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Frontispiece: the calligraphy in Sino-Vietnamese characters (Nôm) by Ven Thích Huỳnh-Vi reads:

"[In Emptiness there is... ]
no feeling or perception,
volitions or consciousness;
no eye or ear,
nose or tongue,
body or mind."

The seals engraved by Ven. Bhikkhu Dhammadaro, Thailand, convey the same meaning as the calligraphy.

EDITORIAL

We apologise for the fact that, once again, you have had to wait so long for this issue. As we mentioned in the previous issue, we planned to acquire a word processor and appropriate software, and this is now in place and functioning. There are, however, due partly to our inexperience and partly to certain limitations of the software, a few gremlins which we hope will be overcome next time. We cannot, for example, do alternate running headings at the top of pages or Chinese characters, so please bear with us. The software is due to be updated shortly and this should no longer be a problem. Because of the size of print produced, you will note a change in format. Since we have had complaints in the past that the type-size was too small, we hope you will be happier with our new look.

This is again a double issue, but we are now doing our very best to catch up and the next issue should be the first of two to be published in 1992. Hopefully you will not have to wait too long before you are reading us again. Thank you for your patience.
EPITHETS OF THE BUDDHA

1. Buddho dasabalo satthā sabbaññū dipadutam
   Munindo bhagavā nātho cakkhumā (a)gīrāso muni.
   1. The Awakening One, Him of the Ten Powers, the Teacher, the All-knowing One, the Supreme Biped. The Lord of Sages, the Blessed One, the Protector, the Seeing One, the Resplendent One, the Sage.

2. Lokanātho (a)adhivāro mahesi ca vināyako
   Samantacakku sugato bhūripiṇno ca māraji.
   2. The World Protector, the Unexcelled One, the Great Seer and the Guide. The All-seeing One, the Happy One, Him of Extensive Wisdom and the Conqueror of Māra.

3. Narasīho naravaro dharmarājā mahāmuni
   Devadevo lokagaru dharmasāmī tathāgato
   Sayambhu sammāsambuddho varapāṇno ca nāyako
   3. The Lion of Men, the Excellent Man, the Dhamma-king, the Great Sage. The God of Gods, the World Teacher, the Dhamma-Lord, the Thus-Gone. The Self-made, the Fully Enlightened One, Him of Excellent Wisdom and the Leader.

4. Jino sakko tu siddhattho ca gotamo
   Sakyasīho tathā sakyamuni vā (a)dīccabandhu ca
   4. The Conqueror, the Sakyamuni, then the Accomplished One, (Son of) Sudhdhana and Gotama. The Lion of the Sakya, also the Sakyamuni and the Kinsman of the Sun.

(Moggallāna’s Abhidhānapadipīkā, edited by Velligalla Siddhattha, Ceylon 1900, p.2. Translated by John D. Ireland)

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING
THE LANGUAGE OF THE EARLIEST BUDDHIST
TRADITION

Heinz Bechert

The almost simultaneous publication of works by Franklin Edgerton on Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit (Grammar/Dictionary/Reader, New Haven 1953; Delhi 1970) and by Heinrich Lüders on the language of the original Buddhist Canon (Beobachtungen über die Sprache des buddhistischen Urkanons, ed. W. Waldschmidt, Berlin 1954) touched off a scholarly discussion on the language of the earliest Buddhist tradition and on the nature of the Middle Indian dialects underlying ‘Buddhist Sanskrit’, which was reflected not only in the numerous reviews of both these works, but also in a series of articles in academic journals. At that time, a symposium on this subject was held during the German Oriental Conference (‘Deutscher Orientalistentag’) in 1954. It should be emphasised, however, that this interest failed to produce a general communis opinio regarding the questions that were raised, or that was even accepted by the greater part of the scholarly world; indeed, the discussion merely seemed to die away. It was revived, however, more than twenty years later, and most of the relevant arguments as well as various theories were formulated in the volume Die Sprache der ältesten buddhistischen Überlieferung/The Language of the Earliest Buddhist
Tradition (ed. H. Bechert, Göttingen 1980). Relevant problems were further discussed by Oskar von Hinüber (Das ältere Mittelindisch im Überblick, Vienna 1986), and by K.R. Norman in various essays.

The question, of course, has a long history. Both N.L. Westergaard (Om de eoldeste Tidsrum i den indiske Historie med Hensyn til Literaturen, Copenhagen(359,967),(440,996)(359,950),(440,979)(359,846),(440,879)(359,830),(440,862) and 9) had asserted long ago that the language of the Pāli Canon could not be identical with the language spoken by the Buddha himself, as the Sinhalese tradition maintains. Both identified Pāli as the language of Ujjayāni, and their most prominent follower has been R.O. Franke (Pāli und Sanskrit, Strassburg 1902, p.131 ff.). Franke even proposed that the tradition according to which Kaccāyana, the author of the oldest surviving Pāli grammar, had lived in Ujjenti, should be considered 'a dim recollection' of this original Pāli (op. cit., p.139, n.2; cf. also O. von Hinüber, 'Zur Geschichte des Sprachnamens Pāli', Beiträge zur Indienforschung. Ernst Waldschmidt zum 80. Geburtstag gewidmet, Berlin 1977, pp.237-46).

In 1912 Sylvain Lévi proposed the thesis that a language of the 'precanonical' Buddhist tradition could be detected in the

earliest terminology of the Buddhists, especially in the terms used in the Vinaya; he maintained that in this 'precanonical' language - and by this he meant essentially what H. Oldenberg (e.g. in 'Studien zur Geschichte des buddhistischen Kanons', NAWG 1912, p.206 = Kleine Schriften 2, Wiesbaden 1967, p.1024) somewhat misleadingly called simply 'Māgadhi' - the intervocalic tenues are weakened (S. Lévi, 'Observations sur une langue précanonique du bouddhisme', JA 1912, pp.493 ff.; cf. also E.J. Thomas, 'Pre-Pāli Terms in the Pātimokkha', Festschrift M. Winternitz, Leipzig 1933, pp.161 ff.). H. Lüders, who had already taken up this problem in connection with his epigraphical studies (see 'Epigraphische Beiträge' III, 1913 = Philologica Indica, Göttingen 1940, p.288), stated at first that 'the earliest Buddhist scriptures were written in Old Ardhmagadhi', and that 'the works constituting the available Pāli canon, like those of the Sanskrit canon are, at least in part, translations of works in Old Ardhmagadhi'. Later he called the language in question simply an 'eastern dialect' or also 'the eastern language' (cf. Beobachtungen über die Sprache des buddhistischen Urkanons, p.8) and used the term 'Urkanon' - 'original canon' - for the material underlying the available texts. W. Geiger advanced a different opinion; he stated that 'Pāli was not a pure Māgadhi, but was rather a kind of lingua franca based on Māgadhi which the Buddha himself had used', and that 'the Pāli canon represented an attempt to reproduce the buddhavacanam in its original form' (Pāli Literatur und Sprache, Strassburg 1916, p.4). As we know, there was no general agreement with Geiger's thesis. Finally Helmer Smith ('Le futur moyen indien', JA 1952, p.178) stated that we must postulate the existence of a 'koinè gangétique, dont l'ardhamāgadhi et le pāli représentent les normalisations les plus anciennes' for the period in question. If this is accepted, then the approach to the problem of

1 This essay is based on my paper 'Allgemeine Bemerkungen zum Thema "Die Sprache der ältesten buddhistischen Überlieferung" therein, representing methodological considerations which, it seems to me, remain valid for the further study of the problems involved even today. I wish to thank James Di Crocco for preparing the English translation and Philip Pierce for rereading the text.
methodology must be quite different from that of the scholars quoted above.

We can proceed from the above on the assumption that none of the canonical texts exactly reflects the language of the Buddha or even of the earliest Buddhist tradition, and that accordingly the various textual versions are based in one way or another on earlier stages of the tradition couched in a different linguistic form. Thus we must further assume that there has been a transference of the texts from one linguistic form to another, with or without intermediate stages, either in the form of a deliberate translation or a gradual transformation in the oral tradition. In the course of this transformation certain peculiarities have been preserved which represent the linguistic form of earlier stages of the tradition that has since been lost. We have agreed to call these 'Magadhisms', and some of them might well have belonged to the language of the Buddha. The primary task now before us is to make sure that we are fully aware of the implications of the terminology which we employ in this field. A second essential task is to move our thinking ahead from the isolated discussion of certain individual observations of a linguistic nature, on which we have concentrated the greater part of our deliberations to date, to a consideration of the broader interrelationship of the questions associated with our problem. Thirdly, we must review our research methods and strive to develop them even further, and we should make use of the results of research into related developments outside India.

Now I should like to try to formulate some questions in this vein and thereby venture some suggestions as to how we should go about the problem, without in any sense intending to propose definite solutions. In this connection it would be best to start with the subject itself, which has long been formulated as the question of what was 'the language of the Buddha'. Taking into consideration the circumstances of the life of the Buddha as we know them, we can certainly come up with conjectures about which local dialect the Buddha must have spoken, but it would be much more appropriate to formulate the question in such a way that what we are really setting out to find is the linguistic form of what we term the 'earliest Buddhist tradition' - that is, the body of traditional material that underlies all the variants of the tradition that have come down to us, and thus represents, as it were, the archetype of the Buddhist tradition. At this point it is only natural to recall the passage in the Vinaya where the Buddha himself may have given us a clue as to the linguistic form in which his teaching was transmitted (see E. Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism, Louvain-la-Neuve 1988, pp.552-5), and along with it the controversy over the interpretation of this passage. (See John Brough, 'Sakāya niruttityā: Caul kale het', Die Sprache der ältesten buddhistischen Überlieferung, pp.35-42.)

The question as to the linguistic form of the earliest Buddhist tradition cannot be separated from the question of the content and structuring of this tradition. Was there really such a thing as an 'Urkanon', or is it not more likely that separate bodies of traditional material came to be integrated into one Canon, gradually at first, in the course of the dissemination and diversification of Buddhism, eventually to form the 'earliest tradition'? The corpus of traditional material would then have been organised into Pitakas, Nikāyas, Āgamas, Aṅgas, etc., in accordance with various principles of classification. It now appears as if, along with the fusion of distinct regional traditions
into supra-regional streams, there also ensued a fusion of different principles of organisation, in accordance with which the division into Pitakas was largely accomplished; the other organisational systems which originally had equal standing were then used for the subdivision of the Sūtrapiṭaka. It would thus seem that these same organisational principles were applied simultaneously at several places, independently of each other, to traditional material which itself had already become locally diversified, so that many correspondences arose which would not necessarily have had to derive from an archetype. Consequently we have to be extremely sceptical about any assumption that an 'Urkanon' ever actually existed.

We can now formulate our question more precisely. In every case we must check to see at what stage of development certain complexes of tradition were so organised that they could already be regarded as constituting a structured literary work. There can be no doubt that this occurred very early for the formulory for confession (P. pātimokkhā; Skt. prātimokṣa); it is much more difficult, however, to determine in which phase of the tradition the formulories for governing the life of the community (P. kammavācā; Skt. karmavācānaḥ) were put in order and came to underlie the broader context of a 'skandhaka' text. For the history of the formation of the Vinayapīṭaka we can refer to the book by E. Frauwallner (The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature, Rome 1956) and to an entire series of other studies which have appeared since, while for the text of the four Nikāyas or Āgamas no really serious attempt to reconstruct the four 'Ur-Āgamas' has yet been undertaken. So far as we can see at this time, such an attempt would probably be doomed to failure, because in this case the application of the principles of organisation was introduced at a

time when the local diversification of the tradition was already further advanced than with the Vinaya. The compilations available to us hardly go back to any 'Ur-Āgamas', but originated as the result of local applications of the same principles of organisation to bodies of traditional material that were still largely in agreement. As a natural consequence of this, various compilations of texts came into being that resembled each other in many respects, and their similarities can lead to the erroneous assumption that there might have been an original form of the corpus as a whole.

Besides, in the early period we must also take into account numerous borrowings from other branch traditions; thus we are dealing with a tradition that is largely 'contaminated', and consequently if we try to reconstruct the oldest form of the tradition on the principle of a genealogical tree we can easily go astray.

The question now arises as to when the tradition was actually established in definite form. Buddhist tradition of course maintains that the texts were already established at the time of the First Council, but were still being transmitted orally for a long time thereafter - in Ceylon from the advent of the Theravāda until the time of King Vaṭṭagāmanī Abhaya (89-77 B.C.E.). As for the traditional date when the Pāli Canon was first written down, we can declare with certainty that, in view of the most recent research into the source history of the Ceylonese chronicles, the traditional account constitutes reliable historical information. Also, if my conjecture is correct that the process of committing these texts to writing had actually been initiated in the motherland some time previously, we can reject outright the possibility that a written translation into Pāli of the
works of the earlier Pāli Canon was made from some other dialect, even if the other well-known arguments against such a notion did not exist.

To be able to pass on textual complexes as large as these by word of mouth while still maintaining an acceptable level of accuracy requires a special system, and it is precisely this that is attested to by the tradition that there existed specialists in the skill of recitation (bhānaka), which represented a parallel with the methods of transmission used by the Vedic schools. To a certain extent the Buddhist practice of oral transmission continues to exist side by side with the written even today, especially in Burma.

Thus, there cannot be a shadow of doubt - and at this point I believe I can pass from asking a question to making a flat assertion - that what we are dealing with in the early period is an oral tradition. Indeed, literary historians have long since determined with great exactitude the effect of a long oral tradition on the form of literary texts (see G. von Simson, 'Zur Phrase yena... tenopajāgāma/upetya und ihren Varianten im buddhistischen Kanon', Beiträge zur Indienforschung, pp.479-88).

Now that we have come to this conclusion we can answer more accurately the question as to the nature of the 'transmission' of the texts. If we look for remnants of earlier linguistic forms in the available texts, we must do so bearing in mind the characteristic features of oral tradition; to interpret the differences between the versions of the Buddhist text we must bring to bear an entirely different methodological approach from that which we would use, say, in comparing the versions of the Aśokan inscriptions, even though these inscriptions belong to the same linguistic and chronological domain.

Thus, in seeking out traces of earlier linguistic forms, we must heed the principle already formulated by S. Lévi for our own question and later applied successfully by Hermann Berger (in Zweit Probleme der mittelindischen Lautlehre, Munich 1955) to the solution of a large number of individual problems; namely, we must always look for the specific conditions which have led to the preservation of forms from an alien dialect in these linguistic monuments. This precept applies whenever we see in the language in question not simply a 'hybrid dialect' but a specific linguistic form into which the given textual material has been 'transformed' or 'transmitted'. We have accepted as a premise that this applies to Pāli. Thus H. Berger has designated as 'Magadhisms' (op. cit., p.15 ff.) such linguistic doublets as occur only or chiefly in stereotyped series of synonyms (e.g. kīnha along with kānha), or which are found in verses whose metrical structure would be distorted if the normal Pāli form (e.g. kīcchā for the 'Magadhism' kāsira) were used. Both premises are in keeping with the special demands of oral transmission and oral conversion.

I should like to cite as an additional example the use of bhikkhave and bhikkhavo in the earlier prose sections of the Pāli Canon. We find the 'Magadhism' bhikkhave in the actual sermon of the Buddha, while the vocative bhikkhavo occurs in the introductory formula. The text of the Majjhima Nikāya begins as follows:

tāra kho Bhagavā bhikkhū āmantesī: bhikkhavo ti. bhadante ti te bhikkhū Bhagavato paccassosu. Bhagavā etad avoca: sabbhadhammamūlapariyayam vo bhikkhave desessāmi...
The form bhikkhave is thus established as a specific usage in the Pāli text which can be explained as a way of recalling the actual speech of the Buddha. Once such a standard procedure has been devised, it could be applied to newly created texts without further ado, and thus the occurrence of this ‘Magadhism’ would tell us nothing about the original language of the text in question. On the other hand, it would explain why we find only bhikkhavo throughout the verses of the Suttanipāta, which otherwise is so full of ‘Magadhisms’.

The forms in -e (for Sanskrit -ās), which of course were determined very early to be Magadhisms in the Pāli Canon (Kuhn, Beiträge, p.9; V. Trenckner, Pali Miscellany, Copenhagen 1879, p.75 etc.), also provide exemplifications of this methodological principle, which are plausible in other ways. If we refer to the list of such cases compiled and expanded by H. Lüders (Beobachtungen, §§ 1-24), we find that - except for set expressions to which e.g. seyyathā and yebhuyyena owe their adoption into Pāli - the causes for the preservation of such forms are generally speaking misunderstandings in transmission. This applies also to those passages in the Pāṭikasutta (Lüders, o.p. cit., § 5) that can obviously no longer be correctly understood. As with seyyathā and bhikkhave, the easily remembered formulation - and thus the existence of a stereotyped mode of expression - may have contributed significantly to the preservation of the -e in the passage of the Sakkapaññasutta (Geiger, op. cit., § 80; Lüders, op. cit., § 6) and the Sunakkhattasutta (Trenckner, op. cit., p.75; Lüders, op. cit., § 7).

On the other hand, this very form provides an example of how we can go astray if we rely exclusively on the grammatical form and do not pay attention to the context. Lüders, for instance, explains (Beobachtungen, § 8) the nominative in -e in the language of the heretics in the Samaññaphalasutta as ‘Magadhisms’, although it is difficult to perceive why an historical peculiarity of the language of the Buddha should be preserved in the language of the heretics only, while it is not found in the speech of the Buddha himself. I have attempted to explain these forms and related passages in the Jātaka as ‘Sinhalisms’, i.e. as forms first adopted in Ceylon from the local vernacular to characterise the uncultivated patois of the heretics (‘Über Singhalesisches im Pālikanon’, WZKSO 1, 1957, pp.71-5). This implied that these forms were inserted in the text in early Ceylon during the period of oral tradition. K.R. Norman disagreed (‘Pāli and the Language of the Heretics’, Acta Orientalia 37, 1976, pp.113-22), but I am not at all convinced by his arguments which I shall discuss elsewhere. In any case, we may not consider these forms as ‘Magadhisms’ in the usual sense of the term. They do not seem to be residua from the language of the oldest tradition, but are forms which came into the text later, even though they look like ‘Magadhisms’ purely from the standpoint of form. If, on the other hand, the ending āse in the nominative plural, which occurs in the verses, was not transformed into āso in the Pāli texts (with one or two possible exceptions under peculiar conditions only), it was for the reason that the form in āso was not usual in ‘genuine’ Pāli and thus there was no point in substituting it.

I am still in agreement with a thesis advanced by H. Berger (o.p. cit., p.15) that, in general, forms like pure which appear in the traditional Pāli texts should not be regarded as ‘Magadhisms’, although -e appears for -ah instead of *puro which the laws of Pāli phonetics would lead us to expect; hence Berger’s comment...
(ibid.), 'It is hard to understand why the Pāli translators would have neglected to put this particular word, common as it is, into the corresponding western form while they never made the same slip with other adverbs (tato, bahuso etc.).' This must be a case of formation by analogy (and indeed with a significance corresponding to that of agge and similar forms; cf. Karl Hoffmann in Berger, op. cit., p.15, n.6). The same holds true for Pāli sve or suve (Skt. svah). Here again we must not allow ourselves to be misled by a merely apparent congruence with the Eastern dialect.

Thus we can clearly see the general applicability of the principle enunciated above to the example of the occurrence of -e for -as in Pāli, and, as we proceed to exclude, on the basis of convincing arguments, forms like these, which are not 'Magadhisms', we can then turn to working out the complex of true 'Magadhisms' which remains. The example has also shown us how important it is to take note of the further destinies of the transmitted texts. Aspects of the history of the transmission of the Pāli Canon have been examined recently by O. von Hinüber, K.R. Norman and other scholars. Various orthographic and grammatical peculiarities result from the influence of the vernaculars of the countries in which the texts were handed down, or from the influence of Sanskrit.

These basic considerations also hold true for that form of the language known to us from the 'Gāndhārī-Dharmapada' (J. Brough, The Gāndhārī Dharmapada, London 1962); this was tentatively identified by F. Bernhard ('Gāndhārī and the Buddhist Mission in Central Asia', Aṣṭal. O.H. de A. Wijesekera Felicitation Volume, Peradeniya 1970, pp.55-62) and even earlier by H.W. Bailey ('Gāndhārī', BSOAS 11, 1946, pp.764-97) as the language of the Canon of the Dharmaguptaka school before its Sanskritisation. (Cf. also J.W. de Jong, A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America, Varanasi 1976, pp.62f.).

The situation is more complicated in the case of the texts in 'Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit'. There was an indigenous term for this language, viz. ārṣa. It is used in Kaumāralāta's grammar, as has been pointed out by H. Lüders (Philologica Indica, Göttingen 1940, pp.686 f., 693 f., 713 ff.) and more recently recalled by D. Seyfort Ruegg ('Allusiveness and Obliqueness in Buddhist Texts', Dialectes dans les littératures indo-aryennes, ed. C. Caillat, Paris 1989, p.285 f.). Most of these texts were written in various forms of Middle Indic before Sanskritisation. We can proceed on the basis of the traditions of the Buddhists themselves that - depending on which sect was involved - they are based on different languages. The familiar tradition that four different languages were used by the four main sects (Lin Li-kouang, L'Aide-mémoire de la vrai loi, Paris 1949, pp.175-81) is not, of course, an actual description of the historical facts, yet we can perceive that it represents a recollection of the linguistic differences of the various versions of the canonical texts. Akira Yuyama has presented a detailed critical discussion of this.

2 Seyfort Ruegg remarks that 'this specific use of the word ārṣa has also been omitted from the Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden even though the term, as noted by Lüders, is attested in the "Turfan" collection'. However, this use is found in grammatical literature only, but not in the corpus of texts to be evaluated in this dictionary. The guidelines governing the choice of material to be included in this dictionary were explicitly approved by Seyfort Ruegg in his review in JAOS 106 (1986), p.597, so that his criticism concerning the entry for ārṣa is not justified.
tradition (‘Bu-ston on the Languages Used by Indian Buddhists at the Schismatic Period’, Die Sprache der ältesten buddhistischen Überlieferung, pp.175-81). Accordingly, the thesis once expressed by F. Edgerton concerning an ‘essential dialectic unity’ of the Prakrit underlying the hybrid Buddhist Sanskrit (see, e.g. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar, § 1.80) no longer requires any specific refutation.

Our task now lies in differentiating between the various strata of dialectic change. There is good reason to believe that Sanskritisation began when the texts were committed to writing, and we can be helped along by the fact, well-known from the lessons of textual criticism, that textual changes occurring in the course of written transmission come about in a different manner from those developed in an oral tradition. Sanskritisation itself is known to have been a multi-stage process, and we are much better informed about it than we are about the previous stages of textual development, especially since we actually have available to us earlier versions of many texts which are closer to the Middle Indic variants as well as later, more strongly Sanskritised versions. Naturally we are speaking here only of the Buddhist works in Sanskrit which are actually based on a Middle Indic original. Various other Sanskrit Buddhist works were written from the beginning in the so-called ‘hybrid dialects’; for a discussion of this question, see C. Regamey, ‘Randbemerkungen zur Sprache und Textüberlieferung des Kārāṇḍavyūha’ (Asiatica. Festschrift Friedrich Weller, Leipzig 1954, pp.514-27).

As has already been demonstrated by the foregoing discussions, the question of the relationship of the individual versions to the earliest tradition must be viewed in connection with the problems of the history of the early Buddhist sects, and we must also enquire into their localisation. The home of Pāli, for example, cannot be determined exclusively on the basis of linguistic arguments, but only with due regard to the early history of the Theravāda. Consideration of that history made it possible to classify Pāli as the language of Vidiśā (cf. E. Frauwallner, The Earliest Vinaya, Rome 1956, p.18 ff.), a determination which would not have been possible on the basis of current arguments from the standpoint of historical linguistics, but which nevertheless was in close agreement with the results of philological research. Local factors also help to explain the noteworthy similarities between Pāli and the language of the texts of the Lokottaravādins, which the history of the formation of the sects leaves quite obscure.

