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STANZAS OF VICTORY*

(translated by *Bhikkhu Khantipālo*)

I have seen laymen learned in Dhamma, "Pleasures are transient" so often they say but passionately they are attached to caring for children, jewellery, wife. They know not the Dhamma as it really is though often they say "O transient pleasures" they're lacking the power to cut their desire and therefore attached to children, wife and wealth. (187-188)

Isidinna was a merchant's son born in western India who heard the Buddha give a Dhamma talk and then became a Stream-winner. While he was still living as a householder a deity who had compassion for him roused him with the above words. When Isidinna heard these he was deeply moved and, going forth, not long after won Arahantship. And when he confessed his penetrative knowledge, he repeated these verses.

Five and twenty years since I went forth
and not so much as a finger-snap
of peaceful mind have I obtained!
Never getting one-pointedness of mind
since afflicted by sense-desires,
lamenting and with arms outstretched
I went away from my dwelling-place.
Shall I, shall I take a knife—
what use is life to me?
Giving up training, such as I,
how am I to die?
Taking then my razor
I sat upon my couch
with the blade placed on my throat

* These extracts are taken from a new anthology of stanzas from the Thera-theri-gāthā, *Banner of the Arahants*, which will be published by the Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy. The English bhikkhu translator is normally based on Wat Buddharingsee in Stanmore, New South Wales. Recently, however, he established a meditation and retreat centre in the same Australian state: Wat Buddha-Dhamma, Ten Mile Hollow, P. O. Wisemans Ferry, N.S.W. 2255.

to cut my own artery;
thorough application of mind arose in me
the danger was revealed and then
weary with the world was evenness established.
Then my mind was Free!
See the Dhamma's normality!
Possessed is the triple knowledge,
done is the Buddha's Sāsana. (405-410)

Sappadasa tried to kill himself out of despair because of his wandering mind. He was born as the son of King Suddhodana's ceremonial priest and therefore of brahmin stock. When the Buddha returned to his own people to teach them, he obtained confidence and went forth. He was overpowered by defilements of mind and so could not win one-pointedness of mind. Finally, he became so distressed that he got to the point of committing suicide but then insight arose and Arahantship was attained. Declaring his perfect knowledge, he uttered the above verses.

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SUTTA NIPATA

N. A. Jayawickrama

THE NARRATIVE BALLADS

The *Pabbajjā* and *Padhāna Suttas* and the *Vatthu-gāthā* of *Nālaka Sutta* and *Pārāyana Vagga* and part of the epilogue to the latter can be classed as narrative pieces in *Sn.* In addition to these there are other isolated narrative verses (*Sn.* 30, 251-252, etc.), which the Commentator himself attributes to the *saṅgītikārā*. Out of these narrative pieces, the *Vatthu-gāthā* of the *Pārāyana* have been fully discussed in the general remarks on that *vagga*. An attempt will now be made at a more detailed examination of the *Pabbajjā*, *Padhāna* and *Nālaka Suttas*. A brief reference has already been made to them, and Winternitz's significant statement that they form the earliest beginnings of a life of Buddha in verse, has been noted. A little more has been said about these *suttas* in the general discussion on the *Mahāvagga*, and the arrangement of the *suttas* in it.

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Pabbajjā Sutta

The *Pabbajjā Sutta*¹ is essentially a narrative ballad, which on account of the highly interesting dialogue it contains can be called a dialogue-ballad at the same time. The whole *sutta* is built upon the event of Bimbisāra's first meeting with the Buddha. The first three stanzas serve as an introduction to the narrative, which proceeds throughout in the 3rd person, and the other 17 (*Sn.* 408-424) constitute the body of the ballad. It will be noticed (later) that these introductory verses did not form an integral part of the poem. The dialogue-stanzas of the *sutta* are of a highly dramatic character. The narrative-stanzas interspersed with the dialogue, describe in successive stages the events leading up to the point when the respective characters represented in the *sutta* make their statements. It is not improbable that this poem was a regular dramatic ballad, in which the narrator recited the narrative stanzas while others sang the respective stanzas assigned to the various characters; for, in many respects the narrative verses closely resemble the prose narrative element in the regular "*Ākhyāna*-ballads" of *Sn.* (e.g. *Kasibhāradvāja Sutta*); and the dialogue stanzas, the dialogue element in such *suttas*. The description of the change of scene and events enables the listener to follow the dialogue closely.

1. The Commentary (*SnA.* 381) ascribes the *sutta* to Ananda.

From the analogy of the “*Ākhyāna*-type” of mixed ballads it may be argued that only the dialogue (Sn. 410-411, 416, 420-424) formed the original ballad and that the narrative stanzas were merely a versification of earlier extant prose, which was perhaps like the narrative prose of some of the *suttas* in Sn. However, this cannot be established with any degree of certainty. Neither can it be said whether the poetical forms in the narrative stanzas are artificial forms based on the prose or not. Yet, in two instances (Sn. 406, 417-419) the narrative verses closely resemble the standard form of expression in prose canonical Pāli.² This coincidence is not a mere accident.

As regards the forms themselves in these narrative-stanzas they present no divergence from the normal *gāthā*-Pāli. Linguistic data suggest an earlier date for the dialogue-stanzas. The uniformity of metre (*Anuṣṭubh Śloka*) is perhaps due to the attempt on the part of the writer of the *ākhyāna* in verse to present a uniform ballad. The striking forms in the dialogue-stanzas are:—Sn. 410, *bhonto, brahā* the use of which is entirely restricted to poetry (s.v. PTS.), *pekkhati*; Sn. 411, the *sandhi, nīcakulā-m-iva*, which though inorganic is essentially old Pāli; Sn. 421, *anika* of direct Vedic origin *bhuñjassu, akkhāhi*; Sn. 422, the adverbial usage of *ujum* which is archaic (v.l. *ujū*. cp. *Mvastu. nija-* which Neumann calls a misunderstanding of the old Pāli) Sn. 423, *kāme abhipatthayam* (a) *abhi* construed with acc. (b) the old p. pr. in *-am*, Sn. 424, *kāmesu*... an historical construction belonging to old Pāli and *daṭṭhu*, irregular archaic absolute.

There exists no early prose record of this incident. According to later tradition (SnA. 382 ff., J.I, 66 and DhA. I. 85) the meeting between Seṇiya Bimbisāra and Gotama took place prior to the Enlightenment. The reference made to him as the Buddha (Sn. 408a) and *cakkhumā* (Sn. 405^b) need not imply any contradiction, for even prior to the Enlightenment Buddha may be spoken of in such terms by later writers. Yet, the reference here is to the personal Buddha.³ As a rule, the term as referring to the personal the Buddha was not very popular in the earliest portions of the Canon, where, invariably, he is called Bhagavā or Tathāgata. But its use as, “the Enlightened” or “the Awakened” is early, e.g. S.I. 35, 60, A. IV. 449, Sn. 622, 643, 646, etc. Besides this the occurrence

2. (a) Sn. 406 cp. M.I, 179, S.V. 350, A.II, 208, etc. *sambādho gharāvāso rajā-patho, abbhokāso pabbajjā*.

(b) Sn. 417-419 cp. D.I, 50 II. 73, A.V. 65, Vin. I, 231, 242, etc. . . . *bhaddāni bhaddāni yānāni yojāpetvā, Bhaddam yānam abhiruhitvā, bhaddehi bhaddehi yānehi. . . niyyāsi, yena. . . tena pāyāsi, yāvatikā yānassa bhūmi yānena gantvā, yānā paccorohitvā, pattiko'va yena bhagavā ten'u pasankami upasaṅkamitvā bhagavatā saddhiṃ sammodi, sammodaniyam katham sārāṇiyam vitisāretva ekamantaṃ nisīdi*.

3. The term Buddha occurs 39 times in the *gāthās* of Sn. . . As many as 25 refer to the personal Buddha, and the other 14 to Buddha in the impersonal sense. The term Sambuddha is met with 19 times.

of the phrases, *ākinnavaralakkhaṇo* (Sn. 408^d) and *lakkhaṇasampannaṃ* (Sn. 409^c) may be accepted as indicative of a certain amount of development in the concept of the Buddha. The nominal forms, *pāsādasmiṇ* (Sn. 409^b) and *rājino*⁴ (Sn. 415^d) apparently belong to a considerably late stratum of Pāli. All this evidence does not go to prove the lateness of the entire poem, but that probably the narrative verses may not be as old as the rest of the poem. This may still be maintained in spite of the general uniformity of the poem in many respects. It is clear that the event reported in this *sutta* took place prior to the Buddha's Enlightenment (vide Sn. 424^c) and that it was the first time that Bimbisāra met the Buddha. This is further attested to by the strong tradition preserved in the *Nidāna-kathā* of the *Jātaka*.

However, there are a few discrepancies in the poem. The occurrence of the term Buddha at Sn. 408 has already been discussed. It is to be noted that the version of this *sutta* in the *Mahāvastu* (*Mvastu*. II. 198 ff.) does not refer to him as the Buddha. Again according to the *Pabbajjā Sutta*, the Buddha had a following even at this stage—*nāgasāṅgha purakkhato*, Sn. 421. Neither *Mvastu*. nor the condensed version in the *Nidāna-kathā* makes any mention of a following or a *saṅgha*. In fact Sn. 420-421 are represented by only one stanza in *Mvastu*.,

*Udagro tvam asi rājñah aśvāroho'va selako/
dadāmi bhogaṃ bhunjāhi, jātīm cākhyāhi prechito||*

It may be quite possible that in this instance *Mvastu*. preserves an older tradition while the two stanzas in Sn. indicate an expansion on a different line. This is further borne out by the strange resemblance of Sn. 420^{ab} to the oft-recurring prose formula, *daharo hoti, yuvā susu kālakeso*⁵ *bhadrena yobbanena samannāgato* . . . M. I, 82, D. I. 115, A. II, 22, III, 66, etc. Some of these apparent contradictions may be ascribed either to later accretions or to a confusion of the tradition at some early stage. The latter possibility is more plausible when all the other available evidence is taken into consideration.

Though both versions narrate the same event, the Pāli and BSk. show definite signs of independent development from their original source, if such a version did exist. In the case of Pāli this has been effected mainly by the association of the forms of expression and formulae pertaining to the standard prose idiom. Many of the discrepancies in evidence in Sn. can be thus explained on this basis. Two such instances have been

4. The only other occurrence of *rājino* in Sn. is at 209. in the *Brāhmaṇadhammika Sutta*. To say nothing of that *sutta*, but taking Sn. 299 independently, its comparative lateness is evident from the late word *vipallāsa* and the (late?) artificial nominal form *viyākāram* occurring in it.

