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The Pali Buddhist Review appears three times a year as the organ of the Pali Buddhist Union.

Annual Subscription: £3.00, $6.00 or equivalent currencies payable to "Pali Buddhist Union" (Giro No. 33 483 4007).

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THE DISCOURSE ON OLD AGE

Short indeed is this life—within a hundred years one dies, and if anyone lives longer then he dies of decay.

People grieve for what is “mine”; indeed possessions are not permanent and this is subject to destruction—see this and homeless dwell!

In death it is abandoned; yet man thinks “it is mine”; knowing this, the wise man devoted to me should not stoop down to making “his own”.

As a man awake sees not the things he met in sleep, so too the one beloved is not seen having departed and done his time.

People now are seen and heard and thus are called by name, but alone shall the name remain for the departed to be spoken of.

The greedy in mine-making do not give up sorrow, lamentation, avarice; therefore, sages leaving possessions have wandered about, Seers of the Secure.

For a bhikkhu practising seclusion, keeping company with the secluded mind, all are agreed and say of him “He should not show himself again in becoming!”

The sage is unsupported in all circumstances, nothing he makes dear nor what is not dear, sorrow and avarice stain him not just as water stays not upon a leaf.

As a water-drop upon a lotus plant, as water does not stain a lotus flower, even so the sage is never stained by what has been seen, heard and sensed by him.

Certainly the wise man does not conceive by what has been seen, heard and sensed, nor through another does he wish for purity for he is not attached nor yet is he displeased.

* or on “ageing” or “decay”. Verses 804-813 (Jarā Sutta) of the Sutta-Nipata translated by Bhikkhu Khantipalo.
THE PARTING WAVES

I. B. Horner

The Daily Telegraph has recently (3.11.79) tentatively attributed the disappearance without trace of a gigantic ore-carrier, 234,000 tons, to "the most peculiar horror the sea holds for big ships". For fears have been expressed that she may have dropped into a "hole in the sea", in the South Atlantic 600 miles or so South-West of Cape Town, a region notorious for such happenings. No reasonable explanation, so the Telegraph says, has ever been given for this phenomenon. But it seems to occur in this area, though if it were a constant danger surely it would have been charted in order for ships to avoid this area. What happens is that the waves suddenly part to form a vast hole into which vessels can slide. "It is believed" (I quote the Telegraph again) "that some ships which have vanished without trace off South Africa have dropped into such a hole and have been overwhelmed as the waves rush back."

Was something similar known to the compilers of the ancient commentaries on the Pali canonical texts? At least two commentarial records of the parting waves spring to mind, the one occasion terrifying and alarming, the other beautiful.

First, the Jātaka Commentary. Here some merchants who were preparing a ship to go to sea implored the Bodhisatta to be captain, although he was blind. So for a week they sailed away over the great ocean without mishap. But then a mighty wind arose out of season and drove the ship onto an ocean called Stained with Razors (Kharumallī), then on and on in succession to seas called Stained with Fire (Aggimalā), Stained with Curses (Duddhimalā), Stained with Dark Green-coloured Grass (Nilavayakusamāla), and Stained with Reeds (Nālamāla). In each of these there was an abundance of priceless gems which the blind Bodhisatta by using expedients and stratagems got the merchants to haul up so that later they could trade with them.

But as the merchants were crossing this last sea they saw one called Mare's Mouth or Mare's Face (Vajrahūshaka). "Here the water is sunked down and down, but surges up on all sides, so that on all these sides the upwelling wave looks like a vast pit with a sheer precipice all round. A wave surging up on one side is like a mountain slope, the noise terrific enough to split the ear-drum and burst the heart. Seeing it, the merchants, scared and afraid, asked its name in a verse!"

When I translated this passage and wrote the note using the word "chasm", I thought of this phenomenon as a purely legendary part of the Wheel-Treasure’s powers and had no idea that the sea around us, the cruel sea, is actually no stranger to an event of this nature, where a "hole in the sea" is a notable occurrence. I do not know if it is rare.

The Bodhisatta then told them that if a ship reaches this Mare’s Mouth Sea, no return is possible. "If this ship gets there she will be sunked down and destroyed."

This description of waves parting and swallowing ships exploits its sense of dramatic to the full.

Secondly, the Madhuravijñānasī or Commentary on the Buddhavamsa (BuJ4), p. 139. Here, Buddhaddatta Mahāthera, who lived in the fifth century A.C., and to whom this work is attributed, appears to be aware of the occurrence of the waves of the sea parting on occasion. To him this was legendary, as is also the Mare’s Mouth Sea, but can we say they were entirely imaginary stories or had they a basis in some striking fact? However, in the narrative described in BuJ4 there were no dire consequences. On the contrary the sea looked beautiful.

According to this account, King Vijītāvin, a universal monarch, wanted to define the limits of the “enduring sea”, over which he was determined to hold sway from end to end. He was guided and escorted in this enterprise by the mighty and majestic sea-going Treasure of the Wheel. For when both the Wheel and the king had reached Puvavadeha, the king exhorted the people there to keep the five silas and eat in moderation. The Treasure of the Wheel (the second of a universal monarch’s seven Treasures or Jewels) then rose up and plunged into the eastern sea. As far as it plunged in to that extent did the waves contract, and the waters, receding to the depth of a yojana, stood still like a lovely wall of beryl. When the Wheel turned back, having reached the bounds of the eastern ocean, the waters as though unable to endure their separation from the boundary, bowed back to the shore. Thus the king came to hold sway over Puvavadeha to the bounds of the eastern sea.

When I translated this passage and wrote the note using the word "chasm", I thought of this phenomenon as a purely legendary part of the Wheel-Treasure’s powers and had no idea that the sea around us, the cruel sea, is actually no stranger to an event of this nature, where a “hole in the sea” is a notable occurrence. I do not know if it is rare.  

3. Here the sea is spoken of as a “inhuman”, madhvajiva, which no doubt could be translated also as “demonic”, even “marvellous”.


5. The recognized quarters occur in the order of East, South, West, North. Of these the most auspicious is the East, and the least auspicious the North.

6. A yojana is usually taken as seven miles.

7. Jatalamā, instrumentive. In my note at CSM, p. 199, I say this word is taken here as jala with anta, the sides of the waters (jala) that are the end (anta) of the trough or chasm made in the sea between the two walls of beryl.

8. See n. 7.
The advent of a universal monarch, a wheel-turning king, and of any of his Treasures, be it the Elephant, the Wheel, or all seven, was certainly rare. What does seem to me apparent, however, is a striking similarity between the substance of these three records. Nor do I know whether the phenomenon of the parting of the waves is described in any other Commentary.

In those distant times multitudinous stars, clusters of stars, and galaxies, also the countless number of world systems, lokadātu, were well known and widely recognized. Moreover, very rare occasions are recorded of the earth opening to form a fissure or 'hole' through which some unspeakably evil-doer had to pass to Avīci. The earth seems to open still where there are volcanoes and earthquakes. So, if the opening of the earth and if the heavenly bodies in their courses were known in ancient times, why should not an opening sea and the parting of the waves have been known as well, not merely as imagined legends but with a basis in nature—just as the Way and its symbolism have their basis in the more lowly earth?

DOES THE "CESSATION OF THE WORLD" ENTAIL THE CESSATION OF EMOTIONS? THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ARAHANT

Nathan Katz*

I. The Problem
One of the ways in which the arahant is discussed in the Pali Sutta Pitaka is that he is said to have actualized the cessation of the world (loka nirodha). It is also said that the world arises out of the human desire that there be a world (bhavataṅkhā) and for sensual enjoyment in the world (kāma-taṅkhā). This has led some to conclude that, by having gone beyond the world, all desire and emotionality have been gone beyond as well. Thus we receive an image of the arahant as one who is emotionless as well as desireless, one who is cooled not simply in terms of extinguishing the passions, but also in terms of his relatedness with those who continue to suffer. This image is widely accepted in modern scholarship, and it is also maintained by some Mahāyāna Buddhist writers.

In this paper, we wish to offer a new analysis, maintaining both that: (1) the arahant is beyond the world (loka, samāsata); and (2) that the arahant is not simply one who is beyond all feeling and emotion. It might be held that these two points are contradictory, arguing something like since the world arises because of craving or desire (taṅkhā), and since emotion is likewise rooted in taṅkhā, then either the arahant is beyond the world and therefore also beyond emotion, or that he is in the world and emotional. We feel that this type of objection, as raised by the Uttarapāthaka school, is based on both a faulty understanding of what is meant by 'world' (loka, samāsata) in the first place, and also on a confusion of such Pali terminology as taṅkhā and chanda, both of which are commonly rendered as 'desire' in English. Our reading of the basic texts leads us to conclude that the emotions play a key role in the path (magga) which leads to arabhatta, and in the enlightened life of the arahant. Maintaining this position, we feel, is crucial for any understanding of the arahant, especially in the context of his continuity with later Buddhist images of the perfected person, the bodhisattva and the mahāsiddha.

II. The Arahant and the World
It is well known that the Buddha taught a method which led to the cessation of the world (tiṇṇha loko viśattika ti), but what is not so well known is what the Buddha meant by 'world'. In this case, the term

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Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the Buddhist Studies Colloquium, University of Washington, Seattle, in February 1979, and at the annual meeting of the Rocky Mountains Region of the American Academy of Religion, University of Colorado, Boulder, in April 1979.

2. S 1:60. (All canonical references are to PTS editions unless otherwise indicated).
employed is loka; we also find the term samāra, usually employed in the
case of talk about rebirth; and also jagat, used in the sense of the place
where one goes, a use to be considered below.

Ananda, commenting upon some remarks by the Buddha, equates
loka with lokasaśāti, which is to say that the world is our experience of
the world. ‘World’ means a lived world; it is our experience, and the
world. ‘World’ means a lived world; it is our experience, and therefore
the relational, objectified world. It is not a given, a place
in which human kind is born and dies; not the a priori stage of our drama,
but the drama itself. The world is derived not from some first cause,
but from the gestalt of conditions given that desire that there be a
world for us (bhavatahā); its circular matrix (patīcasamanappe) revolve
around ignorance (anājī). The world is our experience of the world in
the sense that one need not grant any world apart from our experience.

Occasionally the term jagat is used for some sense of what English
speakers mean by ‘world’. This term is interestingly derived from
Vedic 
√gam, meaning ‘go’ therefore the place where one goes, a very
different etymology and usage from loka. This distinction is sharpened by
the Buddha when Rohitassa asks him whether loka can be exhausted by
going (gamassati). The Buddha clearly denies this possibility, indicating
that two things: (1) the distinction between jagat, the physical world to
which one goes, and loka, the world in a Buddha sense; and (2) that
which is the question of the world, according to his Dhamma, is not a mere
question of geography, physics and science. The Buddha says that
while one cannot reach the end of the world by physical means, this
yet still he teaches a way which leads to the end of the world. This
point is emphasized in another place where the Buddha says: “Monks,
there is no going to the end of the world by knowing, seeing or going,
I say. Monks, I say that without having gone to the end of the world,
there is no making an end of suffering.”

The same emphasis is found in the Kevaddha Sutta where the Buddha
is asked where the cessation of the four great elements (mahābhūtā) could
be found. The Buddha says that the question is wrongly put, and that
rather than asking about any location for the cessation of the mahābhūtā,
it would be more sensible to ask where these mahābhūtā, and such

3. As A II 151 and S I 186
4. S IV 95
6. Whitney, William Dwight, The Roots, Verbs-Forms and Primary Derivatives of the
Oriental Series, Vol. 30, 1945 (Leipzig: Breitkopf and Härtel, Bibliothek Indogermanischer
7. S I 60
8. S I 60 (My translation)
9. S IV 93 (My translation)
10. S IV 93
11. Dhammapada I 1 (My translation)
12. S IV 95
13. S I 60
14. D I 2, 28-36
15. D I 2, 16-22
16. D I 2, 1-15
17. D I 2, 30-34
18. D I 2, 23-29

notions as long and short, fine and coarse, pure and impure, and name
and form, cease and lack any basis. The point being made by the
Buddha is that any talk about the world apart from someone’s lived
experience of the world is incoherent; that a religiously significant
concept in the world apart from man’s being in the world is impossible.
The answer to this rephrased question is, of course arahat which is the cessation of the world and all notion of world. As the
Dhammapada says: “Mind precedes dharmas; mind is their leader,
and mind creates them” (monohubhangam dharmā monekhitam monohutam), the
world from which the Buddha speaks is the experienced, objectified
psychological world. It is well known that the Buddha often demonstrated
that all claims about the world are, upon examination, found
to be existential-psychological statements; that psychoanalysis is a more
profitable spiritual undertaking than metaphysical analysis. Here we see
that Ananda’s equation of world (loka) with the experience (or idea,
perception or notion) of the world (lokasaśāti) similarly indicates that,
since there could be no coherent notion of ‘world’ as the a priori of human
existence, then Buddhists must be careful to note their special use and
significance of the term ‘world’ within the context of their religious
discipline: ayaṃ veccati apiyassa vinayo loka.”

This leads us to some interesting questions. First of all, we have seen
that in Buddhist terminology, the ‘world’ (loka) means our experience of
the world (lokasaśāti), the lived world. It was for the same reason that the
Buddha was able to present us with such startling analyses of various
philosophical positions in the Brahmājala Sutta. In this sutta, all
sixty-two possible views on the world, the self, and other metaphysical
issues current in his day, are psycho-analyzed. For example, eternalistic
views (etamātā) are reduced to superficial conclusions drawn from
meditative experiences of former lives, or to mere addiction to reasoning
(katā kotti vimānay). Claiming that the world is infinite or finite is
merely a trans-dimensional hallucination as believing the world to
be created at a given point in time derives from one’s imagining oneself to have been
a Brahmā in a former life, but actually the meditator was merely one of
the “fallen gods deceptively pleased” (kṣītta padoṣākā nāma devā),
who are obsessed with guilt and jealousy,16 those who believe the world
arose by chance (adhocca samappanī) are confused because they are
unable to recall previous lives as unconscious beings (asākhī sutta),17 and
the sophists-like ‘re-wrigglers’ (amāra vikāpata) do not equivocate out
of conviction, but would have us believe, but out of fear of exposing their
stupidity. In this Brahmājala Sutta, the Buddha is providing his
disciples with a divine net (brahmājala) with which to ensure all
metaphysical positions, a net which is the methodology of the psycho-
analysis of metaphysical claims.