Yet we must still keep in mind the linguistic aspects of the problem. The comparison of the language of the early Buddhist texts with the language of the Aśokan and other early Prakrit inscriptions has been carried out in the minutest detail. Indeed, much of the research has, if anything, been undertaken too systematically. For example, we can only view with the greatest scepticism any attempts to come to conclusions about pronunciation on the basis of orthography, since we must never lose sight of the broad spectrum of possible divergences between orthography and pronunciation that we are familiar with from our knowledge of the development of other languages and from examination of later stages in the evolution of the Indic languages themselves.

Similarly, the questions of the conditions necessary for the emergence of a written language must be approached by methods which are predominantly linguistic. Fortunately we
possess a number of examples from other areas - such as the origin of the written form of the Romance languages - for which we have developed an extremely useful research apparatus. The question of the language of the earliest Buddhist tradition and its progressive development into the corpus of material as it stands today must undoubtedly be viewed as part of the formation of standardised (and therefore also in certain ways 'hybrid') languages during the developmental stages of Middle Indic, which ultimately came to be written languages. Moreover, the use of Middle Indic languages in the earliest Indian inscriptions, which of course constitute the oldest written evidence of the Indo-Aryan languages, suggests the hypothesis that we have here the earliest written Indic language, to which, however, the established tradition of a language of priests and scholars that was transmitted orally at first and nevertheless became standardised down to the last detail - i.e. Sanskrit - stands in the same relationship as Latin does to the written Romance languages. We can infer from the passage in the Vinaya that we have mentioned, and also from the actual development of language, that originally, and indeed in deliberate contrast to the Brahmanic tradition, the Buddha had definitely not been striving to bring about a linguistic standardisation to be used in the propagation of his teachings.

Does it not seem reasonable, then, to assume that the earliest tradition actually consisted of a linguistic multiplicity, and that a specific 'language of the earliest Buddhist tradition' does not exist at all? In view of all this there would hardly seem much point in continuing to look for this language; instead we should redirect the thrust of our enquiry towards the process of 'standardisation' of the linguistic form of the tradition as such. In this connection it would be quite helpful if we could answer the question as to how the traditional canonical texts of the Jains developed up to the point when they took definitive form, and how the Ardhamāgadhī of the Śvetāmbara texts actually originated. The significant differences between the language of the canonical prose of the Pāli Canon and the language of the early verses give rise to the further question as to whether or not a poetic language existed in Middle Indic, which was possibly supra-regional in use but in certain places may have been subjected to a process of assimilation with local languages, as Helmer Smith conjectured. Whatever answers we finally come up with to all these questions, it would seem imperative, in any case, always to keep in mind the wide variety of points of view and be wary of supporting just one principle argument.

Considered in isolation and viewed only with reference to individual linguistic phenomena, this question might well appear to be one of those abstruse problems of detail in a highly specialised science the solution to which touches on the progress of that science as a whole only with reference to a narrowly limited issue. If, however, we view our question in its broader ramifications, its answer will prove to be an important element in the task of elaborating an accurate understanding of the entire linguistic, literary and religious development in India during the fifth to the first century B.C.E.
THE ŚÅLISTAMBA SŪTRA

Translated by John M. Cooper

(i) Preliminary Remarks

The Śālistamba Sūtra, an early text on Dependent Origination, is here translated (by kind permission of the publishers) from a reconstructed version in Sanskrit edited by N. Aiyaswami Sastri.

Contents

(i) Preliminary remarks and footnotes to such.
(ii) Translation of Āryaśālistambasūtra with amended opening section from p.xliii of the book, with translation of Sastri’s footnotes to such.
(iii) Translation of Sastri’s reconstructed opening of the Sūtra (pp.1-2 of the book), with Sastri’s footnotes.
(iv) Translator’s notes.
(v) Translation of Sastri’s additional notes.

Sastri’s footnotes, and my footnotes to these remarks are indicated by Arabic numerals; the translator’s notes by lower case letters of the Roman alphabet and Sastri’s Additional Notes by upper case Roman letters (these last two sets of notes appear at the end of the article in sections iv and v). Reference to

1 Ārya Śālistamba Sūtra. Edited with Tibetan version, Notes and Introduction etc. by N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Adyar Library, 1950 (Adyar Library Series No. 76).
Sastri's text is by page numbers. The parts of the Notes and Additional Notes that are in English have been left unchanged.

Sastri states in his Introduction that the Sūtra was reconstructed almost completely to its original form, omitting only the beginning and end, by quoting the Śiksāsāmuccaya (ed. C. Bendall, Bibliotheca Buddhica I, St Petersburg 1897-1902 [repr. Osnabrück 1970, Tokyo 1977] = Śiksā), the Madhyamakavārttī (ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica IV, St Petersburg 1903-13. = Mdhvṛ) and the Bodhicaryāvatārapaṇijīkā (ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Indica I, Calcutta 1902. = Bcp)2.

There is another reconstructed Sanskrit text (and Tibetan text) by L. de La Vallée Poussin3, an English translation by Stanley Frye4, and a very noteworthy unpublished work by Noble Ross Reat5. I have found Frye's and Reat's work helpful in making my own translation.

Sastri analyses the contents of the Sūtra in his Introduction (pp.xi-xiii). On p.xiv he says that 'Buddhist tradition narrates that the formula [of Dependent Origination] dawned on Gautama Buddha during the first week of his stay under the tree of wisdom after his enlightenment (v. Dharmapāla's comm. on Therigāthā, p.2; and H. Oldenberg, Buddha, His Life, His Doctrine, His Order. London 1882 [repr. Delhi 1971], pp.114-15; E.J. Thomas, The Life of Buddha as Legend and History. London 1926 [repr. 1975], p.85)6. However in the Niḍānasamūyukta it says that the Noble Eightfold Path and the chain of twelve causes which produce duḥkha had been rediscovered by the Buddha while he was still a Bodhisattva7. Sastri also says, on p.xvi, that "Nāgārjuna (Mūlamadhyamaka Kārikā 1) and other Mahāyānic writers (v. Tattvasaṅgāraha) believe that the Buddha deserves our homage because he has proclaimed to the world the doctrine of causation which has not been realised by any other previous teacher so far" - although the Niḍānasamūyukta states that Dependent Origination and the Noble Eightfold Path were known to ancient sages8.

As regards the name of the Sūtra, I have translated Sastri's title - Āryaśālistambasūtra - as 'the holy sūtra of the clump of rice plants', whereas the four descriptions of the Chinese translations give the title as Śālisambhava Sūtra (p.xx) and, of course, this title appears in the Sanskrit name of the Sūtra which is given before the Tibetan title in the latter version of the

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2. ibid., p.x-xi.
5. "The Śālistamba Sūtra, Tibetan Original, Sanskrit Reconstruction, English Translation and Critical Notes (including Pali parallels, Chinese version and ancient Tibetan fragments)" by N. Ross Reat (the copy in my hands does not have a Chinese version, perhaps because it is a computer printout).
7. L. de La Vallée Poussin, op. cit., p.2, n.2: "D'après certaines sources, la méditation des Douze Causes est réservée aux Pratyekabuddhas. C'est en découvrant le Pratītyasamutpāda [PS] que le Bouddha est devenu Bouddha". Text: The PS is "le message décisif du Maître".
8. Ibid., p.57, 14 from bottom; p.58, ll.7-9.
Sūtra which begins on p.438. The Tibetan sa lu represents the Sanskrit śālī 'wild rice', the -hi is the genitive of this, ljan.pā according to Das means '1. green, not ripe; 2. green corn in the first stage of its growth, green leaves of barley and oats', zhes.byawa is 'so to be styled', theg.pā.chen.pohi.mdo means 'Mahāyāna sūtra'. In a handout distributed at the Dalai Lama's philosophy seminar in London in July 1984 there is a diagram of 'dependent arising' attributed to the 'Rice Seedling Sūtra', which is obviously a translation of the Tibetan title as analysed above. The confusion, I think, arises from the fact that sambhava can mean 'birth, origin, source', giving rise to the translation 'rice seedling', or it can mean 'being or coming together, meeting, union', whence the other Sanskrit title stamba (clump, tuft). I have preferred the second meaning as it fits both Sanskrit words. A third option exists, as Sastri himself on p.xi translates in the first paragraph of the Sūtra (on p.xlii), 'The Buddha once looking at the stalk of a Śāli plant addressed to the Bhikṣus this sūtra...'. This rendering may have originated from No.280 of Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka where the Chinese title of the Sūtra, Fo-shwo-tao-kǎn-kin [Fo-shuo-tao-kan ching], is rendered into English as 'Sūtra Spoken by Buddha on the Paddy Straw'. I think this third meaning has arisen from taking stamba as stambha, which means 'stem'. However, as I do not see any reason to emend stamba to stambha I have not followed this third translation.

There is a fourfold aspect of Dependent Origination in the Śālistambasūtra: (1) a causal relationship of external dependent origination, (2) its conditional relationship, (3) causal relationship of internal dependent origination, (4) conditional relationship of internal dependent origination.

Although the Śālistambasūtra is a Mahāyāna text there is little in it that would be unacceptable to a follower of the Hinayāna. Richard H. Robinson, in Early Mādhyamika in India and China, Madison 1967 (p.64), says that the Stanzas attack the Hinayānist concept of dependent co-arising, and quotes Śīva in the Middle Treatise as saying, "Because the Buddha wished to cut off all such false views and make them know the Buddha-dharma, he first in the śrāvaka-dharma declared the twelve nidānas."

The word avidyā, translated by 'ignorance', probably means a definite state of delusion rather than just absence of knowledge.

Sastri in his footnotes points out instances where Mdhr, Śīkṣ and Bcp differ from his text, but he does not mention all of them.

(ii) Translation of Sūtra

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8 In the Tibetan translation of the title, the word hphags.pā 'shaken' seems to be a misprint for hphags.pā, 'ārya'.

9 Stambaka means the same thing as stamba. O. von Böhtlingk and R. Roth, Sanskrit Wörterbuch, 7 vols, St Petersburg 1852–75, p.1255, says Śālistambhaka is a wrong reading of -stambhaka.
THE HOLY SUTRA OF THE CLUMP OF RICE PLANTS

Salutation to all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas

(p.xlii) "Thus have I heard" etc. "The Blessed One was living in Rājagrha, on the hill called Grdhra-kūta (Vulture's Peak) with a large number of monks, 1,250 monks, and very many Bodhisattvas." The venerable Śāriputra said this to the Bodhisattva Maitreya, "(The Buddha) looked at a clump of rice plants and spoke this sūtra to the monks, 'He, monks, who sees dependent origination sees the teaching. He who sees the teaching sees the Buddha.' Having spoken thus, the Blessed One became silent. So what is the meaning of this sūtra spoken by the Blessed One? What is dependent origination? What is the teaching? What is the Buddha? And how, seeing dependent origination, does one see the teaching?" etc. "Therein what is called dependent origination is namely ignorance" etc. (And having this in view, this is spoken there in the sūtra) "Whether Tathāgatas arise or not there is still this inherent nature, constant nature of Dharma, unchangeable sameness of the Dharma, true state of things, not untruth, sole truth, reality, truth, fact, absence of contrariety, absence of error", thus and so forth spoke the Blessed Maitreya.

4–4 This portion is cited in Bcp, pp.386–7 omitting '(1) This being arises'. (Notes 1–3 appear on p.60.)

5 This is frequently referred to in Buddhist literature both in Pāli and Sanskrit. Its Pāli form is 'This being, that becomes; from the arising of this, that arises'. When this is absent that does not happen; because of the cessation of this that ceases' (Tr. Taking niruddhā as an obvious misprint for nirodha). Nidānasamjñyutta in S II, pp.28, 65, 78, 85; M II, p.63. Other references: Mahāvāsa (ed. E. Senart, 3 vols, Paris 1882–97) II, p.285; Mdhvr., p.9 with n.7; Bcp, p.182; Dharmapāla's Comm. on Ālambanaparipākā (ed. N.A. Sastri, Adyar 1942), pp.28 (it is said in the traditional teaching, "This being, that becomes", is the expression of dependent origination"), 68; my [Sastri's] 'Central Teaching of Mvanmekhalai' §4, III.

It is also referred to as Dharmasanketa in Bcp, p.414, 18.

See the Buddha's teaching this Dharma to Uddāyin, M II, p.32.
lamentation, misery, dejection and perturbations arise - thus is the arising of this whole great mass of misery.

In that, from the cessation of ignorance (p.3) the cessation of volitional actions come about, from the cessation of volitional actions the cessation of consciousness comes about, from the cessation of consciousness the cessation of mentality-materiality comes about, from the cessation of mentality-materiality the cessation of the six senses comes about, from the cessation of the six senses the cessation of contact comes about, from the cessation of contact the cessation of feeling comes about, from the cessation of feeling the cessation of craving comes about, from the cessation of craving the cessation of grasping comes about, from the cessation of grasping the cessation of becoming comes about, from the cessation of becoming the cessation of birth comes about, from the cessation of birth, old age and death, grief, lamentation, misery, dejection and perturbations cease - thus the cessation of this whole great mass of misery comes about. This is called dependent origination⁴ by the Blessed One.

What is the teaching? It is the Noble Eightfold Path, as here follows: right understanding, right thought, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration. This has been said by the Blessed One to be the Noble Eightfold Path, the teaching in which the acquisition of the result and Nirvana are taken together as one. Therein what is the Blessed Buddha? He who is called the Buddha because of his knowledge of all states of being, possessed of the noble eye of wisdom, possessing his spiritual body (Dharmakaya), sees those characteristics to be cultivated and those not to be cultivated⁶.

⁶Therein how does one see dependent origination? Here it has been said by the Blessed One⁸ 'He who sees (this) continually without a self, soulless independent origination as not wrong, unborn, unbecome, uncreated, uncompounded, unobstructed, without support, auspicious, secure, that which cannot be taken away, unchanging, unceasing, and without self-nature (sees the teaching). But he who⁹ thus sees (this) continually without a self, soulless teaching as not wrong, unborn, unbecome, uncreated, uncompounded, unobstructed, without support, auspicious, secure, that which cannot be taken away, unchanging, unceasing, and without self-nature sees the Buddha possessed of the uttermost spiritual body, by the very (p.4) attaining of right knowledge in the full realisation of the holy teaching.' Why is it called 'dependent origination'? It is with causes, with conditions, not without causes, not without conditions. Therefore it is called 'dependent origination⁶. In that connection the Blessed One has briefly described the

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⁶a Cited also ibid., p.387, II. 8-12.
⁷ This formula is also repeated in the last para. of this Sutra (Tr. really the antepenultimate para. See n.120).
⁸ Om. in Tib.
⁹ Bcp reads simply 'thus'. Tib. seems to read: such teaching as eternally.
10 Ibid., shortened: 'soulless' and so on, as before, up to 'he sees it as unceasing and without self-nature'.
11 Tib. construes this sentence thus: 'Having completely realised the holy teaching, by attaining right knowledge he sees the Buddha, whose body is the supreme Dharma'.
12 Bcp 'by the very) attainment from (right) knowledge.'
characteristic attribute of dependent origination. 'There is this result of its conditioned nature, that whether\(^{13}\) Tathāgatas arise or not there is still the inherent nature of these dharmas, inasmuch as there is that which is this inherent nature of dharmas, constant nature of dharmas, unchangeable sameness of the Dharma, sameness of dependent origination, true state of things, true state of non-contrariety, sole truth, reality, truth, absence of contrariety, absence of error.'

\(^{14}\)Now, moreover, this dependent origination arises from two (causes). From which two? They are, namely, from dependence on causes and from dependence on conditions. It is also to be seen as twofold, as external and and internal. In that connection what is the dependence on causes of the external dependent origination? It is (for example): from the seed comes the sprout; from the sprout comes the leaf; from the leaf comes the stalk; from the stalk comes the hollow stalk; from the hollow stalk comes the knot\(^{15}\); from the knot comes the calyx; from the calyx\(^{16}\) comes the flower; from the flower comes the fruit. When the seed does not exist the sprout does not come to be; as far as: when the flower does not exist the fruit does not come to be. But when the seed exists the sprout comes forth; thus as far as: when the flower exists the fruit comes forth. In that connection the seed does not think thus: 'I bring forth the sprout.' The sprout also does not think thus: 'I am brought forth by the seed' (p.5). Thus as far as: the flower does not think thus: 'I bring forth the fruit'; the fruit does not think thus: 'I am brought forth by the flower.' Moreover when the seed exists the sprout comes forth, it appears. Thus as far as: when the flower exists the fruit comes forth, it appears. It is thus that dependence on causes of the external dependent origination is to be seen.

How is the dependence on conditions of the external dependent origination to be seen? It is from the coming together of six elements. From the coming together of which six elements? It is, namely, from the coming together of the elements\(^{17}\) of earth, water, heat, air, space and seasons that the dependence on conditions of the external dependent origination is to be seen. In that connection the element of earth does the work of supporting the seed. The element of water moistens the seed. The element of heat ripens the seed. The element of air develops the seed. The element of space does the work of freeing the seed from obstructions. The season does the work of transforming the seed. When these conditions do not exist, the sprout does not come forth from the seed. When the

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13 The shorter form of this formula is oft-repeated in canonical and other works, e.g. Lankāvatarasūtra (e. B. Nanjo. Kyoto 1923). pp.144, 218. Kumārila also refers to it in his Tantravārttika, p.163, and further see Mdhv. p.40, and La Vallée Poussin's extensive note upon it. Cρ. also Bep. p.588.

14 Bep, pp.577–9 quotes from this to the end of the (section on the) external dependent origination. (Tr. See n.27).

15 'comes the' knot; from the knot' om. in Tib.

16 'comes the' awn; from the awn' om. in Tib. (Tr. I am not happy with awn (bristly beard), but the only other meaning is calyx, which we have already had (with garbha). It is not surprising that the Tibetan omits it. I follow the Tibetan.)

17 '(of the) elements' om. in Bep.
external element of earth is unimpaired and the elements\textsuperscript{18} of water, heat, air, space and season are thus unimpaired, then when the seed is being destroyed on account of the coming together of all (these elements) then\textsuperscript{19} the sprout comes forth.

In that connection the element of earth does not think thus, 'I do the work of supporting the seed'. Likewise the element of water also does not think thus, 'I moisten the seed'. The element of heat also does not think thus, 'I ripen the seed'. The element of air also does not think thus, 'I develop the seed'. The element of space also does not think thus, 'I do the work of freeing the seed from obstructions'. The season also does not think thus, 'I do the work of transforming the seed'. The seed also does not think thus, 'I bring forth the sprout'.\textsuperscript{20} (p.6) The sprout also does not think thus, 'I am brought forth by these conditions'. Now, moreover, when these conditions exist and when the seed is being destroyed the sprout comes forth. Thus as far as: when the flower exists the fruit comes forth\textsuperscript{21}. And that sprout is not self-made, nor made by another, nor made by both, nor made by God, nor transformed by time, nor produced by nature, (nor dependent on a single cause\textsuperscript{21},) nor even produced without a cause. Now, moreover, when the seed is being destroyed by the coming together of the elements\textsuperscript{17} of earth, water, heat, air, space and season the sprout comes forth. Thus is the dependence on conditions of the external dependent origination to be seen.

\textsuperscript{18} Tib omits 'elements of'.
\textsuperscript{19} Bcp omits 'then'.
\textsuperscript{20} This sentence om. in Bcp.
\textsuperscript{21} Om. in Tib. (Tr. This must be n.21, not note 1 as in the text).

In that connection, the external dependent origination is to be seen with five aspects\textsuperscript{22}. With what five? 'Neither on account of eternity, nor on account of annihilation, nor on account of transference', on account of the production of a major result from a minor cause, and on account of the continuity (of the effect) corresponding (to the cause)'. How is it 'neither on account of eternity'? Because the sprout is one thing and the seed is another. Nor is it that the sprout and the seed are identical. Nor\textsuperscript{23} does the sprout arise from the destroyed seed; nor even from the undestroyed (seed)\textsuperscript{24}. Moreover, the seed is destroyed, and just then does the sprout arise. Therefore it is not on account of eternity. How is it not on account of annihilation? The sprout comes forth neither from a previously destroyed seed nor even from an undestroyed seed\textsuperscript{25}. However, the seed is destroyed; at that very time the sprout arises like the swinging up and down of the arm of a balance. Therefore it is not on account of annihilation. How is it not on account of transference? 'The sprout is different from the seed'. Therefore it is not on account of transference. How is it on account of the production of a major result from a minor cause? (p.7) 'When a small seed is sown it produces a large fruit'. Therefore it is on account of the production of a major result from a minor cause. How is it on account of the continuity (of

\textsuperscript{22} Bcp reads 'with five) causes'.
\textsuperscript{23–25} This portion om. in Bcp.
\textsuperscript{24} 'seed' om. in Tib.
\textsuperscript{25} So reads Bcp. But Tib. reads: 'Because the sprout is one thing and the seed another. Nor are the sprout and the seed identical'. Note this explanation is also given in connection with 'It does not exist on account of "eternity" above.'
the effect) corresponding (to the cause)28. ‘Whatever kind of seed is sown it produces such a fruit’. Therefore ‘and on account of the continuity (of the effect) corresponding (to the cause)’. Thus the external dependent origination is to be seen with five29 aspects.

Likewise the internal dependent origination arises from two (causes). From which two? They are, namely, from dependence on causes and dependence on conditions30.

29 In that connection, what is the dependence on causes of the internal dependent origination? It is, namely, ‘conditioned by ignorance are volitional actions, as far as conditioned by birth are old age and death31. If ignorance should not exist then volitional actions will not be known; thus as far as, if birth should not exist then old age and death will not be known. Now32 when there is ignorance the volitional actions come forth; thus as far as when there is birth, old age and death come forth. In that connection ignorance does not think thus, ‘I bring forth the volitional actions’. The volitional actions also do not think thus, ‘we are brought forth by ignorance’. Thus as far as: birth33 also does not think thus, ‘I bring forth old age and death’; old age and death also do not think thus, ‘we (lit. ‘I’) are brought forth by birth’. Nevertheless, when there is ignorance the volitional actions come forth (p.8), appear; thus as far as when there is birth, old age and death come forth, appear. Thus is the dependence on causes of the internal dependent origination to be seen.

How is the dependence on conditions of the internal origination to be seen? From the coming together of six elements. From the coming together of which six elements? It is, namely, from the coming together of the elements of earth, water, heat, air, space and consciousness that the dependence on conditions of the internal dependent origination is to be seen. In that connection what is the element of earth of the internal dependent origination? That which produces hardness on body-compaction34 (i.e. solidity), that is called the element of earth. That which does the work of cohesion35 of the body is called the element of water. That which digests what has been eaten, drunk or consumed for the body is called the element of heat. That which does the work of breathing in and out of the body is called the element of air. That which produces hollowness36 inside the body is called the element of space. That which brings forth the sprout of mentality-materiality of the

26 ‘How... cause’ om. in Tib.
27 End of the explanation of the ‘external dependent origination’. The full text of this portion is cited in Bep, as stated above, see n.14.
28 Candrakirti quotes a larger extract of the Sutra covering the whole explanation of the ‘internal dependent origination’ in his Mdhv, ed. La Vallée-Poussin, pp.560–70.
29 Śantideva also draws a similar extract from this, almost to the end of the Sutra, in his Śīkṣ, ed. C. Bendall, pp.219–27.
30 Mdhv repeats the formula fully.
31 Mdhv ‘Or rather’ (Tr. samkaraṇam emended to samkāraṇam).
32 Śīkṣ jātyaḥ (Tr. instead of jāter. meaning unchanged).
33 Mdhv yaḥ kāyasya samāḷeṣṭāḥ instead of samāḷeṣṭāḥ (Tr. meaning unchanged).
34 Śīkṣ ‘the cohesion work’ (Tr. meaning unchanged).
35 Śīkṣ ‘a state of hollowness’.
body in the way (C) of (two) bundles of naḍa-reeds, mind-consciousness conjoined with the group of the five types of consciousness and together with the defiled mind-consciousness, this is called the element of consciousness. In that connection there is no arising of the body when those conditions do not exist. When the internal element of earth is unimpaired, and likewise the elements of water, heat, air, space and consciousness are unimpaired, then on account of the coming together of all these a body is produced. In that connection the element of earth does not think thus, 'I produce hardness on body-compaction'. The element of water does not think thus, 'I do the work of cohesion of the body'. (p.9) The element of heat also does not think thus, 'I digest what has been eaten, drunk or consumed for the body'. The element of air does not think thus, 'I do the work of breathing in and out of the body'. The element of space does not think thus, 'I produce hollowness inside the body'. The element of consciousness does not think thus, 'I bring forth the mentality-materiality of the body'. The body also does not think thus, 'I am produced by these

conditions.' Nevertheless the body arises when these conditions exist.

