribed question and answer format. The Buddha here expresses a concern that this passing on will come to be done by those who do not fully understand what they teach or who do so, as the commentary states, “looking for defects, marking, preaching for gain and honour.”

“Essence of the teaching” fits the last four contexts quite well. When taken along with our findings for the “abhidhamma, abhiṣikṣaṇa” phrase, “essence” seems to be an altogether adequate translation. While not a perfect translation (the impossible dream), it does gather together in one term concepts which earlier translations ignore; “essence” implies a condensed, manageable body of material which all bhikkhus could discuss harmoniously, it has no connotations of eliteness, it suggests intensified importance, the general meaning of “abhi-”. The Buddha, while careful not to overemphasize philosophical positions, considered a basic orientation (an asking of the correct questions) indispensable for one to be considered a “Buddhist”. He makes allusions to this throughout the Sutta Pitaka and in several places becomes quite specific, e.g. the Brahmajāla Sutta. “Abhidhamma”, “essence of the teaching” came to be the core of his teaching.

The value of this revised translation lies in the increased understanding it gives us of the body of writing which later came to be the title Abhidhamma Pitaka. Obviously the result of an attempt to make manageable the extremely large and diverse materials which grew up around the Buddha’s teaching in the immediate centuries following his death, the Abhidhamma Pitaka reflects the scholastic nature of its origin, the teaching in teachable form. Because of its complexity it outgrew this early role and became the pinnacle of Theravāda Buddhist philosophy but in it can easily be recognised the early quintessence which bhikkhus passed on to one another, and to pupils and novices.

32. Dialogues of the Buddha (PTS), I, p. 256n.
33. Gradual Sayings (PTS), III, p. 83.
34. Anguttara Nikāya (PTS), III, p. 107.
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STUDIES IN THE JINACARITA

Sukomal Chaudhuri*

The Jinacarita is a poem on the life of the Buddha. It was written by the Thera Vanaratanama Medhamtara of the Vijayabahu-parivēpa of Ceylon during the reign of King Bhuvana-bahu I (1277-88 A.C.). Like the Mahāvamsa, Dipavamsa and Dāthāvamsa, it is an important contribution to the history of Pali literature. According to B.C. Law "it represents a poetic development in Pali similar to that represented by the Buddha-carita in Sanskrit Buddhist literature." As a good specimen of fine poetry, it comes in the category of a Khandakāyika (short poem) like the Meghadūta and Rtusuṣṭhāra of Kalidāsa in Sanskrit. Though not of as high a poetic merit as the Meghadūta, the crest-jewel of Khandakāyika, yet, as B. M. Barua says, the Jinacarita is undoubtedly, the best work of its kind in Pali." The following words of W. Stede in his "note on the position of the Dāthāvamsa in the history of Pali Literature" are applicable to the Jinacarita also: "There are not many books of that character in the Canon or post-canonical literature, and it is a pleasant change to see the venerable language of the Nikāyas put to a different, i.e. fluently poetical, use. It testifies also to the importance of this language and the favour it has found up to modern times. The character of Classical Pali is well retained, although the Sanskrit education of its author has left its stamp on its style." According to Charles Duroiselle, the poet of the Jinacarita "has risen to heights placing him in the foremost rank among poets only in those places where he has broken through the ethereal imitation, and written from the depths of his own inspiration." But Winternitz has to some extent underestimated the merit of the book with the statement that "it is a very mediocre poem on the life of the Buddha, in simple and natural, but not particularly beautiful language. It looks almost like a somewhat clumsy versification of the Nidānā-kathā. We however agree with the statement that the Jinacarita is a mediocre poem on the life of the Buddha, for as regards merit it cannot be compared with Asvaghosa's Buddhacakarita, an actual epic of the Buddha. But what is remarkable is that like Asvaghosa the poet of the Jinacarita has not burdened his poem with unnecessary doctrinal matters, his chief intention being simply to write a biography of the Buddha. It is not a clumsy versification of the Nidānā-Kathā, as Winternitz has pointed out, but it is something more than that. It is not unlikely that the author of the Jinacarita has utilised the Nidānā-Kathā as the source of his book. But like a swan he has shunned aside the water and has sucked up only

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2. JPTS. 1890, p. 63. JPTS. 1886, p. 62, 72 .
5. Dāthāvamsa (Lahore edition, 1925) p. iii.
poetic sentiment. His description of the journey to Kapilavatthu from Rājagaha (vv. 347-352) is beautiful and unique for which our poet should occupy a place in the foremost rank of poets. His description of the beauty and charms of Māyā (vv. 77-78) and Yasodharā (vv. 172 and 395) is delicate and graceful. His description of the overall change in the world immediately after the birth of Siddhattha (vv. 96-116), and his description of Siddhattha's conflict with Mara under the Bodhi-tree (vv. 243-265)—all are striking, and exemplify the poet's real poetic intellect.

But what is remarkable about the style of the Jīnacarita is that in most cases it is coarse and light while at the same time elegant and brilliant. The verses are not constructed artificially but we seldom find any difficult or irregular constructions. Besides, the verses are embellished with choice words and striking figures of speech. How excellent and appropriate appears that simile in which Sumedha is compared to a royal elephant as an elephant flees from a forest blazing with fire, Sumedha also departed from his house (blazing with passions, envy, delusion and the like—v. 21); or in which the newborn child Siddhattha is compared to a golden goose-Siddhattha came forth from the womb of his mother like a golden goose descending from a lotus (v. 88); or in which a consignment of deer (or animals) with lions is compared to that of parents with children (v. 100); or in which Yasodharā is compared to a moon which is aspired to by all bee-like eyes (v. 172); or in which the Buddha's journey is compared to that of the moon—like a full moon surrounded by stars, the Buddha went here and there being accompanied by his brilliant disciples (vv. 326, 356-357).

In conclusion, we quote Charles Duroiselle's comment: 'The charm of the Jīnacarita lies in its lighter style; in the author's choice of graceful and sometimes forcible images; in the art of his descriptions, the richness and, in some passages, the delicacy of his expressions; qualities which go to make its reading of heavy didactic poetry. But for its some lengthy and bombastic compounded words and some proxy expressions, the Jīnacarita could have occupied a place in the foremost rank of the Indian kāyas.'

17. Very few contracted forms like pāpaṃta (v. 326) has been used for the sake of metre.

THE LOTUS AS A SYMBOL IN THE PALI TRADITION

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From Hindu mythology, one learns that from the golden lotus on Vishnu's forehead appeared the goddess Śrī. In another episode, while reclining on the serpent Ananta a lotus stalk arose from Vishnu's navel which gave birth to the god Brahma. In sculpture Vishnu is often depicted holding a lotus-flower in one of his four hands. In pre-Vedic literature Surya, the sun god, is represented as standing on a red lotus flower. Besides its importance in Hindu religion, the lotus-flower plays a prominent role in Mahāyāna Buddhist literature and art; it is especially associated with the Bodhisattva. The purpose of this paper is to examine the symbol of the lotus in the earlier Pali Buddhist tradition. It will be demonstrated that much of the later symbolic significance of the lotus in Mahāyāna Buddhism is prefigured in the Pali tradition.

The lotus is not just any lovely product of nature; it possesses a mysterious power. If used in conjunction with medicines, the lotus can cure illness. It is reported that it helped cure the fever of Sāriputta, an important early disciple of the Buddha. Thus from an early period in the Buddhist tradition the lotus had a magical quality.

The lotus is a plant which grows upward from the bottom of a lake or pond and slowly ascends to the surface. Thus the lotus is born in the water; it comes to full maturity in the water, eventually rises to the surface and stands unspotted by the water. As such, it serves as a symbol of the Tathāgata (the one thus come), who is born and matures in the water, passes beyond the world, and eventually emerges untainted by the world. In this sense, the lotus is not only a symbol of the Tathāgata but also of upward action, spiritual growth and attainment, and detachment from the world.

The spiritual development of human beings is represented by the lotus. There are beings with a little or much dust in their eyes. Others possess acute or dull faculties. In other words, some individuals are more enlightened than others. Just as some lotus-flowers thrive while immersed in water, others reach the surface of the water, and some rise unfilled out of the water. *

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3. Ibid., 214.
At times, the lotus beneath the water is symbolic of a bhikkhu in the third state of trance. Just as the lotus flourishes beneath the water and is saturated by cool water, a monk in the third trance state is saturated with joy. The bhikkhu in this state is serene and self-possessed.

