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EDITORIAL

The Pali Buddhist Union was established in November 1970 by British and European Theravāda Buddhists for the purpose of propagating the teaching of Gotama the Buddha as contained in the Pali Canon and later literature belonging to the same tradition.

One of the principal aims was “to endeavour to compose, publish and translate such literature as will be conducive” to the overall objects of the Union. In spite of the cost involved in such specialised undertakings, three Occasional Newsletters were produced in English in 1971, 1972 and 1974, one bulletin in French (Evans) and a number of booklets issued by the Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy, translated into Czech, French, Polish and Swedish, were produced by a few dedicated individuals.

Now at last the original aim in providing a means whereby texts and hitherto unpublished studies relevant to the Pali Buddhist tradition can appear in English has been realised. This journal will appear in January, May and September of each year and will, as implied, be devoted exclusively to Pali Buddhism. As is customary, opinions expressed will be the responsibility of the individual writer concerned.

There have been only three English-language journals that provided an outlet for contributions in the field of Pali Dhamma studies: the Journal of the Pali Text Society – twenty-three issues appearing between 1882-1927, many devoted to reproducing minor and little-known Pali texts in either Roman characters or in translation; The Pali Buddhist Review (1909-22), the quarterly journal of The Buddhist Society of Great Britain and Ireland; and The Light of the Dhamma, a quarterly from the Union Buddha Sāsana Council, Rangoon, that appeared between 1952-63, containing an average of the two translated suttas (or commentarial equivalents) in each issue and providing the first popular outlet for the writings of Ledi Sayadaw, Nyānatiloka, Nyānaponika, Nāṇamoli, Francis Story and many others. To a certain extent, The Maha Bodhi (founded 1892) continues this pattern.

Very few university journals, or even those supposedly devoted to Oriental studies, have in fact published more than just occasional papers...
relevant to Pali Buddhism, with the exception of the Ceylon University Review (1943–67). There is, therefore, a real need to provide a periodical that will appeal to the already-initiated Pali Buddhist reader without necessarily making the contents abstruse or remote from the practice of Dhamma.

The Review will contain specialist papers from both bhikkhus and laymen on the Dhamma and Pali (including translations of Pali texts and comparative studies, for example, with modern philosophical and psychological trends, where these highlight and clarify the Teaching), reports on Pali and classical Buddhist studies in universities and other centres of learning, selective book reviews and relevant news items.

Relevant Buddhist Words

Udana I, 10 – Bāhiya

Yato te Bāhiya diṭṭhe diṭṭhamattam bhavissati... viṁśat āyatām attī dyāttha... from your ceasing to conceive when you perceive (i.e., what is seen is merely seen, and not seen as mine)... tato tvam Bāhiya na tattva ma... there will no longer be a reason or instrument (whereby there is a perceiver and a concefer of the world)... yato tvam Bāhiya na tattva, tato tvam Bāhiya tattha... from the ceasing of the instrument there will be no longer a body there (in the world).... yato tvam Bāhiya na tattva, tato tvam Bāhiya na tattva... from the ceasing of the body there (in the world) there will no longer be the ajjhakkāyatanāṁ upon which depends phassa, upon which depends nāma (cf. M. 109), upon which depends nāmarīpa saha viṁśat āyatāna, and cessation of (conception of) viṁśat āyatā, nāma and rāpa, is the end of suffering.

Note that in the Mahānukaputta Sutta, in the Saḷāyatana Saṁyutta, the wording of Bāhiya is repeated, and in the expansion it is made clear that the six senses are what is referred to.

(Ñāṇavīra – March 1959)

WHAT IS PALI?*

Pāli is a Prākrit of the early phase of the Middle Indo-Aryan period. This period may be said to be represented by the language of the Theravāda Canon and its ancillary literature, that of the early Jainā sūtras and earliest Prākrit plays, and of the early inscriptions as those of Asoka. Although available records suggest that this early period of Middle Indo-Aryan would extend from the fifth to the first century B.C., one cannot state with any exactitude what its upper limit would have been.

By the term Pāli the ancient Theravādins primarily implied the Word of the Buddha, i.e., the words of the Buddha as uttered by the Buddha himself. However, the Theravāda Canon consists not only of utterances purported to be of the Buddha himself but also of statements of some of his early disciples who were reporting his speech. Ultimately, therefore, the term Pāli came to mean the text, i.e., the sacred text as it were, that comprises the Theravāda Canon. Even in the fifth century A.C. when the Commentaries on the Canon came to be written down, the term Pāli was still being used only in this latter sense. This is clearly borne out by Commentarial phrases and expressions such as iṁ chā pāli (this is the text), ṭena ādaṁ vaccatā pāliyaṁ (therefore this is stated in the text), and taṁ n eva attākaṭṭhāsu atti na pāliya sameti (it is not to be found in the Commentaries, nor does it agree with the text). The last example shows the clear distinction that had been maintained between the sacred text (Pāli) and the commentarial tradition (āṭṭhakathā).

From being the sacred text it was no far cry for the term Pāli to acquire a linguistic connotation. Now, Pāli comes to mean the medium or the vehicle of expression of “the text” or “the Buddha’s word”. And it has to be stated that this too has occurred very much after the period of the Commentaries. Furthermore, the term Pāli, as designating the language, is an abbreviated form of the term Pālibhāsā, which, in turn, is synonymous with tantābhāsā, i.e., “the language of the text”. Pāli

* This comprises a translation from the original Sinhalese, by Piyananda Dissanayake, combined with the short Introductory Note in English, extracted from the first fascicle (A – Akkhabhājana) of the Pāli Dictionary, compiled at the Sīri Vajirāṇāṁ Dhammāyatanā (Bhikkhu Training Centre), Maharagama, Sri Lanka. An Editorial Board is headed by Ven. Madhīne Patunātha and the publishers are the Sāsana Sevaka Society, also at Maharagama. Dr. P. B. F. Wiżeratne, former Editor-in-Chief of the Dictionary of the Sinhalese Language, is responsible for the English translation of the Pāli words.
is also referred to as Māgadhi or Māgadhībhāṣā by the Theravādins since the view that the Buddha preached in the Magadhan idiom (māgadhaka vohāro) developed among them—a view resulting from the fact that the country of Magadha occupied a key position in the history of early Buddhism. Thus, when the term Pāli came to mean a language, it was employed to connote the medium not only of the canonical texts, but also of the whole literature—both religious and secular—of which it became the vehicle of expression. While the Canon, of course, was of Indian origin, the latter literature, almost in its entirety, developed in countries like Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand—countries to which Theravāda Buddhism spread and took a firm foothold.

The term Pāli itself received the attention of scholars during the early days of Pali studies, especially in the West. The etymology of the term has been discussed and opinions have been expressed regarding what one may call “the home of Pali”. We set out below some views expressed by scholars on this subject:

1. T. W. Rhys Davids was of the view that Pali was the spoken language in the kingdom of Kosala during the 6th. and 7th. centuries B.C. and that it was the common medium of communication between several kingdoms.

2. According to Westergaard, Kuhn and Franke, Pali was the language of the people of Ujjain.

3. Geiger agreed with Buddhaghosa’s view that Pali was the language used in Magadha. K. Sumangala concurred with this view.

4. Oldenberg, who compared the language of the Khandhagiri inscription with Pali, concluded that Pali was the language of Kalinga or modern Orissa.

5. B. M. Barua, however, thought that although the Pali language was similar in the Udayagiri and Khandhagiri inscriptions, it was never the language of Kalinga.

6. Lüders tried to prove that Pali was an adaptation from Ardhamagadhi but this view was rejected by P. V. Bapat who has said that it was the earliest stage of Prakrit.

7. According to S. K. Chatterji the Pali and Sauraseni languages have common philological characteristics but he says that many words from North-Western Indian and other Aryan languages have gone into it.

8. Winternitz was of the view that the Buddha preached the Dhamma in the language of the kingdom of Kosala but that the Buddha was not particular about the medium in which he taught. He further stated that the language of the Tipiṭaka was a mixture of several regional dialects based on Magadhi, which also served as the literary language of the Buddhists.

Many critics agree that the Pali language contains several characteristics common to other languages. In this connection it may be noted that, out of the forty-five years of his ministry, the Buddha lived the major part of it in Kosala and Magadha and that therefore it is impossible to trace the origin of Pali to that region.

According to the Araṇavibhaṅga Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya, it is clear that the Buddha did not pay undue attention to language. When several terms are used to describe one thing in different states or regions, one must not stick to one particular term only. In such situations, conventions obtained in those areas should not be overlooked. According to the Culla Vagga, it is quite clear that the Buddha had to be studied in the language medium of the region concerned. The Buddha did not approve of closing the door to Dhamma to anyone merely on account of the difficulty of understanding a language, because his teaching was meant for the welfare of all people, irrespective of caste, creed or tribe. It is probable that the Buddha, who was keen to make himself understood to the largest possible number of people, chose Pali either because of its widespread usage in the region or because it was more easily understood by the common people.

Geiger traced the following four stages in its development:

1. Stanza, that is, the language used in works such as the Dhammapāda, Sutta-Nipāta, Thera-therī-gāthā, Jātaka and the like.

2. Tipiṭaka prose: this style is more homogeneous than that of 1. A special feature was that the writers of prose observed the rules of grammar more rigidly than the composers of those works in 1.

3. Post-Tipiṭaka style: here the language is more heavy and erudite. The Milinda-panha and the Athkhakātha are examples of this category.

4. Post-Tipiṭaka verse: here the language is heavy and unnatural. Both old and new usages of language are found. The style is uneven and the influence of Sanskrit is prominent in many of the works belonging to this category. The Mahābodhiṇa, Dāhavanīsa and Hathawanagallavahāvanīsa are some examples.
The Pali language in Ceylon received an impetus during the time of Buddhagosa. Works like the Visuddhimagga clearly demonstrated that Pali was rich enough to express very subtle and philosophical ideas. The Mahāvamsa is a clear indication of the interest shown by the monks of Ceylon in the study of Pali during that time.

During the last hundred years much enthusiasm has been shown both in the East and in the West for the study of Pali and Buddhism. This new interest has made it possible for the Pali language and Buddhism to spread in many parts of Asia, Europe and America. The Western contribution during this period to the spread of the language deserves special mention. The Bibliographie Bouddhique and Winternitz’s History of Indian Literature were among the great works undertaken by Western scholars. Among those dedicated and untiring scholars of the West, Fauböll, Childers, Trenckner, Oldenberg, Geiger, Mr. & Mrs. Rhys Davids, Dines Andersen, Helmer Smith, Stede and F. L. Woodward should be gratefully remembered for their invaluable service rendered to the cause of Pali education. These great scholars would not have been able to accomplish their task so successfully if it were not for the Pali Text Society inaugurated by T. W. Rhys Davids. At that time the Pali Canon, not to speak of the rest of Pali literature, was not fully edited for critical study. Today, these texts have been studied almost completely and students of Pali, it will be conceded, are now better equipped to study the subject. Furthermore, it is possible to claim now that the linguistic problems connected with Pali have, of late, been seen in a better perspective and the early Buddhist attitude towards language and linguistic issues has emerged today in greater relief. Circumstances, however, do not enable us to take up these questions with the issue of these few pages of this Dictionary. A detailed study of these questions will accompany the second fascicle. For the present we shall confine ourselves to a few remarks pertaining to Pali lexicography.

The only extant Pali lexicon of ancient times is in the Abhidhammapadipīkā. This lexicon follows the style and method of the Sanskrit lexicon Amarakośa, and was compiled in Sri Lanka in the twelfth century, A.C. While it is doubtful whether the Abhidhammapadipīkā could have met the requirements of Pali and Buddhistic studies even at that time, it certainly cannot serve the requirements of the modern scientific age with its vast strides in the linguistic, religious and allied fields. If Buddhism is to face squarely the challenges of modern times more comprehensive Pali lexicons compiled on scientific principles are, indeed, a desideratum. Today one would expect a dictionary to furnish something more than a bare meaning or a synonym for a given word. This is all the more important with a language like Pali, related, as it is, to a long and unique religious and philosophical tradition.

The need for such a dictionary was, no doubt, keenly felt in the early days when Pali studies commenced in the West. It has to be recorded with gratitude that the pioneering lexicographical efforts of scholars like R. C. Childers, V. Trenckner and T. W. Rhys Davids are still the only available aids for the study of Pali in modern times.

When Childers compiled his dictionary in the years 1872–75 he had access only to a fraction of the Pali Canon. The compilers of the Pali Text Society’s Dictionary are themselves conscious of the limitations involved in their effort. Moreover, the compilers of these two dictionaries considered them to be provisional. Whatever that may be, the contribution of these scholars to Pali lexicography is, indeed, substantial. We shall have occasion in the next fascicle to refer to this contribution in greater detail.

In these circumstances the present lexicographical effort of the Sirī Vajirāṇāṇa Dārmāyatana of Sri Lanka is, indeed, laudable. The present dictionary, we trust, would go a long way in supplementing the efforts of these pioneers. And this too is a provisional dictionary.