In that connection the element of earth is not the self, not a being, not the soul, not a creature, not a man, not a human, not female, not male, nor 'T', nor 'mine', nor of anybody else. Likewise the element of water, the element of heat, the element of air, the element of space and the element of consciousness are not the self, not a being, not the soul, not a creature, not a man, not a human, not female, not male, nor 'T', nor 'mine', nor of anybody else.

In this connection what is ignorance? It is that which, when these very six elements, there are perception of a unit, perception of a lump, perception of the permanent, perception of the stable, perception of the eternal, perception of happiness, perception of the self, perception of a being, a soul, a creature, a person, an individual, a character, perception of a man, a human, perception of 'I' and 'mine'. Suchlike various kinds of
misconception - this is called 'ignorance'. Thus when there is ignorance, lust, hatred and (p.10) delusion are occupied with their objects. In that connection, the lust, hatred and delusion which are linked to these objects, those are called 'volitional actions' (conditioned by ignorance). Consciousness is the recognition of an object. Four aggregates, together with consciousness, are formless, called (the aggregates of) grasping - they are mentality; materiality consists of the four great elements with the derivative forms derived from them - those are materiality; the one is mentality and the other is materiality, and taking them together as one they are mentality-materiality. The faculties connected with mentality-materiality are the six senses. The coming together of the three objects is contact. The experience of contact is feeling. Clinging to feeling is craving. Developed from craving is grasping. Action produced by grasping and producing rebirth (lit. rebecoming) is becoming.

The manifestation of the aggregates, caused by becoming, is birth. The ripening of the aggregates of the person born is ageing. The annihilation of the ageing aggregates is death. The anguish in him with attachments, dying, bewildered, is grief. Speech arising from grief is lamentation. An experience which is unpleasant, conjoined with the groups of the five types of consciousness, is misery. Mental misery conjoined with taking it to heart is dejection. And also those others which are minor causes of misery of this kind are called perturbations.

(p.11) In that connection, ignorance means great darkness. The predispositions (or volitional actions) mean the accumulation of karma. Consciousness means making known. Mentality-materiality means (mutual) support. The six senses

46 So Mdhyā. But Śīksa The four formless aggregates of grasping together with the consciousness produced with them - they are mentality; (materiality) and there are the four great elements, and on the basis of these is derivative form, and abbreviating these together they are mentality-materiality. (Tr. There are 28 subdivisions of the aggregate of form, namely the four great elements (elemental forms) and 24 derivative forms. I am taking upadāya to be a misprint for upādāya.) Bcp 'The four great elements and the objects of grasping are materiality, materiality of these things taken together. The four formless aggregates of grasping, together with the consciousness that arises with them, are mentality. They (together) are mentality-materiality. Tib. has much simplified the sentence thus: 'The four aggregates of grasping, together with the consciousness that arises with them, they are mentality-materiality.' (Tr. The four great elements are earth, air, fire and water.)

47 Śīksa bhavanā (Tr. 'produced by contact is feeling').

48 Tib. 'caused by that (Becoming).

49 Śīksa 'The ripening of the aggregates is ageing'. Bcp 'The ripening of the aggregates brought forth by birth is ageing'.

50 Śīksa 'annihilation is death'. Bcp 'annihilation of the aggregates (or of the body)'.

51 Śīksa, Bcp and Mdhyā 'the internal anguish (of him with attachments)'.

52 Śīksa 'wailing is lamentation'. Bcp śokottthalpanam (Tr. meaning unchanged).

53 Śīksa āśātām (Tr. meaning unchanged).

54 Mdhyā 'associated with the mind'. Bcp 'united with taking to heart the misery'. Śīksa 'united with taking it to heart'.

55 This para. is omitted and abbreviated by 'et al.' in Śīksa.

56 Mdhyā 'The darkness of delusion' (Tr. instead of 'great darkness').

57 Bcp vijnānāna = perceiving, understanding. (Tr. Combined with arthena in the text there would be no way of knowing whether the word ended in -a or -ā.)

Moreover, not understanding the facts, misunderstanding, unknowing, is ignorance. Thus when there is ignorance three kinds of volitional actions come forth: those conducive to merit, those conducive to demerit, those conducive to immovability. In that connection, of the volitional actions conducive to merit there comes to be consciousness just conducive to merit. Of the volitional actions conducive to demerit there comes to be a consciousness just conducive to demerit. Of the volitional actions conducive to immovability there comes to be a consciousness just conducive to immovability. This is called conditioned by volitional actions is consciousness. The four formless aggregates (mentality), with accompanying consciousness, and that which is materiality, that is called conditioned by consciousness is mentality-materiality. The performances of actions proceed by the six doors of the senses with the growth of mentality-materiality. Thus it is said conditioned by mentality-materiality are the six senses. And the six groups of contact originate from the six senses. This is called conditioned by the six senses is contact. When there is contact of a particular kind a feeling of the corresponding kind comes forth. This is called conditioned by contact is feeling. When somebody especially enjoys that feeling, delights in it, clings to it, and having clung to it abides in that condition, that is called conditioned by feeling is craving. Thus the desire which is for its own permanent retention, with the thought, 'let

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58 Om. in Mdhvr.
59 Bcp 'the means of obtaining (the sense impressions)'. Tib. skye.balsgoi.phyir. (Tr. = 'means the entrance of birth') lit. jammadvārārthena.
60 Mdhvr 'means rebirth'.
61 Mdhvr 'means birth' (Tr. Tautology, like other sentences in this paragraph).
62 'of the aggregates' om. in Mdhvr.
63 'by speech' om. in Mdhvr.
64 Bcp upaklesanā... (Tr. using the neuter or feminine action noun) 'means the making of minor causes of misery'.
65 The citation in Bcp ends here.
66 Cited from this para. in Śīkṣ and Bcp, pp.479–83. Mdhvr 'or rather'.

67 Om. in Mdhvr.
68 Śīkṣ: 'Likewise mentality-materiality'. Mdhvr: 'Conditioned by consciousness is mentality-materiality': 'the four formless aggregates beginning with feeling incline towards coming into existence here or there' – this is mentality. Together with the aggregate of materiality it is 'mentality-materiality'. It is called mentality-materiality. Bcp: 'Therefore then, conditioned by consciousness is mentality-materiality'.
69 Mdhvr adds 'and' are known'.
70 Mdhvr adds 'O monks'.
71 Śīkṣ and Bcp 'When somebody feels that (feeling) ... clings to it, abides in it), (Tr. adhiṣṭhati must be a misprint for adhiṣṭhati) Tib. reads 'those particular feelings' ... omitting 'when somebody'.
72 Bcp 'gladdens'. (Tr. 'gladdens (that feeling)' may be a way of saying 'rejoices at that feeling', 'delights in it').
there not be any separation from the state of enjoyment, delight, grasping and clinging by one’s own beloved objects and objects of delight\textsuperscript{73}, this is called (D) \textsuperscript{74}conditioned by craving is grasping'. Thus desiring, he causes rebirth-producing karma to arise, by the body, by speech and by the mind. That is called 'conditioned by grasping is becoming'. (p.13) What\textsuperscript{75} is the coming forth of the five aggregates produced by that karma, that is called 'conditioned by becoming is birth'. There is annihilation on account of the growth and ripening of the aggregates brought forth by birth\textsuperscript{76}. Therefore this is called 'conditioned by birth are old age and death'.

\textsuperscript{77}Thus this twelve-linked dependent origination has mutually related causes, mutually related conditions, is not eternal, not transient, not conditioned, not unconditioned, \textsuperscript{78}not without causes, not without conditions\textsuperscript{78}, not informative, \textsuperscript{79}not liable to destruction, \textsuperscript{80}annihilation or stopping, \textsuperscript{81}not begun at the beginning of time, not destroyed, and proceeds along like the current of a river.

\textsuperscript{82}If this twelve-linked dependent origination has mutually related causes, mutually related conditions, is not eternal, not transient, not conditioned, not unconditioned, not without causes, not without conditions, not informative, not liable to destruction, annihilation or stopping, not begun at the beginning of time, not destroyed, and proceeds along like the current of a river\textsuperscript{82}, then these four links of this twelve-linked dependent origination proceed as causes for assembling (these twelve causes) together. What four? They are ignorance, craving, action and consciousness. \textsuperscript{77}In that connection, consciousness is a cause as a seed by nature. Action is a cause as a field by nature. Ignorance and craving are causes as defilements by nature. Therein the defilements of action produce\textsuperscript{83} the seed of consciousness. Therein action performs the function of a field for the seed of consciousness. (p.14) Craving moistens the seed of consciousness. Ignorance scatters the seed of consciousness.

\textsuperscript{73} 
Bcp 'Retention is more and more the desire, with the thought, "There are. . . (and) grasping; let there not be any separation (from these) by one’s own beloved objects and objects of delight"'. \textsuperscript{Si}kṣ (Tr. the \textsuperscript{Si}kṣ version of this sentence is the same as that of Bcp except that it has ‘my (me) beloved objects. . . ’ instead of ‘one’s own (ārma) beloved objects. . . ’). \textsuperscript{Mdhrv} ‘. . . May there be no separation. . . , from the state of grasping. . . ’. Tib. omits ‘permanent’ and ‘which’.

\textsuperscript{74} \textsuperscript{Mdhrv} adds ‘monks’.

\textsuperscript{75} \textsuperscript{Si}kṣ yā \textsuperscript{karma} . . . sā . . . (Tr. i.e. \textsuperscript{Si}kṣ places ‘what’ at the beginning of the sentence instead of in the middle, and omits ‘that’ before ‘\textsuperscript{karma}’).

\textsuperscript{76} \textsuperscript{Si}kṣ and Bcp Yo jātāyākinīrūṭṭhānam \textsuperscript{skandhānubhānapacayaparipākād \textsuperscript{vināśo bhavati} (Tr. meaning unchanged). Tib. ‘There is ripening (of the aggregates) and annihilation’.

\textsuperscript{77–77} This para. and up to ‘In that connection, consciousness’ in the next para. are omitted and contracted to ‘once more’ in Bcp.

\textsuperscript{78} Om. in \textsuperscript{Si}kṣ.

\textsuperscript{79} \textsuperscript{Mdhrv} adds ‘not uninformative, not dependently originated, not non–dependently originated, . . . not unliable to destruction, . . . annihilation . . . or stopping . . . ’.

\textsuperscript{80} \textsuperscript{Si}kṣ omits ‘not liable to annihilation’.

\textsuperscript{81} \textsuperscript{Si}kṣ adds ‘not marked by dispassion’.

\textsuperscript{82–82} Om. in \textsuperscript{Si}kṣ. \textsuperscript{Mdhrv} reads ‘. . . origination is not destroyed and proceeds along like the current of a river’.

\textsuperscript{83} \textsuperscript{Si}kṣ and Bcp sanjānayanānī ‘produce’ (Tr. meaning unchanged).
In the absence of these conditions there is no coming forth of the seed of consciousness. Here action does not think thus, ‘I perform the function of a field for the seed of consciousness’. Craving also does not think thus, ‘I moisten the seed of consciousness’. Ignorance also does not think thus, ‘I scatter the seed of consciousness’. The seed of consciousness also does not think thus, ‘I am produced by these conditions.’

Nevertheless, the seed of consciousness, established in the field of action, drenched with the moisture of craving, sprouts up, having been well scattered by ignorance. When the sense-organs are being reborn in a suitable place it brings forth the sprout of mentality-materiality in the womb of the mother. And that sprout of mentality-materiality is neither made by itself nor made by another, nor made by both, nor made by God, nor matured by time, nor produced by nature, nor dependent on one cause, nor arisen without causes either. Nevertheless, on account of the union of mother and father, the concurrence of the mother’s season and the coming together of other conditions, the seed of consciousness, incited by their enjoyment, wherever they may be, brings forth the sprout of mentality-materiality in the womb of the mother on the occasion of the sense-organs being suitably reborn, in conditions of existence which have no possessor, which are devoid of an ego, not being [one’s] property, like empty space, and which have the nature of characteristics of a magical illusion, because the causes and conditions are not defective.

(p.15) Now eye-consciousness arises from five causes. From what five? As follows: (E) conditioned by the eye and conditioned by form, light, space and mental advertisement produced by these there arises eye-consciousness. In that connection the eye does the work of the basis of eye-consciousness. The visual object (form) does the work of the sense-object of eye-consciousness. Light does the work of manifesting. Space does the work of freeing (eye-consciousness) from obstructions. Mental advertisement produced by these does the work of focussing the attention. In the absence of these conditions eye-consciousness does not arise. However, when

84 Mdhv ‘those’.
85 Mdhv ‘I perform the function of moistening’.
86 Śīks and Bep ‘But’ (or ‘But yet’).
87 Śīks ‘When the seed of consciousness has been established in the field of action, drenched with the moisture of craving, scattered by ignorance, in the rebirth of the sense organs arising here or there it sprouts up in the womb of the mother. The sprout of mentality-materiality comes forth.’ (Tr. Satri’s áyana is a misprint for áyatana. The Śīks has sandhau but apparently had prati in the margin. See his n.8 on p.224) Bep (Tr. First sentence as in Satri’s work) ‘The sprout of mentality-materiality comes forth’.
88 Śīks ‘created by God and others’. Bep ‘created by God’.
89 Tib omits ‘one’.
90 Śīks ásvādānupraviddham. Bep ásvādānupraviddham. (Tr. I do not think there is any difference in meaning except that maybe ’attracted’ rather than ’incited’ is meant.)
90a Bep ‘in the womb of the mother suitably wherever she may be’.
91 Śīks and Bep add ‘not hostile’.
92 This para. om. in Bep by peyālam ‘as before’.
93 Śīks tajjānca (Tr. probably no difference in meaning intended).
94 Śīks uses locative absolute instead of genitive absolute (Tr. meaning unchanged).
the internal sense of sight is unimpaired, and likewise the visible form, light, space and mental adverention produced by these are unimpaired, then from the coming together of all (these) eye consciousness arises. In that connection the eye does not think thus, 'I do the work of the basis of eye-consciousness'. The visible form also does not think thus, 'I do the work of the sense-object of eye-consciousness'. Light also does not think thus, 'I do the work of manifesting for eye-consciousness'. Space also does not think thus, 'I do the work of freeing eye-consciousness from obstructions'. Mental adverention produced by these also does not think thus, 'I do the work of focussing the attention of eye-consciousness'. Eye-consciousness also does not think thus, 'I am produced by these conditions.' Nevertheless when these conditions are present the arising of eye-consciousness takes place, and likewise the remaining faculties are to be considered each in the appropriate way.

(p.16)

In that connection nothing passes over from this world to another world. However, there is the appearance of the result of action because the causes and conditioned are unimpaired. It is just as if a reflection of a face is seen in a very clean circular mirror. But in that case the face does not pass over into the mirror. However, there is the appearance of the face because the causes and conditions are unimpaired. Likewise, nobody disappears from this world, nor does he appear elsewhere. But the result of action appears because the causes and conditions are unimpaired. It is just as if the moon-disc were moving four thousand yojanas above. Likewise, again, the reflection of the moon is seen in a small pot full of water. But the moon-disc has not fallen from that place and (been) transferred into the small pot of water. However, there is the appearance of the moon-disc because the causes and conditions are unimpaired. Likewise, nobody has disappeared from this world, nor appeared elsewhere. But there is the appearance of the result of action because the causes and conditions are unimpaired.

(F) It is just as when a fire blazes when the condition of fuel is present. When there is inadequate fuel it does not blaze.

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95 Śīks has sarvasamavāya (instead of sarveṣaṁsamavāya (Tr. meaning unchanged, Sastri’s samavāya is a misprint) and the arising of eye-consciousness comes about).
96 Mdhrv adds ‘Likewise’.
97 Śīks omit ‘for eye-consciousness’.
98 Śīks omits ‘for eye-consciousness’.
99 Śīks janāta (Tr. Śīks takes viñāna as masculine, as it does with bija, p.224, 112).
100 Mdhrv ‘Nevertheless on account of the coming together of these conditions which are present...’
101 Mdhrv karaniyam (the same thing) is to be done (with the other faculties). Śīks kartavyam (Tr. the same meaning as Mdhrv).
102 This para. and the following are cited in Bcp.
103 Bcp ‘There is the result of action and there is recognition [i.e. awareness] (of these)...’
104–105 Bcp omits this entire example by peyālam ‘et cetera’, and Śīks does so without it. Mdhrv adds ‘O monks’ after ‘It is just as if’.
105 Tib. omits ‘world’.
106 Mdhrv adds ‘O monks’.
107 Mdhrv adds ‘in the sky above’.
up. In just the same way, the seed of consciousness, produced by the defilements of action, brings forth the sprout of mentality-materiality in the womb of the mother, in the rebirth of the senses arising here or there, in conditions of existence which have no possessor, which are devoid of an ego, not being [one's] property, like empty space, and which have the nature of characteristics of a magical illusion, because (p.17) the causes and conditions are not defective. Thus is the dependence on conditions of the internal dependent origination to be seen.

In that connection the internal dependent origination is to be seen with five aspects. With what five? 'Neither on account of eternity, nor on account of annihilation, nor on account of transference, on account of annihilation, on account of the production of a major result from a minor cause, and on account of the continuity (of the effect) corresponding (to the cause)'. How is it not on account of eternity? Because the aggregates ending in death are one thing and the aggregates belonging to birth are another. Nor is it that the aggregates ending in death and those belonging to birth are identical. Nevertheless, the aggregates ending in death are destroyed. And at that very time the aggregates belonging to birth appear. Therefore, it is not on account of eternity. How is it not on account of annihilation? Neither when the aggregates ending in death have been previously destroyed do the aggregates belonging to birth appear, nor when they are not destroyed. Nevertheless, the aggregates ending in death are destroyed, and at that very time the aggregates belonging to birth appear, like the swinging up and down of the arm of a balance. Therefore, it is not on account of annihilation. How is it not on account of transference? Different kinds of beings achieve birth as the same type of being. Therefore, it is not on account of transference. How is it on account of the production of a major result from a minor cause? A small minor cause is done; a consequent major result is experienced. Therefore, it is on account of the production of a major result from a minor cause. How is it on account of the continuity (of

108 Śīks (Tr. instead of these two sentences has) 'It is just as when a fire does not blaze because there is inadequate fuel'. Bcp reading like Śīks, adds 'but does blaze up when there is no lack of fuel'. Tib reads ... (does) not (blaze up) because the causes and conditions are inadequate. (but) blazes up because all the causes and conditions are present.

109 Mādhyānata ('a reflection of the moon-disc in water').

110 This sentence om. in Mādhyānata and Śīks.

111 Mādhyānata, Śīks and Bcp 'causes' (Tr. instead of 'aspects').

112 Bcp adds 'which appear'.

113 Tib. omits 'and at that very time'. Bcp omits this sentence and the previous one. Śīks for these two sentences has 'Nevertheless the aggregates ending in death are being destroyed and the aggregates belonging to birth appear'.

114 Śīks omits 'ending in death' and 'previously'.

115 Śīks omits 'at that very time'. (Tr. n.115 over māraṇāntikesu should be deleted.)

116 Mādhyānata adds 'like the reflection of the moon-disc in water'.

117 Śīks and Bcp 'It is because the (five) aggregates which belong together from each different kind of being are reborn in a different birth'.

Tib. 'From each different kind of being rebirth occurs in a birth common to all'. La Vallée Poussin reports that Tib. of Mādhyānata reads with a negative mgon.par.hgrup.par.mi.hyed.pao. (See Mādhyānata p.569, n.5). But our Xylograph has no such reading.
the effect) corresponding (to the cause)? As the action that is to be accomplished is performed, so the result that is to be correspondingly experienced is experienced. Therefore, it is also on account of the continuity (of the effect) corresponding (to the cause). Thus the internal dependent origination is to be seen with five (aspects)\(^{118}\).

\(^{119}\) Whoever, Venerable Śāriputra, sees this dependent origination, duly taught by the Blessed One, thus truly by wisdom according to the facts, \(^{120}\) as continually without a self, soulless, accordingly not untrue, unborn, unbecome, uncreated, uncompounded, unobstructed, without support\(^{121}\), auspicious, secure, that which cannot be taken away, permanent, unceasing, and without self-nature, and (G) regards it as unreal\(^{122}\), vain, void\(^{123}\), insubstantial, \(^{124}\) as a disease, as a boil, as a splinter\(^{125}\); as pain, as impermanent, as misery, as empty, as without a self, (H) pays no attention to the past, thinking, 'Did indeed I exist in past time, or did I not exist in past time? Who indeed was I in past time? \(^{126}\) how indeed was I in past time?\(^{127}\)' Or again, he pays no attention to the future, thinking, 'Will I indeed exist in future time or will I not exist in future time? Who indeed will I be in future time? \(^{128}\) how will I be in future time?\(^{129}\)' Or again he pays no attention to the present, thinking, 'What indeed is this, how indeed is this being who we shall become?\(^{130}\), where did this being (i.e. I) come from, where will he go when he dies?\(^{131}\) What false views there will be in the common world of some\(^{132}\) ascetics and brahmins, namely those pertaining to the theory of the self, to the theory of a being\(^{133}\), to the theory of a soul, to the theory of a person, (I) to the theory of auspicious ceremonies, having been initiated and finished with, having been abandoned at the time, (J) having been recognised, completely cut off at the roots, disappeared like the tuft of leaves at the top of a palm tree (cut down), and having the nature of not arising or ceasing in the future.

He who, Venerable Śāriputra, fully endowed with willingness to accept such a doctrine, fully understands the dependent origination, for him the Tathāgata, Arhat, the perfectly enlightened one, endowed with knowledge and conduct, who has attained happiness, knower of the worlds, supreme charioteer of men to be tamed, teacher of gods and men, the Blessed Buddha, predicts perfect, supreme enlightenment, saying, 'You will become a perfectly, supremely enlightened Buddha.' Thus spoke Maitreya, the Bodhisattva, the

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\(^{118}\) Tib. Śīks and Mdhv omit this sentence. Thus ends the citation in Bcp. Mdhv also closes its long citation here.

\(^{119}\) Mdhv cites this para. on p.593f. 'It was said thus in the holy Śāliṣṭambha Sūtra by the great Bodhisattva, the holy Maitreya, Who (sees) this dependent origination...'.

\(^{120}\) This set of phrases is already referred to on p.29. See n.7.

\(^{121}\) Mdhv and Śīks 'without obstructions'.

\(^{122}\) Śīks 'untrue'.

\(^{123}\) Mdhv and Śīks rktakā (Tr. instead of rktakāh, meaning unchanged).

\(^{124}\)–\(^{125}\) Śīks omits 'as a disease... boil... splinter'.

\(^{125}\)–\(^{126}\) Śīks omits this clause.

\(^{126}\) Quotation in Śīks ends here.

\(^{127}\) Tib. 'where did these beings come from, where will they go when they die?'

\(^{128}\) Tib. omits 'some'.

\(^{129}\) Mdhv omits 'to the theory of a being'. 
Great Being. Then the Venerable Śāriputra, together with the worlds of gods, men, demons and Gandharvas rejoiced in and applauded the words of Maitreya, the Bodhisattva, the Great Being.

The Mahāyāna sūtra called 'The Holy (Sūtra) of the Clump of Rice Plants' is completed.

(iii) The original reconstructed opening of the Sūtra

The first paragraph of the Sūtra as translated above is taken from "Additions and Alterations" on p.xlii, where it says 'The beginning portion of the Sūtra is cited in Abhidharmakōsavyākhyā (ed. U. Wogihara, 2 vols, Tokyo 1932-6. = AbhKvy) III, p.48'. However, as the footnotes, the additional notes and the comparison with a Chinese version of the Sūtra refer to the first two paragraphs of Sastri's text as originally reconstructed by him on [his] pp.1-2, these two paragraphs are translated below.