11. Dhammapada I 1 (My translation)
12. S IV 95
13. S I 60
14. D I 2, 28-36
15. D I 2, 16-22
16. D I 2, 1-15
17. D I 2, 30-34
18. D I 2, 23-29
'Going to the end of the world' means crossing over the floods (aghā), and the four floods are: the flood of sensuality (kāmabhā); the flood of becoming (bhavabhā); the flood of metaphysics (dīthidharmabhā); and the flood of ignorance (aniñjīgha). 'Going to the end of the world' means overcoming the tendency to grasp (upādāna), and the four graspsings are: grasping after sensuality (kāmupādāna); grasping after metaphysics (dīthidharmupādana); grasping after primitive ritualism (tīlakhabhātupādana); and grasping after an egoistic eternalism (attādīvajjupādana). 'Going to the end of the world' means arahattā, the overcoming of the fiction of self (anattā), which leads us to saying that, for Buddhism, the self and the world are co-terminous and co-extensive.

III. The Arahant and the Emotions

This brings us to a crucial question. If, as we have argued, the Buddhist notion of 'lōka' is psychological in the sense of lived and not a priori world, then would it not follow that emotions, which are certainly psychological, would find no place in that which is beyond the world, in arahattā? Our response to this type of position, which has found its way into both traditional and western scholarship, is that it assumes too narrow an understanding of human emotions. The detachment of the arahant, which is the detachment from self (atta), from the dhamma, from all grasping (upādāna) and desire (tanha), is not a state of neutrality or indifference. The Buddhist tells us19 that indifference or neutrality (upekkhā) is of the same nature as happiness (sukhā), ease (somanassindriya), pain (dukkha), and discomfort (domanassindriya). This is to say that indifference or neutrality is not a goal of Buddhism, that it, like all other similar emotional tones, is not satisfactory and should be gone beyond. Buddhist detachment means the non-reference of feeling and desire thereby the cultivation of a hedonically or emotionally balanced neutrality. Neutrality (upekkhā) should not be cultivated, but simply regarded as us feeling like other feelings: "Similarly (as with pleasant and unpleasant feelings), monks, neutrality or indifference must be seen (merely) as a feeling which is neither painful nor pleasurable."

To return to our immediate problem: if the world and the self are co-terminous and co-extensive, and that the world is a product of grasping and desire, then what type of emotions could there be said to remain after the overcoming of self? Or, to rephrase this question, is there a type of emotion which is not contingent merely upon self? We offer that in Buddhism there is, and to present our case we must consider in what sense the Buddha taught that the world is a product of our desire, and what other senses of desire there might be. We feel that a problem in this regard has been the muddle relating to two key terms, tappa and chanda, both translated into English as 'desire' but with differing and even contradictory usages.

That the lived world is neither created nor random was expressed by the Buddha in the well known formula of 'patissanamppadhā' or dependent co-arising: "By this being, that is; from the arising of this, that arises; By this not being, that isn’t; from the cessation of that, this doesn’t arise." (Imasmin sati idhami; imasmi upada idham upajjati; imasmi sati idham na hoti; imasmi niruddhā savari maraṅgajoti). This concise formula of patissanamppadhā has several extended forms, all of them including tanha as the eighth member of the circular series. In one place there are said to be three tanha, namely: the desire for sensuality (kāmatanha); the desire for becoming (bhavatānha); and the desire for annihilation (vihvatānha). Following form the principle that imasmi sati idham na hoti, we see that given the non-being of tanha, then the whole of the world (expressed as the trichotomy of the world of sensuality (kāma), the world of form (rupa), and the world of formlessness (araṇkapala) cases. In another place we learn that there are six types of tanha corresponding to the six sense-field; elsewhere we learn that the three aspects of the trichotomy derive from our desire for these three worlds.

The most literal meaning of the term tanha is 'thirst'; and Rhys-Davies and Stede28 have suggested a possible philological relation to its English cognate. We also learn that the destruction of tanha (tanhkāya) is identical to the destruction of the dhamma (dhammakaya), which is to say that it is identical to the cessation of the world, or arahattā.

Thus, the world is the product of our desiring that there be a world. Birth-and-death, which is to say suffering, is the product of the multilemma that I wish I were here but know that I will not be here (bhavatānha), and that I wish that I might not be here despite that fact that I am and will continue to be here (vihvatānha). The Sutta Nipata29 indicates the strong connection between our views of the world and our desires:

That which in the world is called 'being' or non-being, desire sufficiently gives rise to it. Having seen the becoming and annihilation of form, beings in the world make judgements.

One should note in this passage the use of the term chanda ('desire') where one might expect to find tanha. In many cases, these terms are interchangeable. In this passage, we have translated it as 'desire' much as we would had the term been tanha. This new term, chanda, derives from

19. S V 257
20. S V 258
21. S V 210
22. S V 20 (My translation)
23. [M H. 38 (My translation)]
24. See D 221
25. S V 257
26. D XV
27. D xxiii.
30. Sutta Nipata, p. 189 (My translation)
31. Śatatā, asatā, tī yam ālu loke, tām upajjāya pahoti chanda, rūpesu divā bhavaṁ bhavaṁ ca, vinnanāyaṇa kurute jantu loke.
the root √skandh, ‘to leap’,31 and gives us the sense of jumping at, and therefore intention, resolution, will, motivation,32 or desire. We shall return to its use as ‘motivation’ shortly, but its usage in the compound kāmacchanda is identical to kāmalaṇḍa.

Chanda is a most interesting term in the Sutta Pitaka, one which underscores for us the necessity of close, contextual readings of these materials. Nyāṇatiloka Mahāthera33 carefully distinguishes three distinct ranges of usage: (a) as used in Abhidhamma literature in a very neutral sense of intention, generally one of the mental concomitants (cetasā); (b) as ‘desire’ in the sense of that which binds us to saṁsāra, such as one of the five nivāraṇās;34 and (c) as desire in a positive sense, a usage which we shall consider below, in connection with a Buddhist sense of motivation.

One comes across this positive sense of chanda most often in discussions of the cultivation of the iddhipāda, which have been discussed as practices conducive to nibbāna.35 In order to cultivate these practices, one must conjoin chanda into his meditations: chanda samādhi padhāna sakkāra samanamattagāna iddhipadaṃ bhāveti.36 After a discourse on the necessity of incorporating desiring (chanda) into religious practices, Ānanda is asked by a brahmin37 if this were a coherent statement, since if the goal of the Buddha’s teaching is the overcoming of desire, then to utilize desire in the overcoming of desire would leave us with a sort of infinite regress. Ānanda is not troubled with this objection. He makes the analogy of going to a park: the going thereto is usually preceded by the desire, energy, thought and reflection (chanda, viriyaṃ, cittan ad vimutinā) that one goes to the park, and therefore that desire, etc., were appropriate (tañjo). Ānanda concludes:38

So it is, brahmin, that the arahant monk, the destroyer of the āsavā, fulfilled doer of what was to be done, layer down of his burden, actualizer of his goal, who has fully destroyed the fetters to this worldly existence, liberated by the supreme wisdom; that former desire (energy, thought, reflection) which he has used for attaining arahattā, [now that] arahattā is attained, that desire which so arose [or: ‘appropriate’] is satisfied.

31. Whitney, op. cit., p. 190
32. D. xxi, 11
33. Nyāṇatiloka, op. cit., pp. 40-41
34. Whiffen, J., Dictionary, p. 574
35. Which, at A ix 40, are listed as: desire for sensuality (kāmacchanda), malevolence (pudāda), torpor (bhū-mūdā), restlessness and worry (uddhāra-kukkutā), and doubt (cakkālā) (A IV 360).
37. It should be noted that Ānanda is not saying that all chanda is abated; he is merely indicating that desire or motivation is appropriate in the spiritual life, and that the culmination of the spiritual life means that one need no longer desire that culmination. We cite this dialogue to indicate that the Buddha and his disciples did have some sort of notion of appropriate and inappropriate use of desire or motivation.

The idea of motivation or desire entails that which gives rise to activity, and there is a great deal of material to convince one that the arahant notion in the Sutta Pitaka is a very active ideal. For example, Subhuti’s short verse in the Therāgāthā reads in part:39 “My mind is well composed, freed; I dwell actively.” The sphere and nature of this activity is properly the topic for another discussion, but basically it refers to a very active and compassionate (mettāvītana) teaching. At the moment, however, we are concerned with making the case that the arahant is active, and that the notion of activity entails the notion of motivation (chanda), and that the motivations of the arahant are rooted in emotions. Of course, it has been held that the Buddha or an arahant is the paradigm of a motiveless life, but we wish to point out that this motivelessness is a coherent concept only within the context of an understanding of motivation as rooted in egoism (asmimāna). We are offering there that can be, should be, and is in Buddhism a different and significant sense of motivation, emotion and activity.

In the Itivuttaka we learn that exertion (padhāna) is rooted in a certain type of emotion called samvega:40

Monks, with two dhāma a religiously-inclined monk dwells happily and at ease in this life, very firm about the destruction of the āsavā. Which two? By emotion [when there is] cause for emotion and from that emotion he exerts himself strongly.

The text goes on to say41 that the wise man should be emotional when there is cause for emotion: samvejjaneyuṁ thānesu samvejjethāva padhāna. Buddhaghosa42 discusses samvega in its compounded form, samvega-vattthi, which is to say, those occasions by which samvega is aroused. There are said to be eight such occasions, namely: birth, old age, sickness, death, suffering in the lower realms of rebirth and suffering in saṁsāra in the past, present and future. The Buddha says that there are four causes for samvega, namely the four places of Buddhist pilgrimage! Lumbini, the place of the birth of the Buddha; Buddha Gaya, the place where he attained bodhi; Sarnath, where he preached the first sermon, setting the wheel of the Dhamma into motion; and Kushinārā, the place where
he attained parinibbāna. Thus samāna is a type of spiritually productive emotion, which Buddhaghosa interprets as something like the feeling of disgust at the misery of the world, which is to say a feeling of disgust with that which we experience as a world, following from Ananda’s equation of loka with lokasaṁññā. Buddhaghosa’s interpretation seems to follow from the dictum of the Buddha.44 “That which the outsiders [i.e., non-Buddhists] call happiness, that the holy ones [i.e., advanced Buddhists] call suffering.” (Tām āni pava sukhamā ṣu, tad ārjya ṣu dukkhaḥ.) Another sutta helps to explain this. An analysis of that which is called pleasant (sukham ēsu) finds that since all worldly pleasures are dependently co-ordinated, they are in truth painful (dukkham ēsu). But Buddhism would not have us merely attempt an escape from dukkhaḥ for two reasons. First of all, any such attempted escape would be unsuccessful, as even the highest escape imaginable, that of birth among the devās, or of meditative bliss, are neither lasting nor ultimately satisfactory. This is not to say that the Buddha’s attitude toward worldly pleasure was uncompromisingly negative. It was allowed for, in a limited sense, as the Buddha realized that, for the majority of people, it was the best that could be hoped for.45 “Monks, the worldly person knows no other refuge from painful feeling than delight in sensuality.” It seems that the bliss of the destruction of desire (tathākkhayusukha) was simply of a much greater magnitude than any conceivable worldly bliss, as we find stated in the Udāna.46

“That worldly happiness of sensuality, and that happiness of the devās, does not come to one-sixteenth part of the happiness of the destruction of desire.” Following Buddhaghosa, then, we see that worldly pleasures of sensuality and of the devās may be seen as the closest approximation of spiritual accomplishment, but the purpose of the Buddha’s doctrine was to see the superficiality of this type of pleasure. Religious emotion, according to Buddhaghosa, was the feeling of repugnance with all worldly pleasures. This disgust, repugnance and renunciative spirit was his use of the term samāna.

But it seems not to be the only one. We have seen that the Buddha taught that samāna could also mean a positive religious sentiment,47 such as that arising from pilgrimage to the holy places. This trend seems to be more developed in the Sinhalese commentaries. For example, the Sarāthappakāsinī48 tells us that samāna arose in both monks and laypeople. The people merely at the sight of the Mahācetiya at Anurādhapura. In the people at the sight of the Mahācetiya at Anurādhapura. In the


aroise the religious sentiment of pīti or joy while contemplating the Buddha (buddhā-rāmamāsāpa). Māra, a personification of those forces which hinder one’s spiritual growth, tried to combat this pīti, but Phussadeva, in his struggle with Māra to maintain that pīti, attains arahattā in such a situation. Govinda46 makes the point that while sensuous desire (kāmacchanda), an emotion rooted in egoism, is always seen as a prime enemy of spiritual growth, a desire for the Dhamma (dhammacchanda) is a positive emotion to be cultivated.

Similarly, Johansson45 makes a keen observation which could, however, be misleading. He says that “by definition, nibbāna is freedom from the emotions and desires by which egoism and attachment are created; all definitions are in complete agreement on this point.” We would only wish to add, by way of caution and emphasis, that not all emotions, according to Buddhism, give rise to egoism (asimānā) and attachment (upādāna).

Thus far we have limited ourselves to discussions of tāpā and chanda, and of samāna. We have seen that while tāpā is always something to be overcome; and also that although chanda is, in some contexts, identical to chanda, nevertheless, we have shown other uses of chanda, such as Govinda’s dhammacchanda, which are clearly positive; and also the role of chanda in the cultivation of the iddhipādā, a way leading to nibbāna.

Samāna seems to be used to indicate two distinct types of religious emotion. The first one, following Buddhaghosa and some Sutta Pitaka sources, is that feeling of repugnance and renunciation for the misery of the world. The second sense of samāna, about which the Buddha spoke and the commentaries elaborated, is a type of religious sentiment arising on pilgrimage or at a shrine, useful to both monks and the laity, which is something like joy (pīti).