A special feature in this dictionary is that every Pali term is given in both the Sinhalese and the Roman script with its Sanskrit equivalent in the latter script. Etymologies have been given wherever it has been felt necessary. The compilers, we understand, do not wish this to be looked upon as a purely etymological dictionary.

We would like to conclude these remarks with the words of a lexicographer of no mean repute: “A dictionary can be too explicit: it will then lose its charm and become tedious. It must contain a certain amount of hints, instead of ready solutions; the more it arouses the curiosity (and sometimes the anger!) of its user, the better it is for the latter.” — Dr. WILLIAM STEDE in his Afterward to the PTS Dictionary (p. 201).

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KHUDDAKAPĀTHA

As a tribute to the forerunner of modern English Pali studies, and on the centenary of his untimely decease (in 1876), we are reprinting R. C. Childers' first contribution in this field — the translation of the Khuddakapātha. This first appeared in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (November 1870) and subsequently in The Buddhist Review (October 1909).

His other writings were: "Notes on Dhammadapada, with special reference to the question of Nirvāṇa" (JRAS, 1871), the edited text of the Mahāparinibbāṇa Sutta (JRAS, 1875–6), "On Sandhi in Pāli" (JRAS, 1879), and a translation of the Sigālovāda Sutta which appeared in the Contemporary Review (London, 1876) and was reprinted in the Indian Antiquary (No. 12, Bombay, 1883).

Robert Caesar Childers will, however, be best remembered for his monumental Dictionary of the Pāli Language (London, 1872–5) which served the needs of scholars until the advent of Rhys Davids and Stede's Pāli-English Dictionary (PTS, 1921–5). His pioneer efforts in this context were further remembered with the reproduction of his Dictionary in 1974 by the Union Buddha Sāsana Council in Rangoon.

Little is known of Childers save that he, like Rhys Davids, became acquainted with Pāli and Buddhism whilst serving in the Ceylon Civil Service (1869–4). Whilst in Ceylon he met an early French Pāli scholar, Paul Grimblot, whose Sept suttas pālīs (from the Digha Nikāya) appeared in 1876. He attempted, without much success, to master Pāli although he later acknowledged the assistance of Yatramulle Dhammārāma (the "Unnanse" of Rhys Davids, who died in 1872), Vaskaduwe Subhutu and the Mudaliyar L. Corneille Wijesinha.

Ill-health forced him back to England where, in 1868, Dr. Reinhold Rost induced him to persevere with his Pāli studies. Out of gratitude, the Dictionary was dedicated to him and he continued his work in collaboration with Fausböll and Trencher until his early death at 38. He was appointed Professor of Pāli and Buddhist Literature at University College, London in 1873.

The Khuddakapātha is the first book of the Khuddaka Nikāya and was primarily intended to be used by young sāmaneras upon admission to the Sangha. Since most of the formulas and expressions will be familiar to readers, I have deemed the explanatory footnotes supplied by Francis J. Payne (in The Buddhist Review) to be redundant. Certain archaic and even misleading interpretations of key words have been corrected: viz., Dhamma, Sangha, Nibbāna, arahat, preceptă, bhikkhu, kamma, Sāvatthi and Gotama, for "Law", "Church/Priesthood" "Nirvāṇa", "saint", "laws", "priest", "Karma", "cāvasti" and "Gautama". Otherwise the original translation remains substantially unaltered save for a few suggested alternative readings to clarify the meaning in parentheses. (The occasional use of the word "soul" is, naturally, employed in a figurative sense only!)

Editor

"THE LESSER READINGS"

The Three Refuges

I put my trust in the Buddha; I put my trust in the Dhamma, I put my trust in the Sangha.

Again I put my trust in the Buddha, again I put my trust in the Dhamma, again I put my trust in the Sangha.

Once more I put my trust in the Buddha, once more I put my trust in the Dhamma, once more I put my trust in the Sangha.

The Ten Precepts

1. To abstain from taking life.
2. To abstain from theft.
3. To abstain from impurity.
4. To abstain from lying.
5. To abstain from wine, spirits and strong drink, which tempt men to sin [heedlessness].
6. To abstain from eating at forbidden times.
7. To abstain from dancing, singing, music and stage-plays.
8. To abstain from adorning and beautifying the person by the use of garlands, perfumes and unguents.
9. To abstain from using a high or a large bed.
10. To abstain from receiving gold and silver.
The Thirty-two Constituent Parts of the Body

1. Earth. The parts of the body that are formed of this element are twenty in number; viz., the hair of the head, the hair of the body, the nails, the teeth, the skin, the flesh, the veins, the bones, the marrow, the kidneys, the heart, the liver, the abdomen, the spleen, the lungs, the intestines, the lower intestines, the stomach, the faeces, and the brain.

2. Water. The parts of the body that are formed of this element are twelve in number; viz., bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, serum, saliva, mucus, the oil that lubricates the joints, and urine.

The Novice's Questions

What is the one principle of Life?
Food is the sustenance of all animals [beings].
What are the Two?
Essence and Form [Nāma – Rūpa].
What are the Three?
The three Sensations [feelings].
What are the Four?
The four great truths [of Buddhism].
What are the Five?
The five Elements of Being.
What are the Six?
The six organs of Sense.
What are the Seven?
The seven branches of Knowledge [factors of enlightenment].
What are the Eight?
The glorious eight-fold path of Nibbāna.
What are the Nine?
The nine abodes of reasoning beings.
What are the Ten?
He is called arahat who is endowed with the ten forms of holiness.

The Sources of Happiness
(Mahāmahākala Sutta)

Thus I have heard. On a certain day dwelt the Buddha at Sāvatthī at the Jetavāna monastery, in the garden of Anāthapindika. And when the night was far advanced a certain radiant celestial being, illuminating the whole of Jetavāna, approached the Blessed One, and saluted him and stood aside. And standing aside addressed him with this verse—

Many gods and men, yearning after good, have held divers things to be blessings; say thou, what is the greatest blessing?

The Buddha
To serve wise men and not serve fools, to give honour to whom honour is due, this is the greatest blessing.

To dwell in a pleasant land, to have done good deeds in a former existence, to have a soul filled with right desires, this is the greatest blessing.

Much knowledge and much science, the discipline of a well trained mind, and a word well spoken, this is the greatest blessing.

To succour father and mother, to cherish wife and child, to follow a peaceful calling, this is the greatest blessing.

To give alms, to live religiously, to give help to relatives, to do blameless deeds, this is the greatest blessing.

To cease and abstain from sin [evil], to eschew strong drink, to be diligent in good deeds, this is the greatest blessing.

Reverence and lowliness, contentment and gratitude, to receive religious teaching at due seasons, this is the greatest blessing.

To be long-suffering and meek, to associate with the bhikkhus of the Buddha, to hold religious discourse at due seasons, this is the greatest blessing.

Temperance and chastity, discernment of the four great truths, the prospect of Nibbāna, this is the greatest blessing.

The soul of one unshaken by the changes of this life, a soul inaccessible to sorrow, passionless, secure, this is the greatest blessing.

They that do these things are invincible on every side, on every side they walk in safety, yea, theirs is the greatest blessing.
The Three Jewels
(Katavīha Sutta)

All spirits here assembled, those of earth and those of air, let all such be joyful, let them listen attentively to my words.

Therefore hear me, O ye spirits, be friendly to the race of men, for day and night they bring you their offerings, therefore keep diligent watch over them.

Whatsoever treasure there be here or in other worlds, whatsoever glorious jewel in the heavens, there is none like the Buddha—the Buddha is this glorious jewel. May this truth bring prosperity.

Did the tranquil sage of the race of Sakya attain to the knowledge of Nibbāna—Nibbāna sin-destroying, passionless, immortal, transcendent? There is nought like this doctrine—the Dhamma is this glorious jewel. May this truth bring prosperity.

Did the supreme Buddha extol a pure doctrine, have holy men told of an unceasing meditation? There is nought like this doctrine—the Dhamma is this glorious jewel. May this truth bring prosperity.

There are eight orders of men praised by the righteous, four that walk in the paths of holiness, and four that enjoy the fruits thereof. They are the disciples of the Buddha, worthy to receive gifts, in them charity obtains an abundant reward. The Sangha is this glorious jewel. May this truth bring prosperity.

Who are they that with steadfast mind, exempt from evil desire, are firmly established in the religion of Gotama. They have entered on the way of Nibbāna, they have bought it without price, they enjoy perfect tranquillity, they have obtained the greatest gain. The Sangha is this glorious jewel. May this truth bring prosperity.

As the pillar of a city gate, resting on the earth, is unmoved by the four winds of heaven, so declare I the righteous man to be who has learnt and gazes on the four great truths. The Sangha is this glorious jewel. May this truth bring prosperity.

They that clearly understand the four great truths well preached by the profoundly wise Being, however much they be distracted by the temptations of this world, they shall not again receive eight births. The Sangha is this glorious jewel. May this truth bring prosperity.

He who is blest with the knowledge of Nibbāna, and has cast off these three sins, vanity and doubt and the practice of vain ceremonies, the same is delivered from the four states of punishment, and cannot commit the six deadly sins. The Sangha is this glorious jewel. May this truth bring prosperity.

If a bhikkhu commits sin in deed or in word or in thought he is wrong to conceal it, for concealment of sin is declared to be evil in one who has gained a knowledge of Nibbāna. The Sangha is this glorious jewel. May this truth bring prosperity.

As the tree tops bloom in grove and forest in the first hot month of summer, so did the Buddha preach for the chief good of men his glorious doctrine that leads to Nibbāna. The Buddha is this glorious jewel. May this truth bring prosperity.

The noblest, the greatest of men, the finder of Nibbāna, the giver of Nibbāna, the bringer of Nibbāna, preached his glorious Dhamma. The Buddha is this glorious jewel. May this truth bring prosperity.

Their old Kamma is destroyed, no new Kamma is produced. Their hearts no longer cleaving to future life, their seed of existence destroyed, their desires quenched, the righteous are extinguished like this lamp. The Sangha is this glorious jewel. May this truth bring prosperity.

Ye spirits here assembled, those of earth and those of air, let us bow before the Buddha, the Tathāgata revered by gods and men. May there be prosperity.

Ye spirits here assembled, those of earth and those of air, let us bow before the Dhamma, the Tathāgata revered by gods and men. May there be prosperity.

Ye spirits here assembled, those of earth and those of air, let us bow before the Sangha, the Tathāgata revered by gods and men. May there be prosperity.

The Spirits of the Departed
(Tīrokuṭṭha Sutta)

They stand outside our dwellings, at our windows, at the corners of our streets; they stand at our doors, revisiting their old homes.

When abundant food and drink is set before them, by reason of the past sins of these departed ones, their friends on earth remember them not.
Yet do such of their kinsmen as are merciful bestow upon them at due seasons food and drink, pure, sweet and suitable. Let this be done for your departed friends, let them be satisfied.

Then, gathering together here, the assembled spirits of our kinsmen rejoice greatly in a plentiful repast.

“Long,” they say, “may our kinsmen live through whom we have received these things: to us offerings are made and the givers are not without reward.”

For in the land of the dead there is no husbandry, no keeping of flocks, no commerce as with us, no trafficking for gold: the departed live in that world by what they receive in this.

As water fallen upon a height descends into the valley, so surely do alms bestowed by men benefit the dead.

As the brimming rivers fill the ocean, so do alms bestowed by men benefit the dead.

Let a man consider thus — “Such a one gave me this gift, such a one wrought me this good deed; they were my kinsmen, my friends, my associates.” Then let him give alms to the dead, mindful of past benefits.

For weeping and sorrow and all manner of lamentation are of no avail, if their relatives stand thus sorrowing it benefits not the dead.

But this charity bestowed by you, well secured in the Sangha if it long bless the dead, then does it benefit them indeed.

And the fulfilment of this duty to relatives to the dead is a great service rendered, to the bhikkhus a great strength given, by you no small merit acquired.

The Hidden Treasure
(Nidhikṣaṇa Sutta)

A man buries a treasure in a deep pit, reasoning thus within himself, “When occasion arises this treasure will be of use to me — if I am accused by the king, or plundered by robbers, or for release from debt, or in famine or in misfortune.” Such are the reasons for which men conceal what in this world is called treasure.

Meanwhile all this treasure, lying day after day concealed in a deep pit, profits him nothing.

Either the treasure vanishes from its resting place, or its owner’s sense becomes distracted with care, or Nāgas remove it, or malignant spirits convey it away, or his enemies or his kinsmen dig it up in his absence. The treasure is gone when the merit that produced it is exhausted.

There is a treasure that man or woman may possess, a treasure laid up in the heart, a treasure of charity, piety, temperance, soberness.

It is found in the sacred shrine, in the monastic assembly, in the individual man, in the stranger and sojourner, in the father, the mother, the elder brother.

A treasure secure, impregnable, that cannot pass away. When a man leaves the fleeting riches of this world, this he takes with him after death.

A treasure unshared with others, a treasure that no thief can steal. Let the wise man practise virtue: this is a treasure that follows him after death.