Translation

(p.1) Thus have I heard. At one time the Blessed One was living at Rājagṛha, on the Grdhakūta (Vulture's Peak), with a large company of monks, 1,250 monks, and very many Bodhisattvas, Great Beings. The Venerable Śāriputra approached the place (A) where Maitreya the Bodhisattva, the Great Being used to walk up and down. When he had approached they conducted a diverse friendly conversation with each other and both sat down on a stone slab.

Then the Venerable Śāriputra said this to Maitreya, the Bodhisattva, the Great Being: 'Having looked at a clump of rice plants here today, Maitreya, the Blessed One spoke this Sūtra to the monks, (B) 'He who, monks, sees dependent origination sees the teaching; he who sees the teaching sees the Buddha'. Having spoken thus the Blessed One fell silent. Now, Maitreya, (p.2) what is the meaning of this aphorism spoken by the Buddha? What is dependent origination? What is the teaching. What is the Buddha? How, seeing dependent origination, does one see the teaching? How, seeing the teaching, does one see the Buddha?'

(End of opening section; this section corresponds to the first paragraph in the body of the translation.)

1 I.e. (he was walking on) the ground, or floor, of the monastery. Tib. 'Maitreya's ambulatory'. Cp. Vinaya Texts (SBE), II, pp.7, 390, n.4.
2 Pāli expression: 'Having conducted a friendly and polite conversation' — e.g. in M I (27), p.178.
3 These sentences are reproduced in AbhKvy ad III, 28. N. Dutt's ed., p.48. See La Vallée Poussin's note in his edition of Mdhvr, p.6, n.2. The phrase 'He who (sees) dependent origination' etc., is oft-quoted as ñāgama (Tr. traditional doctrine) in Buddhist Sanskrit literature; e.g. Mdhvr, p.160, 6; and Bhavya's Karatalaratna, p.39, [rec. by N.A. Sastri, Adyar 1938].
(iv) Translator's notes

a [in section iii] (p.xlii Sastri) Gradhra must be a misprint for Grdhra.
b [this, and the following, in main translation (section ii)] Or: ‘sees those characteristics of Arhats and the holy ones proceeding to Arhatship’.
c Am should be abhayam ‘secure’.
d The text says: The seed also does not think thus, ‘I bring forth the seed’. As this does not seem to make sense I have risked emending it.
e Or transmigration.
f asu must be a misprint for esu.
g Emending gharma to dharma. The three objects must be the sense organ, the object of sense and the consciousness arising from the contact of these two.
h Vatipula is Pāli vepullaṃ (Childers) = development, quoting from the Prātimokṣasūtra.
i See Nyānatiloka’s Buddhist Dictionary (4th ed., BPS, Kandy 1980), pp.16, 30, 106-7 and 180, ‘Puñña: “Meritorious” are called the karmically wholesome (kusala) states of the Sensuous Sphere (kāmāvacara) and the Fine-material Sphere (rūpāvacara), whereas the wholesome states of the Immaterial Sphere (arūpāvacara) are called Imperturbable (anēnja) [which I have translated as ‘immovable’]. Demeritorious acts can only result in rebirth in the kāmāvacara, the Sensuous Sphere.
j Action (karma) must be volitional action (samskāra).
k Sastri’s avakīromi must be a misprint. Śikṣ has avakīrāmi (p.224). It may mean that ignorance scatters the seed or that it covers it up.
l Abhinirvayati must be a misprint for abhinirvartayati; cf. [Sastri’s] p.14; 13 from bottom.

m A yojana may be anything from two and a half to eighteen miles, according to Monier-Williams’s Dictionary.

n Reading samkrāntih as samkrāntitah.
o The force of the argument is that a creature can be reborn as a different kind of creature, which is not what one would expect if the soul-migration theory were true.
p This idea is confirmed in Abhidharmakośa III. 25c-d: ‘Turning away from complete bewilderment in the past, future and intermediate time.’ (See Sastri, p.xlii).
q Compare ‘He whose faults have been completely destroyed and cut down like the top of a palm tree, will attain concentration by day and by night’ (Udānavarga 10, ‘Śraddhāvarga - Faith’, v.13 in BSR 4, 2, 1987, p.96 (tr. from the French of N.P. Chakravarti by Sara Boin-Webb)).

(v) Additional Notes (Sastri, pp.29-30)

(A) p.1, 14 [in section iii above]: Caṅkrama (Tr. ambulatory) is a place where a monk walks in circuit while reciting dhāranī, a prayer (Tr. i.e. japa, mantra or incantation); cp. Bhartrhari’s verse, caṅkramāna dhiṇvātra japamāsacakramanaṃ kuru (Tr. “Recite while walking up and down” here means “Do caṅkramana while muttering (a prayer etc.”)), cited in Mahābhāṣya II, p.247 (Bombay edition). A reference to the Buddha’s caṅkama at Sarnath is made in the Inscription in the third year of Kaniska, see Epigraphia Indica VII, p.176.

(B) p.1, 18 [section iii]: Cp. M I (28), Mahābhāthipadopama Sutta (Tr. ‘The Greater Discourse on the Simile of the Elephant’s Footprint’), p.191, ll. 1, 26-7: “This, moreover, was spoken by the Blessed One. “He who sees dependent origination sees the
teaching (Dhamma); he who sees the teaching sees dependent origination". - a discourse by Sāriputta. Note Dhamma in this passage is not the Eightfold Path as understood in the Sālistamba Sūtra; S III 120: 'He who sees the teaching sees me; he who sees me sees the teaching'. Cp. It. 92. See La Vallée Poussin, 'Notes sur les corps du Bouddha', *Le Muséon* 1913, pp.259-90.

(C) p.8, l.14 [main text, section ii above, for this and following notes]: 'in the way of a bundles of nada-reeds'; cp. Mahānīdatā Sutta, D II 55 [correctly 15]; S I; Oldenberg, *Buddha, op. cit.*, p.230; AbhKVy VIII, pp.667, 31: 'because mentality and materiality are said to be mutually dependent, like two bundles of nada-reeds'. Yaśomitra cites some passages from a Sūtra: "It is as follows, venerable sir: if two bundles of nada-reeds were in the sky above and they were leaning against each other, then leaning against each other they would stay in position. If someone were to remove one, the other would fall down; if the other were removed, the one would fall down. In this way, Venerable Śāriputra, mentality and materiality are dependent on one another. Depending on one another they endure' and so forth" (p.668, 1-6). Nāgārjuna also uses this simile in his *Pratītyasamutpādaḥṛdaya* (Tr. 'Heart of Dependent Origination') ad ver.1.

(D) p.12, 9: Cp. M I (38) p.267: 'That which is delight in feelings is grasping'.

(E) p.15, 2: Cp. M I (28) pp.190-1: Where mention is made only of the three: cakkhu ['eye'], rūpa ['form or object seen'] and manasikāra ['mental advertence'].

(F) p.16, 12: M I (72) p.487: 'A fire blazes in dependence on fuel in the form of straw and firewood' etc. See Upādānasutta, S II 84, for a fully developed simile.

(G) p.18, 10-12: 'regards. . . as without a self'. Cp. M I (64) p.435, 32-34 and p.436, 30-32.

(H) p.18-p.19, 2: 'past time', 'future time' and 'the present' are detailed in exactly similar terms in M I (38) p.265, 1-17.

(I) p.19, 4: Cp. M I (38), p.265, 25. "Or would you, monks. . . fall back on those which are the customs and curious ceremonies of ordinary recluses and brahmins (thinking) these to be the essence?"

(J) p.19, 6: Cp. M I (72) p.487: "Even so, Vaccha, that material shape by which one recognising the Tathāgata might recognise him - that material shape has been got rid of by the Tathāgata, cut off at the root, made like a palm-tree stump that can come to no further existence and is not liable to arise again on the future". And [M 36] p.250: '.."Even as, Aggivesana, a palm tree whose crown is cut off cannot come to further growth, even so, Aggivesana, got rid of, cut off at the root, made like a palm-tree stump so that they can come to no further existence in the future are those cankers [Tr. of the Tathāgata - missing in Sastri] that have to do with the defilements, with again-becoming, that are fearful [Tr. Sastri's *sādāra* is an error], whose result is anguish, making birth, ageing and dying in the future". (Tr. note: In the above two passages from Pāli I have followed the PTS version.)
hishiryō presupposes an intuitive actualisation of inner energies with an invisible centre which is yet tangible through its effects and transforming power. It is part of a common vocabulary of ‘understanding’ among Japanese steeped in Zen and its allied arts (dō). On the empirical level, it is rooted in the hara (Chin. t'ou-t'ien) and there is nothing arbitrary about it. However, on p.116, Stambaugh seems to go out of her way to distance Dōgen’s understanding of sazen from any formal praxis at all and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that this was done in order to make Dōgen’s ideas seem more congruent with Heidegger’s than the facts really warrant, and to do so is as unfair to Dōgen as it is to Heidegger. Generally, this chapter is so loaded with ‘Heidegger’ that it is intrusive (given the title of the book). For all of Heidegger’s apparent divergence from traditional Western metaphysics, his ideas are still individualistic/subjective in a distinctly Western sense. Watsuji Tetsurō’s ‘Ethics’ (Rinrigaku, vols 10 and 11 of his Zenshū) illustrates some significant differences; where Heidegger posits the individuality of Dasein (the being-in-the-world of an individual), Watsuji stresses the collectivity of Mitsein, showing that the Japanese model is only able to posit the existence of the ‘individual’ within the context of his relatedness-to-others (ningen). This is not meant to be a criticism of Heidegger, we are simply pointing out areas where the Japanese model differs from Heidegger.

A final point: Heidegger once spoke of language as ‘the house of Being’ - but it is hard to imagine Dōgen doing the same, despite his recognition of the need to give expression (dōtoku) to the Dharma, and at this point, I think the dialogue breaks down, or rather, it just ceases to be relevant. Stambaugh’s extensive use of parallels drawn from the Western tradition leaves precious little room to appraise Dōgen’s ideas against the general background of Mahāyāna Buddhism and, as such, this work provides us with a peculiarly foreshortened view of Dōgen’s teaching. The facts are that Dōgen was not a ‘thinker’ in the Western sense at all and, in the final estimate, the only way to assimilate his ideas is to utilise that essential praxis recommended in his teachings. Inevitably, however, the kind of dialogue that Stambaugh has in mind will continue to grow and, so far as it goes, this book is a genuine attempt to explore dialogue between the two traditions and well worth reading.

CORRIGENDA & ADDENDA TO BSR 8, 1-2 (1991)

1) THE ŚĀLISTAMBĀ SŪTRA translated by John M. Cooper, pp.21-57

p.27, l.18: for p.00 read p.53.
p.29, l.3: for ‘independent’ read ‘dependent’.
p.37, l.12: after ‘elements’ insert ‘are present’.
p.39, l.2: for ‘person born’ read ‘born one’ (Tr. not necessarily human).

l.3: for ‘aging’ read ‘aged’; after ‘death’ add ‘Or: the annihilation of the worn-out body is death’.
p.49, l.13: delete ‘small’.
p.51, l.5: delete ‘being who shall we become’ and replace by ‘being who shall we become’.
p.54, l.2: for ‘section iii’ read ‘section ii’.
2) THE KĀŚYAPAPARĪVARTA (KP) BIBLIOGRAPHY by Bhikkhu Pāśādika, pp.59-70.

Only when the latest issue of BSR was in the press and while I was writing another paper on KP ('Remarks on Two Kāśyapaparivarta Translations'), I remembered the publication of two fragments of Central Asian Sanskrit manuscripts of KP by Vorob'ev-Desjatovskij to which J. W. de Jong refers in 'Sanskrit Fragments of the Kāśyapaparivarta', pp.251-3. As for bibliographical particulars, I am much obliged to Prof. O. v. Hinüber of Freiburg University who was so kind as to fill the lacuna in the bibliographical remarks by sending me the following piece of information wanting at loc. cit., p.61 (between Item Nos 15-16):

1957: Vorob'ev-Desjatovskij, 'Vnov' najdennye listy rukopisej
Kāśyaparivarty' (Newly Found Leaves of KP MSS) in Rocznik
Orientalistyczny 21, pp.491-500.

Bh. P.

3) NEWS & NOTES, p. 148

The contact address for the Fundación Instituto de Estudios Budistas is now: Olazábal 1584, 3° "C", 1428 Buenos Aires, Argentina.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Udāna, Inspired Utterances of the Buddha. Translated by
pp. $8.50.

It is certainly time that we had a new translation of the Udāna,
as the only available version is to be found among the Pāli Text
Society's series originally published in 1925. The BPS presents
this new translation with an attractive cover, good paper and a
clear modern typeface, quite an achievement in Sri Lanka
considering the troubled times there.

The translator has rendered the Pāli prose and verse into
free-flowing English as well as brought out the deep meaning of
these brief sayings. As an example of this, readers should look
at the account of Bāhiya (110), perhaps comparing it with the
older translation. We are fortunate that the translator of this
book is a Buddhist who has practised for many years.

He provides us with many notes drawn from Pāli
traditional commentaries by way of explaining some matters in
the text which are unclear. These notes are usually based on the
explanations of the Commentaries, though in a few cases he
offers us other possible interpretations. For instance, the Comy
always shows disdain for brahmins who are described as
uttering the sound HUM, said to be a mark of their pride. The
translator accordingly translates hukumka as 'naughty'. The
verse ascribed to the Buddha (1.4) also mentions being 'without
Hum Hum', as though the Hum-repetition were an evil. So it is
interesting to reflect that later Buddhists have valued the
practice of sounding Hum and not seen it as anything to do
with caste or pride.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REMARKS BEARING ON THE
KĀŚYAPAPARIVARTA

Bhikkhu Pāsādika

In view of the fact that the oldest strata of the Kāśyapaparivarta (KP) point to the very beginnings of Mahāyāna/Bodhisattvayāna literature proper (cf. E. Conze's observations in his review of F. Weller's German translation of KP, No.31 below), bibliographical remarks pertaining to this text may not be out of place, although exhaustiveness cannot be claimed. Special thanks are offered to Professors H. Bechert and J.W. de Jong, to Peter Skilling and Russell Webb for having provided me with relevant materials and valuable pieces of information.


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3 plates showing, *inter alia*, epigraphical remains of parts of KP) in EZ III, pt.20, pp.199-212.

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Index to the Tibetan Translation of the Kāśyapa-parivarta, Cambridge, Mass.

7 1934: Yamaguchi, S. (ed.)

Madhyānta-vibhāgaṭikā of Sthiramati (containing 11 KP quotations; cf. No.34), Nagoya.

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9 1939: Paranavitana, S.

'A Note on the Iñikatūsāya Copper Plaques' (a comparative study of short KP extracts written on 15 of the Iñikatūsāya plaques and corresponding portions in von Staël-Holstein's text) in EZ IV, pt.5, pp.238-42.

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CERTAINTY AND THE DEATHLESS

John D. Ireland

There is a generally held opinion among scholars that at the
time of the Buddha there were many lay persons who had
become arahants, although during the early centuries of
Buddhist history this had been a matter of dispute - some
insisting that to achieve this goal a person would have to be a
bhikkhu or monk, others that a lay person was able to become
an arahant, but could not then retain his lay status. The
Theravāda tradition is that if a layman did become an arahant
he either 'went forth', that is, entered the Sangha, or passed
away (parinibbāyai) that same day (Milindapañha, p.264). In
the Tevijjā-Vacchagotta Sutta (M 71) the Buddha states that no
lay person can become an arahant without getting rid of the
'householder's fetter' (gihisamyojana). The household life was
thus not considered propitious for arahantship. Is there,
however, any firm evidence in the Sutta Piṭaka that lay arahants
did exist? As it has been a matter of dispute this seems unlikely,
but the purpose of this essay is to examine some of the
evidence regarding the problem of the lay arahant and the
nature of the ariya-sāvaka ('noble disciple') in Pāli canonical
literature.

In Dialogues of the Buddha (Vol.III, p.5), the Rhys Davids'
translation of the Dīgha Nikāya, there is a footnote giving
several references said to demonstrate the existence of lay
arahants at the time of the Buddha. The first reference is to
Vin I (p.17) where Yasa becomes an arahant while the Buddha
instructs his (i.e. Yasa's) father. In fact Yasa was not at that
moment a bhikkhu, but the circumstances being such he could hardly be said to be living an ordinary lay life. He immediately afterwards asks for the ‘going forth’, thus conforming to the tradition mentioned above. On consulting the second reference, S V 94, this mentions nothing about arahants lay or otherwise and must be an error. The next reference is to A III 451 which consists of the names of twenty or so laymen and of each it is said that he ‘. . . has arrived at certainty regarding the Tathāgata, has seen the Deathless and lives (motivated by) having experienced the Deathless’ (. . . tathāgata niḥṭāṅgata amataddaso amatama sacchikatkā iriyati).

That this passage does not refer to lay arahants is confirmed by the Commentary. It merely alludes to the fact that these laymen are ariya-sāvaka, assured of salvation. However, it is this reference (apparently) that has been added as being the main evidence for the existence of lay arahants by modern scholars. That the laymen named did indeed become either sotāpannas, sakadāgāmins or anāgāmins (stream-entrainers, once-returners, non-returners) can be confirmed by consulting the further references to them to be found in various places. Most are well-known individuals, such as Anātha-piṇḍika, Mahānīma, Purāṇa, Isidatta, Hatthaka of Álavi, etc., whose fates are known from elsewhere in the Sutta Piṭaka, but there are no arahants on the list.

That this Aṅguttara passage has been taken to refer to laymen becoming arahants was evidently due to C.A.F. Rhys Davids’ misunderstanding of it and E.M. Hare’s translating it incorrectly in Gradual Sayings. Hare’s rendering of niṭṭhaṅgata as ‘gone to the end’ (GS III, pp.313-14) is wrong if the various other contexts where the word occurs are consulted. Niṭṭha does indeed mean ‘end, conclusion’, but in combination with the verb gacchati (‘to go’), it evidently means ‘to come to a conclusion (about something), to be sure, to be certain, to come to or arrive at a certainty’. Note that the Pāli idiom ‘gone’ is used where in English we would say ‘come’. In the Cūḷa-Hathipadoma Sutta (M 27), for example, occurs the sentence: ‘When I saw four footprints in the Samana Gotama I was certain [or, I came/went to the conclusion, niṭṭham agamami], “The Blessed One is fully enlightened. . .”’

In the Anguttara passage, too, it is the Buddha or Tathāgata who is referred to. Again, in the Udana Commentary (p.76) occurs this sentence: ‘Therefore it must be concluded (niṭṭham. . . ganabham), not by water is one cleansed.’

The negative anīṭṭhaṅgata is also found (e.g. A II 174, S III 99), meaning ‘being unsure, uncertain’, and is a synonym of hesitation or doubt (kaṅkhitā, vicikicchitā). It ought to be obvious that an adaptation of ‘gone to the end’ would not fit the examples quoted, nor is it likely anywhere else where the expression occurs. However, following Hare’s rendering, it is probably Lamotte’s paraphrase of this Aṅguttara passage in his Histoire du bouddhisme indien that has been crucial in misleading many scholars and authors. He says ‘The Aṅguttara knows of some twenty lay people. . . who attained the end (niṭṭha), the Immortal (amṛta), without ever having taken up the

1 Notably in the Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names (PTS).
religious life. This is a distorted and misleading account of what the text actually says. Nevertheless, it has apparently been accepted without question by many ever since it appeared in 1958 and it is thus this reference that is most often cited as evidence for the existence of lay arahants.

Far from implying some final attainment, tathāgatenaṁ nīthāṅgato simply means the person concerned has reached a conclusion about the Tathāgata; he has the certainty that the Buddha is indeed fully enlightened. It is because he has acquired the faith or confidence (saddhā) that arises through knowledge and insight into the Dhamma taught by the Buddha. His certainty arises because he has actually 'seen the Deathless' for himself. He is amatadassato 'one who sees (dassato) the Deathless (amatā). The Buddha has revealed to him the four Noble Truths (ariya-sacca), specifically the ending of suffering, which is the Deathless, and the path leading to it. And he has understood it, that is, he has acquired Right View and thus stepped onto the Path, the ariya-magga. Right View is acquired by hearing the Teaching with the Dhamma-ear (dhammasota) and seeing the goal by having the Dhamma-eya (dhammadakkhu) opened for him by the Buddha. It is by means of the Dhamma-eya that the Deathless is seen. The whole process is described in the story of Suppabuddha the leper (Udāna 5.3), where the Buddha by a gradual talk prepares Suppabuddha's mind, uplifts and purifies it from the hindrances to understanding, and when the moment is right, reveals the four Truths: suffering, origination, cessation and the Path. Whereupon the 'stainless Dhamma-eye arises' that sees 'whatever is of the nature to originate (through conditions), all that is of a nature to cease (through their removal)'. Suppabuddha declares he has understood, affirms his faith in the Buddha by going for refuge, and is later said to have become a sotāpanna. The point is, Nibbāna or the Deathless or the four Truths are seen at the moment of entry onto the ariyan-plane. Thus, to have 'seen the Deathless' is again not a final attainment, but the initiation into what, for us who have not seen it, must remain a profound mystery; the opening of the 'door to the Deathless', whereby the ordinary person, the outsider or puthujjana, is transformed into an ariya-sāvaka.

However, there is still work to be done, the Path has still to be trodden, and this is indicated by the ending of this brief Anguttara passage. The verb iriyati means: 'to go on, to proceed, to progress, or to live or behave in a particular way'.

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2 Etienne Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism, English tr. by Sara Webb-Boin [correctly Boin-Webb], Louvain 1968, p.80.

3 Richard Robinson, in what is obviously a quote of this Lamotte passage, states, 'The Sutta partially twenty upāsakas who attained the highest goal without ever becoming monks' (The Buddhist Religion, Belmont 1970, p.37); also H.W. Schumann, 'The Pali Canon lists the names of twenty-one householders who became Arahants without ever becoming monks' (The Historical Buddha, tr. by M.O.C. Walshe, London 1989, p.191). And Nathan Katz too, when he says, 'Certainly if one reads the primary texts on this issue, one learns of numerous lay arahants' (Buddhist Images of Human Perfection, Delhi 1982, p.179), one may hazard a guess he is referring to Lamotte. These are just three examples.

4 The Path always begins with Right View and progresses stepwise in a causal sequence as indicated in the Mahācattārīsakā Sutta (M 117). This is despite Nyanatiloka's denial, - see his Buddhist Dictionary under 'Magga'.
indicates activity, movement, and the reason for it is because of ‘having experienced, or realised, the Deathless’ (amatam sacchikavā). In other words, the experience of having seen the Deathless is now the motivating force in his life, that impels him onward towards its final attainment.

Are there any other references in the Sutta Pitaka that can establish there were arahants at the time of the Buddha who continued living as laymen? We believe there are none that stand up to serious consideration. There is S V 410, for instance, which deals with how a wise lay-follower (sapañño upāsaka) should admonish another wise lay-follower who is sick so that the latter gets rid of all attachments. It ends with the Buddha declaring there is no difference between such a layman who so avers and a bhikkhu who is rid of the āsavas (i.e an arahant). However, the point is that this is a deathbed exhortation and so conforms to the idea, mentioned above, that the attainment of the highest goal by a lay person necessitates either dying or ‘going forth’ as a bhikkhu. Another example of such an exhortation is that of Sāriputta instructing Anāthapindika as he lay on his deathbed (M 143), but this did not lead to Anāthapindika becoming an arahant. Here it is said that he was a sotāpanna and after death was reborn as a deva in the Tusita heaven. Another possibility is the Sekha Sutta (M 53), which was addressed to a company of lay people headed by Mahānāma the Sakyan. This deals with the course of training leading up to the highest goal. But practising this course necessitates becoming a bhikkhu, for the Sutta states that the disciple undertakes to observe the Pātimokkha and thus implies the removal of the ‘householder’s fetter’: the ownership of property, the accumulation and storing of possessions, the procreation of children and so forth.

