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Frontispiece: the calligraphy in Sino-Vietnamese characters (Nôm) by Ven Thích Huyễn-Vi reads:

"There is no ignorance, and no cessation of ignorance."

The seals engraved by Ven. Bhikkhu Dhammaviro, Thailand, convey the same meaning as the calligraphy.

EDITORIAL NOTES

In presenting to you this issue of BSR, we are pleased to announce that the next one marks our tenth anniversary, of which we can't help being rather proud. In order to celebrate this occasion, we would like you, our faithful readers, to submit suggestions to this end. Is there anything you would particularly like to see us include? Hopefully you have something suitable to contribute. In any case we would very much appreciate hearing from you.

Owing to a misunderstanding at our supplier, the promised upgrade to our software programme has not yet been installed. We sincerely hope to have it up and running in time for next year’s specials. In the meantime if anyone would like to supply material on 3.5 diskette, we have IBM equipment and Multi-Lingual Scholar software, with a Star LaserPrinter 4.

In BSR 8, 1-2 (1991), p.2, we inadvertently omitted a word in ‘Epithets of the Buddha’, v.4, line 1, which should read:

Jino sakko tu siddhattho suddhodani ca gotamo.
As a general principle, the Buddha always spoke to the point and only taught Dhamma to those capable (bhābbo) of understanding. He did not waste words but spoke only what was appropriate on any particular occasion according to the capacity of his audience. Then, it may be asked, what about the concise teaching to Dandapāni (‘Stick-in-Hand’) the Sākyan (Madhupindika Sutta, M 18) which was quite beyond his comprehension? The whole episode was subsequently related to the bhikkhus and was beyond them too until explained by Mahākaccāna. However, there are a number of indications in this story that make one suspect Dandapāni was not a ‘real’ person at all in the usual sense. Perhaps we should regard him as a ‘type’, a hypothetical case, employed by the Buddha as a teaching device. In fact, looking at this episode closely, Dandapāni was actually a Māra-like figure. Māra the ‘Evil One’ can also be viewed symbolically, as a psychological entity - in a sense the personification of the ego and sensual attachments, and an obstacle to be overcome before enlightenment is attained. For the arahant Māra poses no problem; he is always recognised immediately and is, accordingly, sent packing. As in a great number of Māra episodes, Dandapāni appeared when the person, in this case the Buddha, was in solitude and in an open place, ‘under a tree’. Like Māra he was always roaming about seeking a ‘victim’ to debate with. Again, as so often with Māra, he assumed an arrogant stance, leaning on his stick, when putting his question. Finally, he departs, like Māra once did when defeated, with a wrinkled brow and leaning on his stick (see Māra Samyutta, S I, p.118). Māra defeated and recognised departs dejected, downcast and uncomprehending.
THE DĪGHĀ NIKYĀ DEBATES: DEBATING PRACTICES AT THE TIME OF THE BUDDHA

Joy Manné

Eighteen out of thirty-four suttas in the Dīgha Nikāya (D 1-13, 23-25, 28, 31) are debate suttas, that is to say that each of these has all or most of the following features: a central character, most usually the Buddha, and a statement of his credentials; an adversary, and a statement of his credentials; a description of a location that functions to set the scene and the atmosphere; an audience; a greeting ceremony; a challenge; a refutation of the adversary's position; the establishment of the Buddhist position; a hypothetical case history; a surrender, in the form of an acceptance formula, by the adversary; a reward. Witzel has already drawn attention to similarities between the debates in the Vedic texts and those in the Pāli texts, notably on the issue of the severed head, on the relationship between the sahadhammika type of questioning which takes place in a kind of open challenge or tournament, (which is) similar to the Vedic brahma dhyā, and on the similarity of both the anatipraśnyā and the sahadhammika questions and the general rules of discussion found in the Vedic and Pāli texts. He particularly observes, 'As often, it is the early Buddhist texts which provide more detailed and useful information. The Pāli texts... frequently describe in lively and graphic detail what is only alluded to in the Vedic texts which were, after all, composed by Brahmins for Brahmins: one did not have to explain ritual matters of everyday occurrence or of common knowledge to one's fellow Brahmins or to brahmācārin students...'. Witzel comments further, 'Interestingly, the challengers seem to be the best among the various groups of Brahmins (and both Yājñavalkya's and their personalities require further study).

The Buddhist debates of the Dīgha contain information regarding contemporary debating practices, including customs or conventions related to the debate situation, information regarding the types of utterance that were usual in religious

1 These investigations were supported by the Foundation for Research in the field of Theology and the Science of Religions in the Netherlands, which is subsidised by the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (Z.W.O.), and constitute Chapter IV of my doctoral dissertation, 'Debates and Case Histories in the Pāli Canon' (Utrecht 1991).
2 Most usually a repetition of §§ 40–98 of the Śāmaññaphala Sutta, D 2.
6 'Both the saccakāriyā and the anatipraśna / sahadhammika statements deal with truth, but both do so in a formalised context: either a discussion with a challenger and one or more opponents.' Ibid., p.110.
7 Ibid., p.381.
8 Ibid., p.365.
debate, and criteria for judging success in debate, beyond those that Witzel discusses in his article (by no means all of which have been referred to above). It is the very large number of features in common between Vedic and Buddhist debates that Witzel has drawn attention to in his article, and others that I have pointed out that permits me to say this. The purpose of this article is to present this material. It is beyond its scope to make extensive comparisons with the Vedic tradition. This article then analyses the Buddha's debating style and techniques in terms of these conventions and compares them with those of one of his disciples, Kumāra Kassapa.

In three of the debate suttas, the Brahmajāla (D 1), the Kassapa-Śihaṇāḍa (D 8) and the Udumbarikā-Śihaṇāḍa (D 25), contemporary debating practices, including customs or conventions related to the debate situation, are specifically mentioned. In the Brahmajāla there is information regarding the types of utterance that were usual in religious debate (and the Buddha's attitude towards them). In the Kassapa-Śihaṇāḍa are the criteria for judging success in debate, and in the Udumbarikā-Śihaṇāḍa the value placed upon discussion between religious practitioners of different persuasions is demonstrated. In these suttas the Buddha is the debater on behalf of the Buddhists. This is the normal state of affairs in the Pāli texts, which lends support to Witzel's observation cited above that 'interestingly, the challengers seem to be the best among the various groups of Brahmins,...' In a fourth sutta, the Pāyāsi (D 23), the wordy Kumāra Kassapa takes this role. It is because he is so explicit about his tactics in the discussion that this sutta also provides useful information on debating techniques.

In the Brahmajāla Sutta the Buddha criticises the disputatious habits of brahmans and samanas, particularly the use of expressions like:

(1) 'You don't understand this doctrine and discipline, I do.'
'How should you know about this doctrine and discipline?'
'You have fallen into wrong views. It is I who am right.'
'I am speaking to the point, you are not.'
'You are putting last what ought to come first, and first what ought to come last.'
'What you have excogitated so long, that's all quite upset.'
'Your challenge has been taken up.'
'You are proved to be wrong.'
'Set to work to clear your views.'
'Disentangle yourself if you can.'

Because of the many features in common between the Vedic

11 'Na tvām imām dhamma-vinayaṃ ājñāṣi, aham imām dhamma-vinayaṃ ājñāṇām, kim tvām imām dhamma-vinayaṃ ājñāṇāsati?' - Micca-patipanno tvam asi, aham asmi sammā-patipanno - Sahitam me, asahitam te - Pure vacaniyam pacchā avaca, pacchā vacaniyam pure avaca - Avicinnaṃ te viparāvatiṣam - Aropito te vado, niggahito 'si - Cara viddappamokkha, nibbethi va sace paḥositi, D 8, § 18. Tr. T.W. Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha 1, p.14f. See also his extensive notes.
and the Buddhist debates, the reference to these types of utterance may be taken to indicate that they were in general use in contemporary debating practice.

The expression of criteria for success in debate in the Kassapa-Sihanāda Sutta takes the form of a categorical denial, uttered by the Buddha, of a set of criticisms that he suggests might be made against him by religious wanderers of other sects\(^\text{12}\). The structure of the sutta shows that these criticisms are important: it is the Buddha himself who, unprovoked, first introduces them and then denies that they can be applied to him. Once again, because of the many other features in common between the Vedic and the Buddhist debates, this suggests that these were genuine contemporary criticisms which accurately reflected contemporary conventions of the debate situation. In this case, however, because Kassapa was a naked ascetic (acelo), they may not apply strictly to the Vedic debates\(^\text{13}\). The points that the Buddha disputes provide us, nevertheless, with the criteria of the time for judging and evaluating the competence of the debater.

The following are the potential criticisms that the Buddha suggests might be made against him: that although he issues his challenge\(^\text{14}\),

\begin{itemize}
\item[2.] he does this in empty places, and not in assemblies\(^\text{15}\),
\item[3.] he issues his challenge in assemblies, but he does it without confidence\(^\text{16}\),
\item[4.] he challenges with confidence, . . . but people do not ask him questions\(^\text{17}\),
\item[5.] people ask him questions, but he does not answer\(^\text{18}\),
\item[6.] he answers their question, . . . but he does not win over their minds with his exposition\(^\text{19}\),
\item[7.] he wins over their minds with his expositions . . . but they do not find him worth hearing\(^\text{20}\),
\item[8.] they find him worth hearing but after they have heard him they are not convinced\(^\text{21}\),
\item[9.] having heard him, they are convinced, . . . but the faithful make no sign of their belief\(^\text{22}\),
\item[10.] the faithful give the sign of their belief, . . . but
\end{itemize}

\(\text{\textsuperscript{12}}\) thānāṃ kho pan' etāṃ Kassapa vijjati yaṃ aṅnatīthikā paribbājakā evān vadeyyaṃ. D I 175, § 22.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{13}}\) JUB [Jaṁiniya Upaṇiṣad Brāhmaṇa] 3.7.2 sqq. expressively states that such discussions were held only among the Brāhmīns and Kṣatriyas (and Vaiśyas?) but not among the Śūdras.’ Witzel, 1987, p.410.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{14}}\) siha-nāḍam nadati = ‘utters his lion’s roar’, ‘makes his assertion’, ‘issues his challenge’.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{15}}\) taṁ ca kho suññāgare nadati no parisāsati. D II 175. parisā = ‘group’.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{16}}\) parisāsu ca nadati, na ca kho visārado nadati. Ibid.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{17}}\) visārado ca nadati . . na ca kho naṁ paṁham pucchanti. Ibid.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{18}}\) paṁham ca naṁ pucchanti . . na ca kho pan' etāṃ [Nālanda ed. nesaṁ] paṁham pūṭṭho vissākaroti. Ibid.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{19}}\) paṁham ca nesaṁ pūṭṭho vissākaroti . . na ca kho paṁhassa veyyākaranaṁ cittaṁ ārūḍhethi. Ibid.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{20}}\) paṁhassa ca veyyākaranaṁ cittaṁ ārūḍhethi . . na ca kho sotabbam assum maṁhanti. Ibid.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{21}}\) sotabbam c’assā maṁhanti . . na ca kho sutvā pasidanti. Ibid.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{22}}\) sutvā c’assā pasidanti . . na ca kho pasannā pasannakāraṁ karonti. Ibid. Presumably this means that they utter no acceptance formula, provide no meals for the bhikkhus, etc.
they do not follow the path to the Truth (Nibbāna)\textsuperscript{23},

10. they follow the path ... but they do not succeed\textsuperscript{24}.

The Udumberikā-Sihanāda Sutta contains a list of criticisms which provide further evidence that a religious leader was required to discuss his views and indeed to put himself before his critics in the public debating arena rather than to remain in solitude. These criticisms are made by Nigrodha, a wanderer (paribbājaka) and not a brahman, against the Buddha. Nigrodha challenges Sandhāna, a householder (gahapati) and lay disciple, on the subject of the Buddha's habits:

(3) ‘With whom does he talk?
With whom does he engage in conversation?
With whom does he attain wisdom and distinction?
His wisdom is damaged by solitude.
The samaṇa Gotama is outside the assembly.
He does not converse enough.
He busies himself with peripheral matters\textsuperscript{25}.

He ends his criticisms with the boast: ‘If the Samaṇa Gotama were to come to this assembly, with a single question only could we settle him; yea, methinks we could roll him over like an empty pot’\textsuperscript{26}.

As this criticism comes from Nigrodha, whose followers have been criticised for their talkativeness by Sandhāna (§ 4), and who will be criticised for the same fault by the Buddha later in the sutta (§ 21), its content is evidently defensive in character. For this reason it might be expected that the Buddha, as he is represented by the composers of the texts, would not take it entirely seriously. As in the Kassapa-Sihanāda Sutta, however, these criticisms are given importance in the sutta: the Buddha hears Nigrodha’s accusations by means of his clair- audience, and takes them seriously enough to come out of his solitude on the Vulture Peak into the area where the discussion was taking place in order to refute them.

Finally, Kumāra Kassapa, who is so explicit about what he is doing in the debate situation, by suggesting an earnest desire to conform to standards, provides samples that support the rules in the previously cited suttas. He provides further examples of the techniques a debater was expected to use, and indeed was admired for using. These are supported by examples of similar strategies in debates where the Buddha is the protagonist.

Kumāra Kassapa attempts the Buddha’s technique of gradually leading the adversary on ‘by the usual Socratic method adopted in so many of the Dialogues, to accept one self-evident truth after another’\textsuperscript{27}, explaining to his adversary:

(4) ‘Therefore, Prince, I will question you in this matter

\textsuperscript{23} pasannā pasannākārān ca karoti ... na ca kho tathattāya paṭipajjanti. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} tathattāya ca paṭipajjanti ... na ca kho paṭipannā āruddhenti. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} ... ca kho Samaṇa Gotamo sādhibhi sallapati? kena sākaccham samāpajjati? kena paññā-veyattiyam āpaṭijati? Suvāsera-haṭa Samaṇassa Gotamassa paññā, aparīśāvacaro Samaṇo Gotamo, nālam sallāpaya, so antamanā eva sevati. D III 38, § 5.
\textsuperscript{26} Iṅgha gahapati, Samaṇo Gotamo imaṁ parisam āgaccheyya, ekā-pahken eva naṁ saṁsādeyyāma, tuccha-kumbhi va naṁ maṁhe orodheyyāmīti. D III

\textsuperscript{28} § 5. Tr. T.W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha II, p.35.
\textsuperscript{27} T.W. Rhys Davids’ introduction to the Sonaḍaṇḍa Sutta (D 4). Dialogues I, p.138.
and you answer if you please.\footnote{28} In the same explicit way he offers a simile:

(5) ‘Well then, Prince, I will make you a simile, for by a simile some intelligent persons will recognise the meaning of what is said.\footnote{29}

The text tells us that Kumāra Kassapa was considered a skilled debater. At the end of the debate his opponent says to him, ‘I was delighted, satisfied, by Master Kassapa’s first simile, but I wanted to hear the variety of (his) answers to the question.\footnote{30}

The suttas above provide information concerning the conventions, rules and customs connected with the debates that took place between religious leaders of one sect, or their senior followers, and those of another. They refer explicitly to a number of debating techniques or strategies. How far does the Buddha’s performance in the debate suttas conform to these conventions?

In the Brahmajāla Sutta the Buddha’s choice not to express himself in certain ways (see (1) above) is reported, and indeed the Buddha adheres to his standards throughout the Dīgha debates.

The criticisms in the Udumbarikā-Sīhanāda Sutta emphasise certain features of the customs that formed part of the debate situation, notably the expectations placed upon a religious leader, that he should be willing to enter into public debate and discussion. The large number of debate suttas in D alone attest to the Buddha’s conformity to these expectations.

The criteria of the Kassapa-Sīhanāda Sutta (see (2) above) relate to the conventions of the debate situation. The debater was expected confidently to issue a challenge or make an assertion to an assembly (see (2), points 1 and 2). The challenge or assertion should be so important (or interesting?) that people wish for further information or elucidation, i.e. they ask questions (see (2), points 3 and 4). Questions should be so competently answered that the attention of the questioner is captured, he appreciates the value of the message, and he becomes so convinced that he makes his convictions publicly manifest (see (2), points 5 - 9). Furthermore, he should undertake to follow the path being taught and he should succeed in his efforts, thus proving that the assertions were well-founded (see (2), point 10).

The defeat of and surrender by the adversary is a significant feature of the Buddhist debate suttas as well as of the Vedic debate tradition. It regularly attests to the Buddha’s success as a debater. There is, however, only one occasion where the eventual attainment (see point 10 in (2) above) of the

\footnote{28} Tenā hi Rājañī āsthām api evaṃ kāśyapī, yathā te khamyayā tathā nam vañchareyyā颇具。 D II 319, § 5.
\footnote{29} Tenā hi Rājañī āsthām api karisīkām, āpamāya pi idā ekacce vihārā purīsa bhāsitassa atithā ajānanti. Ibid., § 9. Tr. Rhys Davids, Dialogues II p.354.
\footnote{30} Purimen’ evaṃ āpamāṃ bhātī Dīghapassa atamano abhiraddho, api cāham imāni viicitrāni pañha-pañhābāhānāni sotu-kāmo... D II 352.

\footnote{31} ‘In the course of the discussion, participants who do not know the whole truth have to state this clearly, they must cease questioning... and thus declare defeat, or they must even become the pupil of the winner.’ Witzel, 1987, p.372.
erstwhile adversary is attested (Kassapa-Sihanāḍa Sutta). The Pāyāsi Sutta adds to the above requirements a point of style: the technique, richly adhered to by the Buddha in the debate suttas, of furthering one’s argument through the use of similes and analogy.

The seemingly simple conventions of the debate situation are used in a variety of powerful ways.

The first requirement in a debate is that a challenge should be issued. When the Buddha receives a challenge he may accept it and respond directly, answering point by point, as in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta (D 2) when he shows his thirty-two marks, the Kūṭadanta Sutta (D 5) where he describes the higher sacrifice, the Mahālā Sutta (D 6) where he explains the relationship between achieving the hearing of heavenly sounds and the seeing of heavenly sights, the Poṭṭhāpādā Sutta32 where he answers Poṭṭhāpādā’s questions on the summits of consciousness33, and many further occasions.

The Buddha may, however, reject a challenge. The grounds for this are that it is misplaced, i.e. he will reject a challenge on subjects with regard to which he has made no claims. This demonstrates a convention, not directly named in the suttas, that a challenge on a position that was never asserted could rightfully be dismissed. Into this category comes the Buddha’s refusal to answer certain questions, for example the avyā-
kata questions (Poṭṭhāpādā Sutta34) because they do not conform to the purpose of his teaching35. Also in this category is his refusal in the Pāṭika Sutta36 to reveal the Knowledge of the Beginning37, and his refusal in the Kevaddha Sutta (D II) and the Pāṭika Sutta (D 24, § 4) to produce miracles38. The Buddha may simply reject a challenge on this ground, or he may first reject it and then redefine it and answer it (Kevaddha Sutta: the mystic wonder)39. The Buddha may use the technique of both issuing and answering his own challenge. He does this in the form of a rhetorical question40, or by referring to a challenge made by a hypothetical opponent41.