5. Also *susukālakeso* which is explained by Commentaries as, ‘with very black hair’.

Padhāna Sutta

The *Padhāna Sutta* appears to be foreshadowed in the last stanza of the *Pabbajjā Sutta*—*padhānāya gamissāmi*, (*Sn.* 424°). The two *suttas* are closely connected with each other, but in spite of *Sn.* 424° it is doubtful whether they aim at a connected narrative, though they ostensibly appear as such. In view of the changes that the *Pabbajjā Sutta* has undergone at editorial hands it may be surmised, though it cannot be established with certainty, that it served as an introductory *sutta* to *Padhāna* in *Sn.* and that *Sn.* 424° was a mere coincidence. *Mvastu.* hardly throws any light on this, on account of the fact that the *sūtra* there, while preserving some of the primitive characteristics, also shows an expansion on a line different from that of *Sn.*, and besides, some of the sections that are placed between the two *suttas* contain much irrelevant matter (such as *jātakas*). However, it is significant that the next *sutta* in *Mvastu.* deals with incidents following Buddha's departure to Uruvilvā leaving Udraka Rāmaputra. The *pāda*, *padhānāya gamissāmi* is common to both Pāli and BSk. (*prahānāya gamiṣyāmi*—*Mvastu.* II, 199¹⁸), and must necessarily be old, but seems to have been partially responsible for the prefacing as it were, of the *Padhāna Sutta* with the *Pabbajjā*—besides taking into account the logical sequence of these two surviving ballads.

These two *suttas* represent but two of the major episodes in the eventful period of Buddha's early career, the one, at best being a record of Bimbisāra's first meeting with the Buddha, and hence be more appropriately termed "Bimbisārapratyudgama" (*vide* PBR 1, 3), while the other allegorical representation in ballad-form, Buddha's conquest of evil. On the strength of the evidence from these two *suttas* alone, the relevance of intervening incidents recorded in *Mvastu.*, *SnA.*, *DhA.*, and *Nidānakathā* (J. I, 66), however late some of these accounts may be, cannot be brushed aside as subsequent accretions in the course of development of the story of the Buddha. Although it is quite obvious that the latter accounts are highly embellished versions of the life of the Buddha, the fact that only these two important events of the renunciation and the quest of peace by asceticism are preserved in the form of ballads, neither precludes the possibility of the early existence of more ballads of this nature, nor establishes that these *suttas* contain a complete record of Buddha's early sojourn as an ascetic. Yet, "the wholesome austerities" as pointed out by Chalmers (p. xix) evinced in these *suttas* gives them precedence over all other extant accounts.

noticed earlier (above). The three introductory stanzas are replaced by a brief prose sentence in *Mvastu.* which states that the *Bodhisattva* leaves Ārāḍa Kālāma and repairs to Rājagṛha. There is nothing corresponding to *Sn.* 413 in *Mvastu.* The number of instances in which the *pādas* of this stanza are seen to occur in other Pāli metrical works (Hare, p. 195) perhaps indicates a possible explanation for the presence of this stanza here. The stanza *Sn.* 416 is expanded into two verses in *Mvastu.* and *Sn.* 417 into three. The stanza corresponding to *Sn.* 418 in *Mvastu.* is totally different from the Pāli which bears kinship with the prose formulae. Again, *Sn.* 424^{ab} (cp. *Th1.* 458, *Th2.* 226, etc.) has no parallel in BSk. Though the dialogue between Bimbisāra and Buddha (*Sn.* 420-424) is found in a more condensed form in *Mvastu.*, it does not end where it stops in *Sn.*, but continues with two more stanzas in which Bimbisāra solicits Buddha's promise to visit him after the Enlightenment.

The story in the *Nidānakathā* (J. I, 66) is not very helpful in the analysis of this *sutta*, as it is even posterior to *SnA.* which it mentions.⁶

Other internal evidence consists of an examination of the places mentioned in the *sutta*. Rājagṛha was connected with Buddha's early career, and was one of the earliest centres of Buddhism. The peak Paṇḍava was situated in the line of hills which formed a natural fortification to the city, giving it the name Giribbaja (see also DPPN). The Sākiyas are spoken of as a family of the Āditya clan inhabiting the Himālayan sector of Kosala. Legend has not yet grown round them making them an all powerful clan. They are merely a *kula* in Kosala. This too supports the general antiquity of the poem. However, the evidence at hand shows that the dialogue-stanzas preserve an older stratum than the narrative verses which betray signs of further development. It is quite probable that the three introductory stanzas which cannot be traced in *Mvastu.* were still later than the narrative verses. On account of the general consistency of the poem in language, metre, style and syntax it is not possible to say by what length of time these stanzas were separated; yet it must be agreed with Winternitz that this *sutta* is a precious remnant of the ancient ballad-poetry from which the epic of the life of Buddha developed.

6. A comparison of the two is interesting merely from the point of view of tradition. In the *Nidānakathā* the *dūtas* see the Buddha and inform the King, and it is they who speculate whether he is a *deva*, human being etc. It is described how the Buddha loathed the meal he obtained by begging alms, and he finally ate it after self-admonition. Bimbisāra visits the Buddha and is impressed by his bearing—*iriyāpathasmiṃ pasīdītvā*—and offers him all comforts which the Buddha refuses. He finally solicits a promise from the Buddha to visit Magadha after the Enlightenment. Buddha then goes to Ālāra Kālāma, and Uddaka Rāmaputta and finally practises austerities—*mahāpadhānaṃ padahitukāmo mahāpadhānaṃ padhānesi*. Subsequent events are next recorded in the *Nidānakathā*.

The *Padhāna Sutta*, like its companion poem, the *Pabbajjā Sutta*, is a narrative incorporating dialogue-stanzas. The occurrence of the 1st person in the opening stanza (*Sn.* 425^a—*maṃ*) cannot be reconciled with the 3rd person in the narrative at *Sn.* 429^{cd},

imā gāthā bhaṇaṃ Māro aṭṭhā Buddhassa santike.

It has been correctly pointed out by Katre that *maṃ* is an error for *naṃ*, which has its antecedent at *Sn.* 408^a.⁷ The fact that this line has no exact parallel in *Mvastu*. makes the verification of Katre's suggestion rather difficult; and furthermore, the uniformity of the Pāli Mss. which read *maṃ* throughout shows that the "error" has set in at a very early stage. This confusion is also noticeable in *Mvastu*. though the exact parallels are not found there. (The account at *Lal.* 299 ff. is of no value as it offers no parallel to *Sn.* or any other Pāli version). The opening stanza in *Mvastu*. reads, *prahāṇaṃ prahitaṃ mayā* (II, 238^d), but the narrative reverts to the 3rd person in the sixth stanza,

imāṃ vācāṃ bhaṇe Māro, Bodhisattvasya santike.

This coincidence, besides establishing for certain the common origin of the two versions throws some light on the narrative element in this *sutta*. A glance at the *sutta* shows that it contains comparatively few narrative stanzas. (*viz.* *Sn.* 425, 426^{ab}, 429^{cd} 430^{ab} and 449) as contrasted with *Pabbajjā Sutta*. The dialogue-stanzas at *Sn.* 425^{ab}-429^{ab} can be taken as forming three complete stanzas; thus;

1. *Kiso tvam asi dubbhaṇṇo, santike maraṇaṃ tava, saḥassabhāgo maraṇassa, ekaṃso tava jīvitaṃ.*
2. *Jīva bho, jīvitaṃ seyyo, jīvaṃ puññāni kāhasi, carato ca te brahmacariyaṃ aggihuttaṃ ca jūhato.*
3. *Pahūtaṃ cīyate puññaṃ, kiṃ padhānena kāhasi. Duggo maggo padhānāyu dukkaro durabhisambhavo.*

Similarly *Sn.* 430^{cd} and 431 can conveniently form a stanza of six *pādas* like *Sn.* 434. (It is not possible to arrange *Sn.* 430^{cd}-434^{ef} into five stanzas without breaking up complete sentences and disturbing the harmony of the poem). It is quite probable that at some stage the *sutta* consisted of only the dialogue, the narrative stanzas being a versification of older prose. The presence of narrative verses in *Mvastu*. makes it quite clear that this has taken place at a very early stage. The confusion in the narrative may be ascribed to that same period.

7. Neumann (*Reden*, p. 469) equates *taṃ maṃ* to *taṃ' maṃ* (= *taṃ imāṃ*—anaphoric, like so 'ham) which is a brilliant suggestion which explains the whole discrepancy, though the exact idiom is not to be met with elsewhere.

The opening dialogue-stanzas quoted above are the words of Māra, and Buddha's reply commences at *Sn.* 430^{cd} and ends at *Sn.* 440. The next five stanzas are in the form of a soliloquy, and the end of *Sn.* 443 marks the complete defeat of Māra, while *Sn.* 444-445 constitute the "victorious resolution of the hero" (Katre). The next three stanzas representing Māra's acknowledgment of defeat appear to be a subsequent addition. They are not found in *Mvastu*.; but it is stated at S.I, 122 that Māra was on the Buddha's trail for seven years waiting for an opportunity to seize him, but with no success—*olārāpekkho, olāraṃ alabhamāno*. Later, in the same section (S. I, 124), he acknowledges defeat and utters the identical stanzas at *Sn.* 447-448. It is quite probable that *Sn.* 446 is a versification of a passage corresponding to that at S. I, 122 while the next two stanzas were perhaps taken from the same source as S. The final stanza of the poem (*Sn.* 449) roughly corresponds to that in *Mvastu*, and forms the narrator's conclusion.

There is no doubt that the *sutta* is old, but the whole of it cannot be assigned the same antiquity. Some austerities practised by the Buddha are mentioned at M. I, 242 ff. Here the Buddha relates how he gradually gave up self-mortification and fasting. He took food in gradual quantities till he became strong again. The *pañcavaggiyas* left him saying, *bāhuliko samaṇo Gotama, padhānavibbhanto āvatto bāhullāya*. ("The ascetic Gotama has swerved from his austerities and has reverted to a life of luxury"—M. I, 247, cp. M. I, 17-24, 114-118, 167, etc). Then he evolved the four *jhānas* and realised the three *vijjās*. There is no mention of Māra in the *Majjhima* account. S. I, 103 speaks of Māra as having visited him when he was seated at the foot of the Ajapāla banyan tree, after attaining Enlightenment. *Lal.* devotes a whole section (*Māradharsaṇa-parivartaḥ*—*Lal.* 299-343) to the Buddha's conquest of Māra. (S. I, 124 will be discussed later). Besides these there are numerous late accounts which deal with this topic in great detail, e.g. J. I, 71 ff. *BvA.* 239, *SnA.* 391, *DhA.* II 195, etc. Actual battles are spoken of between the legions of Māra and the Buddha, and many of the late accounts make *pāramitās* combat Māra.