It may seem unfair that the laity are excluded from the highest goal. However, this view is based upon a number of misconceptions and the assumption of a rivalry between the laity and the Sangha, an assumption for which there is no justification at the time of the Buddha. Although arahantship evidently necessitated living the bhikkhu-life, lay people could be sotāpannas, sakadāgāmins and anāgāmins, and many were, and in large numbers, if the suttas are to be believed. All these constituted the Blessed One’s community of disciples assured of salvation, the ariya-sangha. And not only human beings, for divine beings, too, devas and brahmas from the various heavenly worlds, were included in this spiritual community. It is this ariya-sangha in its entirety that is said to be ‘... worthy of offerings, worthy of hospitality, worthy of gifts, worthy of salutation, an incomparable field of merit for the world’, it should be noted, and not merely the Bhikkhu Sangha per se as is sometimes suggested and assumed. All these various kinds of noble persons are equally assured of salvation, in contrast to the puthujjana, the outsider, who has had no such assurance. So the sotāpanna, etc. should not be regarded as being inferior to the arahant in this respect. There is also another consideration. The Theravāda commentarial tradition assumes that the goal of all Buddhist endeavour is arahantship and the three ‘lower’ paths of the sotāpanna, etc. are stages on the way to that goal. However, in the suttas themselves there is very little to support this theory and it may be that originally the four ‘paths’ were possibly regarded not as ‘stages’ but as alternative goals that were realised by the individuals concerned. Depending upon the capacity of the person - perhaps due to past kamma which varied for each individual - upon being instructed in the Dhamma, he or she attained one or other of the paths (of the
sotāpanna, etc.). This instruction in the Dhamma is sometimes said to be initiated by the Buddha when he perceives, by reading the minds of his audience, someone there is capable (bhābbo) of understanding it and realising one or other of these paths, as was the case with the leper Suppabuddha. In the suttas, furthermore, once named individuals are declared to be sotāpannas, etc., it is never said they finally ended as another kind of noble person (ariya-puggala). Nor is it ever suggested that those who became arahants had first to become sotāpannas, then sakadāgāmins and anāgāmins as is assumed in the Commentaries. In fact it is the definitions of these various persons that preclude one kind from becoming any other, as Horner once pointed out. All are equal in that, upon being taught the Dhamma by the Buddha, they have been granted a vision of the Deathless and established upon the path leading to its actualisation, to aṇñā or final knowledge. However, the several kinds of ariya-sāvaka are distinguished by the length of time they must continue in existence before realising this aim, this probably being due to the nature of their past kamma still awaiting fruition. The arahant attains aṇñā 'here in this present life' (diṭṭheva dhamme, 'in this invisible state'). In a number of places (e.g. S V 237, etc.) it is said, if a person does not attain aṇñā beforehand [patihacc, a gloss on diṭṭheva dhamme] here in this present life, then he attains it at the time of dying. If he does not attain aṇñā beforehand here in this present life nor... at the time of dying, then by the destruction of the five lower fetters he attains extinction in the interval (antarā-parinibbāyān, i.e. without returning 'here', that is, he is the first of the five kinds of anāgāmin or non-returner). Elsewhere, final knowledge in this present life and the state of non-returning are called the twin fruits of the holy life (brahma-cariya). For the sakadāgāmin and the sotāpanna a yet longer period must elapse before final knowledge is attained. They have to undergo several more births up to a maximum of seven. The significance of all this is that, once an individual has left his present life before attaining aṇñā, he has passed beyond the point where he could become an arahant. Moreover, the once-returner or sakadāgāmin, because he is a 'returner' cannot, naturally, then become a non-returner and so forth.

Not only could lay people become sotāpannas, sakadāgāmins and anāgāmins, but references in the Sutta Pitaka to the first and second especially allude more often to the lay ariya-sāvaka than to the bhikkhu. This is in contradiction to the view sometimes stated by modern writers. In fact when,

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6 This is a term of uncertain meaning. There are a number of reasons for thinking it may indicate the existence of an 'intermediate state' between death and rebirth, an antarāhāvī, and accepted as such by some Buddhist schools, the Sarvāstivāda, etc. But this is not countenanced in the Theravāda exegetical tradition which denies the existence of such a state. For an examination of this problem see Masefield, op. cit., p.109f.

7 E.g. M 10; It, suttas 45–7, etc. ‘... one of these two fruits is to be expected, final knowledge in this present life or, there being some residual defilement (upādisesa), the state of non-returning’.

8 E.g. Steven Collins, *Selfless Persons*, Cambridge 1982, p.92, says, ‘... the idea of being a person on the Path, and therefore at least a stream-winner
upon being instructed in the Dhamma by the Buddha, a person declares he goes for refuge ‘to the Lord, to the Dhamma and to the Order of bhikkhus’ and then says, ‘May the Lord accept me as a lay-follower as one gone for refuge from this day forth for as long as life lasts’, one may conclude that person to be an ariya-sāvaka and at least on the sotāpanna path. Whereas if, instead of becoming a lay-follower, he says, ‘May I, Lord, receive the going forth in the Lord’s presence...’, this is almost invariably followed by, ‘Then the venerable so-and-so... soon realised even here in this present life through his own direct knowledge that unequalled goal of the holy life... And the venerable so-and-so became one of the arahants’. It seems as if it is expected that one who goes forth will become an arahant, or that he goes forth because he knows he has the capability to become one.

In the Mahā-Vacchagotta Sutta (M 73) there is found a threefold division of the Buddha’s followers. First there are the monks and nuns who are arahants, then there are the lay-followers who are of two kinds (1) householders, both men and women, who are living the holy life (brahmacariya, which must mean the practice of celibacy here) and are anāgāmins, and (2) householders of both sexes who are enjoyers of sense-pleasures (i.e. non-celibates) who ‘have accepted the Teaching, overcome doubt and perplexity (i.e. ‘have arrived at certainty’) and live confident and independent of others in the

Teacher’s instruction’. Of each of these six categories (three pairs of male and female) the Buddha says there are not merely a hundred... five hundred, but many more such followers and Vacchagotta remarks that if any one of these categories was missing the holy life propagated by the good Gotama would be incomplete in this regard.

That there actually existed lay people who were celibates during the Buddha’s lifetime may seem surprising, even a novel idea, hardly mentioned in modern Buddhist writings. However, although the large numbers could be attributed to pious exaggeration, that they existed is confirmed in one or two other places. There is, for example, the instance of Uggā of Hāthigāma who gave up his four young wives, giving the eldest in marriage to a man of her choice, when he became an anāgāmin (A IV 214). It is because the anāgāmin, like the arahant, is rid of the five lower fetters (samyojana) that bind beings to the sensual world that he leads a life of continence (brahmacāri). The sotāpanna and sakadāgāmin, the ‘enjoyers of sense-pleasures’ and hence still sexually active, while having overcome the three fetters of personality-belief (sakkāya-ditthi), doubt and attachment to outward observances, still have the fetters of sensual desires and malevolence and will return again after death to this world, the Kāmaloka (the world of sense-desires). The anāgāmin is free of these fetters although not yet free of the five higher fetters, and so will arise in the Pure Abodes of the form world (Rūpaloka), but cannot return again here to the Kāmaloka. The arahant, being rid of all fetters, is not liable to be reborn anywhere. The higher fetters are: desire for form and formless realm existence, conceit,
restlessness and ignorance. It is the subtle residual clinging supplied by these fetters that enables the anāgāmin to continue living a limited lay-life. It is the absence of these fetters in the arahant that precludes him from so living and for whom the Bhikkhu Sangha was established by the Buddha.

A number of lay anāgāmins, such as Hatthaka of Ālavi and Uggala of Vesāli, are said to have had large numbers of followers. Although the Commentaries sometimes suggest their following was of a purely secular nature, that they were communal leaders, headmen or rājas, it does seem more likely they were actually preachers of the Dhamma with other lay people as their pupil-disciples. After he passed away, Hatthaka visited the Buddha as a brahma-god of the Avihā heaven and remarked that divas come from afar to hear the Dhamma from him (A I 279). Citta of Macchikāsanda even instructed bhikkhus (cf. Citta Samyutta, S IV 28ff).

A distinction perhaps should be drawn between the actual state of affairs and the 'ideal' picture that is presented (e.g. in M 73, Ud 6.1, etc.). There must have been many who heard the Buddha preach but remained unaffected and we learn of quarrelsome, badly behaved monks, schisms and so forth.

9 Perhaps 'ignorance' as a translation of ariyā, especially in the context of the samyojana, may be misleading. It cannot here refer to ignorance as stupidity or delusion (moha), but rather the absence of the specific knowledge(s) possessed by the arahant, that is, the threefold knowledge or teiyjā: the knowledge of former births, seeing the arising and passing away of other beings according to kamma, and especially the knowledge of the ending of the flow of defilements (āzava).

These were the puthujjana, those who were apart (puthu) from the 'ariya'. They were outsiders, foolish people who could not comprehend the Dhamma when it was taught to them and retained their various erroneous views. The ideal was that all bhikkhus should be arahants and that the attainment of the arahant-path was the sole reason for going forth. The laity then consisted of both celibate anāgāmins and sorāpānna, still enjoying sense-pleasures, all entirely devoted to the Buddha and supplying the Order of bhikkhus with its needs. The arahant bhikkhus were full-time professionals, the elders of the community, the guardians of the Teaching, instructors and advisors. Whether or not this ideal was ever realized during the lifetime of the Buddha, after his passing away the ariya-sangha underwent a rapid decline. And indeed this was inevitable. The literal meaning of sāvaka is 'hearer' and upon the departure of the Buddha there would soon be no more of that community of 'those who had heard' (the Dhamma directly from) the Blessed One (the bhagavato sāvaka-sangho). Thus Subhadda was not only the last sāvaka converted by the Buddha (D II 153), but the last sāvaka of all!

Although there would still be those who by their own efforts successfully practised the Path to enlightenment, as is testified throughout the long history of Buddhism, this was on a more limited scale than formerly. Evidently few sāvakas were able to make others 'see the Deathless' in the same way that the Buddha could. And it would be more difficult to 'arrive at the certainty' of faith in the Blessed One when one could no longer meet him face to face. As the venerable Ānanda said, shortly after the Buddha passed away, There is not even one bhikkhu, brahmin, who is possessed in every way and in every part of all those things of which the Lord was possessed...
one to make arise a path that had not arisen before, to bring about a path not brought about before, to show a path not shown before. But the sāvakas are now path-followers who do so by following after him' (M 108).

Interestingly, as Peter Masefield has pointed out, when it is said the Buddha 'makes arise a path... shows a path', this must have been meant in the sense of making it arise in a particular person on a particular occasion and not in a general sense of propagating a universal teaching for all. Despite the Buddha's stricture on accepting teachings based on hearsay, the latter view arose after the passing of the Buddha and the disappearance of the original sāvaka-sangha when direct contact was no longer possible. The Buddhist community had to come to terms with this new situation and to interpret what had been collected and preserved of what the Buddha had said and taught. In this interpretation one of the ideas that appeared was that the four paths were stages on the way to the ultimate attainment of Nibbāna, and this in turn has led inevitably to further changes in outlook in present day Theravāda Buddhism. If the view is entertained that arahantship is to be regarded as the sole goal of Buddhist endeavour and the sotāpanna, etc. is relegated to a stage on the way to that goal, then the tendency is to regard the arahant as the only true 'ariyan disciple'. Again, if the arahant has to be a bhikkhu, the ariya-saṅgha is then conceived as some kind of élite within the Bhikkhu Sangha itself. The laity being excluded from any meaningful spiritual attainment is then demoted to a secondary rôle. In recent times undue emphasis has been placed upon the social division of the Buddhist world,

This is a completely revised and updated edition of John Snelling's account of the sacred mountain Mt. Kailas in Western Tibet, as seen through the eyes of the travellers and pilgrims who visited it from the early 19th century onwards. Since the first edition appeared in 1983, however, a new wave of Western and Indian travellers has been able to visit the mountain, thanks to the relaxation of China's attitude to Western tourism, so accounts of their visits have been added to those of the classic period. A vast array of colour and black-and-white photographs, both historic and modern, adorn the text of this entertaining account of one of the most spiritually potent places in the world, while for those valiant hearts actually planning to visit Mt. Kailas there is a whole section of advice and information for modern travellers, plus a number of beautifully-drawn maps.

This concentrated little book is an attempt to give both the newcomer and the established Buddhist a succinct overview of all Buddhist schools: their history, teachings and practices. There are chapters detailing the Indian background, the life of the Buddha and Buddhist cosmology, plus special sections on meditation, ethics, philosophy and the spiritual quest in the contemporary West. Straightforward in style and non-sectarian in spirit, this book makes an excellent introduction to what is in fact a vast and often confusing field.

STANLEY WEINSTEIN AND THE STUDY OF SINO-JAPANESE BUDDHISM

T.H. Barrett

Japan may not by some definitions be the most Buddhist of Asian countries, yet it is without a doubt the country in which it is easiest to study the whole historical range and depth of the Buddhist religion. Paradoxically, however, a glance at any history of Buddhist studies shows that remarkably few Westerners, especially scholars publishing in the English language, have approached Buddhism armed with a knowledge of the living Sino-Japanese tradition of the faith. True, some of the great Indologists and Sinologists have made use of Japanese scholarship, but until very recently few academics have made it the starting-point of their researches: rather, the Sino-Japanese tradition has been more often represented (or misrepresented) in English by the sometimes explicitly anti-academic proponents of Zen Buddhism1.

It is, of course, possible to point to one or two notable

1 For a list of the surveys which may be consulted to verify this point, see n.1 on p.247 of Russell Webb 'Contemporary European Scholarship in Buddhism' in T. Skorupski (ed.) The Buddhist Heritage (Buddhica Britannica I; Institute of Buddhist Studies, Tring 1989), pp.247-76, which article provides in itself an updated survey for a large part of the field. Yet the importance of Japanese Buddhist studies has been an open secret at least since the publication of S. Lévi, 'Matériaux japonais pour l'étude du bouddhisme', Bulletin de la Maison Franco-Japonaise 1 (1927), pp.1-63: note, e.g. the mention of S. Weinstein's teacher Hosaka Gyokusen, already teaching at Komazawa, on p.10.
pioneers in bringing the fuller riches of Sino-Japanese Buddhism to the attention of the English-language reader. Bruno Petzold (1873-1949), a German scholar of Tendai Buddhism, published much of his work in English; indeed, since his memory still seems to remain green in Japan, his writings continue to be published there. Here in London we should surely not forget the remarkable New Yorker, William Montgomery McGovern (1897-1964), Ph.D. (Oxon), who introduces himself on the title page of his A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy as 'Lecturer in Japanese and Chinese at the School of Oriental Studies, University of London; Priest of the Nishi Honganji, Kyoto, Japan'. McGovern was at the School from 1919 to 1924; that his subsequent career was probably an increasing disappointment to the Nishi Honganji may be guessed at from his publications, namely To Lhasa in Disguise (1924); Jungle Paths and Inca Ruins (1927); Early Empires of Central Asia (1938); From

Luther to Hitler (1941); and Strategic Intelligence and the Shape of Tomorrow (1961). From 1929 he had taught at Northwestern University, apart from war service in intelligence which added the title of Commander, U.S. Naval Reserve, to his priesthood. For a former lecturer of the School, McGovern makes a slightly disturbing appearance in John K. Fairbank's autobiography: 'We privately believed him to be a charlatan but if so he was a very smart one.'

Though Stanley Weinstein was also born in New York (in 1929) and also taught at the School, his consistent dedication to the promotion of Buddhist studies could not contrast more sharply with McGovern's passing interest. Although it is misleading in respect of Prof. Weinstein's own biography, the Encyclopedia of Religions correctly places him in the post-War expansion of East Asian Buddhist Studies in the United States: 'World War II also had an effect on Buddhist studies. In particular, many young Americans who took part in government language-study programmes were assigned the task of learning Japanese and Chinese... Stanley Weinstein at Yale University has focused his research and teaching on Japanese methods and sources, stressing that the number of scholars in Japan who are engaged in Buddhist studies far exceeds all of those in the rest of the world, making the detail of information

2 For Petzold, see 'Reminiscences about Mr. Bruno Petzold, by Shinsho Hanayama', Young East 3:12, 1954, pp.18-20, though I have not been able to locate a copy of this in Britain, nor a copy of the collection of his writings published posthumously under the title Tendai Buddhism, Yokohama 1979, nor a copy of the work on Buddhist Prophet Nichiren (Tokyo 1978) by Petzold edited by S. Iida and W. Simonds: the last two studies are cited by M. Pye (tr.) Emerging from Meditation by Tominaga Nakamoto (Duckworth, London, 1990), p.192, and Iida 'Watsukushi no Hoku-Bei Bukkyōgaku sanjūnen', p.20, n.11, in Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyōgakubu ronshū 20 (1989), pp.1-20, respectively.


available in Japanese crucial for adequate study\textsuperscript{5}. The opinions attributed to him are accurate enough, but Weinstein was not swept into East Asian studies by the War: it was a matter of deliberate choice, as a published autobiographical talk on his academic career clearly shows\textsuperscript{6}.

Weinstein's earliest interest in Japan was awakened by the writings of the Irish-Illyrian Lafcadio Hearn (1850-1904), who ended his life as a Japanese citizen\textsuperscript{7}. Hearn's exotic tales inspired him while still a teenager to undertake the study of Japan and the Japanese language completely on his own initiative, using the cumbersome and by then already dated publications of W.G. Aston and B.H. Chamberlain. It was through his initial explorations of Japanese history, literature and society in the books available to him that he came to sense the major importance of Buddhism in Japanese life, but he had no opportunity to pursue his studies further until service in the Korean War had taken him to East Asia for the first time. Even in Korea itself the legacy of the recent Japanese occupation allowed him to improve his knowledge of spoken Japanese and lay the foundations of an impressive private

library of Japanese books, but the G.I. Bill gave him just what was needed: the chance to study at a Japanese Buddhist university.

Swayed by the prevailing Western interest in Zen, he chose Komazawa University, Tokyo, academic stronghold of the Sōtō school of Zen\textsuperscript{7}. As it turned out, the great texts of that school proved (for linguistic and other reasons) not very rewarding for a beginner, but fortunately Komazawa was an institution, like several other Buddhist universities in Japan, with roots deep in the scholastic tradition of mediaeval Japan, so apart from its own sectarian emphasis it also upheld the teaching of the foundation texts of early and mediaeval Japanese Buddhist learning, the Chinese translations of Yogācāra philosophical literature. From his second year onward, Stanley Weinstein began to concentrate on this literature and its East Asian commentaries, and when he graduated in 1958 with Highest Honours, his graduation thesis was on a technical aspect of Yogācāra thought.

At this point he entered the M.A. course of Tokyo University, supported financially by the Ford Foundation, who in helping to establish Buddhist studies within East Asian studies had little choice but to pay for education in Japan, since postgraduate teaching in East Asian Buddhism hardly existed in the United States at that point - like Britain, more than thirty years later. The Tokyo University experience proved invaluable for Weinstein, allowing him to study with Yuki Reimon, an expert on East Asian Yogācāra whose personal commitment to Jōdo Buddhism made a deep impression, as did his insistence on studying Buddhist doctrines in their full social and political context.


\textsuperscript{6} ‘Nihon Bukkyō to ichi Amerikajin Bukkyō kenkyūka no setten: Tōdai no Bukkyō no hakkān ni chinde’, Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyōgakubu ronshū 19 (1988), pp.13–29. In what follows I have felt free to supplement this source with my own reminiscences of Prof. Weinstein’s remarks in conversation.

\textsuperscript{7} Note Kenneth Rexroth (ed.), The Buddhist Writings of Lafcadio Hearn (Wildwood House Ltd, London 1981), especially the editor’s introduction.
After completing this M.A. Weinstein found that the Ford Foundation now stipulated that he could only qualify for their support if he took an American Ph.D., so despite permission to continue at Tokyo he switched to Harvard in 1960, where Professor M. Nagatomi had just started the teaching of East Asian Buddhism at graduate level. This was to lead to the completion (in 1966) of a doctorate on the Kanjūn kaksu, a work written in Japan in 1244 as a restatement of Yogācāra thought in simple terms for the mediaeval age and which had earlier been rendered by Yuki from Classical Chinese into Japanese.

By this time he was at the School of Oriental and African Studies, where he held the newly created post of Lecturer in Far Eastern Buddhism from 1962 to 1968 - a post which was at the retirement of his successor lost once more, as similar positions burgeoned in the United States and elsewhere. His published memories of the School stress the great benefit he derived from the company of his colleagues studying Buddhist topics through other languages, for example the late Professor John Brough (1917-84). Among his students at this time was David J. Kalupahana, now a well-known scholar of Buddhism himself. Of his colleagues beyond Buddhist studies, Prof. D.C. Twitchett was also able to call on his expertise to write a conference paper on the T'ang dynasty, under which Yogācāra thought had become firmly established in East Asia. For this he developed some work already published in Japanese by Yuki Reimon, extending his approach to demonstrate the importance of the T'ang state's patronage to the success of the great Buddhist schools of the day.

By the time that he delivered the paper, however, he had transferred to an Associate Professorship (from 1974 a Professorship) at Yale University. Here, according to his recollections, he found himself hard pressed by a much greater load of graduate teaching - though I must say that I myself saw no sign of effort in the consistently enthusiastic and stimulating teaching I received during his early years at Yale. In any case the success of his work with graduates right from the start is demonstrated by the fact that his earliest students - David Chappell, Paul Groner and John McRae - are all now established teachers of East Asian Buddhism themselves.

His own work, meanwhile, returned in part to mediaeval Japan: Yale, after all, possessed a great historian of Japan in John Whitney Hall, who was well able to appreciate the importance of Buddhist studies in understanding Japan's past. But Weinstein also remained committed to further work on the T'ang for the Cambridge History of China. The volume containing his contribution, planned twenty years ago, has not yet appeared, but in the meantime his chapter has been

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8 In the series Kōkuyaku Issai, Shoshūbu, Volume 15 (Daitō shuppanaha, Tokyo 1937), pp.151-223.
9 By this time Brough himself was also actively interested in exploiting East Asian sources to elucidate aspects of Buddhist philology: see 'The sinological writings of John Brough (1917-84)', Bulletin of the British Association of Chinese Studies, 1984, pp.21-3.
published as a monograph and has been widely acclaimed as a history of the Buddhist church of this period, especially by those who have taken into account the constraints under which it was written\(^\text{11}\).

For the 1990 Jordan Lectures in Comparative Religion\(^\text{12}\), Prof. Weinstein was asked to return, as it were, to his roots and consider the most basic questions concerning Japan and Buddhism. How was Buddhism established in Japan? How did Buddhism interact with its Japanese environment? The Western student of Japan is remarkably poorly served by current scholarship on the relationship between early Buddhism and Japanese religion. J.H. Kamstra published a lengthy study in 1967 concerning the introduction of Buddhism into Japan\(^\text{13}\), but it is high time for the topic to be treated afresh, with greater precision and concision. Alicia Matsunaga likewise published a monographic study in 1969 concerning the honji-suijaku theory, the key whereby Buddhist figures and Japanese divinities came to be construed as manifestations of one another, but the same strictures apply\(^\text{14}\). Both these works, moreover, (to say nothing of broader surveys, such as that by Alicia and Daigan Matsunaga\(^\text{15}\)) are written primarily from the standpoint of Buddhism, without taking a balanced view of non-Buddhist belief. Because of the rather unfortunate reputation acquired by Shinto up to the middle of this century, recent research into its early historical antecedents has been severely lacking\(^\text{16}\), but such work as has been done by Western scholars on modern Japanese religion only serves to emphasise the importance of non-Buddhist elements\(^\text{17}\).

Stanley Weinstein's Jordan Lectures, therefore, provided a badly-needed and also authoritative account of the crucial early, formative phases of Japan's religious development. Their

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\(^{11}\) Buddhism under the Tang. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1987. The criticisms cited by Iida in Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyōkubu ronshi 20 (see n.2 above), p.8, are thus entirely beside the point: Iida's grasp of such matters is betrayed by his n.16, which locates the study I have referred to in n.10 above in an entirely different collection of essays on 'Tang society!'