In the Sāṅgiti Sutta of the Digha Nikāya, seven types of recluses are enumerated: the unshaken recluse; the blue lotus recluse; the white lotus recluse; and the exquisite recluse. I want to concentrate on the significance of the blue and white lotus recluses.

The blue lotus recluse is equivalent to a once-returner (sakadāgāmin):

Herein a monk, by utterly wearing out three fetters and by weakening lust, anger and delusion, is a once-returner. Coming back just once more to this world he makes an end of ill.

The blue lotus recluse is assured of no bad rebirths and enlightenment within one more lifetime. He is free of the three fetters (sanyojana): delusions of self; doubts about the Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha; trust in the efficacy of rituals and good works. If one places the colour blue within the Indian cultural context, one discovers that since indigo-blue is so durable, blue is the colour of faithfulness. Furthermore, the blue lotus recluse contemplates the rise and fall of the five-grasping groups (uppādānakkhandhā), but he does not experience the eight deliverances (vinikākisas).

The white lotus recluse is equal to the degree of sanctification represented by a non-returner (anāgāmin):

Herein a monk, by utterly wearing out the five fetters which cause rebirth here, is apparitionally born, destined there to pass utterly away, of a nature not to return from that world.

The non-returner destroys the initial three fetters plus sensuality and ill-will. The white lotus recluse is assured of enlightenment during his current lifetime. He will be reborn in another world and never return to the present cycle of suffering. Like the blue lotus recluse, he contemplates the rise and fall of the five-grasping groups, but he goes beyond the level of spiritual attainment of the blue lotus recluse by personally experiencing the eight deliverances.

In many world religions, white is the colour of purity. The lotus is rooted and grows in the slimy mud at the bottom of a pond. As it moves upward and blossoms forth, the white lotus is untainted by the mud of the earth. Likewise, the successful monk emerges clean and purified of the world’s uncleanness.

The lotus is a symbol of spiritual progress and enlightenment. It grows in the maternal, primeval, procreative waters. The waters represent the pre-formal potentiality for spiritual enlightenment. It is the unformed from which a new form, new being or new life can emerge. Within the water, the lotus represents its generative organ; it is the energy and force inherent in the waters. The waters—the symbol of life—gives new life; the lotus is nourished by the waters, but it eventually rises above the waters and symbolically transcends them. Not a drop of water can cling to the leaves of the lotus which becomes totally detached like the enlightened saint. The gradual rising of the lotus is an act of creation; the emerging of a new being.

The significance of the lotus as a pre-eminent symbol in Mahāyāna Buddhism is prefigured in the Pali tradition. In other words, the seeds of its later importance are rooted in the Pali tradition and in early Hinduism. For example, a symbol of the ātman is the lotus of the heart. For one who knows the truth, evil action does not adhere to him, just as water does not cling to the leaf of a lotus-flower. And from its association with the Hindu goddesses, the lotus connotes the supramundane character of the enlightened ones of the Mahāyāna tradition. The unfolding of the lotus is symbolic of the dawn of enlightenment and the victory over ignorance. It represents the wisdom of Nibbāna, the aspiring monk, and the various levels of human existence.
THE WAY TO NIRVANA ACCORDING TO THE DHAMMAPADA

L. M. Joshi***

1. The Dhammapada

The Dhammapada is a collection of 423 verses in classical Pali. It forms the second book of the Minor Collection (Khuddakankikāya) of the Sutta Pitaka of the Theravāda Buddhist tradition. More than half of the verses collected in this book have been traced to the other Pali texts of the Tipitaka. This shows that it was compiled by some able Buddhist sage after the first four Nikāyas had received their present form. The fact that the Dhammapada is an anthology of sayings attributed to the Buddha compiled perhaps at the time of the final reduction of the Pali Tipitaka, suggests a definite purpose of this compilation. In our opinion, this purpose was to present a practical manual or guide to those who seek to reach Nirvāṇa. Similar Buddhist anthologies are found in Sanskrit and Prakrit languages also. The Udānāvarga and the Gandhāri Dhammapada are two well-known examples of this class of texts. The Pali Dhammapada belongs to the Sthaviravāda School, the Udānāvarga belongs to the Sarvāstivāda School, while the Gandhāri Dhammapada perhaps belongs to the Dhammaupakāsa School of ancient Buddhism. The fact that there are many verses common to these three anthologies indicates their common source belonging to a period prior to the rise of schools in the Buddhist Tradition.

As an authentic guide to the seekers of Nirvāṇa, the Dhammapada seems to present us with a complete perspective of the Way to Nirvāṇa. The purpose of the present paper is to describe this Way. In a recent paper I have suggested that the word Dharma, means Nirvāṇa also, and that the word pada means the way; in other words, the title dhama-pada has been interpreted in the sense of ‘the Way to Nirvāṇa’. Here we propose to analyse different facets of the Way according to the Pali Dhammapada.

2. Futility of External Asceticism

It is sometimes said that the Buddhist Way to Nirvāṇa is ascetic, and that Nirvāṇa can be achieved only by the ascetic monk. This view seems to be based on a misunderstanding of the Way. It has to be remembered that Sakyaṃuni had rejected the path of mortifying asceticism as fruitless. He had finally adopted the Middle Way which led him to Buddhahood. This Middle Way transcends both mortifying physical austerities and thoughtless indulgence in sense-pleasures.

There is, nevertheless, a certain degree of ascetic discipline in the total structure of the Way. This ascetic or yogic strand of the Way does not consist in external forms of asceticism; it consists in a systematic method of restraining the bodily, mental, and vocal actions with a view to effecting total external and internal purification and in developing inner awakening. This can be achieved by the monks who have renounced the common mode of existence as well as by the lay people who are living in society as regular members of the Buddha’s Universal Order. We shall quote a few verses from our text to support the above view.

Rejecting mere external asceticism, the Buddha declares that “Not wandering naked, nor mattered locks, nor filth, nor fasting, nor lying on the ground, nor dust, nor ashes, nor striving squatting on the heeds, can purify a mortal who has not overcome doubts” (verse 140). One does not become a true monk merely by wearing an ochre robe. Defining a true monk, the Lord says: “He who, though richly decked, behaves imparitially, is peaceful, subdued, settled (on the Way), of holy conduct, and has ceased to harm all living beings, is indeed a holy man, a samana, a bhikkhu” (verse 142).

A mere yellow robe is not enough; ascetic discipline does not consist in external rituals and symbols of austerity. In one of the sterner sayings in our text we read the following: “What is the use of your matted hair, O Rōkah! What is the use of your garment of antelope skin? Inside you are full of passions, but the outside you make clean” (verse 394). Corrupt monks were not unknown in ancient times. It is stated that “Many men whose shoulders are covered with the yellow robe are of evil character and unrestrained; such evil-doers by their evil deeds go to hell” (verse 307).

3. Necessity of Self-Effort

Another feature characteristic of the Way to Nirvāṇa is the necessity of individual effort. Here is the message of self-reliance and independence broadcast by one who had attained Nirvāṇa by his own efforts. In many verses of our text individual effort on the part of the seeker is declared essential. “What neither mother, nor father, nor any other relative can do, a well-directed mind does and thereby elevates one” (verse 43). In the two opening verses of the text the mind is declared to be the forerunner of all our good and evil states and supremacy of what we think is emphasised (verse 1-2). A wise man is he who purifies himself of the impurities of the mind (verse 88). Purification does not come from within; it comes from within and is achieved by oneself. Therefore, the Buddha says: “Onself, indeed, is one’s master; what other master could there be? With oneself well subdued, one finds a master difficult to find” (verse 160).

No god nor any other higher power is recognised in the Buddhist doctrine. Man is himself fully responsible for his condition in the course of existence, and he is also fully capable of effecting his liberation from this course. The teacher of this principle of independence and self-reliance has exhorted his disciples in the following words: “Rouse yourself by yourself, examine yourself by yourself; thus self-guarded and mindful, O brother, you will live happily. Self, indeed, is the master of


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self. Self is the refuge of self. Therefore, subdue yourself as the merchant subdues a good horse" (verses 379-380).