A treasure that gives every delight to gods and men; for whatsoever they desire with this treasure it may be bought.

Bloom, a sweet voice, grace and beauty, power and pomp, all these this treasure can procure.

Sovereignty and lordship, the loved bliss of universal empire, yea celestial rule among the gods, all these this treasure can procure.

All human prosperity, every pleasure in celestial abodes, the full attainment of Nibbāna, all these this treasure can procure.

Wisdom, enlightenment, tranquillity, in one who lives wisely for the sake of virtuous friends, all these this treasure can procure.

Universal science, the eight emancipations of the mind, all the perfections of the disciple of the Buddha, supernatural knowledge [self-enlightenment] supreme buddhahood itself, all these this treasure can procure.

Thus this possession of merit is of great and magical effect, therefore are good works praised by the wise and learned.
Good Will to All
(Metta Sutta)

This is what should be done by him who is wise in seeking his own good, who has gained a knowledge of the tranquil lot of Nibbāna. Let him be diligent, upright, and conscientious; meek, gentle, not vainglorious.

Contented and cheerful, not oppressed with the cares of this world, not burdened with riches. Tranquil, discreet, not arrogant, not greedy for gifts.

Let him not do any mean action for which others who are wise might reprove him. Let all creatures be happy and prosperous, let them be of joyful mind.

All beings that have life, be they feeble or strong, be they tall or of middle stature or short, be they minute or vast.

Seen or unseen, dwelling afar or near at hand, born or seeking birth, let all creatures be joyful.

Let no man in any place deceive another, nor let him be harsh towards any one; let him not out of anger or resentment wish ill to his neighbour.

As a mother so long as she lives watches over her child, her only child, so among all beings let boundless good will prevail.

Let good will without measure, impartial, unmixed with enmity, prevail throughout the world, above, below, around.

If a man be of this mind so long as he be awake, whether standing or walking, or sitting or lying, then is come to pass the saying, “This place is the abode of holiness.”

He who has not embraced false doctrine, the pious man endowed with a knowledge of Nibbāna, if he conquer the love of pleasure he shall never again be born in the womb.

THE BUDDHIST SUTTA
John Ireland

The Pali scriptures were established more or less in the form we know them today in the first century B.C. when they were committed to writing in Ceylon. Before then they were carried about as an oral tradition in the minds of the Buddha’s followers. It is obvious that it would be easy for extraneous matter to intrude and be passed off as sayings of the Buddha. Therefore, to safeguard the tradition any doubtful sayings had to be carefully examined and compared with the accepted sutta (discourse) and vinaya (rule of conduct). If they did not conflict, they were retained, but if they did, they were rejected.

In the Netipakarana there is a threefold definition of a sutta\(^1\) which may be useful to consider and may help one to think more deeply about these sayings.

The three are:

1. A sutta ‘must conform’ (to the Truths), or, ‘must give access’ (to the four stages of sanctitude).

2. A sutta ‘must point the way’ (of overcoming the three unhealthy roots).

3. A sutta ‘must have the nature of Dhamma’.

Firstly it must conform to or lead towards an understanding of, the four Noble Truths: Suffering, its origin in craving, its cessation or Nibbāna and the eightfold path leading to its cessation. The Buddha claimed not to teach anything not connected with these four Truths, and if we are presented with an idea that runs contrary to them it may be rejected. The stages of sanctitude, Stream-entry, Once-returning, Never-returning and Arahatta, arise upon successively deeper realisations of these four Noble Truths. They are essential attainments in the practice of Buddhism, so it must give ‘access’ to them.

Next a sutta must guide one who practises what it advises, whether directly or by implication, towards the getting rid of greed, hate and delusion and towards the development of their opposites. For, “whatever leads to dispassion and not to attachment; to release from bondage and not to bondage; to dispersion of defilements and not to accumulating


them . . . . this, you may affirm is the Dhamma, this is the Teacher’s message’. (Anguttara-nikāya VIII 53) In addition it should be remembered that the cessation of greed, hate and delusion is a definition of Nibbāna.

Finally, and perhaps most important of all, a saying claimed to be that of the Buddha’s must be Dhammatta, which might roughly be said to mean, “having the flavour of Dhamma about it.” Dhamma referring here to the Buddha’s theory of causation, the Law of Dependent Arising (paticca-samuppāda), summarised in the formula:

‘This being, that is; from the arising of this, that arises; this not being, that is not; from the cessation of this, that ceases.’

Therefore it must be adaptable, to and not conflict with, the idea of the conditioned nature of phenomena, their impermanence and unsatisfactoriness; as well as the doctrines of impersonality (anatta) and emptiness (suññata) which are characteristics also of the unconditioned Nibbāna.

The Buddha’s theory of causation pervades all his utterances. He analyses situations and exposes the causes and conditions that give rise to them. He probes behind the questions he is asked, seeing clearly the motives behind them and the implications they give rise to. He lives this Dhamma, has become this Dhamma and never deviates from it. Moreover it is the method (or Dhamma) he uses in teaching his followers:

“You, bhikkhus, have been trained by me to look for conditions (paccaya) now here, now there, in these things and those,” (Majjhima-nikāya, 109).

The interesting point in this threefold definition is not that a saying is actually and historically proven as being that of the Buddha’s which would be impossible to prove, but that the elders who formulated this definition were well aware of the spirit of the teaching. They knew that, ‘whatever is well-spoken is an utterance of the Buddha.’

KARMA — THE RIPENING FRUIT*

Bhikkhu Nāṇājīvako

With the decline of Newtonian Physics and the emergence of quantum theory and relativity, the physical world-picture in the West became centered around a process-concept. Natural sciences and 19th century scientifically oriented philosophy were in quest of new criteria that could be better adjusted to their specific aims than the rude causal interpretation of the whole world, “with its men and gods” (as the Buddha would say) in bare analogy to “dead matter” in its macroscopic commonsense aspect. This was the end of the stiff mechanistic absolutism based on the substance-view, and the corresponding conception of causality as the universal pattern of blind determinism in nature. The dominant role of physics was about to be replaced by a prevalently biological orientation. This at least was the tendency of the new vitalistic philosophy, whose most pre-eminent representative was Henri Bergson.

By this essential turning, modern philosophy seemed to return to pathways that closely, though not explicitly, resembled certain specific features of Buddhism, which have arisen out of different contexts and much earlier in time. The first to advert to this analogy explicitly, in terms of a new philosophy of culture, was Friedrich Nietzsche. The idea of the “eternal recurrence” of cosmic and historical cycles, taken over from early Greek philosophy was not sufficient for his dynamic “transvaluation of all values.” Yet the way from the early Ionian world-view to the Indian heritage in the dissolving civilizations of the Near East—out of which ultimately the Ionian Renaissance had arisen — was not very long. Thus Nietzsche discovered in the teaching of the Buddha an archetypal model for his own vitalistic attitude in philosophy. His interpretation of Buddhism became a paradoxical counterpoint accompanying Nietzsche’s antithetic position to Christianity.

Despite its rather strange position in the structure of Nietzsche’s own thought, his interpretation of Buddhism is neither vague nor unauthentic. Nietzsche found his access to Buddhism through the basic text of Dhammapadā (probably Fauböll’s masterly Latin translation in 1855, the first in Europe). In Chapter 1,5, the Buddha is quoted as saying “Enmities are never appeased by enmity, but they are appeased by non-enmity. This is the eternal law.”

In Nietzsche's interpretation, this statement is "the moving refrain of the whole of Buddhism ... and quite rightly: it is precisely these emotions [of resentment] which would be thoroughly unhealthy with regard to the main dietetic objective," since Buddhism "no longer speaks of 'struggle against sin' but, quite in accordance with actuality, 'the struggle against suffering'". Suffering is in Nietzsche's existential interpretation "a state of depression arisen on the basis of physiological conditions, against this depression Buddha takes hygienic measures." The Buddha was a "deep physiologist, whose 'religion' should more properly be called a hygiene ... whose effect depends on the victory over resentment: to make the soul free from it — this is the first step towards health. 'Enmity is not ended by enmity ...'—this is not a moral advice, this is an advice of physiology."1

As brutally partial as this interpretation may seem even to Buddhists, it nevertheless singled out an essential point whose deeper implications will remain characteristic for the development of the later philosophical thought on the main subject of the present paper.

On the other hand, at the end of the 19th century and also much later, missionaries of more popular versions of Buddhism, still unaware of the essential purport of the new scientific and philosophical world-view emerging in their own cultural ambience, were praising Buddhism for its eminently rational advantages as a religion founded on the "solid scientific basis" of the universally valid principle of causality," almost in its Newtonian meaning. For at that time the term *paticcasamuppādo*, or "interdependent origination" of all phenomena (*dhammā*) used to be interpreted in analogy to the "hard facts" of physics and physically oriented "positive" sciences. This understanding of the principle of causality seemed sufficient to account for the generally Indian teaching on *karma*, the basic principle of moral determinism, and for its peculiarly Buddhist version, distinguished by the Buddha's negation of a permanent soul-principle (*anattā*) in the process of becoming visualized as a "stream" (*samsāra*) of life-experience, and corresponding most closely, as we shall see, to Bergson's *flux du vécu*.

It seems that at that time, and for a long time after, nobody except Nietzsche was interested in taking note of another humble historical fact, namely that the Buddha's attitude to the world as a whole was emphatically negative: *sabba-loke anabhiri*, "disgust with the whole world" — not only because the world, whose overlord is Death (*Māra*), is essentially anguish or suffering (*dukkham*), but also because the deeper reason for this existential anguish is the "nullity" (*suññam*) of our-self-being-in-the-world, or "nihilation" as we might express it in 20th century terms:

...since in this very life such a being [as the Buddha,] cannot be identified by you as existing in truth, in reality, it is proper for you to state that such a being is the superman, the most excellent man who has attained the highest aim, and that such a being, if he had to be designated, should be designated in other than these four terms: "Such a being exists after death" or "he does not exist after death", or "he both does and does not exist after death"; or "he neither does nor does not exist after death."

Surely not, reverend sir.

Good, Anurāhdo. Both formerly and now, it is just suffering that I proclaim, and the ceasing of suffering.2

II

In the oldest Buddhist texts of *abhidhamma* ("about phenomena"), the central conception of phenomenological analysis (vibhajjavādo) was concentrated on the idea of a "stream of existence" (*bhava-sūtu*): articulation (*ākām*) of the existential (*bhava*) flux (*sūtu*) or, in a free translation, emergence of fluctuating articulation. Thus, in early Buddhism as in modern philosophy, "substance-thought" had to be replaced by "process thought." Long before the Buddha, substance-thought was formulated in the Vedantic conception — contained, among so many other world-views, in the earliest *Upanishads* as the teaching of an absolute, all-encompassing being, *Brahman*, conceived as "changeless, all-pervading, unmovable, immovable, eternal." In negating all these attributes, the Buddha challenged Vedantic absolutism by adopting the alternative solution of resolving all "being" into flux and nullity (*suññatā*) in negating even a permanent or static soul-principle (*anattā*), or the negation of *ātā* the Vedantic *Self*).

Thus the core of the *abhidhamma* conception of the "stream of existence" consists in its theory of momentariness (*khetikavādo*). Its modern analogy has found its first and best formulation in the philosophy of William James, especially in his essay, Does "Consciousness" Exist?, where the "stream of consciousness" or "stream of thinking" (which, "when scrutinized, reveals itself to consist chiefly of the stream of my breathing") is elicited from his basic theory of "pure experience," defined as "the instant field of the present ... this succession of an emptiness and fullness that have reference to each other and are of one flesh" — succession "in small enough pulses", which "is the essence of the phenomenon." In the same connection, as "the result of our criticism of the absolute," the metaphysical and metaphysical idea of a "central self" is reduced by James to "the conscious self of the moment."9 Compare this with Whitehead's further elaboration in his metaphysical conception
of “actual occasions” and “throbbing actualities” understood as “pulsations of experience,” whose “drops” or “puffs of existence” guided by an internal teleology of their “concrescence” (analogous to the Buddhist sakhārā in karmic formations) join the “stream of existence.”

All this was summarized by Bergson in a statement which to a Buddhist sounds like a formulation in the simplest and most authentic terms common to all schools and periods of Buddhist thought:

There are changes, but there are underneath the change no things which change: change has no need of a support ... movement does not imply a mobile.5

In his introduction to the French translation of Pragmatism by William James, Bergson says that “from the point of view taken by James which, is that of pure experience or of ‘radical empiricism’ reality ... flows without our being able to say whether it is in a single direction, or even whether it is always and throughout the same river flowing.”6 And in his own Introduction to Metaphysics, he says, “All reality is, therefore, tendency, if we agree to call tendency a nascent change of direction.”7

Bergson’s approach to a biologically oriented philosophy of life was entirely different from Nietzsche’s intentions. He did not explicitly consider cultural implications of the biological reorientation of the new philosophy of nature until the last period of his activity (The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, 1932). Bergson’s most important work, Creative Evolution, which appeared in 1907, begins with the question, “What is the precise meaning of the word ‘exist’?” The answer, at the end of the first section is:

We are seeking only the precise meaning that our consciousness gives to this word “exist,” and we find that, for a conscious being, to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly.8

In such maturing and “creation of self by self”, which “is the more complete, the more one reasons on what one does,”9 consists the problem of freedom. In this process each individual self-consciousness “lives and develops itself as an effect of its own hesitations until a free action is detached from it as if it were an overripe fruit.”10

The Buddha also speaks of the guidance, or protective care, “of self by self” in the same process of “the ripening fruit of action,” thus, “One oneself is the guardian of oneself. What other guardian would there be?” (Dhammapadam, 160).

