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**STANZAS OF VICTORY**

*(Translated by Bhikkhu Khantipalo)*

Vāseṭṭhī was a mother who grieved over her dead son. Born to a good family and married to a young man of equal status, she lived happily with her husband and bore a son. When able to run about he died and while relatives were consoling the father, Vāseṭṭhī ran away raving and wandered about until she came to Mithilā. There she saw the Buddha and, at the sight of the Great One, regained her normal mind. Hearing Dhamma in brief, she asked to become a bhikkhunī and soon after, an Arahant. Reflecting on her attainment, she exalted in this way:

> With my mind deranged, crazed by grief  
> for my son and out of my senses,  
> naked, with dishevelled hair  
> I wandered here and there.  
> On heaps of rubbish from the streets,  
> on charnel-grounds and chariot-roads,  
> there I lived for three long years  
> given over to hunger and thirst.  
> Then I saw him, the Sugata,²  
> Come to Mithilā’s city  
> the tamer of the untamed  
> Enlightened, without fears at all.  
> Having then regained my mind  
> I bowed to him and sat nearby  
> and out of compassion did Gotama  
> teach me Dhamma, which having heard  
> I went forth to the homeless state.  
> Devoted to the Teacher’s word  
> I realised the State secure,  
> all griefs completely cut right out,  
> abandoned, brought to an utter end,  
> for known to me are the causes  
> from which all griefs are born. (113-138)

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*Extracts from a new anthology from the Theravāda-pātha—Banner of the Arahants—which will be published by the Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy.*

1. The Well-farer, one whose going was always auspicious, in this world and beyond all worlds.
Vaddhamatā, the name means Vaddha's mother—parents often being nicknamed after their children, was born in a good family in the town of Bharukacchā (=Bhārach). When married, she bore one son who was known as Vaddha. After hearing a bhikkhu teach Dhamma she handed her child over to relatives and became a bhikkhuni. Afterwards she won Arhatship and in due course her son became a bhikkhu, learned and eloquent in preaching. One day, negligently, he went alone and without his upper robe to see his mother. She rebuked him for both these things so that he returned to his own quarters and sat in meditation there, attaining Arhatship.

This incident is interesting in view of the prohibition on bhikkhunis instructing bhikkhus, but perhaps this prohibition only covers formal sermon-type instruction and not more informal conversation of this sort:

**Vaddha's mother:** Do not, Vaddha, ever get entangled in jungle-lusts2 regarding the world! My son, do not again and again become a sharer of dukkha! Happy indeed are the Wise Ones, Vaddha, having no craving, cut off doubt, become quite cool, taming attained, unpolluted now they live.
The way that Seers have practised for attaining insight, for putting an end to dukkha, that, Vaddha, you should develop.

**Vaddha:**
You have spoken confidently to me concerning this matter, mother.
I think, indeed, my mother, no jungle-lust in you is found.

**Vaddha's mother:** Whatever conditioned elements are, whether middling, low or high3 for them not a speck, even an atom, of jungle-lust in me is found.
My pollutions, all destroyed by meditating diligently, possessed of triple knowledge done is the Buddha's Sāsana.

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2. One word in Pali means both jungle and lust and refers generally to the tangle of sexual passions.
3. This world, all worlds, everything known through the senses and the mind, is conditioned. The Unconditioned is Nibbāna.
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SUTTA NIPĀTA
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

N. A. Jayawickrama

§1. In the series of contributions to the PBR concluding with the present article, an attempt has been made at an analysis of the Pali Sutta Nipāta in the light of Higher Criticism. Various factors of the latter were grouped under the categories of 'criteria' which enabled us to estimate the single suttas as well as groups of them from the angle of literary, doctrinal and linguistic development. Special attention was paid, in the application of these criteria, to view the Sutta Nipāta under the aspect of historical development, illustrating its gradual growth. Wherever possible, external evidence was adduced in the historical interpretation of the data furnished by internal sources.

A study of methodology was one of the main concerns of this undertaking. Copious examples of each category have been given to illustrate and (as far as possible) prove the propositions; and special attention has been paid to samples of textual interpretation. Exegesis was both synthetic and analytic and the foundation on which it was built is the historical background of Indian (Hindu and Brahmanic) ideas around and prior to the time of Asoka.

By 'growth' is implied the gradual formation of a separate anthology called the Sutta Nipāta by the incorporation of suttas belonging to diverse strata.

For purposes of investigation this work has been divided into four parts. Part I (Introductory). The chief criteria (which fall under the heads of linguistic, metrical and literary evidence, doctrinal developments, growth of ideas and external and indirect evidence) employed in the examination of the ballads and other poems of the Sutta Nipāta were discussed in PBR 1, 2. The remarks (ibid) dealing with the title 'Sutta Nipāta' and its form and contents are also of an introductory nature, Part II. A brief study of the five Vaggas of the Sutta Nipāta was made in PBR 1, 3. Special attention has been paid to explain the present arrangement of the suttas in their respective vaggas. A few topics of general importance such as the seven dhāmmapaliyāyas of Asoka's Bhābra Edict, the Chinese version of the Asthapadām (Aṭṭhaka Vagga), the title 'Aṭṭhaka Vagga' and the relation of the vatthugāthā to the pucchas of the Pārāyana were also discussed there. Part III. The contributions in PBR 2, 1 to 3, 2 dealt with the analysis of a few suttas representative of the various types of poems of the Sutta Nipāta, with the aid of the criteria detailed in PBR 1, 2. The poems examined were: three ballads from the Uraga Vagga, (Uraga, Khaṇṇā and Muni Suttas), five suttas of popular character (viz. Parābhava, Vasala, Mahākūta, Metta and Ratana), the Yokha-ballads (Henavata, Jayaka and Sīlomāna Suttas), the Pastoral-ballads, Dhānyya and Kasāhārādāya Suttas, the narrative-ballads, Pahājā Pābhāna and Nālaka Suttas, suttas from the Aṭṭhaka Vagga and the Pucchas of the Pārāyana. Now, Part IV is devoted for general observations and conclusions.

The composition of the majority of these poems can be assigned to the period 400-300 B.C. On the evidence available, it is clear that individual suttas have to be taken on their own merits though to some extent particular types of suttas can be vaguely generalised as belonging to distinct strata. The results which this investigation points to fall under the following headings:—(1) an early nucleus of a more or less floating tradition; (2) several intermediate reddenions incorporating suttas drawn from the Buddha-legend and Buddha-worship; (3) a final redaction made for the purpose of propagating the Buddhist faith through its ecclesiastical representative, the Saṅgha.

§2. In the analysis of the suttas (loc. cit.), with the aid of the criteria detailed in PBR 1, 2, a few general tendencies have been observed. Many of the poems, on linguistic grounds, appear to be old; but it is not always that the evidence from other sources is in support of this. Generally speaking the poems of the Aṭṭhaka and Pārāyana Vaggas and many of the pieces of the Uraga Vagga, in addition to those poems which can be termed as the 'Muni-ballads', represent the oldest stratum in the Sutta Nipāta. Before finally enumerating the results which this investigation has led to, a short synthesis of the various data will perhaps be helpful in obtaining a better perspective of the Sutta Nipāta as viewed from the angle of Higher Criticism. This synthesis will be mainly devoted to some aspects of linguistic data; and the characteristics of the later compositions can be inferred thereby. No special attention will be paid to the nominal forms and the few remarks made in isolated instances on the vocabulary are deemed sufficient. Yet, some interesting nominal forms have been touched upon. On the other hand, a study of the verb and the verbal derivatives sheds further light on the Sutta Nipāta as a whole. However, dialectical variations, Vedic characteristics, style and metre will again be touched upon in passing. Sufficient has been said in the individual suttas taken up for analysis on the doctrinal developments; and comparisons with similar poems (in Sn.) and classes of ballads have to some extent shown the general trends in Sn. A short survey will be
made of the epithets and other terms used in Sn. to describe the muni and the Buddha.

§ 3. The Sutta Nipāta is rich in verbal forms and shows a very wide range. There are over 2,364 finite verbs in Sn. leaving aside variant readings and p.p.p.s. used in a finite sense. Of special interest are the verbs in the Optative and Imperative Moods and the Aorist and Future Tenses.

Optative.—The most favored inflexion for the opt. in Sn. is -e for 3 sg. In all, about 192 forms end in -e, but as many as 31 of them are either causals or medials (of the 10th class) with the element -ay (i.e. -aye); e.g. hāraye; adīye, cintaye, etc. A small number of these optatives in -e belongs to the first and second person singular; e.g. sikkhe, Sn. 1061a, 1062d, etc. Next in number come the forms in -eyya. Considering the fact that this is the most popular conjugational element for opt. in Pali, (vide Geiger, § 128) it is surprising to note that there are only 135 such forms. Geiger (ibid.) does not class these forms as very early, for -eyya is a generalization of the Sk. -eya which underwent universal application in Pali. Of the 135 forms, no less than 115 are 3 sg. Another inflexion used frequently is -a for 3rd sg. (Sk.-ā); 71 times. Its use however, is restricted to a few roots, e.g. /āhiba, 33 times, javas, 27 times (assa and stiga), v lok (kayāra) 7 times, etc. The opt. 3 sg. in -eto occurs 57 times, and the 2 sg. in -eto only once (Sn. 833c). Opt. 1 sg. in -aum occurs 6 times (vijnāha, Sn. 482a, 1020d, 1022c, 1065b, 1090c, 1097d). The first pl. in -ma or -ma occurs 8 times (jānma, Sn. 76d, 599c, 999a, jānīyama 875a, nammāma 992c, sikkhama, 89c and 326 v.l. caremā-se). The 3rd pl. in -a or -an (/ Sk. -āh) occurs 10 times. It is evident that these forms are old. As seen above, some of the forms ending in -an have also the element -eyy which can be directly traced to Vedic (and Sk.) -ey. Besides those belonging to the type kathayeyya (Sn. 980d) which are accepted as old (Geiger § 139), the majority of the 135 forms in -eyy cannot be classed with the later types enumerated by Geiger (ibid.). viz. 1 sg. manteyyam (Sn. p. 103), 2 sg. aroceyya (M. II. 210), dhāreyyā (M. II. 203) and dasseyya (Milp. 47).

Imperative.—The imp. in Sn. can be tabulated as follows:—

2 sg. in -a, 43; in -hi, 110; in -s u, 23;
2 pl. in -tha, 40; in -h o, 3;
3 sg. in -tu, 16;
3 pl. in -ntu, 6.

All these forms are historical in varying degrees, but are used in all stages of the language, and therefore are of no great value.

Aorist.—Parasmaitpada: Following Geiger's classification (Geiger, 159) 37 verbs can be said to belong to type I (33, aor. 3 sg., 3 aor. 2 sg., 1 aor. 3 pl.), 63 to type II (40, aor. 3 sg., 2 aor. 2 sg., 5 aor. 1 sg., 13, aor. 3 pl., 3 aor. 1 pl.), 90 to type III (72, aor. 3 sg., 5, aor. 2 sg., 3, aor. 1 sg., 10, aor. 3 pl.) and 119 to type IV (67, aor. 3 sg., 5, aor. 2 sg., 7, aor. 1 sg., 38, aor. 3 pl. 2, aor. 1 pl.) which make a total of 309. Āṭmane-pada: There are 18 A’pada aor. forms. Of them 11 belong to type II (3 sg.), 4 to type II (1 sg.), 2 to type IV (3 sg.) and 1 to type IV (1 pl.)—vide Geiger, ibid. Among these forms are a few augment less aorists. Some original pf. forms can still be distinguished, e.g. dhā, vedị, etc. The impf., lost in Pali, is represented by type II and the characteristics of the impf. are preserved in many of them.

Future Tense. The sign of the future tense conjugation -eśa- and the terminations -mi, -ma, -si, -hā, -tī, -nī are used in 46 future tense verbs. A form with issuṣmace occurs once (Sn. 814d). The future 1 sg. -issam occurs 9 times, and ssam (without the connecting vowel, i) is used twice with thematic roots (spissam, Sn. 29c, and sossam 494c). The other historical forms are:—anupadassati (ab-syu-ti, Sn. 983b), kāhasi (kār-sya-st, -ss-) -b- 427d, 428d) ganidhi (p-ga’-sya-st, 665d), dakkhita (dākṣeyd, iya, 909a), dakkhiti (p. 14), pavakkhami (vākṣyam, 701c, 963d, 1050b), bhūdhi (bhū-sya-st, 719c), dakkhiti (cp. dakkhiti 28c) and seghisa (v/sak. 834d). This brings a total of 72 future forms.

§ 4. The verbal derivatives too show an old phase of the language. The Agent Noun, Absolutive, Present Participle, and the Future Passive Participle will be discussed below. The Past Participle Passive will not be touched upon as it yields no definite information. The Infinitives and other forms of Vedic or dialectical origin will also be mentioned.

Agent Noun.—There are 21 agent nouns in Sn. distributed in the following manner in the five rāgas:— 8, 1, 6, 4 and 2 respectively.

Absolutive (Gerund).—There are 389 absolutes in the whole of Sn. gāthās. Of them as many as 187 end in -ya, i.e. 111 formed with vowel-ending roots in Pali, in addition to 2 with -dyav-ā (paritthā, Sn. 779a, pakkhathā 968b), 66 with consonant-ending roots and assimilation, in addition to 3 with -yy- (pappuya, Sn. 593b, 829d, 482d) and 7 forms with the svabhadhāti vowel (a-r-i). Of these 187 forms, 185 contain prefixes conforming to the Sk. rules. The two forms without prefixes are:—gāhāya, Sn. 792d, and yāceya 295b. Of the others, there are 117 formed with -rā, directly from the root. There are 8 forms with -rā assimilated (labh- = laddhā). There are 26 forms formed directly from the base. Of the 48 forms with -rā, 45 are formed directly from the root, two
with the base and one form with assimilation (laddhāna, Sn. 67c). The form dattu occurs 3 times (Sn. 424b, 681d, 1098b). Of these 202 as many as 36 forms contain prefixes. It is clear that the majority of these forms go back to a very early stratum in the language.

Present Participle.—In all, there are 350 present participial forms. Of them as many as 139 are medial (107 contain the suffix māna and 32-an, both of which are highly archaic and go back to Vedic dialects). The occasional pronominal terminations of ppr. forms with -māna (e.g. Sn. 434a, and mānassā, 7 times) do not indicate that they were late, for in early Sk. too -smih and -syu are the terminations for the sg. of loc. and gen. respectively for ppr. medials in -māna. Of the rest of the 211 ppr. forms as many as 191 are historical. The total lack of forms like gacchantasā and gacchantamī and the exclusive use of forms like gacchato and gacchatamī for the gen. sg. and pl. respectively show that the ppr. too represents an old stage of the language. The 20 forms which cannot be considered equally old consist of 17 nom. singulars in -antu and 3 loc. singulars in -antu. But in Pali these endings came to be fixed for their respective cases rather early. Though they are not pure historical forms they may be old. The nom. sg. in -am occurs 83 times as contrasted with that in -antu, 17 times. The nom. sg. -ano occurs 21 times (passives included) while that in -māno (passives included) occurs 67 times. The nom. sg. neut. -antām occurs once (Sn. 208b jānantām). The nom. pl. in -antu occurs 13 times, in -mān 12 times, and in -ān 9 times. The gen. sg. in -atā occurs 44 times as contrasted with that in -antassa nil and in -mānassa 7 times. The gen. pl. -atām is to be met with 20 times (tām once metri causa, Sn. 763d), as contrasted with -antānil and -mānānil only once (Sn. 569c). The acc. sg. in -antām occurs 24 times (including passives and one instance of the final nasal omitted metri causa -Sn. 689c) as against the acc. sg. in -mān 12 times and that in -ān twice (Sn 789d, 802e). The acc. pl. in -ante is to be seen three times, that in -māne twice and neut. -manī once. The inst. sg. in -ān occurs twice (asatā, Sn. 861b, 950c) and that in -yā (fem.) once (santā, Sn. 872c). The loc. sg. in -ante and -māne occur three times each and in mānamihi once (Sn. 434a). The pl. -mānesu is seen only once (Sn. 434c).