\(^{12}\) 'When the Gods met the Buddhhas: Religious Syncretism in Early and Medieval Japan' (28.11.90), a public lecture followed by four seminars (29–30.11.90) on the themes, 'Japanese religion before the introduction of Buddhism', 'The Encounter with Buddhism', 'Kami in need of salvation' and 'The transformation of Buddhhas into Kami'.


\(^{16}\) I owe this observation to Prof. Richard Bowring. A certain amount of work has been done in Japanese to demonstrate the Chinese elements in non-Buddhist religion in early times: A. Shigematsu, Kodai kokka to Dōkyō (Yoshikawa Kobunhan, Tokyo 1985) would be one recent example. Needless to say, all too few Western Japanologists possess the range of linguistic skills necessary to participate in such research.

\(^{17}\) I have in mind the writings of such scholars as Carmen Blacker, H. Byron Earhardt, Helen Hardacre and Winston B. Davis: see, e.g., Carmen Blacker, The Catalpa Bow (George Allen & Unwin, London 1975) for a fine representative work of Western scholarship on modern Japanese religion.
approach (as the foregoing remark will have shown) was
historical, but was combined with a consideration of social and
political factors and an unrivalled awareness of the importance
of a correct grasp of doctrinal matters. In their published form,
they will constitute indispensable reading for anyone interested
in the Japanese cultural heritage, the mature reflection of a long
and remarkable academic career.

RELIGIOUS CHANGES IN LATE INDIAN BUDDHIST
HISTORY*

Lal Mani Joshi

Part One

I

Preliminary Observations

The history of Buddhism in India covers a period of nearly
seventeen centuries, from the fifth century B.C. to the twelfth
century C.E. The last five centuries, from the seventh to the
twelfth, thus constitute the late phase. Of the many events that
marked this period the following four are outstanding:

i) Production and publication of a large number of
Tantric texts.

ii) Assimilation of several features of Brahmanical and
tribal ritualism and of a few elements of
Brahmanical Hindu theology by Tantric Buddhism.

iii) Assimilation of a large number of Buddhist
doctrines and practices by Brahmanical Hinduism.

iv) Gradual decline and final destruction of Buddhism
in most parts of India.

* Presented to the Second East-West Religions in Encounter Conference,
Honolulu, January 1984.
A study of paradigm changes in Buddhist history has to take note of the current theory of three phases of Buddhism in India. Major changes in paradigms are supposed to be connected with changing epochs of Buddhist history. Some modern scholars divide the history of Buddhism in India into three phases: Early, Middle and Late. It is also customary with modern scholars to use sectarian names, invented no doubt by a section of ancient Buddhists, for three forms of the Buddhist religiousness. The three sectarian names are 'Hinayana' or Little Vehicle, 'Mahayana' or Great Vehicle, and 'Vajrayana' or Diamond Vehicle. A correspondence is often seen between these three forms and the three phases. In other words, Little Vehicle is assigned to the Early Phase, Great Vehicle to the Middle Phase, and Diamond Vehicle to the Late Phase.

This seemingly neat and clear scheme appears to reflect paradigm changes in the history of Buddhism in chronological order, but there are difficulties involved in this facile formulation of the complex development of Buddhist ideas and practices during so long a period as seventeen hundred years. This formulation gives a rather misleading impression of the antiquity and history of diverse Buddhist doctrines and practices, and also tends to ignore the continuity of Buddhism. One is likely to think that the Great Vehicle supplanted the Little Vehicle and was in turn supplanted by the Diamond Vehicle. This is an error. The so-called Little Vehicle continued to flourish throughout the duration of the three periods, though in a slightly modified form and with reduced vigour. Similarly, the so-called Great Vehicle continued to flourish vigorously even during the period of the Diamond Vehicle. The history of Buddhism has been characterised by a remarkable degree of change along with a remarkable degree of continuity. Old sects and schools existed alongside the new sects and schools; old paradigms were neither discarded nor suppressed, but they were continuously reinterpreted and expanded in the light of new situations.

Another point worthy of our attention at this juncture is that we, as academic students of Buddhist religiousness, cannot adopt sectarian approaches in our studies. For example, we cannot say that the Buddhists in the early phase were followers of an inferior course of religious culture; nor can we say that the Buddhists of the middle and late phases were followers of superior courses of religious culture. Sakayamuni Buddha, who lived and taught in the early years of the early phase, cannot be called a representative of the Little Vehicle; on the other hand, we cannot accept the view that the followers of the Diamond Vehicle were degenerate Buddhists. In short, sectarian views and mutual doctrinal and practical differences of the Buddhists should not colour our perception nor distort our conception of the dynamics and dialectics of Buddhist religious history. A number of Buddhist texts in Pali and Sanskrit refer to forebodings of the decline and effacement of Buddhism in India with the passage of centuries. However, we shall not be

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2 David W. Chappell has discussed this question in considerable detail in 'Early Forebodings of the Death of Buddhism' in Numen XXVII, Leiden 1980,
justified in an attempt to correlate the succeeding phases and three forms of Buddhism, for these prophecies are found in the texts belonging to all three phases.

The belief in the gradual decline and final destruction of the Dharma may be said to have been a part of Buddhism since the earliest times of its history. Paradigm changes have been a constant feature of Buddhist history. What is important to bear in mind is that Buddhist teachers and leaders in every century thought and taught that the Dharma was a dynamic forced to be adapted to changing circumstances inherent in human history. They did not hold the view that there was a strict correspondence between the three phases and three vehicles, nor did they teach that the succeeding vehicles represented increasing decay of the doctrine and practice. There is a belief current among Tibetan Buddhists that the Śrāvakayāna, Bodhisattvayāna and Vajrayāna are based upon spiritual and intellectual gradation and represent increasingly subtle ideas and stages. This, of course, is a sectarian view; but it warns us against seeking a correspondence between successive phases associated with the three vehicles and an increasing decline of Buddhism with the emergence of each successive vehicle.

We are obliged to mention here the well-known Buddhist theory of the origin of the three vehicles (yāna) when we are talking of paradigm changes in the history of Buddhism. The older set of three vehicles mentioned in some early Mahāyāna sūtras, viz., Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna and Bodhisattvayāna, is explained as an example of the Buddha's judicious use of diverse liberative techniques (upāyakauśalya). The three vehicles, those of the Disciples, the 'Isolated Buddhas', and World Saviours or Bodhisattvas have one single final goal of Supreme Enlightenment (anuttara samyak sambodhi). By resorting to numerous expedient devices the Buddha seeks to save living beings in the world who are likened to a multitude of children playing in a house which is burnt by fire on all sides. The Saddharmapuṇḍarikāsūtra denies the possibility of any real vehicle except the Buddha-Vehicle (Buddhayāna) which is called the one and only vehicle (ekayāna)3. The Mahāyāna sūtras take it for granted that the practice of the bodhisattvas is the heart of the Buddha's project of universal salvation. These texts cut through our modern theory of the emergence of the Mahāyānic doctrines and practices during the so-called 'middle phase'. The Saddharmapuṇḍarikāsūtra in fact records that the Transcendent One (Tathāgata) 'set in motion the Wheel of the Dharma' (dharma-cakra-pravartana) twice, first at Rājagrha in Vārānasi, and then at Gṛdhra-kūta in Rājagrha4. According to this view, the essentials of both Little Vehicle and Great Vehicle were taught by the Buddha. Buddhist texts belonging to the late phase record the tradition of three dharma-cakra-pravartanas. These authorities teach that doctrines and practices which constitute the Vehicle of the Disciples were expounded by the Blessed One when he set in motion the Wheel of the Dharma for the first time at

Rṣipatana; doctrines and practices which are known as the Bodhisattvayāna or the Great Vehicle were taught by him when he set in motion the sublime Wheel of the Dharma for the second time on the mountain top called Gṛdhraṅkūṭa; whilst those of the esoteric vehicle known as the Diamond Vehicle were revealed by the Lord at a place called Dhānyaakaṭaka (modern Amaravati) in the course of the third dharmacakra-pravartana. The Vajrayāna authorities also teach that the Great Vehicle subsumes the Diamond Vehicle; the Mahāyāna is twofold: one based upon the practice of perfection of spiritual qualities (pāramītās), and the other based upon the practice of meditation on mystic words and symbols (mantras). In short, according to these Buddhist traditions all three vehicles are as old as the age of Śākyamuni Buddha. Paradigm changes, if any, in the history of Buddhism cannot be understood in terms of three successive phases, each of which is separated from the other by several centuries; all the different paradigms were set forth already in the fifth century B.C. by the founder of Buddhism. Those Buddhists who believe in the theory of setting

5 Sekoddesa-Tikā (of Naropa) ed. M.E. Carelli, Oriental Institute, Baroda 1941, pp.2-5; see Rahula Sāṃkṣṭyāyana, Purāṇattva-Nibandhāvali, Kitab Mahal, Allahabad 1958, p.113. A slightly different version of setting in motion the Wheel of the Dharma will be found in Mkhals Grub Rje's work translated by F.D. Lessing and Alex Wayman, Introduction to the Buddhist Tantric System, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1978, pp.41ff.

6 Advayavajra-samgraha (of Maitripa alias Advayavajra) ed. H.P. Sastri, Oriental Institute, Baroda 1927 p.14. See also Mkhals Grub Rje, op. cit., pp.21-5, who says that there is no discrepancy between the teaching of the tantras and that of the pāramītās (Mahāyāna sūtras) concerning the method of becoming a Buddha.

in motion the Wheel of the Dharma thrice want us to believe that there have been no changes, no revolutions in Buddhist history!

Buddhist scholars are, however, astounded by the great variety of Buddhist practices. The differences among the philosophical opinions held by different Buddhist schools that originated in India are equally amazing. The bodhisattvas appear to us so different from the arhats who in their turn differ only slightly from the pratyekabuddhas; and the mahāsiddhas lived a life-style and spoke a language that would have shocked all the upāsakas and upāsikās of Śākyamuni Buddha. Indeed, just as the arhats and 'Great Disciples' (mahāśrāvakas) like Śāriputra are said to have been astonished by the wonderful and inconceivable liberative techniques adopted by Buddhhas and bodhisattvas and taught in the Saddharmapuṇḍarika and the Vimalakirtinirdeśa, so the numerous bodhisattvas, Sarvanivaraṇavīskambhin and others, are said to have been frightened to such an extent that they became unconscious when the Guhyasamājā Tantra was revealed. Similarly, all the wise ones (bodhisattvas), Vajragarba and others, are reported to have been so thoroughly amazed and

bewildered that they also became unconscious and fell to the
ground when the Hevajra Tantra was revealed! These records
seem to contradict the belief that the three vehicles are merely
three facets or aspects of the Buddha's teaching. The Buddhists
of the Mahāyāna sūtras and Vajrayāna tantras would not see
here any contradiction or opposition. Contradictions and
oppositions within the tradition are either understood in terms
of skill-in-means (upāyakauśalya) adopted to suit diversity in
the intellectual and spiritual equipment of the people whose
final liberation is the burden of the Teaching, or as something
inherent in all empirical experience (samvṛti) of embodied
existence in the world (Saṃsāra).

8 Guhyasamāj Tantra (Gst) ed. B. Bhattacharya, Oriental Institute, Baroda
1931, p.21; ed. S. Bagchi, Mithila Institute, Darbhanga 1965, pp.15–16:
Sarvanivaranaśiṣṭhān prabhāṣytoy mahābodhitattvā uṣcaryā prāptā
abhiniprāptāḥ bhūtāḥ saṃprastā mūrcchitā abhūvan.
and Tibetan Texts, Ch.X, v.14, pp.36–7:
evam śrutā tu vai sarve Vajragarbhadayo buddhāḥ
paramavismayāpannā mūrcchitāḥ patītāvanau

Snellgrove's transl. may be seen in Hvt 1 (p.82) but I think his rendering of
buddhāḥ as 'buddhas' is incorrect. On the opening page the text clearly records
that Vajragarbha and others in the assembly are bodhisattvas. Buddhás cannot
be supposed to become 'senseless' (mūrcchitāḥ) as Snellgrove's transl. – 'Hearing
this, all the Buddhás, Vajragarbha and the rest, were seized with the greatest
astonishment and fell senseless to the ground' – seems to imply. The word
buddhāḥ means 'wise ones' and here refers to the bodhisattvas like Vajragarbha
who had not as yet heard 'this most secret of all secret things'
(guhyāguyāyatāram).

The one and only eternal, changeless, ultimate absolute is
the Cosmic Buddha, often identified with the transcendental
Dharma and conceived as the Dharmakāya. This conception of
the Buddha has been the paradigm supreme in the Buddhist
tradition in all its phases. Everything else, including Buddhism
itself, has been regarded as changeable. Buddhism or the
Dharma as Buddhists know it, has been understood as a
constellation of provisional means and methods of realising
the primary and secondary goals of religious life. As such it has
been dynamic and diversified. The doctrine of universal change
and impermanence is a basic Buddhist doctrine, and it applies to
Buddhism as well. The history of Buddhism shows that it has
been a growing and changing tradition; such process of growth
and change stopped only when Buddhism was plundered,
persecuted and finally effaced in India. I will have more to say
about this below.

Having made these preliminary remarks on the theory of
paradigm change in the history of Buddhism in India, I shall
now proceed to analyse in what follows some of the salient
features of Buddhist religiousness in early medieval India. My
analysis will be based chiefly on some Tantric Buddhist Sanskrit
texts. It can be studied under three headings, or categories of
paradigms: philosophical conceptions, aims of religious and
spiritual culture, and methods used to attain those aims.

II

Philosophical and Theological Conceptions

Although great Buddhist philosophers like Sāntideva,
language. This fact has made appreciation of Tantric thought quite difficult and controversial. Since language is the standard vehicle of thought communication, if it is 'secret' or 'symbolical' or 'paradoxical', an ordinary academic scholar who is not initiated into the mysteries, rituals, techniques and psychological symbolism of this system may not be able to grasp the untold but hidden and intended meaning of the riddles of the Vajrayāna. Keeping in mind these problems we may refer to some leading ideas of the siddhas.

(i) Reality: Absolute and Relative

The siddhas held a monistic and non-dualistic view of Reality (advaya, advaita). There is no duality or diversity in the Reality which is cosmic and all-pervading. By nature luminous (prabhāsva) and immaculate (śūdha), it is the nature of great bliss (mahāsukha). Without beginning and without end (anādinidhana), quiescent, free from existence and non-existence (bhāva-abhāvavivarjita), it is the unity of emptiness (śunyatā) and compassion (karunā)\. This idea of the unity of emptiness (śunyatā) and karunā, of wisdom (prajñā) and means (upāya), is a very important theme in these sources. This idea harmonises all polarities and syntheses seemingly paradoxical conceptions and situations. This Reality is often described in negative terms, although positive descriptions also are found abundantly. Thus

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we are told that it is all-void (sarvāśūnya), like space (khasama), unutterable (avācyat), inexpressible (nisprapañca), unthinkable (acintya), selfless (nairāmya), supportless (nirālambha), and so on.

One of the important names of this reality is sahaja. This word literally means born together with, co-emergent, innate, natural, simultaneously arisen. The term is crucial and its significance is such as to give the name Sahajayāna to the system of the siddhas. It refers to the co-emergence of wisdom (prajñā or śūnyatā) and means (karunā or upāya) in the final state of Liberation (mokṣa) which is characterised by great bliss (mahāsukha). According to Sarahapāda (eighth century), the Innate is the Reality which is neither manifest nor hidden, neither existent nor non-existent\(^{11}\). Frequently the siddhas pile up paradoxes in their elucidation of the nature of sahaja. A characteristic example is the following verse:

\[
\text{abhāve bhāvanabhāvo bhāvanā naiva bhāvanā} / \\
iit bhāvo na bhāvāh syād bhāvanā nopalabhyate \text{ }!^{12}
\]

‘Existence is conceptualisation of non-existence, and this conceptualisation does not exist.’ A similar view is expressed in the Hevajra Tantra\(^{13}\) and the verse quoted above is repeated in several tantric texts.

The sahaja is identified with the Enlightened One, the Thought of Enlightenment (bodhicitta), with the Self (śūnyata-jñāna-vajra-svabhāvamako'ham)\(^{14}\), and with the nature of the Cosmos (sarva-dharma-svabhāva). This Great Bliss, the Innate Joy (sahajānanda), is the same as Nirvāṇa. We read in the Hevajra Tantra: ‘Thus the Buddha is neither existence nor non-existence. Although he has a form with arms and a face, he is formless in the Supreme Bliss. So the entire world of beings is the Innate (sahaja), for it is of the nature of the Innate. Likewise, it is of the nature of Nirvāṇa, too, when the mind is in the state of purity\(^{15}\).

Another major symbol or name of this Reality is Vajrasattva. The term vajra literally means diamond or thunderbolt. It is the synonym of wisdom (prajñā). Here wisdom is not so much a diamond-cutter (vajracchedikā) as the diamond itself. The Reality is conceived as the Diamond, as Adamantine. A verse quoted by Kṛṣṇapāda (ninth century) as well as by Advayavajra (tenth century) explains why emptiness (śūnyatā) is called diamond (vajra):

\[
dṛghham sāraṁ asauśīryaṁ acchedyābhedyā laksanam \text{ } adāhi avināṣi ca śūnyatā vajraṁ ucycate \text{ }!^{16}
\]
‘Emptiness is called diamond because it is firm, substantial, unchangeable, cannot be cut, cannot be penetrated, cannot be burnt, and is imperishable.’

Here we clearly have a positive conception of śūnyatā. The same Reality is called Vajrasattva, literally Adamantine Being. According to Siddha Advayavajra, this compound name signifies the same ultimate Reality which the Madhyamikas called śūnyatā and the Vijñānavādins called cittamātratā:

vajreṇa śūnyatā proktā sattvena jñānamātratā ā

‘Vajra indicates emptiness and sattva indicates mere consciousness. The identity of these two follows from the nature of the Adamantine Being.’

In several places in the tantras vajra is a symbol of the male principle called the jewel (mani) when lotus (padma) is used as a symbol of the female principle. Philosophically speaking, vajra represents the whole truth; it is viewed as the unity of body, speech and mind (kāyavākṣayavajra). The personified form of the Reality is called Vajradhara and Vajrin. Vajra is identical with sahajā; Vajrayāna and Sahajayāna lead to the same Truth.

The doctrine of the two truths is basic to this ideology. The two truths are phenomenal or relative (samvrti, vyavahāra) and transcendental or absolute (paramārtha, vivṛti). The all-void (sarvaśūnya), which is luminous (prabhāsvara), is the absolute (paramārtha); void (śūnya), more void (atśūnya) and great void (mahāśūnya) belong to the realm of relative truth. The siddhas teach that the doctrine of the Adamantine Lord is twofold: according to the steps of origination (upattikrama) and according to the steps of realisation (nispānakrama, uppanākrama). Without dwelling on Nāgārjunian parallels, we may immediately note that the siddhas declare that the steps of origination belong to the realm of the phenomenal (samvrti) while those of realisation to that of the transcendental (vivṛti)\(^{18}\). It is an error to suppose that these two truths are unrelated to each other. In fact, the two are inseparable. Once again we are reminded of the classical Buddhist teaching on the relation between the phenomenal world and the absolute. According to one tantric authority:

\[\text{samvrtisatasya hetu prabhāsvarah.}\]

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\(^{18}\) Yogaratnamāla, p.104. It is a quotation from an unknown source:

\[\text{upattikrama pakṣam ca uppanākrama pakṣataḥ / kramadāvam uṇādaya desanā vajradhāriṇām.}\]


\(^{17}\) Advayavajra-saṃgraha, p.24.
samvritisatyan prabhāśvarasya hetuḥ

'The relative truth is due to the absolute truth, and the absolute truth is due to the relative truth.'

This inseparable mutual relation between relative and absolute aspects of the Reality is in fact the inseparable mutual relation between Samsāra and Nirvāṇa, or between everyday experience (lokasamvṛti) and the ultimate sphere of peace and bliss (paramārtha). There is no real dualism here because there is no difference between Samsāra and Nirvāṇa at the highest level of spiritual perfection. We read in the Hevajra Tantra:

'Just as is Samsāra, so is Nirvāṇa; there is no other Nirvāṇa than Samsāra, so it is said. For Samsāra means form, sound and so on (i.e., smell, taste, touch and mental states); it means feelings and so on (i.e., other personality factors); it means the sense-organs (i.e., eye, ear, nose, tongue, skin and mind); Samsāra means hatred and so on (i.e., greed and delusion). All these things (dharmas) are of the nature of Nirvāṇa; they appear in the form of Samsāra because of delusion. The wise person, having purified Samsāra, realises it as Nirvāṇa. This Nirvāṇa or liberation (nirvṛiti) is the Thought of Enlightenment (bodhicitta) which

has both relative and absolute facets.

This view is in keeping with the teaching of the Mahāyāna sūtras and the treatises of the Mādhyamika school. From the standpoint of an enlightened person, dualism between the relative and the absolute does not hold good. Not only that, he also does not consider as real those things which are real for the ordinary folk. Thus the authors of the Hevajra Tantra record that 'In reality there is neither form nor seer, neither sound nor hearer. There is neither smell nor one who smells, neither taste nor taster, neither touch or one who touches, neither thought nor thinker.'

The siddhas uphold not only the Mādhyamika ideas but also the ideas of the Viśṇuavāda school. Anāgavajra (eighth century) says that Samsāra is a condition of the mind when enveloped by darkness born of numerous ideations; it is ephemeral like the lightning in a storm, and is besmeared with the dirt of attachment and so on which is not easily removable. The same mind becomes an excellent jewel when it is freed from these excretions. It then becomes the excellent Nirvāṇa, the foremost reality, luminous, beyond imagination and devoid of defilements, neither a subject nor an object. According to

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20 Hvt 2, p.66 (II.v.32–35). Author's transl.
21 See Akṣayamatinirdeśaūra, yutsvabhāvā ca klesāḥ, tatsvabhāvā bodhāḥ, quoted in Bodhicaryāvatāra-Pañjikā, ed. P.L. Vaidya, Mithila Institute, Darbhanga 1960, p.246 (IX.106); Mūlamadhyamakārikā XXV.9–20.
23 Prajñopāyavinīcayasyaiddhi IV.23 in Two Vajrayāna Works ed. B. Bhattacharya, Oriental Institute, Baroda 1929.
Indrabhūti (eighth century) the Supreme Reality (*paramam tattvam*) is the highest Diamond-Wisdom (*vajrājñāna*); it is not fixed, like the sky it is all pervasive and free from characteristics. Known as Samantabhadra, Mahāmudrā and Dharmakāya, it is the object of knowledge and the mirror-like knowledge itself.

Reality is thus the nature of consciousness which subsumes the knower, knowledge and the known. Both Sāṃsāra and Nirvāṇa are facets of this very consciousness. Here mind, thought, knowledge and consciousness appear as synonyms (*citta, mana, vijñāna, vijñānā*). Mind or Consciousness is the Cosmic Reality. It is both the end and the means. According to Sarahapāda, ‘Mind is the universal seed. Both Sāṃsāra and Nirvāṇa spring forth from it. Pay honour to this, that like a wish-granting gem, gives all desirable things’.

The mind is by nature pure and luminous. Defilements are accidental or adventitious (*āgantuka*). Similarly all phenomena are by nature luminous and like the sky. Since in reality there is no impurity, there can in reality be no difference between defilement and purification. The doctrine of the *ratnagotra* or

27 Gst II.7, p.9 (Darbhanga ed.): *prakṛtiprabhāsvārā dharmāh sūriṇḍhā nabbha samāh.*

tathāgatagarbha expounded in texts like the Śrimālāśīlīmāhāsūtra and the Ratnagotrīvīhāra-mahāyānottara tantrārātra, teach that the seed of Buddhahood is a cosmic reality which exists in all beings. The siddhas reaffirm this doctrine in the light of the Innate (*sahaja*) which is of the nature of Great Bliss (*mahāsukha*) and is all-pervading like the sky. The dualism between purification of mind (*cittaviśuddhi*) and defiled mind (*upakliṣṭacitta*) is due to ignorance. The enlightened sage who knows the true nature of reality, having destroyed ignorance, goes beyond this dualism. The mind is thus the cause of bondage as well as of liberation. In liberation there is neither mind nor no-mind, neither defilement nor purity, neither Sāṃsāra nor Nirvāṇa. Ultimate Reality or Buddhahood is therefore incomprehensible and ineffable. All conceptions of it are misconceptions; all names of it are mere conventional designations. In order to understand this reality which is beyond understanding, one must be a siddha. Such is the conception of the Ultimate Reality (*tattva*) in this phase of Buddhist thought.