We shall now consider a Buddhist use of the term mettā, which is love or loving kindness or perhaps friendliness, an emotion upon which was based a very significant part of the bodhisattvayāna teachings under the term karunā or compassion. We shall then return to the issue of how emotions are to be viewed in a Buddhist context in general. We shall argue that the Buddha took a middle path in his approach toward the emotions: some are to be avoided, some cultivated, and all analyzed. This case is against many interpretations of Buddhism, and of scholarly accounts of the Theravāda in particular, which hold that the Buddha was categorically opposed to all emotionality. This, we feel, is based on a misunderstanding of many factors, including a Buddhist understanding of the positive emotion of motivation and perfection.

We will readily grant that in the instances of those emotions which give rise to egoism and attachment, which is to say, those emotions which give rise to the world, the Buddha was uncompromising in saying that

they must be overcome in order for there to be spiritual growth. A paradigm for this sort of negative emotion would be sensual desire (kāmārāga) or lust for sensuality (kāmācchanda), or lust for sensuality (kāmārāga). This sort of emotional tone distorts and perverts the mind and therefore the world. The Buddha says:32

Suppose, brahmin, a bowl of water were mixed with lac or tumeric or blue or yellow dye, and suppose a man with good sight should look closely therein for the reflection of his own face. He would not know or see it as it really is. Just so, brahmin, when one dwells with his heart possessed by sensual lust, overwhelmed by sensual lust, and knows not in very truth any refuge from sensual lust that has arisen,—at such time he neither known nor sees in very truth his own profit.

There is no question that such emotions have no place in the religious life according to the Buddha; yet, just that lust (rāga), if directed toward the Dhamma rather than sensuality, can conduce to arahattā. This is explicitly stated:33 "... yet by his lust (rāga) or passion for the Dhamma, by his bliss in the Dhamma, he utterly destroys the five lower fetters."

A narrow interpretation of the Buddha's teachings on the emotions, especially lust or passion (rāga), led some Buddhists to insupportable conclusions. In the Kathāvātthu3 we learn of a group called the Uttarāpathaka sect who so narrowly defined passion (rāga) as to hold that since the Buddha was not impressed (aroga), therefore he was incapable of emotions like friendliness (metta) or compassion (karuṇā). The Theravāda controversialist makes two points against such a position. He first of all says that such a narrow view of being non-impressed (aroga) entails that the Buddha was ruthless, which no Buddhist would contend. He then appeals to the Uttarāpathaka not to get intoxicated with his logic, and to please see the simple fact that the Buddha did act compassionately, and that one should not hold theses which do violence to the simplest observations. The rejoinder is couched in language about the four divine abodes (brahmavihārā) of friendliness (metta), empathy (muditā), compassion (karuṇā) and equanimity (upekkhā), all of which were taught by the Buddha. To say that the Buddha did not live compassionately because he was free from passion is to deny the teaching of these four brahmavihārā, which are elementary Buddhist meditation practices.

52. A V 121-122 (PTS translation) Seyyathāpi bhārāma uddapata samattho lākāha vā halidiyā vā nīlī vā maṇjethiyā vā, tathā ca khikhanā purū saκam mukkha-nimittam paccekkhaṁ nā yahābhūtaṁ na jāneya na paseyya, evam eva kha bhārāma yasmin samaye kāmārāgapi-uttiheta cetasā viharati kāmarāgaparētona, uppanna ca kāmarāgaṁ nissaranaṁ yahābhūtanā nappajātan, atthaṁ pavma samaye yahābhūtanā na jānati na paseyya, parathāṁ pavma na bhārāma yasi samaye yahābhūtanā na paseyya, digharatam satthāyaṁkātaṁ pi mantā na paṭṭhaṁ yahābhūtanā na paseyya, aparipāyaṁkaṭā yā jānati na paseyya.

53. A V 346 (My translation)

ten' eva dhammaṁvaṁ tāya dhammaṁvaṁ paccacchanta orambhāgyaṁ saṁyogānāṁ paṭikkhayā.

54. Kathāvātthu, pp. 56f

The Sutta Pitaka is most eloquent in its praises of metta. In the Metta Sutta35 we find the gāthā:

Just as with her own life
a mother shields from hurt
her own, her only child,—
let all-embracing thoughts
for all that lives be thine,
an all-embracing love
for all the universe,
in all its heights and depths
and breadth, unstinted love,
unmarried by hate within,
not rousing enmity.

Moreover, the disciple who cultivates other aspects of the Dhamma but neglects metta, opens himself to spiritual dangers. The Buddha says on this point:36

Monks, just as any clan which is populated largely with women is susceptible to attacks from thieves and robbers, just so it is, monks, that any monk who does not cultivate the freedom of the heart-mind by means of metta, he is susceptible to attack from non-human beings.

One possible interpretation of 'non-human beings' (anuṣṭhāṭha) could be their psychological functions which either endanger spiritual growth, with Māra as the paradigm, or perhaps to something like the yakkha, demons which cause psychopathological problems. To say the least about this verse, the neglect of metta in one's spiritual practices leads to a weakening of the results of those practices. To say the most, unless spiritual practices are infused with metta, then one runs a great psychological risk.

Having demonstrated that the emotions play a role in the spiritual life as understood by the Buddha, one might raise the question of how these emotions are to be viewed. The Buddha tells us that the spiritual life must be preceded by a healthy view of the worldly life. One must understand what satisfaction is found in the emotions, and also those which are related to self and sensuality are ultimately unsatisfactory.37

55. Sutta Niṭṭha, p. 26 (PTS translation)
Mātā yahā niyaṁ puttaṁ, ayusak eka puttaṁ anukkho, evam eva sabbahūthuṁ, mānasam bhāvaye aparimāvaṁ, Mettaṁ ca sabbhāsataṁ, mānasam bhāvaye aprimāvaṁ, udhānaṁ adho ca tiriyā ca, asambhā dhamva averaṁ aparisaṇaṁ.

56. S II 264 (My translation)
Seyyathāpi bhikkhave yāṁ kāniṁ kulaṁ bhavucchāṁ appupāsāṁ tāṁ suppadhanisāyāṁ honi cēri kumbhāravatāni. Evam eva kho bhikkhave yassa kassaci bhikkhuno metta cetovimutti abhāvetā abhāvikaṁ, so suppadhanisāyo hoti amanuvatti.

57. S IV 11. (PTS translation)
Yava kāniṁ bhikkhave sattaṁ imesamahanne apaggallanām āyatanasamassadādānaṁ ādānavaṇca ādānavaṇca nissaranāca nissarananto yathābhūtanā nābhāsanaṁ, neva tāva bhikkhave sattaṁ sāvadā kāli sabrahmāṇaṁ sānamasbhāvahāniyāṁ paṭṭhaṁ sāvadānāsāyaṁ nissarā vimūryatāṁ vippanātāṁ vimūryadasanānaṁ cetasā viharituṁ.
So long, brethren, as beings have not understood, as they really are, the satisfaction as such, the misery as such, the way of escape as such, in this sixfold personal sphere of sense, so long, brethren beings have not remained aloof, detached, separated, with the barriers to the mind done away with, nor have the world with its deas, its Māras, its Brahmās, nor the host of recluse and brahmans, of deas and mankind.

This is a very balanced view of ordinary human life which holds that the spiritual life must be preceded by a full understanding of the senses, which is not merely to say that they are to be avoided, but that they yield their satisfactions and their sufferings.

Similarly a balanced view, or middle path, is taken regarding the self. The Buddha tells us\(^{59}\) that there are three forms of pride (māno): pride (māno); self-denigration (omānā); and excessive pride (ālāmānā). Belitling oneself, then, is as much a form of pride as self-aggrandizement according to the Buddha, who herein displays an understanding of the psychological person which corresponds to many developments within the western psychotherapeutic tradition.

The Buddha did not instruct his followers to suppress, ignore or view as pathological the emotions as such. They are to be analyzed or, perhaps in certain situations, to be used as a method of teaching. To this last point we find an example in the Udāna.\(^{99}\) One of the Buddha’s disciples, Nanda, has become infatuated with a Sakyan girl and despair of progressing in the spiritual life. The Buddha takes Nanda to one of the heavens and shows him five hundred of the kakasapadini, a type of goddess with bird-like feet. Nanda says that, when compared with these goddesses, his Sakyan girl friend looks like a deformed monkey. Thus his passion (rāga) is skillfully redirected by the Buddha, and Nanda eventually attains arahattā.

All emotions and feelings are, in Buddhism, a potential ground for spiritual growth; it merely becomes a question of our attitude towards these feelings and emotions. For example, the Buddha says:\(^{60}\)

Monks, by a monk happy feelings are seen as unsatisfactory; unhappy feelings are seen as a prod; and feelings which are neither happy nor unhappy are seen as impermanent. Monks, I call that monk one who sees rightly.

It is also important to note that this attitude towards emotions and feelings which the Buddha prescribes is not a mere neutrality. Neutrality or indifference is just another emotive tone, perhaps preferable to extreme agitation, elation or depression but not ultimately satisfactory.

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60. S IV 207 (My translation)
Yatho kho bhikkhave bhikkhuno sukha vedanā dukkha dōppha honti, dukkha vedanā sallato dōpphā honti, adukkhahamassukha vedanā aniccato dōpphā honti. Ayapi viccā bhikkhave bhikkhave samuddassato.

61. S V 209 (My translation)
Kāmaṁca bhikkhave upakhindriyam? Yan kho bhikkhave ākaṁati vata eva neva sātiṁ nāsatiṁ vedatiṁ.
62. S III 198
AN ANALYSIS OF THE SELA SUTTA OF THE SUTTA NIPĀTA

L. P. N. Perera

The Sela Sutta belongs to the ballad poetry of the Sutta-Nipāta. It may be of interest to view this Sutta in the light of the accepted criteria for the ballad and determine how far we may support this contention. Although it is difficult to give an exact definition of the term "ballad", it may be generally explained as "a type of verse of unknown authorship, dealing with episode or simple motif rather than sustained theme, written in a stanzaic form more or less fixed and suitable for oral transmission, and in its expression and treatment showing little or nothing of the finesse of deliberate art" 1. A few characteristics of the ballad, are, that "it is short, adapted for singing, impersonal and of simple metrical structure" 2. The Sela Sutta embodies nearly all these characteristics. It is typical of the ballads of ancient Indian literature. A popular form of the ancient Indian ballad is the mingling of the dialogue and narrative stanzas. In this Sutta the stanzas alternate with a prose framework. The Sutta reveals instances of the dramatic element (which is more evident in suttas like Dhnenya, Hunnovada and Padānā) especially in the concluding stanzas, nī. Sn. 570-573. Some of the verses are well adapted for singing, cf. Sn. 548 etc. Winternitz 1 considers the Sela Sutta a sermon in verse with a prose framework. According to N. A. Jayawickrama 3 this is a "mixed ballad". However, a better explanation has been sought in the definition "Sutta Ballads" 4—a term denoting that these suttas are discourses in the form of mixed ballads. It has also been observed 5 that this Sutta could be regarded as "uniform in every way" with five other suttas of the same Vagga, nī. Sundarikākhañāda, Māgha, Sābhaya, Vāsīthā and Rokāniya. These Suttas afford a close parallel to the "mixed ballads" of the Cullavagga of the Sutta-Nipāta.

The foregoing observations, however, do not throw any light on the question of the age of the Suta under discussion. The indisputable fact that most of the suttas of this collection hark back to very early times has often reiterated. 6 Most of the suttas of this Vagga, too, as Fauböll observes 7, are probably very old. The Sela Sutta, on the contrary, shows signs of lateness.

* First published in the Colombo University Review VIII, 3 (July 1950)
1. Encyclopaedia Britannica, s.v.
2. Ibid.
3. "Tsapatun sapphādāgamha iti atthami cakkham...", etc.
4. Paripurṇakāya atthi suvītā cārattusu...", etc.
5. Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature II, p. 93
7. Ibid., also cf. Winternitz, op. cit. II, 93 ff.
8. Ibid., also Winternitz, op. cit. II, 92 ff.
9. Cf. Ibid., also Winternitz, op. cit. II, 92 ff., Fauböll, SBE X (Introduction to Sutta-Nipāta translation), Chalmers, HOS XXXVII (Introduction to Sutta-Nipāta translation) etc.
10. Ibid

Although in Indian literature the title of a book, or section thereof, is no guide to its contents, 11 the title of this Sutta is a clear index as to what the Sutta is. It deals with the conversion of the Brahmin Sela. 12 The Sela introduces two personalities—Kenyā, the matted-hair ascetic and Sela, the Brahmin. It is quite probable that Kenyā (or Kenyā) in this context is a proper-name, 13 although Kenyā occurs as a class-name, too, as for instance in the Apadāna, 14 where the monk Mahākappāna is said to have belonged to the Kenyā class. However, it is very unlikely that any such class existed as Kenyā; and, as Malalasekera surmises, 15 Kenyā may be an alternative reading for Koliya (the historical clan) as actually occurring in some recensions of the Therāgatha. The Brahmin Sela, who was converted by the Buddha, is introduced next.

The question whether this Sutta as an original whole dealt with Kenyā and Sela, or whether it is a fusion of two ballads dealing with them separately, arises next. Two instances, however, occur in the canonical literature dealing with Kenyā and Sela without any reference to each other. The Vinaya 16 refers to the meeting between Kenyā and the Buddha, but this account differs somewhat from the version in the Sela Sutta, in that the narrative there is considerably longer than in the Sutta-Nipāta, and no reference is made to Sela. On the other hand, Sela is referred to in the Therāgathā, 17 which preserves the verses ascribed to him, but without any mention of Kenyā.

