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STANZAS OF VICTORY*

(Translated by Bhikkhu Kantipalo)

Due to her past bad kamma, Vimalā 1 was born to a prostitute and herself followed that trade when she grew up. One day she saw the left hand chief disciple of the Buddha, venerable Mahāmoggallāna, walking for almsfood in Vesāli. Feeling desire for him she went to his dwelling and tried to seduce him. She could not succeed as he was an arahant but he succeeded in humbling her pride of beauty with verses ending with this one:

See this body beautiful, 
a mass of sores, a congeries, 
much considered but miserable 
where nothing is stable, nothing persists.

She was ashamed of her actions and became a lay-follower, later a bhikkhuni who after effort and striving won arahantship. Her verses of exultation are as follows:

Proud of my good complexion and figure, 
my beauty and my fame as well, 
haughty because of my youth 
other women I despised.

Having adorned this body, 
well decorated, deceiving fools, 
at the brothel door I stood 
like a hunter laying a snare 
showing off my attractions, 
much of my secrets revealing, 
various jugglery I performed 
and many people laughed loud.

* Extracts from a new anthology from the Thera-theri-gāthā—Banner of the Arahants—which will be published by the Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy.

1. Ironically her name means ‘pure’—which of course she was, eventually.
Today for almsfood having walked
shaven-headed, wrapped in my robe,
sitting down at the foot of a tree
I have obtained the non-thinking mind. 2

All ties completely cut away
whether for gods or men
and all pollutions having destroyed,
quenched I have become quite cool. (72-76)

As a result of pride in former lives, Punnikā was born in the household
of Anāthapiṇḍika, to a domestic slave. After hearing a discourse by the
Buddha called the (Lesser) Lion’s Roar 3, she became a stream-winner.
After the incident described below, Anāthapiṇḍika freed her so that she
could gain “acceptance” as a bhikkhunī. In no long time she attained
arahantship and one day reflecting this attainment, uttered these verses
of exultation:

Punnikā: I am a water-carrier who,
even in the cold, goes down into the water
fearful of ladies’ blows,
harassed by fear of blame.
What is it, brahmin, that you fear
always going down into the water?
Why with shivering limbs
do you suffer bitter cold?

Brahmin: Already you know, Miss Punnikā,
the answer to what you ask:
making wholesome kamma
while annulling evil kamma.
Whoever, whether young or old,
evil kamma makes,
even he from evil kamma’s free
by baptism in the water.

Punnikā: Who has told you this,
O ignorant of the ignorant—
that truly he’s from evil kamma free
by baptism in the water?
If this is so all turtles, frogs,
serpents, fish and crocodiles,
all that live in the water,
al will go to heaven!

Butchers of sheep and swine,
fishermen and trappers,
robbers and murderers too,
all who make evil kamma,
even they by water-baptism
will be free from evil kamma!
And if these streams could bear away
the evil formerly done by you,
then your merits they’d bear away
leaving you stripped and bare!
That of which you’re frightened,
and so go into the waters,
that thing, brahmin, do not do;
let not the cold pierce your skin.

Brahmin: From the practice of the wrong path
to the Noble Path you’ve led me!
This cloth for water-baptism,
now I give to you.

Punnikā: Let the cloth be yours,
no desire for cloth have I.
If you are afraid of dukkha,
if dukkha is not dear to you,
then make no evil kamma
either openly or in secret.
But if you make, or you will make,
all kinds of evil kamma
then you’ll not be free of dukkha,
even by flying or running off.
If you are afraid of dukkha,
if dukkha is not dear to you,
go to the Buddha who is ‘Thus’ 4
as refuge, to Dhamma and Sangha too,
undertake the training-rules,
for your benefit that will be.

2. The attainment of the second concentration (jhāna) in which thought processes
are completely stilled.
3. Majhima Nikāya II.
4. Thus seeing things as they really are.
THE NOTIONS OF CITTA, ATTĀ AND ATTBHĀVĀ IN THE PĀLI EXEGETICAL WRITINGS

Aloysius Pieris, S.J.

1. Consciousness and Its Names
The phenomenon of ‘consciousness,’ the major focus of Buddhist ethico-psychology, has received many names in the Pali literature. The first book of the Abhidhamma lists them as follows: citta, mano, mūnasam, hadaya, pandara, mano, maniyatana, vīdhāna, vīdhā-akkhando, tañjama-vañcha-dhātu. In his exegesis, the author of the Aṭṭahasālimi has attached a specific meaning to each of these terms, implying that they may not have been regarded as ‘synonyms’ in the strict sense.

This observation is doubly true of the three basic forms mano, citta and vīnahā, listed above. The oft quoted Sutta dictum, yam ca kho bhikkhag citta ñi’ti’pi mano, ñi’ti’pi vīññā, need not mean that the three concepts are univocally predicated of consciousness. It may be said that they point to different (though, at times, partially overlapping) dimensions of the same general complex of consciousness. More accurately, they are three different ways of viewing the same reality. That there is a semantic differentiation of this kind is demonstrable from the way these concepts are handled both in the Pali Cannon and in the Pali Commentaries.

It should be conceded, however, that this fact is not formally stated anywhere in the Pali literature. Was it so much taken for granted that it did not occur to the Pali scholastics to develop a set of conceptual tools to formulate a theory about it? On the other hand, one would suspect that the Sarvāstivādins who are reported to have made s subtle demarcation between the concepts of dharmā and dhātu may be presumed to have possessed such tools for expressing this law unambiguously, as for

5. Brahmins boasted that they were the kin of Great Brahmā but the Buddha taught that one is truly a brahmin who is rid of delusions.
instance, by saying that mano, citta and viññāṇa are three distinct dhātus constituting one sole dharma.

At any rate, it is fairly evident that any discussion of the phenomenon of consciousness ultimately hinges round these three basic concepts. We would go further and add that even among these three there is one that plays the key role: the concept of citta. It is, therefore, convenient to study mano and viññāṇa in terms of citta.

Semantically, mano is the most precise, while viññāṇa is the most elastic and elusive of the three. Mano denotes the "noetic awakening" of the bhavaṅga, or the subliminal consciousness, in response to an external stimulus (bāhiyavatana); or, more precisely, it is the noetic "opening" (dvāra) to the outside world, i.e., an act of advergence (dvajā:-a). Viññāṇa would normally stand for the general undifferentiated (i.e., anoetic or "ontic") consciousness sometimes coinciding with the subliminal continuum (or bhavaṅga); it can also frequently mean apperception or full noesis (mano-viññāṇa or, simply, viññāṇa).

Citta, as it occurs most often in Pāli exegesis, amounts to being an explanatory equivalent of both mano and viññāṇa described above. It is employed as a comprehensive term for the entire complex of consciousness (i.e., viññāṇa in the "ontic" sense) together with its potential or actual noetic centre (i.e., mano).

It could be said, therefore, that the Pāli commentators have treated mano, citta and viññāṇa as concepts that are "mutually inclusive", so that the three terms are not mere "synonyms" in the strict sense, but pariṣāya-vacanā, i.e., terms that depend on one another for their definition or explanation (pariyāya).

Thus, synthesizing what we have said so far, we would express this "mutual inclusiveness" with the formula: "Citta is mano-centred viññāṇa." Obviously, we are aware that this definition does not cover every instance in which each one of these terms occurs in the commentaries. Rather, we are enunciating, here, a general law of consistency which can explain, to some considerable extent, the various occurrences of mano, citta and viññāṇa in the Pāli exegetical literature.

8. Pm. 43: Sāvajñānam bhavaṅgam mano-dvārum. Cf. also n. 16 below.
9. Guenther (op. cit., p. 19) accuses the Pāli scholastics of extending the notion of citta to include also that of apperception.
11. Aloysius Pieris, op. cit., p. 260

II: Citta as the Central Concept

Even a casual reader of the Abhidhamma writings would know that citta and viññāṇa explicitly refer to the subliminal (ontic) consciousness, when combined with bhavaṅga. Bhavaṅga-viññāṇa and bhavaṅga-citta are recurrent phrases. But nowhere is mano used in this manner. The phrase, bhavaṅga-mano, when it does occur, simply means the first dawn of noetic consciousness in the bhavaṅga itself; it is no more an intermediary moment between the bhavaṅga (or the ontic flow of the subliminal continuum) and mano proper (i.e., its notice awakening).

The present writer knows only one instance in the commentarial literature where bhavaṅga citta is referred to as ajjhātika-mano or internal mind, but even this, when subjected to a closer scrutiny disappears as an insignificant exception or even an oversight. Hence, it may be safely assumed that mano is the noetic awakening of the bhavaṅga-citta (or bhavaṅga-viññāṇa) tout, therefore, not strictly co-extensive with citta or viññāṇa. As Dhammapāla puts it,

Though mano is declared to be the whole of viññāṇa, yet, since what is meant here is that it is the "door," it (mano) should be understood as the bhavaṅga which has become the door by advergence.

Sometimes the expression kirimaya-citta is employed to denote this noetically awakened state of citta. According to the opinion Buddhaghosa attributes to Mahā Siva Thera, sleep is the absence of kirimaya-

12. Ibid., pp. 19 ff
13. Cf. Vism XV 10: Pm 510, 516
15. Buddhaghosa seems to understand ajjhātika-mano as "internal mind" whereas the text on which he comments here (MA I 191) is to be interpreted in the context of the classical division of the cognitive bases (dhyāna) into internal (ajjhātika) and external (bāhirā), the former referring to the six "senses" including the mind and the latter to the six corresponding "objects." In this passage, ajjhātika-mano is paralleled by bāhirā-dhātu. The meaning, therefore, is "The mind which is the sense" and "the mental data which are objects." In fact, all the senses (eye, ear, etc.) in this text are qualified by the adjective ajjhātika and all the objects (form, sound, etc.) by the adjective bāhirā.
16. It 101
citāni and wakefulness, their presence.\(^{17}\) Hence, it is the noetic state (mano, kirimaya-citta) that is totally non-existent in sleep; in other words it is the “mind” that “sleeps,” and not the whole phenomenon of consciousness. Dhammapāla offers us a valuable clarification on this point when he comments on the term mano-java:

**Here mano means citta.** Though the expression mano is a common term for all the wholesome, unwholesome and indeterminate moments of consciousness, where mano-java is mentioned, it should be understood in the sense of kirimaya-citta (noetically active consciousness-mind) dwelling on some object or other.\(^{18}\)

Here we see how the exegete explains the convertibility of mano and citta. It is, therefore, not surprising that he often makes citta serve at an explanatory equivalent of mano and vice versa.\(^{19}\) Hence, we may conclude that citta, which may be identified with mano, is called bhavana when noetically inoperative; and its noetically active moments, or kirimaya-cittani, coincide with what is generally referred to as mano.

Allied to the concept of bhavana-citta is that of santāna (series or continuity) which is also a term that is often yoked with citta. Thus, the thought-moments or cittāni which serially constitute the whole complex of viññāna can be brought under the single concept of citta. In other words, the expressions such as citta, citta-santāna or simply santāna are employed as semantic alternatives for the central and basic constituent of being, namely, consciousness. “A being’s continuity is citta” insists Dhammapāla: sattva-santāna cittan-evam.\(^{20}\) Here, phrases such as ajjhatte-santāna (subjective continuum),\(^{21}\) attano santāna (in one’s own continuum)\(^{22}\) or khīndava-santāna (in an arahant’s canker-free continuum)\(^{23}\) should all be interpreted as referring to the citta.