(ii) Divinity, the World and Living Beings

Though the tantras continued to refer to several elements of

30 Ed. – Unfortunately the late author’s note here is lost.
classical non-theistic or atheistic Buddhology, they introduced frankly theistic ideas. Buddhology of this period is in fact Tantric theology. Here I can only quote some statements from Tantric texts which illustrate cosmogenic, cosmological and pantheistic ideas of the siddhas. A clear and systematic summary of Tantric Buddhist theology is not possible at this stage when the large number of Tantric Buddhist works remain unpublished. Classical Buddhist doctrines and symbols are fused with esoteric cosmology and mystical/yogic symbolism in such a way that it is very difficult to bring into light a world-view which will fit into the framework of any other known system. In other words, Tantric Buddhist theology is unique.

The Divine Lord (bhagavān) who reveals the Tantric doctrines and practices is described as dwelling in bliss with his female aspect, called Vajrayosit in the Guhyasamāja Tantra and the Hevajra Tantra, and Vajraviṣāri in the Candamaharosana Tantra. She is conceived as the core (hṛdaya) of the diamond (vajra) of the body, speech and mind of all the Tathāgatas. The Lord himself is also described as the Lord of the body, speech and mind of all the Tathāgatas (sarva-tathāgata-kāya-vāk-citta-adhipati). He is the unity of the body, speech and mind of all the Buddhas. This unity is mystical or esoteric (guhyā), it is the greatest secret (guhyatiguhyataram), the most mysterious of mysteries (rahaṣyātirahasya, mahāguhya). One of his names is Hevajra. Another of his names is Vajrasattva. We have noted earlier Adhavayavajra’s explanation of the name Vajrasattva as representing the nature of Reality as the unity of sūnyatā and jñānamātratā. The Hevajra Tantra tells us that the name Hevajra represents two principles in harmony; the HE sound proclaims great compassion (mahākarunā), and VAJRA is the name of wisdom (prajñā). Reality is the unified essence of these two, wisdom and means, prajñā and upāya, hence called Praṇāpāya. The name Vajrasattva is likewise a symbol of the unity of diamond (vajra) and being (sattva); because it is impenetrable (abhedya) it is known as vajra; because of the unity of the triple-world of becoming (tribhavasya ekañ), it is called the Being (sattva). Hevajra, Vajrasattva, Praṇāpāya, Tathāgata-kāyavāksita and Bhagavān are thus names of this unifying Principle in the universe. Heruka and Candamaharosana are also his hierophanies.

Here we have to recognize that Buddhology was transformed into Tantric theology without setting aside Buddhological ideas and symbols. Sākyamuni had long been forgotten but Buddhahood, the idea of the Buddha, was reshaped and reformulated by Tantric teachers. In this theology we see a fresh and vigorous effort to reaffirm life and the world in the light of newly discovered powers and attitudes which had been an anathema to all standard forms of ascetic soteriologies. The Buddha is occasionally remembered but always identified with the newly envisioned Reality which, though formless and immaculate, assumes diverse forms, benevolent as well as
wrathful, dark as well as brilliant, masculine as well as feminine, austere as well as orgiastic, in accordance with the complex and incomprehensible nature of the phenomenal world.

In addition to the Three Bodies of the Buddha well-known to us from earlier sources, the tantras contain visions of a fourth body. In a symbolic way they are all to be found within the human body. The order and location of these bodies according to the Hevajra Tantra is as follows:
1. *nirmānakāya* or Human Body in the navel
2. *dharma-kāya* or Absolute Body in the heart
3. *sambhogakāya* or Enjoyment Body in the throat
4. *sahajakāya* or Innate Body in the head

The *sahajakāya* is also called *vajrakāya*, Diamond Body, and *svābhāvikakāya*, the Essential Body or the Natural Body. Tantric theology is a theology of bliss (*ānanda*). Each of these bodies is associated with bliss or joy. Thus simple bliss (*ānanda*) is associated with the Human Body, supreme bliss (*paramānanda*) with the Absolute Body, detachment bliss (*vira-mānanda*) with the Enjoyment Body, and innate bliss (*sahajānanda*) with the Innate Body. The *sahajakāya/vajrakāya/svābhāvikakāya* is the Highest Truth and it is characterised by the highest bliss called the Innate Bliss. This is beyond Samsāra and Nirvāṇa yet attainable within this body, within this life in the world. The tantras have a scheme of a subtle body with ‘circles’ (*cakras*) and ‘veins’ (*nādi*) conceived as a microcosmic structure (*mandala*) of the macrocosmic existence.

Various are the manifestations of this divinity. The steps of origination and of realisation mentioned above are the processes through which the diverse and complex relation between this divinity and the numerous individual living beings becomes intelligible. The order of manifestation of the steps of origination (*upattikakrama*) reveals the structure of this relation. A full and systematic theory of creation or origin of the phenomenal world out of this divinity is not found in Tantric texts so far published. Occasional statements scattered in these texts give some hints of how the siddhas understood this matter. At last one text retains the classical doctrine of the conditioned origin of phenomenal life (*pratītiyasamutpāda*). In the beginning of the XVIth chapter of the Candamahārūṣana Tantra we read the following dialogue between Bhagavatī and Bhagavān, between ‘goddess’ and ‘god’:

Bhagavatī asked: ‘Explain, O Supreme Lord, how the world originates, how it is destroyed, and how the perfection is achieved.’

Bhagavān said: ‘Conditioned by causes the world comes into existence; its destruction too is conditioned by causes. Having known these two phenomena, one achieves perfection by

meditating on the Non-dual (advayam)\textsuperscript{35}.

The Hevajra Tantra has a passage which traces the origin of the phenomenal world to the divinity. At one place we are told that ‘Wisdom is called the Mother, because she gives birth to the world. She is also called Sister (bhagini) because she shows the division (vibhāga)\textsuperscript{36}. According to the commentator of this text, the ‘division’ (vibhāga) refers to the division of the Reality into absolute and relative. At another place, this text teaches that ‘the Samsāra is Heruka’s form, and he is the saviour Lord of the world’\textsuperscript{37}. Then we have the definitive statement:

\texttt{madhavam hi jagat sarvam madbhavam bhavanatrayam /}
\texttt{madvyāpitaṃ idam sarvam nānyamayaṃ drṣṭam}
\texttt{jagat //}\textsuperscript{38}

‘The entire world is born from me, the triple world is born from me.
All this is pervaded by me, of nothing else does this visible world consist.’

This statement reminds us of the proclamation of Lord Kṛṣṇa in the Bhagavadgītā.

\textsuperscript{36} Hvt 2, p.16 (Iv.16); see Yogaratnamāla, p.118, lines 14–15.
\textsuperscript{37} Hvt 2, p.92 (Ix.10): samsāram herukākāram jagaduttaranam prabhum.
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ibid.}, p.30 (Ivii.41); cf. Bhagavadgītā VII.6; IX.10; X.39.
fantasies, it has not been comprehended by others.\(^{39}\)

This statement thus clearly rejects all form of theism; it rejects doctrines of Prākṛti, Puruṣa, Īśvara, Ātma, and also of a combination or union of the two principles, God and his Nature (prakṛti, māyā, śakti) as in theistic Vedānta, and of Prakṛti and Puruṣa as in the Sāmkhya school, as a source of the world. In short, it rejects all those forms of reality that are postulated in the six schools of Brahmanical thought. In his commentary on these verses, Kamalaśīla (eighth century), among other things, points out that the knowledge of this truth of pratītyasamutpāda is avenika, that is, peculiar to the Buddha. Viṣṇu (Hari), Śiva (Hara) and Brahma (Hiranyakarabha) do not possess this knowledge, and the Buddha’s revelation of this truth was not based on the Vedas which the tīrthikas, Brahmanical followers, regard as ‘self-sufficient-proof’, but on his own intuitive vision.\(^{40}\)

The Tantric theologians, however, were a product of that fusion of Mahāyāna Buddhism and Purānic Brahmanism which those is the West have described as ‘Hinduism’. Just as substantial portions of Viṣṇuism and Vedānta represent a brahmanised version of some fundamental Buddhist doctrines and practices, so some portions of Tantric Buddhism may be said to represent a late Buddhist version of Purānic Brahmanism. Religious practices of modern Buddhists and Hindus in Nepal are indicative of this fusion.

We should, therefore, not be surprised when we read the following views published in a Buddhist text composed jointly by two siddhas who were contemporaneous with Śantaraksita and Kamalaśīla. Describing the profound nature of ‘Equality-Taste’ (samarasa) or the taste of the perfect unity of prajñā and upāya which is to be attained by the esoteric method of ‘wisdom-initiation’ (prajñābhiṣeka), the authors of the Hevajra Tantra expound a mixed theology which can find itself at home in Vedāntic Viṣṇuism, and in modern world

The knowledge (jñāna) which is free from consciousness of self and other arises from one’s own knowing. It is like the sky free from defilements, void, of the nature of being and non-being, and supreme; a fusion of wisdom and means, a fusion of passion and dispassion. It is the life-breath of living beings; its is the Supreme Imperishable (paramākṣara), the all-pervading, abiding in all embodied beings. It is the universal living breath (mahāprāna), it subsumes the world; being and non-being and whatever other things there are (in the world) have their genesis in it. It is the Cosmic Consciousness (sarvam-vijñāna-rūpa), the Ancient Man (puruṣah purāṇa), God (īśvara), the Self (ātma), Soul (jīva), Being (sattva), Time (kāla), and

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Person (*pudgala*) too. It is the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) of all beings as well as their illusory form (*māyārūpī*)

This formulation will evoke a spontaneous appreciation from modern Theosophists and followers of Ramakrishna-Vivekananda-Gandhi. It presents perhaps the earliest synthesis of diverse ideas of Reality found in Jainism, Vedānta, Sāṃkhya, Buddhism and among the followers of Eternal Time. This synthetic theology also indicates that the siddhas disregarded not only the caste-system, conventional ethical norms, traditional philosophical opinions, but also systematic thinking within the framework of Buddhism and Hinduism. It was an unfamiliar Buddhist exposition never heard previously in Buddhist quarters. That is why all the bodhisattvas in the audience headed by the Bodhisattva Vajragarba were struck by great amazement and became unconscious and fell to the ground.

More or less similar ideas can be gleaned from several other Tantric texts so far published. The Candamahāroṣana Tantra describes the Lord Adamantine-Being (*bhagavān vajrasattva*) as free from being and non-being, sunk only in fourfold bliss, of inexpressible form, without any thought-concentration, and abiding in all men. It describes the goddess, the Ruler of the Adamantine World (*bhagavatī Vajradhāvīśvari*), as the identity of emptiness and compassion, established in divine pleasure, bereft of frivolity, inexpressible, without agitation and established in all embodied women.

Theistic terms and concepts are found in the Guhyasamājī Tantra also. The Lord (*bhagavān*) who teaches the secret and mysterious theology to members of a secret assembly (*guhyasamājā*), is called the Lord of all Tathāgatas (*sarvatathāgataśvamin*), Lord of the world (*bhuvaneśvara*), Supreme Lord (*parameśvara*), the Great Imperishable (*mahākṣara*), the Maker (*kartā*), and the Creator (*sraṣṭā*). He is rarely if ever referred to as the Buddha; his names are Vajradhara, Vajrarāja, Vajrakāya, Vajrasattva, Kāyavākcittavajrin and so on; his forms too are numerous: Mahāvairocana or Vairocana, Akṣobhya, Ratnaketu, Amitāyus, Amoghāsiddhi and so on. His most significant and mystical epithet is Kāyavākcittavajra, the Diamond which is the unity of Body, Speech and Mind. This Diamond (*vajra*) or Diamond-Being (*vajrasattva*) symbolises the unity of Diamond-Body (*kāyavajra*), Diamond-Speech (*vāgvajra*) and Diamond-Mind (*cittavajra*). At one place these three facets of Diamond are identified with the Brahmanical triad (*trimūrti*):

\[
kāyavajro bhaved brahmā vāgvajras tu maheśvaraḥ \]

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41 Hvt 2, p.36 (I.x.8–12). Author’s transl. For a brief comment see Yogaratnamāla, pp.131–2.
42 Yogaratnamāla, p.132, and the Prasannapadā, p.165 (Darbhanga ed.) have quoted a verse of these Kālavidins which is as follows:

\[
kāla pacatī bhutāni kālaḥ samharaṇe praṇāhaḥ
kālaḥ saptesa jāgariḥ kālo hi duratikramaḥ
\]

43 Hvt 2, p.26 (I.x.14); also Gst, p.16; see n.8 above.
44 Candamahāroṣana Tantra, p.18, vv.1–4 abridged. GST (Darbhanga ed.), pp.3, 14, 25, 28, 32, 40.
Thus Diamond-Body is Brahmma, Diamond-Speech is Shiva, and Diamond-Mind, the King, is the great magician Visnu. One might also say that Vajrasattva is far above any one of these great gods for he is the unity of all of them.

Similar ideas abound in the Samvarodaya Tantra. It invokes the authority of the Vedas and Siddhantas to eulogise the four fundamental elements (caturbhuta), viz., air, fire, water and the earth. The last element is called the place where the Supreme Lord (paramesvara) called god (deva), and consciousness (vijnana) eternally dwells. This god or consciousness is transformed into knowledge (jnana) which takes the shape of five deities. Then the text enumerates five personality factors (pañcaskandha), five types of knowledge, five Tathagatas (from the Tantric pantheon mentioned above) and so on. The deity yoga, we are told, is unthinkable, just as the sport or play (nataka) of Buddhas is unthinkable, because they have the form of a multitude of dakini (goddesses with magical powers) in union with Lord Heruka. This god is conceived as standing in a shooting position (alictha posture of the feet) in the centre of the solar circle like a hero; he is three-faced and six-armed.

This Heruka is often identified with Prajinopaya, and a

yogin often conceives himself in meditation as of the nature of Heruka. A sort of Vedantic notion of self occasionally occurs in these texts. Contemplating complete Non-duality (sarvam advayatam), beyond subjectivity and objectivity, the Tantric yogin free from all conventional ideas and practices dwells in the bliss of the indivisibility of sunyat and karuna. It is said that the Supreme Self (paramatma) dwells without hesitation in the form of his self (atmaripta).

The individual soul (pinda) with its internal and external (equipments) is pure like the sky; thus the liberated self (muktatma) always sees the self (atma) as he does the sky. It is bodiless, without beginning and without end, is free from qualities like sound, and so on, is released from duality (dvitityena vinirmuktam), and somehow exists in every way. Having based being on non-being, it renders being without basis; having made thought without thought, it does not think any thing at all.

The text also states that beings are like thought, and thought is like the Jinas (Victors); this was revealed by the Buddha who is free from thought. He who does not think of thought, all his thoughts disappear; not to superimpose various kinds of superimpositions and to be dispassionate is to achieve the Great.

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46 Ibid., XVII.19; see also pp.104-5.
47 Samvarodaya Tantra IV.9-14.
48 Ibid., IV.33.
49 Ibid., XIII.15.
50 Ibid., IV.32; XXI.7-9.
51 Ibid., XXXII.2-4. Author’s transl.
Bliss.52

The Tantric Buddhist pantheon is truly enormous and complex, and we cannot here discuss even its major figures and features.53 The position of religious preceptor (guru), the symbolism of numerous rituals, sacred formulas (mantras), diagrams (yantras), physical postures (âsanas), finger-postures (mûdâras), mystic maps (manâlas) and articles of use in Tantric practice, all these and many other elements of Tantric Buddhist culture have yet to be studied in depth and detail. The work so far done by several scholars in this field has only touched some areas of the meaning and importance of what is likely to remain a major paradoxical problem of the history of Buddhist civilisation.

It was observed earlier in this paper that the siddhas maintained a monistic or non-dualistic theory of ultimate reality. It can also be suggested now that, along with monistic or non-dualistic ideas, there is in these tantric texts a definite strand of theistic or monotheistic doctrine. Several passages quoted above suggest that Vajrasattva is viewed as the Supreme

52 Ibid., XXXIII, 11-12

55 Sadhanamâla II, p. 505 (Dvibhujasambaropadesa), lines 5-12:

Buddhânum janâkah trikâya-sahitas-traikâya-srayvedakah
sarvajñah paramâdhibuddha bhagavân vande tameva-adwaryam
kam tat sukhâm rupâddhitâ karunâ-jhânam-aksaram
sânyâsqaram etat paramadhâbhava sarvâhavasya darânanam
sarvatah pâni-pâddhâm sarvatoâksi sûro mukham
sarvatah sarvatmâna loke sarvam-âvatra tisthâti
ekâh svabhâvikâh kâyâh sânyâstâkaruna-advayâh
napumṣakâm iti khyâto yuganaddha iti kvacit
These verses freely translated here were composed by Mahāpanḍita Ratnākaragupta who probably lived in the eleventh century. Three works are attributed to him in the Tibetan Tanjur, and two of his short ritual texts are preserved in the Sādhanamāla, a collection of 312 sādhanas, a manuscript of which was written in 1165 C.E. Buddhism was thus transformed into Theology before it died in its homeland during the age of the Great Adept.

(To be continued)
Cependant je suis aussi pur et serein que lui, puisque le śramaṇa Gautama mange des aliments riches et succulents alors que je ne mange que des fruits ordinaires pour ma subsistance. En ce moment le Bienheureux savait ce que le brahmane pensait et il dit aux bhikṣu:

Il y a vingt-et-un comportements malsains qui corrompent l'esprit des gens et les conduisent forcément dans les voies mauvaises (durcari), ils leur empêchent la renaissance dans un monde meilleur. Quels sont ces vingt-et-un comportements?

1- La haine
2- Le désir de tuer
3- La paresse
4- L'attachement aux plaisirs
5- Le doute [permanent]
6- La colère
7- La jalousie
8- L'inquiétude
9- Le dépit
10- La rancœur
11- L'impudicité
12- L'impudicité
13- La dépravation
14- La malhonnêteté
15- Le faux raisonnement (lit.: forger, fabriquer)

16- Le désir de lutter
17- La vanité
18- L'égocentrisme (c.à.d. l'amour-propre, la hauteur)
19- L'envie
20- L'orgueil
21- La cupidité.

Ö bhikṣu! si quelqu'un possède ces vingt-et-un comportements malsains, son esprit est infecté, il s'engagera forcément dans des voies mauvaises, il lui sera impossible de renaitre dans un monde meilleur. C'est comme un vêtement nouveau [fabriqué] de la laine fine, tout blanc, qui jaunit au cours des années par la poussière et les saletés. On ne peut le colorer en bleu, en jaune, en rouge ou en noir. Pourquoi? Parce qu'il a la poussière et les saletés. Ainsi, ô bhikṣu, si quelqu'un laisse imprégner son esprit des vingt-et-un comportements malsains, il est certain qu'ils le conduisent forcément dans des voies mauvaises, qu'ils lui empêchent la renaissance dans un monde meilleur. Au contraire, s'il y a quelqu'un dont l'esprit n'est pas infecté par ces vingt-et-un comportements malsains, il est certain qu'il renaittra dans les cieux et non pas en enfer. C'est comme un tissu de laine fine, tout blanc et propre: on peut le teindre en n'importe quelle couleur: bleu, jaune, rouge ou noir, avec une réussite certaine. Pourquoi ? Parce que le tissu est blanc et propre. Il en est de même pour une personne dont l'esprit a été purifié des vingt-et-un comportements malsains; il est certain que cette personne renaittra dans les cieux et non pas en enfer.

S'il arrive à un disciple des saints (arya-śrāvaka) d'avoir un comportement haineux, il faut qu'il essaye de le maîtriser. Il
faut faire la même chose pour les autres comportements - le désir de tuer, etc. S'il arrive à un disciple des saints d'être purifié de la haine et des autres comportements malsains, il a un comportement paisible et gai, et de la bienveillance (maitri) pour tout le monde sans distinction aucune. Cette bienveillance universelle apportera la paix et la joie à tout le monde. Et c'est dans la paix et la joie qu'il aura la vue juste des choses. Il a aussi de la compassion (karuṇa) pour tout le monde sans distinction aucune. Cette compassion apportera la paix et la joie à tout le monde. Et c'est dans la paix et la joie qu'il aura la vue juste des choses. Il aura le plaisir (muditā) d'avoir apporté la paix et la joie à tout le monde sans distinction aucune. Ce plaisir apportera la paix et la joie à tout le monde. Et c'est dans la paix et la joie qu'il aura la vue juste des choses. Il aura la fermeté dans la protection [de la Doctrine] pour tout le monde sans distinction aucune. Cette fermeté apportera la paix et la joie à tout le monde. Et c'est dans la paix et la joie qu'il aura la vue juste des choses.

Il parvient ainsi à la foi inébranlable dans le Tathāgata. Alors il brandit inébranlablement le drapeau [de la Doctrine]. Parmi les dieux, les dragons, les asuras, les śramaṇa, les brahmanes, ou les habitants de ce monde, il arrive ainsi à la paix, la joie, la vue juste des choses. Ainsi est vraiment le Tathāgata, perfectionné, pleinement illuminé, doué de la science et de la bonne pratique, bien allé, connaisseur du monde(des mondes), chef de la caravane, maître des dieux et des hommes, le pleinement éveillé qui protège tous. Ainsi cette [foi] lui [le disciple] apporte la paix et la joie et il a la vue juste des choses.

Il parvient encore [à la foi inébranlable] dans la Doctrine: La Doctrine du Tathágata est tout à fait lucide, elle ne change jamais, elle est vénérée. Ainsi un homme sage doit observer la Doctrine, dans laquelle il aura la paix et la joie. Il vient de nouveau [à la foi inébranlable] dans la Communauté: la Communauté du Tathágata est pur et serein, honnête et conformément à la Doctrine; [ses membres] obtiennent les accomplissements parfaits qui suivent: l'observance des règles religieuses (śīla), la concentration (samādhi), la sagesse (prajñā), la délivrance (mokṣa), l'éveil. La Communauté des saints comporte quatre paires (celui qui entre dans le courant... arhat) et huit personnes (câd. les quatre ārya, dont chacun(e) réalise le 'chemin' et le 'fruit' de son niveau de sainteté). Ce sont les saints de la Communauté du Tathágata. Ils sont respectables, vénérables, et peuvent vraiment faire [ce qui doit être fait]. Cette [foi] lui [le disciple] apporte la paix et la joie et il a la vue juste des choses. Il se sert de sa concentration, de son esprit serein dépourvu de toute impureté et de tout comportement malsain, de son caractère doux; il peut manifester ses pouvoirs surnaturels; il peut ainsi connaître ses innombrables vies antérieures; connaître parfaitement ce qui s'était passé il y a une génération, deux générations... dix générations... cent générations... d'inombrables générations antérieures; connaître ses noms, ses prénoms, ses façons de vivre, sa joie, sa peine, ses

6 Lit: 'esprit protecteur', ce qui veut dire upekkhā (Majjhima), upekkhā (lit. dans le MĀ: 'renoncer').

7 Tandis que la liste des qualités de Buddha (buddha-guna) est assez proche du pāli (iti pi so bhagavā araham...), les énumérations qui suivent des dhamma et sangha-guna dans l'EĀ rappelle de loin seulement le pāli svākkhālo bhagavatā dhammo... supatispanno bhagavato sāvakasāṅgho...
succès, ses défaîtes, etc. ... connaître la pensée des êtres vivants, il peut utiliser son oeil divin pour observer les différentes espèces d'êtres vivants, leurs aspects physiques, leurs caractères, leurs comportements, leurs vies successives, leurs évolutions selon leur karma (bonnes ou mauvaises actions).