Future Passive Participle.—There are 63 f.p.p. forms in Sn.; of them 46 are formed with -ya (17 assimilated forms), 6 from -sahā and 11 from -anīya. A noteworthy feature is that 46 out of a total of 63 are formed with -ya. Speaking of Sk. the derivatives with -ya are formed in all periods of the language whereas the other two are of later origin—being almost entirely absent in the Vedas (Whitney § 962a). The same holds good with Pali.

The infinitive in -tuṣit is the commonest, but there is an appreciable number of Vedic forms in -tave. (Dative Ininitive); e.g. uṇṇametav (Sn. 206b), dātave (Sn. 286d), vippahātave (Sn. 817d) and sampayātave (Sn. 843d).

Vedic and Dialectical Variations

§ 5. It is not only in the verb that Vedic and dialectical forms are preserved in Sn. Nominal themes too, both in their composition and declensional terminations show Vedic and dialectical characteristics. Many examples of such forms have been noted in the analysis of the suttas. To give a few more instances, the indicative 3 pl. (A'pada) in-re is seen to occur several times (vide Geiger, §122, 2), e.g. upadissare (Sn. 140d), diissare (688d), paññāhare (601b), pithiyāre (1036d, 1035d), miyāre (575b), vijāre (20a), and socare (445d). There are a few instances of the ending -āmase (1 pl.), e.g. cādāmase (Sn. 32b), sikkhasāmase (814d). The Vedic -as has already been noted in āsaras (Sn. 804d, 1123b), also cp. līkasas (Sn. 244a) and damas, besides forms like manasa which are in frequent use in Pali.

There are at least 22 double Vedic forms in Sn.: of them as many as 17 belong to the Aṭṭhaka and Pārāyana Vaggas; viz. cutāsā (Sn. 774d), avātāgāhāse (776d, 901d), stūase (791a), paṭiccātāse (803b), paṭhasāmāsakāse (827b), pappātāse (875d, 876b), pāvāyāsāse (885b), upajjātāse (898b), sankhakadhammāsāse (1038a), samagārāhāsāse (1079a-1082a), and svāsāse (1082f, 1083f)—in the Aṭṭhaka and Pārāyana Vaggas—and sahātāse (Sn. 14b, 369b), paccayāse (15b), upāsāsāse (367d), samuppilavāso (670d); also cp. the sg. rakkhitamānāso (63b).

Dialectical variations are too numerous to give a comprehensive list here. The Māgadhī nom. sg. has been noted earlier. Besides this, various other forms belonging to dialectical strata have been pointed out. However, the following words are of special interest not only for the study of the Sutta Nipāta, but of the whole Canon. The Sutta Nipāta preserves many forms the parallels of which are to be found either in Sn. itself or elsewhere in the Canon. The word akalāya occurs at Sn. 692a, (akalyārīpa, 691b) besides akalla at 456d; but in the case of tulya 377c, 85b, 683b there is no parallel form tullā in Sn. (cp. J. 1, 102), whereas tulya occurs frequently in the Canon (s.v. P.T.S.). Such combinations of semi-vowels do not present a standard form in Pali (vide Geiger, §84). cp. also -annāya (Sn. 243c) and -ānāya (Sn. 36b, 254a, 556b). The forms aggi, aggiṇi and gini have been noted earlier. The form aggi occurs at least 8 times in Sn. in addition to the proper name Aggikabhāravāja;
agginī, 3 times (Sn. 668d, 670bd) and gini twice (Sn. 18c, 19c). The parallel observed (loc. cit.) was atta, atūma, and tūma; atta occurs at least 45 times leaving aside cpds., atūma, 3 times (Sn. 782d, 888b, 918d), and tūma twice (Sn. 890b, 908c). Substitution of consonants is to be noted in antika (3 times) by the side of antīka (also 3 times). The parallel form abhiṅkhaṁ to abhiṅkaṁ (7 times in Sn.) is not to be met with in Sn. cp. titika 3 times, but tikkha and titkha do not occur; also cp. timisa, Sn. 669c. Similarly agga does not occur though iṅga is found 5 times. The particle ivu (usually after original h, m, or inorganic r, m, or in combination with a+i>e=sse va only)—occurs 37 times, whereas va occurs 58 times (7 times after -ā 4 after -ā 3 after -e, 20 after -o and 24 after -m). But the later Pali form viya occurs only 5 times in the whole of Sn. The term chamā occurs at Sn. 401b, but samā the rarer form does not occur. Other parallel forms of interest are, iha at Sn. 460a (in tasmat iha) as opposed to idha, over 90 times; ujja and ujam once each as opposed to ujja—7 times; ubho, the original dual 8 times as against ubhaya 5 times; eva 61 times as opposed to va 23 times (mainly me tri causa) while yeva is seen 4 times; kasira and kiccha both occur once each (Sn. 574a, 676a); kakkukciya occurs once (Sn. 972d) and kakkucea twice (Sn. 925b, 1106d); agiba occurs 4 times, ghita at least 6 times, ghita (cp. Rajagaha, 408a) in gagattha, 9 times, geha (nissita) at Sn. 280b and ghara 6 times; tacccha occurs at Sn. 327a and 1096d, while tathiya at Sn. 883a and 369c; tatra occurs 4 times as opposed to tattha about 40 times; tamanudo is found at Sn. 1136a besides tamamado at 1133a; tiyo at Sn. 796c has been noted earlier, and itthi occurs at Sn. 112a; divya occurs twice and dibba 4 times (cp. khilu); dhānīha is seen 4 times as against dhāniya twice; wabhha occurs 5 times whereas usabba occurs thrice in cpds.; the form nariyo (3 times) is probably a metrical variation of nāriyo and nariyo occurs at Sn. 838b; nabhataka is found at Sn. 646c whereas nha-ta is seen at Sn. 518b, and 521d; pada occurs 14 times (inclusive of cpds.) while pada 17 times (cp. pada and pāda). The form bhūvo (11 times) is preferred to bhūvyas (only once in prose); the forms sacchi- and sakkhī- have been discussed earlier; Sakka occurs 6 times, Sakya 10 times and Sikkha, twice; sāmin and suvāmin occur once each (Sn. 83b, 666b). The group sav- has been dealt with earlier.

7. The terms and epithets used in Sn. usually reflect an old phase. The following synthesis will be mainly restricted to the gāthās. The term muni is used 77 times in the gāthās. It is distributed in the five vaggas in the following manner; 26, 2, 17, 18, and 14. In 24 instances it is an epithet of the Buddha. It is significant that 8 of the 17 references in Mahā Vagga are to the Buddha, and a noteworthy feature is that the least references to muni are in the two vaggas which are not the oldest sections in Sn. (i.e. 2 in Culla Vagga and 9 excluding the 8 references to the Buddha in Mahā Vagga). Besides these, mona occurs at Sn. 718c, 725d, moneyya at Sn. 484c, 698c, 700d, 701a, 716a and monapatha at Sn. 540c. Bhikkhu occurs 80 times in the gāthās, i.e. 22, 19, 15, 18 and 6 times respectively in the five vaggas in addition to over 15 times in prose. Just as the term muni occurs a large number of times in Muni Sutta (20), bhikkhu is frequently used in the Uraga, Tavatāka and Sāmāparipāca Suttas (17, 9, and 8 times respectively). The term sāvaka occurs only 12 times, and it is significant that it is not used in the Aṣṭadaka and Purāṇaya Vaggas. Besides, these references are to be found in suttas which cannot be called particularly old. Five of these references are in the Dhammakā Sutta, in which bhikkhu occurs 8 times but muni not once. Samanu occurs 31 times in the gāthās, and over 10 times in the prose (7, 1, 11, 8 and 4 respectively in the five vaggas). It is used in a wider sense than a Buddhist samanu in at least 17 out of the 31 occurrences. In the combined phrase, samanabhārmano it occurs 7 times in verse and once in prose. It is again curious to note that the word occurs only once in the Culla Vagga. The word brāhma occurs 141 times in verse and 12 times in prose (12, 16, 82, and 23 times respectively in the five vaggas). The extraordinarily large number of references in the Mahā Vagga is due to the fact that it deals mainly with brahmin interlocutors; and in the Purāṇaya, the majority of the references are in the vaṭha-gāthā. Brahma occurs 43 times in the gāthās and 7 times in prose; i.e. brahma (Sk. brāhma).
once, Brahmā 6 times, as an appellative (voc. brahme) 3 times, and the rest in cpds. including brahma-cariyā 19 times in gāthā and 9 other references connected with brahma-cariyā in both prose and verse. Brahma loka is mentioned 6 times. There are only 3 references in the Uraga Vagga and one in Atthaka Vagga. Thera occurs only twice, and both in prose (discussed earlier). The word sāṅgha occurs 7 times apart from the 8 references in Ratana Sutta. It refers to the Sangha (apart from Ratana S.) probably only at Sn. 569d, 1015b (Pūr. v.g.) and p. 16 (prose). The term Buddha occurs 39 times in the gāthās (i.e. 10, 5, 14, 1 and 9 times respectively in the five vaggas). Of these the personal Buddha is referred to 7, 3, 5, 1 and 9 times respectively in the five vaggas. All the references in the first three vaggas go with other epithets while the 9 references in the Pārāyana are to be found in the v.g. and epilogue. Bodhisattā occurs only once in the late vatta-gāthā of the Nātaka Sutta. Sambodhi occurs 5 times. Sambuddha occurs 3 times in Uraga Vagga, 7 times in the Mahā Vagga and 9 times in the v.g. and epilogue of the Pārāyana. Bhagavā occurs 54 times in the gāthās and over 20 times in the prose. It does not occur in the Atthaka Vagga. Sathā occurs 12 times in verse and Sugato 4 times while each epithet is used at least twice in prose. Tathāgata occurs 21 times in both prose and verse; but it does not occur in the gāthās of the Uraga and Atthaka Vaggas.

In all the above instances it is quite clear that the early emphasis is on the muni or the bhikkhu and not on the sāṅgha or the ‘perfect’ disciple nor on the personality of the Buddha. These aspects are taken up by the later poets.

§8. Coming to a few terms of general interest atta, dhāmma, attha, saddhā, patha, magga, nibbāna and saṁsāra (bhava, etc.) demand attention. The words atta (by itself and in cpds.) ātuma and tuma occur 105 times in the gāthās (i.e. 11, 14, 44, 29 and 7 times respectively in the five vaggas). Attā has already been referred to. Atta meaning body or soul in the Brahmanic sense is found at Sn. 508b (Māgha’s words), and 919a (a denial) and 800a (a doubtful context); atta (self) tending towards the Brahmanic concept is found at Sn. 514a and 709a; attānāmi, the reflexive in objective case in 10 instances (and probably also at Sn. 709a). The possessive of the (pronominal) reflexive occurs in 13 instances, the reflexive agent attanā in 5 and the loc. of the reflexive attani in 3 instances and the ethic dative at Sn. 368a. All the three occurrences of ātumānapa appear to be reflexives (Sn. 782a, 888b, 918d). Manatta (or manāyita) occurs 12 times in the gāthās; 9 of these references are in the Atthaka Vagga. Anamana also occurs 5 times. The word dhāmma occurs 188 times in diverse meanings. Attha occurs 48 times in Sn. The significant references are

§9. As regards definite results which this investigation has yielded, one is confronted with various difficulties. Firstly, the diversity and disparity of the constituent parts of Sn. lead to contradictory data which result in conflicting conclusions. Secondly, the various religious elements which are not clearly separable rather tend to confuse the issue and are not helpful in any way in deciding the diverse strata these poems belong to. To give an example, the Buddha is referred to in many ways; Tathāgata, Gotama, Sakya and Buddha. Though these terms are interlinked there is an inherent subtle distinction as seen in phrases such as, Tathāgata-sāvaka, Gotama-sāsana, Saka Gotama and Buddha-vacana. Thirdly, the archaic character of the language is sometimes very deceptive. It is not always that poems bearing an archaic stamp, linguistically, are genuinely old. This fact has been stressed before and instances of this nature have already been noted; (e.g. Ratana Sutta). The Pali of the gāthās represents the standard vehicle of poetic expression, the archaic colouring being the outcome of a close adherence to what may be termed as the gāthā-style. Yet, the Vedic elements in Sn., as a rule, are generally confined to those sections to which an early date can be assigned on collective data. On the other hand, the late linguistic characteristics have yielded definite information. Finally, no definite and precise information can be gathered from the haphazard arrangement of the suttas in Sn., for, no final decision can be made from the present state of Sutta Nipāta which contains suttas put together at various dates and presenting no uniformity whatsoever. The different traditions in Pali and BSK., show that the development of these suttas many-sided with divergent roots both in contents and form.

§10. In spite of these limitations the diverse strata as regards compilation as opposed to those of composition are discernible to some extent in the light of the information gathered in the course of our investigation. It is not our aim to determine the dates of composition of every sutta.
The internal and external evidence of the sutras selected for analysis in Part III has shown that the sutras of the Athkhaka Vagga, the Pucchās of the Pārāyana and the ballads in praise of the Muni-ideal (found chiefly in the Uraga Vagga) are about the oldest sections in Sn. The general didactic poems found scattered in the first three vaggas and usually named after a simile or metaphor represent a subsequent phase. To the same period can be assigned the two opening sutras of the Mahā Vagga dealing with the Buddha’s early career, the older dialogues in the Mahā Vagga, the dialogue-ballads of the Uraga Vagga and the Yakkha-ballads. Four of the five sutras of popular character (i.e. excluding Ratana, PBR 2, 2), the Cunda Sutta and the Kokāliya Suttas appear to be a little younger but were definitely pre-Asokan. The Ratana, Vijaya, and Drayatänupassanà were probably the youngest sutras in Sn. While the parahagāthas (excluding those of the Rāhula Sutta) represent the latest compositions in Sn.

S. N. Katre in his Early Buddhist Ballads and their Relation to the older Upanishadic Literature assigns the period 500-300 B.C. to the ballads of Sn. From the data now available and the fact that due allowance should be made for the arising of Buddhist literary activity among the adherents of Buddhism (for, the pieces in Sn. are decidedly literary compositions) the age of composition of the bulk of the poems may be narrowed down roughly to the period 400-300 B.C. This does not deny the possibility of a few ballads being anterior to the earliest limit of 400 B.C. Although it is not possible to estimate by what length of time the various classes of poems were separated it is evident that the earliest and the youngest poems show a great disparity as regards their respective ages of composition. On the evidence available it is clear that individual suttas have to be taken on their own merits, though to some extent particular types of suttas have been vaguely generalised as belonging to distinct strata.

§ 11. This disparity in the dates of composition of respective suttras clearly implies a ‘growth’. The stages by which the present anthology has come into existence underlie the various strata in Sn. Firstly there appears to have been an early nucleus of a more or less floating material quite similar to the traditional Brahmanic knowledge of pre-Buddhistic and early Buddhist times on which were based the subsequent Dhāraṇa Sāstras and the early didactic literature of the Hindus. It is not in thought and ideology that these early ballads of the Buddhists bear kinship with early Brahmanic literature (vide Katre) but also in phraseology and literary modes, all of which reflect a common background. This is not confined to the so-called ‘unsectarian’ ballads of Sn. which deal with general Indian or ‘Aryan’ teachings (embracing the ethical principles o

Brahmanic teachings and Upanisadic lore) but is much in evidence even in poems which are considered as being distinctively Buddhist.

The earliest attempt at a collection as such belongs to a subsequent period. Many of the poems in the Athkhaka Vagga and the Pucchās of the Pārāyana are of a sectarian character on a broad basis. Although the general outlook of these poems is rather wide there is something characteristically Buddhist underlying them, as contrasted with poems of common Brahmanic and Buddhist origin. There is no doubt that the Athkhaka and Pārāyana Vaggas and the Khaggavisāga Sutta formed the foundation on which this collection of suttras was built. In doing so the compilers have drawn freely from a floating tradition.

The transitional stage (or stages) of the formation of a nipata was (or were) marked by the incorporation of these suttas as well as many others deemed as being truly representative of the Buddha’s teaching. No definite conclusions can be arrived at regarding these intermediate stages. The present arrangement of the sutta in the Uraga Vagga (with the Khaggavisāga Sutta occupying the third place in it) shows a certain amount of re-shuffling to furnish a more effective presentation of the suttas; for, Uraga with all the mysterious significance attached to it was probably considered as a suitable suutta to be placed at the head of the anthology.