On the other hand, viññāna—not to speak of mano—is never hyphenated with santāna, though it is true that we do find occasional references to saññānakaka-khandha-santāna (the conscious aggregate series)\(^{24}\) or saññānakaka-santāna (conscious process of existence) which is regarded as almost synonymous with satta (being).\(^{25}\) One may infer from all this that there is a tendency to consider santāna (or citta), i.e., the consciousness-continuum, as the principal constituent of existence, which, in the ultimate analysis, defines and denotes the empirical being (satta).

**III: Citta in Relation to the “Human Person”**

Citta, then, is bidimensional. The noetic centrality characteristic of mano as well as the dynamism or the ontic continuity of the bhavana-viññāna is attributed to it. This is why we have defined it as “mano-centred viññāna”—i.e., the noetically oriented flux of consciousness. This is also why citta is more appropriate than mano or viññāna as a term for describing the principal constituent of a being. It is, therefore, quite understandable that the qualities generally descriptive of a human person are invariably expressed by the term citta qualified by adjectives or past participles denoting such qualities, e.g.,

- Surprised = acchariyabhiṭṭha-citta-jato (Pr A 6; 50)
- gentle = mudha-citta (Pr A 54)
- depressed = patihata-citta (Pr A 20, 21, 207 etc.)
- happy = pahajhata-citta (Pr A 235)
- frightened = utarata-citta (Pr A 243)
- ignoble = nihīna-citta (Pr A 107)

These examples are from Dhammapāla’s Petavatthu Commentary. This usage of citta occurs about 40 times in that book.\(^{26}\) But only 17 times does mano occur in the same book in the same sense (e.g., nibbānasāna, gudhī-citta, mano, atta, maṇṇa, saνyga-mānasena, etc.).\(^{27}\) Now, if one were to take into account also the allied constructions such as citta-vikkhepa, citta-santāna, cittasa samayena, etc. (Pr A 5, 13, 14, 17, 18, 39, 40, 41, 52, 120, 129, 132, 135, 139, 168, 180, 190, 200, 212, 265, 269, 280...), these being some examples taken at random), the occurrence of manas in any such form fade into insignificance.

And, as for viññāna, we have not discovered even one single instance in which it is used in this manner. It is too ambiguous a word to be qualified in an adjective which is actually meant to describe the human person.

\(^{17}\) M A 1 269
\(^{18}\) V Pa 111
\(^{19}\) Mānasā sajāhyo tīttena sajāhyo (Pr A 246); manassā kātthabhi citta kātthabba (Pr A 248); tuṭṭhena cittamati atamanum (Thag A II 153); manasākāra-cittasa avajjana (Ita I 48); padattha-manasā ti padattha-citta (Pa A 34); Vippatiṇā-paṭṭha-citta = mīcchādhi-paṭṭha-paṭṭha-mānas (Pr A 242); madhayeva manañi-cittam madhayeva (Pr A 260); Manasābhājānīrata ti ime idari honti ti cittamā nirmitadisa (Pa A 276); Mano tava aṭṭhāya ti tava cittaṃ āṭṭhava (V Pa A 278); Tāthāsuṇiṃ manañi paśāyam ti tāthāsuṇiṃ cittam paśāsāmin (V Pa A 321); Pasānu-cittam ti... pasānu-mānasā (Ita I 72); etc.

\(^{20}\) Ud A 223; Pa S 33; Ita I II 127
\(^{21}\) Ita I 64
\(^{22}\) Ita I 78; II 1 135
\(^{23}\) Ita I 167

\(^{24}\) Ud A 341
\(^{25}\) Pa A 403
\(^{26}\) All the instances are recorded in A. Pijers, op. cit., pp. 262-3.
\(^{27}\) Ibid., p. 263
The above then gives us a rough indication that *citta* is preferred to *manas* as a concept that principally constitutes and therefore defines the core of human personality.

Rune Johansson, who really has given the lead in this kind of study, has compiled a series of examples to show that in the Nikāyas there are "indications that a person identified himself with *citta*."²² For instance, in Therigāthā verse 1123, we read: *kāma-rāgena dayāhami, cittaṃ me paridadhātī* (I am burning with passion, my *citta* is being consumed). Here the first person singular is replaced, in the second part, by *citta*.

The question we pose is: were the Pali commentators aware of this identification of *citta* with the personal pronoun in the Nikāyas? Annotating the phrase just quoted, Dhammapāla maintains that the substitution of *citta* for the first person singular in the second part of the sentence was intended to show that the burning passions are a more lasting hindrance to the *citta* than to the *kāya* (body).²⁹ We may have to grant, perhaps, that the Pali exegete has not seen the implication that Johansson sees in the substitution of *citta* for the personal pronoun, namely that in the Nikāyas "a person identifies himself with *citta*." And yet, Dhammapāla himself would not hesitate to use the term *citta* in place of the personal pronoun occurring in the texts.²⁰

Further, one notices also a tendency to identify *citta* with "*self*" in the reflexive sense. This is already evident in the Thera—and the Therigāthā where apostrophizing is a frequent feature. The monk (or the nun) is often reported there as "addressing his own *citta*," as Dhammapāla himself observes more than once.²¹ As a matter of fact, Mrs. Rhys Davids has drawn our attention to the fact that it is invariably *citta* that is addressed in apostrophizing, and never either *mano* or *viśuddha*.²² Dhammapāla, however, does not observe such an observation, as far as we recall. But it is very significant that whenever he annotates a passage in the Thag or in the Thig. (where apostrophizing is recorded) he would never use *mano* or *viśuddha* as he would normally do,²³ but simply repeat *citta* in his own paraphrase of the text, implying that *citta* alone could be employed in such a context, e.g.,

Tāhāṃ citta kāliṃ brumi (v. 214) ti tāṃ tasmaī pamattabhāvato ambho citta, kāli-citta, kakākānno ahāṃ kathāyāmi.

²⁸. Art. cit., p. 168
²⁹. Thag A I 192
³⁰. Thag A II 256
³¹. Thag A I 136; II 151; ibid. 134; etc.
³². Birth of Indian Psychology (London 1937). pp. 240 ff
³³. See n. 19 above
³⁴. Thag A II 79
³⁶. A. K. Coomaraswamy and I. B. Horner, The Living Thoughts of Gotama the Buddha (Bombay 1935), p. 14. But the similarity between D II 100 quoted here and Brhad 2. 5. 11 where ātman and dharmas are equated (cf. I. B. Horner, The Early Buddhist Theory of Man Perfected: A Study of the Arthas, London 1936, p. 145) does not warrant the conclusion that the *ātta* in the second sense (the one to be cultivated) is a revival of the Upaniṣadic ātman. It is truer to say that *ātta* in the first sense (the one to be denied) would correspond to the ātman of the Upaniṣads.

Let us note in passing that it is not by mere coincidence that, here, the notion of *citta* implying "*self*" in the reflexive sense is also equated with one's continuum (or *sāttā* which, for Dhammapāla, seems to denote the basic constituent defining the empirical being or *sattā*, as we have already observed earlier.

IV: *Citta* as *Attā *

Would all this amount to saying that in Pali scholasticism *citta* has begun to replace the notion of "*self*" or *attā*? If that were so, how could this be reconciled with the doctrine of *anatta*?

The author of the *Psychology of Nirvāṇa*, who goes so far as to suggest that the *post mortem* continuity of *citta* in the case of an Arhat is not explicitly denied anywhere in the Nikāyas, would, nevertheless, persistently remind the reader that *citta* so understood should never be confused with *attā* or *self*.²⁶ Āciyaṭṭha Dhammapāla has no such inhibitions. He explicitly equates *citta* with *attā* and yet continues to uphold the doctrine of *anatta* as consistently as the canonical writers.

It should be recalled that the Canon and the commentaries seem to employ the world *attā* in at least two distinct senses. For, in Buddhism, the denial of a permanent substantial *self* goes hand in hand with the doctrine of self-realization and self-effort. There is a "*self*" that is negated in *anatta* and there is the *self* that is affirmed as refuge in *attā-saraṇa* and *attā-dīpa* (D II 109) or in *attānam gaveseyyātha* (Yn I 23). For, the use of the term *attā* in Buddhist literature, as Coomaraswamy and Horner observe, seems to involve "an apparent contradiction that can be resolved if we clearly distinguish between the "*selves" referred to—one to be naughted, one to be cultivated."²⁶

The *attā* to be naughted, i.e., to be regarded as non-existent, is what the doctrine of *anatta* is about. The following note from Dhammapāla may be instructive at this point. Explaining why in the *Itivuttaka* (Tika-
Nipāta, Vagga III, No. 8) only anicca (impermanence) and dukkha (misery, unsatisfactoriness) are mentioned, and not anatta which is normally included to form the triple characteristic of samsāric existence. Dhammapāla remarks:

It is on purpose that only two characteristics are mentioned here in the texts. It should be understood that according to the dictum “whatever is dukkha, that is (also) anatta,” the characteristic of anatta is indicated by the characteristic of dukkha.37

It is, therefore, a truism to say that attā as it occurs in the word anatta, here, is the antonym of dukkha and cannot, therefore, be predicated of citta which Dhammapāla describes as wretched and miserable (kallakā, dhabba, dubbhi, kāli, etc.).38 Nor can permanence and immutability, characteristic of attā, be attributed to what is essentially a series or a continuum (sāntāna). Rather, citta is something imperfect but perfectible. In itself it is deceptive—like māyā—and one should not come under its sway,39 one should rather bring it under control. It is this citta, wild but tamable, imperfect but perfectible, that is often equated with the second of the two “selves”—i.e., “the one to be cultivated.”

Take, for instance, the following examples from the texts where the word attā (self) is qualified by the past participles bhāvita (cultivated), danta (tamed), saṁbhāta (disciplined) and samāhita (calmed). In his exegesis, Dhammapāla repeats the phrases replacing attā with citta in each case so that where the text says “one whose self is cultivated...tamed...disciplined...calmed” Dhammapāla would read “one whose citta is cultivated...tamed...disciplined...calmed.” Schematically,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Exegesis</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bhāvita-citta</td>
<td>bhāvita-cittena (Pv A 139)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attā-danta</td>
<td>danīta-cittā (Pv A 265)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>saṁbhāta-attā</td>
<td>saṁbhāta-cittā (Vp A 265, Pv A 98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>samāhita-attā</td>
<td>samāhita-cittā (Thag A 148)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On another occasion, after stating that bhāvita-cittanām is the same as bhāvita-cittadānaṁ. Dhammapāla makes an explicit statement to the effect that in the texts attā is used for citta:

For it is citta that occurs as attā in such texts as “‘For the self is difficult to train’”, “‘Whoever has steadied his self, his (self) is Upright’”, “Self well resolved”, etc.40

V: Citta and Atubhāva

Atubhā discussed above as a synonym for citta should be carefully distinguished from attabhāva which has come to mean the “empirical being” or the (complex) factors that go to make up the human personality. Citta (or attā in the reflexive sense) is only the principal constituent or central unit of this personality.