— if, Ananda, there were no kamma [karma, action] ripening in the sphere of sense existence, would there appear any sensual becoming?

— Surely not, Lord.
— ... and wherever the action ripens, there the individual experiences the fruit of that action, be it in this life, or in the next life, or in future lives.
— The results of kamma are unthinkable, not to be pondered upon.11

Here is Bergson’s explanation of the thesis:

What are we, in fact, what is our character, if not the condensation of the history that we have lived from our birth ... nay even before our birth, since we bring with us prenatal dispositions? Doubtless we think with only a small part of our past, but it is with our entire past, including the original bent of our soul, that we desire, will and act. Our past, then as a whole is made manifest to us in its impulse ... From this survival of the past it follows that consciousness cannot go through the same state twice. Our personality which is being built up each instant with its accumulated experience changes without ceasing ... That is why our duration is irreversible ... Thus our personality shoots, grows and ripens without ceasing.12

Bergson’s conception of causality and motivation departs from the classical theories of determinism and freedom of action and approaches the Indian (not exclusively Buddhist) idea of karma in two essential points: its psychological origin and its creative character. It is based on Bergson’s critique of both mechanistic and finalistic theories in biology:

Evolution will thus prove to be something entirely different from a series of adaptations to circumstances as mechanism claims; entirely different also from the realization of a plan of the whole, as maintained by the doctrine of finality ...... Such a philosophy of life... claims to transcend both mechanism and finalism, but ... it is nearer the second doctrine than the first.13

As for this second doctrine, Bergson maintains that the finalistic interpretation, such as we shall propose it, could never be taken for an anticipation of the future ... How could we know beforehand a situation that is unique of its kind, that has never yet occurred and will never occur again? Of the future, only that is foreseen which is like the past or can be made up again with elements like those of the past. Such is the case with astronomical, physical and chemical facts, with all facts which form part of a system in which elements supposed to be unchanging are merely put together in which the only changes are changes of position......... But an original situation, which imparts something of its own originality to its elements......, how can such a situation be pictured as given before it is actually
produced? All that can be said is that once produced, it will be explained by the elements that analysis will then carve out of it. Now, what is true of the production of a new species is also true of the production of a new individual, and, more generally, of any moment of any living form. 14

Compare the simpler statement of the Buddha, with strict reference to the karmic, i.e. the morally relevant, act:

If any one were to say, “this person commits an act and he will suffer accordingly” — if that were the case, there would be no [use of leading a] life of holiness, and there would be no opportunity of putting an end to suffering. If any one were to say: “this person commits an act for which he deserves to suffer accordingly” — if that were the case, there would be a use of leading a life of holiness, and there would be an opportunity of putting an end to suffering. 15

The vitalist attempt to re-examine the problems of causality, finitude and freedom of will from Bergson’s standpoint of “transformalism” 16 brought us to a wider epistemological problem of establishing adequate relations between science, history and philosophy — a problem extensively discussed by the later philosophies of existence:

Science can work only on what is supposed to repeat itself . . . . Anything that is irreducible and irreversible in the successive moments of a history eludes science. To get a notion of this irreducibility and irreversibility we must break with scientific habits which are adapted to the fundamental requirements of thought, we must do violence to the mind, go counter to the natural bent of the intellect. But this is just the function of philosophy. 17 Modern science is the daughter of astronomy, it has come down from heaven to earth along the inclined plane of Galileo, for it is through Galileo that Newton and his successors are connected with Kepler . . . . Each material point became a rudimentary planet . . . . Modern science must be defined pre-eminently by its aspiration to take time as an independent variable. 18

But to the artist who creates a picture by drawing it from the depth of his soul, time is no longer an accessory . . . . The duration of his work is part and parcel of his work. To contract or to dilate it would be to modify both the psychical evolution that fills it and the invention which is its goal. The time taken up by the invention is one with the invention itself. It is the progress of a thought which is changing in the degree and measure that it is taking form. It is a vital process, something like the ripening of an idea. 19

Compare this the statement of Buddhaghosa, in Atthasālīni:

“By time the Sage described the mind, and by mind described the time.” 20

The “scission” of intellect from intuition 21 is explained by Bergson (and later existentialists) by the “practical nature of perception and its prolongation in intellect and science”, we could almost say, by the lack of contemplative interest in modern, technically oriented science. Thus in a deduction which reminds us of Heidegger’s basic thesis on the scope of metaphysics, Bergson formulates the question:

But has metaphysics understood its role when it has simply trodden in the steps of physics, in the chimerical hope of going further in the same direction? Should not its own task be, on the contrary, to remount the incline that physics descends, to bring back matter to its origins, and to build up progressively a cosmology, which would be so to speak, a reversed psychology? 22

Everything is obscure in the idea of creation, if we think of things which are created and of a thing which creates, as we habitually do, as the understanding cannot help doing . . . . It is natural to our intellect, whose function is essentially practical, made to present to us things and states rather than changes and acts. But things-and-states are only views, taken by our mind, of becoming. There are no things, there are only actions. 23

Époché, refraining from judgments based on such “views” (Greek doxa, Sanskrit drishṭi, Pali diṭṭhi), the philosophical method brought from India by Pyrrho of Elis at the time of Alexander the Great, has become in the 20th century the fundamental method of Husserl’s “meditating philosopher” in phenomenological analysis. It is a “science of phenomena, which lies far removed from our ordinary thinking, and has not until our own day therefore shown an impulse to develop . . . . so extraordinarily difficult . . . . a new way of looking at things, one that contrasts at every point with the natural attitude of experience and thought,” whose development is felt, however, as an “urgent need nowadays.” 24

The teaching of the Buddha was, with a still wider purpose, the expression of “the right effort” (samma-vāyāmo) to “swim against the stream” of such world-views, i.e. “ . . . the type of views called the thicket of views, the wilderness of the contortion of views, the vacillation of views, the fetter of views . . . .” 25

In Bergson’s theory of intuition, the act of “swimming against the stream” is interpreted with his basic French term Torsion:

Let us try to see, no longer with the eyes of the intellect alone, which grasps only the already made and which looks from the outside, but with the spirit, I mean with that faculty of seeing which is immanent
in the faculty of acting and which springs up, somehow, by the twisting of the will on itself, when action is turned into knowledge, like heat, so to say, into light.26

By intuition I mean instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely. That an effort of this kind is not impossible is proved by the existence in man of an aesthetic faculty along with the normal perception ... This intention is just what the artist tries to regain, in placing himself back within the object by a kind of sympathy, in breaking down, by an effort of intuition, the barrier that space puts up between him and his model.27

The ultimate metaphysical consequences implied in a theory of causation based on the biological phenomenon of the “ripening fruit” were taken into adequate consideration only in some later philosophies of existence. Yet the preparatory vitalistic stage of modern philosophy remains more important for an Indian reinterpretation of the theory of karma than can be assessed within strictly European limits, where the importance of the missing link between the vitalist and existentialist stages — the link of a new theory of causality — has not yet been fully and explicitly realized. Let us therefore conclude the survey of this cycle of ideas by returning to the lowest level on which Bergson’s vitalistic interpretation of cosmic matter had to establish a new starting point:

Let us merely recall that extension admits of degrees, that all sensation is extensive in a certain measure, and that the idea of unextended sensations, artificially localized in space, is a mere view of the mind, suggested by an unconscious metaphysics much more than by psychological observation. No doubt we make only the first steps in the direction of the extended, even when we let ourselves go as much as we can. But suppose for a moment that matter consists in this very movement pushed further, and that physics is simply psychics inverted.28

The conception “a cosmology which would be a reversed psychology” or of physics understood “simply as psychics inverted,” was destined to become the fulcrum for a transition from a physical to an historical orientation in other contemporary philosophies. This transition is also clearly marked in Whitehead’s later works. “Physical endurance is the process of continuously inheriting a certain identity of character transmitted through a historic route of events.”29

Bergson expressed this emphasis in terms which brought him still closer to a specific aspect of later existentialist thought: the predominant importance of the future for (karmic) shaping of the present by the past.

Though Heidegger’s critique of Bergson’s idea of the “stream of experience” was concentrated on this point, where in an initial metaphor Bergson compares a “mental state, as it advances on the road of time, continually swelling with the duration which it accumulates” with “a snowball on the snow, rolling upon itself” and thus increasing — we can read a few pages later in the opening chapter of Creative Evolution another statement, anticipating Heidegger’s objection to some extent: “Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances.”30

III

Martin Heidegger, in his basic work, Being and Time,31 seems to take over the meditation on “the ripening fruit” at the critical point reached by Bergson’s analysis of its wider biological scope: the karmic predicament of human existence. It can be seen from Heidegger’s numerous critical references to Bergson (though in many cases I would not agree with them) that in the meantime it had become obvious that there was more to elicit by the process-philosophy than the biologically oriented thinkers of the vitalist period could realize. The philosophy of existence undertook this work in essentially different dimensions. Heidegger in particular was very careful and explicit in critically adapting new methods of independent historical thinking in the philosophy of culture introduced by Dilthey, and above all the new structure of transcendental logic laid down by his teacher Husserl, for phenomenological analysis independent of natural science. Within the scope of this new framework, similarities with Buddhist thought emerge still more strikingly, especially in the domain of the “suffering/concern” theme and the need for the notion of karma in a process-multiple causality structure.

The second part of Heidegger’s Being and Time deals in particular with problems of human reality and temporality (Dasein and Zeitlichkeit). The possibility for human being to attain to full ripeness in an existence conditioned by man’s “being-towards-death,” is discussed in the first chapter (“Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole and its being-towards-death”) Chapter Five is dedicated to “temporality and historicality” as essential constituents of the human being32 involved in this ambiguous process.

When for instance, a fruit is unripe, it “goes toward” its ripeness. In this process of ripening, that which the fruit is not yet is by no means pieced on as something not yet present-at-hand. The fruit brings itself to ripeness, and such a bringing of itself is a characteristic of its being as a fruit. Nothing imaginable which one might
contribute to it would eliminate the unripeness of the fruit; if this entity did not come to ripeness of *its own accord*. When we speak of the “not yet” of the unripeness, we do not have in view something else which stands outside, and which — with utter indifference to the fruit — might be present-at-hand in it and with it. What we have in view is the fruit itself in its specific kind of being... The ripening fruit, however, not only is not indifferent to its unripeness as something other than itself, but it is that unripeness as it ripens. The “not yet” has already been included in the very being of the fruit, not as some random characteristic, but as something constitutive. Correspondingly, as long as any Dasein is, it too is already its “not-yet.”

The implicit emphasis laid on the difference from the “classical” European mechanist theory of causality is obvious enough.

The karmic process in its Buddhist meaning, can be defined as a vicious circle of “interdependent origination” (*paṭicca-samuppāda*), consisting of a chain of twelve rings (*niṭānam*), the first of which is *avijñā*, “ignorance” or better, metaphysical nescience of a human being (defined by Heidegger as a “being-there — Dasein”) about his own emergence in the flux of existence. The last ring of the chain is “death.” Heidegger’s analysis of human reality as a “being-there” in the world is not less distinctly determined and delimited by the tension of the same polarity — ignorance and death:

If the term “understanding” is taken in a way which is primordially existential, it means to be *projecting towards a potentiality-for-being for the sake of which any Dasein exists*. In understanding, one’s own potentiality-for-being is disclosed in such a way that one’s Dasein always knows understandingly what it is capable of. It “knows” this, however not by having discovered some fact, but by maintaining itself in an *existentiell* [Essential] possibility. The kind of ignorance which corresponds to this, does not consist in an absence or cessation of understanding, but must be regarded as a deficient mode of the projectedness of one’s potentiality-for-being. Existence can be questionable ...... When one understands oneself projectively in an *existentiell* possibility, the future underlies this understanding, and it does so as a coming-towards-onself out of that current possibility as which one’s Dasein exists... Projection is basically futural ...... Temporality does not temporize itself constantly out of the authentic future. This inconstancy, however, does not mean that temporality sometimes lacks a future, but rather that the temporizing of the future takes various forms.

This seems to explain one step further the “hesitation” of the self “until a free action is detached as an overripe fruit,” as Bergson expressed the limits of freedom as release (*mokṣa*) within the scope of a karmic determinism.