The technique of the question-challenge is fundamental to a further strategy that the Buddha uses. He will accept his adversary’s position and then, by posing subtle questions, lead him him to refute his own position through his own answers42. In this way he gets him to cede point after point, and then uses what is left of the adversary’s position to his own advantage43. In a similar way, the Buddha will prove his case by asking a

32 D 9 [I 185, §§ 19,20]
33 saññāgga.
34 D 9 [I 187f, §§ 25-27].
35 Defined in this sutta, § 28.
36 D 24 [II 4, § 5].
37 aggahām paññāpeti.
38 iñddhi-pāṭihāriya.
39 The Pāṭika Sutta, D 24, however, demonstrates that although the Buddha may refuse to perform miracles and to reveal the Knowledge of the Beginning, he both performs the former and knows the latter.
40 Brahmajāla Sutta, D I; Kevaddha Sutta, D II; Lohicca Sutta, D 12.
41 Poṭṭhāpādā Sutta, D 9 [I 197, § 43]. Pare ce . . . amhe evam puccheyyum . . .
42 Poṭṭhāpādā’s position on the soul/self, Poṭṭhāpādā Sutta, D 9, §§ 21–23; the limitations of ascetic practices, Udāmarikā–Sihanāḍa Sutta, D 25.
43 Senādanā Sutta, D 4.
sequence of rhetorical questions to which he will provide answers. These answers add increasing weight to his argument, and point by point he gets his adversary to agree with him. He will also use simile and analogy strategically in his argument to attain this goal. He will provide an analogy with the case presented, and get the adversary to agree to his own (i.e. the Buddha's) position in terms of the analogy. The Buddha will then relate the analogy to the opponent's position, and in this way show that the latter has condemned himself.

The Buddha is also successful at eliciting questions from his opponent, the requirement of the third point in the Kassapa-Sīhanāda Sutta. This occurs so generally in the debate suttas that it is not worth citing examples. What is noteworthy in the Buddha's use of this strategy is his ability to force from his adversary a question which demonstrates the latter's ignorance, and hence the Buddha's superior knowledge. So Sōṇadāṇḍa, having been led to reduce the number of qualities that permit a person to be defined as a brahman to two, is forced to ask the Buddha to explain these qualities.

There are a variety of further strategies or conventions which occur regularly in the debates but which have not been specifically mentioned in any of the suttas cited above. Two strategies especially favoured by the Buddha are those of appealing to authority, both his own and that of another person, and of undermining the opponent's authority and status.

The Buddha will appeal to his own authority as Tathāgata. He will enhance his authority by telling the story of a previous lifetime in which his competence to answer the present challenge is established, and he is proved to be an expert on the subject (Kūtadāṇḍa Sutta: when he was the brahman chaplain in charge of the sacrifice). He will present the adversary's position exhaustively and systematically, and then put himself above it because of his knowledge and achievements. He will resort to his transcendental vision. He will put himself forward as the example that is also the ultimate proof of his own position: ‘Could such a bhikkhu (i.e. one who has achieved the described advanced state) say that?’... ‘But I am such a bhikkhu and I do not speak thus.’ Similarly he puts his discipline above and out of reach of that of certain adversaries. In this context too

42 Sāmañña Sutta, D 2.
44 See Witzel, 1987, for the importance of this strategy and its occurrence in the brahman texts.
45 Sōṇadāṇḍa Sutta, D I 124, § 22.
come the Buddha's assertions that he is 'the greatest'\textsuperscript{50}

The Buddha quotes or resorts to external or non-present authorities to enhance his authority. He cites the gods in the Ambattha Sutta\textsuperscript{51}, where he quotes a verse by Brahma Sanam-kumara and agrees with it, and in the Patika Sutta\textsuperscript{52} where he supports his assertion that he knows by adding that he has also been told this by a deva. He tells a story which shows that the highest god recognises that only the Buddha can answer a certain question\textsuperscript{53}. In the Kassapa-Sihanada Sutta\textsuperscript{54}, he imputes a decision in his favour to 'the wise'. Also in this sutta\textsuperscript{55}, he invokes Nigrodha's support, although the latter is absent, when he refers to an occasion when Nigrodha found an answer that he (the Buddha) gave very satisfying.

The strategy of undermining or reducing the adversary's status and authority is also frequently used. In the Ambattha Sutta\textsuperscript{56}, the Buddha humiliates Ambattha by revealing the latter's humble origins; in the same sutta\textsuperscript{57} he reveals that

\begin{quote}
\textit{a\textbar hatr' \textasciitilde acariyakena yen\textbar ham sa\textbar vake vinem\textbar} \ldots
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{50} Cf. Kassapa-Sihanada Sutta, D 8 [I 174§ 21], and variously. Y\textbar vat\textbar a Kassapa aruy\textbar par\textbar m\textbar vimut\textbar ti, n\textbar ham tait\textbar a\textbar att\textbar ano sam\textbar sasa\textbar nam sam\textbar anupass\textbar am kuto bh\textbar i\textbar yyo. Cf. On the claim to be the best, Witzel, 1987, p.365, quoting the Taittiriya Br\textbar hman\textbar a 3.10.5. Also, 'One cannot just claim to be better than the rest .. Mere brazen assertion does not suffice; one must be able to prove one's knowledge.' p.372f.

\textsuperscript{51} D 3 [I 99 § 28].

\textsuperscript{52} D 24 [III 14§ 18].

\textsuperscript{53} Kevaddha Sutta, D 11 [I 215, § 67-end].

\textsuperscript{54} D 8 [I 163, § 8].

\textsuperscript{55} § 23.

\textsuperscript{56} D 3 [I 92f, § 161]

\textsuperscript{57} D 1 103, § 6.

Pokkharas\textbar di, Ambattha's teacher, is not sufficiently respected to be permitted into the direct presence of the king. Also in this sutta he tells Ambattha that the ability to recite mantras of the ancient rishis does not make him a rishi\textsuperscript{58}. He resorts to ridicule of brahman knowledge and habits in the Tevijja Sutta (D 13). Similarly, Kassapa ridicules his adversary when he tells him, 'I have never seen or heard anyone professing such a position, such a view\textsuperscript{59}.

There are further general strategies in use. The Buddha will establish the criteria for winning the debate and then maintain that he conforms to them, as in the Kassapa-Sihanada Sutta\textsuperscript{60}, where he defines the criteria for the appellation 'sama\textbar na' or 'br\textbar hman\textbar a', and in the Udumberik\textbar a-Sihanada Sutta, where he defines true asceticism\textsuperscript{61}. The Buddha will show both the pros and cons in the adversary's position, and then demonstrate that his own position is still stronger\textsuperscript{62}. Like Kum\textbar ara Kassapa, but not so explicitly, the Buddha will use similes and analogy. He may use these poetically, to reinforce the ideas he is presenting, as the many similes in the Sama\textbar n\textbar aphala Sutta. He may also use these strategically in his argument, especially with the goal of getting the opponent to refute his own position. The Buddha can also be reasonable. In the Kassapa-Sihanada Sutta, when Kassapa challenges him whether he condemns all asceticism, he

\begin{quote}
\textit{ty\textbar ham mante adhi\textbar y\textbar i\textbar m s\textbar c\textbar a\textbar ri\textbar yako\textbar ti t\textbar evat\textbar a tvam bhav\textbar issi\textbar x\textbar it\textbar it\textbar y\textbar a\textbar va\textbar patt\textbar i\textbar an\textbar no ti n\textbar em \textbar than\textbar am vi\textbar j\textbar y\textbar a\textbar ti.} D 3 [I 104, §§ 8, 10].

\textit{N\textbar am\textbar har\textbar a\textbar evam\textbar v\textbar a\textbar dim evam\textbar di\textbar t\textbar th\textbar im adda\textbar sam\textbar va\textbar assos\textbar i\textbar n\textbar va.} (P\textbar ay\textbar asi Sutta, D 23 [II 319, § 5]).

\textit{tap\textbar o\textbar jiga\textbar h\textbar uc\textbar c\textbar a\textbar pari\textbar su\textbar d\textbar h\textbar a.}

\textit{Kassapa-Sihanada Sutta, D 8; Udumberik\textbar a-Sihanada Sutta, D 25.}
\end{quote}
replies, ’How then could I, O Kassapa, who am thus aware, as they really are, of the states whence men have come, and whither they will go, as they pass away from one form of existence, and take shape in another, — how could I disparage all penance, or bluntly revile and find fault with every ascetic, with every one who lives a life that is hard?’ The Buddha can open himself up to the judgment of others. Also in the Kassapa-Sihanāda Sutta, he tells Kassapa of an occasion when in discussion with certain **samanās** and **brāhmaṇas** he offered them to put aside all the subjects on which they held mutually incompatible views, and to judge solely with regard to those qualities that they mutually agreed were unskilful (akusala), blameworthy (sāvajjā), ignoble (nālam-ariya) and wicked (kinha), whether the Buddha was not the one among them who had most completely abandoned them (anavasesam pahāya vattati).

An interesting feature that occurs in two of the debates is the sub-challenge.

Sub-challenges have a particular character. They occur when the followers of an adversary interfere in a debate. The Buddha responds to these sub-challenges in a standard way. He counters by challenging his adversary’s supporters to debate with him themselves, if they think that their leader is not performing adequately.

The sub-challenges occur only in debates with brahmans. In the Ambaṭṭha Sutta, once the Buddha has accused Ambaṭṭha of being descended from the slave of a Sākyan, Ambaṭṭha’s followers defend him. The Buddha then challenges them: ’If you, young brahmans, think that the young brahman Ambaṭṭha is ill-born, not of good family, not learned, not a fine reciter, without wisdom, and not able to debate with me, then let him be silent, and you debate with me. If you think the opposite, then you be silent and let Ambaṭṭha debate with me.’ Ambaṭṭha’s companions are silent. In the Sonadanda Sutta (D 4) the Buddha extracts from Sonadanda the concession that only two attributes are essential for a man to claim truthfully to be a brahman. Sonadanda’s companions accuse him of betraying them: ’Do not, Venerable Sonadanda, speak in this way. The Venerable Sonadanda rejects our caste; he rejects our sacred verses, he rejects our birth.’ The Buddha’s reply is the same as

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63 Kassapa-Sihanāda Sutta, D 1 161f, § 3: Yo ‘ham Kassapa imesan tapissanem evam āgati ca gati ca citta ca uppati ca yathābhutam pajānami, so ‘ham kiṃ sabbhaṃ tapaṃ garaññissi saṃmaṃ tappaṃ lakkhajivaṃ ekamena upakkosissi sa apavadissi? Tr. Rhys Davids, Dialogues 1, p.224.
64 i.e. in a debate with potential opponents. See Manné, 1990, p.58f.
65 Kassapa-Sihanāda Sutta, D 1 163, § 5.
in the Ambattha Sutta, but without the opening remarks about birth and family. The style of debate is remarkably consistent in all the debate suttas, with the single exception of the Pāyāsi Sutta (D 23), where Kumāra Kassapa, and not the Buddha, is the protagonist. This enables us to compare the Buddha’s debating style and techniques with those of one of his disciples. The style of the Pāyāsi Sutta is qualitatively different from that of the suttas in which the Buddha is the protagonist. Where Kumāra Kassapa says, ‘I, Prince, have neither seen or heard of any one holding such a view, such an opinion’71, the Buddha is never surprised by a view expressed by his adversary. Where Kumāra Kassapa asks the adversary his reasons72 the Buddha never invites extensive representations of the opponent’s views. It is his style rather to ask brief pointed questions to which only one answer is possible and which leads to the rebuttal by the adversary himself of his own position. Kumāra Kassapa thus pays more attention to the details of his adversary’s case, while the Buddha goes straight to the weak point of his adversary’s argument.

Kumāra Kassapa’s is a poor imitation of the Buddha’s method of asking a series of questions whose answers manoeuvre the adversary into denying his own position: he takes much longer to convince his adversary than the Buddha ever does. Kumāra Kassapa’s arguments contain notably less Buddhist teaching than those of the Buddha. Where the Buddha produces similes, without explicitly saying that he is doing so, Kumāra Kassapa is explicit (§ 9). In every way the Buddha is both more subtle and more skilful than Kumāra Kassapa in his use of debating techniques and strategies.

Fully half of the debates in the Dīgha are with brahmans (D 1, 3-5, 10, 12, 13, 23). Debates exist also in the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads. They appear too in the earliest Vedic literature, the Rgveda, as Speech Contests73. So far the rules for these have not yet been fully described by scholars. Insofar as they have been74, they show that this is another case75 where we need Buddhist texts to help us understand brahmanical literature.

70 Ibid., § 171
71 See n.61. Tr. Rhys Davids, Dialogues II, p.351.
72 pāriyāya, §§ 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16.
NOTES ON THE UDĀNA¹

John D. Ireland

The Udāna or ‘Inspired Utterances’ is the third book of the Khuddaka Nikāya or Minor Collection. It consists of eighty short suttas or discourses of the Buddha, divided into eight groups (vagga) of ten suttas each. The title refers to the pronouncement, usually in verse, made at the end of each sutta and prefaced by the words; ‘Then, on realising its significance, the Lord uttered on that occasion this inspired utterance’ (atha kho bhagavā etam attham viditvā tāyam velāyaṃ imam udānaṃ udānesti). Here it is the Buddha who pronounces them, although others are sometimes so inspired (e.g. in Ud. 2.10 and 3.7). Such utterances also occur elsewhere in the Sutta Pitaka (e.g. M I 508; M II 104-5, 209; S I 20, 27-8, etc.).

The prose suttas which precede the ‘inspired utterances’ themselves could be regarded as a kind of commentary, supplying the introductory circumstances to the essential Dhamma-teachings found in the utterances. Because they are introductory, relating circumstances and containing little doctrinal material, they betray their lateness in a variety of ways and strongly suggest they are actually an ancient commentary. Sometimes the utterances do not appear to fit neatly into the context in which they are set (e.g. 5.2, 5.5), though in other cases the story and the udāna-utterance are integral to each other (e.g. 1.8, 4.5, etc.). Being expressions of the Buddha’s teaching, the utterances often allow for a wider interpretation than the circumstances surrounding them suggest and have, moreover, multiple meanings and allusions to the teachings referred to in other portions of the Sutta Pitaka. The fact is there exists an intricate network of cross-references throughout the Tipitaka and no one passage can be studied in isolation. A particular topic or aspect of the teaching found in one place begins to become meaningful only when everything else that has been said about it is known. Everywhere the Dhamma is spoken of in brief and no one place can be pointed to as being exhaustive and definitive of any aspect of the Dhamma. When a topic, word or phrase is come across and occurs apparently nowhere else in the Canon, it always presents the problem of determining its exact meaning and significance. An example would be kappa, āyu-kappa in 6.1. We have to rely on the Commentary to tell us that kappa does not mean the aeon in this context, but the normal human life(āyu)-span. However, there is no certainty that it was always so interpreted.

Could the udāna-verses once have existed as a collection apart from the introductory sutta, like the verses of the Dhammapada? These verses are also described as Buddha-udāna, but the stories supplied to explain when and where they were spoken are found in the Commentary and are not reckoned as the word of the Buddha. In the first vagga of the Udāna, the Bodhivagga, the udāna-utterances form a group united by the common word ‘brahmin’ (brāhmaṇa), which is obvious when they are read apart from the introductory suttas.

1 The present essay was compiled from notes made and problems encountered while preparing a translation of the Udāna. This translation, to which the references herein are made, was published as The Udāna. Inspired Utterances of the Buddha (BPS, Kandy 1990), and was reviewed in BSR 9, 1 (1992).
So this *vagga* could well have been called Brāhmaṇavagga, following on from the last *vagga* of the Dhammapada, the preceding work in the Khuddaka Nikāya. Similarly, the second *vagga* has the unifying theme of *sukha* happiness, bliss. Subsequently there is no obviously discernible theme linking the utterances. However, there is a suggestion of an overall plan to the work as a whole, in that the beginning of the first *vagga* does deal with the start of the Buddha's career beneath the Bodhi tree. Additionally, the final *vagga* contains material also to be found in the Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta of the Dīgha Nikāya, which recounts the last days of the Teacher before he passed away. The first sutta of the sixth *vagga* is also an important episode in the life of the Buddha. It is found in the Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta too and is the beginning of the events leading up to the passing away of the Buddha and contains Ananda's failure in not requesting him to delay his departure from this world.

As well as being uplifting and inspiring, the stories from the Udāna also reveal much humour. For example, the response of Nanda on being asked to compare those pink-footed nymphs with that Śākyan girl, 'the loveliest in the land'. Again, in the story of Suppavāsā, when the Budha elicits from her the response that she would like another seven sons, despite the trouble and pain she had to undergo to produce just one — all forgotten in the pride of motherhood! And then there is the incongruity of a new-born baby being able to hold a conversation. These, and other subtle touches, reveal the inspiration, humour, joy and delight — and devout faith too — of those ancient and unknown story-tellers who collected and put together this literature. Also noticeable is their love of puns and allusions, the word-play and the ingenuity involved. Thus in 1.8, the pun on Sangāmaji's name, and, in the 'Bull-Elephant' story (4.5) the play on the word *nāga*, meaning both perfected one and elephant. In this last is also the charming touch of the elephant bringing water 'for the Lord's use' with his trunk. Then there are the similes and parables, like that of the blind man and the elephant (6.4), that are both entertaining and instructive. Although it should be pointed out that this parable is best suited to Jain rather than Buddhist doctrine — a theory of partial truth being somewhat un-Buddhistic — the story is probably older than both Jainism and Buddhism and is still used today by modern Hindu teachers (e.g. by Ramakrishna).

The thought processes of the compilers of the Pāli Canon are also revealed when it is discovered that there is a connection between two adjacent suttas, although this may not be too obvious at first sight. One example in the Udāna is between suttas 5.8 and 5.9 where a reference to Devadatta's schism is followed in the next sutta by the inclusion of a verse that is found elsewhere (e.g. Vin. 1, p.349) in the context of the Kosambi rift. Other examples may be found in the Anguttara Nikāya. These connections are often so well hidden they need great ingenuity to discover them. They would also constitute necessary aids to memory in an oral literature and an indication of how it was gradually put together, a word or phrase in one sutta acting as a cue or trigger for the next. Also to be found are connections and allusions within the same sutta that are not at first obvious; some so subtle that one could be forgiven for thinking they are accidental rather than deliberate. An example is contained in Ud. 5.4. What is more natural than for little boys, caught out in some misdemeanour ('tormenting fish in a pond') by a passerby, attempting to run away, as is suggested in the last line of the verse.
‘If you have done a bad deed or do one now,
You will not escape pain, though you try to flee.’

Another device the ancient compilers of the Canon have employed is the occasional interposing of lines of explanatory narrative prose, or verse that repeats what was previously said in prose. This has been done in the Cunda Sutta (8.5.), heightening the solemnity of the events being described with dramatic effect. This sutta also has a number of curious features. It consists of four separate pieces, actually four short suttas that have been strung together. The composition of sūkaramaddava, the Buddha’s last meal, has been the subject of continuing controversy from the earliest times and much has been written about it. Although it is thought to have been the cause of the Buddha’s sickness, this is not borne out by a careful examination of the commentarial tradition. It was possibly medicinal in nature and acted as a purge and was prepared by Cunda with the purpose of prolonging the Buddha’s life. In any case the Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta suggests the Buddha fell ill during the last rains-retreat, prior to informing Māra he would pass away in three months’ time and the visit to Cunda’s dwelling. The remorse of Cunda was probably because his preparation did not succeed. Another feature of the Cunda Sutta is the sudden appearance of the venerable Cundaka as the Buddha’s attendant, whilst the final section reverts to Ānanda again. An intriguing question is whether there is any connection between Cunda the Smith (Cunda Kammāraputta) and the venerable Cunda(ka). Thus, is there a portion of the story missing where Cunda the Smith ‘goes forth’ and becomes the venerable Cunda or Cundaka? Moreover, are the narrative verses actually fragments of an alternative verse recension of the story? The text we have is very much an edited and selected version of the whole mass of floating oral material, much of it now lost forever. An example of some of this material is the survival of the Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit work, the Mahāvastu, which gives a glimpse of the extent and richness of it. Herein are to be found both prose and verse alternative versions of various tales and episodes within the Buddhist tradition, many of which are absent from Pāli literature altogether.