On the assumption that this poem was a unified whole as it is, originally, (and not a fusion of two ballads), it may be argued that the omission of Sela in the Vinaya account is justifiable, as any reference to him in that particular context has no bearing on the Vinaya rule that was to be laid down with reference to Kenyā. 18 Such a view would remain plausible only in the absence of any other reference either to Kenyā or to Sela, separately. But the fallacy of this assumption becomes obvious from the fact that no reference is made to Kenyā in the Therāgathā where the verses attributed to Sela occur. It is of interest to note that the verses attributed to Sela were probably known to the Pāli Buddhists Sanskrit work Dighajātaka, 19 where reference is made to Sālāgathā, among other Sātras called Munigātha and Arthavargiyāni. There are two more instances in the Pāli Canon where Sela and Kenyā are mentioned, but in both

11. E.g. the Kenyā Upanissad is so called as it connotes with the word Kena (the Instrument) a singular of the Interrogative Pronoun Ken, as pointed out by Rome (The Thirteenth Principal Upanisads) which is not at all connected with its contents.
13. Malalasekera, Dictionary of Pali Proper Names, s.v.
15. Cf. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Vinaya (Mahāvagga) I, p. 245.
18. The reference is to the laying down of the rule regarding drinks, which was occasioned by the drinks offered by Kenyā to the Buddha and the monks. See Mahāvagga I, p. 245.
instances they are referred to together. Firstly in the Majjhimaka Nikaya where the Sutta under discussion occurs iden
tically; secondly, in the comparatively late Apadana, where Sela refers to Keniya in his verses. Other references to them are to be found in eight post-canonical works. However, the post-canonical accounts are not sufficiently authentic to be of much importance, in that they are either adaptations from the canonical accounts, or records of an oral tradition, or borrowings from various narrative works. In view of the general lateness of the accounts in which both are mentioned together, it is likely that two narratives dealing with Keniya and Sela have been fused into one ballad.

The hypothesis that this Sutta is a fusion of two ballads raises the question as to what the ballads are. Although they are incapable of being positively ascertained, it appears that the one concerning Sela is that preserved in the Theragatha, while the ballad regarding Keniya is from a then-floating tradition, drawn upon both by the Sutta-Nipata and the Vinaya. The fusion itself follows a definite pattern. The prose and the verse of the Sutta occur alternately. First comes a long prose introduction followed by the first twenty stanzas attributed to Sela in the Theragatha. Next a prose passage dealing with Keniya, and establishing continuity with the introduction. The Sutta concludes with the four remaining verses attributed to Sela in the Theragatha. Thus, even if the verses attributed to Sela are omitted, the prose passages maintain continuity.

The language of the prose, as in almost all the Suttas of this collection, is quite similar to the prose of the Nikayas in idiom, syntax and style. The expressions employed are stereotyped. One of the many instances of the similarity of the prose of this Sutta to that of the Nikayas is afforded by a comparison of the introductory prose here, for instance, with the introductory prose section of the Asamba Sutta. The prose, though not an essential factor of the ballad, is employed as an aid to the narrative, and serves as "a connecting thread running through the whole ballad linking up the various parts." 26

An interesting feature of this Sutta is that no narrative verses are to be detected. Although the "mun" of the Sutta-Nipata is to be seen in Sela as a monk, the language and the ideology of the verses suggest that the Sutta as a whole belongs to a comparatively late period. Probably an older layer is to be seen in Sn. 562-567, for a similar poetic section may be detected elsewhere. On the whole, however, Sn. 562 to the end sounds very poetic, while the earlier portion of the Sutta is rather laboured and seems to be adapted from a prose version, as Sn. 552 suggests. 27

The metre of the verses is Anustubb Sloka, Old linguistic forms (particularly Vedic, for which the Sutta-Nipata is well-known) are not very common. A few old forms such as brahja (Sn. 550), abhijnas (Sn. 559, 560), bhonto (Sn. 562) and the Imperative vinayasa (Sn. 559) may be observed. The rest of the language of the verses is suggestive of a later phase of Pali. No old idioms are to be cited.

Another important characteristic of the Sutta is its development in ideology. The ideas of Mahapurasakkhana (the characteristics of a Great Being) and Cakkavatti (the Universal Monarch) occur both in the prose and the verse. The concepts Mahapurasaka and Cakkavattin probably hark back to pre-Buddhist times, or at least belong to the early Buddhist period. The term Mahapurasaka occurs in the Aitareya Aranyaka where it means "the year" (saṃvatāra eva), the essence of which is said to be the "sun" (ādiyav rasah), which in turn is identified with "the incorporeal Supreme Spirit," (yaśve pragnā prajñāna yātāvān śrutiśeṣa eva) in the Veda and the Sutras. It is also a name for Vīśnua, which occurs in the Maitri Upanisad, where fifteen mythical figures are referred to as sakravartin. Both concepts were probably well known to ancient India as evident from the popular floating tradition as embodied in the Great Epics, Kathasaritsagara and Hitopadeśa.

The thirty-two characteristics (lakkhasana) are very likely of mythological origin and probably first attributed to dancer—a contention justified by the fact that Vīśnua has been referred to as Mahapurasaka. Hence, these concepts are more of adaptations from the then-current ideas than pure developments in Pali Buddhism. It is usually taken for granted that the Cakkavatti ideal developed only after the rise of Magadhan imperialism, as suggested by Rhys Davids. Although this view seems plausible as the idea was an innovation in early Buddhist doctrine, the foregoing observations indicate that these concepts were pre-Buddhist, but revived during the Asokan period when the Pali Canon was reaching completion.

25. Cf. Pali Dictionary, s.v; 26. Cf. Le Mette, op. cit., II, p. 101; 27. Saṅgāyana, V, p. 818-841. It may be noted that the verses in question in the Theragatha are identical with those of this Sutta, with the exception of Sn. 568 and 569.
The reference to the Cakkavatti ideal in the Jaina scriptures and particularly in the later Buddhist Sanskrit literature, further strengthens this contention.

The foregoing observations may suffice to indicate that the Sōla Sutta, as it stands in contrast to many a Sutta of the Sutta Nipāta (which usually abound in archaic linguistic forms, old idiom and early phases of the doctrines) is decidedly a later addition to that text.

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THE ANALOGY OF JIVAN MUKTA IN VEDANTA WITH THE ARAHANT IN PALI BUDDHISM

Bhikkhu Nanajivavāko

O great hero, O great sage,
glorious spring of magical powers!
You have overcome the fear of all hostility,
I pay homage to your feet, O clairvoyant wise!

Yet, how is it, O Lord, that your disciple (Godhiko),
devoted to your teaching, died without
having attained the ultimate aim of his efforts?

(Godhiko Sutta, S IV 23)

In the Upanisads referred to by Śaṅkara in his commentary on Bādara-yaṇa’s Brahma Sūtrāṇi there are some references to the early Vedāntic teaching on the jīvan-mukta, or a person “liberated while in life”. Thus the long introductory paragraph to the third chapter of Pāṇḍara Upaniṣad summarizes the karmic development and the ultimate requisites for the attainment of this state. In Śaṅkara’s adavānta-vedānta this doctrine is generally admitted and fully developed. Since this doctrine, as elucidated by Śaṅkara, corresponds in several essential characteristics to the attainment of enlightenment in life by the arahant as described in the Pali suttas, the subject is worth a comparative study of the two terms: jīvan-mukta and arahant. For our purpose, to disentangle some possible and actual misunderstandings of this analogy, a few basic statements by Śaṅkara may suffice to make explicit the historical background of some peculiar mistakes recurrent on the side of authors under prevalently Vedāntist influence approaching this analogy still today in the atmosphere of interreligious dialogues:

In this commentary on Brahma Sūtra 1 3 19, Śaṅkara affirms that in the attainment of mokṣa only individual consciousness is removed (vīśeṣa-vijñāna-vināśaḥ), but not the consciousness in its totality.

According to the same commentary, 1 4 22, this means only the dissolution of name-and-form which abides in the limiting adjuncts (upādiṣṭa) and not the dissolution of atman (upādiṣṭa-pralayaṃ evamy nātma-pralayaṃ II 1 14).

B S III 3 32 states that persons who have attained release but still “have a certain duty (adhikāraḥ) to perform, (continue to live) as long as their duty lasts”. In his commentary Śaṅkara mentions examples from the purāṇas “that even from amongst these who have realized buddha, some acquire other bodies”.

Śaṅkara’s long comment on S B III 2 21 contains perhaps his most explicit explanation of the doctrine of “final release by stages” (krama-muktiḥ):

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36. Uttarādhyayana Sūtra (translated by Jacobi) SBE XLV, p. 83, fn. 1. Although the origins of Jainism were pre-Buddhistic, Jaina literature is comparatively late since the Jaina Canon reached completion about the fifth century, A.D. See Rādhā-krishnan, Indian Philosophy I, p. 288.

37. See Lankadhātra Sūtra, Ch. II, where Mahāmattā is depicted questioning the Buddha regarding the nature of a ākāśamati.
"It is also understood according to the scriptural instruction that these deep meditations on Brahman as having such forms, have fruit, such as that sometimes it is the destruction of sin, sometimes it is the attainment of power and sometimes final release by stages (krama mukti)".1

In Rāmānuja’s critique of Śaṅkara’s advaita-vedānta absolute monism from the standpoint of his theistically ‘qualified’ (viśeṣātva) interpretation of Vedānta, Śaṅkara’s doctrine of jīvo-mukta and his krama-mukti is rejected in statements as the following:

“The cessation of worldly existence itself is, indeed, salvation...
Hence salvation is not possible while one lives…”2

(Rāmānuja Śrībhāṣyam 113)

When the highest principle of Being, brahma, understood here as the God-head, is quoted in the Upanisads “as associated with adjunctless (nimūpyādhi) existence, by that are excluded (such qualities as) the nonsentient, the sphere of modifications and the corresponding sentient constituents dependent on them” (ibid 112), and not the nirguṇa-brahma as understood by Śaṅkara. According to Rāmānuja,

“since brahma as the knower has himself the nature of knowledge (jñāna-svarūpātādā), scriptural passages which declare that knowledge is the nature of brahma do not declare that (brahma) in its Being is distinctionless and mere consciousness” (Ibid, Mahā-siddhānta 49)—but on the contrary,

“the words sat, brahma and ātmā denote the paramātma having a body”. (Ibid 78)

“Otherwise, if this treatise (Budarāyaṇa’s Bhrahma Śvarūpi) is admitted to be intent upon propounding distinctionless entity (nirvairasā-nastuḥ), all these queries would not harmonise...and brahma would be the abode of everything inauspicious...and thus would result the state of everything being nothingness (sarva-sānyatam-eva)”

(Ibid 54 and 63)

—the typical pre Śaṅkaran reproach to the vedāntic idealist as a “disguised Buddhist” śānyavādīn.

An essay to extend the comparison of these antagonistic theses of the scholastic Vedānta theology with the Buddhist teaching on sa upādī-saṣṭa and an-upādī-saṣṭa (ete—) vimutti should begin with an adequate and

1. For the translation of texts I have consulted V. M. Apte, Brahma -Śrītā & Śāntakara-Bhāṣya, ed. Popular Book Depot, Bombay 1960, and for the context, S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy II, Ch. VII, section XLIII (Moksa).
The commentary on II 22 ff. explains the teaching of (prati-samkhya- and a-prati-samkhya-) nirodha as vināśa, i.e., "international destruction of entities". Although the vināśavāda (corresponding to the Pali uchchada-vāda, materialism), is clearly distinguished from the idealism of sānyāsāvāda, it would go beyond the scope of the present survey of misunderstandings between Vedānta and Buddhism to inquire how far Śaṅkara actually tends to avoid the basic distinction of the correct meaning of sānyāsāvāda from the heretic distortion of vināśa (or uchchada-vāda), which certainly cannot be dubbed 'nihilism' or even 'annihilationism', since neither in Buddhist nor in any other classical system of Indian philosophy can there be found any such entity which could be either 'created' or 'annihilated' in the absurd meaning of the Biblical religions.

It appears from the context of the quoted passages that Śaṅkara also refers to Buddhism rather as vināśavāda than as sānyāsāvāda. He might have considered it to be preferable for his argument against the Buddhists to reduce implicitly both negative attitudes, the authentic sānyāsāvāda idealism and the heretical sānyāsāvāda materialism, to two possible alternatives in relation to the common denominator of nirodha (in the 3rd and 4th Noble Truths of the Buddha) as quoted above. He may have considered his unfortunately incorrect psychological observation about the horror vacui among Buddha's the disciples who, unlike their teacher, had a too strong existential "predilection for believing in the reality of external entities".

In his commentary on B S IV 4 2, Śaṅkara, referring to the "final release", quotes the same psychological attitude of the deep existential dread in front of the same dilemma of the unripe mind lacking of discrimination between vināśa and sānyāśa confronted with the existential experience of a free choice as a challenge to moke. Śaṅkara's quotation from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (VIII, 9-11) sounds almost the same as the description of the existential dread by the Buddha (Cf. M 22).

"He happens to become blind, he weeps as it were, and is, as it were, destroyed (nāyati)."

3. Schopenhauer, in the second edition of his Phm. thesis "On the Fourfold Root of the Principal of Sufficient Reason" (1847) quotes the Mahāvīravāsin, translated by E. Upham in 1893 "from the Sīhalese..., which contains the official interrogatories, translated from Dutch reports, which the Dutch governor of Ceylon conducted with the high priests of the five principal pagodas... about the year 1766. The contrast between the interlocutors who cannot really reach an agreement is highly entertaining...But the Dutch governor cannot possibly see that these priests are not theists. Therefore he always asks about the supreme being, and then who created the world, and other such questions...But they are of the opinion that the world is not made by anyone; that it is self-created, and that nature spreads it out and draws it in again...And so these discussions last for a hundred pages". All this is due to the inability of the biblically-minded and trained Europeans to understand that only for Buddhists, but for all Indian systems of thought, and even of religious beliefs, and "even for the other two religions existing with Buddhism in China, those of Lao-tse and Confucius, which are just as atheistic", "the world is not made by anyone"—and therefore can also not be "annihilated" by anyone, but only destroyed and reshaped again. Consequently, neither uchchada nor moke can be associated or connoted in Indian contexts as "annihilation..." (For the above quotation from Schopenhauer, cf. my Schopenhauer and Buddhism, BPS, Kandy 1970, p. 32 f.)

Rāmānuja's criticism of Buddhism as vināśavāda could only dramatize, in an argument ad hominem, the same state of unripe mind at the first glance at the archetypal dilemma: "To be or not to be?"—He could not understand how Buddhism could become attractive to anybody.