First of all, it is common knowledge that among the four mental components, it is citta (or viṁsāna or even mano) that stands out as the fundamental factor, while the other three (vedāna, saṁsāra and samskarā) are called “cetasikā,” i.e., “pertaining to citta.” Therefore, Dhammapāla is traditionally correct when he separates viṁsāna (which, he equates with mano) from the other three khandhā (aggregates) which he subsumes under the category of dhammā,41 i.e., objects of mano or viṁsāna. He would even contrast viṁsāna (citta, mano) with nāma so that only the other three mental groups or khandhā would be included in nāma.42

From this it follows that citta remains the basic constituent in the mental complex while the other three khandhā are, in some way or other, dependent on or related to it. But this dependence or relationship is never explained with precision. Conflicting images are resorted to when describing it. Our impression is that the Pali scholiasts tend to advocate a theory of inherence approximating that of the vaibhāsikas.43 In fact, a contemporary Theravāda monk has described viṁsāna as “the receptacle, so to say” of the other mental aggregates.44 Similes of this kind should not be taken seriously. In fact, Dhammapāla reminds us that it is no easy matter to perceive citta isolated from the other three mental aggregates as much as waters from several rivers and various kinds of oils cannot be perceived separately once they have been churned together.45 All that can be declared with certainty is that citta is central in relation to the other three mental khandhā.

Now the picture becomes complete and even complicated when the fifth khandhā, i.e., the physical component of the empirical personality, is taken into account. Normally, the fifth khandhā is designated as

40. Thag A 1 7-8
42. Udā 41, Vijñānati ti viṁsānaṁ...Nāmāti nāmaṁ, vedānādikkhandhāyyaṁ
43. A. Pieris, op. cit., pp. 44-45
45. Pm 432
rupa. But the words sarira and kaya are also used. The last mentioned (kaya) is important as it is used in a double sense. It is regarded as the tatha or the locus of the citta,\(^{46}\) and citta is also the locus of the other mental factors like vedana, as much as kaya is.\(^{47}\) In other words, kaya is the "physical body" in which citta and the other psychic events take place.

But kaya may also refer to the whole "body" of psycho-physical factors generally known as the Five Aggregates (pahacakkhunah).\(^{48}\) It is this that has earned the name "attabhava" or the empirical personality, or simply the human person: pahacakkhunah-sakkhato attabhava-kaya, as Dhammadipa has it.\(^{49}\) In other words, the kaya which is the locus of citta may not denote merely the fifth khandha as it often does, but the whole pentad of aggregates, including the citta! According to a passing comment by the same writer, the human person or the "body of five aggregates" could refer to oneself or some other according as the santana (i.e., citta) is one's own or another's.\(^{50}\) Citta, therefore, constitutes the central element which defines the individuality of the attabhava.

This is illustrated with a simile. Explaining why the attabhava is called a hut (kutika), Dhammadipa suggests that just as a hut is what results from the assembling of things like sticks, etc., so also the attabhava is had when the fifth aggregate (pathavi-dhatu-dhaya) and the four mental groups (jhaissadaya) come together.\(^{51}\) Continuing his annotation, the exegete further extends the reason for calling the attabhava a hut: namely, because it is the nivasa (i.e., dwelling place or locus) of the monkey known as citta.

Though not to be taken too literally, this simile seems to have been commonly resorted to; for, in Thig A 158, Dhammadipa makes a matter-of-fact reference to citta as kuti-citta, reminding us of the equally intriguing mention of the kuti-puru in the Milindapañha.\(^{52}\) The simile certainly suggests that in the mind of those who used it, citta was regarded as the central and decisive constituent of the human person or the five aggregates.

The point we would like to make here is this: the scholiast does not show any obsession with the fear that citta could be mistaken for a permanent immutable soul. The monkey in the hut symbolizes the

53. This is clearly seen in the way Buddhaghosa (VSN VIII 39) and Dhammadipa after him (Pm 242) emphasize the decisive character of consciousness in the very act of dismissing the notions of "attabhava," "aggregates," "life," "feelings," etc.
55. VSN IX 54.
56. Aparādha-vattthukānaṃ attā ti bhavati citta abhidhammaṃ citta cati-atta bhava: sartrap; khandha-pathakāna-svāvā (Pm 296), which I would render into English as follows: "The body" or the Pentad of Aggregates are called attabhava because when they are not perfectly understood, then the appellation or the thought "atta" (attā) occurs (bhavati) (with regard to them)." Nāmapāli (op. cit., p. 336) has mistranslated this passage to imply that citta (rendered, there, as "consciousness") could be called attā. For his translation to be correct, citta should be in the genitive case. Here it is in the nominative case and means just "thought": it functions as co-subject with abhidhamma (appellation) having as the common predicate attā ti bhavati. Dhammadipa is actually deriving attabhava from attā ti bhavati, just as a little earlier in the same text he has traced puggala to pāramāya, pāramānātā ca. It is by means of this fanciful etymology that he is making his point—which Nāmapāli's translation has missed entirely.
ANICCA

Arvind Sharma

In writing about Buddhism, the Three Characteristics (ti-lakkatā) or the General Characteristics (samañña-lakkhatā) are often referred to. Indeed, some scholars like Henry Clarke Warren regard them as so important that they are "placed at the head" of the book.

The classical and forceful statement of these three characteristics occurs in the Anguttara Nikāya (III, 134):

Whether Buddhas appear in the world and whether Buddhas do not appear in the world, it remains a fact, an unalterable condition of existence and an eternal law, that all karmic formations (sankhārā) are impermanent (anicca). This fact a Buddha discovers and masters, and after having discovered and mastered it, he announces, proclaims, preaches, reveals, teaches and explains thoroughly, that all sankhāras are impermanent.

Whether Buddhas appear in the world, or whether Buddhas do not appear in the world, it remains a fact, an unalterable condition of existence and an eternal law, that all karmic formations are subject to suffering (dukkhā). This fact a Buddha discovers and masters, and after having discovered and mastered it, he announces, proclaims, preaches, reveals, teaches and explains thoroughly, that all sankhāras are subject to suffering.


Whether Buddhas appear in the world, or whether Buddhas do not appear in the world, it remains a fact, an unalterable condition of existence and an eternal law, that all that exists (sabbe dharmā) is non-absolute (anatā, i.e. without an unchangeable or absolute ego-identity). This fact a Buddha discovers and masters, and having discovered and mastered it, he announces, proclaims, preaches, reveals, teaches and explains thoroughly that all that exists is non-absolute (without a permanent ego).

In fact, the "Nikāyas and the Agamas abound in statements such as: sabbe saṅkhārā anicca, sabbe saṅkhārā dukkha, sabbe dharmā anatā." 3

Out of these three characteristics only one, namely anicca, is selected here for further examination and the rest are by passed unless their relationship 4 to anicca sheds light on anicca itself. This selection is by no means arbitrary. In the very first sermon preached by the Buddha the doctrine of anicca seems to have figured. For accounts of the Dhammazakka-pavattiya Sutta give a dialogue between the Buddha and the monks: "What do you think, monks, is matter permanent or impermanent?—Impermanent, sir...But if it is impermanent is it unhappiness or happiness, having the nature of change, is it proper to envisage it as This is mine, I am this, This is my self (atman)?—It certainly is not, sir...In this case, therefore, monks, whatever is matter, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far away or in one's presence, all manner should be seen in its true nature with right understanding as this is not mine, I am not this, This is not my self". The dialogue continues with the other groups, from sensation to consciousness, substituted for matter, the replies being the same.

And it is well-known that the Buddha's last sermon contained the following exhortation:

And now, O monks I take leave of you; all the constituents of being are transitory; work out your salvation with diligence.

II

The purpose of this note, however, is not to critically analyze the Buddhist doctrine of anicca from a non-Buddhist point of view——But rather to

present a critical analysis of the doctrine as it is propounded in the Tipitaka. Such an analysis though difficult, can be made simpler by directing it in the directions: (1) what is meant by anicca; (2) what aspects of anicca represent it and (3) which aspects do not represent anicca.

III

What then is meant by anicca, most frequently translated as impermanence? The question being asked here is not what is impermanent but rather, what is impermanence?  

"There is no single treatise on the characteristic of impermanence either in the Tipitaka or its commentaries", hence a number of sources will have to be employed to grasp the concept. However, on the basis of the various discussions in ancient and modern literature on the subject, three approaches to the nature of the impermanence may be identified. One of these may be constructed out of Buddhaghosa's Commentaries and his Visuddhimagga thus. Therein a distinction is drawn between the impermanent and the characteristic of impermanence. The five categories are impermanent. Why? Because their essence is to rise and fall and change, and because, after having been, they are not. But the characteristic of impermanence is their state of rise and fall and alteration, or it is their mode-transformation (ākāra-vikāra) called non-being after having been; again "the eye (etc.) can be known as impermanent in the sense of its not-being after having been; and it is impermanent for four reasons as well: because it has rise and fall, because it changes, because it is temporary and because it denies permanence"; and "since its destiny is non-being and since it abandons its natural essence because of the transmission (of personal continuity) to a new state of being (or rebirth), it is inseparable from the idea of change, which is simply synonymous with its impermanence.  

Thus impermanence is seen here as characterized by:

1. not being after having been;
2. rise and fall;
3. because of change;
4. because of its temporariness;
5. by the denial of permanence.

8. For etymological derivations, see ibid.
10. Ibid.

A closer look suggests that it is really the idea of change which is so critically associated with impermanence. Impermanence implies change.

A second way in which the nature of impermanence can be identified is elaborated by Nāṇamoli. He identifies three aspects as the "necessary and interlocking constituents of impermanence, namely (i) change, (ii) formation (as "this, not this" without which no change could be perceived), and (iii) a recognizable pattern in a changing process (also called "specific conditionality"—dappaccayañca—which pattern is set out in the formula of dependent origination—paticeca-samappaṭṭaṃ". This position may be summed up in the statement that "to be impermanent is to have a beginning and an end, to have rise and fall".

A third attempt to identify the nature of anicca or impermanence has been undertaken by Conez:

In its simple, untechnical meaning impermanence simply means that everything changes all the time. This thesis, which is held to be indisputable, is further developed by (1) an analysis of the process of change, (2) the determination of the duration of an event, and (3) reviewing of the practical consequences which should be drawn from the fact of the impermanence.

Ad 1, we are urged to see things as they "come, become, go", and to distinguish the three phases of rise, fall and duration. Ad 2, we are taught things and persons last very much shorter than we usually suppose. An almost Herakleitan statement reminds us that "there is not a moment, not an inkling, not a second when a river does not flow". On closer investigation a factual event (dhamma) turns out to last for just one moment, and as Th. Stcherbatsky put it, "instantaneous being is the fundamental doctrine by which all the Buddhist system is established 'at one stroke'.". Ad 3, everything that is transient should for that very reason be rejected. The impermanent is automatically ill and should be dreaded. For "what is impermanent, that is not worth delighting in, not worth being impressed by, not worth clinging to. The above three points constitute the minimum definition of "impermanence", which led to further developments in-hinayāna and Mahāyāna, alike.

If these three attempts at identifying the nature of anicca are surveyed synoptically the following essential sense seems to emerge: impermanence implies change which implies a beginning and an end in point of time. It implies a duration without implying the idea of enduring forever.