As noted earlier (PBR 1, 3), the Uraga Vagga appears to be older than the next two vaggas. In view of the internal changes that have taken place in the various vaggas (ibid.) it is quite clear that the final redaction of Sn. has been preceded by several intermediate reductions (though they cannot be easily enumerated). The Culla Vagga and the Mahā Vagga have not come into their present form by any historical sequence. As suggested earlier (loc. cit.), the two vaggas (perhaps together with Uraga) probably replaced an older group (or vagga) which contained sutta of popular appeal. The final phase was marked by the prefixing of Uraga, Ratana and Pabbajjā (and Paddhāna) Suttas to the three respective vaggas under the editorial hand of monastic redactors for the purpose of propagating the Dhamma.

§ 12. Thus, the results of this investigation can be briefly summarised under the two heads (a) tradition and (b) growth:

Sets of sutta with reference to tradition:

1. Unsectarian:
   (a) General Indian, ‘Aryan’ or Brahmanic (Upanisadic) teachings;
   (b) The ascetic ideal.
2. Sectarian ("Buddhist"):  
   (a) Suttas purporting the Buddhist point of view;  
   (b) Suttas with special Buddhist interpretations of then-current  
        themes, values and concepts;  
   (c) Buddhist Dogmatics; and suttas representative of the ecclesiastical phase.

3. Popular Buddhism; Suttas of the Life of the Buddha, and legend.

   The main trends of growth:
   1. An early nucleus of more or less floating material.
   2. Several intermediate redactions incorporating suttas of popular  
      Buddhism, dialogues, Buddhist ethics, life of Buddha and  
      Buddhist worship.
   3. A final redaction made for the purpose of propagating the Buddhist  
      faith through its ecclesiastical representative, the Saṅgha.

Postscript

Prof. Jayawickrama had agreed to contribute a recapitulation of the salient features of his *Analysis* that would incorporate the findings of other scholars made during the last thirty years. Unfortunately, his sabbatical leave in the West will be largely spent in lecturing at Cambridge and at Carleton College, Minnesota. Moreover, he had been engaged in preparing a new edition of the *Kathāvatthu-uṭṭhakathā* together with a translation of the *Pāvacāsādanī* (the Commentary to the Majjhima Nikāya).

However, since very few students have specialised in this field the Editor feels that he can but draw the attention of readers to those translations and studies that have appeared subsequent to the acceptance of the author’s dissertation by London University in 1947. In passing, however, it should be emphasised that the discussion on linguistic terminology and pre-monastic features by Fausböll (*A Collection of Discourses*) and Chalmers (*Buddha’s Teachings*) was substantially incorporated into Prof. Jayawickrama’s *Analysis*.

All the English translations, in whole or in part, of the *Sutta-Nipāta* are listed in the Editor’s *Analysis of the Pali Canon* (BPS, Kandy 1975) and the two subsequent supplements. Straightforward descriptive surveys of this text as a whole are best found in M. Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature II* (University of Calcutta 1933; Mānshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi 1972, pp. 92-98) and B.C. Law, *A History of Pali Literature I* (London 1933; Bhartiya Publishing House, Delhi 1974, pp. 232-260).
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SOPADHISESA AND NIRUPADHISESA NIRVĀNA

Arinjith Sharma

Edward J. Thomas has shown that the description of attainment of enlightenment in life as nirvāna and upon the death of the arhat as parinirvāna is a misnomer. The correct terms to represent the in-life enlightenment and post-enlightenment life are sopadhisesa and nirupadihesa nirvāna. The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of the distinction between the two. Nalinalakshha Dutt suggests that "It is called sa-vipadihesa-nirvāna when an arhat removes all his impurities and realizes the truth but still retains the body, the last remains of his past upādhi. When he lays down his mortal frame he is said to have anupadihesa-nirvāna and after this he never takes rebirth." Thus here we have a simple way of distinguishing between the two types of nirvāna. The only difference is that in one case the body continues to exist and in the other when the body perishes, nirvāna without a substrate is attained.

It will be noticed that Dutt refers to the body "As the last remains of the state of nirvāna". Moreover, he also clearly implies that there can be no lapse from the state of nirvāna between the two nirodhas mentioned. For the first statement no source is cited by Dutt. As for the second, it can be suggested, even asserted, that "The state called nibbāna could be lost." The story of Gotihka, for instance, "who attained temporary release six times, but fell away" is well-known.

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2. When Nāgārjuna discusses the question of nirvāna in chapter twenty-five of his Mulamadhyamakakārikā, "The commentator first gives a fair statement of the Hinayana view and then going on to claim that the Hinayana view is not correct, our Lord has described two-folds Nirvāna of individuals who have practiced the religious life, followed the teaching of Buddha, acquired the greater and lesser doctrines, namely, Nirvāna with the remainder of a substrate of a rebirth (upādhi) and Nirvāna without a remainder. The first is understood as due to complete abandonment of the depravities, ignorance, passion, etc. It is like a village in which all the gangers of robbers have been destroyed. But the Nirvāna in which even the mere skandhas no longer exist is Nirvāna without such a remainder. It is like a village, which after the gangers of robbers have been destroyed, has itself been annihilated." (ibid, p. 224). Thomas also notes two interesting aspects of this account: (1) that the simile of the village and the robbers goes back to Surya. IV 175 and (2) the "word parinirvāna sometimes supposed to be the term for complete nirvāna is not used." (ibid, fn 1, 2).

4. As a matter of fact, this interpretation seems to show traces of Hindu influence, see T.M.P. Mahadevan, Outlines of Hinduism (Bombay: Chetana Ltd., 1971) p. 124.

Thomas also tries to tackle this issue in the context of Dhammapada 89 and writes:

The commentator here explains "attained Nirvāna" as attained by the two attainings of Nirvāna (dvīha parinibbānā), (1) that which is with a remainder of substrate of rebirth after reaching arahatship and getting rid of the course of the depravities, and (2) that which without a remainder of substrate of rebirth with the cessation of the last thought and getting rid of the course of the khandhas. What is to be understood by this substrate of rebirth has been disputed, for in Pali the term is upādhi and in Sanskrit upadhi. It is now generally agreed to be a collective name for the khandhas, the elements constituting the individual, which at death, unless dispersed by knowledge of the truths, continue their existence in a new birth. The form that they have at the moment of conception is consciousness (viññāna, citta), and with enlightenment it is said to cease. It is not said to be annihilated, but it stops or ceases (nirajjhatti) to transmigrate. What that implies may be still argued, but it is known only to the arhat.

He does, however, seem to overlook one point to which attention has been drawn by Rune Johansson. He agrees with Thomas that it is the cessation rather than annihilation of khandhas which is involved when the arhat dies. Thus he remarks on the description found in Udana 93 of the death of the arhat Dābbha Mallaputta that "The choice of verbs is interesting, since most of them suggest stopping or reaching immobility rather than annihilation. This is in good agreement with the Buddhist view of the process-nature of personality, and it suggests that the psychological factors may 'go home' and continue to exist, just as the body will exist in a different form after death."

The point which Thomas does not seem to take into account is that "After all, something happens to the khandha when a man attains nibbāna." and by nibbāna here is meant saṇapadihesa nibbāna. In a

nutshell, to use Thomas’ phraseology of the ‘substrate of rebirth’, the substrate persists till death, but its ability to generate rebirth has been neutralized. As Johansson points out:

Although complete cessation of viññāna will take place only in death, the word cessation is still adequate for nibbāna in this life, since viññāna is a series or processes, and the meaning is not different from what is said in the continuation of the text: viññāṇaparinibbuto ti, ‘by calming viññāna the monk becomes satisfied and attains nibbāna.’ Nirodha probably means no more than ‘stopping’ = ‘making still and immovable’.

An interesting description of the viññāna of the arahant is found in D I 223, where it is asked, where name and form cease without remainder. Answer:

Viññāṇaṁ anidassanāṁ anantaṁ sabbato pahān:  
Etha āpo ca pathāvi tejo vāyo na gādhati,  
Etha dighaṁ ca rassāṁ ca anumāṁ thālam subhasubhām,  
Etha nāmaṁ ca rāpaṁ ca āsavāṁ upasuphātī,  
Viññāṇassā nirodhena ethth evam uparujjhati.

The consciousness that is without attribute, endless, drawing back from everything: there water, earth, fire and wind find no footing; there long and short, fine and coarse, pleasant and unpleasant—there name and form stop without remainder: by the stopping of consciousness this also stops.’ In nibbāna viññāna is said to be stopped, i.e. the flow of conscious processes has ceased and consciousness has been emptied, either by means of meditation or simply by means of pānāthi, ‘understanding’. It is therefore undifferentiated (i.e. free from attributes), endless (because a resting consciousness contains no sense of limits), and being undifferentiated, it cannot contain separate things like water and earth. And so no further processes are produced and no rebirth can take place: for... in rebirth, viññāna is said to enter the mother’s womb and give rise to name and form there (D II 63). But in nibbāna, viññāna is stopped: its processes do not flow anymore, there are no more desires manifest and it can therefore not be stationed in this way: Yato ca kho... ne cettī no ca pakappeci no ca amuseti, ārammanatm etam na hoti viññāṇassa thitīyā, ārammanatm etam na hoti viññāṇassa na hoti (S II 66).

"But when somebody neither plans, nor decides, nor has a subconscious leaning, then this basis for the settlement of viññāna does not exist; and without the basis viññāna will not become established."  

III

An attempt to distinguish between the two kinds of nirvāna was also made by Henry Clarke Warren who noted that ‘So far as mental groups are concerned, Nirvāṇa can be obtained in the present life, but from the form-group deliverance can only be attained at death because... whereas there are sensations, perceptions, etc. [i.e. predispositions and consciousness] which are not subject to depravity, it is not so with form.”

But if this be so then it follows that only partial nibbāna can be achieved in this life—relating to nāma alone and never to rūpa if the five skandhas are so grouped. Nowhere is nibbāna referred to as being achieved in a piecemeal fashion thus in the Pali texts. Moreover, if nirvāṇa cannot be attained so long as the form-group does not dissolve then how is sopādhiṣeṣa nirvāṇa achieved, as this form of nirvāṇa is achieved while still alive? It is clear, therefore, that Warren’s attempt to distinguish between the two nirvāṇas is rather misleading.

IV

To conclude: the distinction between sopādhiṣeṣa and nipātika-samutpāda as they were before the attainment of nirvāṇa. At the time of Nibbānic death, the conditions also dissolve.²

1. ibid., p. 75-76. “The fate of the khandha in nibbāna can to a great extent be deduced from what we already know. In the living individual the factors must be intact, and functioning. The body is not changed, and the perceptual apparatus must function, but it will not be permitted to stimulate desire and passion. Activity must to a certain extent go on, but it must be of a kind that produces no more kamma effects. Viññāna must be reduced to such a state that it will not ‘flow over’ into a new existence.” (ibid., p. 73).


2. “..., a distinction must be made between nibbāna in this life, where upādāna still remains, and the state of nibbāna reached by the arahant in the moment of death, when the upādāna is destroyed." (Johansson, op. cit., p. 59) “In this life the fire can flare up again, as there is fuel left: this is impossible after death when there is no more fuel.” (ibid. p. 60).
CETOVIMUTTI PANNAVIMUTTI AND UBHATOBHAGAVIMUTTI

Lily De Silva*

An attempt is made in this paper** to study the concepts of cetovimutti, paññavimutti and ubhatobhagavimutti as represented in early Buddhism. Cetovimutti is generally translated as freedom of the mind or heart, paññavimutti is translated as freedom by understanding or through intuitive wisdom, while ubhatobhagavimutti is translated as freedom in both ways. In this paper synonyms such as freedom, liberation, release and emancipation are used with hardly any discrimination in translating the word vimutti. For the purpose of studying these concepts it seems desirable to start with a brief account of the nature of the untrained worldly mind as explained in early Buddhist texts.

Puthujjana—The Untutored Wordly Man

The untrained worldly man is always described as working under the influence of lobha 'greed', dosa 'ill-will', and moha 'delusion'. The Mahatthasahasikayasutta (M I 266) explains that reactions by way of attachment or hatred are caused by pleasant and unpleasant sense data respectively (piyarippe rāpe sārājati appiyari rāpe hyāmajjati). A person reacting thus, does so because he is not mindful of his own physical activities. As a result, his mind gets circumscribed or limited in scope (parittaceta). Possessed of attachment and hatred towards sense data he experiences feelings, he revels in these feelings, entertains them and gets overwhelmed by them. As a result of this process, passionate delight (nandit) arises in him which itself becomes the basis or fuel (upādana) for his continued existence through birth, decay, death and all accompanying misery.

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** All Pali works referred to in this paper are editions of the Pali Text Society, London. All Roman figures denote volume numbers and the Arabic figures denote page numbers. The following abbreviations are used:
A Aṅguttara nikāya
AA Aṅguttara nikāya Āṭṭhakathā (Manorathapūrṇi)
D Dighañkāya
DA Dighañkāya Āṭṭhakathā (Sumanagala viśuddhi)
Dhp Dhammapada
M Majjhima nikāya
S Sutta-pitaka
Vim Vinaya Pitaka

1. Sometimes given as abhijjhā 'coveiteousness', or rāga 'lust'.
2. Sometimes given as vyāpāda 'malevolence', or paññā 'aggressiveness'.

It is relevant to emphasise that the mind of one who is thus wallowing in a world of his own sense experience gets necessarily circumscribed and limited in scope. When the mind is constantly bombarded by sense data and it ceaselessly reacts by way of attachment towards the pleasant, by way of repugnance towards the unpleasant and by way of ignorance towards the neutral sense data, the mind gets pegged on to sense objects so tenaciously that it calls for the greatest sustained human effort to free it from the entanglements of this cramped world. This tenacious binding aspect of sense data is variously emphasised in the Pali Canon by way of similes, metaphors and psychological terminology. Mental phenomena generated by the interplay of sense organs and sense objects show surprising variations. The Dhammasaṅgani (214-5) enumerates a lengthy list of emotions which spring from the root causes of lobha, dosa and moha.

A discourse in the Aṅguttara nikāya (A I 268) analyses the state of the worldling from another point of view. According to this he is beset by silavipatti, cittavipatti and diśṭhivipatti, 'moral, emotional and intellectual perversions'. The Buddha teaches a course of training whereby the mind is emancipated from these perversions and the limitations imposed by sense experience, a course whereby it could be developed into infinite glory and absolute freedom.

Salient Features of the Course of Training

This course of training is gradual and systematic, and it has to be ceaselessly applied. Just as a carpenter's adze gets gradually worn out through constant use, even though the rate of its wearing off itself cannot be measured, the adept progresses gradually, eliminating defilements step by step but the rate of progress itself cannot be strictly determined (S III 154-5; A IV 127). At the culmination of this course of training which consists of adhistisikkhā, adhisītisikkhā and adhipathisikkhā, training in higher morality, concentration and understanding respectively, the adept is able to acquire, by an act of deliberation, wisdom and insight (dhammaṅgā parittā cittan abhinibbhati abhivimāneti 'he directs and inclines his mind to get wisdom and insight'; D I 76, 147, etc., etc.). When understanding is complete the mind gets liberated from the obsessions (evaṃ jānato evaṃ passato āsavesi cittanā vinuccti—A I 165; M III 30-2, 3-

3. M I 303
5. mālavatā—the fast growing mālava creeper.
6. cetokhila—pegs or stumps of the mind.
7. sanyojana—yoke or fetter; bandhiva—bond.
etc.), as an automatic result of the course of training. The adept has no power to determine when his mind should attain emancipation. A farmer may plough the field, sow the seeds, and supply water in a great hurry, but he cannot accelerate growth and maturity of the crop. It is the natural result of a conditioned process, and so is vimutti ‘emancipation’, the natural result of a controlled process (A I 239-40).

Favourable Conditions

Having observed the nature of the untrained mind and the important features of the process leading to emancipation, it is appropriate to inquire into the preliminary conditions conducive to the attainment of emancipation. While the Pali Canon abounds in information regarding this question, it would suffice if a typical relevant passage is cited. The Aṅguttaranikāya (A IV 357) enumerates the following as favourable conditions conducive to maturity of cetovimutti: (a) virtuous companionship, (b) moral behaviour, (c) serious conversation pertaining to austere living, which opens up the mind (yāyaṃ kathā abhisallekhikā cetovivaranasapāpabyādā), (d) sustained application, and (e) intelligence. These conditions reveal the social impact on an individual’s spiritual progress as well as personal responsibility and enthusiasm.