In the Commentary to the Suppavāsā Sutta (2.8) it is said Koliyaputta was the son (putta) of the Koliyan king. However, this is anachronistic as the Koliyans, like the Sākyans their neighbours, formed a republic during the lifetime of the Buddha. As Suppavāsā herself is designated Koliyadhītā (‘a Koliyan daughter’), this might then give the impression that they were brother and sister instead of husband and wife! The word putta (as also dhīta) when used as a suffix to a name, here and elsewhere, seems to mean ‘a member of’, ‘belonging to’ or ‘one born in’, a certain family or clan, rather than the ‘son’ or ‘child’ of a particular person. It is used especially by khattiya clans such as the Koliyans and Sākyans in whose republic-states there was a legislative assembly (sāṅgha) of leading members, heads of families. These members are called rājas, whilst the other

2 I disagree now with my observation in the introduction to the Udāna translation (p.8) that, ‘The Udāna is an anthology, many pieces being taken from elsewhere in the Pāli Canon . . .’, which is misleading. Neither the Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta nor the Udāna can be pointed to as the original source for those suttas they have in common.

3 These are either truly tribal, ruled by the elected elders of a council, or republican states governed by an aristocratic (i.e. khattiya–born) oligarchy.
male members of the clan were the puttas or rājaputtas, the 'sons' of the rājas. That the Buddha was a rājaputta would not necessarily mean that he was a 'prince' as the later tradition would have it, the son of King Sudhodana, but merely that he was a member of the Sākyan clan. He was a Sākyaputta or Rājaputta, that is, he belonged to a clan or tribe that was governed by an assembly of rājas, a Rajput tribe in modern parlance. A remnant of such a tribe, the Forest Rajputs, still existed in recent times in the foothills of the Himalayas on the borders of Nepal. Their origin had much in common with the ancient traditions recorded in Pāli literature of the origin of the Sākyans, whose home was that very same region.

This system of government of the Koliyans and Sākyans is also reflected in the heavenly worlds with the distinction between 'devas' and 'devaputtas'. The leader of the devas, the devarāja of the Tāvatiṃsa (the 'Assembly of the Thirty-three') reveals in the name of 'Sakka' his connection with the Sākyans. Possibly he was originally a tribal god, hero or ancestor, who in later times came to be identified with the Indo-Aryan thunder-god, Indra. Because of this tribal connection it is appropriate that Sakka should have become the special patron and protector of the Buddhadharmam, the teaching of the Great Sage (mahāmuni) Sākyaputta Gotama, the Sākyamuni, the Sage of the Sākyans. The devas, it may be gathered, lived an idyllic existence as rājas, in aristocratic or 'regal' splendour, attended by retinues of devaputtas, celestial maidens (devakaññā) or devadhitiṣ (the 'daughters'), also called accharā or nympha, musicians (gandhabba), etc. Here, as in the human world which it mirrors, there is to be seen the transition in the actual meaning of the term rāja, from the original tribal/republican connotation to the idea of 'kingship', the single rule of a

mahārāja, when kingdoms replaced the tribal territories. References to devatās or devaputtas belonging to 'a Tāvatiṃsa company' (Tāvatiṃsa-kāyikā devatā) may be taken to mean referring to this heaven as organised into presumably thirty-three companies or divisions. Each of these are headed by a 'deva' as the leader which, like that of the overall leader Sakka himself, is an office held by that deva and who is replaced upon his decease. The term 'devaputta' then refers to the other members of the various companies under the leadership of a particular deva. These companies also resemble military battalions and are so employed in the mythical warfare that takes place between the devas and the asuras. As well as this warrior/khattiya ethos, the Tāvatiṃsa is characterised by its sensual delights which here reach unsurpassed heights of indulgence and perfection.

In the Udāna (3.7) there is a reference to Sakka's consort, Sujā the asura maiden. In 3.2 Sakka is revealed being ministered to by five hundred beautiful pink-footed nympha (accharā) or the Kakuta-pādāni, literally, the Dove-footed Ones', referring to their delicacy and complexion, rather than any bird-like characteristics. Some texts (e.g. the Burmese) have kukkan (chicken), instead of kakuta- (dove). In the Commentary (UdA, p.172) it is stated that their feet were of a reddish or pinkish colour 'like the feet of a pigeon' (pārāpata-pāda-sadisa), whilst the PTS edition of the Udāna reads pādāni instead of pādāni - the only reference to these nymphs in the Sutta Pitaka, making the correct reading difficult to ascertain.

4 Khuddakaniyagapā, Chatthasangāyana ed. 1956.
Some other words and phrases of interest in the Udāna are the following:

*sabbattha ekarattiparivāsa* (1.10). This seems to mean ‘staying one night at each place (upon the journey)’. However, the Commentary takes it to mean ‘taking (but) one night to complete the journey’, despite *sabbattha* which ought to mean ‘everywhere’, ‘each place’.

In 1.10 also occurs the phrase *gāvi tarunavacchā*: ‘a cow accompanied by a young calf’. This should pose no particular problem, except that Woodward mistranslated the sentence, implying that Bahiya (and also Suppabuddha in 5.3) was killed by ‘a calf’ instead of ‘a cow with a calf’, the latter being more plausible. Normally gentle and inoffensive, a cow can be dangerous and unpredictable when she has a young calf to protect. Woodward’s mistake seems to have gone unnoticed for it is found repeated in books and articles by other authors when referring to the deaths of Bahiya and Suppabuddha. Pukkusāti (M 140) and Tambadāthika (DhA II 203f.) were also similarly killed by cows, the former by a cow rushing to protect her calf according to the Commentary (MA V 62).

*Janapadakalyāṇī* (3.2) meaning ‘the loveliest in the land’ is taken by the Commentary to be the personal name of the Sākyan girl with whom Nanda is infatuated, rather than merely descriptive. One feels the Commentary is stretching a point here but it had to fit the manifestly late and absurd tale of Nanda’s going forth as found in DhA.

In 3.9 occurs a list of crafts. The fifth is *muddāsiḥpa*: communicating by gestures. The Commentary is of little help, merely adding ‘hand gestures’. Woodward’s explanation of it as bargaining by signs or hand-touching employed by merchants is far-fetched and quite wrong according to the late I.B. Horner in a personal communication. Possibly it may have had a military significance as do the previous crafts, i.e. directing the course of the battle by signalling commands. T.W. Rhys Davids’ proposal that *lokāyata* means ‘nature lore’ has been disposed of by Jayatilleke who has shown that it originally meant ‘the art of debate’ as a branch of brahminical learning. Lokāyata came to mean materialism at the time of the Pāli commentators and, outside Buddhism, it is also used as a term for materialism. It is so described in Haribhadra’s Saddarsānasamuccaya (8th cent. C.E.) and in the Vedāntīn Mahādeva’s Sarvadarśānasamgraha (14th cent.). There are two distinct readings of the final craft mentioned: (1) *khattavijjā*: political science or statecraft, the craft of the ruling or warrior class (*khatriya*); (2) *khetavijjā*: the knowledge of, or the ability to locate, suitable sites for building upon. There is also a possible reading of *nakhattavijjā* (astrology).

Most translations of the verse beginning *abhūtavādī nirayam upeti* (4.8; also found in Dhp 306 and It. 48), render this line: ‘The liar goes to hell’. However, this does not clearly differentiate the subject from the person of the next line. That

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the verse should be translated as:

'The false accuser goes to hell
And he who denies the deed he did...'

is suggested by the story of Sundari's murder (also found in DhpA) and also the prose of It. 48.

In 5.9 occurs the phrase saddāyamāṇarūpā, 'making an uproar', in the PTS edition of the text. However, on consulting the various readings noted by the texts, none of the Mss used in its preparation actually has this reading. Paul Steinthal, the PTS editor, apparently took saddāya- from the Commentary which gives this as an alternative, possibly because he considered his Ms reading meaningless. These various readings are: padhāya-, hathāya-, vadhāya-, saddhāya-. More recent Oriental printed editions of the text are of little help in resolving the problem. The Burmese edition has sadhāya-, as does the Nālandā edition, and this may be equated with padhāya-, because sa and pa are similar in the Brāhmī script and easily confused. There is a verb sadh- (Skt. śṛdh-) meaning 'abuse', which ought to give the Pāli present indicative saddhati, not sadhati. The Udāna Commentary gives the reading vadhāya-, meaning 'harm', 'injury', but 'harm by verbal abuse', which seems to be what is intended, would be a peculiar use of the word. To establish the correct form of the text is a complicated problem and cannot be resolved with the material available.

Parulha-kaccha-nakha-loma: 'with long-grown nails and hair'

(6.2). Woodward translated as 'with long nails and hairy armpits' (Verses of Uplift, p.78), and at Kindred Sayings I (p.104) it appears as 'with hairy bodies and long nails'. There seems to be uncertainty as to the meaning and derivation of kaccha, as either 'marshy land', 'the long grass', etc., growing in such a place, or 'a hollow' such as 'an armpit', etc. The whole phrase appears to imply being unkempt, dirty, sweaty and smelly ('hairy = sweaty armpits, caked with dust', etc.). Later in the sutta the king says, '... when they have washed off the dust and mud, are well-bathed and perfumed, and have trimmed their hair and beards...', which seems to support this interpretation.

Koñco khirapako va ninnagam (8.7). I translated, 'as a fully-fledged heron leaves the marshy ground'. However, khirapaka actually means 'milk-fed', i.e., 'a suckling-calf' and seems hardly appropriate for a bird, although possibly it could refer to a fledging being fed with regurgitated food by its parents, but far-fetched. The Commentary (UdA, p.427) refers to the notion of certain birds (heron, goose or swan, etc.) having the ability to separate milk from water, leaving the water behind (ninnaga = udaka). Another possibility is that koñca is not a heron at all, but an elephant. See PED koñca12: trumpeting (of elephants; also the sounds made by certain water-birds that are similar. cf Milindapañha chap 6, '... an elephant's sound is like a heron's'). koñca = koñcanāda (kuñcanāda). koñca / kuñca / kuñja / kuñjara: an elephant.

9 Private communication from K.R. Norman, Cambridge.
10 Both PTS, and Simon Hewavitarne Bequest ed. 1920.

11 Cf PED kaccha1, kacchā2, also kacchantara, upakaccha; and Skt. kacchā, kakṣa, kaca.
12 This interpretation was suggested to the writer by the late Ven. H. Saddhatissa.
However, it seems best to accept the commentarial explanation here. Although it has not been possible to locate the concept of the milk-drinking heron elsewhere in any Pāli work, it is a known convention in Sanskrit literature\(^{13}\). It is used as a simile for accepting the good but rejecting the bad, thus ‘He takes the good utterances (away from the bad) as the goose takes milk from water’ (Mahābhārata I 69:10) and, ‘The royal goose drinks milk, (but) avoids water’ (Subhāṣītaratnakośa, 1374). Therefore, the Udāna passage should be amended to translate as: ‘(the wise man . . . abandons evil) as the milk-drinking heron leaves the water behind’\(^{14}\). However, the substitution of ‘heron’ for the more usual ‘goose’ (or ‘swan’) does leave the suspicion that this interpretation may not be entirely correct. Perhaps it would be going too far to consider this as another example of the Pāli redactor’s subtle humour!

Sutta 8.6. betrays its lateness by the prophecy about Pātaliputta (modern Patna) put into the mouth of the Buddha, concerning its future greatness when it was to become the capital of Magadha and the centre of the Asokan empire. The sudden introduction of the name Pātaliputta itself, and also the explanation calling one of the entrances to the city the Gotama Gate, look very much like a late interpolation.

In conclusion, a word should be added regarding the text and translation of the Udāna. The PTS edition is in a very unsatisfactory state. It was prepared by P. Steinthal in 1885 from three Mss (two Sinhalese and a Burmese), all containing many defects. An attempt was made to improve the text by E. Windisch who produced a list of alternative readings\(^{15}\). This list was subsequently further improved and added to by F.L. Woodward when he made his edition of the Commentary (1925). Despite these attempts, the fact is that there is still much left to be desired in the text and what is really needed is a completely new edition to replace Steinthal. There are now in existence several Oriental printed editions, such as that contained in the Burmese Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana edition of the Tipiṭaka (1956), that are more satisfactory or at least ‘readable’ compared with many portions of the PTS text. This Burmese edition, the Nālandā Devanāgarī edition and the Sinhalese Buddha Jayanti Tripiṭaka Series edition were consulted by the present writer in preparing his translation of the Udāna. The initial purpose of this translation was to ‘improve upon’ Woodward’s 1935 version (‘Verses of Uplift’) which is unsatisfactory in many respects. However, I have refrained from being overtly critical of Woodward’s work for, although many of the errors in his translation have been corrected, this new translation has produced a new crop of errors. These were discovered only subsequent to publication and hopefully may be corrected in a future edition.

\(^{13}\) That this was a widespread belief is substantiated by the fact that it is actually mentioned in a 9th cent. Chinese (T’ang Dynasty) Buddhist source. After hearing a report of a conversation with the Ch’an master Huang-po, another remarks, ‘That swan is able to extract the pure milk from the adulterated mixture . . . ’ (J. Blofeld, The Zen Teaching of Huang Po, London 1958, p.100).

\(^{14}\) This information and the references were supplied by K.R. Norman in a personal communication.

\(^{15}\) ‘Notes on the Edition of the Udāna’, IJTS 1890, pp.91–108.
CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS TO BSR 9, 2

1 — NOTES ON THE UDĀNA, by J.D. Ireland:

p.143, l.10: for ‘Their origin’ read ‘The tradition of their origin’.
p.144, l.10: for ‘complexion’ read ‘colour’.
p.146, l.16: for ‘Mahādeva’ read ‘Mādhava’.

2 — Review of Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden:

p.211, l.6: for ‘Mulasarvāstivādin’ read ‘Mulasarvāstivāda’.
p.212, l.3: for DhpA’ read ‘Dhp-a’.

3 — Obituaries:


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RELIGIOUS CHANGE IN LATE INDIAN BUDDHIST HISTORY
(conclusion)

Lal Mani Joshi

(iv) Rituals and Evocations

The practice of *mantrayoga* was a part of Tantric rituals which, in turn, remind us of the Vedic rituals of sacrifice (*yajñā, homa*) and magic (*yātu, jādū*), and of Purānic rituals of earning merit and averting disasters and hostile forces. People wishing happiness, long life and prosperity performed rituals of propitiation towards the deities. Rituals were also performed for hyper-physical aims (*pāralaukika*) such as avoiding hell after death. Rituals which were destructive and violent in result were also performed. It is not possible to describe the technique of all these rituals in this paper. We shall state in general terms the nature of these rituals connected with human goals, religious and secular. Some involve physical purification through ablution, fasting or some other form of austerity, honour to the guru, worship of the chosen deity, recitation of *dhārāntis* and/or *mantras*. Among articles used in rituals mention is made of water, fire, flowers, leaves, grain seeds, fruit, flesh, fish, wine, urine, dung, bones, a skull, a sword, a trident, a tigerskin, a deerskin, a bell, a vajra-symbol, a book of ritual-worship, incense, a lamp, an image of the deity, and so on.

As already mentioned, the Sarvadurgatiparīśodhana Tantra is a manual of rituals to be performed for eliminating birth in evil states. Śākyamuni Buddha is now conceived as the Teacher of that diamond-wisdom which removes all evil states (*durgātis*).

The text describes various *mantras, mudrās*, deities, creation and rites of the *mandala*, rites for the dead, and assures the performers of happiness and good birth. Every ritual requires the formation of a *mandala* and diverse kinds of devotional worship. The desire of people to seek freedom from suffering is reflected in the request of the gods to the Blessed One to reveal means and methods of escaping from manifold sufferings. They pray fervently, saying 'Protect O Glorious One, protect O Blessed One' (*paritṛṇam kuru bhagavān, paritṛṇam kuru sugata*). The Glorious One then teaches the various ritualistic methods of praying to the Buddha and of propitiating numerous gods and goddesses with *mantras*. The Buddha is the embodiment of purity and can purify his worshippers who seek purification through prayer. The following words are said to constitute the basic prayer-formula (*mūladvidyā*):

Hail ! Obeisance to the Chief Purifier of all evil states of existence, the Transcendent One, the Holy One, the Perfectly Enlightened One. Hail ! Purifier, Purifier, Purifier of all evils. Pure, Perfectly Pure, the Purifier of all obscurations of karma *svāhā*.

The text declares that by merely remembering these auspicious words even those beings that have little religious merit can be released and thus pacify all evil states\(^{86}\).

A number of texts describe and recommend a set of four rituals: for peace (*śānti*), prosperity (*puṣṭi*), subjugation (*vaṣya*), and destruction (*mārana*). The purpose of the peace-ritual is to secure peace and protection from calamities and evil states.

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\(^{86}\) *Sarvadurgatiparīśodhana* Tantra, pp.120–6.
That of the prosperity-ritual is to secure longevity, wealth, beauty and happiness. The rite of subjugation is performed to subdue wicked people, demons, hostile gods and enemies, whilst that of destruction is recommended for destroying sins, dangers and cruel opponents. Besides these rituals, mention is made in some texts of those for conquering a territory, defeating an army in battle, attracting and infatuating specific persons, compelling deities and dākinis to appear before the practitioner, and even for warding off mosquitoes! It may be mentioned in passing that many gods and goddesses propitiated by Tantric Buddhists had very fierce appearances. In spite of the doctrine of compassion and love, these terrifying figures appeared on the scene because of the persistence of fear and death in the world. These deities are propitiated and their grace and mercy are eagerly sought for by timid devotees. Thus at the beginning of the Yamārisādhana its author makes the following statement:

‘Having made obeisance with my head to Lord Yamāri who is illustrious, internally compassionate but externally terrible in appearance for the benefit of living beings, I write this ritual of his worship for the good of all’.

Another reason for propitiating this terrible aspect of a deity was the need of devotees to seek freedom from sufferings that had overtaken them during this age. The author of the Ucchuśma-Jambhala-Sādhana says the following in revealing words:

‘What mental attitude towards the deeds (or teachings) of the Blessed One can be expected among the people who are ground down by poverty and suffering? It appears, therefore, that Jambhala out of anger has assumed the terrifying form of Ucchuśma’.