The only version which bears a close resemblance to the *Padhāna Sutta* is the section at *Mvastu*. II, 237 ff. Their common origin has already been hinted at. Among the numerous incidents reported in *Mvastu*. between the two *sūtras* corresponding to *Pabbajjā* and *Padhāna*, there occurs a description of severe austerities practised by the Buddha (II, 231 ff.). It is stated that he lived on one *kola* (Pāli, *kaḷāya*?) a *tila* and a *taṇḍula* each a day for three successive periods of 18 months each, and no food at all for a further period of 18 months making up a total of six

years which agrees with all other accounts (cp. *Nidānakathā*). An old parallel to this is found at M. I, 245; *thokaṃ thokaṃ āhāraṃ āhāresin, pasataṃ pasataṃ yadi vā muggayūsaṃ, yadi vā kulatthayūsaṃ-pe*.

The prose introduction to the *Prahāṇa Sūtra* occurs at *Mvastu*. II, 237, in which it is stated that the Evil One visited the *Bodhisattva* while he was practising; austerities (*duṣkaracārikaṃ carantaṃ*) at Uruvilvā on the banks of the Nairāñjanā. Comparing this narrative with M. I, 245 the striking similarity in the essentials, leaving aside the extraneous matter in the former, is the common basis of their origin that they point to. The main purpose of the narrative in *Mvastu*. being the linking up of various *jātakas* it is very unlikely that much attention was paid to the narration of the present story. This being the case exaggeration and poetic embellishment find no place in this part of *Mvastu*.

It is significant that it contains no passages corresponding to *Sn.* 427^{ab}, 438^{cd}, 440, 441^{cd}, 442, 443^{ab}, 444^c, 445^{eb}, and 446-448. Of these *Sn.* 427^{ab} is a descriptive line emphasising the odds against Gotama, while 438^{cd} is a phrase found in a slightly different form in prose, *attānaṃ ukkaṃseti pare vambheti*, M.I. 402, A. II, 27, etc. and is probably an importation to the *sutta*. This is further strengthened by the phrase *lābho siloko sakkāro* (*Sn.* 438^a) which closely resembles the familiar phrase *lābhasakkārasilokānisamsā*, whereas *Mvastu*. reads *lobha* for *lābha* (probably a scribe's error).

The absence of the stanza *Sn.* 440 in *Mvastu*, its rhetorical effect lending a realistic touch, and the occurrence of line cd. at Th1, 194, J. VI, 495 make it appear rather suspicious in the eyes of the reader. Scholars have discussed at great length the phrase, *esa muñjaṃ parihare*. ("Look you, I bear the *muñja* grass"—Neumann, *esa*=*Du da*, Hare, "See, I bear *muñja* grass"). Otto Schrader (JRAS. 1930, pp. 107-109) refers to Pischel's misinterpretation of the phrase as *Ich verschmähe das Schilfrohr* ("I refuse to take the reed"); so does Oldenberg reject it (ZDMG 1908, p. 594). He quotes five passages from *Gobhila Gṛhya Sūtra*, *Kātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra* and *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* to show the connection of *pariharati* with *muñja-mekhalā* or *muñjayoktra*—i.e. wearing a girdle. Dr. Schrader disagrees with Oldenberg's view that *Sn.* 440-442 is a soliloquy interrupting the direct speech of the *Bodhisattva* to Māra and says that these verses are calculated to frighten Māra though *Sn.* 442 may not seem to be directly addressed to him. Basing his argument on *Sn.* 431^d he says *Māraṃ* here is a poetical substitute for *Māra tvaṃ* and interprets the phrase as "I take this vow (to conquer or to die, caring nothing for life)"; cp *SnA.* 39. K. Chaṭṭopādhyāya (JRAS 1930, pp. 897-898) agrees with Schrader but prefers to translate it as "I gird up my loins" (which meant that he

would use his utmost vigour in his spiritual fight). He equates the passage to *Eṣo' ham parikaram badhnāmi* (*Veṇisaṃhāra* IV).

The section *Sn.* 439-444 is represented by only four lines at *Mvastu*. II, 240, and bears definite signs of enlargement. Judging from the fact that it was not customary for *Mvastu*, to summarise and condense, and that it often contains expansions of passages found in brief in Pāli it cannot be said that *Mvastu*. here contains a summary. The absence of a stanza corresponding to *Sn.* 442 in BSk. and the fact that it consistently refers to a real army and not an allegorical representation as in *Sn.* 436-438, are probable indications of the lateness of this stanza. *Sn.* 445^{ab} appears as a familiar expression adapted from the prose. The section *Sn.* 446-448 has already been dealt with (above). Thus, many of the lines in *Sn.* which have nothing corresponding to them in BSk. appear to be poetical flashes for embellishment which perhaps did not belong to the earliest form of this *sutta* on which were based the two versions in Pāli and BSk.

The *Mvastu*. too shows an expansion, which however, as in the case of the *Pabbajjā Sutta* has proceeded in a different direction from that in *Sn.* Besides numerous other *pādas* and parts of stanzas which have no counterpart in *Sn.* the stanza immediately preceding the concluding verse does not occur in *Sn.*, but can be traced in *Dh.* 26^{ab} and *Th1.* 883. An instance of a divergence in simile is seen in *āmapātraṃ va ambunā* which is meant to correspond to *āmaṃ pattaṃ va amhanā* (*Sn.* 443^d). Again, *Sn.* 446-448 need further investigation. If *Sn.* has borrowed the last two stanzas of this section from S. it follows that this part of the *Padhāna Sutta* is later than the *Māra Saṃyutta*. Taking into account the propensities of Buddhist writers to incorporate *gāthās* wherever possible, it would seem natural that S. should also contain *Sn.* 446 in verse. From this it may be deduced that *Sn.* 446 was not known in *gāthā*-form by the time of the compilation of the *Māra Saṃyutta*. Hence any inference that *Sn.* has directly borrowed them from S. would be erroneous.

On the other hand, from the aspect of the development of the Māra-legend S. I, 124 appears later than *Sn.* Here three of Māra's *senās* in *Sn.* *taṇhā*, *arati* (cp. *ārati* BSk.) and *kāmā* (viz. fourth, second and first) are personified as his three daughters Taṇhā, Arati and Ragā who attempt to allure the Buddha. Thus, on the whole the *Māra Saṃyutta* appears to be later than *Sn.*

Judging from the fact that *Sn.* 446-448 are not known to *Mvastu*. it may be inferred that at some stage the concluding stanza *Sn.* 449 occurred immediately after *Sn.* 445 and that with the introduction of the new stanzas the concluding narrative verse was shifted to occupy its present position. The *pāda* b, *viñā kacchā abhassatha* ("the lute fell from his arm-pit")

suggests a confusion of legend, the origin of which seems obscure. The Commentary (*SnA*. 393-394) states that it was this *vinā* (called *Beluva-panḍu*) that Sakka presented with to Pañcasikha. Yet, this does not solve the question of how Māra came by a *vinā*. The parallel *pāda* in *Mvastu*, which reads, *vināsaṃ gacchi ucchriti* ('his pride was all shattered') probably expresses the original idea that may have existed, prior to the importation of the *vinā* from the developed legend which speaks of his daughters as playing instrumental music as a part of their wiles. This phrase perhaps dating not earlier than the time of the incorporation of *Sn*. 446-448, a confusion as it may seem, is at best a master touch of poetic fancy bringing the *sutta* to a dramatic climax.

An examination of the *internal evidence* from language and syntax, metre and ideology confirms what has been already noticed. The idiom throughout is old *gāthā-Pāli*, and from the point of syntax the following expressions depict a very old idiom:—*Nadiṃ Nerañjaraṃ pati-Sn*. 425^b,... *seyyo...yañ ce...-Sn* 440^{cd}, *mā maṃ thānā acāvayi-Sn*. 442^d; etc. The *sutta* is full of archaic nominal and verbal forms e.g. *Namuci* (for Māra) -*Sn*. 426^a, 439^a, which is old Vedic (Neumann, p. 469), *amhanā-Sn*. 443^d, *kāhasi -Sn*. 427^d, 428^d (<*kārṣya*- Geiger, 54.4, 153.1), *socare -Sn*. 445^d, *nādhigacchissam -Sn*. 446^c (*iṣ-* Aor.), *aṭṭhā -Sn*. 429^d, *anupariyagā -Sn*. 447^b (✓Aor.), p.pr. *bhaṇam -Sn*. 429^c, and *vinayaṃ -Sn*. 444^d, etc.

The metre throughout is old *Anuṣṭubh Śloka*. The few metrical irregularities are:—*anacrusis* at *Sn*. 428^a, 431^a, *even* quarters at *Sn*. 435^a, 440^a, 443^a, 428^a, 439^c and 444^c.

No developments in doctrine are noticeable. The thought and ideas embodied in the *sutta* are distinctively old. Confidence (*saddhā*) and *virīya* and *paññā -Sn*. 432 have no special technical significance which is to be seen even in very early works. Other qualities mentioned are, *cittappasāda*, *sati* and *samādhi - Sn*. 434. The severe austerities referred to at *Sn*. 433-434 are characteristic of the times. Another important concept is *yogakkhema* (already discussed) which has been seen to pertain to the earliest phase of Buddhism. Māra is called *yakkha* at *Sn*. 449.

All this evidence shows that the *sutta* is old as a whole; but as observed earlier, *Sn*. 446-448 should be considered as being later than the rest of the poem. It is also probable, from the analogy of the *Pabbajjā Sutta*, that the narrative element in verse need not have formed an integral part of the poem and that the nucleus of the *sutta* was the dialogue.

Nālaka Sutta

The *Nālaka Sutta* consists of two parts, the introductory *vatthu-gāthā* (*Sn*. 679-698) and the dialogue-discourse (*Sn*. 699-723) dealing with *moneyya*—the state of a *muni*. As the *vatthu-gāthā* present a multiplicity of problems they call for separate attention. Generally, introductions to old Pāli ballads are considerably later than the poems themselves (*vide* PBR 1, 2, p. 86 and *vide* E. J. Thomas, *Life of Buddha*, p. 38). It will be seen that this is clearly borne out by the *vatthu-gāthā* in spite of the fact that they are in verse (also cp. *vatthu-gāthā* of *Pārāyana*). Unlike the introductions to many other *suttas* which narrate the incidents leading up to their preaching, these *gāthās* have little bearing on the *sutta* proper. There is a difference in point of time in the sequence of events in the two parts of the *sutta*. As regards characters in the v.g. a close parallel is offered by the *Pārāyana Vagga*, for Nālaka plays the same rôle as Piṅgiya in *Pār* (*vatthu-gāthā*, *pucchā* and epilogue) while Asita's position here is very similar to that of Bāvarī.