Types of Vimutti

Vimutti ‘emancipation’ is looked upon in Buddhism as the supreme goal of the higher life (ariyā paramā vimutti—D I 174). The Sāmaññaphala-sutta which enumerates the advantages of recluseness in ascending order maintains that there is no higher or better reward than vimutti (D I 84-5). It is the very essence of all endeavour (vimuttisàrā sābbe dhamma—A IV 339). It is the ultimate purpose, the essence and culmination of the noble life (yā ca kho ayaṃ bhikkhave akuppā cetovimutti, etad attānaṁ idam bhikkhave brahmācariyam etām sāraṁ etām parivāsānām—M. I 197).

Nevertheless the word vimutti is sometimes used, especially in compounds, without the connotation of final emancipation. In the controlled process of mental culture the mind is successively purged of its impurities and contents, and the notable achievements made during this exercise are designated cetovimutti. Broadly speaking Pali literature makes reference to two types of cetovimutti, (a) temporary and pleasant (sāmaññikāyā kammā—A I 64; M III 110), (b) inviolable or permanent (akuppā cetovimutti—D III 273; S III 27; A I 259 etc.). When cetovimutti is used in conjunction with paññāvimutti (A I 108) emancipation is final and inviolable, and akuppā cetovimutti is also used in the same sense. Though paññāvimutti alone also refers to final emancipation (S II 121; A IV 452) cetovimutti alone is hardly used in that sense. Ubbatobhāga-vimutta is another expression meaning final emancipation (D II 71; M I 477; A IV 453).

The vimutti types that emerge from the texts can be tabulated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i cetovimutti</td>
<td>temporary liberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii akuppā cetovimutti</td>
<td>final liberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iii paññāvimutti</td>
<td>final liberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv paññāvimutti and cetovimutti</td>
<td>final liberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v ubbatobhāgavimutti</td>
<td>final liberation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cetovimutti is repeatedly said to be derived from samatha ‘calm, tranquility’, while paññāvimutti is said to be the result of vipassanā ‘introspection’ (A I 61). It is also emphasised that samatha and vipassanā should be developed for the purpose of fully comprehending the nature of raga, dosa and moha and their total destruction (A I 100). By the elimination of raga ‘sensuality’ cetovimutti is gained, by the elimination of avijjā ‘ignorance’ paññāvimutti is gained (rāgavirāga cetovimutti avijjāvirāga paññāvimutti—A I 61).

Cetovimutti—Temporary

The texts contain many references to temporary cetovimutti of different degrees and types. According to the Aṅguttaranikāya (A V 139) even an immoral person (dussālo) might experience temporary release (sāmaññikāyā pi vimuttim) if he has studied the Dhamma. According to the Mahāsāṅghikasutta (M III 110), a life of seclusion away from the crowds conduces to cetovimutti which is pleasant but temporary (sāmaññikāyā vā kammaṃ cetovimuttim). The Aṅguttaranikāya (A I 64) maintains that a monk with moral behaviour, who lives restrained according to monastic rules, endowed with suitable conduct in suitable habitat, seeing danger even in the slightest fault, training himself according to monastic discipline, may live having attained a certain pleasant state of cetovimutti (so aṭṭhataṃ sāntaṃ cetovimutto upasampajja viharit). If no further spiritual progress is made, at the dissolution of the body, he may be born in a celestial sphere, departing whence he may not return (tato cuto onāgāmī hoyi). It could be summarised that solitude, moral behaviour, scrupulousness and monastic discipline promote temporary freedom of the mind which is a pleasant experience. According to the Nibbānasutta (M I 156) physical weakness causes deterioration of moral strength and the consequent loss of cetovimutti which has already been won. The Sānuyuttanikāya (S I 20) records that Godhika could not retain the cetovimutti which he won six times, and when he attained it on the seventh
Attempts, he committed suicide. In the *Aṭṭhakāṭṭhakaccāna-sutta* (M I 351) Ānanda reasons out that cetovimutti is subject to conditions and therefore to change as well. Seeing the impermanent, unsatisfactory and substanceless nature of this cetovimutti one must develop intuition and eradicate obsessions (āsavānaṃ khayaṁ) in order to gain final emancipation.

**Types of Cetovimutti**

The *Māññavada-lasutta* (M I 296–7; also S IV 296) records eight types of cetovimutti namely adukkhamasukkhāya cetovimutti, four appamāṇī cetovimutti, akīrtanānaṃ cetovimutti, suññata cetovimutti, and animitta cetovimutti, and goes on to explain the factors which constitute them. It can be summarised that these different types of cetovimutti comprise the following meditational levels: the catutthajñāna ‘the fourth level of concentration’, the four brahmavihāras ‘sublime states’, the ākīrtanānaṃ-yatana ‘the sphere of nothingness’, reflection on emptiness, and animitta cetosamādhi ‘signless concentration of the mind’ respectively. The Sutta goes on to explain that these cetovimutti can be considered different in meaning and different in terminology (nānātthā e’eva nānābhājanā ca) insofar as the mental phenomena involved in the various cetovimutti types are concerned, but they can be considered identical in meaning only different in terminology (ekatthā, bhājanam eva nānān ti) in so far as they share the common characteristic of the eradication of rūpa, dosa and moha at their highest level.

The different types shall be taken up for discussion one by one in collaboration with other relevant textual data.

**Adukkhamasukkhāya Cetovimutti**

The fourth jhāna which comprises the adukkhamasukkhāya cetovimutti has the positive characteristics of upākkhā-sati-pārisuddhi ‘perfect equanimity and mindfulness’. During this stage of meditation the mind is inwardly settled, calm, focussed and concentrated (ajjhettam eva cittam sāntātipariṣuddhi samādāhāti—M III 111). When it is thus concentrated it is described as pure, excellent, blemishless, free from defilements, supple, efficient, steadfast and firm (evam samāhāte cittte pariṣuddhe anagange vigatapakkite mudubbhāte kammānive jhite ānejāpattte—D I 76). It is compared to burnished gold which is pliable and ready to be fashioned into any intricate design (M III 243). Its efficiency and pliability are such that it could be diverted with ease for the realisation of higher forms of knowledge (abhilāda) through extra-sensory faculties (D I 77, etc.). The Jhānasavatthu (S V 308) maintains that a monk who has developed the four jhānas is prone towards nibbāna, is inclined and bent towards nibbāna just as the river Ganges is prone towards the east. The *Paññatta-sutta* (M II 237) points out that it is even possible for the adept to be mistaken at this stage to have attained nibbāna.

The fourth is the lowest of the jhānas to be designated a cetovimutti, and none of the first three is so described anywhere. At this level of meditation respiration is also said to stop, and that means the cessation of all physical activity (catthajñānasamāpamassan aśīsapassā nīruddhabhānī—D III 266; aśīsapassasā kayasaññhā—M I 201). Another noteworthy observation is that it is the adukkhamasukkhā aspect of the fourth jhāna which has been termed cetovimutti. Adukkha-m-asukha means the absence of pain and pleasure, and this state has been achieved by emptying the mind of its affectionate contents of pleasure, pain, elation and dejection (sukhassa ca pahāna dukkhassa ca pahāna pabbave somanassanān attantān...D I 75). Unencumbered by physical activity, having transcended the dichotomy of pleasure and pain, the mind has arrived at complete hedonistic neutrality. This is quite a significant achievement in the process of mental culture, for, it is reactions by way of pleasure and pain which distort the realistic perception of sense data (phassa-paccayā vedanā, yam vedetī tama śaṅjānti—M I 111). This freedom of the mind from the affective principle, which generates transcendent clarity of vision leading to realisation of truth and consequent emancipation is designated adukkhamasukkhā cetovimutti ‘liberation of the mind through hedonistic neutrality’.

Further it should be noted that, by the time of the fourth jhāna, in addition to vacissanākāra ‘verbal activity’ and kāyasanākāra ‘physical activity’ which have ceased to operate, the mind is emptied of some of the citt-sankhāra ‘mental activity’, as well. It is said that saññā ‘idea’ and vedanā ‘feeling’ form part of cittasanākāra (M I 301). As the sukha and dukkha vedanā elements of the cittasanākāra are eliminated, this is the first jhāna experience at which some of the mental activity is arrested, and the stage is therefore meaningfully called adukkhamasukkhā cetovimutti—the first level of mental freedom.

**Appamāṇī Cetovimutti**

The four appamāṇī cetovimutti ‘infinite liberation of the mind’ comprise the four brahmavihāras ‘sublime states’. They are mettā cetovimutti, karunā cetovimutti, muditā cetovimutti and upekkhā cetovimutti, ‘liberation
of the mind through benevolence, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity' respectively. *Aṅguttaranikāya* (V 299) gives the following lucid description of a monk engaged in *metta* (the sublime state of benevolence): A noble disciple who has given up covetousness and ill-will remains unconfused, alert and mindful, suffusing with his benevolent mind first one quarter, then the second, third and fourth, then upwards, downwards and across, in every way, everywhere, the entire world. Radiating thoughts of benevolence in great abundance, with great intensity, without any reservations he dwells in peace and amity. He knows thus: 'Formerly my mind was limited and undeveloped, now it is limitless and well-developed. No activity imposing limitations is left behind in it, and no such activity lingers there.\(^{10}\)

Such is the description of a mind liberated through benevolence (*metta*) and the adept similarly develops *karunā*, *muditā* and *upekkhā* (*upekkhā*) as well.

The state of this limitless well developed mind is further clarified with a simile in the *Subhasuta* (M II 208=Ś IV 322=D I 251). It is just like a strong conch-shell-blower who makes himself heard far and wide without difficulty, and petty actions which impose limitations find no place in a mind so liberated. Perhaps what is meant by this simile is that, just as petty small noises get drowned by the all-pervading sound of a conch-shell, petty emotions such as attachment and aversion with sense data find no foothold in a well developed mind suffused with infinite benevolence (Ś IV 120). Further rāga, dosa and moha are said to be traits which impose limitations (rāga pamāṇakaraṇa, dosa pamāṇakaraṇa, moha pamāṇakaraṇa—M I 298), for they keep the mind confined to a small world circumscribed by sense data (parittacetas—M I 267). The mind radiating *metta*, *karunā*, etc. is liberated from the crumbling confines of sense objects (appamāṇa cetosa vihārati—M I 270; Ś IV 120; A V 299 etc).

The *Bojjhanga sasayutta* (Ś V 118-121) records an important discourse on the nature of *brahmavihāra* from the Buddhist point of view, in reply to a question asked by the heretics on the difference between Buddhist and non-Buddhist practice of *brahmavihāra*. The Buddha elucidates (a) the method of developing *brahmavihāra*, (b) the attitudes to be entertained during the course of meditation, (c) the highest achievements associated with them, and (d) the final results, and fearlessly proclaims that no human or divine being outside the pale of Buddhism is capable of understanding the sublime states in this manner. The discourse on *metta* is as follows:— "A monk, accompanied by benevolence develops the seven factors leading to Enlightenment (samma-bodhi), dwelling in seclusion, free from passion, bent on the cessation (of suffering), and having relinquishment as its culmination (vassagga-parināṇām). During the course of this meditation it is possible for the adept to entertain the following attitudes at will: (i) to be conscious of the loathsome nature of what is not loathsome, (ii) to be conscious of the agreeable nature of what is loathsome, (iii) to be conscious of the loathsome nature of what is loathsome and what is agreeable, (iv) to be conscious of the agreeable nature of both the loathsome and the agreeable, or (v) regard everything with equanimity being mindful and alert. He could also abide having attained the *subhavimokkha* 'delivery called the beautiful'. *Metta* (metta) has the *subhavimokkha* as the highest achievement (subha-paraṃā). If the adept has not realised a higher state of liberation, he has gained only mundane wisdom."\(^{11}\)

Similarly *karunā*, *muditā* and *upekkhā* could be developed in conjunction with the seven *bojja-bhāgas*, entertaining the same attitudes towards agreeable and loathsome sense data. They have *ākāśanābhāvyata* 'sphere of infinite space', *vībhāγa-bhāvyata* 'sphere of infinite consciousness' and *ākāśicābhāvyata* 'sphere of nothingness' respectively as their highest achievement. In the absence of further spiritual progress the knowledge they have gained still remains within the mundane sphere.

An important observation regarding this method of developing the four *appamāṇa* (*upekkhā*) is that these are strictly considered as means to an end and not the end itself. Once the psychological maturity desired through these exercises is attained, the exercises themselves have to be relinquished (vassagga-parināṇām), for however advanced, they still remain world-bound. The non-Buddhist attitude was evidently to regard these sublime states as final salvation. The concurrent development of the factors of Enlightenment is extremely important and functional. A monk whose mind is freed from the circumscribed world of sense data, is now expected to develop great presence of mind (sati), a spirit of investigation into the truth (dhammanirattaya), energetic application (viriya), joy (piti, i.e. interest in his spiritual exercise), tranquillity (paccutti, physical and mental relaxation), concentration of mental energies (samādhi) and philosophical neutrality (*upekkhā*). Thus a monk is expected to work for Enlightenment inspired by the love of truth, propelled by unswerving determination, but cautioned by philosophical impartiality.

\(^{10}\) Yum kho panā kihī pamāṇakaraṇa kammāna, na taṃ taṭṭavassati, na taṃ taṭṭavassati—a V 299.

\(^{11}\) SA III 172. Idha-pahāsāti...lukiyagāhāsāti attho.

\(^{12}\) Here *upekkhā* cannot mean emotional neutrality, as *upekkhā* is to be developed concurrently with *upakāra* (no).
The Anuruddhasutta (M III 146) refers to mahaggatā cetovimutti in addition to appamāṇa cetovimutti. Mahaggatā cetovimutti literally means 'liberation of the mind grown great'. Differentiating the two types of cetovimutti, the Sutta explains that appamāṇa cetovimutti is the limitless development of mettā, karunā, etc., while mahaggatā cetovimutti is the intense development of these qualities enveloping a limited area big or small.

By the development of appamāṇa cetovimutti the mind is purged of evil emotions. It no longer harbours emotions of attachment and aversion towards sense data (pīyarāpe rūpe na sārajjati, appiyarāpe rūpe na bhāpajjati—M I 270). Freedom from emotions is gained by the sublimation of emotions, vyāpāda ‘malice’ is replaced by mettā, viharā ‘violent dispositions’ by karunā, arati ‘envy’ by muditā and rāga ‘sensuality’ by upekkhā (D III 247-9; M I 424; A III 290-292, etc). The Kakācūpamassutta (M I 129) illustrates the ideal of the replacement of vyāpāda by mettā. Even if the limbs are sawn into pieces, the monk with self-control and emotional maturity entertains no evil thoughts towards the tormentors.

The experience of Nandamāṭa recorded in Aiṅguttaranikāya (IV 65-67) is another example of the nature of this emotional freedom. She has developed meditation up to the fourth jhāna and destroyed the five orambhāgīya sanyojanas ‘letters of degradation’. She explains that she watched her one and only son being tormented, without experiencing any change in her emotions. Again the apparition of her dead husband who was very near and dear to her earlier, made no change whatsoever in her heart. Though the word cetovimutti is not used in this context, it is quite likely that she has gained emotional liberation through the fourth jhāna which replaced rāga by upekkhā, and by the elimination of vyāpāda resulting from the destruction of orambhāgīya sanyojanas.

As emotions are intimately connected with sexuality it would be appropriate to inquire into the Buddhist ideas regarding the emotional attraction between the sexes. The Aiṅguttaranikāya (IV 57-8) gives the following explanation: “A woman ponders over the femininity in herself, ponders over her feminine behaviour, attire, ways, impulses, voice and charm. She gets impassioned (with femininity) and finds delight therein. Thus impassioned and delighted she ponders on masculinity outside, and ponders over masculine behaviour, attire, ways, impulses, voice and charm. She gets impassioned and delighted therein. Thus impassioned and delighted she wishes for external union and longs for the pleasure and joy resulting from such union. Being in love with her own sex (femininity) she goes into union with men. Thus she has not gone beyond her own femininity.” The case is the same with the male. With this explanation it becomes quite clear that self-love plays a basic role in sensuality. The same is emphasised by the words of Mallikā that none is dearer than one’s own self. When equanimity is developed to perfection all forms of self-conceit disappear and one is able to rise above sexuality, and rāga ‘sensuality’ loses its very foundations. Mettā is often described in terms of mother-love. It is admonished that infinite mettā should be cultivated towards all beings without exception, like a mother who protects her one and only son even at the cost of her life. Such mettā replaces dosa/vyāpāda/patigīha, aggressiveness in general which in a broad sense is considered a masculine trait. It can be maintained that an adept with emotional freedom is a human being who has transcended sexual differences and replaced emotions usually associated with sexuality by sublime human emotions. When compared with the pathujjana, an adept with appamāṇa cetovimutti is a noble human being who has gained liberation from raga/lōba and dosa which are two of the three root causes of all dukkha.