In the light of this statement we can understand the attitude of Tantric Buddhists. Each devotee or practitioner wanted to conquer happiness and security by propitiating and calling forth positive or negative forces personified by the tradition for good or evil purposes. Each devotee, in the course of a ritual of evocation and worship, was asked to assume the form of the deity propitiated. In this way the power of that deity was sought to be transmitted to the devotee concerned. Instead of cultivating the classical ascetic qualities and spiritual virtues, these Buddhists seem to have personified those qualities and virtues as deities who could be invoked by means of appropriate rituals. Thus they established the following correspondence between the seven limbs of enlightenment (sapa bodhyangani) of classical Buddhism and the seven deities of the Vajrayāna:

1. smṛti, mindfulness, is viewed as Śri Heruka;
2. dharma-pravicaya, investigation of dharmas, as Herukī;
3. virya, spiritual energy, as Vajrabhairavi;
4. priti, joyfulness, as Ghoracandi;
5. praśradhī, tranquillity, as Vajrabhāskari;
6. samādhi, concentration, as Vajraraudri, and

87 Ibid., pp.222-4; Sādhanaṃāla, pp.367-9, 532-4; Pañcakrama IV.29-30; Samvārodaya Tantra, pp.151-5; Hvi 2, Lii, pp.6-10.
88 Sādhanaṃāla, p.550.

89 Ibid., p.570.
7. upeksā, equanimity, is viewed as Vajradākinī. The number of gods and goddesses in Tantric Buddhism is very large and the number of rituals connected with their propitiation and evocation is also correspondingly large. The Sādhanamālā contains rituals for averting and curing diseases, for the extraction of snake venom, for subduing Brahmical gods, for gaining victory in debate, for seeking and obtaining wealth and pleasure, for performing miracles or attaining all the eight siddhis, and so on. There are rituals which if performed correctly lead to conquest of the threefold world (trilokya-vijaya), that can make the performer capable of doing everything, that result in subduing beings in all the six states of existence. Demonology, necromancy and numerous kinds of magical practices occupy a considerable part of a Tantric priest's repertoire. However, mantras and sādhanas seem to have constituted the foundational structure of the Vajrayāna.

(v) Method of Esoteric Union

Although mantras and sādhanas play a very important part in Tantric techniques of seeking religious and secular goals, it is the rite of esoteric union (gukya.samāja) which constitutes the main theme of the Anuttarayoga tantras. Here esoteric, secret or mysterious (guhya) means the threefold mystery of body, speech and mind; the coming together or commingling of these three mysteries is called union (samāja). This union or unity is also known as the unity of wisdom (prajñā, sūnyatā, nairātma) and means (upāya, karunā), the unity of Nirvāna and Śaṁsāra. Since this ultimate state of unity is viewed as the unity of two, it is also called 'Two-in-One' (yuganaddha) or the Non-dual (advaya). Since its nature is conceived as the Great Bliss (mahāsusukha) and it is realised within oneself (pratyātmavedya) as a result of the joint and simultaneous arising of the two essential co-efficients, it is called the Innate (sahaja). Mention has already been made of several personified epithets and attributes of this supreme Non-duality.

Esoteric imagery is employed in the tantras to illustrate the processes in this rite of mysterious union. Thus wisdom is called the female, means the male; the former is the yogini, the latter the yogin. Not only the literature but also the art of this period reflect the active role of sexual techniques employed in religious rituals. The tantras use 'shocking' language perhaps intentionally, and tell the puritan world in unmistakable words that even the unity of man and woman in the act of copulation is an aspect of the ultimate unity and perfect non-Duality. An aspirant or yogin goes to his guru, among other things, with a young yogini. Their physical union effected with great attention and care in accordance with the prescribed ritual is a microcosmic aspect of the transcendental union at the macrocosmic level.

There has been some controversy in modern times about this eroticism and sexual terminology of the tantras. Some scholars hold that all this talk about male and female union is

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90 Ibid., pp. 489 and 494.
91 Ibid., see Sādhanas numbered, 17, 71, 81, 84, 144, 151, 155, 172, 206, 218, 222, 235, 256, 260, 293 and 312. The Hvt has rituals for producing rain, holding clouds, holding the sun and the moon, and for seeking a lost thing; see Hvt 2, Li20. 27, 28.

92 Gst XVIII/24.
merely symbolical and that the esoteric speech (samdhābhāsā) of these texts should not be taken literally. This is also the view of some mediaeval commentators on the dohās or songs of the siddhas. I find it very difficult to agree with this view. I find sufficient evidence for making a distinction between what is written in samdhābhāsā and has to be interpreted symbolically, and what is written in clear and direct language which has to be understood quite literally. We have not merely the references to a young and beautiful girl initiated in this adamantine discipline (vajrayoga) who is an active partner in the rite, but also the repeated declarations of the tantras regarding freedom from all ethical restraints or scruples during the course of the practice. We have to admit that sexuality and immorality were made the means of spirituality and ethical purity; we have to keep in mind that the Vedic and Upaniṣadic texts taught a similar attitude\(^93\), and that the Brahmanical sects of Śaivism and Śāktism also had a similar theory and practice of esoteric union\(^94\). It is true, however, that the siddhas revolutionised and transformed Buddhism in a truly astonishing way.

The siddhas believed that ascetism and monasticism are no longer effective means of growing in religiousness. They held that difficult and ascetically-orientated rules could not bring about release quickly, therefore there was no need to adopt the monastic life. Siddhi was attainable by enjoying all the sense-pleasures\(^95\). Passion (rāga), hatred (dveṣa) and delusion (moha), the basic roots of evil leading to bondage and the hells, are now constituents of the path of the Tantric adept. The identity of Samsāra and Nirvāṇa is now understood as a soteriological technique in which Samsāra with all its evils and defilements becomes the standard constellation of means of achieving liberation in this very life. The siddhas claim that they have changed the very basis of ordinary experience (āśraya-parāvṛtti) by a regulated method of sublimation and subtle process of reversion. Their sexo-yogic rituals do not lead to a discharge of male and female vital fluids (ṣukra and rakta), nor result in the procreation of children, as was the case with knowers of the 'Vāmadevya Sāman' of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, or as is the case with all ordinary men and women who experience the pleasures of copulation. It is impossible either to demonstrate or to falsify the validity of this claim of the siddhas.

The sexo-yogic technique of union is open only to those whose intention is supreme and whose mind is pure. Such yogins can use the worst things and put them to the best uses. The hidden, dark and terrible forces within us become the limbs of enlightenment and means of reintegration when processed and transformed in accordance with the method of the Guhyasamājā. Passion is overcome by passion, poison is negated by poison; Samsāra is conquered through Samsāra. The Innate is not something out there. It is within oneself though not limited to this or that individual self. It is everywhere, free and infinite.

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95 Gst. VII.1-5, XVIII.160, Hvt 2, lvi.18-21.
‘Without meditating, without renouncing the world, One may stay at home in the company of one’s wife, Can that be called perfect knowledge, Saraha says, If one is not released while enjoying the pleasures of sense?’

The yogin who is engaged in the ultimate battle of attaining liberation and whose mind is pure does all kinds of deeds and eats all kinds of food. There is no act that he shall not perform, no food that he shall not eat, no beverage that he shall not drink. Free from shame and fear, the yogin lives as he likes.

‘The same fearful deeds which lead living beings to terrible hells, without doubt lead to liberation when done in accordance with the method of release. It is the established opinion that the mind is the forerunner of everything, evil as well as good; the distinctions regarding state of existence, place and so on are forms of imagination of the mind.’

The Tantric yogin may live as a householder without owning anything. Having purified his mind, he sees purity everywhere in everything. His conduct is therefore free from the norms of behaviour of common people in the world (lokācāraviniṃuktā). His method is radical and cannot be judged by those who are lost in the dark forest of dualism.

‘Without the very poison, a little of which would kill any other being, a man who understands poison would dispel another poison . . . existence is purified by existence in the countering of discursive thought by its own mind.’

He realises the ultimate enlightenment who is freed from both sin and virtue. The Guhyasamāja Tantra gives some details of a kind of ascetic discipline called ‘Four Means’ (caturvidhā upāya) which, among other things, include ‘six limbs’ of yoga: 1) withdrawal of the senses (pratyāhāra), 2) meditation (dhyāna), 3) breath-control (prānāyāma), 4) concentration (dharanā), 5) mindfulness (anuśmṛti) and 6) deep consciousness or absorption (samādhi). It also recommends the ‘discipline of coercion’ (hāthayoga). Thus the method of esoteric union involves the yogin in mastering not only his own psychophysical complex in all its aspects, bright and dark, good and evil, but also the visible and invisible entities and forces of the universe.

Paradigm Changes: Causes and Consequences

We can now sum up the important changes which took place during the last phase of Buddhist history in India and briefly review their causes and consequences.

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98 Hvt 1, p.9. Transl. by Snellgrove; similar passage in the Cāndamahāroṣaṇa Tantra, p.32.
99 Gt VIII.67, 70, 198.
100 Ibid., XVIII.134–180. For some comments on these verses see Studies in the Buddhist Culture, Ch. XI, pp.287–8.
The siddhas became the religious leaders. The arhats, bodhisattvas and Buddhas of classical conception receded into the background. The life-style of the siddhas did not conform to the Pratimokṣa tradition of the Vinaya. Celibacy and monasticism became things of the past. Every siddha was a yogin, one who had achieved ‘union’ (yoga) in an esoteric technique of siddhi; he was not a regular householder; neither was he a monk. He was required by his new discipline to adopt a female co-efficient partner in order to succeed in the rite of union. The introduction of this erotic element was a radically new development.

The scriptures of Buddhism of this period were the tantras and sādhanas, although the sūtras and śāstras were occasionally quoted in support of the tantras. Old terms and concepts were also retained to a great extent, but they were put to a new use in the service of a new theology and newly-discovered techniques of perfection. New terms and concepts became decisive. In place of renunciation appeared world-affirmation, and in place of meditation appeared ritualistic adoration. The presence of Māra, the classical Buddhist symbol of desire and evil in embodied existence, disappeared from the soteriological environment. Classic manuals of moral and spiritual growth such as the Visuddhimagga, Abhidharmakośa and Bodhicaryāvatāra ceased to have relevance to the soteriology of the tantras. The anti-scholastic attitude of the siddhas tended to ignore Buddhist philosophy, logic and epistemology which had been flowering until the eighth century\textsuperscript{101}. Manuals of ritualism and tracts on devotional practices, rather than philosophical treatises, became the sources of religious authority. In place of the sūtras the Adamantine Lord now revealed the tantras.

Although Saraha criticised ritualism in all forms, most of the siddhas were authors of the tantras which expounded ritualism in a big way. While the ‘songs’ (dohā) of the siddhas promoted a new language for a new kind of religious poetry, they also popularised erotic imagery and unconventional figures of speech and thought. This category of literature produced by the siddhas made a new contribution to the vast mass of sacred literature and popularised the image of the holy man as beyond good and evil, as a ‘revolutionary’ in religious and social matters. Although women had played a powerful role in Buddhist religiousness since the time of Śākyamuni, it was in the Vajrayāna that some of them became siddhas on an equal basis with men. The tradition recognised at least four women, Mañjīhadrā, Mekhalā, Kanakhālā and Lakṣmīnkārā, in the list of eighty-four siddhas\textsuperscript{102}. The idea that a woman must change to a man before she becomes a Buddha\textsuperscript{103}, was now given up. Women could attain siddhi just as men did. The conception of Non-duality came to be compared to the unity of ‘woman-and-man’.

The most important changes took place in doctrine and

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\textsuperscript{101} Minor works on philosophy and logic continued to be written. See Rautakrishna

\textsuperscript{102} See Buddha's Lions (Caturāśīti siddhapravṛtti), tr. James Robinson, Berkeley 1979, Siddhas 65, 66, 67 and 82.

\textsuperscript{103} See Diana Paul, Women in Buddhism, Berkeley 1979, Ch.V.
practice. We now see clearly a new face of the Buddha, the Buddha of the Vajrayāna. One many call it Buddhological theology or theological Buddhism — and it is theistic. Traditional Buddhist atheism, in spite of Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s refutation of theism in the Tattvasamgraha and its Commentary, and in spite of the short tracts against theism written by scholars such as Ratnakirti, JITār and Jiñānāśrimitra, during this very period, was ignored by the tantras. Viṣṇuites and Vedāntic authors had been known for quoting Buddhist texts approvingly, but during our period Buddhist authors of ritual-texts began to quote Brahmanical texts like the Bhagavadgītā approvingly. Brahmanical leaders and teachers had been building a grand synthesis of Brahmanism and Buddhism for hundreds of years in the past; our period had produced for the first time some Buddhist teachers who accepted this synthesis and added their own contribution to the brahmanisation and ritualisation of the Saddharma.

The traditional Buddhist view of self (ātmā) as a conventional reality with no ontological selfhood was also modified by the introduction of the idea of adamantine essence (vajra-svabhāva) as the underlying all-pervading reality. The concept of union of self (ātmā) and the supreme self (paramātmā) found in the tantras came close to that of Purānic Brahmanism. The doctrine of the Ādibuddha or Vajradhara as the primordial father or creator and ruler of the universe now became the centre of Buddhist devotion and piety. Viṣṇu, Śiva and the other old Vedic-Buddhist Brahmā were now subsumed by the Vajrasattva. Just as the Brahmanical gods had their divine consorts, so the Tantric Buddhas and gods were provided with their female manifestations occupying different positions in the ritual map (mandala) of the cosmos. Liberation or Enlightenment was now attainable by devotional and ritual techniques with the help of prayer formulas (mantras). A massive pantheon now overtook Buddhism. Goddesses and gods, merciful as well as destructive, came to be adored. Goddesses like Jānguli, Ekaṭā, Bhūruti, Cundā, Vajrayārāhī, Parnāsāvari, Sarasvatī, Herukī, Māricī, Kurukullā, Usṇīsavijayā, and unfamiliar dākinīs and so on, and gods like Mahākāla, Jambhala, Heruka, Candamahāraosana, Bhūtadāmara, Yamāri, Gandatī, and numerous forms of Avalokiteśvara and so on, became objects of intense devotion and ritualised meditation. The Buddhist texts of this period hardly mention the Noble Eightfold Path or the triple religious discipline of training (morality, meditation, wisdom); we do not hear of the six or ten perfections (pāramitās), ten levels of spiritual development (bhūmīs) of the bodhisattva; we do not hear of the Four Noble Truths nor of the thirty-seven practices favourable to enlightenment; there was no scope in this form of Buddhism for the study of the three collections of scriptures (tripitaka). Although every siddha was in a sense a bodhisattva, and although wisdom (prajñā) and compassion (karunā) appear on almost every page of Tantric texts, the bodhisattva tradition of attaining universal Enlightenment by spending incalculable world-cycles in Samsāra could not give way to the need of attaining siddhi as soon as possible by the quickest of methods. The tantras were still ‘proclaimed’ by the Lord, but this Lord was quite different from the Tathāgata of classical Buddhist tradition. For the most part, Vajrayāna Buddhism had become indistinguishable from the Purānic Brahmanical sects of Śāktism, Śivaism and Viṣṇuism.

What were the causes and consequences of this wholesale transformation of the spiritual legacy of Sākyamuni Buddha in India? Our answers are likely to be debatable. In the beginning of this paper we had drawn attention to four major changes which also implied causes and consequences of these changes.
The final changes in Buddhist paradigms in India resulted in the destruction of the paradigms themselves. That is to say, Buddhism was neither changed nor revolutionised during this period in order to survive and grow; it was transformed so completely that it disappeared from India. The theory of Thomas Kühn, therefore, applies to the history of Buddhism in India. What we observed in the opening section of this paper also indicated that what are called 'revolutions' are not considered revolutions by the Buddhists. Continuity and change both characterised the history of Buddhism in India. The Tantric revolution in Buddhist history seems to come close to some observations of Kühn, but the final death of Buddhism as a living religious tradition in India makes his theory entirely irrelevant if not invalid. We have to acknowledge that the history of religiousness differs from the history of science.

The changes in Buddhism occurred partly due to cultural interactions and partly due to historical circumstances. The greatest consequence of these changes was the decline of Buddhism in India. By cultural interactions I mean the assimilation of Buddhism by Brahmanism and of Brahmanical ideas and practices by Buddhism. By historical circumstances I mean the persecution of Buddhism first by Brahmanical Hindus and later on by the newly-converted Central Asian and West Asian Muslims who invaded and conquered India in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

It might be argued that the history of Buddhism in Tibet shows that the Tantric transformation of Buddhism cannot be considered a valid cause of its decline in India. The Tibetans received Buddhism in this transformed shape and yet it went on flourishing in Tibet until our own days. This is not so sound as it appears. The Tibetans received the entire Buddhist tradition from India and preserved its doctrines and practices in all forms with an unparalleled zeal and faith. The Tibetan educational and monastic tradition was so shaped and developed as to promote the study and practice of the Śrāvakayāna, Bodhisattvayāna and Vajrayāna. Moreover, there was no Brahmanical Hinduism in Tibet to create confusion or to carry on persecutions. Whereas in Tibet Buddhism was the state religion and the best minds of Tibet were devoted to Buddhism, in India, on the other hand, Buddhism had been plundered, persecuted and condemned as a religion of demons and atheists in the Kaliyuga, and its followers had been reduced to a state of poverty and mockery, living as the lowest members of the lowest caste of the Brahmanical social hierarchy. Buddhism had lost royal patronage and its followers were without means of protection from violence and disasters; this was not the case with Buddhism and Buddhists in Tibet.

Interaction between Buddhism and Brahmanism proved advantageous for the latter but destructive for the former. Brahmanism reshaped itself in order to counteract the influence of Buddhism; it appropriated a large number of Buddhist ideas and practices and even declared the Buddha as an aśvādāra of

105 See Studies in the Buddhistic Culture of India, Ch. XII.
Viṣṇu. The notion of the Dharmakāya had appealed to Viṣṇu priests, being comparable to the Upaniṣadic Brahma or the so-called Vedāntic neuter brahman. The authors of the Bhagavadgītā (see II.72; V.24-26, brahmanirvāṇa) were quick to identify Brahma with Nirvāṇa. A little later Brahmanical theologians declared that the Buddha was the god of the Buddhists (brauḍhāṇāṁ sugato devo), and in about the seventh century the Brahmanical purāṇas included Sākyamuni in the list of Viṣṇu's avatāras. In theory at least, all the powers and functions of God were to be attributed to the Buddhāvatāra also. This was the theory in spite of the view entertained by some brahmaṇa theologians that the ninth avatāra was a false trick of God for the destruction of non-gods (asuras) or the followers of Buddhism. Now, Lord Viṣṇu is always conceived as a householder, and his avatāras such as Rāma and Kṛṣṇa were householders who taught all kinds of doctrines and practices, Vedic and non-Vedic, Brahmanical and Buddhist, yet they always stressed observance of caste-duties and rituals of devotion as well as those that were prescribed in the śruti and smṛti texts. Lord Śiva, a supreme god in his own right, was often viewed as an aspect of the Supreme God or Brahma (brahman), but he was frequently identified with Viṣṇu and Brahmā (creator). He was worshipped as a great yogin, yet he had a female consort too. Asceticism and eroticism were inseparable from Śivaism and the cult of Śakti shared many features of the Vajrayāna. The paradigmatic figure of Śiva as a siddha whose myths had identified bhoga and yoga was an important source of inspiration for all those seekers of liberation who saw the world as a manifestation of Divinity and who postulated an ultimate unity. The mistaken identity between Samsāra and Nirvāṇa was also partly responsible for creating great confusion between siddhi and mukti, between bhoga and yoga. For him who was in Nirvāṇa, Samsāra was indeed Nirvāṇa, for there was no duality for him; but he who was in Samsāra and still maintained that there was Nirvāṇa, enjoyments (bhoga) became unity (yoga).