Despite the slender connection between the two parts, the internal and external evidence establishes beyond doubt that a fusion of two independent ballads has taken place, as in the case of the *Sela Sutta* (*Sn*. pp. 102 ff.⁸) and that the two components were separated in point of time.⁹

The language, style and metre of the *vatthu-gāthā* differ considerably from those of the *sutta* proper. At the same time there is a marked tendency towards the growth of a developed Buddha-legend, which is totally absent in the discourse. This is evident from the reference to the thirty-two marks (*vide* E. J. Thomas, *ibid.*) and the occurrence of the term *Bodhisatta* at *Sn*. 683.¹⁰ The general tone of this part of the *sutta* with its description of the devas rejoicing at the birth of the Buddha and Asita's prophecy is that of a later piece.

Language and style.—There are many late and Sanskritic forms lying side by side with equally numerous very old forms: e.g. *cittimkaritvā*, *atiriva kalyarūpo* (*Sn*. 680), *lomahaṃsano*, *marū* (*Sn*. 681), *manussaloke*, *hitasukhatāya* (*Sn*. 683), the epithets in *Sn*. 684, *avaṃsari* (an analogical form -*Sn*. 685), *sikhī*—fire—, the simile in the lines be (*Sn*. 687), *paṭiggāhe*

8. *Vide* Katre. He states that the intervening prose between *Sn*. 567 and 568 is "solely due to the fusion" of two different ballads.

9. *Vide* E. J. Thomas, *ibid*, p. 39 "The question of the *sutta* is quite different from the question of the origin of the legend (Asita's) and its becoming attached to this *sutta*."

10. Though "the Bodhisattva doctrine probably originated in the second century B.C." (Har Dayal—The Bodhisattva Doctrine in *Buddhist Sanskrit Literature*, p. 43) the term is older; but it does not reflect the oldest stratum of thought in Pāli Buddhism.

(an artificial form -*Sn.* 689), *Sakyaṇṇigavaṇṇa* (*Sn.* 690), *gamaṇaṇi* (= *maraṇaṇi*), *akalyarūpo* (*Sn.* 691), the *sandhis*, *isi-m-avoca*, *cāpi-m-assa*, the phrase *adhimanasā bhavātha* (*Sn.* 692), *kālakiriya*, *asamadhura* (*Sn.* 694), and *hīlamanasena* (*Sn.* 697). While the late forms suggest a date for the *vatthu-gāthā* the old and archaic forms handed down from an older period as the standard vehicle of poetic expression require no comment. The *sutta* itself (*Nālaka*-discourse) is marked by a total absence of late forms.

The *style* of the discourse is quite different from that of the *vatthu-gāthā*. The miraculous and the semi-supernatural element is a dominant feature in the latter. The narrative in addition to its highly ornate character is extravagantly descriptive and abounds in simile and metaphor, e.g. *Sn.* 686-687, etc. There are also instances of the same statement being repeated in similar words, e.g. *Sn.* 687, 689, which have the appearance of commentarial gloss. The *sutta* proper is written in a much simpler style.

Metre. The *Sutta* proper (*Sn.* 699-723) is in uniform *Śloka* metre like the *Pabbajjā* and *Padhāna Suttas* while the *vatthu-gāthā* are in a jumble of metres i.e. *Sn.* 681, 682, 684, 688-690 (except 688^b) are in *Triṣṭubh* with *jagati pādas*, and *Sn.* 679-680, 683, 685-687, 691-698 are in a metre of their own with the *Triṣṭubh* rhythm continued. Though it is generally held that historically, the *Śloka* metre is later than the *Triṣṭubh* it need not necessarily imply that these *ślokas* are later than the *Triṣṭubh* verses in the *vatthu-gāthā*. The divergence in metre is perhaps additional proof of the difference in the periods of composition of the two parts.

External Evidence:

The story of the Buddha's nativity in the *vatthu-gāthā* agrees in general with the versions in *Lalitāvistara*, *Mahāvastu*, the Tibetan *Dulva* and the *Nidānakathā* (*Jātaka*), but differs considerably in details. E. J. Thomas (*Life of Buddha*, pp. 38 ff.) has made a comparative study of this and no attempt is made here to go into any details. The verse-recension which follows the prose at *Lal.* 101 ff. has no connection whatsoever with the *Nālaka*-discourse in *Sn.* but is merely a different version of the prose legend with enlargements and details which differ to some extent. Unlike the prose these verses bear no close resemblance to the *vatthu-gāthā*. The points of interest in this account are:—1. Asita's nephew is Nara-datta and not Nālaka as in *Sn.* 2. There are more miracles, but the Bodhisattva does not plant his feet on Asita's forehead as at J. I, 55. 3. Asita sees with divine eye—*dibbacakkhu*—the birth of the Buddha and informs his nephew of it declaring the only two courses of action open to such

a being. 4. He takes his nephew with him to Kapilavāstu and interviews Śuddhodana and not the Śākyaas as in *Sn.* 5. The thirty-two major characteristics are dealt with in great detail. 6. After his pronouncement that the new born babe would become the Buddha he returns to the *āśrama* and advises Naradatta to follow the Buddha when the time comes.

The version in *Mvastu.* which agrees with the *vatthu-gāthā* is found quite apart from the *Nālaka*-discourse, viz. *Mvastu.* II, 30 ff. and III, 382 ff. (in both prose and verse respectively). Here Asita, the *ṛṣi* from Ujjayini goes to Kapilavāstu with his pupils including Nālaka who later in the account is also called Nārada. In details, the account is similar to that in *Lal.* Although the *naimittikas*, "soothsayers" declare that the young prince would become a *cakravartin*, Asita is certain of his becoming the Buddha. There are a few other miracles such as the birth of 500 each of girls, boys, male and female slaves, etc. simultaneous with that of the Bodhisattva. The verses that follow (pp. 33-43) deal more elaborately with the same incident. Asita advises Nārada to practise the *brahmacaryā* under the Buddha. The version at *Mvastu.* III, 382 ff. will be discussed later. It is also noteworthy that the Buddha's interlocutor here is called Nālaka Kātyāyana (p. 386) who on the advice of his father, the *purohita* to king Tonehāra seeks ordination (by the formula, *ehi bhikṣu*).

According to the Tibetan account at *Dulva*, III, f. 461 ff. (Rockhill, *Life of the Buddha*, pp. 17 ff.) it is the statue of the *yakṣa* Śākyavardhana that bows down at the child's feet and not the hermit as in J. The *ṛṣi* Akleśa (=Asita—Rockhill) the dweller on the Sarvadhāra mountain, with his nephew Nalada goes to see the infant Bodhisattva. He predicts the child's future and advises his nephew to enter the Śākya order when the time comes. The *Dulva* further states that Nalada became known as Kātyāyana among the 500 brahmins whom he joined at Benares, and that after his conversion by the Buddha he was called "the great member of Kātya's family". Thus, an attempt is made here to identify him with Mahākātyāyana (cp. *Mvastu.* III, 386 Nālaka Kātyāyana).

The *Nidānakathā* (J. I, 54 ff.) which decidedly shows signs of being much later than the BSk. accounts contains a great many details and abounds in miracles. The story, agrees fundamentally with the other versions. The name of the aged visitor is Kāla-devala, 'Devala the Black' (Asita=Kāla). He is a *tāpasa*, 'a hermit' from Avanti Dakkhinā-patha (Ujjeni, cp. *Mvastu.*) and not an *ṛṣi*. As in the *Dulva* the exact time of the Buddha's enlightenment is stated (viz. after thirty-five years).

Among other references to Asita in the Pāli Canon is the mention of Asita-devala at M. II, 155 whom Malalasekera (s.v., DPPN) attempts to

identify with Kāḷadevala an ascetic of Arañjarā whose younger brother was Nārada. In the *Samodhāna* of the *Indriya Jātaka* (J. III, 469) Kāḷadevala is identified with Kaccāna which perhaps indicates a distant echo of Nālaka Kātyāyana in *Mvastu*. or Mahākātyāyana of the *Dulva* (*vide* Rockhill, *ibid.*, pp. 18, 45). There is also mention made of Nārada of Arañjagiri in Majjhimappadesa, the younger brother of Kāḷadevala at J. III, 463 ff. and V, 133 ff.

The relatively early existence of the account is evident from the diverse accounts which present a uniformity in essentials. The more elaborate versions in BSk. with all their embellishments are decidedly later than the *vatthu-gāthā*. Needless to say the *Nidānakathā* and the *Dulva* are much younger than the BSk. However, the general consistency suggests a common origin to all these accounts. Though it is said that there is no evidence to show that the legend itself was pre-Christian (Thomas, *ibid.*) this alone is no proof of its being so late as that. It may have had an independent existence long before it came to be fixed in some definite form in the *vatthu-gāthā*. There is no reason to exclude the *vatthu-gāthā* from the *Sutta Nipāta* that was known to the author of *Milp.* (*vide* *Milp.* 411, 414, etc.). Thus it is quite probable that this legend existed in pre-Christian times. At the same time it cannot be disputed that it was later than the *sutta* proper.

Internal evidence has shown that it belongs to a younger stratum than the *Nālaka*-discourse. The fact that it has little bearing on the latter is further proof of its being an accretion at editorial hands, as was noted in the case of the *vatthu-gāthā* of the *Pārāyana Vagga*. The independent accounts in *Lal.*, *Mvastu.*, *Nidānakathā* and *Dulva*, though they may be much later than *Sn.*, further testify to the fact that the two parts of the *sutta* known as *Nālaka Sutta* in *Sn.* are in reality two independent poems differing in age, brought together at a subsequent date which, most probably, coincided with that of the final collation of *Sn.*

The identity of Nālaka is made rather obscure by his being referred to as Nālaka Kātyāyana at *Mvastu*. III, 386 ff. Nālaka Kātyāyana's conversion at *Dulva* XI, f. 118 ff. (Rockhill, *op. cit.* 45-46) found quite independently of the story of the nativity shares something in common with the introduction to the *Mauneya Sūtra* of *Mvastu.*, for, the episode of the Nāga Elapatra occurs in both of them. Yet, the individual in question is no other than Nālaka of the Pāli *sutta*. Nārada of J. III, 463 and V. 133, ff. is quite distinct from Nālaka. Similarly it is doubtful whether Asitadevala of M. II, 155 who had a younger brother Nārada was Asita of the *vatthu-gāthā*. Perhaps the identification of Kāḷadevala at J. III, 469 with Kaccāna and the mention of Asitadevala may have been respon-

sible for the name Kāḷadevala (of Ujjeni) in the *Nidānakathā* instead of Asita as in other versions.¹¹ However, it is almost self-evident that with the passage of time and the spread of the story various confusions have set in as a result of the influence of foreign legends.