As is well known, these sayings of the Buddha seem to have inspired some ideas contained in the Bhagavadgīta. Consider, for instance, the following three verses in this text: "One should elevate oneself by oneself, and should not degrade oneself; for self is the only friend of self, and is the only enemy of self. To him who has subdued his body by his self, his self is friend; but to him who has not subdued his self, his own self will behave inimically, like an enemy. He who is self-subdued and pacified, his supreme self remains concentrated in cold and heat, pleasure and pain, likewise in honour and disgrace" (VI 5-7). Some modern translators, who were struck by these two sets of verses with almost parallel contents, have interpreted the meaning of these verses of the Dhammapada. In the Bhagavadgīta the first line of the seventh verse of the sixth chapter reads thus: jītvamah prāṇāsya paramātma samāhitaḥ, which we have rendered as "he who is self subdued and pacified, his supreme self (paramātma) remains concentrated". Those who are wedded to the doctrine of "God" or "Supreme Self" (paramātma) make here a distinction between a lower ātma and a higher ātma, and think that the self-subdued man becomes established in the Supreme Self or God (paramātma samāhitaḥ). This interpretation is a possible interpretation of the Dhammapada's Vedānta in which an embodied self (jītvam) is destined to merge into the Supreme Self (paramātma). The Bhagavadgīta itself teaches this belief in several of its verses. But this idea is not found in the verses quoted above. The self-subdued man remains still (samāhita) and concentrated even when he encounters pairs of opposites because of his self mastery and self-control (jītvam). His subdued self itself is called paramātma or supreme self; in other words, jītvam, prāṇātma and paramātma are epithets of the same yogin who remains in absorption and is not disturbed by heat, cold, praise and insult.

When even on the evidence of the Bhagavadgīta, VI 5-7, we cannot find the theory of conquering lower self by another higher self, how can we find such a theory in the Dhammapada which is an authentic document of a non-Vedic and non-theistic tradition which has held aloft the unique banner of anātmaśuddha or the principle of not-self? Those who try to offer a Vedantic interpretation of Buddhist principles and practices seem to be engaged in what is called vipālītsa or vipārītya.

When the Buddha says that self is the refuge of self, it simply means that oneself is the refuge of oneself, there is no other refuge. The duality between a lower and a higher self is foreign to Buddhist thought. This duality is opposed to the Buddhist principle of autonomy which stresses self-exertion, self-reliance, and ultimately self-transcendence. In Nirvāna there is neither ātma nor paramātma. The Buddhist soteriology differs radically from all the other theistic soteriologies which teach surrender to God and make salvation dependent on His grace. The Buddhist Way to Ultimate Release keeps man at the centre of the whole drama of samāra and seeks to release him not only from suffering but also from God, gods, and all kinds of foreign powers end fears. He who wants to be released ultimately must work for it diligently and with earnestness. The text says: "by oneself, indeed, is evil done; by oneself is one defiled. By oneself is evil avoided; by oneself, indeed, is one purified. Purity and impurity depend on oneself. No one can purify another" (verse 163).

This doctrine might appear disappointing and even terrifying to the weeklings, devoid of firm mind and sharp intellect. The strength to follow the Buddha's Way comes from the capacity to renounce all that does not conduce to the realisation of Nirvāna. Those whose strength lies in their self-love and who cherish ownership in any of its forms cannot renounce; they are indeed frightened and therefore seek some external assistance and refuge. "Driven by fear, people go to many a refuge, to hills, woods, groves, trees, and shrines. But that is not safe refuge, that is not the best refuge. One is not delivered from all sufferings by resorting to such refuge!" (verses 188-189). People do not know that the ultimate Protection or Security from suffering and death can be achieved only by successfully traversing the Way to Nirvāna. The text says: "Sons are no protection, nor father, nor brothers, for one who is seized by death kikaṃ are of no protection. Knowing this fact, let a wise and good person immediately clear the Way to Nirvāna" (verses 288-289). The Goal, the Teacher, and the Way are there; the disciple has to make the effort by himself to reach the Goal by following the Way pointed out by the Teacher. The Buddha says: "If you go on this Way you will make an end of suffering. I have taught the Way having known the removed of the arrow of suffering. You yourself must make an effort. The Transcendent Ones (Tathāgatas) are only teachers. The meditative ones, who enter the Way, are released from the bonds of Death" (verses 275-276).

4. Ethical Practices

The text occasionally refers to the Eightfold Way (verses 191 and 273); the Eight Factors of the Way find mention here and there, and all of these factors are part of Buddhist ethical practices. The Eightfold Way constitutes the fourth Holy Truth, and it is believed to include the triple course of training, viz. ethical, Mental, and intellectual (ṣīla, samādhi, prajñā). Right Speech, Right Action, and Right Livelihood, these three factors of the Eightfold Way constitute ethical training; Right Effort, Right Mindfulness, and Right Concentration constitute the mental training, while Right Perspective and Right Aim constitute the intellectual training culminating in Wisdom. A detailed description of these Eight Factors is not needed here, because this is given in almost all modern books on Buddhism.

The Dhammapada (verse 89) once refers to the Factors of Enlightenment (samābodiyaśigas). Like the Eight Factors of the Holy Way, the Seven Factors of Enlightenment are included in a most ancient list of Śrāmanic practices known as Thirty-seven principles Conducive to Enlightenment (pudgārakṣa-dharma). The Seven Factors of Enlightenment are: Mindfulness (sati), Energy (Virya), Joy (Pīti), Serenity (Prajñā), Concentration (Samādhi), and Impartiality (Upekkha). It
needs no mention that several factors are common to these two lists of eight and seven factors. In many verses of our text almost all the Seven Factors of Enlightenment find a pointed reference. The scheme of triple course of training noted above is again elaborated to some extent in the practice of the Seven Factors.

One of the most important terms which is also one of the key-concepts of Buddhism is *sīla*. It covers the entire range of ethical conduct and religious behaviour developed by the Buddhist tradition. The Dhammapada repeatedly refers to numerous facets of moral and religious culture summed up by the term *sīla*.

It is acknowledged that the vast majority of people in the world are undisciplined; hence the seeker of Nirvāṇa will have to endure abuse patiently (verse 320). Control of the mind and the sense organs is the key to successful observance of ethical principles. In all the eleven verses the second chapter of our text teaches the necessity of controlling the mind (verses 33-34). It is indeed said that those who subdue their mind are free from the bonds of Māra (verse 67). Love is a virtue which must be cultivated, for it is the only antidote to hatred (verse 5). Freedom from greed, temperance, virtuous conduct and truth are praised in many verses of the first and second chapters (verses 9, 10, 16, 18, 21, 22, 31, 32). Pure deeds, actions, with consideration, restraint, and living in conformity with the teaching are recommended (verse 24, 86). He who has subdued his senses, is free from pride, and has eradicated evil propensities is considered superior to the gods (verse 94). One must reflect peace through one’s mind, speech, and activities (verse 96).

A few verses of our text sum up the negative and positive contents of *sīla*. “Not to do any evil deeds, to accomplish good deeds, and to purify one’s own mind—this is the teaching of the Buddhás” (verse 183). Forbearance patience is declared to be the supreme form of austerity (verse 184). Another verse mentions the following principles of ethical conduct: “Not to slander, not to harm, to observe the liberating code of conduct, to eat moderately, to sleep and sit in seclusion, and to cultivate higher thoughts—this is the teaching of the Buddhás” (verse 185).