With ripeness, the fruit *fulfills itself*. But is the death at which Dasein arrives, a fulfilment in this sense? With its death, Dasein has indeed “fulfilled its course.” But in doing so, has it necessarily exhausted its specific possibilities? ... For the most part, Dasein ends in unfulfilment, or else by having disintegrated and been used up. Ending does not necessarily mean fulfilling oneself. It thus becomes more urgent to ask *in what sense, if any, death must be conceived as the ending of Dasein.*

Arising out of this situation, the problem of *karma*, implicitly felt as an “anticipatory resoluteness” in “concrete working out of temporality” aiming at “an authentic historizing of Dasein,” is further discussed as the existential problem of Dasein’s potentiality-for-being-a-whole.**

Since “those possibilities of existence which have been factically disclosed are not to be gathered from death ...... we must ask whence, in general, Dasein can draw those possibilities upon which it factically projects itself.” The answer is:

The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them *in terms of the heritage* which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over. In one’s coming back resolutely to one’s throwness, there is hidden a *handing down to oneself* of the possibilities that have come down to one, but not necessarily as having *thus come down*.

We shall take for granted that the coincidence of the expression (underlined by me) “thus come down” with the literal meaning of the most common attribute of the Buddha — *tathāgato* — is another of many casual cases where a modern philosophy of essentially the same trend as our archaic one will, to some extent, come to use the same terms in expressing ideas of the same kind. What is meant here by the same trend will be explicated later. Let us first single out the specific meaning of this important term in the specific context.

The word *tathāgato* in its widest sense in the early Pāli literature, is used as a designation of “human being” in general. Its logical connection with Buddha’s best known definition of the human being as “heir of his own actions” is obvious, even when it is used as the highest epithet of the Buddha.
What Heidegger wishes to point out is that the “heritage” of a jathāgāra has not to be understood here as a passive facticity of historically “objectified” social tradition or collective behavior, which in Heidegger’s terms would be designated as “inauthentic heritage.” Unlike the social study of external history, Dasein in its intimate ripening “never comes back behind its thrownness” in the “situationality” of its world. In other words, in a personal history there is no possibility of statically objective repetition of one and the same situation. This is the basic law of karmic development that both Bergson and Heidegger try to confirm on different levels of their investigations.

On this point, in Heidegger’s philosophy, “thrownness” appears as a critical term whose meaning has to be better determined, in view of the fact that it denotes an obvious Christian “cypher” for a karmically determined situation. This historical implication in basic existentialist terminology could even be interpreted by some critics as revealing an apparent deficiency of our analogy, had not Heidegger, fortunately for us, explained it, in the same context, by an “attribute” synonymous with the basic First Truth of the Buddha, dukkham, “anguish” or “worry”; “Before we decide too quickly whether Dasein draws its authentic possibilities of existence from thrownness or not, we must assure ourselves that we have a full conception of thrownness as a basic attribute of care.”

The translation of the German word Sorge by “care” may often diminish the full meaning of “Dasein’s character” of this fundamental “existential” or practical category on which Heidegger’s entire ontology is built. From our standpoint, “worry” would often seem a preferable translation. Yet Heidegger himself has left no doubt about the meaning of this term. At the end of the first part of Being and Time whose aim it was to “exhibit Care (Sorge) as the Being of Dasein,” i.e. “of that entity which in each case we ourselves are, and which we call “man,” the basic “ontical” meaning of Sorge is interpreted (and illustrated by an ancient fable) as “worry” and “grief.”

The continuation of the inquiry shows how the karmic phenomenon has to be comprised within the scope of this central theme—how the essence of worry and grief is revealed in response to the “call of conscience.” First of all Heidegger’s philosophy is no longer a philosophy of consciousness but a philosophy of conscience. (The word “consciousness” is never used by Heidegger except in critical disputes, mainly with the Kantians.) Here conscience discloses itself as the awakening call which alone can liberate us from our lost condition (Verlorenheit) and thrownness in avijñā (avidya, ignorance), or metaphysical “nescience.” Only in giving heed to the awakening call does “Dasein understand itself with regard to its potentiality for-being” in man’s mindfulness and resoluteness “to take over in his thrownness — right under the eyes of Death — that entity which Dasein is itself, and to take it over wholly”, as his karmic load. In Heidegger’s words, “Resoluteness is defined as a projecting of oneself upon one’s own being-guilty—a projecting which is reticent and ready for anxiety.” This is the ultimate moral aspect of the “hesitation in the ripening fruit of Bergsonian “creative activity”.

The last metaphysical (or better, eschatological), question to which Heidegger’s inquiry into the phenomenon of karma, or “ripening fruit,” arrives, concerns the origin of that strange experience, the primeval phenomenon of all religion: being-guilty.

[The call of conscience] is the call of care. Being-guilty constitutes the being to which we give the name of “care.” In uncanniness Dasein stands together with itself primordially. Uncanniness brings this entity face to face with its undisguised nullity, which belongs to the possibility of its ownmost potentiality-for-being. The appeal calls back by calling forth: it calls Dasein forth to the possibility of taking over, in existing, even that thrown entity which it is.

The statement underlined by me (“Der Anruf ist vorrufer Rückruf”) is the best shortcut definition of karma that I can imagine, even if it had to be formulated by the greatest master of Zen art in Japan (an art not at all unknown to Heidegger). The next one is not less pregnant with deep oriental meaning.

We have seen that care is the basic state of Dasein. The ontological signification of the expression “care” has been expressed in the definition: ahead-of-itself-being-already-in [the world] as being-alongside entities which we encounter (within-the-world).

Heidegger insists on an implicit consciousness of karma in the experience of care, or worry, as Dasein’s “understanding of itself in being-guilty.” He equally insists on the fact that even “phenomena with which the vulgar interpretation has any familiarity point back to the primordial meaning of the call of conscience when they are understood in a way that is ontologically appropriate” and that “this interpretation, in spite of all its obviousness, is by no means accidental.”

And yet, the call of conscience is “a keeping silent... Only in keeping silent does the conscience call, that is to say, the call comes from the soundlessness of uncanniness, and the Dasein which it summons is called back into the stillness of itself, and called back as something that is to
become still." A Japanese student in Heidegger's seminar once interpreted this course of thoughts in terms of a few Zen kôans. A follower of Ramana Maharshi in India could do it just as well to Heidegger's full satisfaction.

Having unfortunately no better word than "destiny" wherewith to designate the full range of the category of karma (though fully conscious of the wide horizon it encompasses). Heidegger brings us ultimately to the following summary of essential questions on this subject:

But it remains all the more enigmatic in what way this event as destiny is to constitute the whole "connectedness" of Dasein from its birth to its death. How can recourse to resoluteness bring us an enlightenment? Is not each resolution just one more single "experience" in the sequence of the whole connectedness of our experience?... Why is it that the question of how the "connectedness of life" is constituted finds no adequate and satisfactory answer? Is our investigation overhasty? Does it not, in the end, hang too much on the answer, without first having tested the legitimacy of the question?

Speaking of the problem of re-emergence or "recurrence" of existential situations in their essential dependence on "destiny" in Dasein's "historizing" course, Heidegger does not even indirectly attempt to formulate any hypothesis analogous to "rebirth" (as e.g. Nietzsche did in his own way) in Indian religious thought (punarbhava), though his sensitivity for the "enigmatic" remainder of the problem, as traced above, permits a still closer approach to this complex issue: "Dasein can be reached by the blows of destiny only because in the depth of its own being Dasein is destiny... a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen."

In suggesting the categorial designation of karma for the whole range of problems concerning the organic connectedness of vital processes whose ripening results in creative activity, my intention remains far from any attempt to propose any overhasty solution or pattern that could be discovered readymade in the transcendental schematism of some specific type of Asian philosophy or religion, such as Buddhism. Though, for the purpose of the present survey, Buddhism was chosen as the tertium comparationis; it was presumed as a wellknown fact that the historical origin of the categorial designation of karma in Indian philosophy is considerably older than its specific interpretation by the Buddha.

Notes

2. *Sanghyuta-nikâyo* XXII, 86 and 85. Quotations from Pâli texts are adapted mainly from the Pâli Text Society (London) editions of the Translation Series.
4. Some analogies between Whitehead and Buddha have recently been discussed by Kenneth K. Inada, "Whitehead's 'Actual Entity' and the Buddha's Anâtman," in *Philosophy East and West*, July 1971. Prof. Inada mentions at the beginning that Whitehead "especially in his later works makes several references to the Buddha," though his knowledge of Buddhism was rather superficial and on certain points basically wrong. Independently of such occasional direct references, Whitehead's philosophy in its original structure "shows strains of thought remarkably similar to those of the Buddha." Some of Inada's implicit references could be of much use also for a wider comparison with Bergson from the same Asian standpoint. The article does not deal with the subject of karma.
7. Ibid., p. 222.
8. H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, translated by A. Mitchell (N. Y., Modern Library, 1944), pp. 3, 10 (Quoted in the continuation as C. E.)
12. C. E., p. 8 Sartre has reformulated this problem on a deeper existential level, in his *Being and Nothingness*, translated by H. R. Barnes (N. Y., The Citadel Press, 1966), p. 114f: "There is no absolute beginning which without ever having past would become past. Since the For-itself, qua For-itself, has to be its past, it comes into the world with a past. These few remarks may permit us to view in a somewhat different light the problem of birth... There is a metaphysical problem concerning birth in that I can be anxious to know how I happen to have been born from that particular embryo..." Bergson's emphasis is also always on the concreteness and uniqueness of each creative act, even on the lowest biological level.
13. Ibid., pp. 113, 57.
15. *Anguttara-nikâyo*, III, 99. Sartre's analysis of "human reality" as "a project of being" bring him to the conclusion: "We can ascertain more exactly what is the being of the self: it is value." (Being and Nothingness, p. 92).
17. Ibid. p. 34f. Italicizing in this and following quotations are partly mine.
18. Ibid., p. 364.
19. Ibid., p. 370.
22. Ibid., p. 227f.
23. Ibid., p. 270.
25. Majjhima-nikāya, 2. Sābbāseva-suttaṃ
27. Ibid., p. 194.
28. Ibid., p. 221.
32. Heidegger’s designation of human being as Dasein (“being here” or “being there”, i.e. in the world, which is always “one’s own”) has been interpreted by Sartre in Being and Nothingness, as “human reality” a term which will be occasionally used in the continuation.
33. B. T., p. 243. (Marginal German page numbers used here and following.)
34. Ibid., p. 336.
35. Ibid., p. 244.
36. Ibid., p. 309.
37. Ibid., p. 383.
38. Cf. Ibid., pp. 196-200.
39. Ibid., p. 382.
40. Cf. Nāgārjuna’s statement in Mādhyamaka-kārikā, 24, 14: “For him who admits nullity all appears to be possible. For him who does not admit nullity nothing appears to be possible.”
41. B. T., p. 286f.
42. Ibid., p. 249.
43. As we shall see in the continuation, for lack of a better word in European tradition, Heidegger uses the word “destiny” (Schicksal) in the meaning which comes closest to karma. Schopenhauer, who was aware of the specific meaning of this category in Indian philosophy (in Vedānta and Buddhism) could not find a better term in European languages, and made efforts to adjust the meaning of “destiny” to the basic Indian idea of karma. An analogous effort is often made by Heidegger.

Bhikkhu Nāṇaḷīvako (Cedomil Veljacić) was born in Zagreb, where he took his Ph. D. in Indian and Greek philosophy at the University of Zagreb, and where later he returned as a lecturer in Asian philosophy. After two years as a visiting professor in India, he went to Ceylon and was ordained a Buddhist monk. He lives presently at the Cetiyaṭi Hermitage, Palatella, Ceylon. Besides translations from the Sanskrit and Pali, his principal work in Europe was a History of Oriental Philosophy, published in Zagreb in 1958. He has contributed a number of essays to Indian Philosophical Annuals, University of Madras, and is presently preparing A Buddhist Philosophy of Religion. A previous article relating Buddhism to contemporary Western philosophy, “Anicca—the Buddhist Theory of Impermanence,” was published in Main Currents, 27, 5 (May–June 1971).
BOOK REVIEWS


This volume contains essays on linguistics, philosophy and sociology from the standpoint of Buddhism presented to Miss Horner, the President of the Pali Text Society, in honour of her long and dedicated service to the cause of Buddhist scholarship.


A bibliography of publications by Miss Horner is followed by an invaluable biographical sketch by the Iggedens who have distinguished themselves in the field of Abhidhamma studies since playing host to (their Burmese teacher) Sayadaw U Thitila many years ago.

Alsdorf examines some gāthās from the Chavaka Jātaka ("The Impious Brahman and the Pious Caṇḍāla") whilst Caillat and Ruegg clarify the meanings of little-known Pali terms in comparison with their Sanskrit equivalents: ṭhāṇābhya and gōṭṭa/goṭra v. gotrabhā.

Dr. Rāhuła explores the various meanings of dhamma and dhammatā and incisively refutes the fallacious reasoning of those who claim that there is some nebulous motivating factor "behind or above or apart from spiritual states which can be considered as some external or superior force or power or grace".