Various attempts have been made by scholars to establish a connection between the nativity-legends in Buddhism and Christianity. In the circumstances of the birth of Christ, Bunsen,¹² Seydel¹³ and Lillie¹⁴ see an echo of the story of the Buddha's birth. C. F. Aiken¹⁵ an American theologian, sees in all these works "spurious evidence used to impugn the originality of the Gospels". E. J. Thomas (*op. cit.*) notes that Seydel, Edmunds and Pischel see in the story in *Sn.* the original story of Simeon (Luke, ii, 22-32) and that according to the latter¹⁶ (Pischel) the differences between the two stories are less than their correspondence. Windisch, in *Festschrift Kuhn* has traced Asitadevala back to Brahmanical literature. He regards it "not absolutely proved that the Simeon of St. Luke owes his existence to the Asita of the Buddhist legend". This subject is discussed at length by Edmunds in his *Buddhist and Christian Gospels*, by Windisch in *Buddha's Geburt*, and by J. Kennedy in *JRAS* 1917, pp. 209 ff., 469 ff. Whatever similarities there are in these two stories Thomas has pointed out clearly the differences between them (*ibid.*).

As noted earlier it is quite probable that this story was incorporated in the traditional accounts of the life of the Buddha in pre-Christian times. Thus, any suggestion of a borrowing on the part of Christianity or of a common origin prior to the birth of Christianity might cast serious aspersions on the originality and uniqueness of the legendary sections of the Gospel which many writers have endeavoured to maintain. If there has been any borrowing at all both the Indo-Aryans in Madhyadeśa and the Jews in ancient Israel may have probably drawn from a common source. However, the greater probability is that both stories may have originated independently of each other, and that they are merely parallel developments in the course of growth in the two respective religions.

The Nālaka-discourse:

The *sutta* itself dealing with *moneyya*, as observed earlier, preceded the composition of the *vatthu-gāthā*. The contents of the discourse with the emphasis on the conduct of a *muni* which points to a society of forest-dwelling ascetics, are indicative of its early origin. It prescribes the rules

11. *Sn.* 689 refers to Asita as Kaṇhasiri and *SnA.* 487 as Kaṇhadevala.
12. E. von Bunsen, *The Angel-Messiah of Buddhists, Essenes and Christians*, p. 34.
13. R. Seydel, *Das Evangelium von Jesu in seinen Verhältnissen zu Buddha*, p. 136.
14. A. Lillie, *Influence of Buddhism on Primitive Christianity*, p. 26.
15. *The Dhamma of Gotama Buddha and the Gospel of Jesus Christ*, p. xiv.
16. Pischel *Leberi und Lebre des Buddha*, p. 23 II.

and modes of conduct for the monk, and therefore belongs to that category of *suttas* in *Sn.* designated as the “*muni-class*”. There is a higher ethical basis underlying the *sutta*; and this is much more pronounced than even in the *Muni* and *Sammāparibbājanīya Suttas*. It has the same tone as the *Khaggavisāṇa Sutta* and agrees with its ethical values which have a special reference to the *bhikkhu*.

No detailed observations need be made on the language, style and metre of the *sutta*. A few casual remarks, however, have to be made on the ideology. On its own merits, the *sutta* recommends itself as an early poem, for all internal evidence clearly indicates it. The language is old and preserves several archaic forms many of which are poetic. Unlike the *vatthu gāthā* it contains no late forms. The ideas in the *sutta* share much in common with contemporary Indian thought. Neumann (*Reden*, p. 504 ff.) has made a comprehensive study of this giving many parallels. The stanzas *Sn.* 702, 703, 705, 711, 712, 713, 714, 720-722 are outstanding examples of ideas common to all literature of the period, though the thought throughout the *sutta* is more characteristic of an ascetic sect. However, a distinctive Buddhist strain runs through the whole poem. Yogic practices are mentioned in *Sn.* 716, and in the above mentioned stanzas are to be seen echoes of the Brāhmanas and the Upanisads.

Although there are several accounts of the Buddha's nativity in Pāli and BSk. literature, the only version which bears a close resemblance to the *Nālaka*-discourse in *Sn.* is to be found at *Mvastu*. III, 386 ff. Practically the whole discourse occurs in similar words with a few changes, which however, do not show much divergence from the Pāli. The order of the 24 stanzas in *Mvastu*. is different from that of the 25 stanzas in *Sn.* There is nothing in the BSk. version corresponding to *Sn.* 718; and the stanzas parallel to *Sn.* 709 and 714 bear only a vague resemblance to them. *Sn.* 706 is slightly expanded in BSk. while *Sn.* 708^{ab}, 707^{ab} and 708^{cd}, 709^{cd} respectively form two stanzas and *Sn.* 719^a has no parallel at all. The other noteworthy changes are :—*Sn.* 702^d // *kṣānto cānumato bhava*, *Sn.* 711^a *āgamma* // *āsādyā*, *Sn.* 711^d *payutaṃ* // *prepsutaṃ* *Sn.* 708^b *abhihārayc* // *abhirakṣaye*, *Sn.* 715^a *visatā* // *saritā*; *Sn.* 716^a // *evaṃ mauneyaṃ upesyasi* and *Sn.* 714^{ab} // *na pāraṃ dviguṇāyati nā' pi caiva guṇāyati*.

The close resemblance these two versions bear to each other suggests that they are but two recensions of the same discourse. It may be probable that the Pāli version is older than the BSk., but it cannot be supposed that the latter is based on the former. The only justifiable conclusion is that they had a common origin. Besides this there are several *Moneyya Suttas* in the Pāli Canon. *Anguttara Nikāya* I, 273 contains a short *sutta* dealing with the three *moneyyas*, *kāya*, *vacī* and *mano*, entitled

Moneyya Sutta. The abstention from the three *akusalas* arising from these three sources is termed *moneyya* and the *sutta* is concluded with the stanza,

*kāyamuniṃ vācāmuniṃ celomuniṃ nāsavaṃ
muniṃ moneyyasam pannaṃ āhu sabbappahāyinaṃ.*

Itivuttaka III, iii, 8 (It. 56) contains a more concise version of the same *sutta*. It mentions the three *moneyyas* and concludes with the same stanza as at A. I, 273, but with the last *pāda* altered into *āhu niṇhātapāpakaṃ*. The ten abstentions are not enumerated here. *Saṅgīti Sutta* (D. III, 220) merely mentions the three *moneyyas* together with other groups of threes.

Although the *Nālaka Sutta* neither specifies the three *moneyyas* under *kāya*, *vacī* and *mano*, nor enumerates them as the ten abstentions all that and much more is implied in it. The discourse covers a wider range than the limited scope of the *sutta* at A. I, 273. In addition to the abstentions (*Sn.* 704-706) there are positive injunctions on the mode of conduct of a monk. The absence of a well defined classification, and the emphasis which still lay on the life of the *muni*, the forest-living recluse, are also indicative of the *Nālaka*-discourse being anterior to the *suttas* mentioned above.

It has already been observed that Asoka's *Moneya-sūte* was the *Nālaka Sutta* PBR 1, 3p. 138. Mrs. Rhys Davids (*Manual*, pp. 312-314) identifies the fifth *dharmapaliyāya* with it. III, iii, 8 (It. 367 is evidently a misprint for It. No. 67), and Winternitz (*op. cit.* I, 607) accepts it. The alternative name of this *sutta* was the *Moneyya Sutta* (*Mvastu. Mauneya*), and it is most improbable that Asoka would have meant either It. 56 or A. I, 273 by his *Moneya-sūte*, for there is nothing remarkable about these two pieces whereas *Nālaka Sutta* has every claim to it. The thought and sentiments in it are so lofty that it had to be included in the list with its companion poem the *Muni Sutta*. Besides this, the musical *Śloka* metre may have also been responsible for its popularity, for as stated earlier (*ibid.*) a *sutta* in verse would naturally have been preferred to a passage in prose. Hence Mookerji's suggestion (*Asoka*, p. 118n) that by *Moneya-sūte* was meant the *Nālaka Sutta* should be accepted.¹⁷

(continued)

17. The suggestion that Asoka's *Moneya-sūte* meant the *Thera*-and *Therī-Gāthā* (Max Wallaser) is untenable.

THE DHAMMAPADA IN THE WEST

Russell Webb

The publication of the Dhammapada in Estonian in 1977 highlights the esteem in which this text is held in the West. Undoubtedly the factors that have contributed to its continued popularity are: (i) its self-sufficiency as a guide to Buddhist thought and practice (i.e. it "represents" the Sutta Piṭaka more so than any other text); (ii) its readability, and (iii) its "manual" size.

It is unfortunate that no comparative study has yet been undertaken of, for example, the numerous English versions, many of which differ but slightly in terminological interpretation. Indeed, with over thirty renderings, scholarly collation should assume some urgency in order to deter the often unnecessary production of yet another "new" version.

Despite the foregoing, it is interesting to recall the large number of translations that have been produced, especially since the text in question is, in many cases, the only complete canonical work that has appeared on a commercial basis:

Czech tr. Vincenc Lesný (Symposion, Prague 1947).

Danish tr. Poul Tuxen (1920; reprinted by Gyldendalske Boghandel, Copenhagen 1953).

Dutch tr. J. A. Blok in *Woorden van den Boeddha* (N. Kluwer, Deventer 1953; Ankh-Hermes, Deventer 1970).

English see *An Analysis of the Pali Canon* by Russell Webb (Wheel Nos. 217-220, BPS, Kandy 1975).

Estonian tr. Linnart Mäll (Kirjastus 'Perioodika', Tallinn 1977).

Finnish tr. Hugo Valvanne as *Hyveen Sanoja* (Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, Porvoo/Helsinki 1953).

French tr. Fernando Hū (Paris 1878), R. and M. de Maratray (Paris 1931), P. S. Dhammārāma (BEFEO, LI, 2, Paris 1963), Nārada (*Sagesse*, Gretz 1968-9; *Cahiers Bouddhistes*, Lausanne 1972-), as *Versets du Dhamma* (Centre d'Études Bouddhiques, Grenoble 1976).

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PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSALITY IN EARLY BUDDHISM

Rune E. A. Johansson

According to the Buddha, human life is deeply unsatisfactory. One of three characteristics of life is suffering (*dukkha*), which is defined as frustration, illness, old age and death. And suffering is perpetuated because of rebirth: there is no way out of the endless repetition of painful experiences.

But the Buddha found a way. He made the observation that every event in human life has a cause. And if we know the cause, we can in principle find a way to modify, and perhaps even prevent the result. So if suffering is caused, we should try to find its cause and then remove it. The result of this analysis was the famous and well-known "series of conditions" (*paṭiccasamuppāda*), which is a chain of eleven factors, each depending on the foregoing one and leading up to the twelfth factor which is suffering. The Buddha devised this series as a practical tool. Whatever factor could be eliminated, the eradication of suffering would ultimately follow.

The problem is only that the real meaning of some of these factors must have been lost during the 2500 years that have elapsed since the time of the Buddha. Neither Eastern nor Western authorities on Buddhism have unfortunately been able to explain to me how this series is to be understood, much less how it is to be used practically. So I have tried to find out, by semantic research, how the words have been used in the Nikāya literature, and so the probable meanings. I have obtained interesting results, and a book* containing all the details will probably be published. But the main results can be described both simply and briefly. The only difficulty is that a short article like this cannot *prove* anything, just assert.