11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Conez, op. cit., p. 34.
The implications of this understanding of anicca need to be carefully noted:

(1) existence is not denied. The issue is not one of existence versus non-existence, but of permanence versus impermanence;

(2) the fact, however, that a thing exists does not mean that it has or will exist forever;

(3) the fact that a thing exists makes it appear as stable but further analysis challenges this stability. It is undergoing a process of change;

(4) the idea of a beginning and an end when applied to objects generates the concept of spatial limitation, when applied to an event it generates the concept of temporal limitation, of duration. In this sense Buddhism chooses to look upon experience as constituted of events rather than objects; 13

(5) the fact that events are interconnected creates a semblance of continuity just as the pressure of objects creates the semblance of stability. This again tends to obscure the fact of anicca, 'For it is not through the connectedness of dhammas that the characteristic of impermanence becomes apparent to one who observes rise and fall, but rather the characteristic becomes properly evident through their disconnectedness (regarded) as if they were iron darts'' 14

This prepares the ground for a proper understanding of the doctrine of anicca as not implying annihilationism in the well-known kaccāyana-vāda Sutta, wherein the Buddha avoids the extremes of sassaṭvatvāda or eternalism anducchedaṇa or annihilationism. As A.K. Warder points out:

This text is a difficult one, but when taken in the light of the various aspects of the doctrine as set out in the texts already considered its meaning seems clear. There are no permanent or eternal phenomena in the world, or even phenomena which have come into existence

remain in existence. On the other hand there is not a total absence of phenomena, or even the total destruction of all phenomena one after another without leaving a trace of their ever having existed. The real nature of the universe is that it consists of temporary phenomena, which cease to exist, but not without serving as conditions for further temporary phenomena, without continuity. As opposed to this continuity of a permanent entity, ‘‘is-ness’’ and transient phenomena disappearing without any continuity, ‘‘is-not-ness’’ 19

IV

One important point, however, remains to be resolved. Words like ‘‘world’’ and ‘‘universe’’ were used in the above passages. And claims about the nature of phenomena therein were made. These should be carefully distinguished from claims made in early Buddhism about the impermanence of the universe itself as distinguished from the phenomena within it. For if such distinction is not drawn, then how is one to account for the Buddha’s reluctance to elucidate the theories to Māluṇkyaputta which the ‘‘Blessed One has left unelucidated, has set aside and rejected—that the world is eternal, that the world is not eternal.’’ 20 It should be noted that the Buddha is shown not as replying that the world is neither but rather as declining to answer the question on the ground that the religious life, Māluṇkyaputta, does not depend on the dogma that the world is eternal; nor does the religious life, Māluṇkyaputta, depend on the dogma that the world is not eternal. Whether the dogma obtain, Māluṇkyaputta, that the world is eternal, or that the world is not eternal, there still remain birth, old age, death, sorrow, lamentation, misery, grief, and despair, for the extinction of which in the present life I am prescribing. 21

In this context the following points need to be borne in mind:

(1) the notion of the world in the Pali texts is often narrower than we are liable to understand. The ‘‘world’’ there often really refers to our experience of the world. Thus the Sāṃyutta Nikāya (IV. 95) states:

That in the world by which one perceives the world (loka-saṅñī) and conceives concepts about the world (loka-māna) is called ‘‘the world’’ in the Ariyās’ discipline. And what is it in the world with which one does that? It is with the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind.

14. Note that ‘‘exist’’ can be ‘‘used in two senses: (1) to occur at one time at one time after arising and before ceasing; and (2) to exist at all times without beginning and end’’ (Richard H. Robinson, The Buddhist Religion (Belmont, California: Dickinson Publishing Company, Inc., 1970), p. 30). Thus existence=occurrence or=eternal occurrence. In this statement the word existence is used in the former sense.

15. ‘‘Thus according to Buddhism, when we for instance say ‘‘It thinks; or, it is white; we mean by the ‘‘it’’ nothing more than what we say ‘it rains’’ ’’ (M. Hiriyattha, Outlines of Indian Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1932) p. 140).

16. One might thus even say that what one observes is ‘‘something ever changing, an endless series of processes, lacking not continuity but stability’’ (Rune Johansson, op. cit., p. 15).


19. Warder, op. cit., p. 130.


21. Ibd., p. 121.
In other words much of what Buddha says really applies to *samsāra* rather than *jagat* per se.

(2) the word *sankhāra* may refer not only to dispositions in the world of experience but also to the objects of the world of experience. Thus as Kalupahana points out:

The term *sankhāra*, when it refers to a psychological fact, certainly means ‘disposition’. But there are occasions when it is used in a very broad sense to refer to everything in this world. One prominent example is from the *Mahā-Sudassana-suttanta* where, referring to the glories of the famous king of the past, Mahā-Sudassana, his cities, treasures, palaces, elephants, horses, carriages, women, etc., the Buddha says: “Behold, Ananda, how all these things (*sankhāras*) are now dead and gone, have passed and vanished away. Thus impermanent, Ananda, are the *sankhāras*; thus untrustworthy, Ananda, are the *sankhāras*. And this, Ananda, is enough to be weary of, to be disgusted of, to be completely free of, such *sankhāras*.”

(3) Thus the experiences per se are impermanent, the objects to which they relate are impermanent, and even the reality in which they occur are impermanent as the accounts of dissolution of the world-cycles indicate.

(4) Thus the experiences in the world are *anicca*, the objects to which they relate are *anicca*, and the agents of these experiences, be it man or Brahmā, are *anicca*.

22. I. B. Horner offers a useful correction to the view that the characteristic of *anicca* applies to the “universe” (A. L. Basham, *The Wonder that was India* [New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1967], p. 272) largely in its external sense, as it is often supposed to a greater or lesser degree (Christian Humphreys, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81).

All phenomenal life, all that is constructed, structured or effected has three characteristics. It is impermanent, transient or unresting (*anicca*); it is anguish, suffering, painful (*dukkha*); and it is insubstantial (*anatta*), owing to the absence of anything that in an ultimate sense could be called “self”. Everything constructed is impermanent because it is dependent or caused; its arising is to be seen in its decaying, and also alteration in it while it persists (*Aṅguttara Nikāya* i, 152). What is impermanent is anguish for the very reason that it is not permanent; and what is impermanent, anguish and of the nature to change is not-self. These three marks are features of everything we apprehend through the senses. And these five strands of sense-activity are called “world” in the discipline for an Aryan... and all of these are longed for, alluring, exciting (*Aṅguttara Nikāya*, iv. 430). This “world” far from being external is internal to a man: “There where one is not born, does not age, does not die, does not pass on (from one birth) and does not arise (in another)—I do not say that is an end of the world that one can apprehend, see or reach by... walking... But neither do I say that, not having reached the end of the world, an end can be made of anguish. For I lay down that the world, its uprising, its stopping and the course leading to its stopping are in this fathom-long body itself with its perceptions and ideas” (*Sutta Nipāta* Nikāya i, 61-2; *Aṅguttara Nikāya* ii, 47-9) (*op. cit.*, p. 288).

24. See Majjhima Nikāya, Sutta 52, etc.
25. *Ibid.*, Sutta 13, etc.

In league with Māluṇkyāputta and Vaccha, if we were impertinently to ask one of those questions which tend not to edification of the Buddha: How is it Gotama? Does Gotama hold that the world (=cosmos) is not eternal and that this view alone is true, and every other false? What answers should we expect? It may be noted that this question is to be genetically traced to the doctrine of *anicca*.

V

The question carries us into the controversy about the place of theories of cosmic creation in Buddhism. On one view, “In their views on the structure and evolution of the universe, the Buddhists were... content to borrow from the traditions of contemporary Hinduism”. Other scholars point out that the Buddhist scheme was “based largely on the prevalent Indian ideas, which accounted for the existence of the world without a creator” and was not a mere borrowing. E. J. Thomas even goes further and argues that Buddhists explained away the creator Brahmā and “invented a creation myth of their own. As the doctrine of recurrent cycles was assumed, it was not necessary to ask about an absolute beginning. There is no destruction of the whole universe, but only up to the world of Brahmā”.

Ch’en has pointed out how Buddhist cosmological speculation can be seen as being consistent with the doctrine of *anicca*. He writes:

If, as the Buddhists say, everything is a becoming, without beginning or end, then one would very naturally raise the question, just how did the universe originate? Although the Buddha discouraged speculation on the origins of the universe there is a theory of evolution found in the Buddhist scriptures. In the limitless expanse of space, the Buddhists conceive of an infinite number of world systems requiring immense periods of time called *kalpas* or aeons. Once the Buddha was asked how long a *kalpa* was, and he replied with the following simile. Suppose there were a mighty mountain crag, four leagues in dimensions all around, one solid mass of rock without any crack. Suppose a man should come to the end of every century,

27. One may note that Nāgārjuna offers his own explanation of the Buddha’s silence on the eternity or non-eternity of the universe in *Ratnakālī* (V, 1, 73). Therefore the attainment of nirvāṇa does not imply in fact any destruction of worldly existence. That is why even the Buddha, when requested whether this world has an end, remained silent.

and wipe that crag with a fine piece of cloth. That mighty mountain would be worn away and ended, sooner than the aeon. . . . Such a theory of evolution would, as one could see, fit in very well with the Buddhist doctrine of impermanence, for it is still fashioned in the scheme of a cycle, without beginning or end, just an eternal becoming. After its exposition in one discourse, there is no other reference to it in the sermons of the Buddha, and instead, the master often discouraged his disciples from speculating about the beginnings of life, saying that such speculations were fruitless and devoid of religious merits. 31

In other words, notwithstanding the Buddha’s reluctance to answer the question it seems that the question whether the cosmos was anicca or not can perhaps be answered. It was anicca in the sense all the other elements to which anicca had been applied are anicca—in the sense that they are unstable, of temporary duration; arising, appearing and ceasing but related to further arisings just as the earlier arising was related to the previous arising.

THE PALI TEXT SOCIETY’S CENTENARY

Ven. Dr. H. Saddhatissa

Prof. T. W. Rhys Davids, the most eminent Pali scholar in the 20th century studied Pali in Ceylon and, on his return to London, founded the Pali Text Society (in 1881) for the purpose of promoting the study of Pali, particularly in the West. The other objects of the Society were to publish original Pali texts in Roman characters, English translations of them and other works, ancillary to the study of Pali. These included dictionaries, grammars and the Pali Tipitaka Concordance, as well as selected Buddhist texts in Sanskrit and Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, or in translation.

Most of the major texts and commentaries have now been edited in Roman characters and also the greater number of books of the Tipitaka have been translated and published.

Under the able guidance and direction of the present President of the PTS Dr. (Miss) J. B. Horner arrangements are being made to celebrate its centenary in 1981. In connection with this great event, the PTS has already published facsimile reprints of 23 journals, issued consecutively over the years 1882-1927. These are now bound in cloth in 8 volumes and the set is priced at £65.00.

(1) PTS Journal

The PTS Journals had been out of print for about 18 years, and virtually impossible to procure. They still remain valuable tools for Pali scholars, research workers, lexicographers and others. The rich variety of scholarly topics they contain, comprise editions of some 20 important smaller Pali works, not published separately by the PTS.