Ākīnaṇḍa Cetovimutti

The ākīnaṇḍa cetovimutti ‘liberation of the mind through meditation on nothingness’ comprises ākīnaṇḍhāyatana ‘the sphere of nothingness’ which is the seventh stage of meditation (M I 297). This is realised by the purified mental faculty, unencumbered by the five sense faculties, when it is directed towards nothingness (Nissatthena pātichhi indriyeyi parisuddhena mcnovīhāren n’attī kihciti ākīnāṇḍhāyatana-meyyan—M I 293). According to the Āneñhasappāyasutta (M II 263-4) it is possible for the adept who has developed the ākīnāṇḍhāyatana to entertain the following three attitudes: (a) the cessation of all ideations is peaceful and pleasant, (b) this (personality) is devoid of a soul or anything in the nature of a soul, (c) I am not anywhere, of anyone, in any place, nor is there anything of mine anywhere, nor attachment in anything (Nāhaṁ kvačanī, kassaci, kihcanatasmīna, na ca maça kvačanī, kihcimi kihcanam n’attīhī). Despite this advanced attainment, the dissolution of the body, if nothing further has been attained, his evolving consciousness (sanyattanikānā viihāraṁ) is said to be re-born in the sphere of nothingness. A question arises as to why, after developing ākīnaṇḍhā cetovimutti, the adept cannot realise akuppar cetovimutti ‘inviolable or permanent emancipation of the mind.’ Though this is not directly answered, an inference could be made

14. Mātā yathā niyāna punti puntaṁ ayāta ekapattam amuśriyā evam pi sabbhāhītesu mūsāyam bhūvo aparimāṇī mettā ca sa bhalokassīti mūsāyam bhūvo aparimāṇī
d—Sn. verses 149-50.
from what follows in the Sutta. Ānanda inquires from the Buddha whether a monk who has developed nevasaññāñcatāñjñāyatana ‘the sphere of neither-ideation-nor-non-ideation’ would attain parinibbāna if he develops upakkha ‘equanimity’ after reflecting that: ‘(this state) would not (continue to) be, it would not (continue to) be mine, it will not become (stable) and it will not become mine. I give up whatever there is and whatever there has been.’ (no c’assa, no ca me siṣṭa, na bhavissati, na me bhavissati, yad atti yam bhātaṃ taṃ pajaṭāmi—M II 264). The Buddha replies that the possibility is there that he may or may not attain parinibbāna. The reason is that if he takes delight, if he welcomes and stands overwhelmed by the equanimity so developed, his consciousness would find support there, and that means there is fuel for existence. When there is fuel for existence one does not attain parinibbāna (⋯taṃ nissatam hoti viññānaṃ tad upādānaṃ saupādānaṃ na parinibbāyati). Though clinging to nevasaññāñcatāñjñāyatana is said to be the noblest form of clinging (upādānaseṭṭham) that too has to be got rid of for final emancipation. Perhaps ākiñcaññatā cetovimutti is not transformed into akuppa cetovimutti for the same reason.

Ākiñcaññatā is the meditational level at which the mind is emptied of its thought content by concentrating on nothingness. This is an important achievement in the psychological investigation into the nature and function of the mind. The nature of the river-bed of the mind cannot be understood in the presence of the ceaselessly gushing stream of thought activity. As the mind is functioning concentrating on the absence or vacuity of thought contents, this level of meditation is designated ākiñcaññatā cetovimutti ‘liberation of the mind through nothingness’. A series of similes in the Bojjhangasamyutta (S V 121-124) illustrate the nature of the mind, the inability to view it realistically when it is incessantly reacting to sense data, and the necessity of bailing out the contents to understand its true nature. Just as water that is coloured, boiling, moss-covered, turbulent or turbid, cannot reflect shadows accurately, so a mind overwhelmed with sensuality, aggressiveness, lethargy, agitation or scepticism respectively cannot function with realistic comprehension. The water must be purified of its foreign matter and it should be rendered calm for it to be a good reflector. Similarly the mind too should be purified of its contaminants for efficient functioning. The ākiñcaññatā cetovimutti is so called because the mind is liberated from its thought contents.

Suññatā Cetovimutti
Suññatā cetovimutti ‘liberation of the mind through meditation on emptiness’ is described in terms of the reflection that ‘this (personality) is devoid of a soul or anything in the nature of a soul’ (suññam idam attena vā attaniyena vā).

Animitta Cetovimutti
The last of the cetovimuttis enumerated in the Mahāvīdaḷasattuta is animitta cetovimutti which comprises the animittā cetosamādhī ‘signless mental concentration’. The Sutta itself states that akuppa cetovimutti is the highest as far as these animitta cetovimuttis are concerned. The Cūlasaṇṇārāṣṭra (M III 108) maintains that animittā cetosamādhī is conditioned by causes and characterised by thought activity. What is conditioned by causes and characterised by thought activity is impermanent and is liable to cease. The Mogallānā Sānyutta (S IV 269) warns that great vigilance should be exercised to maintain the signless state of meditation as the danger is ever present of consciousness having recourse to a sign (nimittānusāri viññānaṃ hoti). Though animitta meditation is regarded as the means of warding off unskilful evil thoughts (A I 82), it is also possible for one who has developed this meditation to come under the grip of rāga again (A III 397). If a king’s army camps in a forest, the sound of crickets may cease in that area during that period, but this does not mean that the sound of crickets is banished from the forest for good. Similarly lust can well up again even if a monk has advanced so far as the signless meditation, as in the case of Citta Haṭṭhisāraputta. Despite this impermanent nature, it is described in the Asaṅkhata Sānyutta as the path to nibbāna (S IV 360). When animittā cetovimutti is fully mastered it is said to be impossible for consciousness to have recourse to a sign again (A III 292). A monk who has developed this samādhi can win the purpose of recluseship if he dwells in suitable lodgings, associating with noble companions, controlling his sense faculties (A IV 78). The most important step which transforms animittā cetovimutti into akuppa cetovimutti seems to be the eradication of the ego-notion (A III 292).

Animittā cetovimutti seems to be the liberation of the mind from objects of thought. In the ākiñcaññatāya concentration was fixed on nothingness, and nothingness was the nimitta, the object of concentration. In the animittā cetovimutti the mind is liberated even from this object of concentration. It seems to be a state of pure objectless consciousness with great insight and intellectual clarity.16

When all eight types of cetovimutti mentioned in the Mahāvīdaḷasattuta are taken into consideration, suññatā cetovimutti stands out conspicuous among the others as it is the only cetovimutti type of which akuppa cetovimutti is not specified as the highest. Suññatā cetovimutti is said to com-

16. MA IV 153 explains animittasamādhi as vipassanācittasamādhi.
prise reflection on the non-existence of an ego or anything in the nature of
an ego in the human personality, and it is relevant to recall that this is
the most crucial and indispensable intellectual realisation for final eman-
ipation. Therefore it is possible to theorise that suññata cetovimutti might
also be akuppā cetovimutti. However, it remains a puzzle as to why the
Mahāvedallasutta and also the Cittasamyutta (S IV 296) which appear to
enumerate the various cetovimutti types in their ascending order, assigns
the penultimate position to suññata cetovimutti while animittā cetovimutti
is placed last. The Culasuññataśutta (M III 109), on the other hand, lists
parisuddham paramā ṛtuvaṃ suññataṃ 'the absolutely pure and unique
state of emptiness' as the highest attainment. According to Mahāsuññata-
śutta (M III 111) the Buddha attains to a state of internal emptiness by
not paying attention to all signs (sabbanimittānaṃ amanaskāra aṭṭhatāṃ
suññataṃ upasampajjā viharim). It should be recalled that animittā
cetovimutti too is developed by not paying attention to all signs (sabba-
nimittānaṃ amanaskāra—M I 296). Therefore both suññata cetovimutti
and animittā cetovimutti share the common characteristic of not paying
attention to signs. However, suññata cetovimutti seems to be the superior
of the two because (a) it comprises the most subtle realisation of soulessness
(suññham idam attena vā atteniyena vā—M I 297), (b) it is never said to be
conditioned as a product of thought activity (ibid; S IV 296), and (c) it is
not a state or a type of which akuppā cetovimutti is said to be the highest
(ibid). On the other hand animittā cetovimutti is specifically said to be
conditioned and a product of thought activity, therefore impermanent and
liable to change (M III 108). Therefore it seems plausible to surmise
that suññata cetovimutti belongs to the order of akuppā cetovimutti while
all other forms of cetovimutti mentioned in the Mahāvedallasutta are only
stages in the process leading to liberation and they have to be stabilised
by means of intellectual introspection (vipassanā).

Vipassanā
Having considered the significance of cetovimutti it is now appropriate
to take paññhāvimutti into consideration. Just as cetovimutti is derived
from samatha 'tranquillity' produced by the concentration of mental
energies, paññhāvimutti is said to be the result of vipassanā. Therefore
it would be most helpful if an attempt is made to learn what comprises
vipassanā. The word vipassanā comes from vi-+pañ, to see, and it means
seeing through and beyond superficial appearance. It is usually translated
as insight or introspection.

The pure spotless eye of truth which is said to dawn on a disciple when
he is first introduced into the real nature of things, is described in terms
of the deep awareness that whatever has the nature of arising also has
the inherent nature of passing away (vīraṇam viśamalam dharmacakkhum
udāpādi, yaṁ kālī ca samayadhamman na sabbaṁ taṁ nirodhadharmman
ti—Vin I 11, 16, etc.). It is this insight into the never-ceasing rise and fall
of phenomena, the coming into being and the passing away of all pheno-
mena which go to form the life unit called man, which paves the way to
emancipation (pañcavaśasa upādānappahāne yaṁ udayabbayāmappati viharati,
iti rāpana, iti rāpasa samudayo, iti rāpasa attahāgamo, iti vehaṇa...iti
saḥā...iti sankhāra...iti viññāṇa...attahāgamo...I A IV 153, D III 223,
etc.). An untutored worldly man too might see the growth, decay and
disintegration of the physical body and be disenchanted with it. But
he can never adopt the same attitude towards what is called the mind
(citta, mano or viññāṇa), because, he is so used to cherishing and grasping
it as his own self. In reality, the mind changes with far greater velocity
than the body, and it may have been more sensible, the Buddha says, if
the body were clung to as the self as it appears to remain the same even
for a couple of years, rather than the mind which changes from moment
to moment. The well-informed noble disciple regards the entire psycho-
physical unit called man and all his sense experiences in terms of causality.
All pleasant, unpleasant and neutral sense experiences are causally pro-
duced, when causes are removed they cease to exist. It is the insight into
the causal origination and cessation of all phenomena which paves the
way to emancipation (vipassanāmaggā bodhiyā yaṁ idam nāmarupaniruddhā
vinnāṇaparirodhā...D II 34; also S II 95-7). He who sees causality sees the
truth, he who sees the truth sees causality (yo pañcavasaṁappadānā savatii
so dhammanā savatii, yo dhammanā savatii so pañcavasaṁappadānā savatii—
M I 190-1). Because of the nature of coming into being and passing
away of all things in the world (lokassa hatvā udayabbayāya ca—S I 46), the
human being as well as the entire world of his sense experience is imper-
manent (anicca), what is impermanent is necessarily unsatisfactory (dukkha)
and what is impermanent and unsatisfactory should not be identified as
one's self (anatta). Insight into this anicca, dukkha and anatta nature of
things leads one to emancipation (S III 1, 21, etc., etc.). If onedwells
reflecting on the pleasures of life (uṣṭadhānapassanti) one gets more and
more steeped in lust and all accompanying misery and anxiety. It is
like adding fuel to an already blazing bonfire (S II 85). But if one dwells
reflecting on the evil consequences of sense pleasures (ādhiśvānapassati),
tanha 'thirst/ craving' ceases and paves the way to the end of suffering.
Therefore the adept is constantly urged to train himself to reflect on
impermanence, passionlessness, cessation and relinquishment (M I 425).

These are the perspectives and attitudes which comprise vipassanā.
The basic truth which has to be intuitively discovered and seen with the
inner eye, is the rising-and-falling-nature of all phenomena in accordance with causal laws. The average man sees permanency in continuity and divides things into the three tenses of past, present and future, and regards them as existing always through the course of time. But vipassanā—the new perspective of constant change—shows that what is credited with permanency and clung to with ego-centric possessiveness, is, in reality, nothing but a mere phantom. Viewed through this mirror of truth, the psycho-physical unit of man shows itself to be utterly empty, and devoid of any soul or anything in the nature of a soul (suññam idam attena vā attanīyena vā—M II 265).

This newly-found deep insight into the real nature of things has a profound effect on the adept and brings about a radical change in his attitude and outlook. On the one hand, a great revulsion, a deep sense of disgust (nibbidā) towards all sense experience arises in him. Just as it is natural for one who partakes of food to answer the calls of nature, it is equally natural for one who sees the loathsome, the impermanence and the rising-and-falling-nature of the sense objects, sensory experience and the five aggregates of clinging respectively, to experience a deep sense of disgust towards all of them (A III 32). Being disgusted, he detaches himself from all clippings and his mind gets liberated (Evam passaṁ arjyaṁ vavo rūpasmiṁ pi nibbanti...nibbināṁ virajjati, virāgā vimuccati...S III 21, etc., etc.).

On the other hand, great joy, a deep sense of satisfaction arises in him that he has at long last seen the real nature of things which was so abstruse and difficult to see, and which remained illusive for so long a time.

Suññāgāraṁ pavīṭhassa santacittassa bhikkhuno amānasatī ratī hoti samā dhammaṁ vipassato
Yato yato sammasati khandhānaṁ udayabbayamāṁ labhati pitāmosto amatoṁ tam vijñānati—Dhp. vv. 373-4.

'Superhuman joy arises in a monk who has gathered a lonely hut with a tranquil mind, when he sees with insight the real nature of things. The more he reflects on the rise and fall of the aggregates and understands that state of deathlessness, the more joy and delight arise in him.'

Pāñcāṅgikena turiyena na ratī hoti tādāsti yathā ekaggacittassa samā dhammaṁ vipassato—
—Theragāthā, verse 398.

Orchestral music of five instruments cannot evoke such pleasure as that experienced by a monk with one-pointedness of mind, seeing the real nature of things.'

The Theravāda and Therigāthā abound in triumphant joyful exclamations that the veil of ignorance is at last torn asunder.

Pitikhehi ca kāyaṁ pharitvā viharīṁ vadda sattamīyā pāde pasāresiṁ tamokkhandaṁ padaṁya
—Therigāthā, verse 174.

'I dwelt with a body suffused with blissful joy and on the seventh day after the destruction of ignorance I stretched my legs.'

So delightful is insight and realisation of truth!

Types of Adept

The Kīṭāgirīsutta (M I 477; also M I 439) classifies and defines seven types of adepts according to their attainments. They are as follows:

(a) Adepts who are described as ubhatobhāgavimutta have gained physical experience of the peaceful deliverances (santā vimokkhā) which transcend material form and which belong to the non-material sphere; and they have their obsessions destroyed, having seen them with wisdom.

(b) Adepts who are paññāvimutta ‘emancipated through wisdom’ do not have such physical experience of the peaceful deliverances, but have the obsessions destroyed with intuitive wisdom.

(c) Those who are described as kāyasakkhī ‘having physical testimony’ have fully experienced the peaceful deliverances, with only partial eradication of obsessions.

(d) Adepts who are dīṭhikkātā ‘gained vision’ have no experience of the deliverances, but have partial destruction of obsessions.

(e) Adepts who are described as saddhāvimutta ‘released through faith’ experience no vimokkhā, but possess partial destruction of obsessions and firmly-rooted genuine faith in the Buddha.