Reality is Direct Experience

Our difficulty in understanding Buddhism arises mainly from our different way of experiencing the world around us. To us, sense impressions are not so important. Of course, we always use them, but we never

* *The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism* will be published in 1978 by Curzon Press Ltd., 88 Gray's Inn Rd., London, W.C.1., as No. 37 in the Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies Monograph Series.

"This book is a psychologist's attempt to understand what the Buddha meant by *paṭiccasamuppāda*. . . . The author has collected all passages in the Nikāyas or scriptural literature which throw light on the meaning of conditioned sequences, accepting only those explanations which agree with the facts in the Nikāyas."

take them really seriously. Sense impressions are changing all the time: objects grow when we approach them; they change form when the visual angle changes; when we turn our heads, we find a new environment; and when we close our eyes the world disappears. But we know, from books and many years of schooling, that all this and much more is just illusory: things are real and do not change much, but sense impressions are deceitful and illusory to a great extent. When we try to find our way in the environment, we correct our experiences all the time by our knowledge. We do not care much about visual impressions of the world; we have not really even *seen* the world, not since we were small children.

To the Buddha, the world was the world as he saw it, heard it, smelt it. This does not mean that he was easily deceived, for he knew of course that not all impressions were correct. It also does not mean that the world for him *is* the impressions or that the world is unreal, as our European biases would like to object. To us, the mental representations (images) are only phantoms: we think they are just unreal images of something real, i.e. material, behind. To the Buddha, things were real, but conscious processes were always a necessary constituent part of them. The world is, therefore, in a very crucial meaning our *creation*. This is actually a common view outside the European cultural influence. Nobody to my knowledge has expressed the contrasting views better than Carlos Castaneda in *Journey to Ixtlan*:




Figure 1. A modern example of *sankhāra*. Note that the black triangle seems to have a very clear contour, although neither triangle nor contour objectively exists in the picture. *Sankhāra* means a personal creation like this. (From *Scientific American*, April 1976, p. 48).

"For instance, our rings of power, yours and mine, are hooked right now to the *doing* in this room. We are making this room. Our rings of power are spinning this room into being at this very moment."

—“Wait, wait”, I said. “This room is here by itself. I am not creating it. I have nothing to do with it.” (P. 252).

The corner stone in the ancient Buddhist psychology was exactly this: the creative process (*sankhāra*), which in every moment builds up the things, ourselves, our actions, our inner processes. Since the result of the creativeness usually is a conscious process, it is correct to say, as the Buddha did, that consciousness (*viññāṇa*) is conditioned by the creative processes. Our life is therefore filled with a stream of creative processes which give rise to a corresponding stream of conscious processes (they will frequently be indistinguishable): we would say that they are two personality factors that work closely together.

Consciousness as Connecting Link

The Buddha believed in rebirth, because he could, by means of a special technique, remember a long series of previous lives. This means that he felt a personal continuity during a long span of time. The medium of this continuity was, according to him, consciousness (*viññāṇa*, or “the mind”, *citta*). But he was careful to point out that he found no substantial identity in the line of rebirths: consciousness was not a soul wearing out a sequence of bodies like a number of dresses. His teaching was not a theory of reincarnation. European scholars have found it difficult to understand this clearly stated continuity without identity, but his view is consistent with his psychology and builds on sharp observations of his conscious processes. He remembered several lives in the past: therefore he had really lived. At the moment of remembering he was conscious of his earlier lives and of his conscious processes during those lives. But his conscious processes in the moment of remembering were not identical with those he had had in his previous lives—so there was no identity but only continuity. We can actually make the same observations when we try to remember a journey we have made recently: I am, for instance, in this moment conscious of a journey to Stockholm: I get a series of mental images of my arrival, of my walk to the hotel, of my meal, of friends I met and the things we discussed, etc. I know now that I was conscious then, but my conscious processes now are not the same as those I had then. But I never doubt the continuity. I am also conscious of causal relations. My consciousness during the different moments of my journey was all the time modified through the experiences I made, and I collected experiences. My conscious processes then may have modified my conscious processes now, long afterwards. Rebirth is thought to function in the same way: there is a causal connection between the different links in the chain of births. In every life, conscious-

ness collects experiences, wishes, ambitions and moral attitudes and habits, and the result is the consciousness that ultimately, after death, is “planted” and creates a new body. The Buddha has also pointed out that the same laws are operative *within* each life: even our fate within the same life is to some extent decided by the *kamma* we are creating now: therefore we know that consciousness is governed by the same laws both within the same life and when connecting different lives. We can study these laws by studying the laws of personality transformation within our lives. The psychological laws we can study now can be applied to our total chain of lives.

Consciousness and the Future

According to the view of the Buddha, we can use the laws in order to decide our own future. If I, for instance, in this moment decide to move over to another city, take up a new job and enter a new social environment, what should I do? I must have a strong wish to do so, and I must obtain the necessary qualifications, i.e. learn the job and the social habits in my new environment, make contact with the right people, find a place to live in, and so on. In a similar way, we can prepare for a new life, according to the Buddha, by wishing and by collecting the right qualifications, especially moral traits. All depends on the contents of our consciousness: how strong our wish is and how good or bad our intentions are and have been and what experiences and habits we have accumulated. It is also possible to end the process; this is done by emptying consciousness of all contents that can lead to further growth. An empty consciousness free from ambitions and other creative components cannot be reborn, because it will not contain any free-floating wishes (which are forces programmed to be attracted by their objects).

Analysis of Consciousness

We have found that the creative processes and consciousness are the central concepts in the Buddhist explanation of our life and our world, our past and our future, our freedom and happiness. Now we shall go on to investigate the roles played by the other factors of the *paṭiccasamuppāda* series.

Conditioned by consciousness there will be “name and form” (*nāma-rūpa*). A Nikāya passage says that “name” refers to the following types of processes: “feeling, idea, will, contact and attention” (*Vedanā saññācetanā phasso manasikāro: idam vuccati nāmaṃ*, S II 3). This means that whenever a conscious process is generated it will turn out to belong to one of these types. “Name and form”, therefore, refers to a development and differentiation of the conscious process. This interpretation makes

nāmā rūpa easy to understand. Only the second element, “form”, is not so self-evident, because it certainly is not meant to refer to all types of visual forms but to the human body. When trying to understand how the body can be conditioned by consciousness, we must remember that even the body was known to the Buddha only as a conscious object; it was created by consciousness in the same way as other external objects. It is therefore quite reasonable to see the body as conditioned by consciousness.




Figure 2. *Paṭiccasamuppāda* as parallel streams of processes

The next link in the chain of conditions says that the six sense fields (*saṅgāyatanā*) depend on name and form. This means that whenever a conscious process of a certain type is generated it will turn out to belong to one of the senses. When a consciousness of “body” comes, it may be in the form of a visual image, or a sound, a smell, a taste, a touch or a pure ideation.

Through these two factors, *nāma-rūpa* and *saṅgāyatanā*, the conscious process is then highly differentiated, and these two links actually are a piece of analytic, descriptive psychology. A new factor is introduced with the next link, “contact” (*phassa*): if the six sense fields had not existed, there would be no contact, i.e. stimulation. This factor explains how external objects influence us and produce perceptions. It is true that the perceptual process essentially is a personal creation, but the Buddha at the same time felt sure that the objects were real and by contact could trigger our conscious process.

When contact has occurred, “sensation” (*vedanā*) will follow: here the analysis of perception is continued. The Pali word is usually translated by “feeling”, which is always said to be an aspect of the process: *vedanā* are said to be of three types, namely pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral

(M I 302). However, in English it is not possible to speak about “neutral feelings”, and “sensation” is therefore a more adequate translation. According to the Buddha, feelings and sensations belong closely together and form one indivisible process conditioned by the nature of the object. The things are in themselves beautiful and pleasant (and therefore produce a pleasant sensation) or ugly or unpleasant, apt to produce an unpleasant sensation.

We are therefore not responsible for our feelings, since they are produced by the stimuli. The next stage of the process will also normally come automatically, namely the need or desire (*taṇhā*) which is conditioned by the sensations. This factor is, together with *sankhārā*, the most important motivating factor in Buddhism. Although it is a conditioned process and will come automatically, it is in our power to control it.

Construction and Development

The next link is one of the most misunderstood factors in the entire series: *upādāna*, which is usually translated by either “grasping” or “fuel”. What is grasped is collected and cherished, and this seems to be the psychological meaning of the word. If you feel a strong desire (*taṇhā*) for something, then you will collect all types of conscious material relevant to the goal you wish to attain. If you want to buy a car, then your wish is frequently conscious, you think of cars, collect information about cars, look at cars, read about cars, discuss cars with friends, and so on. This accumulating function was attributed to *upādāna* by the Buddha, even though he thought more about kammic effects than about ordinary memory.

Through this accumulating function, the human personality is slowly changed. Something new is built up and developed (*bhava*, “growth”, lit. “becoming”). Referring to rebirth, the process will mean a development of ambitions and merits for a certain type of future life. The present personality is transformed (*bhava*) and a new personality is formed (*jāti*, “birth”); if the human being then dies, this personality is the rebirth personality which is born into a new life. It should then be observed that this world “birth” (*jāti*) can refer *both* to the continuous production of personality changes in the present life *and* to the actual birth that will take place after death.

We have now discussed the whole series except the first link, which probably was added somewhat later than the others. The thought behind it seems to have been that all these factors will go on functioning only as long as they are not understood. If the causal generation of suffering is really understood, this understanding itself would be a causal

factor towards its elimination. The Buddha therefore derived the whole series from "ignorance" (*avijjā*) and placed this at the head of the list.

"This is the Origin of the World"

The series of conditions is then not meant to explain only the process of rebirth, as is usually maintained nowadays, but also the personality development that takes place throughout life. *Jāti*, "birth", in fact means not only birth in the physiological meaning but all types of "generation". Just as all the other factors of the *paṭiccasamuppāda* series must be understood as parallel, interdependent streams of processes running throughout the individual life, so is also *jāti* a continuous process.

We have seen that the series can explain perception. It seems that we must even distinguish different levels within the process of perception. *Vedanā* means only the information which streams in from the outside. But this is then subjectively transformed by our needs and superstructures. There is actually a special series which might have been constructed in order to explain this subjective transformation which is so characteristic of our perceptual activities.

"Depending on the eye and forms, visual consciousness arises, and the coming together of the three is contact; depending on contact, there is sensation; depending on sensation there is desire; depending on desire there is accumulation; depending on accumulation there is growth; depending on growth there is birth; depending on birth there will be decay and death, grief, lamenting, suffering and despair. This is the origin of the word" (*Ayaṃ lokassa samudayo*) (S. II 73, where the same is repeated for the other senses).