The veteran Burma historian, G. H. Luce, details the advent of Buddhism into that country by the skilful use of inscriptions and other archaeological traces. Trevor Ling, on the other hand, sympathetically portrays the Burmese in his assessment of traditional Buddhist values vis-à-vis the acquisitive, consumer-orientated society that we in the West have been conditioned into regarding as worthy of emulation and promotion.

Finally, Dr. Saddhatissa has submitted a pioneer paper on Pali literature in Thailand. All readily accessible source materials have been utilised to present a vivid picture of the comparatively little-known riches of Thai and Lao Pali compositions, few of which have been translated. It only remains for the libraries of Bangkok and Chiangmai to be explored to convert this monograph into a co-equal with those contributions on Burmese and Sinhala Pali literature by Bode and Malalasekera respectively.

RBW


Students of Pali will be very pleased to hear of the reprint of this "lesson book" where the original Pali version appears on each page facing the English translation. The translation is new and is not a reproduction from E. B. Cowell's complete edition (1895-1907; reprinted by the Pali Text Society in 1959).

Each story illustrates one of the ten Pāramitās (perfections) and, in the words of the renowned editor and translator: "My main object in preparing these ten stories has been to provide those learning Pali with reading material that, of not canonical, is palatable and comparatively easy but which at the same time, since it lacks the repetition characterising much of the Pali canonical literature, uses a large number of words." It is to be hoped that this excellent little book becomes a required textbook wherever Pali is taught in the English-speaking world.

H. Saddhatissa


Minor Anthologies IV—Stories of the Mansions (Vimānavatthu) and Stories of the Departed (Petavatthu). Tr. I. B. Horner and H. S. Gehman. PP. xxv + 159; xiv + 110. £4.50.

It would be a great mistake to dismiss these two volumes, as containing little of real merit. Although they are admittedly of comparatively late date, a careful perusal of them will reveal much of lasting value on three levels:

1. that of pure scholarship;
2. their interest for the student of the history of religion;
3. their value for the ordinary Buddhist reader both for what he
can glean from them for the better ordering of his own life, and
for the vivid light they throw on the hopes and fears of the
ordinary (not particularly well-educated) layman of the age in
which they were written, and in fact of that of the majority of
lay Buddhists in Asia today.

As regards pure scholarship, the fact that they have been translated
and profusely and carefully annotated by Miss I. B. Horner ought in
itself make them worthy of intense study by scholars. The translation
reads effortlessly and it is a great advantage that no attempt has been
made to reproduce the gāthā or verse portions of the original, in verse —
but that the whole translation appears in prose. An example of the
extreme care taken by Miss Horner to choose the absolutely appropriate
word can be seen by referring to foot-note 2, on page 4 of the Buddhavaṃsa.
The introductions to the first three books (especially that to the
Buddhavaṃsa) puts these works into their proper historical framework
and indicates what the authors had in mind as to their purpose when
they were compiled. The notes — detailed but succinct — demonstrate the
complete mastery of Miss Horner in this field, and it would be well
worth while reading the whole of the first three books for the sake of the
notes alone, and the light they throw on Buddhism in general. The
fourth book — the "Stories of the Departed" (Petavatthu), which has
been translated by Dr. H. S. Gehman, contains practically no notes of
value. A particular feature of Miss Horner's notes is the copious use
she makes of the Commentaries, which, in the Buddhavaṃsa, are usually
quoted verbatim, and clear up a number of points which otherwise might
have remained doubtful or would have caused difficulty if the text alone
were read. This embodiment of portions of the Commentary also makes us
understand very clearly what a wealth of valuable information on the
Dhamma is hidden away in these Commentaries — most of which are,
unfortunately, still unpublished in translation, although apparently a
number of them have been recently translated into English by competent
Burmesse scholars and are awaiting publication by the P.T.S.

For the student of the history of religion, they provide fascinating
material for further research as we are here approaching the period in
which Theravāda is just about to develop into the Mahāyāna (although
the four books themselves are still staunchly Theravāda) but they do in
fact point in the direction of early Mahāyāna by, inter alia, the great
reverence, almost worship, of the various Buddhas, the many miraculous
happenings and the emphasis placed on the ten perfections (pāramīs) —
the six pāramitās of the Mahāyāna. They also show what were the
hopes and fears of the ordinary Buddhist layman, the virtues and practices
enjoined on him and why. Their close connection with the Jātakas —
the Buddhist layman's class of literature par excellence — is obvious.
They are works of devotion in the European medieval sense, and each
tale unashamedly sets out to point a particular moral. Just as very
few Christians aim at the "Beatific Vision," but rather at eternal life in a
very comfortable and well-furnished heaven, most lay Buddhists hoped for
(and still hope for, the most part) a better rebirth. Just as medieval
Christians had a very vivid sense of hell, the Buddhists paint painfully
realistic pictures of the unhappy states of existence undergone by the
petaśc (or hungry ghosts) until the evil kamma caused by their failure to
curb unbridled desires during life have finally been purged.

Of the four books contained in these volumes concluding the "Minor
Anthologies," the Buddhavaṃsa is by far the most important and inter-
esting. As Miss Horner so rightly points out, it is very much more
than being just a "work of devotion." In its relating of the enormous
number of prior Buddhas and the aonos during which they manifested
themselves, it gives us some understanding of what the bold statement,
"Samsāra is without beginning or end", really means.

In the Buddhavaṃsa's opening with the "Miracle of the Jewel-Walk"
(not described in any other Pāli source) we seem much nearer to the
climate of the Mahāvastu than to the sober account of the Buddha's life
carefully compiled from extracts from the earlier portion of the Pali
Canon by the late Bhikkhu Nāṇamoli in his Life of the Buddha. (BPS,
Kandy, 1972).

The twenty-five chronicles of the previous Buddhas, starting with
Dipānika and ending with that of Gotama Buddha himself, all follow
a detailed scheme setting out the details of his life. This does not become
wearisome because delicate variations are introduced into each Chronicle,
which makes one think of a musician's "variations on a theme".

The Cariyāpiṭaka, described in Miss Horner's Introduction as
"considered to be post-Asokan, it is a collection of thirty-five stories
each descriptive of conduct engaged in by the Bodhisatta when in birth
after birth as deva, man, animal, snake, bird or fish he was consolidating
the vast aim he had set himself aeons ago, of winning omniscience by
gradually mastering the ten perfections."

Of these tales, the first ten are devoted to the Perfection of Giving
dāna), the second ten to the Perfection of Morality (sīla), the remaining
Perfections being fitted into the last fifteen. The Perfections of Wisdom,
Energy and Patience are, strangely enough, only barely mentioned. The
Cariyāpiṭaka as it has come down to us suggests that the author did
not carry out his original design — which apparently would have entailed writing ten stories on each of the Perfections. The fact that he did not may be due to:

1. the loss of the palm-leaf pages of the original, or

2. more probably, that he just got bored with his task of moralising and gave up any attempt at a more detailed treatment after he had dealt with the two Perfections which seemed the most important to him.

The two books contained in volume IV, the “Stories of the Mansions” (Vimāṇavatthu) and the “Stories of the Departed” (Petavatthu) are very closely connected, the first indicating the joyful abodes of the virtuous, and the precise virtue the practice of which brought them there. The second portrays the unhappy lot of the petas (or hungry ghosts), and the precise demerit that brought them there.

The former contains eighty-five tales in all (some being only variants or duplicates of other tales in this collection). It is worthy of note that the first fifty tales deal with “Women’s Mansions” (although it is only the first division that actually bears this title, and that the lady inhabiting them is invariably and perhaps appropriately endowed with “surpassing beauty”). In almost every case their presence there is as the result of some act of generosity and only very occasionally of having practised “exemplary chastity”. This book contains two charming stories of animals reborn in heaven: the frog crushed to death whilst listening to a discourse of the Buddha (no. 51) and the heavenly reward of the Bodhisatta’s faithful steed, Kanthaka (no. 81).

The Petavatthu contains fifty-one cautionary tales of petas who appeared to monks or seers as well as to their relatives seeking alleviation from their suffering. Monks are able to question them as to the reason on account of which they have become petas. In the great majority of cases it was due to some kind of stinginess — especially in not providing alms food to monks and beggars. Gifts cannot be given directly to them to assuage their hunger, but gifts can be given to others on their behalf and the merit of this giving attributed to them. There are many examples of this “transfer of merit” to be found in this book. Sāriputta, for example, released a peti who had been his mother five generations earlier by causing King Bimbisāra to build four suitable huts for bhikkhus and then dedicating the merit to her. The Buddha himself sums up the (doctrinal) position as follows: “Just as in a sterile field, seed, though much be sown, does not yield abundant fruit nor please the husbandman even so, bountiful giving bestowed upon the wicked does not yield abundant fruit nor delight the donor. And just as when scanty seed is sown in good ground the harvest gladdens the farmer when there is plenty of rain, even so, when paid to the righteous, the virtuous, a deed, though it be slight, becomes merit fraught with great return.”

These tales in Dr. Gehman’s translation are told in a pleasant homely language and from reading them a great deal can be learned about the social conditions prevailing during the centuries immediately following the Buddha’s Parinibbāna. They should, in addition, provide a happy hunting ground for the folklorist. The present reviewer has heard almost exact parallels to a number of the stories in this book in the Western Gaelic-speaking parts of Ireland and particularly in the Western Isles of Scotland. — Ronald Brown


Although one may tend to become blasé over “Lives” of the Buddha that appear from time to time — hagiographies not having a ready appeal to phlegmatic English readers — the present work is an exception and, indeed, stands in a class of its own. Not since E. H. Brewster’s Life of Gotama the Buddha (compiled from the Rhys Davids’ translations in 1926) has such a readable work on the subject appeared based exclusively on the Pali Canon.

The present volume was published from the posthumous papers of Ven. Nāṇamoli whose untimely demise in 1960 was a severe blow to the cause of Pali Buddhist translation. It comprises an ingenious and, indeed, original method of presentation: the free-flowing prose narrative, interspersed with gems of poetry, is so arranged that each section from the Vinaya and Sutta Pīṭakas fits neatly into place to form a consistent whole. The chronological sequence of events is ably enhanced with the employment of actual “narrators” who take the parts of a present-day commentator, a medieval chronicler, Ananda, Upāli and an observer at the First Council. Thus, the dramatic and historical nature of the work.

The canonical material, shorn of the unnecessary repetitions which have so often marred Western translations, by its very economy has a ready appeal. In addition to the inspiring biography of the Enlightened One, an entire chapter is devoted to a detailed analysis of the Doctrine using the framework of the Four Noble Truths.

An Index and notes round off an illuminating volume which deserves the widest possible distribution. As the fly-leaf so rightly states: “This is a book that can inform and inspire.”

R. B. W.
Dasabodhisattupattikathā Edited and translated into English with an introduction by Dr. H. Saddhatissa, Pali Text Society, London. 166pp. £10.50.

The only extant Pali work which develops the Theravāda concept of the Bodhisatta is the DASABODHISATTUPATTIKATHĀ (DBK). The present edition of this work, with a very valuable introduction and an English translation, will undoubtedly receive the serious attention of scholars as well as of the general reader. This edition from Dr. Saddhatissa surpasses in every respect the Sinhalese edition of this work which appeared in Sri Lanka a long time ago.

The DBK comprises the birth stories of ten Bodhisattas including the Metteyya Bodhisatta who is destined to be the next Buddha. Of these, except for the Metteyya Bodhisatta, the other nine are not mentioned either in the Theravāda or in the Mahāyāna scriptures. The Metteyya Bodhisatta, who is first mentioned in the Digga Nikāya, is accepted by all Buddhists. Mahāyāna Buddhism gives pride of place to the concept of Bodhisattvas for they attach immense importance to the idea of Mahākārūṇā (Great Compassion). On the other hand, what matters most for the Theravādins is Mahāprajñā (Great Wisdom). Although there is such a superficial difference, essentially, it is not possible to differentiate between Mahākārūṇā and Mahāprajñā. Both are manifested in Buddhahood. The one who attains that Buddhahood is the Bodhisatta. Thus, Buddhas as well as Bodhisattas who address themselves to the task of redeeming human beings from sorrow and from Samsāra are necessarily founts of Great Compassion. That is why the concept of the Bodhisatta had an important place even among the Theravādins as is evidenced by the story of Sumedha. This story clearly mentions that the Buddha Dipānkara honoured the Sumedha Tāpasa with eight handfuls of flowers.