(f) Adepts who are Dharmānusārī ‘Dhamma followers’ have neither vimokkhā nor destruction of obsessions, but they have genuine intelligent appreciation of the Dhamma and the five controlling faculties of saddhā ‘faith’, viṇṇa ‘energy’, sati ‘mindfulness’, samādhī ‘concentration’ and paññā ‘wisdom’.

(g) Saddhānusārī ‘faith-followers’ have no vimokkhā, no eradication of obsessions, but are endowed with genuine faith in the Buddha, and the five controlling faculties.
These seven types are taken up for discussion in their reverse order for convenience of elucidation. The last two classes comprise only disciples who have not made any special spiritual progress and are not of any interest for the present topic. The preceding three types, dhyānakkhi, dīthippatī and saddhāvimutta, according to Aṅguttaranikāya (A I 120), may comprise noble disciples belonging to the sotāpatti, sakadāgāmi or anāgāmi levels, as well as those who have embarked on the attainment of arahantship. Therefore it is not possible to state categorically which of them is superior. But it is observed that dhyānakkhi have the controlling faculty of concentration (sammādhiṇḍriya) best developed, the dīthippatī have the controlling faculty of wisdom (paññāhīndriya) best developed, while saddhāvimutta have the controlling faculty of faith (saddhāhīndriya) best developed (A I 118-9). According to the Indriya-saṃyutta (S V 203) the complete and balanced development of the five controlling faculties results in cetovimutto and paññāhīnuttā, while partial development results in the attainment of sotāpatti, sakadāgāmi or anāgāmi levels in accordance with the degree of development (S V 201). Differences in the development of controlling faculties (indriyavemattā) give rise to differences in results (phalavemattā), which in turn differentiate personality types (phaluvesattā, puggalavemattā—S V 201). The Luṭukkakapānasutta too seems to classify personality types on the same criteria (M I 453). It is interesting to note that in the Mahāmālukyasutta (M I 437) the Buddha is asked why some monks are cetovimutto and some are paññāhīnuttā, and the answer is that this is due to indriyavemattā.

Indriyavemattā

It seems appropriate here to focus some attention on a few discourses on the five controlling faculties. While the complete and balanced development of all faculties is repeatedly said to result in the attainment of final emancipation, paññā is locked upon as the single faculty the sole development of which leads to the same supreme goal. It is explained that, with the maturity of paññā, other faculties follow suit, even if no special attempt is made to develop them (S V 222). Again, the parallel development of paññā and āriyā vimutti (explained in the Sutta itself as sammādhiṇḍriya—S V 223), the combined development of sati, samādhi and paññā (S V 224), as well as the combined development of viρīya, sati, samādhi and paññā are also said to culminate in arahantship. As paññā remains the constant common denominator in all combinations, it is unquestionably the most important of all the faculties (paññāhīnḍriya aggām akkhāyati yad idam bodhāya—S V 237-9). Except paññā, the one-sided development of no other single faculty is regarded as fruitful. Over-enthusiastic Sopha Kovilisa was advised to tone down his faculty of virīya (Vin I 184) while Vakkali was rebuked for excessive saddhā (kin te imiṇa pūkāyiṇa dīthena—S III 120), as both had their respective over-developed virtues blocking their spiritual progress. The indiscriminate development of samādhi without a specific goal in view is considered fruitless, as far as final emancipation is concerned. Such exercise is even compared to the aimless wandering of a foolish mountain cow who ventures into strange pastures out of curiosity without any common sense or bearing (A IV 418). The realistic understanding of the various levels of meditation, together with their limitations, bliss and cessation is a necessary condition for emancipation (A III 417-8). Jhāna have great instrumental value (ānisaṃsa), but they can be a hindrance for emancipation (ādnava) if considered as possessing intrinsic value (A IV 438-48). Therefore each jhānic accomplishment is considered an obstacle (sambhāda) to be got rid of, in favour of the attainment of successive levels and the final goal of emancipation (A IV 449-51). All this evidence displays the fact that sammādhiṇḍriya alone is inadequate without the direction of paññāhīndriya. The simile of the untrained horse and the thoroughbred seems to illustrate the non-Buddhist and Buddhist attitudes towards meditation (A V 325-6). The untrained horse thinks of the fodder itself while feeding, whereas the thoroughbred ponders on his service to the master. Similarly the untutored ascetic bases his thoughts on the jhāna he has developed (nevasaṅgāṅsānāsānāyatananā nissāya jhāyi). But the noble disciple, on the other hand, observes and objectively understands the subtle mental processes involved in the meditational levels (loka-puruṣāṅsānāsānāyatananā bāhūtā hoti—lit. the nevasaṅgāṅsānāsānāyatananā-preception [involved] in the sphere of neither-ideation-nor-non-ideation becomes clear to the noble high-born man. A V 326). According to the Mahāmālukyasutta (M I 435) the adept has to intuitively see (samappassati) all phenomena belonging to the psycho-physical unit of the five aggregates, associated with the various mediational levels in terms of their true nature, namely that they are impermanent, unsatisfactory, unhealthy, alien, subject to disintegration, empty and soulless.59 Having understood the true nature he withdraws his mind from these phenomena and inclines towards the deathless state; he then tries to establish emotional freedom (taṅghkāhaya vīrhago) and the cessation of this on-going process of life (niruddha). Thus it becomes quite clear that sammādhiṇḍriya alone is quite insufficient for emancipation, it has to be geared and steered towards the goal by the
direction-giving *paññhindriya*. In short it is *pañña* which gives stability and co-ordination to all other controlling faculties (S V 228).

The role of *saddhā* as a controlling faculty has been clearly explained by *Sāriputta* in the *Indriyasamayutta* (S V 225-6). Genuine faith in the Buddha and his teachings would lead a disciple on and on with ceaseless application for the acquisition of proficiency in mindfulness, concentration and wisdom. The compelling power of faith brings him ultimately to a position where he can physically experience and intuitively see everything which he originally only believed in (*kāyena phusitvā viharati*, *paññāya ca ativijjha passati*). In the *Kitāgiśirutta* (M I 480-1) the Buddha explains that for a disciple with faith, the teaching is a source of nourishment and strength (*rumhaniyam satthu sāsanam hoti ojavanam*). Such a disciple strives with undaunted courage to attain that which has to be won with human strength and valour. Such a one would either attain profound knowledge here and now, or become a non-returner.

*Sati* ‘mindfulness’ as a controlling faculty too has to be properly channelled by *pañña*, for the danger of coming to wrong conclusions by the untutored development of *sati* is ever present. For example, all erroneous views regarding eternalism and annihilationism, according to the *Brahmajālasutta* (D I 17ff, II 32), are the results of misinterpreting retrocognition (*punnenivāsānussatiñña*) which is a highly developed form of *sati*.

From this discussion on the five *indriyas* it becomes quite clear that *pañña* on account of its supremacy, and *saddhā* on account of its compelling emotional force, could lead an adept to *vimutti*. Thus *indriya vennattā* or the differences in the development of controlling faculties have given rise to different classifications such as *paññāvimutta* and *saddhāvimutta*, wisdom-based and faith-based arahants respectively. It was already shown in the earlier part of this essay that *ceto vimutti* is based on *samādhi*, i.e. *samādhandriya*.

**Ubbhatobhāgavinnettī and Paññavinnettī**

Of the seven types of adepts described in the *Kitāgiśirutta* the first two, namely the *ubhatobhāgavinnettī* and *paññāvinnettī* are undoubtedly arahants. In addition to the definitions provided in the *Sutta* itself, *Aṅguttaranikāya* (A IV 452-3) sheds considerable light on these two types. According to this discourse, the arahant with *ubhatobhāgavinnettī* is capable of attaining and abiding by any or all the *jhānas* from the first to the *saṁghāsavijñāna* ‘the cessation of ideation and all that is felt’, physically experiencing them to their full capacity, and understanding them with wisdom (**pathamaṁ jhānam upasampajjā viharati, yathā yathā ca tad ayataṁ, tathā tathā naṁ kāyena phusivā viharati, *paññāya ca naṁ paṭīnaṁ***). He has also seen the obsessions with wisdom and eradicated them. The arahant who is *paññāvinnettī* on the other hand, is incapable of the physical experience of the *jhānas* to their full capacity, but is able to attain and abide by any or all of them from the first to *saṁghāsavijñāna*; he understands their nature with wisdom and has seen and eradicated the obsessions with wisdom.

Now the feature which distinguishes the two types of arahants, according to this passage, is the physical experience of the *jhānas* to their full capacity. It is therefore appropriate to inquire into what is meant by this statement: *Yathā yathā ca tad ayataṁ, tathā tathā naṁ kāyena phusivā viharati*. Literally it means whatever be the nature of that faculty/sphere, in accordance with that nature he experiences with the body. It is relevant to recall that *Aṅguttaranikāya* (A II 183) also maintains that the eight *vimokkhas* should be realised or experienced by the body (*aṭṭha vimokkha bhikkhave kāyena sacchikarapiyā*). The involvement of the corporeal body in the process of meditation is quite obvious as one of the aims of meditation is also to bring about *kayaapassaddhi*, complete physical relaxation. The *Sāmaññaṭṭhakaṭṭhāna* (D I 74-6) amply illustrates the physical experience of the first four *jhānas* with four beautiful similes. During the first three *jhānas* the body is filled, saturated and suffused with *vivekajāpatīsakha* ‘joy and happiness born of seclusion from sense pleasures’, *samaṇṇhāpasīsakha* ‘joy and happiness born of concentration’, and *nippannasīsakha* ‘joy-less happiness’, like water in a well-kneaded lump of wet bathing powder, a pond filled to the brim with cool spring water and a lotus fully immersed in water respectively. No part of the body remains unaffected by these experiences, as by water the objects of the three similes. During the fourth *jhāna* the entire body is pervaded by the absolutely pure and bright mind, and just like a man who has covered himself from head to foot with a white cloth, no part of the body remains unaffected by the *jhānic* experience. Though the extent to which physical experience involved in the *arūpa* ‘non-material *jhānas* is not obvious, the last of the *jhānas*, *saṁghāsavijñāna* implies that there is some extremely subtle degree of physical experience left even during the penultimate stage of neither-ideation-nor-non-ideation. Thus the expression *kāyena phusitvā viharati* seems to mean full physical experience of the various meditational levels.

The *Mahāniddanasutta* (D II 71) seems to furnish evidence regarding the mastery of these attainments. According to this, a monk who is *ubhatobhāgavinnettī* can attain the eight deliverances (*aṭṭha vimokkhe* in
the progressive order, regressive order, and in both progressive and regressive orders. He can attain wherever he wishes, whatever he wishes, for any length of time he wishes. Similarly he can rise from them also at will. He has destroyed the obsessions, and having won cetovimutti and paññāvimutti he abides in that obsession-free state. The full command of the meditational levels irrespective of place, time, duration and order is the speciality of the arahant with ubhaya-bhājīvamutta. In fact this is no exclusive speciality of such arahants, as kayasakkhi too have the same proficiency, and pre-Buddhist sages too may have had such skills. The paññāvimutta arahant, on the other hand, can attain all meditational levels but does not command such proficiency and mastery (A IV 452-3). However, according to the Mahānāmaputta (D II 70) he receptively understands the seven stations of consciousness and the two spheres of unconscious beings and neither-ideation-nor-non-ideation, in terms of their arising, passing away, pleasures, perils and escape, without clinging to any of them he is liberated (yato bhikkhu imāsa ca sattamam viññānaṃ imesaṃ ca dvimanaṃ ayam anunayo ca anunayo na anunayo ca niṣsaraṇaṃ ca yathābhūtaṃ viññānaṃ anupāda vimutto hoti, ayaṃ ye ca bhikkhu paññāvimutto—D II 70). While proficiency in the attainment of jhānas thus remains an optional skill as far as the realisation of āsavakkhaya is concerned, the realistic and intelligent understanding of each meditational level is considered indispensable (paññāya ca nam pajanāti). All phenomena belonging to the five khandhas associated with the various meditational levels, have to be understood according to their true nature, i.e. as impermanent (anicca), unmeaning (dékkhā), unhealthy (rūga), alien (parato), subject to decay (palañcha), empty (saññāto), and substanceless (anattato) (M I 435; A IV 422f, A V 34; also A III 417, etc). According to the Mahānāmaputta and several other texts cited so far a monk is able to attain arahantship from the samatha basis of any of the jhānas from the first to the ninth samādhiya-jhāna states, provided he understands, in short, the impermanent, changeable, and substanceless nature of all or whatever jhāna he has already developed (M I 350-2). Once this is intuitively understood the mind gets emancipated from all emotional and cognitive obsessions.

The Nidāna Samyutta (S II 121-128) sheds more light on the question of paññāvimutti. Susima puts a series of questions to a group of monks who had just declared their attainment of supreme knowledge (aśīna) in the presence of the Buddha. The new arahants reply that they have

20. When aśīna is declared the Buddha knows whether the declaration is factual or not—A V 156. If the declaration is the result of over-estimation, the Buddha preaches the doctrine—M II 105. Here in Susima's episode the Buddha has accepted the declaration of aśīna as factual.

no miraculous powers, no divine ear, no ability to read others' minds, no knowledge of previous lives, no divine eye, no physical experience of the bliss of non-material state of deliverance (ye te saññā vimokkhā atīkamma rāpe dārapā te kāyena phussatā viharatthāti? No hetam ānusā). But they maintain that they are freed through knowledge (paññāvimutta) whether Susima can understand it or not.

Baffled by this reply Susima requested the Buddha to clarify the position. The Buddha replied that the knowledge of causality (dhamma-phuṭṭhāna, lit. knowledge regarding the existence of things) arises first and then the knowledge of nibbāna. On request the Buddha explained further that the realisation of the anicca, dukkha and anatta nature of the five khandhas makes one completely detach oneself from the khandhas. This detachment, this passionlessness brings about emancipation, and knowledge regarding his emancipation arises in him who is thus emancipated. Then the Buddha went on to show that for one who has understood the true nature of the khandhas and realised causality, superhuman faculties such as miraculous powers, divine ear, thought-reading, retrecognition, clairvoyance and the physical experience vimokkhā hardly have any value or attraction. Thus by way of explaining paññāvimutta to Susima, the Buddha has delivered a discourse leading to emancipation without any reference to the five higher faculties (pātesābhāhā) or non-material states of deliverance (ārupā vimokkhā).

But according to the Nidāna Samyutta (S I 117-8), Nārada has gained correct knowledge of paricassambuddha without depending on saddhā ‘faith’, ruci ‘partiality’, amamassā ‘traditional authority’, akārappavittaka ‘deductive reasoning’, or diṭṭhinijjhānakkhaṇa ‘congruency with already accepted views’. Though he has correctly seen the causal process with right understanding as it really is, he still does not claim to have attained arahantship (bhavanirodho nibbānāṁ ti kho me ānuso yathābhūtānaṁ samādhiyā nissattaṁ, na c' amhi arahānaṁ khitadavo). He likens himself to a thirsty man who has found water in a deep well in a desert, but without means of cooling himself. It appears that he has mastered theoretical knowledge without cultivating mental tranquillity which should normally accompany such knowledge.

This passage reminds one of a discourse in the Ariyuttanikāya (A V 99) according to which it is possible to gain adhipaññā dhammāvipassanā ‘insight into the nature of things with superior wisdom’ without ajjhatta cetosamathā ‘internal mental tranquillity’. Such a one is advised to establish himself on the supreme wisdom he has acquired and strive for mental tranquillity. Thus samathā—the actual cultivation of tranquillity—

is indispensable for the attainment of cetovimutti and paññāvimutti. The Sekhasutta (M I 358) divides the entire course of monastic training into two parts, namely carana ‘conduct’ and viñja ‘knowledge’. The former comprises stila ‘moral behaviour’, indriyesu gudatvārata ‘restraint of sense faculties’, bhūjanī mattedhutā ‘moderation with regard to food’, jāgariyanu anyutitā ‘alert awareness’, satta saddhamma ‘seven noble qualities such as hiri etc.’, and mastery of the first four jhānas. Viñja, on the other hand, comprises puhubbenaṁnantattānaṁ retrocognition, dibbacakkhu clairvoyance and āsavakkhayānaṁ knowledge of the destruction of obsessions. A noteworthy point is that the ability to attain the four jhānas at will with untroubled ease is also put under the category of carana. According to Aṅguttaranikāya (A II 163) it is an adept endowed with noble conduct who can see reality (caranaṇaṁ annaṁ yathābhāvo jñāti passati), and in the same Sutta Sāriputta scoffs at the idea that viñja alone could put an end to suffering. This means that the four jhānas form an essential basis for emancipation.