Among all the perfumes the perfume of virtue is supreme; the perfume of fragrance of virtuous people is supreme; it blows even amongst the gods; those who are endowed with virtuous conduct are beyond the reach of Māra (verses 55-57). Keeping the company of intelligent and wise men who detect and point out faults is part of ethical training (verse 76). The text counsels thus: “Do not have evil-doers for friends; do not have mean people for friends. Have virtuous people for friends; have the best of men for friends” (verse 76). “The wise people control themselves; they are not ruffled by praise and blame; having heard the teachings, the wise people become serene like a deep, still, and clear Lake” (verses 80-82). The word *sāṇḍa*, in the sense of good, quiescent and wise sage, occurs perhaps for the first time in the Pali texts. It became popular and theologically significant in the medieval Indian texts of religious poetry. But in the ascetic and non-theistic Buddhist tradition a *sāṇḍa* is identical with an *arhat*; he is also called *sāṇḍa*, good person, and *pajjāta*, wise. An *arhat* or a *sāṇḍa* is a kind of sage who has achieved liberation in this very life. He is not influenced by the world and its ills, although he lives in the world worshipping his last body. The *sāṇḍa* or sages are described thus: “The good persons renounce everything everywhere; the sages do not prattle long for sensepleasure. Whether touched by happiness or suffering, the wise people are neither elated nor depressed” (verse 83). All their actions of mind, speech, and body are characterised by peace” (verse 96).

The observance of ethical precepts is accompanied by peace and happiness. More than one dozen verses of our text are in praise of happiness (197-208). Freedom from hatred, ails, greed, possessiveness, lust and desire brings happiness. Hatred is described as the greatest evil, and peace is described as the supreme form of happiness. The real strength consists of the strength to forbear patiently (verse 399).

Good health or freedom from disease is as much part of Buddhist ethical life as contentment and confidence (verse 204). “Seeing and living with holy, persons is constantly blessed; if a man did not see fools, he would be constantly happy” (verse 206) Several verses teach the avoidance of affection, attachment lust and craving for obtaining freedom from suffering and fear (verses 213-216). The practice of virtue not only secures freedom from suffering and fear but also ensures affability. He who is endowed with moral virtue and insight, who is established in righteousness, knows the truth, and does what is his own duty, him the people hold dear” (verse 217). “He who finds faults with others and is irritable increases his own impurities” (verse 253).

More than a dozen verses are devoted to a discussion of the evils of anger (verse 221-234). Anger and pride are the two chief enemies of the holy life. In a most remarkable verse the Buddha admonishes thus: “Conquer anger by love; conquer evil by good; conquer the stingy by liberality; conquer the liar by truth” (verse 223). In another verse, speaking the truth, not getting angry, and giving even from a scanty store to one who begs, these three steps are said to lead one to the presence of the gods (verse 224). Those who are controlled in their bodies and are insinuous, such sages achieve the Indestructible position where they grieve not (verse 225). Control of body, speech, and mind is the mark of those steadfast people who are well controlled.

The celebrated five ethical precepts (pañcāśīra) are highlighted in some verses. “He who destroys life, tells lies, takes in this world what is not given to him, goes to another man’s wife, and who is addicted to intoxicating liquors, such a one digs his own roots in this world” (verses 246-247). Comparing oneself with others, one should neither strike nor cause to strike (verse 129). Envoy, lust, hate, folly and greed are stated to be some of the greatest evils (verses 248-251). A wise and righteous person is one who discriminates between right and wrong, who leads others lawfully and impartially and who is the guardian of the law (verses 256-257). Forgiveness, friendliness, and fearlessness are the characteristics of a wise man (verse 258). A holy or noble man is he who is unoffensive towards all living beings (verse 270). The principle of *akāśa*
is thus made the basis of the holy life. At another place passionlessness is declared to be the best among the virtues (verse 273). Idleness, slothfulness and weakness of will are the obstructions on the Way (verse 280). These should be removed. The Buddha asks us to uproot our self-love, then only can we cherish the road of peace (verse 285). He who conquers himself is certainly a superman (verse 322). “The dull-witted man, when he is lazy gluttonous, sleepy, and rolls about like a large hog nourished on pig-wash, obtains repeated births” (verse 325).

The virtue of faith is eulogised in some verse (38, 144, 306 and 333). It performs a necessary preliminary function. It is better to live alone rather than associate with a fool; with few wishes and without committing sins, let a man walk alone (verse 330). The need of eradicating craving is stressed in some verses (334-337). False speech is a sure road to hell (verse 306); so is the courting of another’s wife (verses 309-310). Desire for wealth, wife and sons is a bond stronger than those made of iron, wood or hemp (verse 345). Gifts bestowed on those who are free from lust, hate, delusion and craving bring great reward (verses 356-359). The gift of the Doctrine is said to excel all gifts (verse 354).

Destruction of impurities (ālayas) is one of the major aims of ethical practice. The word restraint (samvara) sums up a large part of Buddhist ethics. Restraint in thought, speech, body and in all parts of the body and in all things is indeed said to be the way to freedom from suffering (verses 360-363). While restraint is a negative measure, friendliness (maññiya) is a positive virtue which should govern man’s behaviour with other living beings. “He who abides in friendliness and is pleased in the Buddha’s teaching, attains the blissful state of quiescence of the conditioned phenomena” (verse 368). To achieve perfection in good conduct and to radiate happiness everywhere are also means of ending misery (verse 376). Sense-control, contentment, association, with good friends (kalyanamitra) who are energetic and of pure livelihood, and observing restraint according to the liberating code of conduct (pratiyakkas), these are the basic preliminaries of ethical practice.

5. Meditational Practices

Buddhist religious culture has stressed control and purification of the mind to an extraordinary degree. Mind is declared to be the forerunner and governor of all our good and evil states leading to happiness and suffering (verses 1-2). A well-developed mind cannot be penetrated by passion (verse 14). He whose mind is well released is able to destroy attachment, hatred, and delusion (verse 20). In order to attain release of the mind one must study, regulate and cleanse it thoroughly. This depends upon constant watchfulness (cāpadāda) which is declared to be the way to deathlessness. “The wise people who are steadfast and ever meditative, possessed of strong powers, realise the supreme security that is Nirvāṇa” (verse 23). Earnest meditation leads to abundant bliss (verse 27). So does a controlled and guarded mind (verse 35-36). Those who subdue the mind, which travels far, wanders alone, is bodiless, and hides in the cave (of consciousness), are liberated from the bonds of Mara (verse 37). A wise man, therefore, purifies himself of all impurities of the mind (verse 88). “Those whose minds are well cultivated in the Factors of Enlightenment, who rejoice in renunciation of clinging and grasping, whose impurities have been destroyed, and who are luminous, they are released even in this world” (verse 89). A released sage is called jantu and upasanta, quiet and quiescent. Unrest is a mark of bondage.

Even the deities love the Rightly Enlightened ones who are mindful, wise, intent on meditation, and who delight in renunciation and quiescence (verse 181). Meditation (pāra) produces wisdom (bhūri); in the absence of meditation, wisdom is lost (verse 282). Silence is good when it is accompanied by wisdom and virtue (verses 268-269). Mindfulness of the body coupled with constant reflection leads to the end of evils (verse 293). Constant contemplation on the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha, and the body, and constant delight in inoffensiveness and meditation are the regular practices of awakened and watchful disciples of the Buddha (verses 296-301).

Meditation (dhyāna) and wisdom (prajñā) are complementary. “He who has no wisdom lacks meditation, and he who has no meditation lacks wisdom. He who has both meditation and wisdom, he is indeed in the presence of Nirvāṇa” (verse 372). The process of ultimate release through meditation and insight is summed up in the following words: “The monk who retires to an empty abode, whose mind is quiescent and who perceives the doctrine rightly, experiences a joy transcending that of men. Whenever he reflects on the origination and cessation of compounded heaps, he attains the serene joy and happiness of those who know the Deathless” (verses 373-374). The importance of mindfulness and meditational practices in the Way to Nirvāṇa can scarcely be over-emphasised. The practice of meditation culminates in wisdom.

6. Knowledge and Wisdom

The word buddha means the wise, knowers awakened or enlightened. Sakya牟mi achieved Nirvāṇa and came to be known as Buddha because of His perfection in knowledge and wisdom. The Way to Nirvāṇa may also be described as the Way to Wisdom (buddhi). Our text highlights the crucial role of knowledge and wisdom in the process of Enlightenment.