They also contain original articles, learned notes and queries on difficult Pali words and passages, lists of Pali mss. in various leading libraries in Europe and South-East Asian countries, an index to works published by the PTS and much else of service and interest mostly, but not exclusively, in the field of Pali studies. It is because these contributions—all by eminent scholars—have commanded such a high degree of respect, that the Society hopes this complete reprint will prove acceptable now, even before the Centenary year.

31. Ch’ en, op. cit., pp. 42, 43-44.
(II) A Special volume

As part of the Centenary celebrations, the Society is to publish a 1981 volume consisting of important articles by specially-invited scholars in the fields of Pali and Theravāda Buddhism. One of the Pali scholars of repute, Mr. K. R. Norman, the Hon. Secretary of the Society, has been unanimously appointed by the Council as Editor-in-Chief of this specialised scholarly "Centenary Volume". He, with the concurrence of the council, headed by Miss Horner, has invited a galaxy of scholars to contribute research papers and articles for this volume.

(III) Commentaries

In connection with the centenary celebrations, the Society will also publish the English translations of the Pali Commentaries, which have already been printed in Roman characters. In the Aṭṭhakathā (Commentary) series of translations, the first, 'clarifier of the Sweet Meaning', (Buddhavamsa Commentary), by I. B. Horner, appeared in November, 1978. The second, the Petavathu Commentary by U Ba Kywand Peter Masefield, is in the press. Work on others, mainly by Burmese scholars, is progressing.

The typescripts of translations of the Commentaries on the Apankhāna, Suttanipātā, Theragathā and Therīgathā, are being prepared for the press. Great stress is laid on the importance of translations, so that non-Pali readers may gain an accurate knowledge of the Buddha's teaching. Recently, during my stay in Sri Lanka, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs decided to revitalise the study and teaching of Pali once again. At the meeting with Pali scholars of national and international repute, the Secretary to the Ministry, Mr. Nalin Ratnaike, suggested that the Pali scholars of Sri Lanka should make a substantial contribution by translating the Tipitaka commentaries and preparing, one or two volumes of the Pali Concordance, to make the Centenary of the PTS. I am sure, under the sponsorship of the Ministry, several erudite Pali scholars, like Ven. Ananda Maitreyi Mahānāyaka Thera, Professor N. A. Jayawickrama, Dr. Jotiya Dhiresekera, Ven. Dr. Henpitagedera Ghānava, Ven. Dr. Kakkapalliye Anuruddha, Professor Y. Karunadasa, Dr. Chandra Wickramagamage and Prof. Jinadasa Perera will come forward to contribute to this august project.

(IV) Concordance

Also connected with the centenary celebrations, will be the completion of the Pali Tipitakan Concordance, half of which has already been arranged and edited. The compiling of a Concordance to the Tipitaka dates back to the time of planning a Vedic Concordance some time in the 1890s. No systematic work, however, seems to have been undertaken, until the late Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids with her characteristic energy in 1932, revived the project planned by early scholars like Lamman, Edmund Hardy and Rhys Davids.

At the time, she enlisted the help of workers in Europe, India, Sri Lanka and Australia and to each, allotted a specific work; but the war came and enthusiasm seems to have died away. That the work of editing could begin again in 1950 is chiefly due to the persistent toil of F.L. Woodward. E. M. Hare, who undertook the editing of the PTS in 1950, was unable to complete the publication of Vols 1 and II before his death in 1958. With great enthusiasm, he brought out ten fascicules from a ton in a short period.

E. M. Hare, K. R. Norman, A. K. Warder, N. Warder, H. Saddhātissa and Ivo Fiser, have already edited nearly half of the PTC in three volumes. The other half is still to be edited. In order to complete this great work, the Council of the PTS is endeavouring to procure the collaboration of Pali scholars of India, Burma and Sri Lanka. Now, some scholars of Nālandā Pali Institute, the University of Calcutta and the University of Delhi, have come forward to edit, some fascicules of the remainder and it is hoped that their colleagues, in the Universities of Sri Lanka, will also take an active and prominent part.
Pali Buddhist Studies in the West

Russell Webb

8. Sweden

The first direct translations from Pali (and by implication the first serious study of the subject) were made by Karl Ferdinand Johansson (1860-1926), the first Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Indo-European Philology at Uppsala University. His renderings from the Mahāvagga, Sutta Piṭaka, Dhammapada Commentary, Milindapañha and Visuddhi-magga were incorporated in Främmande Religionsurkunder (Stockholm 1908). This anthology of non-Christian scriptures was edited by the Primate of Sweden, the Archbishop of Uppsala, Nathan Söderblom, who was the first Professor of Comparative Religion in the country and himself translated the Iranian texts for the above collection. Johansson also published a selection from the Jātaka, Indiska sagor (Stockholm 1907).

Johansson’s successor to the Chair in 1927 was Jarl Charpentier (1884-1935) who contributed one of the few studies on the concept of the Paccika Buddha—Paccikabuddhageschichten (Uppsala 1908). He also published a popular account of the Buddha: hans liv och lära (Stockholm 1911, 1926).

Another pupil of Johansson was Helmer Smith, one of the most notable Indologists of this century, who distinguished himself in the fields of Pali, Buddhist Sanskrit and Indian metrics. Born 1882 in Stockholm where he matriculated eighteen years later, he studied at Uppsala and Berlin Universities and obtained his licentiate (M.A.) at the former in 1908. He was appointed Reader in Indian Philology at Lund University in 1921 and succeeded to the Chair at Uppsala in 1936, a position he held until 1947. He spent several years in Paris where he became a close friend of Jules Bloch and other French Indologists and philologists. At the invitation of the Ministry of Education he gave a series of lectures at the Sorbonne during 1926-7. These dealt with the “Buddhism of the Pali language” from which the essay, “La Vie des Saints dans less Ecritures paliens”, was subsequently published. Following his death in 1956, his magnificent library of 20,000 volumes was transferred to the University Library of Uppsala.

Although Smith was proficient in a number of Oriental languages, he specialised in Pali and Sinhalese and in addition, composed numerous original papers on Middle Indian languages. Curiously enough, he never actually lectured on Pali or translated therefrom, but produced many excellent texts. For example, on behalf of the Pali Text Society, he edited the Sutta-Nipāta (with Dines Andersen, London 1913; reprinted 1965), its Commentary (Paramatthajotikā—3 vols. 1916-18; reprinted 1966-72), Khuddakapāṭha with its Commentary (1915, reprinted 1959) and a new edition of the Dhammapada Commentary I (1925). With Andersen he also edited two grammatical works, the Dhatumajjīsa and Dhatupāṭha (Copenhagen 1921) and, from 1916, collaborated with him to produce several fascicles of the Critical Pali Dictionary. He will also be remembered for his monumental annotated edition of the Burmese Pali grammar, Aggamansa’s Saddanti (3 vols., Lund 1928-66).


Nils Simonsson (born 1920) has occupied the Chair of Sanskrit at Uppsala since 1975, having been a lecturer between 1957-63. However, the only Pali texts included in the curriculum (and then only for advanced students) are the Saddantī and Burmese nissaya. From 1978 Theravāda Buddhism was included in the courses conducted under Prof. Carl-Martin Edsman (born 1911), who became responsible for teaching South and East Asian religions.

At Lund, Dr. Jan T. Ergardt lectures on the history of religions in the Theological Institution (headed by Dr. Sven Samuel Hartman). In 1970 he obtained his doctorate for a study on “Buddhismen in England”. Seven years later his Faculty and the “Swedish Humanistic Research Council” financed the publication of his monograph, Faith and Knowledge in Early Buddhism (Leiden), which is centred on the Majjhima Nikāya.

Prof. Gösta Liebert teaches Pali (and Sanskrit) in the Department of Comparative Philology at Gothenburg University. Dr. Peter Schalk teaches Buddhism in the Department of the History of Religions where a knowledge of Pali is presupposed at postgraduate level. Dr. Schalk obtained his doctorate from Lund in 1972 for his thesis on “Der Parittadisent in Ceylon” and has contributed two papers on Sinhalese Buddhist ritual to Temenos.

At Stockholm, Prof. Siegfried Lienhard from West Germany heads the Department of Indology, assisted by David Ståhl. At undergraduate level, Middle Indian languages are prescribed which include Pali or
Asokan inscriptions, the recommended textbooks being Geiger's Pāli Literatur und Sprache, Mayrhofer's Handbuch des Pali and Warder's Introduction to Pali. PTS texts are employed (particularly the Mālinda-pañha) together with the Visuddhimagga (Cambridge, Mass. edition). Buddhism is offered as an optional subject for which Nyānatiloka's Buddhistsches Wörterbuch, Baren's 'Der indische Buddhismus' (in Die Religionen Indiens), Warder's Indian Buddhism and Warren's Buddhism in Translations constitute the relevant reference works for early Buddhism.

In 1976 Ståhl wrote a B.A. thesis on 'Buddhistisk Meditation'—'a comparison between the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta and Vipassanā Bhavana Centre, Kandboda, Sri Lanka'—which was translated into English two years later.

In the academic sphere mention must be made of Rune E. A. Johansson. Born 1918, he studied psychology, Sanskrit and Pali at Lund and obtained his licentiate in 1954. He continued his studies in Sanskrit at the University of Calcutta and in Pali at the University of Ceylon. His English study, The Psychology of Nirvāṇa (London 1969), was the first attempt to fit all the diffuse explanations of Nirvāṇa contained in the Pali Canon into a consistent picture, relating the whole to Western psychology. A sequel to this work, based upon the formula of pāṭiccasamuppāda, was published this year by the Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies in Copenhagen under the title, The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism and will be reviewed in the next issue. The first Pali grammer in Swedish was composed by him. Entitled Buddhistska Texter Pali, it appeared in the Arbok 1967-8 which was published in 1969 by the "Seminar for Slavic Languages" at Lund University. An expanded version in English—Pali Buddhist Texts explained to the beginner—was subsequently published by the Scandinavian Institute (Copenhagen 1973). Apart from this primer, Johansson's most notable achievements have been the translation of the Dhammapada (the first directly from the Pali—Stockholm 1967) and the Sutta-Nipāta (Buddhistiska bollader och läroböcker—Stockholm 1976). For some inexplicable reason the publisher omitted six suttas from the latter collection and these were going to appear in Buddhistisk Gemenskap, the journal of a society with the same name. So far only one, the Vangisa Sutta, has been published (in No. 1, 1978).

At the popular level of dissemination, selections and complete texts from the Pali Canon have been translated and published on a commercial basis. Two earlier translations of the Dhammapada have been made, both from the English version of Max Müller. The first, by L. N., was entitled Buddhás Evangelium eller Dhammapadam (Gotenburg 1927), whilst the second, Dhammapada, lärens ord, was translated by Ake Ohlmarks and included in his anthology, Buddha talade och sade (Stockholm 1968). The eighty verses from the Udāna were published in the May and June 1969 issues of Bodhi, the journal of the Svenska Buddhistska Samfundet (which had been founded in Gotenburg in 1954). From 1969 this journal was edited by Buddhismsens Vänner ('Friends of Buddhism') which had been revived and subsequently led by Sister Amiā Nisatta (formerly Mrs. Ingrid Wagner) who had studied and trained in India, Nepal and Burma.