With this background if Susima’s episode is recapitulated, attention is drawn to the fact that the monks with paññāvimutti disclaimed only the five abhiññās and proficiency in the arūpa jhānas. It could therefore be inferred that they had mastered the first four jhānas in addition to āsavakkhayānaṁ. The mastery of āsavakkhayānaṁ immediately after the fourth jhāna is explained in the Chabbisoḍhanasutta (M III 36) as well, without however, any reference to paññāvimutti. In the case of Nārada (S II 117-8) it appears that he was a monk who had first developed adhipaññāhamsavipassanā (mentioned as a possibility in A V 99)—thus had seen water in a deep well—but lacked ajjhutta cetosamatha which was essential for further spiritual progress—thus was unable to cool himself with the water he had seen. Without completing the actual cultivation of discipline belonging to the carana category which culminates in the mastery of the four jhānas which engender purity of mental phenomena and perfect physical well-being (catumañjhānānaṁ abhcetasitānaṁ ditthadhammasukhabhāvenānaṁ nikāmañābhi hoti—M I 358), he could not have attained arahantship Aṅguttaranikāya (A II 157) recognises the possibility of spiritual progress even when mental tranquility is preceded by insight and Nārada seems to belong to this type (bhikkhu vipassāṅapubbagamanaṁ samathaṁ bhaveti, tassa vipassāṅapubbagamanaṁ samathaṁ bhāvavato maggo sañāyati).

The next important point which merits consideration is whether paññāvimutti could be attained without cetovimutti, for ubhatothagāvimutti is sometimes taken to mean the realisation of both paññāvimutti and cetovimutti.22 Then, an arahant who claims to have attained only paññāvimutti cannot be expected to have gained cetovimutti as well.


But this view which seems to be superficially plausible cannot be accepted as quite accurate for several reasons. Cetovimutti and paññāvimutti are mentioned together in numerous places in the Pali Canon, without any reference to ubhatothagāvimutti or the eight vimokkhas which is the speciality of arahants with this two-fold emancipation. But of course it should not be forgotten that the definition of ubhatothagāvimutti contained in the Mahāniddanasutta (D II 71), whilst emphasising the physical experience of the eight vimokkhas, does mention the attainment of both paññāvimutti and cetovimutti, while in the definition of paññāvimutti in the same Sutta no reference is made to cetovimutti. Aṅguttaranikāya (A III 84), on the other hand, which gives a number of epithets applicable to a monk who has attained both cetovimutti and paññāvimutti, does not cite ubhatothagāvimutti which could have found a fitting place there had such usage been acceptable. The epithets which appear there are only descriptive of the eradication of ignorance, rebirth, craving, five fetters of degradation and egoism, and there is no mention of any special distinction because of the realisation of both cetovimutti and paññāvimutti. Moreover, Aṅguttaranikāya (A II 87) contains definitions of two types of arahants called samaṇa-puṇḍarika ‘white-lotus-like-ascetic’, and samaṇa-pāpadum ‘red-lotus-like-ascetic’, and the feature which differentiates them is the absence and the presence of the physical experience of the eight vimokkhas respectively. Now, it is this same factor which distinguishes the paññāvimutta arahants from ubhatothagāvimutta arahants, and samaṇa-puṇḍarika and samaṇa-pāpadum could very well be new terms to designate the same dyad. The important information furnished by this passage is that both types of arahants are credited with cetovimutti and paññāvimutti. If the identification of samaṇa-puṇḍarika with paññāvimutta and samaṇa-pāpadum with ubhatothagāvimutta is accepted as correct, cetovimutti and paññāvimutti cannot be recognised as the two-fold vimutti types which comprise ubhatothagāvimutti.

The different types of cetovimutti discussed earlier in this essay showed that the mind was successively relieved of its contents through a systematic process of meditation, and the notable achievements were designated cetovimutti. In the Mahāvibhaṅgasutta (M I 298) it was stated that all these cetovimutti types have akūpa cetovimutti as the highest achievement. This meant that none of the cetovimutti levels (possibly except suññatā cetovimutti) was stable and permanent. They could be stabilised only by the intellectual understanding of the working of the mind even during these meditation levels. When this is clear, the causal and soulless nature of the mind is driven home with such clarity and force that the mind gets detached from its anchors and attains supreme inviolable freedom. This seems to be what is meant by the statement pahitatto
are arūpabhārahakeṣu, non-material sublime modes of existences where the physical aspect of the being is regarded as non-existent. The arahant with ubbatobhāhagavimutta is one who could lead an existence characteristic of any of the arūpa brahma worlds wherever he wishes, whenever he wishes, for any length of time he wishes, while his corporeal body still continues to exist. This is exactly the traditional commentarial explanation as well—ubbatobhāhagavimutta ti dvāki bhāgehi vimutto, arūpasamāpatti rūpakāya vimutto, maggena nāmakkāya vimutto ti—DA II 514; also AA IV 207). Therefore ubbatobhāhagavimutta means freedom from the entire psychophysical unit—through the attainment of non-material meditational levels freedom from the material body is secured; through the development of the Noble Path freedom from the psychical body is established.

Types of Arahants

The Vinaya Cullavagga (Vin II 161) contains the following enumeration of saints in their ascending order: sotāpanna 'stream-enterer', sakadāgāmi 'once-returner', anāgāmi 'non-returner', arahā 'worthy one', tevijā 'worthy one with three-fold higher knowledge', and chalabhīṇhā 'worthy one with six-fold higher knowledge'. Of these, the last three types have attained final emancipation while the anāgāmi is said to attain parinibbāna in a brahma world without returning to this world.24

The Vangisa Samyutta (S I 191) subdivides the arahā group into ubbatobhāhagavimutta and pāṇāhāvimutta. Thus there are four types of arahants and their important attainments can be summarised as follows:-

Chalabhīṇhā

Four jhānas or more as samatha basis. Six-fold higher knowledge, namely iddhiyādhiya 'psychic powers', dibhasota ‘divine ear’, paracittavijñānānāhā ‘thought-reading’, pubbenivāsanassatiānā ‘retrorogation or recollection of former births’, dibhacakkhā ‘divine eye’, āsavakkhayānā ‘knowledge of the destruction of obsessions’ (M I 34; D III 281; A I 255, 258, III 17, 280, IV 421, etc.).

Tevijā

Four jhānas or more as samatha basis. Three-fold higher knowledge, namely retrorogation, divine eye and knowledge of the destruction of obsessions (M I 22, 497, etc.).

23. evaṃ muni nāmakkāya vimutto—Sn. verse 1074,

24. A II 160—An adept who has developed nessābhāhavānādhāsārāmīpajātena does not return if he has eliminated the five fetters of degradation (saṅgābhāgīvānī saṅgāyojani).
Ubbatobhāgavimutta — Physical experience and full mastery of eight vimokkhas or nine jhānas. Knowledge of the destruction of obsessions (M I 160, 174, 204, 209, etc.).

Paññāvimutta — Any or all of the first four jhānas as samatha basis. Knowledge of the destruction of obsessions (M III 36).

While the positive attainments of an arahant are summarised above, the Pāśādikasutta of the Dīghanikāya (D III 133) enumerates nine deeds which an arahant is incapable of committing. It is just impossible that an arahant would kill, steal, indulge in sex, utter falsehood, enjoy household life or fall into error on account of partiality, ill-will, ignorance or fear. As the bases of unwholesome physical, verbal and mental activities (akusalamālā—lobha, dosa, moha) and all emotional and cognitive obsessions (kāmasavā bhavāsavā ditthīsavā avijjāsavā) which are the mainsprings of worldly activity have been eradicated without remainder, it is logically impossible that an arahant would commit any of these deeds.

Moreover, by the sublimation of emotions an arahant loses all psychological characteristics associated with sexes. Sexual attraction becomes meaningless and impossible for him because not only self-love which is recognised as the foundation of sex attraction (A IV 57-8) but also the very idea of self—asmimāṇa—has been uprooted. It is categorically stated that even physiological sexual functions become extinct with the attainment of arahantship attāhānām etam anavakāso yam arahato asuci moccayati—Vin I 295). To be born human means to find oneself identified with one or the other of the sexes. To realise freedom from birth seems to be the attainment of freedom from the limitations imposed by sexuality as well. The words of Somā Therī recorded in the Bhikkhuni Sanyūutta provide further testimony to establish that arahants transcend sexuality (S I 129).

Regarding sense perception of an arahant it is said that many sense objects may come within the range of an arahant’s sense faculties, but they do not obsess his mind. He stands unconfused with perfect clarity of vision and his mind remains unmoved like a firmly-planted monolith (Vin I 184-5, A IV 404). Feelings (vedanā), ideations (saññā) and thoughts (vitakka) arise in him with his full awareness, they exist and pass away also with his full awareness (tathāgattāsa viditā vedanā upajjanti viditā
apaṭṭahantī. M III 124). His mind knows no restrictions or limitations (vimarṣiyādikatena cetasā viharati—S II 173, III 30, A V 151f.), as it has gained infinite freedom (appamāṇaceto—M I 270). The nature of this emancipated mind stands in strong contrast to the worldly mind which quivers and flutters like a fish thrown on dry land (Dhp. verse 34). An arahant is described as diamond-minded (vajirāpamācitto, A I 124).

25. Itthihāvā kīṁ kavirā cittamhi susamāhithe
   sānamhi vattamānaspi samma dhammāna vipassato

   Yassa nīna sīyā evam itthihāma purīsa ti va
   kīhe ti pana asmiti tam Māro vattum arahattī.
PALI BUDDHIST STUDIES IN THE WEST

Russell Webb

7. France

As elsewhere in Europe, Pali studies trailed well behind those of Sanskrit and no more so than in France, the Western "home" of research into the Indian Mahāyāna systems of thought. And yet the potential for Pali scholarship was present at the inception of scientific Orientalism in the early 19th century. Allowing also for the eclectic temperament of many students in this field, notable achievements have been made under French auspices.

Probably the first survey of Theravāda Buddhism was contained in a book written by Simon de La Loubère, the ambassador of Louis XIV to Siam in 1687-8. In *Du Royaume de Siam* (2 vols., Paris 1691), he described the life of the bhikkhus and gave a synopsis of the Vinaya: "An explication of the Patimouc or Text of the Vinaya—the Principal Maxims of the Talapoons of Siam". An English version of this book appeared under the title, *A New Historical Relation of the Kingdom of Siam* (London 1693; reprinted by OUP, Kuala Lumpur 1969). Two translations were also made in German: "Die vornehmsten Lebensregeln der Talapoeng in Siam" and "Erklärung des Patimuk oder des Textes des Vinak" (Sammmlung asiatischer Originalschriften I, Zürich 1791.)

Nearly two centuries later Bishop Bigandet was contributing to an understanding of Buddhism in Burма. Paul-Ambronio Bigandet was born 1813 in Malan, Doubs, in eastern France. Ordained in 1837, he trained as a missionary to Malaya and Burma becoming Superior of the mission to the latter in 1852. Four years later he was accorded the title Bishop of Ramatha. After the First Vatican Council in 1870, he became Vicar Apostolic of Ava and Pegu. However, Bigandet is best known for his monumental study, *The Life or Legend of Gaudama*, "the Buddha of the Burmesian. The Ways to Neibban, and Notice on the Phongyies or Burmese Monks" (2 vols., Rangoon 1858; London 1911-2). The major biographical part of this book constituted a translation of an 18th century Burmese Pali text, the Mālālāñkāravatthu (which was compared with another text of the same period—the Tathāgata-udāna—and included in the second edition of Bigandet's book, Rangoon 1866). His *Life* was subsequently translated into French by L.T. Victor Gauvain under the title, *Vie ou Légende de Gaudama, le Boudha des Birmans* (Paris 1878). Bigandet himself died in Rangoon in 1894.

Although the father of Buddhist studies in France, Eugène Burnouf (1801-52), is mainly remembered for the first European translation of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra (*Le Lotus de la Bonne Loi*—Maisonneuve, Paris 1852; reprinted 1973), he emphasized the importance of studying materials in both Sanskrit and Pali. From 1832 until his untimely death, he occupied the Chair of Sanskrit at the Collège de France in Paris. In collaboration with the Norwegian Indologist, Christian Lassen, he contributed an *Essai sur le pâli, ou langue sacrée de la presque île au delà du Gange* (1826) which included a note of those Pali manuscripts that had been deposited in the Bibliothèque du Roi. This was the first work of its kind in the West and in the following year Burnouf published some *Observations grammaticales sur quelques passages de l'Essai sur le pâli*. Thereafter, he translated the Sandhi-kappa section (dealing with the euphonic combination of letters) from the Kācāyanavāyyakāraṇa together with the Abhidhānappadipika (a lexicography from Ceylon). From Burmese Pali recensions, he translated the Bhuridatta, Nemi and Suvaṃja Sāma Jātaka, together with extracts from the Mahājānaka Jātaka and the Pātimokkha-nissaya. A précis of the Sāmaññaphala Sutta and the complete version of the Mahāniddāna Sutta from the Dīgha Nikāyā were included in the appendices to *Le Lotus de la Bonne Loi*. Although he planned a Pali dictionary and grammar, apart from an analysis of the Pali texts in Ceylon, Burnouf was impelled to commence editing and translating those Nepāli Sanskrit manuscripts that Hodgson had recently sent to Paris.

From 1859 to 1865 the French Consul in Ceylon, Paul Grimbout, collected a large number of Pali manuscripts (*vide* Saint-Hilaire, "Du bouddhisme et de sa littérature à Ceylan", in *Journal des Savants*, Paris 1866). He planned to publish these in a *Bibliotheca Pālica* but his death prevented full implementation of this course. His "Extraits du Parīta" were published posthumously in 1871 by Feer in the *Journal Asiatique* and off-printed in the following year. *Sept suttas pâli* appeared in 1876. Although this compilation from the Dīgha Nikāyā was edited by Grimbout, in fact the only French contribution came from Burnouf in the form of his renderings of Sutta 2 and 15 (copied from *Le Lotus*). The remaining suttas (1, 2, 20, 31 and 32) were reproduced from the pioneer English versions of Gogerly.

With Léon Feer (1830-1902) we are confronted with almost the only French Pali scholar, despite his official positions as Professor of Tibetan at l'Ecole des langues orientales vivantes (1864) and Lecturer in Tibetan and Mongolian at the Collège de France (1869). Born in Rouen, he eventually entered the Manuscript Department of the Bibliothèque
Nationale in 1872 and became Assistant Keeper two years before his death.

For the Journal Asiatique, Feer translated the following texts under the general heading of "Études bouddhiques": "Le Sūtra des quatre Précépents" and "Des premiers essais de prédication du Bouddha Cakya-muni" (1866); "L'ami de la vertu et l'amitié de la vertu" (from the Saṃyutta Nikāya, 1873); "Le Sūtra de l'Enfant (= Dahara Sutta from the Saṃyutta) et la conversion de Prasenajit" (from Pali and Tibetan sources, including Jātaka 345–1874); "Maitrakanyaka-mittavindaka: la piété filiale" (from the Maitrakanyaka-avadāna and Jātakas 41, 82, 104, 106, 369 and 439–1878); various apādānas and avadānas (1880-84); "Le Sūtra d'Upāli" (= Majjhima Nikāya 56, 1887); "Le commentaire de l'Upāli-Suttam" and "Nātapattra et les Niganthes" (from the Pana-nicasūdāna, 1888). For the same journal, Feer also translated "Le Enfer indien" (from the Saṃyutta, 1892), "Le Chaddanta-Jātaka" (1895) and "Cīna-Cañavaca Sundari" (from Thai Pali texts, 1897). In Fragments du Kandjou (AMG, Paris 1883), he included the Dhammapakkappovattana Sutta from its Pali and Tibetan recensions together with extracts from the poricca which had been translated into Tibetan.