"if he were to come to know 'I myself would be no more', by utilizing the means (of release). He would certainly move away even from the introductory talk about salvation." (Mahā-siddhānta, 44)

It is not difficult to understand the concurrence of various intrinsic and historical circumstances which, in the period of transition from the 19th to the 20th century, awoke, also in India, the awareness of the universal mission of Indian spiritual culture and of its advantages in comparison with the narrowmindedness of obsolete Western dogmatism. The initiative for this approach and absorption of the Eastern heritage came from the West, albeit with conservative reluctance on both sides which have not been got rid of until today.

Considering the intrinsic relation of Vedānta and Buddhism, in the early missionary zeal awaking at that time in India, it was Swami Vivekananda who established a landmark of central importance also for my orientation in this "revolutionary change", as he called it, in East-West relations in the modern history of culture. In the assessment of the internal situation on the Indian side at the historical juncture characterizing his own missionary appearance in the West, he described his stance in a talk on "Buddha's Message to the World", delivered in San Francisco in 1906:4

"The life of Buddha has an especial appeal. All my life I have been very fond of Buddha, but not of his doctrine...Buddhism apparently has passed away from India; but really it has not. There was an element of danger in the teaching of Buddha... In order to bring about the tremendous spiritual change he did, he had to give many negative teachings. But if a religion emphasizes the negative side too much, it is danger of eventual destruction... The negative elements of Buddhism—there is no God and no soul—died out..."

A broader philosophical framework for a spiritual universalism from the standpoint of the contribution of Indian heritage in it was worked out by S. Radhakrishnan in his Indian Philosophy and his subsequent lectures in English universities between the World Wars.

Although Indian thought has been obstinately accused by the West to lack a sense of historicity, yet its tradition to present the development of its classical systems of thought in a scholastic form of gradual integration goes back at least to Śaṅkara, to whom one of the earliest

historical surveys in this form is attributed (Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha). The same model has been applied by authors of all schools. It consists of an ideal pyramid on whose top is raised the pinnacle of the system followed by the author.

Incidentally, one of the latest manuals of this scholastic form, best known also in the West, Madhava's Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha (written in the 14th century), raised Saṅkara's advaita-vedānta to that position of "the crest-gem of all systems".

Radhakrishnan in his Indian Philosophy follows the same traditional model with the obvious intention to present to the historically minded Western philosophy of his time an integral whole of a millenary slow and careful uninterrupted development as against the disintegrated leaps, contradictions and failures of the discontinuity typical of Western culture. For Radhakrishnan's "modernization" of the model (in the Indian meaning of this term, designating a trend that had steadily and slowly developed and become predominant in the course of the second millennium of our era)—it is characteristic and important for the sequel of our context that he tends to raise also the critical and actual value of Rāmānuja's theistic and theological version of Vedānta above the philosophical rationalism of Saṅkara's idealist monism. Thus Rāmānuja and his teachings with a stronger popular and devotional appeal to the broader average of religious Vedāntins do not represent the beginning of decadence of the primeval Vedic and Vedāntic standard, but on the contrary a higher level, at least in its vitality, than Saṅkara's system, more consequent in its rational orthodoxy. It is important to single out this tendency, because in the sequel of the modern Indian theological philosophy until today it seems to prevail more and more uncritically as against a stricter and more sober interest in fundamental philosophical problems. It is equally important to repeat at this turning point how much closer Saṅkara's understanding of the topic in the title of our survey was to the authentic Buddhist meaning and importance of the attainment of arahantis. I cannot dissociate later doubts on this point by Indian authors from this fact of Rāmānuja's influence, as much as the Mahāyāna (and most radically Chinese) underestimation of the historical origins and structures of the Buddhist World view reveals still closer and deeper roots also for this element of the "modern" distrust of the authenticity of any primeval moral, religious and philosophical values.

"The authentic exposition of truth (saddharmo) will not disappear until its counterfeit appears in the world."... It is the same as with pure gold...

(S XVI 29)

Should we call "counterfeit" the open, explicit, and in so far honest, ignoring of the direct sources of basic Buddhist doctrines? "Modern"


7. Cf. T. M. P. Mahadevan, Gaudapāda, A Study in Early Advaita, Ch. IX. "Gaudapāda and Buddhism". University of Madras 1960.
proper knowledge of Buddhism. He admits that his presentation in the Outlines was limited only to two aspects in the development of Buddhist doctrines—pre-Mahayana and Mahayana. But in the meantime C. A. F. Rhys Davids had discovered and reconstructed the “third” stage, which actually had been the first and only authentic teaching of the Buddha himself. It did not at all correspond to Pali suttas as preserved in the Theravada tradition, which should be considered as a distorted amplification of the Buddha’s original “Sayings.” These “Sayings” —as pruned by Mrs Rhys Davids contain e.g. no trace of a denial of the eternal Self (naraṇayāna, Pali anatta), but remain strictly in keeping with the primeval orthodox ‘catholic’ teaching of the earliest Vedantic doctrine in the Upanisads. In the allowable exegesis of this new “modern” authority “there must not remain any traces of what Vivekananda so very spontaneously and frankly recognized as the main feature of the Buddha’s ‘revolutionary change’.”

And yet, despite such recognitions of “modern” authority, other, not less authoritative representatives of the same neo-Hindu school, who obviously had a wider interest and therefore a better knowledge of the disputed sources and heretical “interpolations”, were not satisfied with such Anglo-Brahmin statements, but saw in the elimination of such basic texts as the Brahmagāla or Paṭṭhāpadā Suttas (I and IX of the Digha Nikāya fundamental collection) first of all a danger of adulteration and distortion of their own Vedantic position. Above all the authentic atmā-nāda appeared endangered by Mrs Rhys Davids most ‘catholic’ baptism. There has never been on the authentic ground of Indian culture any imaginable possibility of such a sectarian version which would try to bring Vedānta and Buddhism to the same common denominator after a millenium feud documented on both sides on such solid grounds as mentioned also in the superficial survey from which we started above.

It was Radhakrishnan’s most authoritative disciple specialized in Buddhist studies, Prof. T. R. V. Murti, who for the Indian side resolutely and thoroughly rejected the rootless interference of Mrs Rhys Davids in the first chapter of the introductory part of his main work, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (pp. 20-35) in 1955. The following reference may suffice for our argumentation:

“In attempting to bridge the difference between the Upanisads and Buddha, we would have immeasurably increased the distance between Buddha and Buddhism.”

“For, it is possible to adduce against one textual citation which affirms the ātman, ten or twenty which deny it with vehemence.”

Thus far, for his favourable account Murti received a wholehearted recognition of all authentic Buddhists. Yet, this is only the critical introductory part of his work. The core of his positive approach to the problem is based on a different turning point from which he undertakes to reformulate a deeper tenet of the neo-Hindu trend in defence of Radhakrishnan’s fundamental thesis aiming at reintegration of Buddhism into the broader Brahmanic tradition on a higher developed historical level. To that effect Murti transferred the weight of his own Central Conception to a later but doubtless authentic beginning of the independent history of Buddhist philosophy inaugurated by Nagarjuna (2nd-3rd cent. A.C.).

Notwithstanding this, Murti’s first steps beyond the said turning into the field of Independent Buddhist philosophy and its interpretations of the basic layer of doctrines established in religious sects, may call forth serious suspicions of careful observers sine ira et studio, even if not versed in the historical depths and intricacies of the specific subject. Having thoroughly rejected in the introductory chapter one shallow and more than doubtful “modern” outsider’s authority, Murti commits himself immediately in his next step by a dangerous and not less uncritical leap to a dialectical reversal, confessing without the slightest criticism or caution his full support for the arbitrariness of another not less disputable modern authority, that of Professor Radhakrishnan, as “unerringly” correct. Murti’s confession of faith implies the consequences for the rest of his thesis on the whole of Buddhist philosophy, and also its typically Mahayanist mystical underground, laid down at the outset of this positive part of his work in dogmatic keeping with this notorious authoritarian ground, is formulated in the proposition (on p. 48):

“Buddha did not doubt the reality of Nirvāṇa (Absolute).”

This is not the place for the disquisition on the consequences of this new formulation of realistic absolutism. It may suffice to remind the reader of its incompatibility with Śāṅkara’s psychological explanation of the motive (in existential dread) of such negative absolutism clinging to the empty concept of “Reality”, while surreptitiously mistaking the Buddha’s śūnyatā (the starting point of Nagarjuna’s philosophy) for the anti-Buddhist (and rather commentarily inflated) śūnyatā of the Upaniṣads. In fact, Murti’s thesis on this point has been often characterized and resolutely criticized as an untenable doctrine of the “negative absolute”.

After this turning point in the discussion of both the wider and the closer scope of problems concerning the topic under discussion, since the middle of the century the battle of views seems to continue on considerably lower levels in a scattered fragmentation of barren disputes and camouflaged skirmishes, just as in the case which gave the initiative for the present considerations on a much wider and deeper problem.

It was not surprising for me to find a symptomatic flare up in a short elliptic and evasive essay on a fragment of the problem formulated in the title of the present paper. It is worthwhile some attention on the Buddhist side for the following two reasons:

1. It appeared in Pali Buddhist Review 3, 3, 1978, under the Sanskrit, and not Pali, title, “The distinction between sopādhīṣēga and nirūpādīṣēga Nirvāṇa”, in order to reaffirm the emphasis on the thesis that “it can be suggested, even asserted”, that “the state Nibbāna could be lost”. This boldly asserted statement is immediately followed by the verifying example (ḍīṭanta) in the Godhika Sutta, S IV 29, though without any nearer reference to the wording of the text.

2. Thanks to the sarcasm of human fate in such ventures (expressed by old Romans in the proverb: *Habent sua fata libelli*), the groundless thesis, formulated in a puzzle of false implications concealing the key term of the original Pali source, suggests too strongly its coincidence with the purpose of Māra pāpako contained in the same Sutta and quoted in the motto of the present paper; the more so as the whole riddle is most thoroughly and pedantically solved and confused in the next following pages of the same issue of the Pali Buddhist Review, provided only that we clearly unridge the authentic Pali term in the ḍīṭanta of the fallacy in logical inference. The title of the second, fully reliable and self-supported (seven times longer) paper on the same, but correctly identified, topic is:

“Ceto vimutti, Patīṭhā vimutti and Ubbhotahādīgāvimutti” by Lily de Silva. The author of the first quoted paper is Arvind Sharma.

The critical term, discussed by both authors using, fortunately, the same ḍīṭanta of the Godhika Sutta to exemplify their theses is sāmāyika ceto vimutti. This designation has been identified wrongly, arbitrarily and implicitly by the author of the first paper with sopādhīṣēga nirvāṇa.

As we shall see in the more extensive documentation in the next chapter, the expression sāmāyika ceto vimutti or “temporary mind deliverance” does not occur only in this exceptional case of the Godhika Sutta, but has also a general terminological meaning in the phenomenology of Buddhist meditation, especially as a stage in the progress of jhāna.

In the arbitrary speculation based on this Sutta in the first paper there is no trace of the standard term ceto vimutti in its elaborate meaning as explained in the second paper. The author of the first paper refers to the Godhika Sutta in the first section of his article, while the author of the second, expostulates and explicates the same text in the sequel of the documentary specification of “Types of Vimutti”, under the heading “Ceto vimutti—Temporary”.

Let us quote first the prima facie documentation on which Mrs de Silva elicits her elucidation of the term:

“The Sānūttaya Nikāya (...) records that Godhika could not retain the ceto vimutti which he won six times, and when he attained it on the seventh attempt, he committed suicide. In the Aṭṭhakathānīgarika Sutta (M I 351) Ānanda reasons out that ceto vimutti is subject to conditions and therefore to change as well. Seeing the impermanent, unsatisfactory and substanceless nature of this ceto vimutti one must develop intuition and eradicate obsessions (dassanaṁ khyāpan) in order to gain final emancipation.

A detailed instruction how to proceed toward this attainment is given by the Buddha, in connection with the practice of the jhānas, in the Mahāsūtraṇī Sutta (M 122).

The author of the first paper, ignoring all this primary documentation, starts his exposition by quoting Edward J. Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought*, Ch. X, “Release and Nirvāṇa”, pages 121 and 131 only, as his first authority. Then he rejects the statement of Nalinaksha Dutt in *Early Monastic Buddhism*, who “clearly implies that there can be no lapse from the state of Nirvāṇa”, reproaching him in an astonishingly bold way (considering his own disrespect for source material and terminology) that “no source is stated by Dutt”. After this “critical” introduction and the immediately following mention of the Godhika Sutta as the ḍīṭanta for his thesis, he goes over to the acknowledgement of Rune E. Johansson, *The Psychology of Nirvāṇa* (appeared 1958) as his ultimate and only clearly and explicitly quoted authority adduced in his favour.

At this point I feel it necessary first to defend E. J. Thomas’s better deserved authority against such superficial allegations.

In the two places quoted by Sharma, referring to footnotes on pp. 121-2 and 131-2, Thomas warns the reader against taking uncritically for granted the meaning of the terms singled out at the end of our chapter I, concerning “the distinction between nirvāṇa and parinirvāṇa,” and also upādi (Pali) and upādhi (Sanskrit). In both cases Thomas is critical of the PTS Dictionary and finds that Childers was more correct and reliable.

1. “Pari—compounded with a verb converts the verb from the expression of a state to the expression of the achievement of an action: nirvāṇa is the state of release; parinirvāṇa is the attaining of that state. The monk parinirvāṇi, ‘attains Nirvāṇa’, at the time of enlightenment as well as at death.”

2. Thomas might have agreed with the equation of terms and their meaning in the transposition used in their Sanskrit form by Sharma in the title of his article, sopādhīṣēga and nirūpādīṣēga as referring to the connotations of mokṣa or vimutti, more adequately and precisely analysed in the quoted paper of L. de Silva, but even this under a critical reserve. Thomas points out that it is the commentator, though not of the text used as ḍīṭanta in the case under review, but in the commentary of Dhamma-
pada 89, who explains the words “attained Nirvāṇa” as attained by the two attinings of Nirvāṇa (...), 1. that which is with a remainder of substrate of rebirth after reaching arahatship and getting rid of the course of the deprivities, and 2. that which is without remainder of substrate of rebirth ... What is to be understood by this substrate of rebirth has been disputed, for in Pali the term is ajahit in and Sanskrit agadhi.” (This passage is quoted in full also in Sharma’s article.)