There are two categories of Bodhisattvas in Mahāyāna Buddhism: Human and Spiritual Bodhisattvas. Siddhārtha Bodhisatta and the Maitreya Bodhisatta belong to the first category while the Bodhisattvas like Avalokiteśvara belong to the second. According to the Theravāda tradition which is reflected in the DBK, there exist at least ten Bodhisattas of the first category. The other Mahāyāna Bodhisattvas connected with the concept of the Sambhogakāya, who are considered as the offspring of Dhyāni Buddhas, are not found in the Theravāda tradition. However, in those Theravāda Buddhist countries which came under the influence of the Mahāyāna, it became the practice to venerate not only such Bodhisattvas but also the Dhyāni Buddhas. For instance, at the Galvihāra at Polonnaruwa, (in Sri Lanka), the seated Buddha statue in the Dhyāna Mudrā with four other Buddhas of the same posture, two on either side of it sculptured in bas-relief, form a complex of five Buddhas. The main and central statue in this complex is that of the Vairocana Buddha. The four other Buddhas can be identified as Samantabhadra, Amoghasiddhi, Ratnasambhava and Akṣobhya. The Viśvavajra symbol carved in the centre of the āsana of the central statue clearly indicates that this vihāra was built in conformity with the principles of Vajrayāna Buddhism. In view of that facts, Venerable Saddhatissa’s proposition that the Vajiryavādins mentioned in ancient historical records of Sri Lanka could be considered as monks of the Vajrayāna sect is quite plausible.

There is archaeological evidence to the fact that there existed in Sri Lanka, from the Anurādhapura period itself, the practice of worshipping Bodhisattvas. The Avalokiteśvara statue found at Veheragala is a case in point. The worship of Bodhisattvas gradually developed since the Anurādhapura period. It appears that the worship of the Dasabodhisattas was quite popular during the Kandyan period. As Venerable Saddhatissa points out, there are paintings of the Dasabodhisattas at the Malwatte Vihārāya of Kandy, the Rajamaha Vihārāya at Dambulla and at several other vihāras in Sri Lanka. Dr. Saddhatissa further points out that the concept of the Dasabodhisattas was prevalent even in Thailand. Perhaps this concept found its way to Thailand from Sri Lanka. Whatever that may be, this shows that the concept of Bodhisattas was current among the Theravādins as well. In Sri Lanka, kings like Siri Saṅgabo, Parākramabāhu II and Vijayabāhu IV (who is better known as Bosat Vijayabahu) were regarded as Bodhisattvas. Venerable Saddhatissa gives a very important account of the Buddhas too, in the introduction to the DBK. In a discussion about the Buddhas of the past, the present and the future, the learned mahāthera examines the formula paccuppamā ca ye Buddhā which occurs in a well-known Pali stanza. According to the Theravāda tradition, there is only one Buddha of the present and that is Gautama Buddha. But since in the formula under reference paccuppamā ... Buddhā is in the plural, the author argues that it could be taken as a reference to several Buddhas apart from Gautama Buddha. The Mahāyāna tradition, however, admits of thousands of Buddhas of the present. These are not Human Buddhas but Dharmakāya Buddhas of the Suhkhāvati heaven. Since the concept of Dharmakāya Buddhas has been current in Sri Lanka at least from the 12th century, it may be surmised that the formula paccuppamā ca ye Buddhā would have meant the Gautama Buddha and the Dhyāni Buddhas. That the number of Mānuṣi Buddhas gradually increased has been shown by Dr. Saddhatissa as well as by Dr. I. B. Horner in her latest work, the edition of the Buddhavamsa. Not only the Mahāyānists but also the Theravādins accepted that the Buddhas
are innumerable. In the phrase Dhammarājā asankhityā occurring in the Apadānapāli, a canonical text of the Theravādins, Dhammarājā means Buddhas.

The stories of the ten future Buddhas contain iconographic and iconometric data relating to them. These stories enumerate the iconography of the Buddha, the chief disciples and the chief attendants of each Buddha as well as the total height of each Buddha and the measurements of the different parts of the body of each of them. The DBK gives the full height of all the Buddhas whereas the measurements of the different parts of the body are given only in respect of the Metteyya Buddha. However, the measurements of the different parts of the body of the other Buddhas are determined by applying these same measurements of the Metteyya Buddha in proportion to the respective height of each Buddha. Although there is no uniformity with regard to the total height of the different Buddhas, there is a stereotyped similarity in the appearance of all the Buddhas: insofar as iconography is concerned. Each Buddha is endowed with the thirty-two major characteristics, the eighty minor characteristics, the bhāmāra bhera and ketumāla. The account embodying these features given in the DBK reveals its author’s profound knowledge of the arts of painting and sculpture. These data will be of immense use to the artist intent on making images of the Dasabodhisattvas. However, one may find at first sight that the total height of the Buddhas is exaggerated in the DBK. It has to be borne in mind in this respect that the Buddha images of Sri Lanka are divided into five groups from the point of view of iconometry. The highest image could be, according to this division, 80 cubits or more. Thus it should be noted that the DBK gives the measurements of the largest Buddha images.

The DBK is an index to the contemporary popular Buddhist concepts. As such, apart from its appeal to the devout Buddhist, it has a sociological value too. It is at the same time a valuable document for the study of the history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. Venerable Dr. Saddhatissa has made a worthy contribution to Buddhist studies in bringing out this excellent edition of the DBK which bears the stamp of authority and scholarship characteristic of all his works.

Chandra Wikramagamage


Bhikkhu Naṇamoli immersed himself totally within the unique ambient of the suttas, that is to say the Buddha’s own technique of phenomenological description: ‘If we then need to “place” Naṇamoli, to “identify’ him, we have to hand a type — that of Husserl’s “meditating” philosopher engaged in phenomenological analysis. Many of these descriptive notes also show at work the process of “reduction”, first philosophically stated by Husserl but no foreign conception to those familiar with such Buddhistic systems as jhānaṇam. Some notes indeed are concerned with the same material, one such example (p. 222) will illustrate such affinities and at the same time give a glimpse of the “style” of this work — strictly descriptive of experience:

“I sit down in a room and consider a fugue. This I call the lower inner heaven.”

“I sit down in a room and consider that in me there is that which can recognize a fugue and its structure. This I call the higher inner heaven.”

“I sit down in a room, quiet and half dark, and watch the act of breathing — the bodily sensation of air touching the tip of the nose. I experience sensing the bodily sensation at an interval of space. I can place the bodily sensation in space as sensed from the direction in which I am. But when I follow that direction back and look for the ‘T’, then I am no longer there but in another place. I have no place in space. I see and sense space and the ‘things’ in it from a place where I am not. Space is complete without ‘T’ and there is no room for ‘T’ in space at all. This I call the inner vertigo.”

Two notes relevant to this picture can also illustrate that such descriptive technique is not merely passive but strongly indicative: “If one could continue the calming process after everything has fallen calm one might enter the looking glass world” (p. 2), and “Suppose boredom is a backstairs to liberation — insignificant and so often overlooked…… Absolute Boredom is rather the pain of nausea,…… the insatiable desire for what we know makes us sick,…… it is the pillar of salt, the exile from the land which is no more, the Sin against the Holy Ghost, the break-up of patterns, the horror that waits alone in the night, the entry into the desert where Deathmocks by serving one’s daily food and one cannot bear but to keep the darkness of one’s own shadow before one for the very brightness of the light that reveals the universal emptiness. Do not try to turn back now — here in the desert perhaps there are doors open — in the cool woods they are overgrown, and in the busy cities they have built over them.” (p. 9)

The lucid observer might indeed come upon strange worlds: And those odd encounters of eyes in lonely alleys……” (p. 12) — even to Kafka’s ‘Magic Theatre’: “A man went to a theatre, but when he thought it was time to leave he found that the real audience was else-where and
he was part of a show containing the piece he had come to see.” (p. 13;)
it might indeed be that the real audience is always elsewhere though
science has need of its “objective” observer. “Odd that ‘now here’ is
‘nowhere’” (p. 61) …… And there are always two view-points: “Some
say ‘Jones has gone up in the world.’ Others say ‘the world is upside
down’. What has happened to Jones?” (p. 4).

And as the contradictions of experience and the ambiguous nature of
existence itself are described (“The unambiguous is non-existent.”
p. 78), the negative nature of consciousness emerges as the central
consideration — being as anatta/suñño (non-self/nothingness) the nēant
of Sartre and the ontological basis for the appearance of ‘lack’ (mangue)
or tapaḥ in the world. Several notes are concerned with ‘nothingness’
in varied considerations: “The world of what is there, is perpetually
haunted by what is not there — what is not, but might be, there; what
could not, but ought to be there,” (p. 28). “…… experience always,
even at its simplest, implies a complex — a manifold subjectively organized
in or against a manifold objectively organized with a surface dividing
them, the surface being indescribable in terms of either manifold except
as ‘not’ or ‘nothing’.” (p. 40). The second note in fact directly echoes
Sartrean description: “Consciousness exists as consciousness by making
nothingness arise between it and the object of which it is conscious”
(translator’s note to nēant Being and Nothingness, p. 632).

This book is something unique, the product of a brilliant mind
and a life “lived as an observer, withdrawn and watching” (p. 56).

Malcolm Hudson


To quote the publishers’ “blurb” on the flyleaf, this book “fills a long-felt
gap in Western literature by presenting a concise summary, in three
volumes and about 2,000 articles, of practically all the literatures of
Asia and North Africa”. Vol. I describes the Chinese, Tibetan, Japanese,
Korean and Mongolian literatures; Vol. II covers India, Pakistan, Nepal,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka. Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia,
Malaysia and the Philippines; whilst Vol. III covers the Asian territory
of the USSR, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and the Arab states from Iraq in
the east to Algeria in the west.

Under the general editorship of Jaroslav Prusk and the auspices of
The Oriental Institute (Prague), an international team of scholars has
presented a comprehensive and fascinating survey of classical, medieval
and modern Oriental literatures. As with any reference work, of course,
one can only single out for special attention that portion which is likely
to prove of immediate interest to readers. And in this case a few words
need only be said which highlight those entries which illustrate the Pali
Buddhist tradition (in Vol. II).

In the volume under review the sole Pali Buddhist entries have
obviously been chosen to reflect the most outstanding authors and tests:
“Theragāthā and Therīgāthā”, “Tripiṭaka” and “Tripiṭaka in Cambodia”.

Prof. Ivo Fisher (currently assisting the editorialship of the Critical
Pali Dictionary in Copenhagen) and Mrs. Judith M. Jacob (Lecturer in
Cambodian Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London
University) have produced their entries with understanding, sympathy
and distinction and the average reader will learn all that is necessary
from them. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the two remaining
and probably the most important entries where a distinct Sanskrit bias
is all-too noticeable.

The “Tripiṭaka” (by A. K. Warder, Professor of Indian Studies,
Toronto University) simply compares, in an academic manner, the
different recensions, many of which were lost in the course of time and
are known only by their connection with defunct monastic schools of
thought. Only a passing mention is made of some of the books belonging
to the Pali Tripiṭaka — which is the only complete recension extant and
therefore of sole interest to the present-day reader — but even here
Sanskrit titles are inexplicably given.

Worse still is the entry on the Dharmapada. It would seem to have
been an incredible blunder to invite a Sanskritist (Prof. John Brough,
Cambridge University) to write on an essentially Pali classic and who
commits the faux pas of terminating his entry with the words: “In spite
of the high and sometimes extravagant praise which the Pāli version has
sometimes received, the poetical quality, as one might expect in didactic
verses, is for the most part mediocre, with only an occasional stanza
of real poetic merit.” Added denigration is also apparent with the
mention of “Lesser Vehicle” as an allusion to the Theravāda and the
spelling of the text in its (hardly known) Sanskrit form (Dharmapada).
The writer’s bias is emphasised when, at the end of his article, only three
works are listed in a bibliography: Radhakrishnan’s (misleading) transla-
tion and the Udanaevarga and Gândhāri Dharmapada editions!

The foregoing entries mar an otherwise excellent and original con-
tribution to understanding and appreciating the variety and wealth of
Eastern literature, both sacred and secular.

R. B. W.
NEWS & NOTES

New Grammar Books

1. Ven B. Ananda Maitreyya, one of the most respected bhikkhus in Sri Lanka, now in his 80s and residing in the Sri Chandrasekerârama on the outskirts of the Bhikkhu Training Centre at Mahargama, has just completed A Beginner’s Pali Grammar.

Whilst A. P. Buddhadatta’s New Pali Course has for long remained the standard manual of instruction for beginners in the English-speaking world, and remained unchallenged until the advent of Warder’s Introduction to Pali, one criticism levelled against it is its lack of Pali phrases from the Tipiṭaka itself. Since a majority of those wishing to master the language undoubtedly want solely to enable them to understand the Buddhavacana, then clearly any grammar or primer should be firmly based on the language of the texts rather aiming to artificially construct Pali sentences in modern contexts.

The present MS aims to correct this imbalance and will be forwarded to the Pali Text Society for eventual publication in London.

2. Fr. V. Perniola, for many years a teacher at Aquinas University College, Colombo, has recently completed a second revised edition of his Grammar of the Pali Language, which first appeared in 1958.

The present MS, which awaits an interested publisher, is specifically designed for a B.A. degree course.

3. In collaboration with W. S. Karunatilaka, James W. Gair (Professor of Linguistics at Cornell University, USA) has produced, in mimeographed form, an Introduction to Reading Pali which, in its final published version, will comprise, “fifteen lessons with carefully graded readings and associated grammars”.

Life of Rhys Davids

Plans are under way for an official biography of T. W. Rhys Davids, the founder of the Pali Text Society.