Spiritual ignorance (avijñā) is stated to be the greatest taint; the Buddha asks us to abandon this taint and become taintless (verse 243). Delusion or folly (moha) is stated to be an incomparable snare (verse 251). It can be cut off only by the sword of wisdom. Right knowledge is essential for sharing the fruits of the holy life (verse 260). Discarding heedlessness by heedfulness, a wise and sorrowless man ascends the high palace of wisdom and surveys the sorrowing people (verse 28). “He whose mind is unsteady, who does not know the true doctrine, and whose faith (prajñā) wavers, his wisdom will not be perfect” (verse 38). Knowledge of the true doctrine and firm faith are thus necessary for the perfection of wisdom. A disciple of the Rightly Enlightened One outshines the blind wordling in wisdom (verse 59). One must know that the way to Nirvāṇa is different from the way to gain and praise (verse 75). Those
who are released through truly knowing are often referred to (verse 96). Generally speaking, this world is blind and dark; those that can see are very few (verse 174).

The great mass of suffering can be destroyed, among other things, by investigating into the truth (dhamma-patitavā) and by obtaining knowledge (verse 144). He who has gone for refuge to the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Saṅgha, perceives with right knowledge the Four Holy Truths—Suffering, the Origin of Suffering, the End of Suffering, and the Noble Eightfold Path leading to the End of Suffering, is release from all suffering (verses 190-192). “Here I shall live in the rainy season, here in the autumn and in the summer; thus the fool thinks, and does not know the dangers of life and death” (verse 286).

It is one of the well-known Buddhist doctrines that false views (mithyādṛṣṭi) lead to suffering and spiritual decline (verses 316-318). Ultimate Release cannot be obtained without destroying the four fundamental evils—sensuality (kāma), lust for life (bhava), speculative views (dṛṣṭi) and spiritual ignorance (avijñā). These evils called āsuvās have been translated as impurities, corruptions, cankers, outflows, deadly drugs, and defilements. The Dhammapada repeatedly dwells on the necessity of their extinction (verses 93, 94, 126, 253, 293, 386, 415, 420). All the four āsuvās can be extinguished by true knowledge and wisdom. Knowledge of the destruction of the āsuvās is a peculiarity of Buddhas and Arhats. In Buddhist ethics, meditational methods and the cultivation of wisdom have only one aim, namely, the complete destruction of the āsuvās and attainment of nirvāṇa.

Knowledge of the three characteristics which characterise the whole mass of conditional things is the declared road to Purification (visuddhi). These three characteristics are: “all conditioned things are impermanent,” “all conditioned things are involved in suffering,” and “all phenomena are not-self.” He who, with wisdom, discerns this, becomes disgusted with suffering, and goes along the Way to Nirvāṇa (verses 277-279). He who knows the Four Holy Truths, who extinguishes the four āsuvās by following the Eightfold Way, becomes master of everything and knower of everything. He is the Omniscient One, the Transcendent One, the Released One. The Way terminates in Nirvāṇa.

We have briefly analysed above the practical steps on the Way to Nirvāṇa as found in the Pali Dhammapada. But the real understanding of the Way consists in actually traversing it and in reaching the end of the journeying. Nothing less than this is enough. The Buddha has given the following warning: “Not merely by morality and austerities, nor again by much learning, nor by entering into meditation, nor yet by sleeping in an empty place do I realise the bliss of renunciation not known to the worldling, O brother’ do not be confident so long as you have not achieved the destruction of the āsuvās” (verses 271-272).

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Pali Buddhist Studies in the West

Russell Webb

10. Poland

The only academic personality who devoted himself solely to Pali studies was Stanisław Franciszek Michalski-Iwiński. Born 1881 in Tarnograd, he was a Reader at Lodz University and between 1930-39 edited the Wieśka Encyklopedia Powszechnej I (Ultima Thule, Warsaw). He translated the Dhammapada in 1925 (Publications de la Société Asiatique, Ultima Thule) which included a long commentary and an exposition of Buddhism for the West. A second edition appeared under the title, Ścieżka Prawdy (“The Path of Truth”) in the series Biblioteka Humanisty (Lodzi 1948). He translated T. W. Rhys Davids’s Buddhism (Warsaw-Cracow 1912), the Sutta-Nipāta for the “Oriental Institute’s” journal, Przegląd Orientalistycki (Warsaw 1957-8) and left, in his post-humous papers, an incomplete grammar (Gramatyka Języka Palijskiego—duplicate in 1963). He died in Lodz in 1961.

A senior contemporary of Michalski also included Pali within her specialised field. Helena Willman-Grabowska was born 1870 in Warsaw and studied in Berne, Lausanne, London and Paris. She lectured in Pali and Sanskrit at the Sorbonne between 1920-27 and thereafter occupied the Chair of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology at Cracow University where she lectured in Pali and Prakrit. Apart from contributing one section to L’Inde antique et la civilisation indienne (Paris 1933), she wrote a number of papers, amongst them “Le génitif en pāli”, “About the Great Renunciation” (1934), “À Motif of Odyssey in a Jataka” and “Les passages dans les inscriptions d’Asoka”. She died in Cracow in 1957.

A Professor of Sinology at Warsaw University between the World Wars, Jan Jędrusiński contributed two studies to the leading journal of classical Asian themes, Rocznik Orientalistycki: “La Section des Remèdes dans le Vinaya des Mahāsākāra et dans le Vinaya pāli” (1928) and “La Section de la Nourriture dans le Vinaya des Mahāsākāra” (1931)—both extracted from the Skandhaka section of the Canon.

Maryła Falk worked with the great Sanskrit scholar Stanisław Schayer, in a private capacity before emigrating to India before the Second World War. She wrote a number of articles on Buddhist themes together with full-length study on Nāma-Rāpa and Dhamma-Rāpa (University of Calcutta Press 1942).

Today, Departments of Indology exist in the Universities of Warsaw, Cracow, Wrocław and Lublin where Sanskrit and Prakrit are taught in relation to Pali (an optional subject since no specific courses in Indian religions are prescribed). At Warsaw a Young lecturer, Artur Karp, has taught Pali literature and language and translated sections 1-25 of the Mahāpāramitābha Sutta for Euhemer, the journal of the Polskie Towarzystwo Religioznawcze (Warsaw 1968). A former lecturer, Dr...
Grażyna Sypańska-Wileczurawa, compiled an anthology from the Jātaka and Dhammapada (Takty Polażyke), with an introduction in Polish, which the University duplicated in 1964. Apart from Michalski’s grammar, B.C. Law’s History of Pali Literature and Winternitz’s History of Indian Literature are prescribed textbooks. The only known relevant doctoral dissertation accepted at Warsaw (in 1973) is Maria Meznicka’s study on the “Dhammapada jako kodeks etyczny” (The Dhammapada as an Ethical Code”).

From the turn of the century a number of popular works, including translations of Buddhist texts, were published in Warsaw. These included Paul Dahlke’s “Buddhist Stories” (Opowiadania Buddyjskie, 1906), an anthology from the Dhammapada compiled by R. Centnerszerw (Buddha-Złote Słowa, 1924), a more comprehensive selection by Jan Starza Dzierzbicki comprising Cullavagga VII, the niidānakathā to the Mahāpadāna Sutta (Dīgha Nikāya) Rañhāpāla Sutta (Majjhima Nikāya) Nālaka Sutta (Sutta-Nipātā) and Jātakas 241, 243, 316, 322, 325, 359 and 538 (Legendy Buddyjskie, 1927) and “Norma etyczne w Buddyzmy” by Leon Krajewski—a long essay on the Dhammapada and Theravāda Buddhism which appeared in the Theosophical journal, Przegląd Teozoficzny No. 17 (1929).

The credit for founding the first indigenous Buddhist group goes to Piotr Boninski and Władysław Misiewicz who, in 1949, established the Kolo Prijaćiol Buddyjemu (“Circle of Friends of Buddhism”). This remains centred on Radom (at the home of Misiewicz) where special meetings are held at Veśākha and on other important festival days. Otherwise, in view of the scattered membership contact can only be maintained by means of a newsletter.

Boninski was born 1898 in eastern Poland. After studying Law, he was drawn to the teachings of Theosophy and Hinduism but embraced Buddhism in 1946 after reading the works of Dahlke, Neumann, Oldenberg and Seidensticker. His sudden death in 1968 at Gliwice was a severe blow to the Buddhist movement. Apart from translating articles from the German Buddhist periodical, Wissen und Wandel, he translated the following suttas from German sources: Dīgha 2, 13, 14, 22, 26, 31 and extracts from 1, 11, 16 and 21; Majjhima 2, 4, 9, 10, 12, 22, 23, 37, 41, 51, 59-62, 66, 77, 90, 91, 97, 117, 121, 130 and 143 and extracts from 63, 120 and 135; Samyutta—Dhammacakkapavatattā Sutta, et al; Anguttara—Kālāma and Girimandana Suttas, et al; Khuddaka—a short selection from the Udāna, Itivuttaka and Sutta-Nipātā. Under the title Wybor nowy Buddy these were duplicated in the USA in 1965.