Struck down by violent persecutions and rendered poor and helpless, the Buddhists of this period sought refuge in the guru's grace, in the power of the mantras, in magical charms and rites, in devotional surrender unto powerful gods and goddesses, and in techniques of propitiating demons and spirits that have always haunted the timid and selfish race of humans. The doctrine of the Absolute Cosmic Buddha, free from notions of Samsāra and Nirvāṇa, realisable and experienceable through the transcendental wisdom and compassion of the universal saviour bodhisattvas, was too difficult to practice and too subtle to understand. People were in need of food, drink, clothing, shelter, security and peace here and now. The whole of India during these centuries dominated by political turmoil, feudal and priestly exploitation and foreign invasions, had been overwhelmed by a massive flood of devotional tendencies and ritually-orientated religious practices. The Buddhist communities who had lost their distinctive features were fast disappearing into oblivion. Neo-Brahmanism or 'Hinduism' had finally absorbed the whole of Buddhism in India.

107 Ibid., pp.63-4, 89

109 Ibid., pp.328-48; Discerning the Buddha, pp.233-42.
EKOTTARĀGAMA (XIII)

traduit de la version chinoise par
Thích Huyễn-Vi

Fascicule septième
Partie 14
Les cinq observances des règles de conduite

1. "Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois quand le Bouddha résidait à Śrāvasti dans le bois de Jeta, au parc d'Anāthapindada, il disait aux bhikṣu: Dans l'assemblée ici-présente, je ne vois [personne qui ait] une ou plusieurs pratiques qui puissent conduire à l'enfer, à l'animalité ou à la voie des fantômes affamés. Si la vie d'un homme est courte, c'est parce qu'il a tué dans sa vie antérieure. Celui qui aime tuer tombera dans l'enfer, dans l'animalité ou dans la voie des fantômes affamés; s'il peut encore reprendre la forme humaine, il sera mort très jeune. Pourquoi? Parce qu'il a tué. C'est pourquoi, ô bhikṣu! il ne faut pas tuer. On doit apprendre sérieusement cela. — Après avoir entendu ces paroles du Bouddha, les bhikṣu étaient heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.

2. "Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois quand le Bouddha résidait à Śrāvasti, dans le bois de Jeta, au parc d'Anāthapindada, il disait

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2 Voir T 2, 576all et suiv.
aux bhikṣu: Dans l'assemblée ici-présente, je ne vois [personne qui ait] pratiqué le respect de la vie sans avoir la possibilité d'être heureux dans ce monde ou dans l'un des cieux et de réaliser [finalement] le Nirvāṇa. Celui qui respecte la vie et qui ne pense jamais à tuer aura une longue vie. Pourquoi? Parce que son esprit n'est pas perturbé. C'est pourquoi, ô bhikṣu! il faut respecter la vie. On doit apprendre sérieusement cela. — Après avoir entendu ces paroles du Bouddha, les bhikṣu étaient heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.


4. ‘Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois quand le Bouddha résidait à Śrāvasti, dans le bois de Jeta, au parc d'Anāthapindadā, il disait aux bhikṣu: Dans l'assemblée ici-présente, je ne vois [personne qui ait] pratiqué la générosité par la donation sans être récompensé équitablement soit en ce monde, soit dans l'un des cieux, soit par la possibilité de réaliser [finalement] le Nirvāṇa. Celui qui pratique la grande générosité bénéficiera de la richesse, du pouvoir, du confort, de la sécurité; il sera heureux dans ce monde ou dans le ciel. C'est pourquoi, ô bhikṣu! il faut qu'on pratique la générosité et que l'on chasse l'avarice de son esprit. On doit sérieusement apprendre cela. — Ayant entendu les paroles du Bouddha, les bhikṣu étaient heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.

5. ‘Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois quand le Bouddha résidait à Śrāvasti . . . , il disait aux bhikṣu: Dans l'assemblée ici-présente, je ne vois [personne qui ait] une ou plusieurs pratiques qui puissent conduire à l'enfer, à l'animalité, à la voie des fantômes affamés, ou à la répugnance d'autrui. Celui qui est avide de sexualité, qui commet des adultères, tombera dans l'enfer, dans l'animalité, dans la voie des fantômes affamés, dans la répugnance d'autrui. C'est pourquoi, ô bhikṣu! il faut se maîtriser par des pensées justes pour ne pas commettre d'adultère. On doit apprendre sérieusement cela. — Ayant entendu ces paroles du Bouddha, les bhikṣu étaient heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.


7. ‘Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois quand le Bouddha résidait à Śrāvasti . . . , il disait aux bhikṣu: Dans l'assemblée ici-présente,
je ne vois [personne qui ait] une ou plusieurs pratiques qui conduisent à l'enfer, à l'animalité, à la voie des fantômes affamés. Celui qui ment, qui déforme la vérité, qui mélangé le faux au vrai, tombera dans l'enfer, dans l'animalité, dans la voie des fantômes affamés, et aura une mauvaise haleine qui fait éloigner les autres. Pourquoi? Parce qu'il a menti. C'est pourquoi, ô bhikṣu! il ne faut pas mentir. On doit apprendre sérieusement cela. — Ayant entendu ces paroles du Bouddha, les bhikṣu étaient heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.


Partie 15

L'existence et l'inexistence

1. ‘Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois quand le Bouddha résidait à Śrāvasti, dans le bois de Jeta, au parc d'Anāthapindada, il disait aux bhikṣu: Il faut distinguer ces deux vues: la vue d'existence et celle de l'inexistence. Il y a des ascètes (śramaṇa) et des brahmanes (brāhmaṇa) qui se basent sur ces deux vues pour


apprendre, pour réciter, pour pratiquer sans comprendre la réalité des choses. Ils ne sont pas de vrais ascètes ni de vrais brahmanes, puis qu'ils violent, sans le savoir, le règlement de leur doctrine (dharma). Grâce aux pratiques dirigées, ils parviennent à un certain degré de pureté et de bonheur et ils s'y accrochent. Il y a des ascètes et des brahmanes qui se basent sur ces deux vues pour apprendre, pour réciter, pour pratiquer, puis ils se débarrassent de ces deux vues pour percevoir la réalité des choses. Ceux-ci sont de vrais ascètes et de vrais brahmanes qui peuvent se libérer totalement du cycle de la vie et de la mort pour parvenir à la perfection finale. C'est pourquoi, ô bhikṣu! il ne faut pas vous accrocher à ces deux vues pour apprendre, pour réciter, pour pratiquer. Vous devez apprendre sérieusement cela. — Ayant entendu ces paroles du Bouddha, les bhikṣu étaient heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.


Qu'est-ce que la vue de l'existence? C'est la vue de l'existence [du monde] du désir (kāmadhātu), c'est la vue de l'existence [du monde] de la forme (rūpadhātu) et [du monde] sans forme (ārūpyadhātu). Quels sont ces désirs? Ce sont les désirs de voir ce qui est beau, d'entendre ce qui est harmonieux, de sentir ce qui est parfumé, de goûter ce qui est bon, de toucher ce qui est agréable, de distinguer [le bon du mauvais, le bien du mal, l'existence de l'inexistence].

Qu'est-ce que la vue de l'inexistence? C'est la vue . . . que (1) il y a de la permanence, (2) l'impermanence, (3) il y a de l'interruption, (4) la continuité, (5) le fini, (6) l'infini, (7) la corporité, (8) la non-corporité, (9) la vie [individuelle] (jīvita), (10), pas de vie [individuelle], (11) il y a un corps autre et (12) une vie [individuelle] autre. Ces 62 vues s'appellent 'la vue de l'inexistence, c'est-à-dire des vues fausses.

C'est pourquoi, ô bhikṣu! il faut vous débarrasser de ces

4 — En effet, dans ce passage, 12 vues seules sont énumérées, et il est difficile de dire comment on en a arrivé à 62. Une allusion indirecte est donnée par Soothill, Hodous, Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms, p. 132: ‘. . . The sixty-two . . . views, of which three groups are given: The . . . takes each of the five skandhas under four considerations . . . of time, considered as time past, whether each of the five has had permanence, impermanence, both, neither, 5 X 4 = 20; again as to their space, or extension, considered as present time, whether each is finite, infinite, both, neither = 20; again as to their destination. i.e. future, as to whether each goes on, or does not, both, neither (e.g. continued personality) = 20, or in all 60; add the two ideas whether body and mind are a unity or different = 62 . . . ’.


deux vues. Vous devez apprendre sérieusement cela.

Ayant entendu ces paroles du Bouddha, les bhikṣu étaient heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.


4. ‘Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois quand le Bouddha résidait à Śrāvasti..., il disait au bhikṣu: “Il y a deux sortes de richesses: la richesse de la vérité (dharma) et la richesse matérielle. La meilleure c’est la richesse de la vérité. C’est pourquoi, ô bhikṣu, il faut faire des efforts en ce qui concerne votre richesse de la vérité et non pas en ce qui concerne votre richesse matérielle. Vous devez apprendre sérieusement cela. — Ayant entendu ces paroles du Bouddha, les bhikṣu étaient heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.

5. ‘Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois quand le Bouddha résidait à Śrāvasti..., il disait aux bhikṣu: “Un borné a souvent ces deux comportements: soit il persiste à faire ce dont il est incapable, soit il s’ennuie et abandonne ce qu’il peut réaliser. Un sage a aussi deux comportements: il n’entreprend jamais des choses irréalisables, il n’abandonne jamais un projet en cours de réalisation. C’est pourquoi, ô bhikṣu! il faut avoir les comportements du sage et non pas ceux du borné. Vous devez apprendre sérieusement cela. — Ayant entendu ces paroles du Bouddha, les bhikṣu étaient heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.


7. ‘Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois quand le Bouddha résidait à Śrāvasti..., il disait aux bhikṣu: “Cf. Aṅguttara I, 92: dve ’me... bhoga...; Woodward, ibid.; Nyanatiloka, ibid.; Kausalyāya, ibid. Dans les textes bouddhiques chinois, l'idéogramme pour bhoga rend normalement karman ou vipāka, mais il veut dire aussi 'richesse' ce qui s'accord avec le pāli bhoga.


9. Cf. Aṅguttara I, 84: dve ’me bhikkhave būlā...; Woodward, pp.76-7; Nyanatiloka, p.84; Kausalyāya, p.85 et suiv.
10. 'Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois quand le Bouddha résidait à Śrāvastī... il disait aux bhikkhu: Il y a deux moyens d'avoir la vue juste: soit écouter l'enseignement, soit méditer. Vous devez apprendre sérieusement cela. Ayant entendu ces paroles du Bouddha, les bhikkhu étaient heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.'

Partie 16
L'extinction du feu

1. 'Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois quand le Bouddha résidait à Śrāvasti, dans le bois de Jeta, au parc d'Anāthapindada, le vénérable Nanda, en se promenant dans le parc calme [nommé] 'Éclat de l'éléphant' de la citadelle de Śrāvasti, pensait: Il est vraiment très difficile pour un homme de rencontrer le Tathāgata en ce monde. Il faut des centaines de milliers...

11 Quant à l'histoire de Nanda, le notes au bas de la page dans l'édition du Taishō se reportent aux Theragāthā, vv.279–82, et les mêmes stances sont signalées par G.P. Malalasekera, Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names II, p.17 dans son article sur '1. Nandaka (v.l. Nanda) Thera. — A householder of Savatthi. Having entered the Order after hearing a sermon of the Buddha, he developed insight and soon attained arahantship... The Theragāthā contains several verses uttered by him to a woman to whom he was once married. She met him begging alms in Savatthi and smiled to him with sinful heart...'.

d’années pour voir son apparition. C’est rarissime. C’est comme l’éclosion de la fleur de l’udumbara12. Il est aussi très difficile de voir une personne qui n’a plus aucun attachement, aucun désir, aucune passion, qui a atteint le Nirvāṇa.

En ce moment, le devaputra Māra (Kāmadeva), ayant perçu la pensée du vénérable Nanda, s’envola vers Sundari13, une femme du clan Śākya, tourna en ronde dans le ciel en chantant cette épgramme:

Aujourd’hui vous devez vous réjouir,
Vous faire belle pour goûter les cinq jouissances des sens14.
Car Nanda vient de quitter l’ordre religieux,
Il viendra s’amuser avec vous.

Sundari, une femme du clan Śākya, se réjouit à cette nouvelle. Elle s’empressa de porter de beaux vêtements, de se maquiller radieusement, de décorer luxueusement toutes les pièces, de faire venir de bons musiciens. Elle essayait de recréer la bonne ambiance préférée de Nanda.

Le roi Prasenajit, en allant à la salle de conférence pour une réunion, entendit dire que le vénérable Nanda eut quitté l’ordre religieux pour reprendre ses vêtements et sa carrière civile, et qu’il y avait un devoir qui était venu annconer la nouvelle à Sundari, [ex-]épouse [de Nanda]. Le roi fut tellement triste. Il monta sur son éléphant blanc pour aller voir le vénérable Nanda au parc nommé ‘Éclat de l’éléphant’ entouré d’un fossé. Il vint au devant du vénérable Nanda, se prosterna à ses pieds, puis


Ici la tradition de l’EA semble être le résultat de quelque désordre dans les légendes de Nandaka, du demi-frère du Bouddha, peut-être de Janapadakalayanī la femme du dernier, ainsi que de sa soeur Sundari–Nanda. Car, à la fin de cette partie de l’EA, Le Bouddha déclare que Nanda est le premier parmi ses disciples en ce qui concerne le maitrīse de soi, ce qui s’accord avec l’Aṅguttara I, 25: indriyesu-guttadvārānam, prononcé en égard à Nanda le demi-frère. D’ailleurs, Nandaka ou Nanda, auquel se rapportent les

stances du Theragāthā citées ci-dessus, est déclaré le premier parmi les exhortateurs des nonnes (Aṅguttara, ibid.). En outre, dans le Saundarananda d’Asvaghosa Janapadakalyani est appelée Sundari.

14 C.-à-d ‘the five desires, arising from the objects of the five senses, things seen, heard, smelt, tasted or touched’ (Soothill, Hodous, p.121). Voir aussi — avec des références — Nyanatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary, p.74 (s.v. kāma, kāma-guna).
s'assit à ses côtés. Le vénérable Nanda lui demanda: Pourquoi Sa Majesté est-elle venue ici avec une mine aussi triste? A-t-elle besoin de moi?

— Le roi Prasenajit répondit: En allant à la salle de conférence pour une réunion, j'ai entendu dire que vous avez quitté l'ordre religieux pour retourner à la vie mondaine. C'est pourquoi je suis venu ici pour voir si c'est vrai.

— Nanda dit en souriant: Pourquoi Sa Majesté croit-il à la rumeur? Sa Majesté n'a-t-elle pas entendu le Tathāgata parler de moi? Il a dit que j'ai éliminé toutes les passions, que je n'ai plus de renaissances, que j'ai mis fin à la conduite de brahma, que j'ai fait ce qu'il y avait à faire, que je ne retourne plus jamais en embryon. Il a dit que je connais la Vérité [suprême], que je suis devenu arhat, que mon esprit est libéré totalement.

— Le roi répondit: Je n'ai pas entendu le Tathāgata dire que le bhikṣu Nanda n'a plus de renaissances, est devenu arhat, a son esprit libéré totalement. Au contraire j'ai entendu qu'un deva est venu prévenir Sundārī, la femme du clan Śākya, de votre retour. C'est pourquoi Sundārī, [votre ex-épouse], a fait décorer les salles, jouer de la musique, elle s'est habillée de beaux vêtements pour vous accueillir. C'est parce que j'ai entendu cela que je suis venu ici toute de suite.

— Le vénérable Nanda dit: Sa Majesté n'a pas vu de ses propres yeux, n'est pas sûre de ce qu'on dit, pourquoi a-t-elle prononcé ces paroles? Les ascètes et les brahmanes aiment tous le bonheur, la joie du détachement, la joie des vœux accomplis, la joie de Nirvāṇa; n'ont-ils pas constaté le danger de la fournaise du désir sexuel. Il serait illogique [qu'ils puissent affirmer autre chose]! L'objet du désir sexuel n'est qu'un squelette caché, qu'un amas de chair, qu'une lame de couteau réouverte de miel. Pourquoi désire-t-on un petit intérêt qui apportera un très grand malheur? C'est comme une branche cassée par ses fruits abondants; c'est comme un emprunt qu'on doit rembourser bientôt; c'est comme une forêt d'épées, un poison, des fleurs et des fruits toxiques. Voilà ce qui est le désir sexuel. Celui qui a encore la passion sexuelle, qui ne considère pas le désir sexuel comme une fournaise ou comme un fruit toxique, ne pourra jamais traverser ni le courant des passions, ni le courant des préjugés [lit. 'vues'], ni le courant de l'ignorance. Et celui qui ne traverse pas encore le courant des passions, le courant des préjugés et le courant de l'ignorance, ne pourra jamais accéder au Nirvāṇa proprement dit. Sa Majesté doit savoir que les ascètes et les brahmanes ont compris et recherchent la joie du détachement, la joie des vœux accomplis, la joie du Nirvāṇa. Ils ont compris que le désir sexuel est comme une fournaise, et que son objet n'est qu'un squelette caché, qu'un amas de chair, qu'une lame de couteau réouverte de miel, qu'une branche cassée par ses fruits abondants. Qu'un emprunt qu'on doit rembourser bientôt, qu'une épée, qu'un poison. Ils ont constaté cela clairement, ils ont compris à fond le danger, le feu du désir sexuel est éteint, ils ont traversé le courant des passions, le courant des préjugés, le courant de l'ignorance. Tout cela est certain. Et après ils arriveront au Nirvāṇa proprement dit. Pourquoi Sa Majesté a-t-elle prononcé ces paroles? Ó Sa Majesté! sachez que je suis devenu arhat, que je n'ai plus de renaissances, que j'ai mis fin à la conduite de brahma, que j'ai fait ce qu'il y avait à faire, que je ne retournera plus jamais en embryon, que mon esprit est complètement libéré.

Ayant entendu cela, le roi Prasenajit se réjouit, le coeur
plein de bonté, il dit au vénérable Nanda: Je n'ai plus de doute. Tout est clair. Je sais maintenant que vous êtes devenu arhat. Je dois m'excuser pour retourner à mes nombreuses occupations pour mon pays.

— Nanda dit: Il faut trouver du temps pour vous occuper du pays.

Le roi Prasenajit se leva, se prosterna aux pieds de Nanda et quitta le lieu. Un instant après le départ du roi, Māra fit son apparition dans le ciel et s'adressa à Nanda par ce poème:

Le visage de votre adorable épouse est comme la lune,
De l'or, de l'argent, un corps couvert de diamants:
Sa beauté est vraiment inoubliable.
Il y a toujours les cinq jouissances des sens à gouter\textsuperscript{14};
Le chant, la batterie, la danse
Et sa voix douce et harmonieuse
Ont le pouvoir de chasser la tristesse et les soucis
Et d'apporter la joie dans cette forêt.

Le vénérable Nanda, sachant que Māra voulait le perturber, répondit:

Jadis je pensais ainsi:
Le plaisir sexuel n'était jamais suffisant,
J'étais ligoté par mes passions,
J'ignorais la vieillesse, la maladie, la mort.
Aujourd'hui j'ai traversé l'océan des passions,
Je suis pur et immunisé,
Je sais que l'honneur est aussi souffrance,
Que seul le Dharma est la joie éternelle;

Je ne suis plus touché par l'amour humain
Ni par le désir sexuel, la colère, l'ignorance,
Je ne pratique plus les habitudes mondiales;
Le borné doit savoir cela.