During the years 1971-74 a number of texts were translated for the journal (mainly by Gunnar Gällmo), viz. the Cāḷāsagāna, Cūḷā-Rāhulovāda and Sacca-Vibhaṅga Suttas (from the Majjhima Nikāya), Dhammacakkappavattana and Aṭṭānarakkhita Suttas (Samyutta), Akampaniya Vagga I, 3 (Anguttara), Khaggavisāṇa, Maṅgala, Ratanas and Parābhava Suttas (Sutta-Nipāta).

Gällmo, a professional translator with a publishing house, subsequently established the Buddhásasanaforlaget at this apartment in Spånga, near Stockholm. To date he has produced three text translations in pocket book size: Buddhás tal till Kalama-folket (Kållåna Sutta, 1976), Talet om Rätt Syn (Sammāditthi Sutta, 1976) and Buddhás tal till Sigala (Sigalovāda Sutta, 1977). Other translations from The Wheel and Bodhi Leaves series of the Buddhist Publication Society (Kandy, Sri Lanka) have also appeared, but undoubtedly the most important undertaking was his Swedish translation of W. Rahula's classic primer, What the Buddha Taught. The MS was completed in 1970 but still awaits an enterprising publisher.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Clarifier of the Sweet Meaning (Maduratthavilāsini). Buddha datta Thera. Translated by I. B. Horner. Sacred Books of the Buddhists Series No. 33, PTS, London 1978. lxvii + 453 pp. £ 15.50. It is always a source of joy to both scholars and the reading Buddhist public when any fresh work bearing the imprint ‘I. B. Horner’ appears. The present volume is the Commentary on the Buddhavamsa which has already been translated by Miss Horner. Entitled Chronicle of Buddhās, the latter formed part of Minor Anthologies III and was published by the PTS in 1975.

Undoubtedly the most important consideration regarding the book reviewed here is that it constitutes the first volume in a new series issued to celebrate the centenary of the Pali Text Society in 1981. This will
comprise the canonical Commentaries (the majority of which were written by Buddhaghosa) and it is understood that the translation into English of a considerable number of them has already been made by scholars from Burma and Sri Lanka and are ready for publication in due course.

The great importance of these Commentaries, which cover every text in the Pali Canon, whether Vinaya, Sutta or Abhidhamma, has hardly been recognised by the Buddhist public. Hitherto, the only one to have been translated into English was the Commentary on the Khuddaka-pāṭha by the late Bhikkhu Nanamoli (Osbert Moore) which was published by the PTS under the title, Minor Readings and Illustrators, in 1960. In this series of Commentaries each word of each sentence (and of course the meaning of the sentence as a whole) of each of the works that make up the Canon is commented upon in detail, and we are told which of various meanings that the word or phrase is capable of bearing is intended and why. Miss Horner devotes much of her Preface to explaining the function of a Commentary and the present reviewer can only point out its great importance by quoting Miss Horner herself:

"The prime object of every Commentary is to make the meanings of the words and phrases in the canonical passage it is elucidating abundantly clear, definitive even and virtually beyond all doubt and argument. This is to preserve the Teaching of the Buddha as nearly as possible in the sense intended and as conveyed by the succession of teachers, Acariyaparamparā. Always there were detractors, always there were and still are 'improvers' ready with their own notions. Through enemies and friends alike deleterious change and deterioration of the word of the Buddha might intervene for an indefinite length of time. The Commentaries are the armour and protection against such an eventuality" (p. xiii); and again the concluding paragraph on p. xxvii of the Preface: "I believe there to be a growing awareness that the Dhamma of the Pali Canon is so deep, subtle, precise, comprehensive and systematic that it is difficult to understand and not easy at all as seemed at one time to have been thought. It is true that though the words this uses, or most of them, can be translated, yet the question would remain what some of them mean in this context or that or in every context, if it were not for the Commentaries and their precise, comprehensive and systematic methods of interpretation. ... Canon and Commentary are interdependent. The latter is essential for an understanding, as exact as may be, of the former. Together they form one ordered whole to guide man in his quest for detachment and the perfection of freedom."

Although the Buddhavamsa itself is a text of comparatively late date and one for which, with the best will in the world, it is difficult to work up any great degree of enthusiasm, the reader as he works his way through it will discover that he is both broadening and deepening his knowledge of Buddhist terminology. For instance, we are told on p. 18 that "having his hands clasped" means "having made a hollow between his palms (he raised them) to his head". Several hundred pages later we learn that the purpose of leaving the "hollow in the palms" is to symbolically offer the cintamāni — "the jewel granting all desires" — to the Buddha or other person thus greeted. Pp. 23-36 are devoted to elucidating the eight different meanings of the word Tathāgata and it is refreshing to find (under the dry heading "defining of the aggregates") all the poetic similes that have been used to bring out their full meaning. "Form is like unto a ball of foam" because it will not stand squeezing and because it is full of holes. "Feeling is like a bubble of water" because it can be enjoyed for an instant only. "Perception is like a mirage" because it causes illusion". "The constructions (sānkhārā) are like the trunk of a pannari tree" because it contains no hard wood. "Consciousness is like conjuring" because it causes deception ... In this way the defining of the aggregates and elements should be understood as the contemplation of impermanence and so forth.

Miss Horner wears her scholarship lightly and is always courteous to her readers, always quoting chapter and verse, always using terms which are comprehensible to readers in this country and not attempting to impose on them some highly idiosyncratic terminology of her own bases on Gestalt psychology or Existentialist philosophy or whatever. She appears to be a firm believer in the maxim: "If anything is important, it is important enough to be written about clearly and comprehensively".

When from the very few extracts from this Commentary which considerations of space permitted giving, it became clear what may be derived from a Commentary on a very minor (and rather uninteresting) canonical text, what treasures are in store for us when some of the more important Commentaries are finally published?

Ronald Brown

*Editor: in fact the following additional Commentaries have also been published by the PTS—


The Debates Commentary (on the Kathāvatthu, tr. B.C. Law—1940, reprinted 1969)

The Inception of Discipline and the Vinaya Nidāna (the introduction to the Samantapāsādikā, the Commentary on the Vinaya Piṭaka, tr. N. A. Jayawickrama—1962)

Peta-Stories (on the Petavatthu, tr. U Ba Kyaw and P. Masefield, will be published at the end of 1979 or beginning of 1980)


This text bears a similarity with the better known Rasavāhini in that both comprise collections of morally edifying stories. It is hoped that Heinz Bechter will edit the text of the latter for the PTS which intends publishing this with the translation which is progressing under Telwatte Rāhula, a Sinhalese lecturer in the Department of Indian Studies at Melbourne University.

Two Burmese works—the Gandhavamsa and Piṭakahatthamain—mention this text as having been composed in Ceylon, but hitherto little was known of the Dasavatthupakarana. It is the merit of this volume to give a detailed description of the contents and circumstances surrounding the composition of this text. Added to which, a full French translation of all thirty-seven stories follows the romanised text. To achieve the latter, Miss Ver Eecke consulted two incomplete Khmer/Thai MSS in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, two editions in Sinhala (one fragmentary—Panadura 1898; the other complete—Alutgama 1916) and five out of the known nineteen ola-leaf MSS in Sri Lanka, all in varying condition.

The stories, in mixed prose and trṣṭūth-metre verse, exalt the importance of giving to the Sangha. Hence, the full title of this text is Dasa-dhānavatthu—"the ten objects of giving"; i.e. food, drink, clothing, vehicles, garlands, perfume, unguents, beds, dwellings and lamps. Garlands, perfume and unguents certainly seem out of place but the translator nowhere suggests when this text was composed although it was certainly known by the 15th century. The stories are derived from the Commentaries and belong to a well-known type of popular Buddhist didactic literature—the anisamsa (literally "advantage, profit, reward"). Composed as they were by bhikkhus, it is hardly surprising that sixteen praise giving to the Sangha, with nine devoted to the Buddha, eight to Pacceka Buddhas and seven to stūpas (—since this totals forty, obviously three stories share favours).

The advantages and fruits of giving are explained in what would now be considered a mechanistic and even materialistic fashion. "To each gift corresponds a fruit of the same order, for example, to the donor of food to the Community of monks accrues fine and plentiful food, to the donor of a bed or couch accrues many palanquins, sumptuous beds, etc." Against this, however, the text does illustrate (from Aṅguttara IV, 243) the eight qualities required for objects of giving: the gifts should be pure and the best, offered at the right time, appropriate (e.g. food to the hungry), with discrimination, repeated, the heart delighting and serene, the mind glad.

Thus, we have here 'a popular anthology on giving... an exemplary document on the traditional instruction of the laity in faith, morality and generosity, the cardinal virtues of Buddhism'.


This work represents a rendering from the 15th century classic Sinhalese poem, Budhagunālankārāya, by Vidāgama Maitreyā Mahāthera, who is renowned for a number of poetical compositions (notably (a) Hança Sandēkaya and (b) Lōvādasaṅgārāṇa) and one prose work, (c) the Hatthavana-gallavihāravamsa.

Since few Sinhalese Buddhist works are available in English, it is worth recalling that (a) was translated in 1926 by C. D. R. Jayaweera Bandara (with extracts and a commentary by Amarasiri Weeraratne in The Buddhist, January 1957, YMBA, Colombo) and (b) was translated by W. A. de Silva (Colombo 1910) and reviewed by Alexandra David-Neel in The Buddhist Review II (London 1910). Both are adequately described by C. E. Godakumbura in his Sinhalese Literature (Colombo 1955). (c) was edited by Godakumbura for the PTS in 1956, translated by James D’Alwis (Colombo 1866) and described by G. P. Malalasekera in his Pali Literature of Ceylon (Colombo 1928, 1958). Extracts from the
Hamsa and Budugwälankārāya are contained in An Anthology of Sinhalese Literature up to 1815 (ed. C. H. B. Reynolds, London 1970) whilst a general survey of the Literature of Sri Lanka is provided by Godakumbura (Dept. of Cultural Affairs, Colombo 1963, 1976).

In the absence of any notes to the contrary, this version of the Budugwälankārāya would appear to be the first in English. The poem is in 612 four-line stanzas although the beauty of the original four kinds of metre is lost in translation. Indeed, the translator must have experienced enormous difficulties in making the lines scan. As it is archaisms abound and these compound the problem of appreciating a metrical work, especially one that is essentially devotional by nature. English readers, familiar with straightforward prose works which deal directly with the Dhamma, could be forgiven for giving the present composition a miss.

This poem is also adequately described by Godakumbura in Sinhalese Literature from which the reader can best judge the quality and worth of Buddhist works composed in Sri Lanka.

According to the Preface, Mr. Weerasinghe has also translated the Dhammapada and Thupavansa but, like so many works produced in Sri Lanka (excepting those from the BPS, Kandy), nothing is known of them.

RBW

ON THE UNITY OF BUDDHIST TRADITION


This book presents a selection of papers written by a well-known Buddhist monk from Sri Lanka who has acquired a scholarly reputation in the West both by his writing and by teaching in universities. Produced over a period of several years and published in various journals or delivered as speeches, some of the essays bear the sign of having been prompted by a special event or need at the time, but they always contribute to some extent to the clarification of tenets or principles shared by all Buddhist schools. The author’s stance is, naturally, Theravāda, but he seeks to bring into the treatment of his topics a perspective which would reveal an underlying agreement in spirit and unity of purpose in the thinking of different schools.