With reference to Chānd. Up. VIII, 11, 12, Thomas remarks in the same context that “Buddhism does not make such a confident assertion as this” (i.e. that “when he is without the body he is not touched by pleasure and pain”), “nor any positive statement at all about the final state of the released”. Such statements again are attributed to the commentators. This, and nothing more, is Thomas’s introduction to his reference to the Godhika Sutta. Almost prophetically for our case Thomas added to his presentation of this case another warning:

“Psychological theorizing...do not tell us anything more about the fundamental question ... The distinction of two kinds of Nirvāṇa is probably such a development” (in exegetical literature).

Thus no other authority remains for the thesis that it can be not only suggested but “even asserted” on the basis of “the story of Godhika” that “the state called Nibbāna could be lost”—except the one just quoted in the article, taken from Jhanons’s book, p. 74.

Looking more carefully even into this last authority, it appears that Jhanons in his context may not have been unaware of the last quoted statement by Thomas. Being actually a psychologist and not a teacher of taśka-mindana, or “logical analysis”, whose “perfection of knowledge” is based on “mere faith alone” (cf. Sangārava Sutta, M 100), Jhanons ventured to take a step further, despite Thomas’s warning, though without particular dogmatic insistence, in formulating his hypothesis by association induced by the psychological impact of another Pali text, S 11 239:

“Monks, even for a monk who is an arahant with his obsessions destroyed, I say that gains, favours, and flattery are a danger.”

From this Jhanons deduces, unlike Thomas, the conclusion: “The state called Nibbāna could be lost”—and this is all.

It would be redundant here to enter any further into the much more adherent detailed analyses contained in the next-page article by Mrs de Silva. In the concluding chapter I shall limit myself to quote, far from the pretention to be exhaustive, a few direct references from the Sutta Pitaka concerning the direct question: Can the attainment of Nibbāna be lost? For this basic material I am indebted to Ven. Nyāsa-ponika Mahāthera’s extensive documentation.

1. For the purpose of a closer survey of this specific problem as it appeared at an early stage of historical development, an adequate stance presents itself in the perspective of the first few centuries of Buddhist history, at the time of Asoka, in the redaction of the Abhidhamma book of the Kathāvatthu. In the first chapter, question two formulates the problem:

“Can an arahant fall away from arahantship?”

(Parihayati arahat arahat’ti)

The answer affirms that “there is no single instance in the texts, where such a case is reported of any monk”.

The Commentary gives a list of heretical sects which insisted on a positive answer: Sammityyas, Vajjiputtakas, Sabbatthivādins and some Mahāsaṅghikas.

2. With reference to the critical term sānāyikā cetovimutti, misinterpreted in the case of Godhika, it has been mentioned earlier in the present survey that the Mahāsadhatā Sutta, (M 124) gives detailed instructions how to proceed from this temporary attainment toward the “permanent and unshakable” (asānyikam ta’l akupan’ti) deliverance. The intermediate temporary attainment is explained in direct connection with the progress in the stages of jhāna. The stress of the whole explanation of this stage is on the statement:

“Indeed, Ānanda, that a bhikkhu delighting in company, ... delighting in society,... should enter upon and dwell in either the temporary, or the permanent and unshakable, defecable mind deliverance—that is not possible...”

The Commentary on the same text quotes Paṭisambhidā-magga, Vimokkha-kathā:

“The four jhānas and the attainment of the four formless spheres—this is called temporary release”; and! “The four noble paths, the four fruits of ascetic life and Nibbāna—this is the permanent deliverance.”

In the same connection Nyāsa-ponika Mahāthera remarks:

“The Paṭisambhidā-magga has another pair of synonymous terms: sānyikā-vimokkha and asānyikā-vimokkha” (occasional and not any longer occasional release). “Its Commentary has a very clear explanation of these, ... substantially the same as that in the Commentary to M 129.”


11. So too Ānanda, bhikkhu sānāyikā,...,gandhāna,...,sīvāja-ka-mu, and kammā cetovimuttati upasamāpajjati tathā, saññiyikam ta’l akupan’ti, n’etam jhānum uccetasat.

12. Cattāri ca ārāmāja ca ta’l āsavāsamupphatī ca yamā niyamā ca vimokkha’ti.

Cattāri ca arjyamaggā ca ta’l saddhatthupallādī ca niyamā ca yañā samāvettā ca vimokkha’ti.
3. Apart from all these stages of "paths and fruits" in the progress of relative attainment, the ultimate aim, Nibbāna, is described in an often repeated standard description:

"As soon as craving has been abandoned, cut off at the root, made like a palm stump, done away with, so that it is no more liable to arise in future, then that bhikkhu is accomplished, with cankers destroyed, who has lived out the life, done what was to be done, laid down the burden, reached the highest true goal, destroyed the fetters of being and is rightly liberated through final knowledge."¹³

4. Among many reference in Pali texts concerning the topic of the unavoidably hard ascetic way requisite for those who may earnestly strive to reach first a temporary, and then progressively the final release from the worldliness of life in samāsara. I wish to lay the final and decisive stress on an advice given in the Rhinoceros Sutta (Khaggavisāna, Sutta-Nipata 54), containing, according to the Commentaries, the advices of several paṭekka-buddhas for the purification of mind by the strictest means and ways of ascetic and hermetic life in deepest solitude. It indicates also the unavoidable toil of the final release by stages (krama-mukti, on which, as we have seen, also Śaṅkara's strict and consequent rationalism insisted):

"It is impossible for him who is delighting in society to reach (even) to temporal release."¹⁴

The importance of this reference in its wider context is significant for the ethical background of our survey, from its non-Buddhist beginning to its end in "modern" Buddhist and quasi-Buddhist inter-pretations. This poem, most beautiful for its deep and extensive structure in ancient Pali poetry, has notoriously been disliked and neglected by such interpreters due to their false understanding and generalisation of the Buddha's "middle way" as the way of easy going mediocrity. It confirms the positive value of the call of conscience (nīpattidsa), confronting those who look in the exegesis of 'semantic differentials' for a subterfuge in counterfeits, motivated by their most legitimate fear that palm trees in their own gardens should not remain cut off "stumps done away with, no more liable to arise in future", just because their owners happened to be born in Buddhist families, or, in the case of Westerners, for the lack of more "transcendental" gurus.

Conclusion

1. Rāmānuja, in rejecting Śaṅkara's theory of nirguṇa Brahma or Absolute Being as impersonal and without specific qualities or attributes, reduced the highest principle of pure being to a worldly-minded Godhead endowed with specific differences (vīteka) of an archetypal personality. Since not even the Godhead was conceivable without such specific

²³. Cf. Maha-Vacchagotta Sutta, M 73

²⁴. 'Athāthaṃ sekkhaññhikota samah pātissaṃ sekkhaññkari vimuttih
9. Czechoslovakia

With Sanskrit studies established in Czechoslovakia by the mid-19th century, the teaching of Pali and the Théravāda Buddhist tradition inevitably followed, albeit on a much smaller scale. Indeed, the first relevant academic paper of a general nature—Príspevky ke studiu tiborských zuboventír oeyloných (“A contribution to the study of popular religions in Ceylon”)—did not appear until 1925 from the pen of Otakar Pertold (1884-1965), Professor of Comparative Religion at Prague.

Whilst Moritz Winternitz (1863-1937—see article on Austria in PBR 3, 1) represented the German tradition at the Charles University in Prague, Vincenc Lesny held the Chair of Indology in the Czech section which was created after political independence in 1918. Born 1882 in Komarnice, Moravia, Lesny matriculated from a local school and entered the Charles University to study classical philology and history together with Indology and Persian under Winternitz and Zubaty. He obtained his doctorate in 1907 and taught Latin, Greek, German and Philosophy at various colleges. He perfected his knowledge of Sanskrit under E. J. Thomas at Oxford and of Indology under Jacoby at Kiel. As a lecturer, he began his new career at Prague in 1918 and was appointed Professor in the Faculty of Philosophy six years later. He twice visited India (1922-3 and 1927-8), lecturing at Shantiniketan on the second occasion, and also spent some time at the Island Hermitage on Polgasduwa, Ceylon. He was for many years first Secretary and then Director of The Oriental Institute, founder of the Indian Society (1934—joined Czechoslovak-Indian Association after the Second World War) and Dean of the Faculty of Arts at Prague and at the Palacky University of Olomouc. He died in April 1953 and is remembered as the first Indologist to make Buddhism an integral part of the university curriculum.

Apart from numerous lectures and radio talks, Lesny penned a total of 200 literary pieces mainly in Czech, German and English. These included articles and translations from the Sanskrit, Avestan, Prakrit and modern Indian vernaculars, especially the Bengali poems of Tagore. Of all his contributions to Pali Buddhism, the most notable are Buddhisms, Buddha a buddhismus paříšského kánounu (“Buddhism and the Buddha of the Pali Canon”—Kladno 1921; reprinted as “Buddhism”, Prague 1948) and his translation of the Dhammapada in 1947. In Duch Indijs (“Through India”—Prague 1927), he included papers on “The Spirit of Early Buddhism and Later Buddhism” and “Neo-Buddhism in Europe” (which was based on the experiences of Paul Dahle in Germany). In 1945 he launched Novy Orient, a popular scientific monthly review which occasionally includes articles on Buddhist culture.

The Oriental Institute of the Academy of Sciences was founded in 1922 (but not opened until 1928) by President Tomas Masaryk (himself a former Professor of Philosophy) from an endowment on his 70th birth-

day in 1920. Until 1938 the first Director was Rudolf Hotowetz. The Institute was reorganised in 1945 as a research centre with four Departments: ancient Near East, modern Near East, Chinese Studies, and Indology (the last named now under Dr Olof Smekal). Archiv Orientální, the Institute’s quarterly journal in Czech, English, French and German, first appeared in 1929 and is currently edited by Miloslav Krás (born 1930) who has described The Temples of Angkor (London 1969).

One of the best known scholars attached to the Institute is Pavel Poncha (born 1905). He has edited the Christomistia tochariana which formed the second part of Instituciones linguas tocharianas (Monografic Archivu Orientálniho, 1956). This volume contains fragments from the Dhammapada, Udānavarasa and Praśītridhā Sūtra, together with the Sanskrit, Pali, Tibetan, Kuchean and Chinese versions.

Returning to the Charles University, Lesny was succeeded as Professor of Indian Studies by his pupil, Oldrich Fris (1903-55), who also occupied the positions of Dean of the Faculty of Philology and Editor-in-Chief of Archiv Orientální. Among his translations of Old and Middle Indian poetry, he included selections from the Thera-theri-gāthā in an anthology of Indian lyrics (“Love and Self-Denial”—Prague 1948).

Dr. Ivo Fiser (born 1929), who gave a number of lectures on Buddhism at The Oriental Institute, became the next Professor. However, he subsequently accepted an invitation to assist in compiling the Critical Pali Dictionary in Copenhagen where he is still employed. He contributed to Vol. III of the Pali Pāṭiṭikāma Concordance (published by the Pali Text Society) and those items relevant to Pali Buddhism in Vol. II of a Dictionary of Oriental Literature. (Under the general editorship of Jaroslav Prusek and the auspices of the Institute, this three volume work was published by George Allen & Unwin, London, in 1974.) Fiser’s Czech translation of the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta and its Commentary (1956) remains unpublished.

Classical Indian civilisation underscored the studies of two young graduates both born in 1943: Jan Filipovsky of The Oriental Institute and Jaroslav Vacek of the Faculty of Philosophy at the Charles University. Their monograph, Asoka (Prague 1970), analysed the emperor’s life and times and in particular his contribution to Buddhism through the medium of his inscriptions.

A popular interest in Buddhism may have stemmed from the Czech translation by Franz Cupr of Albrecht Weber’s Indische streifen (2 vols., 1874-78) which included the latter’s translation of the Dhammapada. However, Buddhism (Moravskova Ostrava 1904) by Dr Alois Lang probably marks the beginning of Buddhist studies as such, based as it was on Oldenberg’s buddha, sein leben, seine lehre und seine gemeinde which was the first European exposition of the Pali tradition. This was followed by translations of Fielding Hall’s The Soul of a People (1910), Olcott’s Buddhist Catechism as Dharma, buddhisticky katechismus (“Dharma, the
Teaching of the Buddha”, by Karel Čvvrk, Prague 1917), Subhadra’s Catechism as Nauka vocekněho, Budhismický katechismus (“The Teaching of the Elect”, by J. Dlouhý, Prerov 1919) and W. Bohn’s Buddhisms, die Religion der Erleuchtung (which, in Czech, appeared in an expanded form as “Buddhism as Ethical Culture and Religion of Deliverance”, by Pavla Moudrá, Klatovy 1920). Moudrá also contributed the chapter on Buddhist ethics for Ctyři velké náboženství (“The Four Great Religions” — Prague 1920). C. T. Strauss’ The Buddha and His Doctrine also appeared in Czech (Buddha a jeho učení, tr. Václav Markvart, Prague Nusle 1921 in this decade whilst Milos Seifert translated C. A. E. Rhys Davids’ Buddhism, Studies in the Buddhist Norm (Prague 1927). In 1929 two anthologies were published: Nyâyântikolâ’s “Word of the Buddha” as Slowo Buddyho (Dvâr Krâlovství; republished in Liberec 1945) and V. V. Vasâklâ’s Tak radí Buddha (“Thus spake the Buddha”), Prague.

One man is credited with the acceptance of the Buddhahammasa as a viable way of life by a large number of his contemporaries; Dr Leopold Procházka. He was born 1879 in Prague, the son of Prokop Procházka, Professor of Chemistry and Provincial Inspector of Schools. He mastered foreign languages in childhood and later (by the turn of the century) developed an interest in Oriental philosophy (including Buddhism) allied to the current trends in the natural sciences. Proficient also in music (especially on the piano) and mechanical engineering in which he specialised, he produced a standard textbook on “Steam Boilers and their Service”. Prior to Czech independence he became the first Chief Commissioner for the Examination of Steam Engines and Examiner of Engine Drivers together with Commissioner for the Examination of Cars. During the First World War he is proficient in his invention of spring wheels as a substitute for tyres. Later, he invented and undertook the production of a new type of popular motor car. Retired from government service at 44 with the post of Chief Construction Commissioner of Pilsen, he then engaged in the private sector of industry in the areas of coalmining, ceramics, radio and aeronautics.