For The Pali Text Society (London) he edited the Saṃyutta Nikāya (5 vols., 1884-98; reprinted 1970-76) and Panācagāti-Dīpana (JPTS, 1884), and submitted a "List of Pali MSS in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris" (ibid., 1882). At the First Congress of Orientalists held in Paris in 1873, Feer contributed a translation of the Cālapadumā Jātaka which was subsequently published in the proceedings of the Congress—Comptes-rendus (3 vols., 1874-76). Marcelle Lalou analysed his literary contributions in "L'oeuvre de Léon Feer" (Bibliographie Bouddhique II, 1929-30).

Émile Senart (1847-1928), the President of the Société Asiatique, translated the Kaccāyanapakaraṇa (JA, 1871), whilst Léon de Milloû (1842-1912), the first Curator of the Musée Guimet, translated Mutu Coomaraswamy's rendering of the Dāthāvamsa—Histoire de la dent relique du Bouddha Gotama (AGM, 1884) and Paul Carus' anthology, L'Évangile du Bouddha (AMG, 1902).


The "Resident Superior" in Cambodia, Adhémar Leclère (1853-1917), was probably the first to compile accurate and detailed reports of that kingdom. These were incorporated into Le Bouddhisme au Cambodge (E. Leroux, Paris 1899; reprinted by AMS Press, New York 1975) and Histoire du Cambodge (Paul Geuthner, Paris 1914; reprinted by AMS Press, 1975). Indigenous lives of the Buddha and Devadatta, together with local recensions of the Mahā-, Jinaka, Nīmarāja and Dīmā Jātakas, were translated by him to form Les livres sacrés du Cambodge (AMG, 1906).

The revival of Buddhism in Cambodia and Laos was due in large measure to the persistence of Suzanne Karpelles (died 1969). A graduate of the University of Paris in Pali, Sanskrit and Tibetan, she studied in Bangkok and finally, in 1930, persuaded the French authorities to establish the Buddhist Institutes of Cambodia and Laos—situated in Phnom Penh and Vientiane respectively. (L'Ecole Supérieure de Pali had been founded in the former capital in 1914.) She then supervised the printing of the Tipiṭaka in Pali and Khmer and, for twenty years, acted as General Secretary of both Institutes.

A later Director of EFEO (1929-47), and acknowledged authority on local epigraphy, was George Coedès (1886-1969). Between 1918 and 1926 he was the Chief Librarian at The National Library of Siam and was thereby instrumental in acquiring for the country a central collection of Pali and Thai manuscripts for future reference purposes. To facilitate co-operation he compiled a survey of the activities and contents of The Vajraṇāṭa National Library (Bangkok 1924). (He was appointed Secretary-General of the Royal Institute of Siam 1927-29 and became President of the Société Asiatique in Paris in 1964.)

Apart from numerous papers on Khmer and Thai inscriptions, Angkor Vat and the regional languages, he contributed a "Compte-rendu sur les manuscrits pali du Cambodge" (BEFEO, Hanoi 1912) and essays on "Les ouvrages pali composés en pays thai" (ibid., 1918), "Religions indiennes du Cambodge et de la Laos" for Un Empire colonial français: I. l'Indochine (ed. G. Maspero, Paris and Brussels 1929), "La littérature cambodgienne/laotienne en Indochine" for Les littératures de l'Indochine (ed. Sylvain Lévi, Paris 1931) and "Les civilisations de l'Indochine française" for Indochine française (Hanoi 1938). His study of "Un vie indochinoise du Bouddha: la Pāṭhasamabhūti" appeared in Mélanges d'indianisme (E. de Boccard, Paris 1968), a volume edited by Paul Mus in memory of Louis Renou. Towards the end of his life, Coedès assessed
the contents of the manuscripts from Thailand deposited in the Danish Royal Library in his *Catalogue des manuscrits en pâli, laotienne et siamése provenant de la Thailande* (Copenhagen 1966).


A newcomer to Pali studies, Jacqueline Ver Eecke, has edited and translated the *Dasavatthayupakaranā* (EFEO, 1976). This almost unknown *sūtra* text from Sri Lanka comprises stories on the "ten objects" that may be offered to the Sangha.

In France itself, Buddhist studies have always been concentrated in the capital. At the Faculty of Letters in the University of Paris, Victor Henry (1850-1907) was Professor of Indian Language and Literature from 1888 until his death. He compiled a *Précis de grammaire pâli accompagné d’un choix de textes* (E. Leroux, 1904) which remains the only indigenous Pali grammar and is still used in teaching the language at university level. He also wrote on *Les littératures de l’Inde. Sanskrit-Pâli-Prākrit* (Hachette, 1904). At l’Ecole pratique des Hautes Etudes (which shares the Sorbonne building with the Faculty of Letters but is administratively independent of the University), the IVth. Section—"Historical and Philological Sciences"—caters for Pali studies. As a subject secondary to Sanskrit, Jean-Michel Agasse is the present lecturer in Pali.

François Martini (born 1895) was Lecturer in Cambodian at l’Ecole des langues orientales vivantes. Specialising in non-canonical or apocryphal Buddhist literature, he translated the *Dasabodhisatva-uddesa* and *Anāgatabuddhavamsa* (BEFEO, Hanoi 1936). He also contributed an essay on "Les jātakas et la littérature de l’Indocheme bouddhique" for *Présence du Bouddhisme* (ed. René de Berval, France-Asie, Saïgon 1959).

Until her retirement, his wife, Ginette Terral-Martini, used to teach Pali at l’Ecole pratique and to this end the Collège de France published her *Eléments de grammaire pâli—explication du Mahāvīmaṃsajātaka* (1974). She compiled a *Choix de Jātaka* (6th. edn., Collection UNESCO: Connaissance de l’Orient, Paris 1958), and continued the tradition of her late husband by translating (for BEFEO) the *Samuddaghosajātaka* (together with the edited text from the Panṇāsajātaka collection, 1956, which formed part of her Sorbonne dissertation in 1952), *Velamajātaka* (1959), Pañcābuddhayakarana (1969) and "Un Jātaka concernant le dernier repas de Buddha" (1972). She also compiled a list of "Les titres des jātaka dans les manuscrits pâli de la Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris" (BEFEO, 1963). In similar vein, the Asian art historian, Pierre Dupont (1908-55), translated *La version môme du Nārada-Jātaka*. This dissertation for the University of Paris in 1953 was published by EFEO in the following year.


_Buddha_ comprises an introduction followed by a wide choice of translated texts, mainly from the Pali Canon but including many from other Hinayānīst recensions, based on "the life and legend of the Buddha", the Four Noble Truths and "the organisation of the community of monks". Special attention should be paid to his comprehensive study of the materials used in preparing his life of the Buddha: *Recherches sur la biographie du Bouddha dans les Sūtra-piṭaka et les Vinayapiṭaka anciens: I. de la quête de l’éveil à la conversion de Sāriputra et de Maudgalyāyana* (EFEO, 1963); II. les derniers mois, le parinirvāṇa et les funérailles (2 vols., EFEO, 1970-1). This study resulted from a comparative examination of the texts of the Therāvādins, Mahāsākakas and Dhamma-guptakas, together with the Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra and parallel texts.
The Pali Canon has been analysed by Marie Gallaud in _La vie du Bouddha et les doctrines bouddhiques_ (Paris 1931) and by Taymans d’Epernon in _Les paradoxes du Bouddhisme_ (Brussels 1947). However, few of the texts themselves have been translated in full. From the Digha Nikāya, apart from Burnouf’s renderings of Suttas 2 and 15, only four other Suttas have been published: Nos. 1-3 were edited and translated for _Canon bouddhique pāli_ (Adrien-Maisonneuve, Paris 1949) by Jules Bloch, Jean Fillionat and Louis Renou—three of the most prominent French Indologists in this century; No. 31 was translated by Alexandra David-Neel for her popular expositions of early Buddhism: _Le Modernisme bouddhiste et le Bouddhisme du Bouddha_ (Editions Alcan, Paris 1911) and _Le Bouddhisme, ses doctrines et ses méthodes_ (Librairie Plon, Paris 1936; reprinted as _Le Bouddhisme du Bouddha_, 1960); this Sutta also appeared in Walpola Rāhula’s introduction, _L’Enseignement du Bouddha_ (Editions du Seuil, Paris 1961).

Jean Bertrand-Boeandé translated the first ten suttas from the Majjhima Nikāya in _Les textes du Canon bouddhique pāli: I. Les Moyens Discours_ (Les Editions Véga, Paris 1953). Sponsored by Les Amis du Bouddhisme and largely financed by the Buddhist Association and Buddhist University of Thailand, it was hoped that the remaining suttas from this collection would be translated but lack of interest or support has prevented the appearance of further volumes. Suttas 2, 7 and 10 were also published in Rāhula’s primer (op. cit.—not unnaturally since Boeandé had worked “under the direction” of the latter), whilst Nos. 3, 11, 75 and 121 have appeared in various Buddhist journals.

XXXV, 28 and LVI, 11 from the Sanyutta Nikāya were included in Rāhula’s exposition whilst XXXV, 200 appeared in _Cahiers Bouddhistes_ (Lausanne 1971). Michel Dufour’s translation of the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta (Mâcon 1973) remains in MS.

Coming to the Khuddaka Nikāya, however, no less than six translations of the Dhammapada have been made, four of which have been published in Paris: those of Fernando Hû (1878), R. and M. de Maratray (Paul Geuthner, 1931), P. S. Dhammārāma (BEFEO, 1963) and André Chedel ( _Les Vers de la Doctrine_, Dervy Livres, 1978). The English version of Nārada was translated and serialised in _Sagesse_ (the short-lived journal of Monastère de la Mahā Prajñāparāmitā, Gretz 1968-9) and _Cahiers Bouddhistes_ (the quarterly journal of Groupement Bouddhiste Romand, Lausanne, from 1972). A collective original translation was undertaken by the leaders of the Centre d’Études Bouddhiques in Grenoble and their efforts were duplicated in the form of _Versets du Dhamma_ in 1976.

From the Sutta-Nipāta, the Dhanija and Salla Suttas and the Vasala and Mahāmaṅgala Suttas respectively appeared in David-Neel’s books (op. cit.), with the Mahāmaṅgala appearing with the Metta Sutta in Rāhula. From the Jātaka, one story was included in each issue of _Le Bodhisat_ (the quarterly journal of the WFB Regional Centre in Paris) from 1972. The Cariyāpiṭaka was translated and bound with the Dhammapada translated by Dhammārāma, one of the most gifted scholar bhikkhus from Cambodia who must, on that account, be presumed murdered by the Khmer Rouge.


Few original works on Theravāda Buddhism have appeared, reliance being placed on translations of works by Evola, Grimm, Nārada, Nyānaponika, Nyāpatiloka and Oldenberg. Michel Dufour, a young Buddhist school-teacher from Mâcon, has translated a large number of Wheel and Bodhi Leaves booklets from the BPS (Kandy), whilst S. Stork translated six Wheels and four Bodhi Leaves for commercial publication under the title, _Initiation au Bouddhisme_ (Editions Albin Michel, Paris 1968).
BOOK REVIEWS


This is a well-printed and produced book which covers all aspects of the subject. The author submitted an earlier form of the same as a Ph.D. thesis to the Dept. of Philosophy at Banaras Hindu University. It was awarded the Metaphysics Prize for being the best dissertation submitted on philosophy in 1970. It is, however, somewhat ironical that a work on Buddhism, that most unmetaphysical of teachings, should receive such a prize!

The author has combed the Pali suttas and Abhidhamma, together with the Commentaries in some places, for references to his subject and one must admit that he has not omitted many. But one should not give the impression that his work is a string of quotations for he has very ably threaded all of them together with his own writing.

Chapter One gives the historical antecedents to the Buddhist teaching on kamma. Relationships with so-called "orthodox" Hindu systems are discussed, also the famous six teachers of the Buddha's day. Perhaps the author does not quite make clear here that the Buddha has not "borrowed" the teaching of kamma from the existing ways of thought but rather verified what was true and rejected what was false. In India the theory of "borrowing" seems very prevalent!

The Karma-doctrine in Buddhist Scriptures forms the subject matter of Chapter Two. Both the suttas and the Commentaries have been searched for references. Kamma and Dhamma are defined, the inextricability of the former stressed and the implications of kamma as a law well-stated. The author has given some useful examples of the categories he describes to illustrate their meaning.

Karma and Rebirth is discussed in Chapter Three. The perennial question of "How can I be reborn if there is no self?" is answered here. Death is also analysed together with the process of death and grasping at a new existence. A final section to this chapter gives scriptural proofs for rebirth, that is, inasmuch as words can be proof for such experiences.

The following chapter, the fourth, deals with Rebirth and the Planes of Existence. These are fully described with many references and the sections on the planes of misery should convince any reader that certain actions must certainly be avoided—so that these experiences are avoided! Similarly, all the material on human and heavenly birth has also been collected here—to convince one that the precepts should be kept and generous gifts given so that they may be enjoyed.

More philosophical and less descriptive, the fifth chapter is on The Wheel of Becoming. Dependent Origination is discussed in general and then factor by factor. The author's references in this discussion are all from the suttas—which in Thailand find more students than the Abhidhamma. Though the writing of this chapter has more Pali words than elsewhere, the author has always given translations and a careful reader will not find the meaning difficult to understand.

Chapter Six relates Karma and Rebirth as the basis of moral principles. The criteria are given (quoting the famous Kāllama Sutta) and then vicarious salvation is discussed and contrasted with Buddhist methods of self-help. Accumulation of wholesome kamma and the benefits of believing in it are made clear.

Nirvāṇa as the end of Karma and Rebirth is the subject of the last chapter. Dukkha is briefly reviewed and then the two kinds of Nibbāna. This is then looked at from different angles. How to approach it is listed as the Eightfold Path and the seven stages of purification are each commented upon.

A full bibliography and a good index round off this book which, it is hoped, will come into the hands of many people. Publications from Bangkok are often overlooked in other countries simply because they are so poorly distributed. A book of this calibre does not deserve that fate!

Phra Khantipalo

Individual and Society in Buddhism. W. G. Weeraratne. Metro Printers Ltd., Colombo. 101 pp £2 (copies are available directly from the author at 71 Mihiiri Pedesa, Asiri Uyana, Moratuwa, Sri Lanka. These will be despatched by registered surface mail, post free).

Books on Buddhist subjects published in English in Sri Lanka often receive little or no publicity in Buddhist and related journals published in Western countries. One hopes that Dr. Weeraratne's excellent work will not suffer similar obscurity.

The theme of this short work, which is based on the author's doctoral thesis submitted to the University of Lancaster, is the role of the individual, and the relationships between individuals, in society, according to the teachings of the Pali Canon. The brief summary of each chapter given below will help to illustrate how this theme is developed.
After discussing the ideas current in India during the lifetime of the Buddha, the opening chapter presents a description of the ideal of life as taught in Buddhism, together with an analysis of the path leading to the realisation of this ideal. The author demonstrates how this path is directly relevant to man in society and how the individual who follows this path may eliminate ignorance and selfish tendencies in himself, thus enhancing not only his own well-being, but also the well-being of others.

The second chapter considers Buddhism's emphasis on the fundamental equality of humans, and the supremacy of man as potential master of himself, possessing freedom in thought and action; as opposed to one whose destiny is presided over by a divine creator. It is demonstrated how Buddhism aims to liberate man from all types of physical, environmental and psychological bondage, so that he can think and act in an unbiased and balanced way.

The norms of good and evil in man's social dealings is the subject of the third chapter. The various criteria taught by the Buddha to determine whether an act is good (kusala, puṇḍita, etc.) or evil (akusala, pāpa, etc.) are discussed in detail. According to these criteria, the perfection and well-being of the individual are directly related to those of others in society and the consideration of both aspects provides the ultimate basis in deciding whether an act is beneficial or not.

The fourth chapter treats the development of mutual relationships and the duties and obligations of an individual to society so as to ensure social progress and the harmony, peace and happiness of all, within that society. All mutual relationships (between ruler and subject, between parent and child, etc.) are discussed in the context of this social ideal.

The final chapter discusses the development of character; how the disciplining of body, speech and mind leads to the moulding of a strong character and all-round personality capable of facing and solving the problems of life and successfully performing one's social duties and obligations.

This book provides a lucid and stimulating treatment of an important aspect of Buddhist ethics, and it could usefully be read in conjunction with the Ven. Dr. H. Saddhātissa's masterly work on that subject. Dr. Weeraratne succeeds in giving us a scholarly study, soundly based on canonical texts, which is at the same time an instructive and practical guide to living.