A fillip to the work of mass distribution of Buddhist literature was given for a short period by the late Dr T. Drobny, an emigre Theosophist who lived in Indiana (USA). Apart from editing a journal, his most valuable contributions were the duplication of Misiewicz’s translation of Nyānati-loka’s Word of the Buddha, Jan Skorza’s translation of Subhadra’s Buddhist Catechism and parts of Boninski’s translations in 1960 and 1965.

Władysław Misiewicz is undoubtedly the longest practising Buddhist in Poland. He was born 1910 in Lvov (or Lemberg, as it then came within the frontiers of the Austro-Hungarian Empire). After matriculation, he was successively a bookbinder, Post Office official, accountant, an executive in a large government bookshop (after the Second World War), finally spending his last working years in charge of the reference library in his wife’s home town of Radom (an industrial town south of Warsaw). On the outbreak of war on 1st September 1939 he served in the cavalry but spent the duration in German POW camps.

Disillusioned with the Church, he was first attracted to Buddhism by means of Michalski’s translation of the Dhammapada. Soon after the War the Esperantist Geo. H. Yoxon sent him a copy of The (London) Buddhist Society’s compilation, What is Buddhism?, together with the journal of the “Buddhist Esperanto League”, La Budha Lumo. These made a profound impression on his mind, but he was only finally convinced of the truth of the Buddhadhama during the course of translating Practical Buddhism by Nyānasatta and The Heart of Buddhist Meditation by Nyānapālita. Subsequently, R. Semage despatched a series of pamphlets, Buddyia Rami, from Colombo, together with a Pali grammar book, a Buddharaupa and a Buddhist flag. Similar items, but particularly books and magazines, flowed from Ceylon (and later from contacts in the western world) to swell his library which must surely rank as the largest private collection on Buddhism in Poland. Totalling about 500 volumes, it includes Pali texts from London, English and German translations from the canonical texts, in addition to general studies in these languages, every Polish work on the subject, and scores of rare pamphlets and journals, mainly in English and German.

He has translated, apart from the above-mentioned works, the essence of G. F. Allen’s The Buddha’s Philosophy, numerous suttas and booklets issued by the Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy (Sri Lanka). Between 1952-59 he compiled an elementary Pali grammar. This was based on A. P. Buddhadasa’s New Pali Course I, Duraiselle’s Practical Grammar of the Pali Language and Nyānati-loka’s Kleine systematische Pali-Grammatica, together with some texts from the Udāna.

In addition to English, German and Pali, Misiewicz has also mastered Esperanto. Since he received his earliest instruction in this international language (particularly from Nyānasatta), he has deemed it expedient to utilise Esperanto not only as a means of corresponding with like-minded students of Buddhism throughout the world but more especially to keep those domiciled in Eastern Europe informed of Buddhist doctrine and events where Esperanto serves as an unofficial lingua franca. Accordingly, he circulates an occasional newsletter amongst individuals in that area as well as in the USSR. He has also been able to regularly produce, in typescript, a Polish journal, Eki Passko, since 1962. This is despatched to several families throughout the country.

Another emigre Theosophist Wanda Dynowska (Unadwé, 1886-1971 translated Paul Carus’s anthology, Gospel of Buddha (Nauka Buddy, Indo Polish Library, Bombay 1962).
Finally, in Warsaw at the present time, Zdzisław Nikuli has translated and duplicated a number of meditation tracts together with Nyānasatta’s translation of the Satipatthāna Sutta (Podstawy wrocławskie, 1975) and Piyadassi’s essay on patissassumppadā (Zależe pemowocni, 1976).

**BOOK REVIEWS**


The subject goes to the very centre of the Dhamma; the material studied is only the Suttanikāya and the Suttanikāya; and the book itself is concise and lucid—by the subject is clearly defined, carefully set out with nothing superfluous, nothing lazy—all is sharply in focus, and this is something rare and a pleasure to find.

A brief introductory chapter delineates the areas of study: cognition, motivation, emotions, and personality; basic features are sketched and some essential terms—sankhāra, vedana, saññā, etc.—are clarified.

Cognition is looked at as a prelude to the study of motivation, for what is perceived through the sense bases can be fuel for latent desires and what is perceived is itself influenced and distorted by those same desires. Here it is described, the synthetic nature of the puthujjana’s perception—distorted by biases (āsava) and proclivities (māsāyā)—and the aim of the teaching—realised in the arahat—of clear, bare perception, wherein “In the seen, there will be just the seen; in the heard, just the heard; in the sensed, just the sensed; in the cognised, just the cognised.” The cognitive process productive of distorted and proliferating views is described within the Madhumipindikasutta, and this relevant passage is quoted: “Visual consciousness, your reverence, arises because of the eye and material shapes; the meeting of the three is sensory impingement; feelings are because of sensory impingement; what one feels one perceives; what one perceives one reasons about; what one reasons about obsesses one; what obsesses one is the origin of a number of concepts and obsessions which assail a man in regard to material shapes cognisable by the eye.”

A number of terms are discussed and defined in this section—sāññā, sathā, satikka, sīcā; also paccavokkha, soti, samapajñā, etc. Higher knowledge” is mentioned, which as a perceptual source is, as introspection is a methodological conclusion by established Western schools of psychology. Dr de Silva states: “Verbal testimony, analogical reasoning, logical reasoning, etc., are not completely satisfactory as means of knowledge. Perceptions, both normal and paranormal, along with inferences based on them, are the valid means of knowledge in Buddhism.” Also noted here is the wrong view of Dhamma as a ‘cutting off’ of the senses—the Dhamma is a training of the senses which is a development and refinement, a refinement which, of course, goes beyond aesthetics. The Dhamma is shown as therapy to clear and refine cognition by the elimination of obstructions and the cultivation of the factors of enlightenment: “The elimination of the impediments makes the mind concentrated in meditation and this in turn makes it possible for it to have knowledge and insight of things as they are.”

The chapter ‘Motivation and Emotions’ is the longest of the book; the structure and aims of the psychology of motivation found within the Dhamma are therapeutic—designated to uncover the roots of unrest and depict a positive path towards happiness. The wholesome and unwholesome roots and the patissassumppadā structure—phassa to, upādāna—are discussed, here upādāna is translated ‘entanglement’ covering the obsession with the disliked as well as the liked. A note on vedana is followed by a section in which is “put together the material on specific emotions disowned by the Buddha, in the hope of working out a Buddhist theory of emotions.” The specific emotions studied are: Fear with closely related factors such as hiri, ottappa, and kālāsaja. Anxiety with sampatī. Hatred with ādā, maachariya, ājanā, etc. Grief and sorrow where the position of dhamma is given: “Mourning and weeping are not effective ways of dealing with the tragic. We should understand the causes and conditions of suffering and work out the causes of suffering. The Buddhist attitude demands a sense of reality.” Love and compassion, here is discussed the wide spectrum from erotic and sexual love through fondness and affection to sympathy and compassion, these discussed in the context of the lay and bhikkhu life. The section concerning motivation—The Psychology of Craving—studies tanha in its three basic forms, craving for sensuality, self-preservation and annihilation—mention being made of the similarity of Freudian analysis, this a subject well covered in the author’s excellent Buddhist and Freudian Psychology.