The book receives its title from the first essay, undoubtedly an astute move to attract the attention of numerous Zen-enthusiasts who are not often acquainted with traditional Buddhism and tend to admire the uniqueness of Zen even where it is most indebted and close to what may be presumed to be the Buddha’s original verbal message, the most complete version of which has been preserved as the Sutta Piṭaka of the Pali Canon. This closeness of Zen and early Buddhism has been known to serious students for a considerable time. E. G. Nyanaponika Thera pointed out the connection between Ch’an/Zen and the satippatthana training, such as “the direct confrontation with actuality (including one’s mind), the merging of every-day life with the meditative practice, the transcending of conceptual thought by direct observation and introspection, the emphasis on the Here and Now.” (The Heart of Buddhist Meditation, London 1962, p. 14). Dr. Rahula demonstrates the connection by tracing the idea behind the Zen “oxherding pictures” in Pali sources. These pictures, originating perhaps in the twelfth century, were made popular in the West by D. T. Suzuki (Myenal of Zen Buddhism, London 1950, pp. 127-44) and others after him and they represent the process of taming a bull or ox by an oxherder. “The bull represents the mind and the herdsman who tames the bull is the yogi, the person engaged in meditation”, says Dr. Rahula. In the process of taming, the bull, originally black, becomes gradually white. Dr. Rahula quotes a passage from the commentary to the Satippatthana in which the untrained mind is compared to an untrained bull and the process of training the mind by mindfulness to taming a calf by taming it. Since Pali commentaries are translations of early Sinhala versions believed to go back to the third century B.C. and these in turn are likely to have been based on an even older Indian tradition, we have here an indication, if not a proof, of a linkage of Zen to the earliest Buddhist tradition which predates Mahāyāna by two or more centuries. The gradual becoming white of the bull symbolises the gradual purification of the mind through discipline and meditation and Dr. Rahula refers to two suttas in the Anuguttara Nikāya which describe the mind (citta) as basically luminous despite its being defiled by adventitious defilements. It becomes freed from its defilements through training based on instruction and understanding. He further shows that the Mahāyāna Lankāvatāra Sutra which greatly influenced Zen uses the same terms when describing the tathāgatagarbha, practically a synonym of ālayavijñāna which in turn is another term for citta. Although the problem of citta—ālayavijñāna—tathāgatagarbha is philosophically much more intricate than would follow from Dr. Rahula’s simple equations, the textual links are made quite obvious.
The link of Zen with *satipathāna* is further elaborated by the author in showing the similarity of *sazen* practice with *anāpānasati* and of the Zen way of living in the present (“When I am hungry, I eat; when tired I sleep”) with *sammañña-paṭiba*, i.e. clear awareness of what one is doing from moment to moment, and in pointing out the connection between the very name Zen and the practice of *jhānas*. However, simplification again sets in when the author says: “Japanese Zen comes from the Chinese Ch’an which is derived from the Sanskrit *diyāna* (Pali *jhāna*), meaning ‘meditation’.” Against this one has to say, first, that it may be regarded as more likely that Ch’an and Zen come directly from the Pali *jhāna*, since its pronunciation is much closer to the Chinese and Japanese words than the Sanskrit *diyāna*. Second, *jhāna* does not mean merely “meditation”. That may be its popular understanding today, but in the context of the Pali Canon and its commentaries *jhāna* means contemplating or examining closely (chosen) phenomena of existence and implies also eliminating obstacles in the way, i.e. hindrances or defilements of the mind. (Cf. P. Vajirāṇa, *Buddhist Meditation in Theory and Practice*, Colombo 1962, p. 35.) Zen is concerned with just that sort of mind-training leading eventually to awakening or enlightenment. If its link to the Buddha’s original message is actual, it would predate the later watering down of the meaning of *jhāna* to mere meditation. One has to avoid regarding Zen in the light of the later Theravāda interpretation of jhānic states as *samañña* which does not lead to Nirvāṇa while *vipassanā* does. Without going into the question to what extent the division is substantiated in the *suttas*, we can say that the traditional exposition of the path in them is a global one and includes *jhānas* (which sometimes culminate in *nirodha samāpatti*) with the subsequent break-through to liberation. Zen may be a development along that particular line.

In dealing with the Zen conception of *satori* Dr. Rahula finds further links to the Theravāda tradition: it lies outside the texts as does Theravāda in so far as it is practice rather than mere study that counts for spiritual achievement; the “suddenness” of *satori* is matched by equally “sudden” attainments of arahatship or a lower stage of sanctity often reported in the Pali *suttas* and commentaries, but in each case it is preceded by periods of study, searching, discipline and meditation. Even the Zen phraseology of “becoming a Buddha” has a parallel in a later Theravāda work which speaks about becoming a Sāvaka Buddha. It is modestly, suggests the author, which prevents Theravādins from using the designation Buddha for every Arahant and we know, of course, that Theravāda reserves it to the accomplished world teachers of past eras, e.g. the Buddha Dipaṅkara, the Buddha Gotama of our historical period and the Buddhas of the future, the next one in the line being the Buddha Maitreya/Metteya.

Dr. Rahula does not try to explain expressly or to suggest why it is that there is such a close resemblance between the early Buddhist tradition and Zen. Sometimes it seems that he believes that Zen, like other schools, relied on scriptural tradition for guidance. But although Zen masters and followers have been usually well read in the texts, this does not account for the immediacy and unconventionality in their application of what appears to be highly skilful practice on the path closely related to, if not identical with, methods described by Pali sources and believed to be a genuine inheritance from the Master himself. Dr. Rahula dismisses the story of the direct transmission of the “True Dharma Eye” and “marvellous mind of Nirvāṇa” by the Buddha to Māha-Kāśyapa on the Vulture Peak when the Buddha held up a golden lotus flower and Kāśyapa smiled. He also reminds the reader that the realisation of truth can be handed down in pupilary succession like an oral tradition and refers to the patriarchal line in Zen as an instance of the institutional side in religion not to be confused with the realm of Truth. This again is a highly simplistic approach to the problem. Why should oral tradition be the only medium of communicating Truth? Words are symbols which stand for and point to reality if they are understood and there is no reason why non-verbal symbols, such as gestures, could not convey the same message and could not be equally well understood. A prepared mind can be prompted to the final break-through by an utterance (there are many instances of it in the Pali sources and Dr. Rahula quotes one of them) and also by a natural event which assumes at that moment symbolical character (e.g. a lamp going out, also occurring in Pali sources). One can imagine, and certainly should not discard the possibility, that the Buddha may sometimes have used gestures of symbolical significance, instead of words, to facilitate a break-through in a monk’s mind whose preparedness he clearly saw, knowing also what exact kind of final impetus he needed. There is no reason why the same ability could not have been acquired by the now enlightened disciple and why this tradition could not be continued by deliberate cultivation for generations. In fact, a line of transmission of this sort would be a natural way of continuing a tradition “outside scriptures”. In a school such as Theravāda, where careful preservation of the oral tradition became a prerequisite of continuity, a succession of “patriarchs” would be superfluous and if it existed, it would truly be only institutional. (Cf. the institution of Saṅgharājas in Thailand).
There is, of course, no hard historical evidence to prove the authenticity of the origin of Zen directly from the Buddha of, for that matter, of the Theravāda form of the teaching. But it appears very likely that both of them started their existence as a direct result of the Buddha’s mission, whose manifoldness and depth would have manifested itself globally and allowed more than one way of transmission.

The second essay, “Buddhism in the Western World”, was delivered by the author as his inaugural lecture in the Northwestern University in Illinois, U.S.A. It gives a brief survey of its topic (sadly, without annotations) and discusses some questions arising from the meeting of the Buddhist teaching with Western ideas and attitudes, such as the question of the alleged pessimism of Buddhism, its relation to social and economic matters and its encounter with science. These are topics which have been much written about, but very few works ever turn their attention to the problem of the direct influence of Buddhism on Hellenistic, Judaic, Gnostic and Christian teachings in the wake of Asoka’s missions to the West and the subsequent contacts. Dr. Rahula only hints at the topic, which still awaits tackling by a highly competent Buddhist with a thorough classical training. Dr. Rahula’s uncertainty as to whether the delegation of Buddhist monks from the “Greek city of Alexandria”, who according to the Mahāvamsa attended the inaugural ceremony of the Great Stupa at Anurādhapura in the 1st century B.C., came from Egypt or some other Alexandria, could well be resolved by research into the origin of Neoplatonism. Its founder was Plotinus (203-270 A.C.), who came to Alexandria in Egypt to study philosophy. Having heard just one lecture by Ammonios Sakkas, he recognized him as his teacher and stayed with him for 11 years. His name makes the impression of a deliberate reversal of the Buddha’s frequent designation “Sakyamuni” used here as a pseudonym or religious name and may well indicate the nature of his teaching of which there is no written record. But Plotinus’ philosophy, although clearly dependent on Plato, bears also unmistakable signs of Buddhist influence and shows close parallels to the Vījñānavāda doctrines.

The third essay, “Fundamentals of Buddhism”, was originally a Buddha Jayanti address (London 1956) and is a very good specimen of its kind, while the fourth one, “The Buddha on Man, his Nature and Destiny” (delivered at the All-Ceylon Theological Conference in Kandy as early as 1947) demonstrates equally well the author’s skill in drawing on Pali sources with parallel examples from Mahāyāna literature. The first part of the book then closes with a highly topical talk given at the London Vihāra in 1974, “The Problem of the Prospect of the Saṅgha in the West”. In it he first gives an important explanation of the meanings of the word saṅgha. According to Pali suttas it means, in the strict sense, the community of those who have entered the path or acquired the fruit of one of the four stages of sanctity (from stream-entry to arahatship) regardless of whether they are monks or lay followers, male or female. The expression used in the suttas is Bhagavato saṅkata-saṅgha, the Community of the Blessed One’s disciples (distorted in the PTS translations into “the Church of the Exalted One”), while the expression bhikkhu-saṅgha, wherever used, refers to the community of monks whether worldlings or saints. Contrary to this, Vinaya texts and commentaries interpret saṅkata-saṅgha as meaning simply the community of ordained monks (bhikkhu-saṅgha). Dr. Rahula therefore sensibly proposes to distinguish the “Spiritual Saṅgha” in the strict sense which exists in the world of the Dhamma, in the spiritual realm of the world, and the “Institutional Saṅgha” of monks controlled by Vinaya rules. Since the latter are the custodians of the Dhamma (or, let us say, of one of its oral traditions) and he visible representatives of the Saṅgha of the Three Jewels, the creation of a Western bhikkhu-saṅgha is essential if Buddhism is to be firmly established and perpetuated in the West. This is certainly true as far as Theravāda Buddhism is concerned and so it is highly relevant that Dr. Rahula then discusses the impracticability of adhering to all Vinaya rules in the context of modern Western society. Arguing that Vinaya, unlike Dhamma, is not Absolute Truth and was modified and amended in the past to suit times and places in the East, it must of necessity find ways of doing the same in the West if the Saṅgha is not to remain there a tropical plant in a hot-house.