His early study of science and philosophy, together with a knowledge of the main international languages, had led him to accept the teachings of Theravâda Buddhism. Between 1920 and 1934 he wrote several works on the essentials of the Buddhahammasa, viz., O vědomém jev osôbním (“On the conscious phenomenon of personality” — Pilsen 1920), Buddha a jeho učení (“The Buddha and his Teaching” — Pilsen 1926)—later revised under the title Knihy o skutečnosti podle Buddhovoho probozeného učení (“Critique of Reality according to the Buddha’s awakened teaching”—Pilsen 1935). Buddhisms světovým násorcem, měřícím a náběhovním (“Buddhism as a world view, ethics and religion” — Prague 1928), O buddhismické meditaci (Prague 1930) and Besedování s Bohem (“Conversations with God”—paraphrasing the Buddha’s references to Brahma as one who is not Creator and Ruler of the world—Pilsen 1934). Each volume was beautifully bound in royal octavo, with red initial letters, printed on the best paper and with a wrapper bearing original woodcuts by Josef Hodek—and all were marketed below cost price to further the dissemination of the Teaching.

Drawing much of his inspiration from Dahlke in Berlin, he also delivered lectures on Buddhism (some of which were incorporated in the first book above) and corresponded with numerous enquirers. He also participated in the first European Buddhist Congress held in Den Buddhistske Haus in Berlin in September 1933.

Following the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, however, events brought Dr Procházka’s life to a tragic end. At the beginning of the Second World War in September of that year he was accused of listening to a BBC news broadcast from London in a coffee house and sentenced to five years hard labour. His property, including his vast library, was confiscated. Developing cancer, he was only released on parole when his condition was past curing, and died soon after an operation in Prague in March 1944. Had he survived, he would either have realised his intention to become a bhikkhu in Ceylon or to have established a sthâra or Buddhist centre (modelled on Das Buddhistsche Haus) in Czechoslovakia. His widowed daughter, Dr Bozena Svobodová-Procházka, lives in Kladno.

At this stage some mention should be made of the only known Czech bhikkhu, Ven. C. Nyânapatta, to whom I am indebted for the biographical sketch of Dr Procházka. Born as M. Novosad in 1908 in Moravia, he studied Buddhism by means of German literature and emigrated to Ceylon in 1938. In May of that year he became a sâmañera and in August 1939 a bhikkhu, both ordinations being conducted at the Island Hermitage, Dodanduwa, under the late Nyânapattha. In 1940 he moved to Bandarawela and established the Verandah Hermitage where he lived until the end of the war. He has contributed a number of essays. His best known publication is Basic Tenets of Buddhism (Colombo 1965).

Following the Communist seizure of power in February 1948, and especially during the Stalinist era, it was impossible to openly propagate non-Marxist principles (as elsewhere in Eastern Europe). In 1956, however, the Buddhists in Prague formed a “Preparatory Committee of the Buddhist Society in Czechoslovakia” and petitioned the authorities to grant them permission to carry out activities. This was refused as Dr Karel Werner, a leading Czech Buddhist, made clear in an illuminating report in World Buddhism (Nugegoda, Sri Lanka—January 1965, pp. 7-8). The leader of this Committee, Dr Zdenek Fierâ (“a Marxist philosopher”), wrote a general survey, Buddha (Prague 1968).

Dr Werner was, however, able to maintain a “yoga” club in Brno until the overthrow of the Dubcek government in 1968. Soon after the Russian army invaded the country, he crossed the frontier on foot and found asylum in England. He left behind him a promising academic career that had been severely disrupted during the Stalinist period. Having studied Western philosophy and Indology at the universities of Brno and Olomouc, he obtained his doctorate in 1949 and became a lecturer in Sanskrit and Indian Civilisation at Olomouc. For political
reasons he was subsequently dismissed from his post but, following his rehabilitation, he translated several essays for duplication and private circulation to students of Buddhism. These comprised the booklets issued by the Buddhist Publication Society (Kandy).

Since 1969 Dr Werner has occupied the position of Spalding Lecturer in Indian Philosophy and Religion at Durham University. He has contributed two papers to the Bodhi Leaves series of the BPS, Kandy—The Three Roots of Ill and Our Daily Life and The Law of Karma and Mindfulness—but his translation of Nyānapālaka’s manual, The Heart of Buddhist Meditation (Jātra buddhistiṣe meditace, 1972), remains unpublished. His general survey on Yoga and Indian Philosophy (Delhi 1977) contains numerous references to early Buddhist practice.

**BOOK REVIEWS**

The Discourse on the All-embracing Net of Views: the Brahmajāla Sutta and its Commentaries translated from the Pali by Bhikkhu Bodhi. Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy 1978. xiii-359pp. Rs. 75. $5.00

This Discourse has been translated now and again since 1899 when T. W. Rhys Davids’s translation appeared in the Sacred Books of the Buddhists. Sometimes the translations of the Brahmajāla have been accompanied by excerpts from its extremely long Commentary. However, I think never before have they also been accompanied, as here, by excerpts, even if short, from the ṛākṣa or sub-commentary, also a very long work.

In this book we find the translation is good not only of the Discourse itself, but also of the well chosen and well fitting excerpts from its Commentary and sub-commentary. From the excellent Introduction it is clear that the author is well and truly acquainted with the Buddha’s Teaching. He sees this as the whole, which indeed it is, so that each of its parts or themes can be related to some other part or theme. No part of the Teaching stands and works in isolation.

At the First Council held after the Buddha’s parinibbāṇa, the Brahmajāla was placed first of all the 34 suttas in the Dīgha Nikāya, itself placed first of the four great Nikāyas. This marks its importance. It is concerned with an examination of the 62 views of the sectaries, seekers after the truth in the Buddha’s day but whose speculative views he found unacceptable, both “view” and “speculation” being rejected by him in any case, and here too all 62 views were untenable because, as is shown, all who believed in them had no hope of escape from ignorance, the direst bond which tied them to repeated birth and dying, the dukkha, sorrow or anguish, of samsāra. The Introduction specifies these views in a lucid and helpful manner: Eternalism (4 views), Partial-Eternalism (4 views), the Finitude or Infinity of the World (a tetrad of views), Endless Equivocation (4 positions), Fortuitous Origination (2 views), Immortality (5 sets), Annihilationism (7 forms), Nibbāna Here and Now (5 theories).

From the Buddhist angle each is erroneous and fails to lead to the end of suffering and the attainment of the two stages of nibbāna, an unconditioned reality, transcending all the conditional and impermanent phenomena of the world.

Moreover, as often said in the Discourses, views are no more than “agitation and vacillation” (p. 96), and merely an attempt “to establish a base of permanence upon a world that is impermanent, to find selfhood in that which is selfless, and to find true happiness in that which is a constant source of suffering—namely, in the five aggregates of clinging” (p. 96). Views and speculations are useless, as is obvious when they are set against the unencumbered knowledge of the origin, passing away, satisfaction, unsatisfactoriness, and escape from, for example, feeling, and hence from the chain of conditions, by means of which the goal of nibbāna may be attained. Indeed the omniscient Buddha, who knew and saw on a plane widely differing from speculation, directed his Teaching, deep and profound as it is, towards this goal with the purpose of making it accessible to the man who unalteringly applies his intelligence to its attainment.

All this, and more, is put forward and reviewed in the reliable, disciplined and informative Introduction. It is also good to notice that the ten Perfections, each illustrating an aspect of the Bodhisattva’s conduct in former lives when he was striving over a period of enormous length for his eventual enlightenment, are not ignored. On the contrary, here they are pertinently investigated. Also, in Part 4, there is a welcome and full treatise on these necessary preparations for samādhi, perfect and complete self-Awakening or self-Enlightenment. According to tradition this was likewise attained by 24 of the Buddhas who are reputed to have preceded Gotama. The Brahmajāla Sutta, however, goes back only as far as the Buddha Vipassin, the sixth of these Buddhas to have preceded him. The interest in the Buddhas of the past and of the future, those who have been and those who will be, is evidently growing. Naturally it will be much influenced in its evaluation of these lengthy, demanding, often agonizing preparations for eventual omniscience, by, for example, the canonical statement (Majjhima i 479) that attainment does not take place straightforwardly, all in a moment, but by a gradual training, a gradual practice, and a gradual course. Or by that among other canonical statements that “Thus it is that skilled moral habits lead on gradually up to the Highest” (Anguttara v 2).

A book to be whole-heartedly recommended.

I. B. Horner

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This book is termed “a psychologist’s attempt to understand what the Buddha meant by ‘dependent origination’” some of the conclusions of which have already been sketched by the author in his article “Psychological Causality in Early Buddhism” PBR 3, 1.

Despite the central importance of paticcasamuppāda this is in fact the first thorough study to appear in Europe and is therefore of vital interest to anyone concerned with the Dhamma. The study commences without prior theorising to ascertain the meaning of the paticcasamuppāda structure, the factors that comprise its various forms and the allied concepts that group about these. This process is achieved by going directly to the Sutta material where the meaning is allowed to emerge from the various contexts and usages of each factor studied. A large proportion of the work is therefore direct Sutta quotation with both Pali and lucid English translation, the whole comprising an excellent collection of essential Sutta material relevant not only to the central paticcasamuppāda factors but also to many allied concepts which cluster about these and help precision of definition e.g. the study of tanhā also analyses other ‘motivational’ terms-chanda, kāma, rāga, etc. Factors studied in detail include the āsava and anāsavā, the khandhā constituents, pāṭhā, citta, vitakka, cetanā and papātana. There is an index of technical terms for these with italics indicating the pages where the primary definition is obtained; there is also an excellent index for all Sutta passages quoted allowing for cross reference when a passage is used in more than one context. Mention should also be made of some 17 diagrams of various processes and relationships, these lucid and occasionally ingenious diagrams are a useful summary and addition to the text.

There are passages in the study of two terms that I might criticise—in the study of sakkārā and citta. The chapter on sakkārā is of great value given that “sakkārā is one of the least understood concepts in Theravāda Buddhism”. Here Dr Johanson states “a common basic meaning has not been found”, however reference to the writings of Ven. Nāṇamoli would give the term ‘determinations’ as a translation to cover all uses of this important factor. This usage would avoid a couple of instances of misplaced emphasis in Dr Johanson’s analysis. e.g. with the list of the various possessions and endowments of King Mahāsudassana which ends with the statement that “all these sakkārā have passed, have ceased, have altered…” (D II p. 198). Dr Johanson has that “They are produced through acts of sakkārā—sakkārā as ‘creative act’ here in the perceptual process. In fact here these objects are determinations in that they determine King Mahāsudassana, are things that he depended on for his very identity. They determined his person as ‘King Mahāsudassana’ and with their cessation the thought ‘I am King Mahāsudassana’ came to an end. Likewise Dr Johanson: “A man free from ignorance make no sakkārā, either good, bad or neutral (S II 82). The exact meaning of this, however, not clear. The arahant is supposed to keep his personality factors (khandhā, of which sakkārā is one) until he dies.” Dr Johanson says “all types of sakkārā with karmic consequences are definitely eradicated” but does not give the central and essential meaning that the determinations which cease are those involving belief in ‘self’, that refer to ‘I’, ‘me’, ‘mine’, and determine that something is for ‘me’. Sakkārāvinipāta is true of the arahant because “actually and in truth there is, even in this life, no arahant to be found” (e.g. S IV 364). In the study of this term, as with the rest of the Dhamma, it should be kept in mind that the Dhamma does not set out to explain, but to lead—it is openyakika. This means that the Dhamma is not seeking disinterested intellectual approval, but to provoke an effort of comprehension or insight leading to the abandonment of avatārā and eventually of asamittāna.

There is also the strange notion twice put forward within the study of citta that this factor survives the death of the arahant in the form of “a quite calm, unmoving consciousness, completely empty of conscious processes, quite impersonal, quite unlimited”. This small aberration (not unique to this author) does not, however, distort or detract from the rest of the study.

Despite criticising this small area the value of this work should be stressed, particularly its method of obtaining meaning through thorough study of the Suttas, extracting all relevant quotations and defining terms by study of all contexts in which they appear—this might appear an obvious way for an honest investigator to proceed but all too often studies of ‘Buddhism’ construct airy theories and fantastic notions based on some single misunderstood quotation.

Altogether an honest, careful and lucid study of an area of essential importance.

Malcolm Hudson


It is perhaps fitting that on the eve of the PTS centenary the English speaking student particularly should find himself on the brink of complete access to the Paṭhāṇā, the full glory of the Buddha’s Dhamma with the publication of this really splendid, clear, concise, practical explanation which opens the door to understanding Paṭhāṇā and so to the possibility which opens the door to understanding Paṭhāṇā and so to the possibility of a true comprehension of the third basket, the Dhammasaṅgāṇī and Paṭhāṇā being its quintessence; the analysis and synthesis of all Buddha-dhamma. Up till now this has not quite been possible as U Nārada’s mūla paṭhāṇā sayadaw’s translation of Vol. 1 of the Chaṭṭhāsāṅgāṇī text of paṭhāṇā (Conditional Relations, No 57 of PTS translation series, 1969) whilst it contains an excellent introduction remains incomplete without the explanation of the methods for working out the answers to
the questions. This publication validates not only Conditional Relations of ten years ago but also Buddhist Psychological Ethics (Dhammasaṅgaṇī) of seventy-nine years ago because it enables us to become conversant with the analytical states involved.

The student new to this area of study should not be put off with the thought that this guide deals only with the first twelve pages of a translation which only covers the first volume of a five-volume text because we are here dealing with an ocean of method, it is the method we have to acquire. Indeed if the Paṭṭhāna were written out in full it would require more than a thousand long human lifetimes to read through if one did nothing else.