The three forms of tanha are discussed in detail in separate sections where it is emphasised that the psychology of tanha cannot be separated from the concept of dukkha. In discussing sensuality reference is made to the ethical religious dimension regarding acceptable and unacceptable pleasures; the dynamics of the psychology of pleasure, and to the predicament of the pure pleasure lover in the form of boredom, ennui and emptiness. Self-preservation is discussed in terms of egoistic drives and the basis of this in false beliefs and illusions (aditthi); views such as self-conceit (mano)—measuring through the viewpoint of ego—and the philosophical standpoint of saccato-aditthi are covered. Likewise self-annihilation is a product of ego view (sakkaya-aditthi) and produces the philosophical standpoint of uchchada-aditthi; discussion is also made here of the expression of aggression. A further section of the chapter deals with ‘unconscious motivation’ and such terms as unaya, āsava, sakkāhā and ceto are studied—the author states “The Buddha probed deeply into the roots of human motivation. The practice of self-reflection, the techniques of concentration and mindfulness and the development of insight were all combined in a system of therapy. In this process of mind-development, the dark interior regions of the mind, the pattern of compulsive behaviour and the irrational biases had all to be laid bare and brought to the surface of clear consciousness, mindfulness and wakefulness.”

Mr. Jones's book is a stimulating and scholarly study based on the 547 Jātaka stories, which T. W. Rhys Davids described as "the oldest, most complete and most important collection of folk-lore extant". This vast corpus of legends which purport to tell of the deeds and exploits of the Lord Buddha's previous lives as a bodhisattva have had a significant and lasting influence on the culture and beliefs of lay Buddhists throughout Asia, particularly in Theravāda countries. For this reason alone the Jātaka stories are worthy of scholarly investigation as a seminal source of what might be called 'popular' Buddhism, and it is this somewhat neglected field of study which interests the author.

The book looks critically and analytically at the Jātaka legends, with particular reference to their ethical and doctrinal content. Whereas it is quite clear that most of the stories have their origin in the oral tradition of pre-Buddhist India; nevertheless, in their derived literary form, they have been adapted within a mythological framework to convey something of Buddhist teaching to the ordinary lay-follower of the Dhamma. It is the specific Buddhist element in the Jātaka that is fundamental to this study, wherein three broad questions are considered: what teachings do the tales impart?; how far are these teachings internally consistent?; and, most importantly, how do they compare with the canonical teachings of the Sutta Pitaka?

The book is divided into two parts. The first part examines the two primary sources: the Jātaka stories themselves and the first four Nikāyas of the Sutta Pitaka. The chapter on the sources of the Jātaka examines in detail the origin and form of the stories, and includes a list of the various roles assumed by the bodhisattas during the course of the Jātaka tales.

The second part of the book deals with the main doctrinal and ethical themes of the stories. A separate chapter is devoted to different aspects of Buddhist teaching (such as kamma and rebirth, non-injury, sex and marriage etc.) which have particular significance for the Buddhist layman; a summary of the canonical teaching is followed by an analysis of the presentation and interpretation of this teaching in the Jātaka tales. The author notes in each case the discrepancies, idiosyncrasies and doctrinal inaccuracies that are contained in the Jātaka presentation and seeks to explain how these differences came about. For example, the Jātaka is at variance with the Nikāyas on the doctrine of rebirth: in the former, no attempt is made to reconcile the doctrine of anatta with the doctrine of a series of lives of the same individual; instead, this simplistic view of the rebirth doctrine might be called the sīla rañña of the Jātaka tales. However, the complexity of the canonical teaching on rebirth precludes such a simple, transmigratory view. Throughout the book we discover that the doctrinal position of the Jātaka is often at variance with canonical teaching—at times the connection between the two is seen to be very tenuous indeed.

Dr. Horner's foreword admirably summarizes Mr. Jones's accomplishments. He has succeeded well with his subject: his aims are clear and well-defined, his scholarship sure and wide-ranging, his style readable and fluent. Although he is not loth to offer his own criticisms, particularly on early Buddhist attitudes to women and personal relationship he does so in a constructive manner and without asperity.

One would imagine that this book will be of more interest to the Pali Buddhist scholar and the student of Indian folk-lore than to the general reader, although it can be read by the latter without difficulty. It will not provide him with a comprehensive introduction to the Jātaka, but it will give him an idea of the doctrines contained therein. It is unlikely, that a study of the Jātaka tales will provide much practical benefit to the Western Buddhist of today; although many of the stories can still be appreciated as moral fables, their doctrinal heterodoxy and the fact that the world portrayed in them is so remote from our own with probably make them unattractive to Western tastes.

A final point of interest: the Editor informs me that this book is the first commercial venture to make reference to the Pali Buddhist Review in its bibliography. May this be the first of many!

This "memorial volume in honour of Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap", edited by his nephew (Professor of South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin), represents one of the most comprehensive festivschrist of its kind. With no less than 37 papers (nearly all on the early Buddhist tradition) contributed by specialists from all over the world, this is a book well worth investing in.

So many aspects of Dhamma are surveyed that it is only possible to mention those that readers of this journal might find most relevant. Harvey Aronson's opening essay on upekkhā follows his doctoral dissertation on the four brahma viharas (Wisconsin 1975) which was recently published by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, and will be eventually reviewed. George Bond's overview of the Nettra-pakaraṇa represents a survey of this little-known exegetical work; hitherto, the only popular account had been written for Praṇā (Buddha Gaya Quarterly, 1975) by Dhammadhāra. John Ross Carter's examination of "The Notion of 'Refuge (Sarana)" recalls Nyānapālaka's semi-novel Wheel booklet, The Threefold Refuge, "The Eight Deliverances" are explained at length by Leon Hurburt who bases his study on Pali sources and la Vallee Poussin's translation of the Abhidhammakośa VIII (summarised by Sukomol Chaudhuri on pp. 219-220 of his Analytical Study of the Abhidhammakośa, Sanskrit College, Calcutta 1976). In discussing the origin of the Buddha image, P. S. Jaini draws upon the apocryphal Vaṭṭantulīra Jātaka, the first in the Pāṇḍava Jātaka collection, Vol. 1 of which he has edited for publication by the PTS this year. (A similar text, the Kosala-Bimbavāṇā, was edited and translated by R. F. Gombrich for the Göttingen symposium, Buddhism in Ceylon and Studies on Religious Syncretism in Buddhist Countries, published in 1978.) The nature of the ultimate reality—Nirvāṇa—receives much needed clarification at the hands of India's foremost Buddhist scholar, L. M. Joshi.

Chapters 22, 26, 28 and 29 comprise important contributions to early Buddhist literature. Kōgen Mizuno's timely survey of the formation and place of the various recensions of the Dharmapada has probably not been tackled in detail since the appearance of P. K. Mukherjee's paper on "The Dharmapada and Udānavarga" (IHQ, Calcutta 1935) H. Saddathissa's edited translation of G. Coedès' Catalogue des manuscrits en pâli, laothienne et siamoise provenant de la Thaïlande (Copenhagen 1966) reveals the extent of "Pali Literature from Laos" and complements his earlier studies on Khmer and Thai Buddhist literature. The editing and translation of Vinaya texts during the period 1950-75 is admirably summarised by Charles Prebish, an American specialist in this field. Gustav Roth has contributed his notes to the introduction of the Bhikṣu-Prātimokṣa-Sutra of the Aryan-Mahāsāṅghikas-Lokottaravādin tradition—for which a useful comparison may be made with his edition of the Bhikṣuṇi Vinaya belonging to the same lineage (Patta 1970) which includes a long introduction in English.

Trevor Ling and Eleanor Zelliot (virtually the only scholar engaged in research on Ambedkar's movement) present accounts of the background to the revival of Buddhism in India during the last century. In this context it is worth mentioning Ling's latest study, Buddhist Revival in India (London 1980). Hitherto, the only full-length surveys have been Buddhism in Modern India (Nagpur 1972) by D. C. Aihir and Ambedkar and the Neo-Buddhist Movement (Madras 1972) by T. S. Wilkinson and M. M. Thomas.

There are many more entries worthy of note but the foregoing should suffice to whet the appetite of readers who are recommended to acquire this tome. 

RBW


To commemorate the completion of his 81st year, this volume of messages of felicitation and articles is offered to Narada Mahāthera, the Head of the Vajjirārāma in Colombo and veteran Dhammadhūthika

The final contribution, a potted history of Buddhism by Olof Gunasekera, occupies no less than 74 pages and dwarfs the remaining entries. Despite some factual in accuracies and generalisations it is valuable in that it presents the colourful progress of the Dharmas not easily available elsewhere; indeed, some of the only comparable survey is found in the only comparable survey is found in E. Conze's Short History of Buddhism (London 1980). In similar vein are two brief articles on Indonesia and Vietnam, for which countries Ven. Narada has maintained cordial links over many years.