Māra, après avoir entendu ces mots, fut déçu et disparut.

Quand les bhikṣu rapportèrent cette histoire au Bienheureux, celui-ci leur dit: Pour la maîtrise des sens le bhikṣu Nanda est le meilleur des bhikṣu; le bhikṣu Nanda est libre de l'amour, de la haine et de l'erreur. C'est pourquoi il est devenu arhat. Parmi mes disciples le bhikṣu Nanda est le meilleur dans la maîtrise des sens. — Ayant entendu ces paroles du Bouddha, les bhikṣu étaient heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.

2. Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois quand le Bouddha résidait à Śrāvasti, dans le bois de Jeta, au parc d'Anāthapindada, il disait au bhikṣu: \textsuperscript{15}Il y a deux conditions de Nirvāṇa. Quelles sont ces deux? La condition de Nirvāṇa avec la base toujours restante et celle sans base. De quelle sorte est la condition de Nirvāṇa qui a la base toujours restante? Ici le bhikṣu a détruit les cinq entraves qui appartiennent à ce bas monde\textsuperscript{16}, s'approcha du


\textsuperscript{16} C-à-d. les 5 orambhāgiya, avarabhāgiya, une épithète des 5 premiers sanyojana (PTS Dictionary, 170): sakkāyadīṭṭhi, vicikicchā, silabbataparāmāsa.
Nirvāṇa final (parinirvāṇa) et ne retournera plus en ce monde après sa mort. C’est ce qui s’appelle la condition de Nirvāṇa avec la base toujours restante. Et de quelle sorte est la condition de Nirvāṇa sans base? C’est comme ceci: Un bhikṣu a vaincu les mauvaises influences (imputrées, āsrava) une fois pour toutes; il a réalisé la délivrance mentale (cetovimukti) et la délivrance par la sagesse (prajñāvimukti). Il a lui-même personnellement atteint la maîtrise parfaite: détruite est la naissance et la mort, mise à sa fin est la conduite de brahma; il n’y aura plus d’être — ceci il sait vraiment. C’est ce qui s’appelle la condition de Nirvāṇa sans base. Donc, ô bhikṣu, vous devez employer les moyens salvifiqnes pour arriver à la condition de Nirvāṇa sans base. C’est ainsi, ô bhikṣu, qu’il faut vous appliquer. — Ayant entendu ces paroles du Bouddha, les bhikṣus étaient heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.’

Traduit en français par Minh-Thien Trần-Huu-Danh

Notes par les rédacteurs adjoints

3. The Max Müller Bhavan, New Delhi, presented an exhibition (between 3-14 Feb 1992) of publications on the theme ‘Studying India. Indology and South Asian Studies in Germany’. The most significant literary achievements were Böhtlingk and Roth’s Sanskrit Wörterbuch and the Sacred Books of the East which were displayed by the publishers, Motilal Banarsidass (who have, incidentally, recently reproduced the original 30 volumes of the Bibliotheca Buddhica).

4. Under the patronage of H.H. the Dalai Lama and organised by the Asian Art Museum, San Francisco, and Tibet House, New York, the Royal Academy of Arts is showing a magnificent collection of thangkas and artefacts to illustrate ‘Wisdom and Compassion: The Sacred Art of Tibet’, held at Burlington House, Piccadilly (London), from 18 Sept to 13 Dec 1992. This monumental exhibition of Tibetan art dating from the ninth century to the present day contains 160 rare examples of paintings, sculptures and tapestries which have been assembled from collections in North America, Europe and the Russian Commonwealth of Independent States. A large proportion of the works on loan are from the outstanding collection at the Hermitage, St Petersburg. Undoubtedly the highlight of the exhibition is the creation of multi-coloured sand mandalas of the Kalacakra and of Avalokiteśvara by monk-artists.

The curators of the exhibition, Robert A.F. Thurman (Columbia University, New York) and Marylin Rhie (Smith College, Mass.) have written the catalogue as well as contributing the first two of a series of lunchtime lectures in conjunction with the exhibition. Other speakers include Sogyal Rinpoche, Zara Fleming and Stephen Batchelor. Evening discussions on contemporary issues affecting Tibet (co-hosted by the Tibet Support Group, UK, and the Royal Academy) will be held in October and November, whilst students of Sogyal Rinpoche will conduct evening sessions on the fundamentals of the Vajrayāna. There will also be a series of films depicting different aspects of Tibetan culture as well as (single) performances of Tibetan singing bowls and the Performing Arts of Mongolia — Dance and Music.

Conferences

1. A symposium on ‘The Language of Sanskrit Buddhist Texts’ was held at the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath, between 1-5 Oct 1991. We have no details beyond the fact that the following participants were scheduled to present papers: K. Bhattacharya (Paris), S. Dietz (Berlin), K.C. Lang (Virginia), L. Mall (Tartu), A. Mette (Münster), E. Steinkellner (Vienna), P.C. Verhagen (Leiden) and A. Wayman (Columbia, N.Y.).

2. The Indian Gandhi National Centre for the Arts and Architectural Survey of India organised a seminar on ‘The Cave Art of India and China’ at the National Museum, New Delhi, between 25-27 Nov 1991. Indian scholars spoke on subjects that included the art of Ajanṭa and Mathura and the grottoes at Tun-huang.

3. In collaboration with learned societies in Sweden and Japan, the Institute of Asian Studies, Madras, sponsored an international seminar from 25 to 31 May 1992 to discuss all aspects of Tamil Buddhism. This field of study has been somewhat neglected and only a few full-length works have appeared, e.g. D.C. Ahir, Buddhism in South India (Delhi 1992),

4. A symposium at Emmanuel College, Cambridge, between 3-5 July 1992 discussed ‘Buddhism and Modern Western Thought’. Organised by Dr John Crook (Dept. of Psychology, Bristol University), the majority of participants came from Cambridge, but a promised report of the proceedings has not been forthcoming.

5. International Association for Tibetan Studies, 6th International Conference held at Fageråsen, Norway, 21-28 August 1992. — There could scarcely have been a more appropriate setting for a Tibetological conference. Some 200 participants assembled at a hotel next to a lake in one of the most beautiful holiday regions of Norway. Such a large conference, convened with unfailing efficiency, good humour and charm by Prof. Per Kvaerne, hosted and supported financially by the Instituttet for Sammenlignende Kulturforskning (Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture). Olso, brought together many of the leading specialists from East and West, including Tibetan delegates from inside and outside Tibet. Because so many papers were scheduled there were both plenary and parallel sessions. Parallel sessions were offered in Philosophy, Religion, Medicine and Astrology, Archaeology and Art, History, Literature, Social Studies, Art and Artefacts, Anthropology, Ancient Tibet, Linguistics, Ecology and Geography, as well as workshops on Pilgrimage and Sacred Geography, and the Tibetan Canon. Most papers were in English, although some were in French, German and Tibetan, and all should soon be published by the above-mentioned Instituttet (Drammensveien 78, N-0271 Oslo). Parallel sessions were inevitable, although if one can be a little critical there was a certain frustration, given the many excellent papers, in having to choose for example between a paper in philosophy and one in religion. Because the conference lasted for a full week, however, it was particularly relaxed, and the various cultural events — a reception by the mayor and local community, folk music and dancing, a guided tour of the local Folk Museum, an opportunity to attend the evening service in a wonderful old wooden church and, for the hardy, a strenuous walk up a mountain — were very much appreciated and really did serve to introduce a stunning area of Norway where perhaps there really are trolls under every bridge and now, maybe, dākinīs behind every tree! The next conference of the Association will be in Graz, Austria, at the invitation of Prof. Ernst Steinkellner.

(Paul Williams)

6. The 7th Shin Conference Europe was held at the European branch of the Bukkyō Dendo Kyokai in Düsseldorf between 2-5 Sept 1992. The proceedings were presided over by the Patron of the European Shin Buddhist communities, Kōshō Ohtani, the Zenmonshū at the Hompa Hongwanji, Tokyo. Although the main theme was ‘European Shin Buddhism or Shin Buddhism in Europe?’, other topics for discussion included ‘Relations with other Buddhist denominations’, ‘Propagation of Shin Buddhism in Europe’ and ‘Translation of Shin texts into European languages’.

7. ‘Unity in Diversity — Buddhism in Europe’ was the theme of the 4th Congress of the European Buddhist Union which convened at the Werner-Seelenbinder-Halle, Berlin (between
24-27 Sept 1992) under the auspices of the Deutsche Buddhistsche Union. The main speakers and their topics comprised: Sogyal Rinpoche, 'Spirituality in Everyday Life', Rev. Daishin Morgan, 'Death and Impermanence from a Buddhist Perspective', Ven. Dr Rewata Dhamma, 'Buddhism and Human Rights', Shamar Rinpoche, 'Discovering the True Nature of the Mind, independent of spiritual tradition and nationality', Sangharakshita, 'The Integration of Buddhism into Western Society', Rōshi Gesshin Prabhassa Dharma, 'Ultimate Reality and Being Human', Thich Nhat Hanh, 'Peace in Every Step' and Ayya Khemā, 'The Heart of Buddhist Meditation'. Sylvia Wetzel chaired a podium discussion on 'Buddhism in the West', whilst an open forum was held on the theme 'Emptiness and Compassion — the common foundation of the different Buddhist traditions'. Information and literature stalls were in evidence together with an exhibition on Buddhist art of Europe. The AGM of the EBU concluded the proceedings.


Obituaries

N. N. Poppe (8 August 1897 - October? 1991)

The outstanding Mongolian scholar of this century, Nicholas Poppe, was born in Chefoo (now Yentai) in Shantung province, China. His father was Secretary at the Russian Consulate, but the family returned to St Petersburg immediately after the Boxer rebellion. The son enrolled at the capital's university in 1916 to study medicine but the following year transferred to the Department of Oriental Languages and graduated in 1922. His professors included Barthold, Oldenburg, Stcherbatsky and Vladimirtsov but, for political reasons, he was unable to gain his doctorate until 1933.

After fulfilling various teaching positions he became first Lecturer in then Professor of Mongolian at the Institute of Oriental Languages and simultaneously a professor at Leningrad University in 1925. Following Vladimirtsov's death in 1931 he was appointed Director of the Mongolian section of the Institute of Oriental Studies which had been reorganised and restaffed after the political purge two years earlier. He remained in this position until the German invasion in June 1941. In the interim he had undertaken fieldwork in Mongolia between 1926-29 and stayed amongst the Buryats during the years 1928-32, 1936 and 1940-1. Fortunately, he and his family were spending their summer vacation in the Caucasus and, realising that Leningrad would be surrounded and besieged, he successfully applied for a teaching assignment in Elista, the capital of the Kalmyk ASSR. A year later he moved to the Caucasian city of Mikoyanshahar which was captured by the Germans in August 1942. This event enabled him, already disillusioned with the Soviet régime's treatment of its Buddhist subjects, to travel to Germany and
begin a new life in the West.
He worked at Berlin University until the end of the War. The British Socialist government having vetoed his acceptance by Cambridge, the University of Washington, Seattle, invited him in 1949 to occupy the equivalent Chair of Mongolian Philology and Uralo-Altaic Linguistics which he had filled at Leningrad. He retired in 1968 but continued his scholarly activities from his home in Seattle until his death. (His first wife died from multiple sclerosis in 1949 and his second wife also predeceased him, in 1979, a year after his elder son, Valerian, succumbed to cancer.)


On the occasion of his 60th birthday, a Festschrift was presented to Poppe under the title Studia Altaica (Wiesbaden 1957); CAJ XXI (1977) was similarly dedicated to him and included U.Sh. Baitchura ‘Nicholas N. Poppe as the greatest Russian philologist-orientalist of our time’, whilst W. Heissig and K. Sagaster edited Gedanke und Wirkung (Wiesbaden 1989) as a 90th birthday felicitation volume. [See also Arista M. Cirtautas, Nicholas Poppe: a bibliography of publications from 1924-77 (Seattle 1977) and Poppe’s autobiography, Reminiscences (ed. H.G. Schwarz, Western Washington University, Bellingham 1983)].

P. V. Bapat (12 June 1894 - 4 November 1991)
The doyen of Buddhist studies in India, Purushottam Vishvanath
Bapat, died in Pune where he headed the University's Department of Pāli. Born in Sangli (southern Maharashtra), he enrolled at Fergusson College, Pune, in 1912 at the same time that Dharmanand Kosambi was appointed to the Chair of Pāli. Bapat was among a handful who offered Pāli as a principal subject at postgraduate level and he obtained an M.A. from Bombay University in 1919. He returned to his alma mater to teach Pāli but, in 1929, he was invited by Harvard to prepare an English translation of the Visuddhimagga (which still awaits publication!), the text of which was romanised by H.C. Warren and Kosambi and appeared in the Harvard Oriental Series, 1950 (repr. Delhi 1989). Bapat mastered Tibetan and Chinese at Harvard, gained his doctorate in 1932 and returned to Fergusson College. Between 1945-48 he was engaged in research at Viśvabharatī University, Šantiniketan, and in 1953, on behalf of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, went on a study tour to survey the state of Buddhism in South-East Asia. Having retired from his alma mater in 1954, three years later he was invited by the University of Delhi to organise the first Department of Buddhist Studies in India, a move which was timed to coincide with Buddha Jayanti Year. Under his aegis, Tibetan and Chinese studies were upgraded to doctoral degree standards. He retired in 1960 to resume private academic work but in view of his international prestige and contributions of repute he was, in 1974, honoured with the presidency of the 27th session of the All-India Oriental Conference at Kurukshetra University.

Apart from writing well over 100 articles, Bapat edited the Dhammapada (1925), the Suttanipāta (1924), Dhammasangīni (1940), Atthasālīni (1942), Pāli Saṅgaha (1968), Vimuktimārga Dhutaṅga-nirdeśa (1964) and Vinayasūtra I with Guṇaprabha's vṛtti (1982); he translated the Arthapadasūtra (Chinese ed. of Aṭṭhakavadagga, 1950) and Shan-Chien-P’i-P’o-Sha (Chinese ed. of Samantapāsādikā, 1971); he wrote Vimuttimagga and Visuddhimagga, A Comparative Study (1971), and edited 2500 Years of Buddhism (1956, 1987). See also his Felicitation Volume, Anala Prajñā. Aspects of Buddhist Studies, ed. N.H. Samtani and H.S. Prasad, Delhi 1989.
CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS TO BSR 9, 2

1 — NOTES ON THE UDĀNA, by J.D. Ireland:
p.143, l.10: for ‘Their origin’ read ‘The tradition of their origin’.
p.144, l.10: for ‘complexion’ read ‘colour’.
p.146, l.6: for Mahādeva’ read Mādhava.

2 — Review of Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden:
p.211, l.6: for ‘Mulasarvavastivāda’ read ‘Mulasarvavastivāda’.
p.212, l.3: for DhpA’ read ‘Dhp-a’.
p.212, n.4, l.1: for ‘Untersuchungen der . . .’ read ‘Untersuchungen zur . . .’.
p.213, ll.14-15: for ‘Those, who do not believe this fact,’ read ‘Those, who do not perceive . . .’.

3 — Obituaries:

Guidelines for Contributors

We welcome contributions to this journal, particularly in the field of early mainstream Buddhism and especially Buddhism in Central Asia except that, since they are adequately covered in other journals, Tibetan studies per se should be avoided.

1. Since this journal is produced by offset-litho, which necessitates the retyping of contributions after submission (and editing), it would be appreciated if contributions are typed double-spaced. For the same reason, proofs are not available for checking by contributors, but a copy of the final typescript can be supplied if specifically requested.

2. Only titles of published books and technical terms need be italicised (or underlined), with the exception of those words which have become part of the English language, e.g. Dharma, dharmas, kamma/karma, Nirvāṇa, sūtra/sutta, etc.

3. Copyright will automatically be vested in this journal, unless a contributor stipulates otherwise.

4. Items not accepted for publication will not be returned unless an SAE or international postal coupons are enclosed.

5. Contributors of articles will be entitled to twenty-five offprints.

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As the reputation of the Pali Text Society grew rapidly after its foundation in 1881, works which had not been originally published by the Society, e.g. editions of the Vinaya-piṭaka, the Jātakaṭṭhaṇaṇāṇa and the Milindapañha, were entrusted to the Society for reprinting, and they consequently appeared under its imprint. In like manner, the Sacred Books of the Buddhists series, started by Max Müller in 1895, came under the Society’s wing not long after.

The existence of this series has enabled the PTS to publish works which, although not in Pāli, are of great importance for the study of Buddhism. Following the precedent set by the first volume in the series — the Jātakamāla — the Society has included in this series in recent years translations of a number of Sanskrit texts, including the Mahāvastu and the Suvarṇabhūṣottamaṇaṣṭra, an edition and translation of the Mañciṭṭāvadāna, and an English translation of Étienne Lamotte’s French rendering of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa.

The translation of the Suvarṇabhūṣottamaṇaṣṭra, an important Mahāyāna text, made by Prof. R.E. Emmerick and published under the title The Sūtra of Golden Light, first appeared in 1970. It proved popular with readers and, on going out of print, had to be reprinted in 1979. Emmerick informed the Society that the translation was capable of improvement and so, when it went out of print again, it was agreed to publish a second, revised edition. To reduce costs Emmerick himself arranged for
the first edition to be scanned electronically, so that the revision could be made on a word processor. The output from this appeared in camera-ready form, from which this new edition has been printed.

An enlarged Preface by Emmerick explains the changes which have been made to the translation. It was originally made as a working tool to support his research on the fragmentary Khotanese version of the Suvarṇabhūṣottamasūtra, and the first edition contained an Appendix listing all the Khotanese fragments which had been identified at that time. Since then P.O. Skjærvø has published an edition of all the known fragments, and the Appendix therefore contains only an improved translation of the introduction to the Khotanese version, in which the Khotanese translator gives his reasons for undertaking the task. The Introduction is revised to take account of Skjærvø’s discoveries.

Besides the improvements to the translation, the Bibliography has been brought up to date, and the footnotes have been expanded to include more references to the original Sanskrit and also to the Tibetan and Khotanese versions where they shed light on the meaning. There are also minor changes of format, e.g. the thirty medicaments on p.47 are now retained in their Sanskrit form in the translation, while their English names and their probable botanical identifications appear in a long footnote (n.82).

It is gratifying to note that the corrections and improvements inserted into this second edition have taken account of comments made in reviews of the first edition, and also of information and suggestions contained in other recent publications.

K. R. Norman


In 1880, the year before he founded the Pali Text Society, T.W. Rhys Davids published what was intended to be the first volume of a translation of the whole of Faussell’s edition of the Jātakaṭṭhavānaṇā. The volume contained a long Introduction on the Birth-story genre, and the translation of the Nidānakathā and the first forty Jātakas.