The Buddha has never further developed this series or commented upon it, but it is interesting that it starts from the senses and their objects; it is then obviously a perceptual series, and this impression is confirmed by the summary: "this is the origin of the world".

What kind of perceptions will then arise if the links *taṇhā* to *jāti* are included into the perceptual process? The activation of desire will transform the perceptual object and make it bigger, better and more attractive than it really is. It will elicit a series of personal associations, memories and fantasies which are piled up (*upādāna*) so that the object grows (*bhava*) into something quite unrealistic. So something new is born (*jāti*) that is a personal falsification and a factor in suffering and death. For instance, we enter a shop in order to buy bread and potatoes. But we discover ice-cream and cigarettes (*vedanā*) and feel tempted to buy them (*taṇhā*), because they remind us of former pleasures. Because of this we can no longer see the objects "as they really are": they are being distorted by our desires. We build up a superstructure of fantasies and construct a seemingly rational motive for buying them (*upādāna*). The objects have "grown" (*bhava*), and we have changed personally. Or we are faced with a danger (*vedanā*), get frightened and run away (*taṇhā*). Although the event is not finished by this, its importance is exaggerated by us: we feel persecuted, think of earlier occasions when we have been in danger, look around suspiciously, plan security measures, etc. (*upādāna*). In this way the danger we have been in receives an exaggerated importance,

and our personalities have changed (*bhava, jāti*) and have become more frightened and insecure. The personal world as we construct it is usually dominated in this way by personal experiences, explanations, expectations, desires and fears. Usually we are not conscious of these personal constructions but believe that we see the world as it really is. But in reality we are the creators.

In this way we create our own suffering. But the Buddha found a way out, namely to stop falsifying and cease feeling tempted. He developed a method to put up a barrier between *vedanā* and *taṇhā*: mindfulness (*sati*), by means of which "in the seen there would be nothing more than the seen". It is our need that creates problems, and we have developed consciousness as a means to solve problems. By needing nothing we have no problems and shall need very little consciousness. Then nothing will be collected and no personality growth will occur. To the Buddha, development (*bhava, jāti*) was a bad word—emptiness and reduction were better. Emptiness is not only a way to avoid rebirth, it is also a state of perfect happiness in this life.

MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT BUDDHISM*

Rada Iveković

Misconceptions about Buddhism are very widespread and serve different purposes with different schools of thought. Arguments of individual Buddhist sects are attacked and used to disprove, not rarely, the whole of Buddhism by being taken out of their context. Most often they affect the central Buddhist teaching of *anattā* or some of the related subjects. Vedāntic, modern Hinduist and many Christian critics have often similar tendencies: to absorb Buddhism into Hinduism, and then refute it by its own arguments which, from its point of view, would prove insufficient.

Disputes between Buddhist and Vedāntists (namely those adherents to Advaita) have been present and sharp right from the beginning. Having the Upanisads for source in a great measure, both philosophies could not avoid having many ideas and technical terms in common. Reason, perhaps for the two to be confused on the part of outsiders or, for that matter, on the part of their own doctors with or without any intention to falsify them. The Buddhist doctrine of *anattā* has naturally been rebuked by Christian scholars for its simple exposition and often without going into details any deeper. It has purposely been tried to equate with the Vedāntic teaching of *ātman*—*brahman* and to explain the Buddhist refutation of an *ātman* in terms of the ultimate reality of the all-pervasive Brahman. The *ātman*, moreover, a term that hardly finds its equivalent in western, especially Bible-conditioned thinking—has persistently been understood as “soul” with little or no modification. Translating *ātman* by “soul” sometimes for the simple reason of the lack of a better word, is contrary not only to Buddhism (for which this fact hardly matters, since the existence of *no* kind of individual or universal principle, *ātman*, is recognised) but equally so to the whole of Indian philosophy and Vedānta in particular. *Ātman* is never the equivalent of a soul (though it may include such an idea); it is—with Vedānta—the highest (subjective) principle of Being the awareness of whose identity with the Universal Brahman is brought about with true knowledge and gives us, by its simple fact—*mokṣa*—release. The merging of *Ātman* within Brahman does not bring eternal life to individual “souls”, but merging into the state of Universal Being, which alone is ultimately real and which has always been there, at the reach of our knowledge and recognition.

S. Radhakrishnan was one of the modern historians of religion whose work underlined the belief that Buddhism should be absorbed into Vedānta and thus disarmed. Vedānta is, after all, the basis of all Indian philosophy and evidently lends some of its conclusions to Buddhism. And yet, Buddhism offers a totally new attitude to life and completely new results in many aspects, mainly its cognitive theory, psychology and social repercussions, in spite of its indebtedness a common Indian heritage. Dr. Radhakrishnan makes use of the fact that the Buddha himself confessed

that he did not discover the *dhamma*, but that it is the old Aryan path, eternal *Dhamma*.¹ He continues by quoting Rhys Davids who said that Gautama was born, brought up, lived and died as a Hindu. What does this prove? We know that the social structure has always been Hindu and Brahmanical even in Buddhist India. Further, Radhakrishnan says that Buddhism had in common with the rest of Aryan India the belief in the law of *karma* and the possibility of attaining Nirvāṇa. All these things may be true, but the final impression from reading will depend on where the stress was laid. Dr. Radhakrishnan does not specify, in this passage, what happened to the law of *karma* with Buddhism, how secondary and almost superfluous it became. Of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, he does not endeavour to explain the basic difference from other kinds of liberation in Indian philosophy. He expressly says that Śāṅkara's notion of *mokṣa* is not essentially different from the Buddhist notion of Nirvāṇa! And yet, here lies the basic and most important difference between the two schools. Śāṅkara's *mokṣa* is the knowledge of the unity of *Ātman* and Brahman, the merging of *Ātman*—individual, illusory consciousness into the immutable state of the Universal Being. And Buddhist Nirvāṇa is certainly not Universal Being, it is no Being at all, there is no *ātman* and no *brahman*; it is the state (if we may call it such) reached at when *suññam* is realised by means of cognisance and/or contemplation; it is extinction, which amounts to *anattā* truly realised. For Nirvāṇa to be Vedāntic *mokṣa* there should be an Absolute, and there is no such thing in Buddhism. Historically, Radhakrishnan is right when he asserts that the main cause of the disappearance of Buddhism from India was the fact that it became indistinguishable “from other (!) forms of Hinduism”. But this only proves the same attitude to Buddhism. And it is difficult to defend, as the author does, that Brahmanism and Mahāyāna held the same philosophical and religious views, even though we know that they did converge in many a way especially in *viññānavāda* and the religious side of Mahāyāna. Paradoxically, the author is quite right in saying that Brahmanism killed Buddhism by a brotherly embrace. Brahmanism absorbed some of the Buddhist social and moral practices and also solved the problem symbolically by admitting Buddha to the Brahmanical pantheon as an *avatāra* of Viṣṇu! Dr. Radhakrishnan really tried hard to work this out. He says that if the reality of the absolute brahman be included into early Buddhism, we will get Advaita-Vedānta again!

The discussion between Advaita-Vedānta and Buddhism was animated ever since the beginning. Advaita-Vedānta is indebted to Buddhism as much as both are to the Upanisads, but the influences worked both

1. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, part I, according to the Serbo-croat edition, Belgrade 1964.

* Extracted from the author's Ph.D. thesis, “The Problem of Soul in Pāli Buddhism” University of Delhi 1972.

ways, no doubt. The disputes centred on *ātman*, *brahman*, *mokṣa*, *anattā*, Nibbāna, Vedāntic *avidyā* and Buddhist *avijjā*, contemplation, *suññatā*, ontological speculations, etc. The problem of void was the most prominent, Buddhism is consequently nihilistic (though in the cognitive theory only). When it comes to the conclusion that everything, the subjective as well as objective world, is *suññatā*, it has nothing more to add. Vedāntins accepted and understood the challenge, but came to opposite results of the same problem: not *suññatā*, but that *everything*—empirical reality cannot be contested—is *māyā*, imposed on the reality of the Being responsible for the apparent plurality of the world and rooted in *avidyā*. The reality of the world is refuted, but that of Brahman is emphasised. Advaita is also an idealistic philosophy and as such an alternative to Buddhism. Gaudapāda's work bears witness to the indebtedness of Advaita to Buddhism. And yet, his successor, Śaṅkara, can hardly hide his wrath at the cognitive nihilism, the "first" cause of *avijjā*, the anti-ontological stand, the *anattā* doctrine of his opponents.

Professor T. M. P. Mahadevan of Madras gives a fair account, from the Vedāntic point of view, of the historic facts of the interaction of the two schools. He is intensely aware of the misinterpretations of both and thinks it equally unfair to any of them to be interpreted in the light of the other or absorbed into the other. He gives them due independence and acknowledges the contributions of both sides. His main efforts, it is true, go to unravel Gaudapāda's philosophy from its Buddhist labels, but he fully acknowledges those instances where his teachings run parallel to it. He says:²

"In the view of the latter (Prof. Bhattacharya), however, to characterise Buddhism as unorthodox is wrong, for there is nothing in it which is revolting to the teachings of the Upaniṣads. Prof. Bhattacharya, for instance, says that a very large number of passages in the Upaniṣads may easily be explained from the Vijñānavāda point of view."

Here is another attempt to absorb Buddhism into Hinduism *via* the common-wealth of Indian thinking, the basis of Vedānta, which Mahadevan strongly opposes. Further, he writes:³

"It has been argued that the *śūnyatā* of the Mādhyamika is not 'nothingness' but the same as the Brahman of the Upaniṣads; it is called *śūnya* because it appears as nothing from the empirical standpoint. The reason advanced in such an argument is that *śūnya* in the sense of an absolute void is inconceivable and that a total denial of all things without the implication of a positive ground is impossible. Now, this is precisely

the criticism of the thinkers of the orthodox schools passed on by the Mādhyamika. In their view, the Mādhyamika is nihilistic and occupies, therefore, a self-stultifying position. Nor may it be said that these thinkers have misconstrued the content of the Mādhyamika metaphysics; for some eminent leaders of that system have explicitly stated that they believe in no reality whatsoever. Candrakīrti, for instance, mocks at the critic who is incapable of conceiving an absolute negation, "by comparing to a person who when told that he would get nothing expected that 'nothing' would actually be given to him". When the charge of nihilism is levelled against his view, Candrakīrti does not refute it. On the contrary, he admits that his view is philosophical nihilism as distinguished from the common or vulgar nihilism. The difference between the two types of nihilism is not in the conclusion, but only in the method of reaching it. While the nihilism of the vulgar is dogmatic, that of the Mādhyamika is reasoned, since it is the result of a logical analysis of experience. "The difference is illustrated by comparing the Mādhyamika to a witness who speaks in a court of law against a thief fully knowing that he has committed theft; and the common nihilist, to one who also speaks against the thief and who, though not uttering a falsehood, is speaking not from knowledge but through some bias or other." Thus it is evident that the Mādhyamika does not favour the conception of a positive ultimate (Brahman). And as de La Poussin observes, "The claim of the Buddhists to be *śūnyatā-vādins* ('doctors of the voidness'), not *brahmavādins*, cannot be set aside: philosophers must be credited with the opinions they profess to cherish."