Richard Gard places Buddhist studies in their modern perspective and suggests an analytical, subject approach for the future—which is, however, only likely to be fulfilled in the author's country (USA) which boasts large numbers of scholars (who are personally committed to the Dhamma), well-established Oriental faculties at the universities and seemingly unlimited funds.

The intersection between "Empiricism in Early Buddhism and William James" and the Dhamma contra the asyadic tendencies in man are ably discussed by two convincing scholars of the present generation, D. J. Kalupahana and Gunapala Dharmasiri. The little-known cult of the Bodhi tree is examined by Gunapala Senadhira whilst Jothiya Dhirasaka takes to task those who misinterpret the "Text and Traditions" by basing their arguments on specious reasoning.

However, this reviewer derived most profit from "Dhamma-Desanā and Dhamma Sākacchā" by the only notable, professional Buddhist educationist: Ananda W. P. Guruge. Drawing upon the Pali texts, the theoretical and practical aspects of the virtues of expounding and discussing the Dhamma are well explained. Investigation and understanding are obvious corollaries but it is a sad reflection on the retarded
development of traditional Buddhist institutions that the art of debate was performed only in the Tibetan monasteries. Clarification and evaluation of the Dharma vis-à-vis current attitudes and lifestyles necessitates a two-way process between speaker and hearers, otherwise an uncritical acceptance of what is heard could lead to unskilful views and practices.

KOMMISSION FUR BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN
DER AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN IN GOTTINGEN

The Committee for Buddhist Studies of the Academy of Sciences in Göttingen
Prof. Dr. Heinz Bechert
Hainbundstrasse 21,
D-3400 Göttingen,
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INFORMATION
A SYSTEMATIC SURVEY OF BUDDHIST SANSKRIT—LITERATURE SYSTEMATISCHE ÜBERSICHT UBER DIE BUDDHISTISCHE SANSKRIT—LITERATUR

Published by the Academy of Sciences (Akademie der Wissenschaften) in Göttingen

The need of a systematic bibliography in Buddhist Sanskrit philology is felt by all scholars working in Buddhist studies and related fields. It is the objective of the present project to provide comprehensive information on Buddhist Sanskrit literature including ancient and modern translations and commentaries of Buddhist Sanskrit texts. The survey is arranged in a systematic order.

The preliminary system of arrangement of the material in the survey is as follows:
A. Canonical and paracanonical texts
   1. Vinaya. Published as Teil 1: Vinaya—Texte by A. Yuyama. Wiesbaden 1979
   2. Sūtra (of the Hinayāna)
   3. Abhidharma
   4. Kṣudraka and related texts
      4.1 Canonical and paracanonical texts minus the Jātaka and Avadāna (Dharmapada and Udāna, Itivṛtaka, Arthavarga, Pārīyāna, Sthavīrāgātha)
      4.2 Buddha biographies (cf. also 7.7)
      4.3 Jātaka, Avadāna and related narrative texts
      4.4 Anāgātavāpana and Vyākāraṇa (prophecy)
      4.5 Sūtrasamgraha, Gāthāsamgraha, Parārāṇa
      4.6 Other texts and various texts belonging to 4.

5. Mahāyānasutra including Prajñāpāramitā (5.1) with several (not yet determined) subdivisions, as e.g. *Avatamsaka, *Ratnakūta, etc.
6. Tantra, Mantra, Dhāraṇī, etc. (including Kālacakra)
B. Non-canonical materials and auxiliary sciences
7. Non-canonical doctrinal texts, philosophy, Sutra, ritual texts, Kāvya
   7.1 Post-canonical doctrinal texts of the Hinayāna
   7.2 Philosophical works and doctrinal texts of the Mahāyāna
   7.3 Philosophical works and doctrinal texts of Tantric Buddhism
   7.4 Pramāṇa
   7.5 Sutra
   7.6 Ritual texts and regulations, Mantra and Yantra, etc. (if not in 6)
   7.7 Kāvya, *Lekha, Nāṭaka and related texts
   7.8 Subhāṣita (Buddhist)
   7.9 Sāsana itihāsa, biographies of monks, descriptions of shrines
   7.10 Various texts belonging to 7.
   7.11 Anthologies
8. Buddhist inscriptions and documents, e.g. "donation forms"
9. "Auxiliary sciences"
   9.1 Philology
   9.2 Sīlaśāstra
   9.3 Bibliography
   9.4 Nārāyaṇa
   9.5 Kāmasūtra
   9.6 Ayurveda
   9.7 Jīvottāra
C. General, undetermined or unidentified texts
01. Texts on the arrangement of the canons, collections, etc.
02. Undetermined canonical texts
03. Undetermined post-canonical Hinayāna texts
04. Other undetermined texts
05. Unidentified texts

NOTE: With * sections are marked which totally or mainly correspond with equally or similarly determined sections in the Kanjur and/or Tanjur.

* * *

All interested scholars are kindly invited to co-operate and to contribute in this task. Comments for improvement of the systematic order are also invited. Those interested may kindly write to:

Professor Dr. Heinz Bechert,
Dektor,
Seminar für Indologie und Buddhismuskunde
der Universität Göttingen,
Hainbundstrasse 21,
D-3400 GOTTINGEN,
West Germany
The volumes will appear in English, French or German according to the individual predilection of the authors. Since the volumes mainly consist of bibliographical references, parts in any of these languages may easily be used by all specialists and interested scholars irrespective of their knowledge of German and French.

The first part of the survey deals with the Vinaya literature and was compiled by Dr Akira Yuyama (The Director, The Reiyukai Library, Tokyo) when he was in Göttingen as a fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung in 1974–76.

The bibliographical information on the first volume is as follows:
Systematische Übersicht über die buddhistische Sanskrit-Literatur - A Systematic Survey of Buddhist Sanskrit Literature.
Im Auftrage der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen herausgegeben von Heinz Bechert:
XXIII, 54 pages. Bds. DM 20—
ISBN 3-515-02837-4


This is a detailed report of explorations in Central Asia and Westernmost China carried out by SIR AUREL STEIN during 1906–08 under the orders of H. M. Indian Government. Published in as early as 1921, this work was long out of print. Sir Aurel Stein, the arch explorer, undertook his second Central Asian Expedition with the object of providing a full record of the explorations, archaeological and geographical. The area covered by these explorations, well under ten thousand miles, extended from Hindukush Valleys and Oxus to the Province of Kan-su in the West of China.

Stein, with his characteristic zeal for things ancient, had recovered a vast amount of relics from the long abandoned ruins in the desert, representing the ancient civilisation fostered by Buddhist India, China and the Hellenised Near East. The finds and relics of exploration include numerous antiquities, and manuscript remains in Sanskrit, Khotanese and Chinese (Khotan), wooden documents in Kharosthi script and Prakrit language (Niya site); important information on ancient routes from Khotan to China; many interesting remains of the architectural and industrial art of third cent. A.D. (at Lou-Lun site); hundreds of Tibetan records on wood and paper along with Turkish "Runic" documents, fine wall paintings of Buddhist shrines (at Miran); a great deposit of ancient manuscripts and art relics belonging to Chinese, Sanskrit, Khotanese, etc., paintings, fine textiles (caves of the Thousand Buddhas at Tun-huang); and several other.

The entire booty of the exploration was brought in over a hundred cases and were deposited in British Museum (London) and Imperial Museum (Delhi). The complete story was given in a fascinating and absorbing manner in 33 chapters (1580 pp.) with ten appendices detailing the relics and finds in minute and scholarly analysis by experts in the respective fields—Chinese Records (M. E. Chavannes), Coins (J. Allan), Physical Anthropology (T. A. Joyce), Mural Painting and Plaster (Sir Arthur Church), Buddhist Paintings (R. Petrucci and L. Binyon), Manuscripts in Sanskrit, Khotanese, etc. (A. F. K. Hoernle), Tibetan Documents (A. H. Francke), Musical Instruments (K. Schlesinger), Tibetan Manuscripts (F. W. Thomas), Tibetan Inscriptions of Buddhist Paintings (L. D. Barnett).

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