The Nidānakathā of the Jātakaṭṭhakathā serves as an introduction to the text of the Jātakas contained in that work. In spite of the fact that it is meant as a preface to the Jātakas, it bears all the characteristics of an independent work. Under the three divisions Dūre, Avidūre and Santike Nidāna, it deals with the story of Gotama Buddha from his existence as Sumedha up to the acceptance of the monastery of Jetavana. The Dūre Nidāna (‘Distant Epoch’) consists of two parts: one, the Story of Sumedha and the other, the Assurances he received under twenty-four Buddhas. The discussion of the Pāramitās (‘Perfections’) occupies an important place in the narrative. The Avidūre Nidāna (‘Intermediate Epoch’) narrates the incidents from the Bodhisatta’s departure from the Tusita heaven up to his attainment of Enlightenment. The Santike Nidāna (‘Recent Epoch’) purports to give ‘the numerous instances which make reference to his stay at various places’, but stops short with the Buddha’s visit to Sāvatthi where Anāthapiṇḍika built for him the Jetavana monastery.

Rhys Davids never continued his translation. The task of translating the Jātaka was taken up by a team of scholars under the editorship of Prof. E.B. Cowell, and it was completed in six volumes between 1895 and 1907. In the preface (p.xi) to VolI
Cowell stated, 'As [the Nidāna-kathā] has no direct connexion with the rest of the work, we have omitted it in our translation, which commences with the first Birth-story'.

In these circumstances, Mrs Rhys Davids revised and corrected the translation of the Nidānakathā and published a second edition in 1928, after her husband's death, with the original Introduction but without the translation of the forty Jātakas. That work has long been out of print and, consequently, for a long period of time no English translation of the Nidānakathā has been available. The Council of the PTS decided that it was time to rectify this situation and they considered the possibility of reprinting Mrs Rhys Davids' revised version. While they were still assessing the changes needed to bring the translation up to date, the work was reprinted in India. They then heard of an edition in Sinhalese script accompanied by an English translation and Introduction which N.A. Jayawickrama had published in Sri Lanka in 1951.

Prof. Jayawickrama very willingly gave permission for his translation to be reprinted. The present version contains a number of changes and additions to the translation and notes, all of which have either been made or approved by Jayawickrama. His original Introduction is included, and also the titles for different sections of the story which he had inserted. Numbers in square brackets refer to the pages of Fausbøll's edition; occasionally different readings are recorded in the footnotes. Dr Steven Collins has edited the work for publication and has provided a Preface. An index of names has been added, and the work now appears in the Society's paperback series.

K. R. Norman


The Pratyutpannasūtra (PraS) is quite a large Mahāyāna sūtra now usually listed as part of the Mahāsāṃnipāta collection. Only a short fragment of the Sanskrit text remains (reproduced, edited and translated in an appendix to the present volume), but there exists a number of Chinese versions, and a Tibetan text which was edited and published by Harrison in the same Monograph Series (Vol.I) in 1978 and forms a basis for the present translation. Harrison has given us a felicitous and accurate translation, with copious references and further translations from the Chinese versions, where these differ significantly from the Tibetan. The whole study serves as a model for research into an early Mahāyāna sūtra — and a useful present for those enthusiasts and devotees who still think we can talk of the sūtra text, and/or its being the authentic word of the Buddha. The PraS is of particular importance not only because of its contents but also because a version was translated into Chinese by Lokakṣema and is given a date in the Chinese catalogues of 24 November 179 C.E. This is exactly the same date as is given for Lokakṣema's translation of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, and it is partly on the basis of this date for the Aṣṭa that Lokakṣema's translation of that sūtra has been taken to provide evidence for some of the earliest strata of Mahāyāna beliefs and practices. The PraS thus gains particular importance for whatever evidence it too can provide for early (or fairly early) Mahāyāna. After all, 179 C.E. could
well have been during the lifetime of Nāgārjuna himself.

Some of the incidental information provided by the PraS is astonishing. The central practice of the sūtra — the samādhi which gives it its name — involves a meditation which is a type of buddhanusmṛti. The meditator fixes his or her mind on a chosen Buddha — Amitayus is mentioned — and remains in this state for hours, days or even weeks. He or she should not give rise to the notion of ‘self’ for up to three months, or sleep or even sit down for that period. Eventually the meditator has visions and enters the presence of the Buddha, or sees him in a dream, without needing to develop extra-normal powers. From the chosen Buddha teachings can be received, and the sūtra exhorts the meditator to transmit these teachings to others. Thus this sūtra gives the clearest evidence yet that some of the teachings of the Mahāyāna arose out of meditative visions. It devotes space to criticising those who deny the sūtra as not the authentic word of the Buddha and, on the model of other early Mahāyāna sūtras, the PraS repeatedly stresses the importance of writing the sūtra down, enshrining it and offering worship. The important role of the development of writing in providing a basis for early Mahāyāna sūtra cults has recently been stressed by Richard Gombrich (see his ‘How the Mahāyāna Began’ in T. Skorupski, ed., The Buddhist Forum I, London 1990, pp.21-30). The PraS also gives some explanation of the role of mind in visionary experience, hinting from this at an extrapolation to a general ontology and providing one of the earliest sources for the famous citramātrām idam yad tvādhatukam (p.42), although in general the PraS espouses an ontology of emptiness identical with that of the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras and akin to that of the Madhyamaka, and Harrison has argued that the sūtra intentionally set out to relate the so-called ‘philosophical’ teachings of the Prajñāpāramitā with those of Amitābha’s

‘devotionalism’. In addition we also find a verse which occurs elsewhere in the Lāṅkāvatārasūtra (sagātākam v.10) making the point, if it needs to be made, that what now has certain identity as a text may well at one time have represented a floating amorphous quantity of textual material, with mutual borrowing and influence. It puts into question, for example, a claim like that of Chr. Lindner (in his Nagarjuniana) that because Nāgārjuna uses one or two verses which look rather like verses in the present text of the Lāṅkāvatāra, so Nāgārjuna knew the Lāṅkāvatārasūtra. Among other fascinating material in the PraS is the claim that after the death of the Buddha this sūtra will be hidden in ‘a cave in the ground’ (saī khung), to be rediscovered during the final 500 years of the Last Days (Jap., mappo), when ‘the ruin of the True Dharma occurs’ (p.98). Thus although the sūtra offers evidence for the visionary origin of new doctrinal material, its account of its own appearance is that it is a re-appearance, rather as Nāgārjuna is said to have rediscovered the Prajñāpāramitā in the palaces of the nāgas at the bottom of the ocean. There is a difference, however. It is a traditional idea in Indo-Tibetan mythology that the nāgas guard precious objects in the depth of the ocean. Thus it is understandable that the appearance of the Prajñāpāramitā should be given a mythological basis in the nāga realms. I do not know that the same could be said for a hole (khung) in the ground, and the use of this motif may just be taken to indicate some sort of tradition of genuine discovery. Needless to say, as Harrison points out, here we have sūtra precedents for the much later Tibetan tradition of hidden and rediscovered teachings (gter ma), sometimes thought to be a Tibetan invention to justify the adoption of newly created doctrinal material.

The frequent mention of the Last Days in the sūtra also provides additional evidence for a suggestion that the early fol-
followers of Mahāyāna cults which were seen by others as inauth-
entic and worthy of scorn saw themselves as bulwarks against mor-
al, religious and cosmic decay. There were few of them —
the sūtra at one point refers to only five hundred taking any
notice of this sūtra (p.104) which, given the tendency to num-
erical hyperbole in Mahāyāna sūtras, suggests that the real number
may well have been many fewer. The scorn of others is
marked, they laugh at it, deride it and revile it (p.58). The compi-
lers of the sūtra place into the mouth of the Buddha a ringing
condemnation of these mockers, themselves contributing to the
Last Days feared by all good followers of the Dharma.

The five hundred who will accept this sūtra are said to be
reincarnations of the original five hundred lay bodhisattvas, led
by Bhadrāpāla, who requested the sūtra. Thus those who accept
this sūtra are in fact reincarnations of those who were present
when it was preached. The emphasis on the laity here has led
many (mainly Japanese) scholars to value the PraS for the
evidence it gives justifying their frequent contention (reflecting
the conditions of modern Japanese Buddhism) that the origins of
the Mahāyāna had something to do with organised activity by
the laity, sometimes in certain tension with the monastic
traditions, representing a lay/liberal reaction against those who
were monastic and conservative. Harrison too seems to see the
central role played in the PraS by five hundred lay bodhisattvas
as significant, and considers that the sūtra marks itself as
particularly significant for lay people (p.xxxvii). I have argued
elsewhere against any direct connection of the origin of the
Mahāyāna with the laity, using the PraS partly to support my
position (*Mahāyāna Buddhism: the doctrinal foundations,
London 1989, pp.20-6). I have argued that the use of lay figures
in Mahāyāna sutras represents a literary and rhetorical device,
and not a claim of social origin or concern. It seems to me

that, far from declaring itself a sūtra for the laity, the PraS
shows an expected primacy of monastic Buddhism. Thus the
sūtra gives pride of place and most words when talking about
the samādhi to those who are renunciates (p.79). Although it
does devote chapters to the conduct of the laity, both male and
female, they are given second place and it is made quite clear
that the ideal is renunciation. Those suitable for the
pratyutpattasamādhi should be celibate in body and mind
(p.135). The laity who wish to practice this samādhi should, of
course, be liberal in gifts — traditionally the main role of the
laity vis-à-vis the monastic establishment — and they ‘should
delight in going forth, and have their mind set on going forth’
(p.91), that is, eventually becoming members of the Sangha.
Elsewhere the sūtra says that those laity who follow this
teaching will have thoughts ‘always firmly set on leaving the
household-life’ (p.111). In a story concerning a merchant’s son
who heard of this samādhi, he immediately became a monk
(p.122; see also p.178). The sūtra allows that laity can practise
the pratyutpattasamādhi, which may be some move towards
accepting lay aspirations, but otherwise it is firmly traditional in
its treatment of the nature and role of lay Buddhists. Which, I
have argued, is as we should expect. *Pace* some modern
Japanese scholars (and Étienne Lamotte), there is simply no
evidence at all that the Mahāyāna was a radical and popular
social movement motivated by aspirations of equality with the
Sangha. In fact, at one point the sūtra implies that only
members of the Sangha should be instructed in this samādhi, for
it lists under qualities of suitable recipients that they ‘beg for
their food without angling for invitations’ (p.152), a point which
would seem to apply to monks and nuns alone. This point is
made explicit in the corresponding gāthā, which actually
mentions bhiksus. As I noted in my *Mahāyāna Buddhism*, the
five hundred lay bodhisattvas who will protect and propagate this sūtra in their reincarnations during the Last Days are not said to be laity in those reincarnations. Rather, it appears to be stated specifically that they are monks. They are said to have 'given up everything' (p.103), moreover they are subsequently described as 'five hundred bhikṣus' (p.105; see also p.129). Thus the PraS, far from providing evidence for a connection of the origins of the Mahāyāna with the laity, rather points strongly in the other direction. Given the association of the sūtra with five hundred lay followers, led by Bhadrāpāla, the fact that on examination the sūtra seems to be understandable in traditional monastic terms suggests support for the claim that the use of lay figures in the early Mahāyāna sūtras should be taken as a literary device and not indicating social reality.

The PraS is a wonderfully important and interesting sūtra which, while of little significance in the subsequent history of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, does seem to have been of considerable importance to Chinese Buddhist thought. This was initially because of its espousal by Hui-yūn (c.334-416), who made the topic of the pratyutpānasamādhi one of the themes of his famous correspondence with Kumārajīva, and its later adoption by the Pure Land tradition. Indeed, Harrison shows that one Chinese version of the sūtra was influenced textually by the development of Chinese Pure Land thought (p.253). The textual history of the sūtra in China is extremely complex, as is the relation of Chinese versions to the Tibetan and the Sanskrit fragment. In a series of lengthy appendices Harrison makes important and detailed attempts to unravel this textual history, and also offers some more recent reflections on editing Kanjur works, with corrections to his own published edition of the Tibetan texts. There is also a Sanskrit-Tibetan glossary, but regrettably no index.

This translation and study formed Paul Harrison's doctoral thesis at the Australian National University. In general scholars are sometimes too quick to publish doctoral theses, which stand as purely preliminary investigations. The long-awaited publication of this outstanding piece of scholarship is not such a case. It represents probably the most important Western work published on an early Mahāyāna sūtra in recent years, while there still remains nevertheless much more to be done, as Harrison is fully aware. The sūtra itself is essential reading for all interested in Mahāyāna thought, and the importance of this sūtra, as well as the meticulous scholarship involved in its study, provides models for the sort of detailed work which needs to be done and which will provide immense dividends in the future in our understanding of what is perhaps one of the most exciting and difficult areas of Buddhist scholarship — what exactly was really going on in the origins of the Mahāyāna? I am not always sure at the moment we are very clear what we are looking for, but perhaps such careful textual work as that under review is beginning to clarify for us what it is we are not looking for.

Paul Williams


From the editor's Preface we learn, inter alia, who has worked
on what parts of the present fascicle and that the material basis for the dictionary has been considerably expanded by drawing upon further publications that appeared between 1985 and 1989 (listed on p. II) and particularly upon H. Bechert (ed.), K. Wille (compiler), *Sanskriihandschriften aus den Turfanfunchen VI* (Stuttgart 1989). The Ms of fascicle 6 was handed over to the printer at the end of 1989, but it was only about a year later that the work appeared due to technical difficulties resulting from a change to a new printing process.

In his report¹ on the Göttingen Sanskrit dictionary (SWTF), M. Schmidt gave details regarding the addenda to be published after completion of the entries beginning with diphthongs. In the present work we now have the first part of corrigenda and addenda (pp.463-80), in which printing errors and other mistakes occurring in SWTF 1-5 are corrected and comments on entries are referred to, offered by SWTF reviewers. Moreover, new evidence collected over the years, new grammatical categories for certain entries, additional meanings of words etc. are found in the 'Nachträg'. When going through them, one realises that the Göttingen scholars, besides those mentioned on the title-page, J.-U. Hartmann and K. Wille, took great pains over re-examining Ms materials and giving fresh thought to difficult readings in extant editions. In this task they have proceeded with judiciousness and due caution.

As for textual material already included in the dictionary and new evidence or new source materials being drafted or to be utilised in future, in a paper entitled 'Investigations into Bud-


ekacara is a literalism and needs to be commented upon. At Dhammapada-Aṭṭhakathā II (Mahamutak, Bangkok 1946), p.138 (DhpA 1, 304, 13), it says: satrathacittāni pana ekato kannikabaddhāni ekakkhane uppajjijum samathāni nāma natthi, uppatikkāle eke kāma cittam uppa jātati, tasmiṁ nirodhe puna eke kāma eppa jātiti ekacaram nāma jātām. ‘It is indeed impossible for seven or eight [occurrences of] mind — as it were [a great variety of mind-objects, like stalks,] bound together into one sheaf-like mind] — to take place [all] within a single thought-moment. On taking place, each [occurrence of] mind does so [separately], and when one [occurrence of mind] has come to an end, again there is a [new occurrence of mind] separately — that is [the sense in which here] ekacara occurs'.

In the same sense Daw Mya Tin (The Dhammapada, Verses and Stories, Delhi 1990, p.15) adds a gloss to ekacara: ‘It means conceiving one thought at a time, i.e., one thought arises only when another ceases’.

To the best of my knowledge, the closest Sanskrit parallel to Dhp 37 and gloss on ekacara is at Abhidharmadīpa with Vi bhāṣāprabhāvṛtti (P.N. Jaini ed., Patna 1959), pp.78,77-79,2. Since only textual material pertaining to Abhidharma citations found in such works as the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Yaśomitra’s Kośavyākhyā or the Abhidharmadīpa commentary, is scheduled to be evaluated for the SWTF, I am quoting the relevant passage

from the Vi bhāṣāprabhāvṛtti in full: dūraŋgamam ekacaram aśārīram guhāśāyam / ye cittam (Ms: citta) damayisyantī te moksyaṃte mārabbandhanāḥ / . ekacaram yugapad dvitiyācittābhāvāt, ‘ekacara because there is no accompanying [occurrence of] mind at the same time’.

One might regard all these commentarial remarks on ekacara as just reflecting Theravāda or Kāśmīra Vi bhāṣāika scholasticism. On the contrary — the fact that the correct understanding of ekacara is a crucial point as far as general Buddhist practice is concerned can be gathered, for instance, from Mahasi Sayadaw’s Discourse on the Basic Practice of the Satipatthana Vipassana (Rangoon 1958), p.16:

“Eka-caram — usually occurs singly”. Mind usually occurs singly and one after the other in succession. Those, who do not believe this fact, believe that one mind exists in the course of life or existence. They do not know that new minds are always arising at every moment. They think that seeing, hearing etc. of the past and those of the present belong to one and the same mind, and that three or four acts of seeing, hearing, touching, knowing usually occur simultaneously. These are wrong views. In actual fact a single new mind arises at every moment. This can be perceived on gaining considerable practice.

Chiefly due to the fragmentary nature of many sources, in the SWTF there are a good many words whose meanings are difficult to ascertain and, thus, there is room for discussion as to how to render them. In the present work on p.466, for instance,


we have aksārthi (aksa-a')", 'Nüsse der Terminallä Bellerica oder eine Achse begehrnd oder verlangend (? . . . )'. This expression is found in the fragment 19 R2, catalogue No.412 of L. Sander, E. Waldschmidt, Sanskrit handschriften aus den Turfanfunden IV (Wiesbaden 1980), p.40. The fragment belonging to the Upālīsūtra of the Madhyamāgama runs: [sadyathā] purīdahā aksārthi aksā[ga](ves[I] i) tiṣṇam kuthāram adāya vanam pra(više). In a footnote, the editors quote various translations of the relevant passage at M I, 383, 26-7, thus I.B. Horner's: 'as a man, a gouger, having gone away, might return with removed eyeballs'. They also offer a translation of the passage from the Chinese version of the Upālīsūtra which, by and large, tallies with the Pāli text. The editors point out that the translator of the Chung-a-han-ching has taken aksa to mean aksi, 'eye', and they allege that it seems strange that someone enters the forest in search of 'eyes'. Additionally, it says in the above Madhyamāgama fragment that the person looking for 'eyes' has with him a sharp axe (which is mentioned neither in the Pāli nor in the Chinese versions). For the editors it is more likely that aksārthi means someone in search of wood for an axle-tree or a beam of a balance and that the loss of that person's eyes might be due to an 'accident(?)'. The problem with this interpretation is that it does not seem to fit in with the context in which ribaldry is employed. I think Horner's translation of the said passage is correct; aksa, to begin with, also means 'eye' (though in fine compositi), and so does aksan. As for the apparently strange custom of hunting for eyes (possibly with a sharp axe), one may recall certain

superstitious practices dating back to Stone Age man and not even altogether unknown towards the end of the 20th century, which consist in consuming organs taken from living beings as a sort of restorative medicine and which might also have consisted in making use of eyes in the preparation of a putative remedy for failing eye-sight.

Also to the 6th fascicle of the SWTF applies what reviewers have written about the preceding fascicles, viz, that the editor and compilers have admirably succeeded in handling such difficult materials as the largely fragmentary Buddhist texts from Central Asia for the making of an indispensable study tool and a worthy companion to the PTS Dictionary, the Critical Pāli Dictionary or Edgerton's works on Hybrid Buddhist Sanskrit.

Bhikkhu Pāsadika


Was the Buddha the first deconstructionalist? There is certainly a sense, as pointed out in this book, in which the doctrine of nairatmya, with its 'deconstruction' of the notion of a self can be seen as predating the insights and methods of contemporary philosophers such as Derrida and Foucault. But how far can this idea be pressed? This study of the Madhyamaka attempts to go all the way and offers a frank reinterpretation of the Madhyamaka as a school which rigorously applied the methods of deconstructionism to the ontological and epistemological problems of the seventh century.