This guide contains a Foreword by I. B. Horner, a Preface by Sayadaw U Nārada, a comprehensive Introduction by U Thein Nyun, a detailed contents which serves as an index, etc., and of course U Nārada’s most necessary charts. There are four chapters, the first “Conditional Relations” tells us of the subject, method and rudiments of conditional relations. The second “Brief Explanations of the 24 Conditions” gives us definition, analogy, conditioning states, conditioned states and such like for each of the 24 conditions. The third “Explanation of the Single Enumerations” explains conditioning and conditioned states according to the method of the classification chapter of the Investigation chapter so that we may proceed to the next chapter and indeed to all 129-232 sections of Paṭṭhāna as each deals with the conditioning and conditioned states of the conditions concerned. The fourth “Explanation of the Analytical Exposition of the Conditions” treats the 24 conditions again at some length, the exposition is confined to just one section of Paṭṭhāna —the Faultless Triplet—so that the method may be applied to the other 129,231 sections.

It is greatly to be hoped that a good response to this most useful and handy volume will enable the already prepared last two parts of this guide to be published in the near future. The Abhidhamma is well worth studying, it is both interesting and rewarding and has a charm all its own. Nyānatiloka’s synopsis Guide through the Abhidhamma Pitaka is a useful and inexpensive aid but the student wishing to study Paṭṭhāna needs only this Guide to Conditional Relations, Conditional Relations and Buddhist Psychological Ethics.

M. J. Goulet


This scholarly study of the pivotal term dhamma is the product of extensive reading in Pali and Sinhalese literature, the author having acquired a fluent knowledge of both languages during a lengthy period of research at various Western universities and a three year stay in Sri Lanka. The meaning and relevance of dhamma is sought through three traditions: that of Western academic studies, that of the Pali texts—the suttas and the commentarial literature that grew about them, and the Sinhalese tradition that continued from the Pali and includes how dhamma is conceived within the present state of that tradition.

The brief, though detailed, review of Western academic concern with the term dhamma, though of some historical interest, could well have been omitted from this study—it is a picture of early scholars groping in the dark often amidst their own fanciful notions. The parts of this section that might have been of more value, being less well known in this country, are those concerned with German scholarship—however they remain less well known since the quotations remain in German.

However, the major part of the book is concerned with what dhamma signifies within the tradition of Pali literature and as such constitutes an original and useful piece of research. Here the relevance of dhamma itself is sought rather than a suitable translation for a particular Pali term: “To define a term is, by definition, to limit it. Defining the term dhamma—how it is used, what it means—is an interesting undertaking. Discerning a perspective for life—how it is to be lived, what it means—is of far greater import, more momentous, of cosmic consequence. Buddhists have been and are concerned with the meaning of dhamma not primarily as a means to facilitate textual translation but as a means to transform life” (p. 64). The search for dhamma goes first by way of commentarial definitions which as well as desanā, pariyatī, saccāmi, etc. also include sabhāva (‘inherent nature’), nissatta (‘that without a living being’), etc. which relate to dhamma (plural). Within the suttas the quest follows that of the Bodhisatta in the context of the Ariyapariyesana Sutta as this unfolds the quest for, discovery of, and decision to teach Dhamma. In natural continuation there follows ‘setting in motion the Dhammacakkha’ and other sections on ‘Dhamma worthy of reverence’, ‘the purpose for which Dhamma is taught’, and ‘hearing and penetrating Dhamma’.

There is a separate chapter for the Visuddhimagga which is concerned with its discussion of Saddhātā Bhagavata dhammo... and the four paths and resultants (phala) included with Nibbāna as the nissagadhā-lokkuttara-dhamma in the later literature. The chapter on Sinhalese literature is concerned with more poetic descriptions of Dhamma and is followed by a brief discussion of present day aspects of Dhamma such as prakti recitation, this section also containing a summary of all definitions in Pali and Sinhalese sources. The concluding chapter returns to the most useful interpretative of Dhamma, the threefold description: pariyatī—‘the authoritative teaching’, pratipatti—practice, patividha—penetration. There is a good index and extensive bibliography.

“There is an ancient way rediscovered by the Buddha, travelled by the Tathāgata, and one who enters into it participates in a process that on one level has a history and on another is timeless, in one sense can be talked about but primarily is to be realized” (p. 87).

Malcolm Hudson

The so-far most reliable French translation of the Dhammapada (from Maratrany, Paris 1931) being out of print for a long time, the need was deeply felt for a new one. This is partly filled with the appearance of André Chedel's version published by Dervy in Paris, an editor whose contribution to Buddhism in France is worth noting (he published, among others, Herrigel's worldwide known Zen dans l'arti chevaleresque du tir a l'arc); this small book could serve as the most interesting introduction to original Buddhist thought so far produced in French. The (too short) introduction is very useful for clarifying such basic notions as Dharma, kamma, rebirth, the Four Noble Truths, and placing the Dhammapada in the whole body of the Pali texts.

Anyhow we can't pass over the (for me) serious drawbacks this new edition has. First of all this book should be intended for a general public, but owing to the fact that the editor is one who doesn't stand in the forefront in France, it is most difficult to obtain. The footnotes are very poor and a lot of words would need at least a few lines of explanation; many terms are misleading, borrowed from a Hindu background (the author has already translated the Bhagavad Gita and is, consciously or not, influenced by its ideas, all the more as he said in the introduction: "certain passages ne sont pas sans analogie avec la Bhagavad Gita"). Many a term would need a completely different rendering, I can quote here just a few of them which clearly indicate the theosophical and even "occult" biases of the author. V. 1: "cosmic order"; v. 21: ambiguous term of "eternal life"; v. 23: he equates Nibbāna with "Non-Being", saying in the footnote that Nibbāna is the Absolute; v. 126: "they reincarnate"; v. 238: he speaks of "purification by ablutions" (!) instead of "purged of stain" (Nārada); v. 241: he translates mantra by "magic formulas" instead of "doctrines" (in the general sense). He is here misled by the similarity between mānta and mantra, the latter being mostly used in some Mahāyāna schools but in no way given prominence in Theravāda practice. v. 282: the expression "union with the Absolute" is to be rejected being one of the extreme views condemned by the Buddha.

So we can say that a good translation of this basic Buddhist text with ample notes is still to come; the most interesting attempt having been published privately (also in 1976) by the Centre d'Etudes Bouddhiques in Grenoble as Verses du Dhamma. Therefore the French Buddhist must still rely upon the English translations so far produced.

Michel Dufour


The previous Italian translation of the Ven. Nyānaponika Mahāthera's well-known manual, The Heart of Buddhist Meditation1 has not been seen by this reviewer, but was apparently not complete in every respect. The present new and quite independent translation, on the other hand, is a faithful rendering of the whole English original, including the introductory discussion, the basic text (i.e. the Mahāsattipatīṭhāna Sutta), the anthology of texts dealing with Right Mindfulness, source references, a Pali and Sanskrit glossary and an analytical index. It should thus prove an invaluable tool for Italian students of the most ancient form of Buddhist meditation in its two complementary aspects of samatha (calming and concentrating the mind) and vipassanā (insight leading to liberation).

Linguistically, there are a few slips which reveal a certain lack of ease in the translator's command of English. As a whole, however, it is a competent piece of translation which successfully reproduces the original's characteristic combination of deep seriousness with easy readability. In all matters of substance, it is conscientious and remarkably accurate. A lot of effort has clearly gone into the search for correct and unambiguous renderings of key concepts which are all too easily open to misinterpretation by readers unfamiliar with Buddhist thought.

To achieve clarity and accuracy is never an easy task in this field, especially when translating into Romance languages which (at the level of the general reader, as distinct from the specialized terminology of professional philosophy and psychology) are on the whole less rich than English or German in just the kind of vocabulary needed here. The two central concepts of "mindfulness" (samādhi) and "insight" (vipassanā) are anes in point. In this translation, the former has been rendered as Prezenza Mutuante, and the latter as Chiara Visione. Both renderings have, however, the advantage of saying clearly what is meant. The disadvantage is that, as neither is idiomatic, and both are capitalized throughout, they may tend to induce in the reader a belief that he is faced here with some kind of special "mystical" powers rather than as is the case—with normal abilities which even the most unenlightened of us use every day to some extent, and which are simply to be sharpened and developed through the appropriate exercises.

For "mindfulness", example of the French translator of The Heart of Buddhist Meditation1 could have been followed with advantage. She uses simply "attention", which has the endorsement of the author's own definition of "What is Mindfulness?... In its elementary manifestation, known under the term "attention", it is one of the cardinal functions of consciousness...".2

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1. L’Essenza della Meditazione Buddhista, transl. by Luigi Martinelli, Florence 1973;
2. E.g. "chiaramente" for "expressly" (p. 9); "reatta" for "actuality" (p. 13); "lenta" for "unwieldy" (p. 21); "mente non ossuta" (a bad one, this) for "unattuned mind" (p. 24); "l'analisi esperimentale diretta" for "direct experiential insight" (p. 37); there is, of course, no single adjective to translate "experiential", but a suitable phrase could have been found—as it is, and with the serious mistranslation of "insight" as "analisi" at this particular point, the result is quite misleading; "favorevole alla conoscenza" for "knowledge-yielding" (p. 34).
There is no simple solution, on the other hand, to the translation of “insight”. The correct technical term in Italian would be “penetrazione” (as also in French—“pénétration”—and in Spanish—“penetración”)—generally defined as “the faculty of perceiving the true, hidden meaning of things”. But this is a word so seldom used in this sense in ordinary parlance that it cannot adequately convey the correct meaning and the right connotations to the non-technical reader. Here, Chiaro Visonice may well be a more satisfactory choice than the French translation’s “vision intérieure” (redolent of “introspection”). It at least conveys the idea of seeing clearly, though it fails to bring out the connotation of seeing in depth. A closer approximation, however, since new terminology was being coined anyway, might have been “visione profonda”.

So much by way of illustration of the formidable difficulties of translating Buddhist vocabulary into a language which has so far evolved little or no accepted terminology in this field, and whose typical conceptual and verbal constructions are—and this is a general characteristic of Romance languages—lacking in the suppleness necessary to adapt to alien ways of thinking and experiencing.

But this is more by way of general comment. With specific reference to Il Cuore della Meditazione Buddhista, it must be stressed again that it is a remarkably successful translation, and that it represents in itself a valuable contribution to the furtherance of Buddhist studies and, one hopes, Buddhist practice in Italy.


The Mahāvastu is one of the earliest Buddhist Sanskrit works which has come down to us intact. The author of the present study suggests that its composition began at the beginning of the 2nd century B.C. and continued until the 3rd or 4th century A.D. The title Mahāvastu is translated as the “Great Subject” or “Great Story”, that is to say, the life story of the Buddha.

An extensive canonical compilation, the Mahāvastu contains practically all the history, quasi-history and legends relating to the Buddha during the long period of its composition. The text belongs to the Lokottaravādins, a sect of the Mahāvīrakās school. It claims to be the first book of the Vinaya Piṭaka of that school although, as our author points out, it has more to do with legend and biography than with Vinaya.

In this study the author attempts to place the Mahāvastu within the context of the development of Buddhist literature and theory. Is it, for example, a forerunner of the Mahāyāna with its bodhisattva ideal and the exposition of the ten bhūmīs, or is it firmly based in the earlier tradition?

This bi-lingual (English-Thai) paperback “is a first attempt to give an explanatory information on the Sutta-Nipatā...as a sample part of an authentic dictionary of Buddhist doctrinal terms as used in the Pali Canon and the Commentaries”.

Unfortunately, well over half of what is claimed to be a Buddh Vaca Ahhidhanā constitutes unnecessary padding; an inside front cover page symbolising the author’s loyalty to King Bhumibol a dedication page, four Forewords, a 16 page Preface, two Introductions (by Dr Singhathorn Kamzao—Lecturer in Philosophy and Religion at Chiangmai University and the author; the longer latter not appearing in English), the opinions of “ten great and famous scholars” on the Sutta-Nipatā and a tribute to the author’s late mother-in-law, Chandrapeng Kanavongse.
The actual analysis of the Sutta-Nipāta takes up a mere 12 pages and is almost wholly in Thai, whereas the "Textual and Commentary Notes" (in English) occupy pages 23-31. Thereafter, a useful bibliography takes one up to page 70.

It becomes painfully clear that this compilation is intended for Thai readers and reflects the lack of scholarship and even disinterest in this field in Thailand today. English students are, therefore, recommended to peruse N. A. Jayawickrama’s definitive analysis of the Sutta-Nipāta (serialised in PBR 1-5) and those separate studies enumerated in PBR 3, 3, pages 112-3.

**NEWS**

**Honours for Buddhist Scholars**
In the 1986 New Year Honours List an OBE was conferred on Queen Elizabeth on Dr I. B. Horner for services to the Pali Text Society. This is the first occasion that Buddhism (albeit indirectly) has been officially honoured in Great Britain.

D. Litts. were conferred on Ven. Dr H. Saddhātissa and Ven. Dr W. Rāhula by Kelaniya (Formerly Vidyalankara) University, Sri Lanka, and the Nālandā Pali Institute respectively. Dr Rāhula’s classic primer, What the Buddha Taught, has just been published in Burmese and can be obtained from Rangoon.

**New PTS Representative**
At the first Council meeting in 1980, the following was appointed as the new Representative of the Pali Text Society for Malaysia:

Dr. Wong Phui Weng,
C/o Buddhist Missionary Society,
123 Jalan Berhala, Kuala Lumpur 09-06, Malaysia.

**New Translations of the Dhammapada**
The version translated by Ven. B. Atīrata Maitreya and serialised in the first two volumes of the PBR has been published in book form in Sri Lanka. Under the title, Law Verses, it is available from Metro Printers Ltd, 29 Austin Place, Colombo 8.

Under the title, The Path of Truth, Ven. Khantipalo has produced a metrical rendering together with notes and introductory essays. It has been published by the Mahamakut Rajavidyalay Press, 287 Phra Sumneru Road, Bangkok 2, Thailand.

The Pali text together with the Thai recension appears with an English translation of The Buddha’s Words in the Dhammapada by Sathienpong Puññavanna. Published by the Sathirakoses-Nagapradipa Foundation, it is available from Sukit Siam Co. Ltd, 1715 Rama IV Road, Samyan Circle, Bangkok, Thailand.

It is hoped to review the last two translations in a future issue of the PBR.

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