T. R. V. Murti is the representative of holders of a notorious theory imputed to Buddhism: the theory of the Negative Absolute. He proceeds by asserting that the Absolute (!)—is *Śūnya*.⁴ "Words do not denote the absolute in any recognisable sense. The Absolute is incommensurable and inexpressible: it is utterly transcendent to thought—*śūnya*."

Naturally and consequently, however, this "Absolute" he arrived at—if it is *śūnya*, then Nirvāna too will be the Absolute; and indeed, with Murti, it is so, as "*Śūnyatā* is the sole means to Nirvāna." And, further, "*Śūnyatā* is Absolutism, not Nihilism or Positivism". Murti quotes his teacher, Prof. Radhakrishnan, holding the same view:⁵

"If the Buddha declined to define the nature of the Absolute or if he contented himself with negative definitions, it is only to indicate that Absolute Being is above all determinations. Why, then, did Buddha not admit in express terms the reality of the Absolute? Buddha refused to

2. Mahadevan, *Gaudapāda*, Madras 1969; p. 201.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 211. Underlined by R.I.

4. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, London 1960; p. 231.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

describe the Absolute, for that would be to take a step out of the world of relativity, the legitimacy of which he was the first to contest in others. The Absolute is not a matter of empirical observation. The world of experience does not reveal the Absolute anywhere within its limits."

What is this "Absolute"? We do not find any such concept in the Buddha's teaching or even later developments. And how are we to conceive it? For if it is negative, or nil, or *śūnya*, it is: *The Absolute is śūnya*. The copula "is" betrays the intention. A negative Absolute is absurd for Buddhism. It is imposed by analogy with the Upaniṣad where, however, it is not necessarily negative. Not even Yājñavalkya's "neti neti" implies it. "Neti neti" points to the irrationality involved in the problem, approaches an epistemological definition and almost discovers *avidyā*. Nor is the Absolute Brahman, by any of the negative attempts to definition in the Upaniṣads, proved to be negative. For, negation in itself very nearly proves the positive opposite as its alternative, as shown by Nāgārjuna. And the Absolute is described by positive statements in equally valid measure. No alternative is suggested or, for that matter, possible. Anyway, Brahman is the only Ultimate Reality, even if it is not always evident and thus *is*. No such "Ultimate reality", positive or negative, is found in Buddhism. Buddhist epistemology itself, which is nihilistic, excludes any such concept for itself.

However, in the first chapter of his book, Murti manages to retain a very fair historical view of early Buddhism, the problem of *anattā* (how does he reconcile it with the idea of an Absolute?), and the relationship of Buddhism to Brahmanical and Jaina tradition.

PALI BUDDHIST STUDIES IN THE WEST

Russell Webb

5. Austria

The greatest name in the field of Austrian Pali studies undoubtedly remains that of **Karl Eugen Neumann** (1865-1915). He was one of the most eminent translators of Pali texts in the West and was responsible for popularising the *suttas* in the German language.

He studied Indology at Berlin University (1887-8), attending lectures by Deussen, Oldenberg and Weber. In 1890 he studied under Pischel at Halle and at the beginning of the following year he obtained a doctorate from Leipzig for his textual critique on the first chapter of the *Sārasaṅgaha* (a medieval Burmese Pali composition). After travelling to India, Ceylon and London (1894-5), he spent the rest of his life in Vienna. He worked with Georg Bühler on Indian inscriptions in the Oriental Department of the University until the latter's tragic death in 1898. Thereafter he devoted all his time to translating in spite of financial problems and ill-health, finally succumbing to the fatal effects of pneumonia on his fiftieth birthday.

Living as a private scholar in Vienna, often in wretched financial circumstances, he dedicated his life to transcribing the Buddha's most important sayings. After translating an initial anthology of *suttas* (*Buddhistische Anthologie*, Leiden 1892; reprinted in Zurich and Vienna 1957) together with the *Dhammapada* (Leipzig 1893; Munich 1918; Zurich and Vienna 1957), he undertook the mammoth task of translating the most important remaining sections of the *Sutta Piṭaka*. He produced the first volume of the *Majjhima Nikāya* in 1896 (*Die Reden Gotamo Buddhos. Aus der Mittleren Sammlung Majjhimanikāyo*, Leipzig) which was soon followed by a further two volumes to complete that collection (II—1900, III—1902; all three reprinted in Munich 1922 and in Zurich and Vienna 1956). Neumann then translated the *Dīgha Nikāya* (*... Aus der Längeren Sammlung*, 4 vols., Munich 1907-28; Zurich and Vienna 1957), *Udāna* (Leipzig 1905), *Sutta-Nipāta* (*... Aus der Sammlung der Bruchstücke*, *ibid.*; Zurich and Vienna 1957), and *Thera-therī-gāthā* (*Die Lieder der Mönche und Nonnen*, Berlin 1899; Zurich and Vienna 1957).

Moritz Winternitz (1863-1937) was an Indologist who obtained his doctorate from Vienna in 1885. After assisting Max Müller in Oxford, he was (in 1899) appointed lecturer of Indo-Aryan Philology and Ethnology at the (German) University of Prague and, in 1911, succeeded to the pro-

fessorship. He wrote *Die Religionen der Inder: Buddhismus* (Tübingen 1911) and *Die ältere Buddhismus nach Texten des Tipiṭaka* (Tübingen 1929), but is best remembered for a pioneer reference book which has hardly been superseded: *Geschichte der indischen Literatur* in two volumes. The second volume (Leipzig 1913; reprinted in Stuttgart 1968) incorporates a detailed critical analysis of the Pali Canon and was translated into English twenty years later (as *History of Indian Literature*, University of Calcutta 1933; reprinted in New Delhi 1972).

Manfred Mayrhofer was a lecturer at Graz University who compiled a *Handbuch des Pali* (2 vols., Heidelberg 1951) which comprised a grammar with original texts and a glossary. He is now a professor at the Institut für Sprachwissenschaft which forms an integral part of Vienna University.

Although Buddhist studies in Austria are concentrated on the capital's university, no separate courses in Pali or Theravāda Buddhism are conducted.

OBITUARY

Ludwig Alsdorf

The sudden death of Ludwig Alsdorf, the Emeritus Professor of Indology at Hamburg University and Editor-in-Chief of the Critical Pāli Dictionary, occurred on 25th March. Succumbing to the effects of an insect bite whilst on a visit to Sri Lanka, he died a few days later in a Hamburg hospital.

Prof. Alsdorf was born on 8th. August 1904 and distinguished himself as an Indologist, specialising in Prakrit studies. His doctoral dissertation, for example, was based on the *Kumāra-pālapratibodha*: "ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis des Apabhraṃśa und der Erzählliteratur der Jainas" (published in Hamburg in 1928). *Apabhraṃśa-Studien* (Leipzig 1937) was followed by similar papers that appeared in numerous academic journals. He also contributed essays on Vedic and Asokan India together with full-length modern studies in the countries in that region, viz. *Indien* (Berlin 1940), *Indien und Ceylon* (Berlin 1943) and *Vorderindien. Bharat Pakistan, Ceylon* (Brunswick 1955).

Of historical interest are his papers on the extent of Indology in Germany: "Die Indologie in Berlin von 1821-1945" (*Studium Berolinense*, Berlin 1960), "Indian Studies in Germany" (*The Indio-Asian Culture* 10, 1962), together with a short essay in *Der Orient in deutscher Forschung* (Leipzig 1944).

In the field of Buddhism, he took a leading role in reviving the work on the Critical Pāli Dictionary which continues to be centred on Copenhagen. For the Pali Text Society, he contributed "Āryā Stanzas in the Theravāda-gāthā" (which was incorporated with the printed texts in 1966). This annotated list subsequently appeared in translation as "Die Āryā-Strophen des Pali-Kanons. Metrisch hergestellt und textgeschichtlich untersucht" (Mainz University 1968). He also contributed studies on the *Mahāvastu* (WZKSO, Vienna 1968-9), *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* (ZDMG, Wiesbaden 1955), Sasa and Vessantara Jātakas (WZKSO, 1961 and 1957 respectively), Vidhura Jātaka (WZKS, Vienna 1971) and Sivi Jātaka (included in *Pratidānam*, The Hague 1968).

On the occasion of this 70th birthday, Prof. Wezler edited *Kleine Schriften* (Wiesbaden 1974)—a collection of writings in his honour.

His daughter married Dr. Willem Bollée who emigrated from the Netherlands and continues to teach Pali at the Institut für Sprachwissenschaft at Münster University. He edited and translated the *Kuṇāla Jātaka* for the Sacred Books of the Buddhists Series (PTS, London 1970).

The Seminar für Kultur und Geschichte Indiens at Hamburg University is now jointly headed by Prof. Drs. Lambert Schmithausen and Albrecht Wezler.

RBW

NOTES & NEWS

Buddhavamsa Commentary translation

The first English translation of the *Madhuraṭṭhaviḷāsinī*, the traditional Commentary to the Buddhavaṃsa, has now been completed by Miss I. B. Horner, the President of the Pali Text Society.

Entitled, *Clarifier of the Sweet Meaning*, this “charming, instructive and in many ways unusual commentary” includes a detailed account of the life of the Buddha upto the Enlightenment.

Priced about £12.50 and distributed by Routledge & Kegan Paul (in London), it will complement the same translator’s rendering of the Buddhavaṃsa itself—*Chronicle of Buddhas*. This is available with her translation of the Cariyāpiṭaka (*Basket of Conduct*) under the joint title, Minor Anthologies III, at £6.75.

Glory of India

A new “research oriented quarterly of Indology and Oriental subjects” was issued in March 1977 under the title, *Glory of India*.

Under the editorship of J. L. and R. K. Shastri, the publishers are the most reputable Indian producers and distributors of books on every aspect of Indology and Buddhology—Motilal Banarsidass.

It is intended that each issue will feature “one scholarly article on Indology; review of latest publications; check list of our [Motilal’s] own and agency publications; books published in India on different aspects of Indian history and culture, religion and philosophy, language and literature; and research being carried out on the above subjects in Indian and foreign universities.” Unpublished manuscripts and book reviews will be welcomed provided they are relevant to the field of Indology.

The first issue, in fact, comprised 74 pages that included 54 pages of reviews and 16 pages of publications.

The airmail subscriptions are: \$3.00 single copy, \$11.00 per annum and \$110.00 for life. Advertisement rates are: \$75.00 full page, \$40.00 half page and \$25 quarter page.

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