5 See also ibid., p.465, under 5aṣa and aksa[galves[in]]
The book falls into two parts. Part One is a discussion entitled ‘Candrakīrti and Early Indian Mādhyamika’. Part Two, entitled ‘The Entry into the Middle Way’, contains the first complete English translation of the Mādhyamakāvatāra. Although the subject matter of both parts is related, they are not essentially dependent on one another and both are of value in their own sense. Having said that, it should be noted that the translation reflects the interpretation of the Mādhyamaka offered in Part One. It is this latter part which contains the author’s intriguing reflections on the Mādhyamaka method, which will be discussed below.

Part One is subdivided into five chapters, in the course of which previous approaches to the study of the Mādhyamaka (and presumably Oriental studies in general) are rejected in favour of an approach inspired by the work of modern deconstructionalist philosophers. The two dominant methodologies adopted so far are characterised as ‘philological’ and ‘proselytic’. The former, which has been the dominant model, relies upon the ‘rigorous application of text-critical methodology’, and eschews enquiry into philosophical or soteriological issues. When these issues are pursued it is linguistic, grammatical and other textual criteria which structure the search for meaning. For Huntington this is missing the wood for the trees. The alternative ‘proselytic’ method abandons the dry rigour of the first in the search for an intuitive grasp of the author’s meaning regardless of logical conflicts and inconsistencies in the ensuing interpretation. This would appear to be the approach of the uncritical devotee who parades the material ‘like a set of royal vestments brought from some foreign court (...) making a rather comical and pathetic spectacle out of what was once a truly majestic literature’ (p.137f).

These two extremes of ‘rigorous philological standards’ versus ‘the search for meaning’ both implicitly assume the existence of a tradition external to the researcher which can be accessed by ‘the proper application of an approved methodology’. Such assumptions of ‘objectivity’ and ‘method’ are anathema to the modern philosophical tradition which features names like Gadamer, James, Dewey, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Derrida and Foucault. Other names which pop up are Kuhn, Feyerbend and Rorty. Huntington’s claim, in essence, is that the work of these philosophers offers a middle way to approach the Mādhyamaka which avoids the extremes of the two main alternatives. Without throwing much away of the excellent textual work done so far, it is suggested that the time is now right for an appreciation of the Mādhyamaka project as neither philosophy nor mysticism but as a radically deconstructive form of spiritual life.

The goal of this form of life, like that of early Buddhism, is not to score philosophical points but to stop philosophising altogether. The Mādhyamikas are not engaging in philosophical disputation but simply trying ‘to change the subject’. The concept of emptiness is not in itself a philosophical position but a practical technique for the deconstruction of philosophy in favour of a way of life motivated by compassion. It is designed as a remedy for the inveterate tendency to seek behind appearances for the ground from which they arise and to cling to the philosophers’ totems of Reality, Truth, Reason, and the like. What exists is dependently originated, or in the modern way of speaking, ‘contextual’. There are no noumena, Kantian ‘things-in-themselves’, Lockean ‘essences’ or Vedāntic Brahman in which phenomena must be grounded. According to the author:

‘In Candrakīrti’s writing, the analysis of the Mādhyamika’s soteriological philosophy is presented as a revolutionary
deconstruction of all views and beliefs which seek justification through reference to a set of presuppositions discoverable à priori, regardless of how rational or virtuous or sublime...’ (p.117).

The above points are made in various ways in the first four chapters, leading up to chapter five which is especially thought-provoking. One particular strength is the author's constant awareness of the dual problem of approaching a paradoxical philosophy embedded in an alien culture. As well as mapping out the main scholarly approaches unconsciously adopted so far, he alludes to the sociological difficulties of making sense of a form of life such as the Madhyamaka in a culture which lacks the spiritual role models of traditional Indian society. No doubt links could be established with the work of Edward Said and other critics of ‘orientalism’, although his name does not appear in the bibliography. I am also surprised by the absence of any reference to Robert Magliola's 1984 essay on Derrida and the Madhyamaka.

The alternative approaches to Buddhism sketched out here strike me as artificial. It just does not seem to be the case that Western approaches to Buddhism have been characterised by dry-as-dust philology on the one hand, and credulous practitioners on the other. Westerners, from the great pioneers onwards, have shown a balanced interest in both the letter and the spirit of Buddhism: scholars have not ignored the philosophical teachings and practitioners tend to be well informed on doctrine and aware of the philosophical issues involved. Huntington himself is an example of an academic with, apparently, a deep personal interest in Buddhist spirituality, and he is by no means an exception in this respect. Anyway, what is so wrong with there being different approaches to a subject? Not all those interested in Buddhism wish to become scholar-yogins, nor should they. I do not really see why the Madhyamaka cannot be studied at a philosophical level, at a textual level, at the feet of a guru, or in a variety of other ways.

For all its topicality, Huntington's claim is not an original one. At the heart of his approach is the contention that the Madhyamaka has no philosophical position of its own, and its teachings are simply an antidote to views of all kinds. This issue has been debated among the Tibetan schools for many centuries. The main objection to it is that it leaves the Madhyamaka with nothing to say and turns the teaching of the masters into one great Zen kōan, whose only purpose is to stop philosophical debate. In other words, the Madhyamaka is a spiritual strategy rather than a philosophical school which believes it has something fundamental to assert about the nature of reality. Certainly the dGe lugs pa would not agree with this view, and one is puzzled about the absence of a disclaimer on the part of the co-author, Geshe Namgyal Wangchen, regarding the conclusions.

Given the author's clear interest in the practical side of Madhyamaka, it would be interesting to hear his views on how the position he argues here can be squared with the ethical teachings of the school. It is suggested that what is offered here is 'a holistic interpretation, that is, an interpretation which rests on an appreciation of all aspects of the Madhyamaka: intellectual, ethical and practical' (p.12). One obvious problem here is that if no true assertions can be made about reality, then no true ethical assertions can be made either. Opponents of the Madhyamaka accused it of being 'a devastating assault on the very citadel of all ethical values' (p.26), while its defenders countered that this was to confuse emptiness with nihilism. However, while the citadel of ethics can be defended with true statements about good and evil, there is a real danger that
Huntington's denial of objective values (indeed of anything 'objective') leaves the gates wide open to relativism.

It seems that ethics is central to the whole notion of the Madhyamaka as a practical spiritual discipline, which lies at the heart of the book. However, although the practical and ethical issues are acknowledged as fundamental, the discussion of them promised on p.12 never really materialises (the promising statement made on p.136 soon peters out). Huntington's position seems to be that ethics is an existential affair and that things will fall into place of their own accord when 'emptiness' is realised. 'The concept of emptiness', he writes, 'functions as an exhortation to act in a certain way' (p.59). And again: 'The direct realization of emptiness, what I call the "actualization" of emptiness, is the source of the bodhisattva's universal compassion' (ibid.). This seems to suggest that ethical behaviour is derived from a cognitive experience (the realisation of 'contextuality'), but traditionally in Buddhism compassion and the other virtues are developed first, with philosophical insights coming later. Dāna is the first perfection and Prajñā is the sixth. Moreover, these virtues are everywhere and unequivocally acclaimed as good in their own right, a claim which could not be made in the contextual universe of the Madhyamaka as depicted here.

In fact, Huntington appears ready to pay the price of ethical relativity by ditching ethics along with the absolutes. He writes: 'It is important to understand that virtue in the Mahāyāna sense of the word need not be viewed as an arbitrary and absolutely binding code of ethics, for in essence it is a system of mental discipline designed to induce goodwill and peace of mind in oneself and others' (p.71). If so, it is very curious that something such as compassion, which at one point is just a subsidiary mental discipline, can suddenly become the absolute paradigm quality of a bodhisattva. In these circumstances, it is inevitable that without its own ontological grounding ethics will be forced into a subordinate position to wisdom, in the tradition of the 'beyond all good and evil' school of Buddhism. The major problem here is the embarrassing habit the texts have of insisting on the importance of moral conduct at every stage of the religious life, both before and after enlightenment. On p.70 is an extract from the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra: 'Bodhi (..) is not realised by (..) the [mere] observance of morals (..) and it is [definitely] not realized by giving up morals'. If the Madhyamaka has no position to assert, why does Nāgārjuna, for example in the Ratnavālī, emphatically affirm the traditional moral values? The two problems Huntington should deal with are: i) why is compassion a supreme virtue in a bodhisattva when on the path it is only part of a 'system of mental discipline'; and ii) why is compassion claimed to be a moral absolute through the length and breadth of the Mahāyāna if there can be no absolute of any kind?

It seems to me, overall, that if the doctrine of emptiness is not saying something fundamental about the nature of reality, then it is extremely difficult to see why it should be linked exclusively to a single form of life (one displaying compassion) rather than any of the myriad alternatives (for example, the pursuit of self-interest). If enlightenment consists in the realisation of the profound contextuality of things, then why should one of the contextual elements be preferred to all others? The dGe lugs pa, I would guess, would resolve this problem by saying that compassion is the appropriate behaviour for a bodhisattva because it is the innate nature of the enlightened consciousness to manifest itself in this way towards other beings (its innate nature, of course, being the absence of the inherent existence which would otherwise incline it to be self-referential).
Huntington cannot make this move in view of his denial that anything true can be asserted beyond the fact of its contextuality; accordingly it is difficult to see how he can reconcile his ontology with Madhyamaka ethics. The nub of the issue is whether one agrees or disagrees with Rorty when he speaks of 'the general absurdity of thinking that the vocabulary used by present science, morality, or whatever has some privileged attachment to reality which makes it more than just a further set of descriptions' (quoted p.130). In the case of morality I would say that the Buddhist tradition believes its ethics to have precisely such a privileged attachment and to be grounded absolutely in the nature of things as the Buddha saw them to be. This is why compassion and the other virtues are cultivated at every stage of the path and perfected at the end. Indeed, if Buddhist morality does not have some privileged attachment to reality, what has given it the right for the past two thousand years to tell people how to live their lives?

The novelty and interest in this book lie in the skilful and attractive way in which Huntington argues his case using the concepts and terminology of deconstructionism. The arguments are lucid, and the reader is likely to benefit as much from the clear exposition of this philosophy as from its application to the Madhyamaka. There is much to commend this thoughtful and careful discussion. The suggestion that the doctrine of selflessness (nairātmeya) marks the beginning of deconstructionism is intriguing and promises a fruitful new perspective which may introduce Buddhism to a wider audience. The main strength of the book, without wishing to overwork the word, is the way it 'contextualises' the Madhyamaka itself. It makes it clear that it is not just a philosophy but also a way of life. I do not agree, however, that it is primarily a 'skilful means', emphasising practice rather than theory. Huntington's

approach will no doubt encourage scholars to be more self-critical in their approach to the Madhyamaka and, by extension, the methodology we bring to Buddhist studies in general. Although describing itself as an 'Introduction', the book assumes a high level of background knowledge. The translation of the Madhyamakāvatāra comes with full critical apparatus and extracts from commentaries.

Damien Keown


In 1988 a writer, two artists, a photographer and a flautist undertook an expedition to Tibet, India and Nepal. Their purpose was to record their impressions of the complex Tibetan culture via their artistic talents. On their return they were able to raise funds to make a video of their trip. The video consists of visual images taken from the thousands of slides photographed on the trip accompanied by field recordings of traditional and environmental sounds.

This book is a companion to the video of the same name and serves as an introduction to Tibetan culture. It consists of sixteen essays on various aspects of Tibetan culture, including religion, painting, language, nomads, etc., all written by different experts in the field. At the back of the book there are a few diary entries from the trip plus a brief guide to the video. Photographs and drawings from the expedition illustrate each essay.

The latter are the meat of the book and would be the reason for buying it, for there is little of the expedition or its
members. The essays are brief — some too brief — and vary as to their usefulness in giving the reader an insight into Tibetan culture. The opening essay by Lobsang Lhalungpa on the history of Tibet is, as one would expect from a Tibetan scholar, to the point and informative, while the next by Anne Klein on contemporary Tibet is intelligent, thoughtful and quite moving. The third, however, purportedly on ethnic cultures within Tibet reads like a dry Ph.D dissertation and so studiously avoids any criticism of the Chinese in its rarified atmosphere of academic detachment that one suspects it is actually pro-Chinese. How anyone can write on the ethnic culture of Tibet without mentioning at all the attempted genocide and repression of that culture attempted by the Chinese over the last forty years is quite beyond me.

There are a couple of articles on lifestyles — town dweller and nomadic — innocuous little pieces but neither here nor there. They are, however, in touch with the people they are written about.

There follow six essays on the religious culture. One would expect the majority of them to deal with Tibetan Buddhism, as it was (and still is) such a dominant force in Tibetan life. They vary from a rather rambling piece comparing Christianity and Buddhism as they exist in one person, to a typical down-to-earth Tibetan exposition of Buddhist tenets. By far the best and most relevant of the six is Robert Thurman’s piece: an inspiring and refreshing essay on monastic and intellectual culture, warmly delivered by a man who so obviously has great insight into his subject.

There are two essays on Tibetan religious painting which provide an informative insight into the world of thangka painting and an interesting article on Tibetan architecture, a subject rarely dealt with. The essay on the language is, regrettably, too short to be of any use to many people. The last piece is a loving, knowledgeable essay on religious literary styles.

The problem with this book is that it doesn’t really deliver. It is intended to be an introduction to Tibetan culture but the reader is left with a collection of disjointed facts and opinions which are difficult to collate into an overall picture. I can understand the purpose of employing different writers on different aspects of Tibetan civilisation but in many ways I feel that either one writer on all aspects or several writers on one dominant feature of Tibetan life — the religion — would have produced a more cohesive and accessible picture.

Finally, the editors of this book had in their hands the perfect material for communicating a culture to a curious readership and they chose not to use it. Surely, instead of these essays, they should have printed their diary entries, a few of which appear at the back of the book. These are first-hand experiences of a culture. Intersperse these with a few historical, political and social facts and you have a wonderful living account of that culture which effortlessly conveys itself to the reader. The short diary entry on Samye Monastery speaks volumes and imbues the political and historical accounts with much needed life. There are glimpses of this approach from some of the contributors but a more personal, day in the life approach coupled with relevant facts would have greatly enhanced the editors’ aim.

Gavin Kilty


Never mind the slightly ‘catchpenny’ title which somewhat
cheekily echoes that of a well-known introduction to Buddhism. True, this is not quite the usual type of book to be reviewed on these pages, but it deserves a notice for the light it throws on one of the most significant developments in East/Western Buddhism, especially as seen ‘from below’. Its style is racy and utterly unacademic. But the book is written with sincerity and is by no means lacking in profundity. Tim Ward, a Canadian, never became or even seriously intended to become a bhikkhu, but he did become for a time a shaven-headed, white-robed pahkow (his spelling) or anāgārika at Ajahn Chah’s famous Wat Pah Nanachat (‘International Forest Monastery’) in north-east Thailand. In fact he never even fully accepted Buddhism any more than did his English companion and ‘twin’, Jim, but clearly both were sufficiently impressed to be prepared to jump in at the deep end. Having glimpsed a little of the life they led, and experienced the lesser rigours of life at Amaravati, I too am impressed. The feel of the place is right: the personality of the Australian abbot, the almost total lack of formal instruction except for the rigid insistence on vinaya (with the increasing severity of 5, 8, 10 and 227 rules to follow — Tim ‘only’ kept eight) and on continual mindfulness, the various characters encountered, life in the jungle with scorpions, snakes and aggressive red ants — all this is brilliantly observed as are the author’s thoughts and — above all else — doubts, and his continued effort. In spite of all doubts he did make some progress in meditation and even acquired more knowledge of technicalities than we suspected, as when he suddenly informs us that he attained ‘second jhana’ (his brief account of which seems incompatible with the standard definition). The final chapter, ‘Ajahn Chah Gives a Teaching’, is intensely moving. As Tim watched — with initial revulsion — the loving care devoted to the paralysed and seemingly lifeless teacher, he gradually came to realise that here too is perhaps the greatest teaching of all.

This is not an academic book, but that is no excuse for the quite disgracefully scrappy and inaccurate ‘glossary’. At the risk of offending a publisher who has, in fact, done me proud, I must say it: surely there was somebody at Element Books who could have corrected at least the more horrendous mistakes here or else cut the glossary right out. As it stands it is useless. But the best joke in the book is unconscious: one of the most brilliant Freudian slips I have ever seen. On p.49 Ajahn Chah’s original monastery of Wat Pah Pong is referred to as Wat Pat Pong. Those who know even by repute the Bangkok district of Pat Pong will have a laugh ...

Maurice Walshe


This is in fact a filmset reprint of the corrected second edition which had been enlarged by the author with additional bibliographical notes and published by Routledge in hardback in 1969. The book is well-known in academic circles and has won wide circulation among educated yoga followers as well. It presents a wealth of historical, religious and philosophical materials on yoga, Brahmanism and also Buddhism, including techniques of yoga and Buddhist meditational attainments. It is the only truly comprehensive study on the subject in English and therefore its publication in paperback is welcome, despite the fact that it badly needs updating and that it has a few drawbacks and misconceptions. Thus, the author did not
sufficiently discriminate between yoga as such and doctrinal additions to it, a still very common misconception, both in academic studies and the public perception of yoga. Further, he applied to his presentation of the history of yoga in India the modern concept of evolution and viewed Patañjali's 'Classical Yoga' as the peak of a process whose beginnings he sought in primitive ecstatic practices for which he thought evidence could be found in the Rg Veda.

With respect to Buddhism, the work abounds in inaccuracies and shows an all too generalising attitude in its observations about it. This was comprehensively dealt with by R. Gombrich, 'Eliade on Buddhism', Religious Studies 10 (1974), pp.225-31. Readers who take the trouble to identify the criticised aspects of the work and read it with caution can still benefit from it substantially.

Karel Werner

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CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS TO BSR 9, 2

1 — NOTES ON THE UDĀNA, by J.D. Ireland:

p.143, l.10: for 'Their origin' read 'The tradition of their origin'.
p.144, l.10: for 'complexion' read 'colour'.
p.146, l.16: for 'Mahādeva' read 'Mādhava'.

2 — Review of Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden:

p.210, l.3: for 'between 1985 and 1989' read 'between 1955...

p.211, l.6: for 'Mulasarvāstivāda' read 'Mulasarvāstivāda'.
p.212, l.3: for Dhpa'A read 'Dhp-a'.
p.212, n.4, l.1: for 'Untersuchungen der...' read 'Untersuchungen zur...

p.213, ll.14-15: for 'Those, who do not believe this fact,' read 'Those, who do not perceive...

p.215, l.13: for 'Hybrid Buddhist' read 'Buddhist Hybrid'.

3 — Obituaries:


Guidelines for Contributors

We welcome contributions to this journal, particularly in the field of early mainstream Buddhism and especially Buddhism in Central Asia except that, since they are adequately covered in other journals, Tibetan studies per se should be avoided.

1. Since this journal is produced by offset-litho, which necessitates the retyping of contributions after submission (and editing), it would be appreciated if contributions are typed double-spaced. For the same reason, proofs are not available for checking by contributors, but a copy of the final typescript can be supplied if specifically requested.

2. Only titles of published books and technical terms need be italicised (or underlined), with the exception of those words which have become part of the English language, e.g. Dharma, dhammas, kamma/karma, Nirvāṇa, sūtra/sutta, etc.

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