The compilation will be made by his daughter, Miss V. Rhys Davids; M.A., M.B.E., in conjunction with Miss I. B. Horner, the Society’s President. Any documents directly relating to his life and work would be very much appreciated — these would, of course, be returned with due acknowledgment being made to the lender. Letters, anecdotes, etc., particularly in connection with Prof. Rhys Davids’ term of office with the Ceylon Civil Service, should be sent to Miss Horner at 62 South Lodge, Circus Rd., London, NW89ET.

Pali Text Society

Following the demise of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan and Prof. W. Norman Brown, Ven. Dr. W. Râhula (the renowned Sinhalese author of What the Buddha Taught) has been elected onto the Society’s Council. The death has also occurred, at 75, of Mr. H. Reynolds, the right-hand man of Miss Horner. For twenty-seven years he faithfully built-up and maintained the order section of the Society, first at Luzac’s and latterly at Routledge & Kegan Paul. Henceforth, distribution will be conducted through Mr. R. L. Locke, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner Ltd., Broadway House, Reading Rd., Henley-on-Thames, Oxon. (tel: 75-30591). Or from their American agents, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 9 Park St., Boston, Mass. 02108.

New Works:

- The Birth-Stories of the Ten Bodhisattas and the Dasa-bodhisattvaparticakâhå. H. Saddhâtissa. £10.50
- Minor Anthologies III. Chronicle of Buddhas (Buddhavansa) and Basket of Conduct (Cariyâpiṭaka). Tr. I. B. Horner. £6.75
- Minor Anthologies IV. Stories of Mansions (Vimânavatthu) and Stories of the Departed (Petavatthu). Tr. I. B. Horner and H. S. Gehman respectively. £4.50
- Buddhavamsa and Cariyâpiṭaka texts. Ed. N. A. Jayawickrama, collating all S. E. Asian printed texts published since Richard Morris’ editions of 1882. £8.50

Reprints:

- Buddhist Psychological Ethics (Dhammasaṅgani). Tr. C. A. F. Rhys Davids. £5.25
- Kindred Sayings III (Samyutta Nikâya). £5.50
- Introduction to Pali. A. K. Warder. £6.00
- Majjhima Nikâya IV (Indexa). £2.00

Forthcoming Reprints:

- Itivuttaka, Samantapāsādikā I and Visuddhimagga texts and Malalasekara’s Dictionary of Pali Proper Names.

New Translations: Two members of the Council have undertaken the difficult task of producing sorely-needed translations of the Sutta-Nipāta, at present available only in Fausböll’s and Hare’s archaic versions. K. R. Norman has now completed his version which will probably be published by the PTS. Ven. Dr. Saddhâtissa has been publishing his version, sutta by sutta, in Buddhist Quarterly, the journal of the British Mahâbodhi Society (London Buddhist Vihâra), and has now completed two out of the five vaggas. His intention is to publish them complete in a popular version, minus unnecessary footnotes which detract from the spirit of this inspiring and important early Pali text, representing as it does the spirit of premonastic Buddhism.
Buddhist Text Information

To date, four issues of this bulletin have been circulated to interested parties by the publishers, The Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, New York, whose President, C.T. Shen, has long been associated with Buddhist-sponsored philanthropic and interdenomina-
tional enterprises. (The Institute was established in 1970 at 555 Madison Ave., New York 10022, and also maintains a research and reference library at the State University of New York, 5001 Melville Memorial Library, Stony Brook, New York 11794.)

Edited by Dr. Richard A. Gard, a former visiting professor of Buddhist studies at several universities and author of a popular exposition of Buddhism in all its traditions, this occasional bulletin seeks to inform scholars and the interested layman of developments in the world of Buddhist textual editions and translations from Pali, Sanskrit, Chinese, Japanese and Tibetan. News of forthcoming projects should be commu-
nicated to Dr. Gard who will publicise them in Buddhist Text Information.

In the field of Pali studies we learn of the following ventures:

1. A bhāvanā text in Pali and Thai, composed by Bhikkhu Paññā-
wongsa in 1900, has been translated by Dr. Donald K. Swearer (lecturer in Buddhism at Swarthmore College, Pennsylvania) with Singkha Wannasai. It is hoped that this will be published in either the Journal of the Siam Society or the Journal of the American Oriental Society.

2. The Vessantara Jātaka has been translated by Dr. Richard Gombrich and Mrs. Margaret Cone from the Fausböll edition (London, Kegan Paul, 1896; PTS, 1964). Entitled The Perfect Generosity of Prince Vessantara, it is being considered for publication by the Clarendon Press, Oxford.

3. A critical edition and translation of the Rasavāhini are being prepared by Bhikkhu Telwatte Rāhula who is Senior Tutor in the Department of South Asian and Buddhist Studies at the Australian National University, Canberra. Another Romanised edition is being prepared for the Pali Text Society by Heinz Bechert, Professor of Indology and Buddhist Culture at Göttingen University, West Germany. (This text is a 13th. century translation from the Sinhalese by Rājāhappāla and subsequently revised by Vēdēha. It comprises 103 “fables, legends, sagas and religious tales” from both India and Sri Lanka.)

Catalogue of Unpublished MSS

In addition to the foregoing services, the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions proposes to publish a free periodic listing of unpublished writings on world religions in English, French and German.

Entitled Working Papers on World Religions, it is proposed to invite scholars to submit a typescript or photostat copy of their unpublished articles, papers, theses, monographs, etc.; thence, to distribute a list containing the title, author, general theme, etc. to publishers, libraries, scholars and journal editors for their scrutiny and comments with a view to accepting them for publication or to utilise them for research purposes.

Further details may be obtained from the Institute at 555 Madison Ave., (30th. floor), New York 10022.

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Pali Text Society

The Pali Text Society was founded in 1881 by T. W. Rhys Davids for the purpose of promoting and fostering the study of Pali. His object was to publish romanized editions of the many original texts, to issue their translations and to make available such other works as would be ancillary to the study of Pali.

Since its foundation the Society has published the works of eminent scholars; the current list of issues shows the Society’s achievements in the field of Pali and Buddhist scholarship.

Most of the major texts and commentaries have now been romanized and a great number of the Pitakka volumes have been translated. As a result of this activity a knowledge of the fundamental structure of Theravāda is available to specialist and student alike, either in text or in translation.

The Society is now engaged in planning ahead the vast project of translating all the basic canonical Pali commentaries. It is also endeavouring to expand its aids to the study of Pali by supplementing its dictionaries, concordance and grammar. Besides this it is occasionally sponsoring publications of selected Buddhist texts in Sanskrit and Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit or in translation.

Scholastically the Society has always maintained a high standard. The record of its Presidents shows that they have been scholars active in the Society’s functions and interest:

- Mrs. Rhys Davids, D.Litt., M.A., 1922–1942
- W. Stede, Ph.D., 1950–1958
- Miss I. B. Horner, M.A., D.Litt., 1959–

The Society is able to continue its work by the sale of its publications, by members’ subscriptions and the generosity of the donors who throughout its history have contributed to its support.
The Society welcomes standing orders for any of its series of publications and is pleased to discuss particular requirements.

Membership of the Society is available as follows:- Annual Subscription of £3.15 due on 1st January of each year. Subscriptions are set against the cost of books ordered and subscribers will be entitled to receive all publications (except issues of the Concordance) at a discount of 10% on their orders provided their subscription for the year has been paid.

Catalogue and full details from Miss I. B. Horner (President)
62, South Lodge, Circus Road, London, NW8 6ET.

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BUDDHIST PUBLICATION SOCIETY

In order to fulfil a long-felt need for reliable and inexpensive literature on the Buddha Dhamma, the Buddhist Publication Society was formed in January 1958 at an informal meeting of Ven. Nyānaponika Mahāthera, Mr. A. S. Karunaratne and Mr. Richard Abeyasekera.

The initial premises were located at the Forest Hermitage, near Kandy, where Ven. Nyānaponika acted as Hon. Secretary. Mr. Karunaratne acted as Hon. Treasurer and Mr. Richard Abeyasekera as Assistant Secretary and Treasurer. Voluntary support in attending to the daily requirements of the infant venture was readily forthcoming and very soon the Department of Cultural Affairs granted an annual subsistence in recognition of the Society’s educational and cultural potential.

The first booklets in “The Wheel” and “Bodhi Leaves” series were issued in January 1958 and have regularly appeared, on an average, every two months. Since that date, over 200 numbers of the “Wheel” and over 60 “Bodhi Leaves” have been published in quantities totaling nearly 1,500,000 copies. These have been circulated to over 1,500 registered foreign readers in 87 countries and over 1,200 readers in Sri Lanka. These publications are now available in book form: three volumes of “Wheels”, three volumes of “Bodhi Leaves” and two volumes of “Selected Buddhist Texts” (Sutta translations that have appeared in the “Wheel” series).

In addition to these two regular series, a number of “Special Books” and “Publications” have supplemented the demand for specific Dhamma studies and meditation manuals. Over 80 issues in Sinhala (“Dhamma” series) and two in Tamil have also appeared. A complete book list is available on request.

From the outset, the Society’s aim was to provide authoritative information embodying the fundamental and original teachings of the Buddha together with reliable translations of the Pali texts. A large number of publications represent original studies in a long-overlooked field of Buddhist literature. The outcome of this work has been the presentation of the Dhamma to contemporary thought and the new generation in the light of a wisdom so sadly lacking in our modern age. The outcome has been a massive increase in attention being paid to Buddhism from all sections of the Society—particularly in the West where originality and high standards of presentation are expected.

The prime intention of the Society was to inform Western countries of the Dhamma, by the initiative of local groups in translating the publications of the Society, in the vernaculars and distributing them to a far wider readership...
Booksellers have been persuaded to stock quantities of “Wheels” and “Special Book Publications” and they are also stocked by book agencies initiated by Buddhist Viharas (see below). Translations of the Society’s publications have also appeared in French, Swedish, Polish, German, Indian vernaculars, Indonesian, Vietnamese and other languages.

Associate Membership of the Society is £2/- or $5.00 per annum and the Executive is made up as follows:

*President:* Ven. Nyånapaniya Thera.
*Hony. General Secretary:* Richard Abeyasekera.


*The Board of Management:* The above office bearers with Messrs: E. Eramudugolla and Brindley Ratwatte.

**BUDDHIST PUBLICATION SOCIETY**
53, Sangaraja Mawata.
P. O. Box 61 KANDY, Sri Lanka (Ceylon)

Most of the publications can be had from:–


3. Mahamakut Buddhist Bookshop, 287 Phra Sumeru Road, Bangkok 2, Thailand.

**PALI BUDDHIST UNION**

A significant convention over the last weekend of November 1971 in The Hague resulted in the creation of an entirely new body—the “Pali Buddhist Union”, which is dedicated to propagating the teaching of Gotama the Buddha as contained in the Pali Canon and later literature of the same tradition.

Group leaders and individual Buddhists representing the interest of Pali Buddhism in Great Britain and Europe participated in what was effect was the 4th European Buddhist Congress, the first of its kind over thirty years. (The first three Congresses were in Berlin, London, 1934, and Paris, 1937). Those present in body or spirit were: Russell Webb (London), Helmut Klar (Heidelberg), Karl Stort (Hamburg), Luigi Martinelli (Florence), Albert Kollè (The Hague), Sister A. Nisatta (Stockholm), Gunnar Gällmo (Uppsal), Olaus Höydal (Nord, Norway), Lajos Bakos (Budapest) and Władysław Misiewicz (Radom, Poland).

The activities and current position of Buddhism in Europe discussed as were potential opportunities affording greater knowledge of the Dhamma in the West as a whole. It was agreed that the interest of the Pali tradition, representing as it does the most accurate and authentic “word of the Buddha”, should be promoted by all means possible, and the Pali Buddhist Union was formally inaugurated with the following aims:

1. To adhere to and propagate the teachings of the Pali tradition contained in the canonical texts, Commentaries and later exegetical literature, relating such teaching, where desirable or necessary, to secular problems in order to prove it applicable to modern conditions.

2. To endeavour to compose, publish and translate such literature will be conducive to the above aims.

3. That each group/individual act autonoously in their/his country of origin in an effort to maintain a regular circuit of news and information with a view to publicising such items in their respective journals or newsletters.

4. To co-operate, strengthen and give moral support to all existing organisations having similar aims. (E.g., the Buddhist Public Society, Kandy, and the Pali Text Society, London.)
This new venture in Buddhist solidarity will not suffer the latent
drawbacks of having the usual paraphernalia of "shop window" organisa-
tions, such as large committees, official forms, subscriptions, etc.; but
the definite advantages and appeal of this body will undoubtedly lie in
the fact that each group or individual will continue to work through
their/his existing centre although perhaps some acknowledgement could
be made to the effect that it is "Affiliated to the Pali Buddhist Union"—and
that publicity can be given to each other's activities, journal or literature,
and information of mutual interest passed on.

Groups and individuals already associated with the PBU are to be
found in Australia, Austria, Canada, West Germany, Great Britain,
Hungary, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Sri
Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland and the U. S. A.

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