The essays of Part Two are preoccupied with essential Mahāyāna teachings and their relation to Theravāda. “The Bodhisattva Ideal in Theravāda and Mahāyāna” deals with the subject from what we could call a realistic point of view. A bodhisattva is one who is in a position to attain Nirvāna, but postpones it out of compassion to become a Buddha and teach the Truth to the world. As such he has also become an arahat so there is no essential difference in achieving arahatship or buddhahood with respect to Nirvāna, though there is a great difference in knowledge and capacity to teach the path. Theravāda, like Mahāyāna, holds the bodhisattva ideal to be the highest and noblest, but, unlike Mahāyāna, does not provide separate literature on the subject, though there are many instances in post-canonical Pali literature of individuals aspiring to become future Buddhas. This is quite correct as far as it goes, but the bodhisattva teachings of Mahāyāna are much more complex than that. Dr. Rahula’s only reference to this fact is to say
that Mahāyāna "also created a fascinating class of mythical bodhisattvas", which is not saying much. Apart from the "realistic" conception of a bodhisattva, there is a typical Mahāyāna conception of a bodhisattva who does not aspire to become a Buddha of a future world period, but renounces Nirvāṇa to stay forever in samsāra in order to help others.

Dr. Rahulę does not mention this conception at all. The category of "mythical" (better: transcendental) bodhisattvas would, of course, require detailed treatment and congruent symmetrical interpretation to reveal its underlying meaning. There is also room for further interpretation of the notion of a bodhisattva who vows to postpone entering Nirvāṇa until he has saved all beings "down to the last blade of grass", an interpretation which might allow us to link it directly with the early teachings and consider it to be a reinterpretation of the arahat goal; if one considers the implications of one's wanderings in samsāra whose beginning cannot be found, one realizes that one has already been through all possible forms of life many times over. In that sense one's past represents the manifoldness of samsāra as it exists simultaneously at the present moment around one. Similarly, if an end is not put to it, one's future wanderings in samsāra will produce innumerable beings again. To save oneself now means to save them all. In order to acquire this vision of samsāra, it would be necessary to develop fully the two knowledges the Buddha gained during the first two parts of the night of Enlightenment. The third knowledge, that of being liberated, would then follow. If this interpretation is anywhere near reality, it would also be understandable why Mahāyāna schools prefer the concept of buddhahood (as a state of mind, not as a status of a world teacher) to arahatship. An arahat seldom, if ever, acquires the two knowledges and as Pali commentaries show it is possible to deceive oneself as to the final attainment. When a Buddha is alive he confirms the authenticity of one's achievement. When he is gone, it is safer to strive for buddhahood, i.e., a Buddhahlike vision of one's past and of samsāra as a whole. Arahatship became a suspect achievement in India, especially after the Mahāsāṃghika split when criteria for "attaining" arahatship were diluted after the five points of the monk Mahādeva. Needless to say this tentative interpretation requires further thought and some research.

The next essay, "Vijñaptimātratā Philosophy and the Yogācāra System—Some Wrong Notions", sets out to show as wrong the view (maintained by scholars like E.J. Thomas, T.V. Muir and D.T. Suzuki) that the mind (citta) or consciousness (vijñāna) is considered to be the ultimate reality in the Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda school of Buddhist thought. Dr. Rahulę shows this by drawing attention to the passage of the Pali Canon in which it is said that the world is led by citta (mind=thought), that nothing more exists than nāma (name, designation) and that all dharmas are ways of pāṭhāni (prajñāni, "notion", "conception"). Showing further that known fragments of Sanskrit Āgamas, from which the great Mahāyāna authors Nāgārjuna, Asāṅga and Vasubandhu elaborated their philosophy as much as from later Mahāyāna sutas, have parallel passages, he points out that the interpretation of cintamāna as "Mind-only" idealism comparable to that of Berkeley (a hint at Conez’s explanation—Buddhism: Its Essence and Development, Oxford 1951, pp. 167-8) stems from wrong understanding and wrong translation of that expression since even the Lankāvatāra Sūtra equates citta with viññāpti so that the proper meaning of cintamāna then is "just a thought, idea, conception". This holds true both for the external and internal world which includes citta itself. In this way Dr. Rahulę hits against the customary metaphysical hyposaturation of the mind in the interpretation of the Vijñānavāda system. He deals similarly with the concept of sānyāsā (void).

In the subsequent essay "Wrong notions of Dhammatā (Dharmatā)", he argues with equal skill against suggestions that this concept could sometimes be compared with the notion of "Grace". Next follows a short note on "Ālayavijñāna (Store-Consciousness)" which in a sequence of quotations tries to demonstrate that ālayavijñāna is nothing more than citta and a layer of the Aggregate of Consciousness (vijñānahānasankhāra). Here again simplification sets in when Dr. Rahulę reduces this highly intricate doctrine to two and a half pages. However, his remarks and numerous textual references are most useful and any future paper on the subject will have to consider his reflections very carefully. The next essay, brilliantly written, is called "A Comparative Study of Dhyānas according to Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda and Mahāyāna". It analyses the problem of the fourfold division of the rupajñānas in the Sutta Pitaka and its later development into a fivefold system in the Abhidhamma. Comparing this material with Sarvāstivāda and Mahāyāna sources, he concludes that their treatment of the dhyānas is closer to the Pali sutta than that of the Theravāda Abhidhamma. This admission has an important implication, especially because one could find still more topics in the suttas which Vīṇāya, Abhidhamma and Pali commentaries treat differently (one has only to remember the interpretation of saṅgha dealt with earlier, to name but one other instance): namely that, like other schools, the Theravāda school of Buddhism is, at least to some extent, a development from the original teaching to which the Pali suttas, and sometimes even more early Sanskrit sutras of other schools, are closer.
This part of the book finishes with a short essay on "Self-cremation in Mahāyāna Buddhism", apparently prompted by well-known events in Vietnam. Tracing the question conclusively in the texts (unfortunately without proper annotation), the author shows that there is no room for suicide in the Pali tradition, unless final liberation is won. But a story from the Mahāyāna Saddharma-puṇḍarīka Sūtra about a bodhisattva setting fire to himself as an offering to the Buddha (to burn ceaselessly for twelve thousand years), taken as a serious act of devotion by Chinese Buddhists, led to several self-cremations over the centuries. Though not in keeping with the original teaching, self-immolation is certainly preferable to killing others, concludes the author.

The last part of the book contains three short essays: "The Influence of Buddhism on Sri Lanka’s Culture" shows the inextricable connection between the two which was only temporarily obscured during the colonial era before the revival initiated by H.S. Olcott in 1880. "Anagarika Dharmapala" is a tribute to this devoted apostle of Buddhism who continued the work begun by Olcott at home and abroad. The last essay, "The Ideal Past" tries to refute the universal belief that the past was better than the present, to which even Theravāda commentaries succumbed, praising monks of previous times and complaining about the contemporary saṅgha, by referring to negative events in the saṅgha at the time of the Buddha and to the frequent complaints of foremost theras about monks. It is not quite clear to me, however, what the essay is driving at. Never mind the inadequacy of the majority of monks stated occasionally in the suttas, if the great theras around the Buddha were what the suttas say they were, then at least at that time there was a large body of "worthy ones" (arahats), such as has never since been evidenced. Besides, it is practically a "dogma" of the Buddhist tradition that the true Dhamma will deteriorate with time and eventually disappear to be brought back again by the future Buddha Metteya. Similarly, in the wider context of the history of the universe the Buddhist cosmology and philosophy of history pictures the beginnings of each cosmic period as starting with spiritual (jhānico) conditions of life devolving into grosser and more materialistic forms, and the history of previous ages with their respective Buddhas also shows a progressive worsening of conditions. In the ever revolving samsāric wheel there is, of course, an ever recurring renewal after every complete deterioration and universal conflagration.
NEWS & NOTES

Pali Buddhism in Japan

During September and October 1978, Ven. Dr. H. Saddhātissa, the Head of the London Buddhist Vihāra and an active member of the Council of the Pali Text Society, became the first Theravāda bhikkhu to be officially invited to lecture on Pali and Theravāda Buddhism at Japanese universities.

Considerable interest was aroused and it is hoped to publish a report on the current position of Pali Buddhist studies in Japan in due course. Although a number of scholars have concentrated on this field, very little has been published in English.

Apart from an upsurge in orders for PTS publications, the immediate result of the above visit was the appointment of a lecturer at Kinki University as the first official representative of the PTS in Japan:

Prof. F. Watanabe, 1-1-79 Nanryo-cho, Uji City, Kyoto 611.

Pali Text Society

At their AGM in June, the PTS elected onto the Council Dr. Richard F. Gombrich, Boden Professor of Sanskrit at Oxford. His doctoral dissertation—Precept and Practice: Traditional Buddhism in the rural highlands of Ceylon—was published by The Clarendon Press (Oxford 1971) which later brought out his translation (with Margaret Cone) of the Vessantara Jātaka—The Perfect Generosity of Prince Vessantara (1977). The latter was reviewed in Buddhist Quarterly 10, 4 (British Mahābodhi Society, London Buddhist Vihāra, 1978).

Pali Buddhist Union

A Buddhist of many years standing, Mr. Lajos Györkös, has been appointed the Corresponding Secretary for Hungary and an editorial representative of the Pali Buddhist Review. His address is: H-1063 Budapest VI, Bokányi Dezső u. 2/B. II. 1, Hungary.

Collected Works of Jayatilleke

The Buddhist Publication Society has announced the publication of a bound volume incorporating all the writings of the late K. N. Jayatilleke that appeared in The Wheel series. These comprise: Buddhism and Science, Buddhism and Peace, Knowledge and Conduct, Aspects of Buddhist social Philosophy, Survival and Karma in Buddhist Perspective, Facets of Buddhist Thought, Ethics in Buddhist Perspective, Significance of Vesak, Buddhism and the Race Question, The Buddhist Attitude to Other Religions and The Contemporary Relevance of Buddhist Philosophy.

Professor Jayatilleke was undoubtedly one of the greatest and most lucid Buddhist scholars and writers of this century. "...the significance and excellence of his writings can be fully appreciated, and the great variety of topics will illustrate the wide sweep of the author's mind" and "will provide informative and stimulating reading....".

Entitled Facets of Buddhist Thought, this volume is priced at £3.25 or $6.50 and is available from the BPS, P.O. Box 61, Kandy, Sri Lanka.

New Journal

The first two issues of The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies have appeared from the Association's centre in the University of Wisconsin (USA). Only three items (in Vol. I, No. 2—Spring 1979) are relevant to Pali studies: "Is the Buddhist notion of 'Cause necessitates Effect' (Paticca-samuppāda) Scientific?" by A. D. P. Kalansurya, "Kēśi, 'Some', in a Pali Commentary" by I. B. Horner, and "The Freudian Unconscious and Bhavanī" by O. H. de A. Wijesekera.

The Association was founded in 1976 in Madison on the occasion of an international conference on the History of Buddhism organized by the Buddhist Studies Program of the Department of South Asian Studies at the University of Wisconsin. The Association is devoted to the promotion and strengthening of scholarship in the field of Buddhist studies and is committed purely to the intellectual treatment of Buddhism.

For further details, write to any of the following:
General Secretary, Prof. A. K. Narain, IABS, c/o Dept. of South Asian Studies, 1244 Van Hise, 1220 Linden Drive, Madison, Wisconsin 53706, U.S.A.

Prof. Erik Zürcher, Oostende 16, Warmond, The Netherlands.
Prof. Yuichi Kajiyama, Dept. of Buddhist Studies, Kyoto University, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606, Japan.
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