Il se sert de sa concentration (samādhi) pour se purifier, pour éliminer les mauvaises actions, les mauvaises pensées, les comportements malsains, et réalise ainsi des pouvoirs surnaturels. Il se sert ensuite du 'plus haut pouvoir surnaturel': devenir libre des souillures. Il réalise [les Vérités] de la souffrance, de l'origine de la souffrance, de la cessation de la souffrance et [du chemin qui] conduit à la cessation de la souffrance. Après cette réalisation, il se trouve libéré de la souillure des plaisirs des sens, de la souillure de l'ignorance. Dans la libération le savoir vient qu'il est libéré, et il comprend: 'La naissance et la mort sont détruites, la conduite de Brahmā (la vie de purification) a pris sa fin, ce qui devait être fait a été fait, il n'y aura plus de devenir [pour moi].

Un bhikṣu qui sait se conduire ainsi est un véritable disciple des saints; son esprit est libéré; même s'il consomme beaucoup de boissons et d'aliments savoureux, il ne fait rien de mal. Pourquoi? Parce qu'il n'a plus de convoitises, parce qu'il n'a plus de désirs, de haine, de rancune, de doute. Il est nommé un bhikṣu, parmi les bhikṣu, qui, au sens le plus haut, est lavé par un lavage interne.


- Ô brahmane! le Bienheureux demanda, qu'y-a-t-il de l'eau du fleuve Sundarikā?

Le brahmane répondit: L'eau est très claire. C'est un fleuve bénéfique. Quiconque se baigne dans ce fleuve se débarrasse entièrement de tous les maux.

Alors le Bienheureux récita ce poème:

Notre corps est le résultat de nos actions pendant d'innombrables milliers d'années passées.
Le bain dans ce fleuve soi-disant bénéfique,
Ainsi que dans d'autres petites mares,
Ne peut jamais nous débarrasser des nos actions ténébreuses.
Les imbéciles aiment aller se baigner souvent dans ce fleuve;
Cependant avec leurs maux antérieurs accumulés,
L'eau du fleuve ne peut pas purifier leur karma.
L'homme pur vit toujours heureux
Dans l'observation des règles de pureté.
L'homme pur mène une vie de pureté,
Sa fermeté lui apportera sûrement de bons

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résultats.
Si quelqu'un s'abstient de voler,
De tuer,
De mentir
S'il considère les autres comme lui-même,
Il peut se baigner n'importe où,
Il est toujours paisible dans son bonheur serein.
Comment ce fleuve peut-il nous purifier?
N'est-il pas comme si un aveugle était capable de révéler ce qui est caché?

Maintenant le brahmane dit avec véhémence au Bienheureux:
- Ô Gautama! maintenant je suis comme un bossu qui retrouve son dos droit, comme un aveugle qui retrouve la vue, comme un égaré qui retrouve le bon chemin, comme une personne [jadis] incapable de voir et maintenant douée des yeux pour voir qui trouve la lumière dans une maison obscure. Ô oui! le śramaṇa Gautama a utilisé d'innumérables moyens salvifiquest pour nous expliquer le merveilleux Dharma. Je veux suivre votre Chemin et pratiquer conformément.

Ainsi le brahmane "Prédisposé-en-faveur-des-fleuves" [demanda à être admis dans la communauté du Samgha,] et il reçut les règles complètes de moine par égard desquelles les jeunes hommes de famille quittent la maison pour entrer dans la vie sans maison. Il suivait strictement l'enseignement [du Bouddha] et pratiquait la conduite de Brahô sans égal jusqu'au temps] qu'il savait vraiment: La naissance et la mort sont détruites, la conduite de Brahô a pris sa fin, ce qui devait être fait a été fait, il n'y aura plus de devenir [pour moi]. A ce moment-là, le vénérable Sundarikâ[10] devint un perfectionné (arhat). Le vénérable Sundarika écoutait les paroles de Bouddha, se réjouissait et les mettait respectueusement en pratique.'

6. 'Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois quand le Bouddha résidait à Râjagrha, au Mont De Vautours (Grdhракुṭa) avec 500 grands bhikṣu, Śakra, le roi des dieux, ayant passé dans la journée, revint dans la soirée auprès du Bienheureux, se prosterna à ses pieds, puis s'installa à ses côtés. Il récita le poème suivant pour demander l'explication au Tathāgata:

[Les grands maîtres] ont souvent déclaré
Que ceux qui ont traversé le cycle de la renaissance sont purifiés.
Maintenant que j'ai traversé le ravin des renaissances,
Je veux vous demander de bien vouloir m'expliquer le sens profond de ces mots.
J'ai constaté que tous les êtres vivants ici présents
Ont fait de bonnes actions, et ont été encouragés
A accomplir des bienfaits de différentes sortes.

9 Lit. 'rendre ce qui est tenèbres/secret'.

10 Ici, au lieu de "Prédisposé-en-faveur-des-fleuves" comme ci-dessus, le nom transcrit est 'Sundarika'; cf. n.8.

Mais quelle est l’action la plus méritoire?
Maintenant que vous êtes au Mont des Vautours,
Veuillez nous expliquer ce qu’il faut faire en
priorité.

Le Bienheureux, [sachant la bonne intention de Śakra qui
avait posé cette question pour aider les autres,] lui repondit en
récitant ce poème :

Dans les quatre voies mauvaises [l’enfer, les ‘âmes
errantes et affamées’, les animaux, les asura]
on n’a pas les moyens de faire le bien d’une
façon complète.
Seuls les saints ont ces moyens.
Car ils ont pratiqué les règles complètes de la
p pureté,
Ils ont la foi solide en la Doctrine en la mettant
en application.
Ils n’ont plus la cupidité, ni la colère,
Ils ont la vue juste des choses, et sont purifiés.
L’action la plus méritoire pour eux
Est de sauver tous [les êtres vivants] du ravin [des
rennaissances],
Tandis que les êtres vivants
Qui veulent faire de bonnes actions
Pour évoluer vite dans la bonne voie,
Doivent choisir la subvention au besoins du
Samgha,
Lequel sauvera d’innombrables êtres vivants.
Comme l’océan produit d’innombrables choses
précieuses,
Le Samgha des saints

Donnera des prédications sur la brillante sagesse.
Pour vous aider à évoluer vite
Je dis qu’il faut subventionner aux besoins du
Samgha.
C’est l’action la plus méritoire.
N’oubliez jamais ces paroles très importantes.

Après avoir entendu ces paroles précieuses du Bouddha,
Śakra, le roi des dieux, se prosternait à ses pieds; il en était très
heureux et il les mettait respectueusement en pratique.

7. Ainsi ai-je entendu. Une fois, quand le Bouddha résidait à
Rājagṛha, au Mont des Vautours (Grññhrakūṭa) avec 500 grands
bhikṣus, le vénérable Subhūti était seul dans sa cabane de
méditation dans la citadelle de Rājagṛha, près du Mont des
Vautours. En ce moment le vénérable Subhūti souffrait d’une
maladie grave, il voulait savoir quelle était l’origine de cette
souffrance, comment se guérir, quel est le devenir de cette
souffrance après la guérison. Il prépara le tapis et le coussin de
méditation, se mit en position de lotus, le corps droit, l’esprit
concentré, il méditait sur la façon d’éliminer les souffrances.

Alors Śakra, le roi des dieux, sachant la pensée du vénérable
Subhūti, donna l'ordre à Pañcaśikha

[Le vénérable Subhūti] est très actif dans sa libération de tout attachement,
Il s'entraîne souvent au Mont des Vautours.
Aujourd'hui il a un grand souci,
Et il arrive à purifier ses sens par [le séjour] dans la vacuité.
Dépêchons-nous de lui rendre visite pour demander conseils.
Seulement en observant la physionomie du vénérable
Nous récolterons de grands profits.
C'est ainsi que nous agrandissons notre amas de mérites.

Pañcaśikha dit: 'Oui, Seigneur!' Et Śakra, le roi des dieux,
accompagné de 500 deva (dieux) et de Pañcaśikha, va en un clin d'œil du ciel de Trāyāstrimśad au Mont des Vautours, non loin de la cabane du vénérable Subhūti. [Śakra] dit à Pañcaśikha en récitant ce poème:

Vous avez fait toutes les bonnes actions,
Vous avez pratiqué la méditation.
Vous êtes sociable, serein, et vous avez une belle voix claire et étendue.
Allez voir [le vénérable Subhūti].

12 波遮逝句 doit certainement représenter le Gandharva Pañcaśikha; cf.
E. Waldschmidt, Bruchstücke buddhistischer Sūtras aus dem zentralasiatischen Sanskritkanon (Leipzig 1932, Wiesbaden 1979), p.63 (259), n.3 (Śakra-prāśnasūtra 1).

Pañcaśikha dit: 'Oui, Seigneur!' Puis il accorda sa guitare de lapis-lazuli, alla au devant du vénérable Subhūti, le complimentant en chantant:

Vos inquiétudes sont complètement finies,
Vos illusions et vos peines sont parties,
Vos impurités ont complètement et pour toujours pris fin,
Votre méditation vous a conduit à l'éveil.
Votre esprit est calme, le fleuve [de vos passions] tari.
Veuillez détromper Māra et conduire les êtres vivants à la réalisation [du dharma suprême].
Votre travail et votre vertu seront grandioses comme l'océan,
Nous espérons pouvoir réussir rapidement pour être digne de votre confiance.
Vos yeux purifiés ressemblent aux belles fleurs de lotus.
Qui n'ont aucune tache de boue, et dont les pistils jaunes restent purs.
Aujourd'hui nous sommes réunis ici,
Dans l'espoir de réussir à séjourner vraiment dans la vacuité.
Nous avons déjà traversé les quatre courants [de la naissance, de la vieillesse, de la maladie et de la mort];
Nous n'avons plus de souffrances physiques,
Il nous reste la concentration et l'éveil pour parvenir à la perfection.
Moi-même et les 500 deva ici présents,
Nous sommes venus des différentes directions pour présenter nos hommages
Au Bouddha Śākyamuni et aux saints,
Pour réaliser - le plus tôt sera le mieux - [le sens profond de] la vacuité.

Ayant entendu cette chanson, le vénérable Subhūti se leva et complimenta Pañcaśīkha: Excellent, excellent, Ō Pañcaśīkha! Votre voix et votre musique forment une harmonie parfaite. La musique ne sort pas de la parole, la parole ne s'écarte pas de la musique, les deux se fusionnent en une chanson miraculeuse!

Śakra, le roi des dieux, s'approcha du vénérable Subhūti, le salua, se mit à ses côtés et lui demanda:

- Pourquoi celui qui fait de bonnes actions subit des malheurs? Votre corps est souffrant, d'où vient ce mal? Du corps ou de l'esprit?

- Très bien, très bien, Ō Kauśika! répondit le vénérable Subhūti à Śakra, le roi des dieux. - Il y a continuellement des choses (dharma) qui apparaissent, d'autres qui disparaissent. Toute existence est relative et relationnelle. Tout poison a son antidote, Ō Kauśika! Les choses, Roi du Ciel, s'entremêlent, s'éliminent, donnent naissance à autres choses. Le noir élimine le blanc, le blanc annule le noir. Pour guérir le désir sexuel, Roi du Ciel, il faut méditer que le corps est malsain. Pour guérir la haine il faut utiliser la bienveillance et la compassion. Pour guérir l'ignorance et l'imbécilité il faut faire intervenir la sagesse. C'est ainsi, Ō Śakra, roi des dieux, que toute existence retournera [au niveau de la vérité absolue] à la vacuité: pas d'ego (ātman), pas de personne (pudgala, puruṣa), pas de force vitale (āyus), pas d'âme (jīva), pas de sages ni de vulgaires, pas de formes ni de phénomènes, pas d'hommes ni de femmes. C'est comme le grand vent qui ravage les arbres, la grêle qui détruit les fleurs, la sécheresse qui flétrit les plantes, la pluie qui les fait épanouir. Ō Roi du Ciel, tout ce qui existe forme un chaos et se stabilise. J'ai eu des soucis et des inquiétudes, maintenant que je les ai supprimés, je ne suis plus souffrant. Alors Śakra, le roi des dieux, dit à Subhūti:

- J'ai aussi eu des soucis et des inquiétudes. Maintenant que j'ai écouté votre enseignement, je m'en suis débarrassé. La plupart des gens, las de la bassesse et de la méchanceté de ce monde, veulent retourner aux mondes célestes; mais là-haut il y a d'autres problèmes aussi vilains.

- Maintenant, dit le vénérable Subhūti, c'est le moment favorable pour évoluer.

Alors Śakra, le roi des dieux, se leva, se prosterna aux pieds du vénérable Subhūti, fit trois tours autour de celui-ci pour le saluer.

Le vénérable Subhūti récita ce poème:

Les sages ont souvent dit ceci:
Ceux qui font de bonnes actions ont raison de croire qu'ils sont en train d'évoluer vers le bonheur parfait.
C'est la foi inébranable des sages.
Entendre le Dharma peut guérir des inquiétudes.

Ayant entendu ces paroles du vénérable Subhūti, Śakra, le roi des dieux, les mettait joyeusement en pratique.'

FIN DE LA PARTIE 13 ET DU FASCICULE SIXIÈME

NEWS AND NOTES

British Library
All Oriental manuscripts and books are now situated in the India Office Library, 197 Blackfriars Road, London SE1 8NG (tel. 071-412 7000), to form the Oriental and India Office Library Collections (OIOC) which change is reflected in the Newsletter. Reading Room, photographic and fax facilities have been enhanced by improved accommodation. By the end of 1996, however, these holdings and facilities will be relocated to the new site of the British Library at St. Pancras in central north London.

British Museum
Following the opening of the Japanese Gallery two years ago, another gallery will be created to house the Buddhist sculptures from Amarāvati, hitherto concealed due to lack of public viewing space since 1960. The Indian display is scheduled to open in mid-1992.

First Buddhist Institute in South America
The Fundación Instituto de Estudios Budistas was created towards the end of 1989 in Buenos Aires and formally inaugurated in the following spring at a public meeting in the Centro Cultural San Martin, also in the Argentine capital. This organisation is the brainchild of a husband and wife team, the Buddhologist Dr Carmen Dragonetti and Indologist Dr Fernando Tola (respectively President and Vice-President of the Fundación), who have distinguished themselves over many years and effectively personify these fields of study in South America.

The declared Objects are 'to promote, make accessible and elevate studies and research on Buddhism, on the cultures in
which this flourished (India, Central, South-East and Far East Asia) and on the languages used by it (Sanskrit, Pāli, Chinese, Japanese, etc.). Activities will include courses, research seminars, working groups and large Buddhist conferences. During 1990, for example, courses in Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese and Japanese were held in relation to the grammar, translation and commentaries of mainly Buddhist texts; also courses on Buddhism, its development and main teachings, the reading of relevant texts in Spanish and translating from Pāli and Sanskrit; ending the year with a conference on the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkaśūtra.

To contact the FIEB write to: Arribeños 2350 Casa 1, 1428 Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Asociación Latinoamericana de Estudios Budistas
This organisation was also established at the end of 1990 with the object of studying and promulgating Buddhist culture. Based in Mexico City, it is supported financially by the Kokusai Bukkyōgaku Kenkūshyo (International Institute of Buddhist Studies, Tokyo). Plans include translating and publishing Buddhist texts and secondary works, creating a public library on the subject (apart from the library of the FIEB, non-existent on the continent), organising exhibitions of Buddhist art and even erecting a statue of Śākyamuni Buddha in a public place.

The official organ of the Asociación is the Revista de Estudios Budistas, an attractive and well-presented periodical scheduled to appear twice yearly. The first two issues were published this year.

The President of the Asociación is Prof. Benjamin Preciado at El Colegio de México (where the well-established Centro de Estudios de Asia y Africa is directed by Prof. Jorge Silva) with a committee which includes Marco Antonio Karam, Director of the Casa Tibet de México.

For further information about the Asociación, write to Apartado Postal # 19-332, C.P. 03901, Mexico, D.F., and for details of the Revista, contact Revista de Estudios Budistas, 2741 Sunset Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90026, USA.

Conferences and Seminars
1. The 7th International Conference on Buddhist Education. Sponsored by the Institute for Sino-Indian Buddhism, this was held in Taipei, July 1990. More than sixty scholars from Asia, Europe and North America participated in the discussion of thirty-one papers submitted on the theme, ‘Development of Modern Buddhist Education’.

2. A ‘National Seminar on Vijñānavāda’ was held at the University of Delhi in the Department of Buddhist Studies on 22 March 1991. The relatively neglected doctrines of the Yogācāra have lately been enhanced by three recent publications: Surekha V. Limaye (ed. and tr.), The Mahāyānasūtraalankāra of Asaṅga (Delhi 1991), Y.S. Shastri, Mahāyānasūtraalankāra of Asaṅga (Delhi 1989), and Thomas E. Wood, Mind Only. A Philosophical Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijñānavāda (University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu 1991).

3. The Association for Asian Studies held its 50th annual meeting in New Orleans, April 1991. Further details, and of its other activities, may be obtained from the Association’s address, 1 Lane Hall, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA.
4. To mark the centenary of the Maha Bodhi Society, its most active Indian branch, in Bangalore, sponsored the 'First International Buddhist Convention' on 10 June 1991; sixteen speakers read papers on 'The Buddhist Approach to Contemporary Problems'. The gathering of invited guests and participants included government ministers from Karnataka state, Ananda Mitra (Sanghanāyaka of the Indian Bhikkhu Sangha), L. Ariyavamsa (Nāyaka Mahāthera, New Delhi), Bhikkhu Sanghasena (President, MBS, Bangalore), Geshé Lobsang Tsering and other senior representatives of the Tibetan monastic community, together with invitees from India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and Australia. The Netherlands, Spain and the USA were represented by Olande Ananda Thera, Ven. Jampa Shenpar and Prof. Kenneth Liberman respectively.

5. The Eleventh International Conference of the Association of South Asian Archaeologists in Western Europe, hosted by the Freie Universität, was held in Berlin, July 1991.

6. The Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion Buddhism Section was held in Kansas City, Missouri, November 1991. Twenty-four papers were submitted from twenty American universities or colleges and McMaster University (Ontario, Canada) covering the following themes: Foundational Philosophies: Ālayavijñāna and Tathāgatagarbha in India, China, and Tibet; Topics in Buddhist Studies; Buddhism and Orientalism at the Turn of the Century; Genre and Canon in Buddhist Literature; Deity and Deification in the Tantras.

7. A symposium on 'Buddhist Studies in the Nordic Countries', jointly organised by the Seminar for Buddhist Studies (the Universitites of Copenhagen and Århus) and the Institute for the History of Religions (University of Oslo) and generously sponsored by the Nordisk Ministerråd, was held in June 1991 at Samsø College, Denmark. (In 1989 Samsø College had already been the venue for a symposium on 'The Esoteric Buddhist Tradition'; see the report in Studies in Central and East Asian Religions 2, Copenhagen and Århus 1989, pp.182-7, and BSR 7, 1-2, p.92f.) The purpose of this year’s symposium was to convene scholars (mainly from the Nordic countries) who work on various aspects of Buddhism so as to ascertain the latest position of this vast field of research. The areas dealt with in the symposium papers, in the workshop and presentations of current research, included India, Tibet, Mongolia, China, Japan and Korea, unfortunately excluding South-East Asia due to the absence of a scholar who had intended to present a paper on the 'Traibhūmi-Kathā - A Buddhist Cosmology from Thailand'.

Nine symposium papers were delivered and subsequently discussed, and an account of Buddhist art was given with the help of colour slides. In his paper on 'The Gaganaganjaparinirvāṇa and Early Mahāyāna', J. Braarvig (Oslo) not only threw new light on the origins of Mahāyāna Buddhism, but also on early phases of an attempted consolidation and classification of Mahāyāna doctrine as suggested by, inter alia, the Mahāsamnipāta collection of Mahāyāna scriptures. Braarvig directed the participants' attention to the hitherto barely noticed Buddhological problem as to whether the first Indian attempts at classification of the Mahāyāna doctrine predate Nāgārjuna I or not. U. Hammer (Uppsala) discussed 'Basic Themes in the Kālacakratantra' by treating both doctrinal aspects and, with reference to modern Kālacakra initiations, political implications. Drawing on Dhp vv.419-20, on the story of Vāṅgisa in the Dhp-Āṭṭhakathā and other allied sources, including Taishō
No.385, the Antarābhavasūtra, P.-A. Berglie (Stockholm) presented 'The Brahman who Tapped on the Skulls of the Dead'. This paper dealt with 'remnants of a soul theory in Buddhism' or what other scholars have called 'the problem of precanonical Buddhism'. Bh. Pāśādika (Göttingen) contributed a paper entitled 'On the Thematic Concord between a Sūtrasamuccaya Quotation from the Ajātaśatruparivarta and Madhyamakakārikās XXIII, Viparyāsaprākṣā', and Á. Lande (Oslo and Birmingham) discussed upon 'Buddhism in the West: A Case Study from Birmingham'.

The initial lecture of the second day's session was C. Lindtner's on 'Yoga i Indisk Mahāyāna' in which yoga was associated with hypnosis (but not in a vulgar sense). After mentioning Sudhana's visit to a lady-bodhisattva, as recorded in the Gaṇḍavyūha, I. Astley-Kristensen (Århus) examined 'Traditions of Bliss in Buddhism' by elucidating the 'relationship between suffering, happiness and great bliss'. H. Büschler (Copenhagen), a Yogācāra specialist, put forward 'Aporias Conceptive of Vijnaptimātratā', whilst H.H. Sørensen (Copenhagen) took stock of 'Esoteric Buddhism in Dunhuang', making it clear that esoteric Buddhism is not necessarily Tantric Buddhism. Finally, M. Thowsen (Oslo) described the until-now altogether unknown 'Chinese Buddhist Sculptures in the Munthe Collection'.

(Bh. P)

8. The 10th Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies. Sponsored by UNESCO and its Sri Lankan delegation, the Université de Paris X and its Laboratoire d'Ethnologie et de Sociologie Comparative, this bi-annual congress was held at UNESCO headquarters in July.

It opened with addresses by Dr Ananga W.P. Guruge (Ambassador of Sri Lanka), C.L. Sharma (Deputy Director-General of UNESCO) and Prof. A.W. Macdonald (Paris). The keynote address on 'The Present and the Future of Buddhist Studies' was delivered by Prof. D. Seyfort Ruegg (Visiting Professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 1991-2). This was followed by a panel on the date of the Buddha led by Profs A.K. Narain (Varanasi), R.F. Gombrich (Oxford) and H. Bechert (Göttingen). The proceedings were attended by bhikkhus from Sri Lanka, Thailand, France and Germany.

The papers submitted included the following:

**Theravādin Studies**

Two papers (unfortunately scheduled on different 'panels') dealt with the Aggaṅga Sutta, one by Richard Gombrich - 'A Fresh Look at Some Features of Early Buddhism', and one by Rupert Gethin (Bristol) - 'Cosmology and Psychology in the Aggaṅga Sutta and Pali Commentaries'. Steven Collins (Chicago), in his 'Oral Aspects of Pali Literature', demonstrated that aural/oral traditions have remained important in the Theravādin lineage, despite the writing down of texts. Peter Harvey (Sunderland) discussed 'The Mind-body Relationship in Pali Buddhism', according to the interpretation of both Sutta and Abhidhamma. Konrad Meissig (Münster) dealt with 'Metres in the Sinhalese Guttīla-kavyaya'. Coming to the modern period, Bhikkhu Mettānanda (Wat Phra Dhammakaya, Bangkok) spoke on 'The Dhammakaya Movement: A Cultural Analysis', and L.S. Cousins (Manchester) surveyed the history of Theravāda Buddhism in England. San Sarin (a Cambodian scholar resident in France) offered a paper entitled 'Buddhism Transformed: Religious Practice and Institutional mixed games in Cambodia'.
Srāvakayāna Studies
Kamaleswar Bhattacharya (Paris) treated ‘Réalisme ontologique et opportunisme grammatical dans l’Abhidharmadīpā et la Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtī’. Sieglinde Dietz (Göttingen) discussed the Kārānaprajñāapti in its Chinese and Tibetan translations in relation to recently identified Sanskrit fragments. Peter Skilling (Bangkok) spoke on ‘The Rāksā Literature of the Srāvakayāna’ and ‘The Pañcarakṣā’. Amalia Pezzali (Bologna) summarized the relevant sections of the Abhidharmakūsa in ‘The Four Noble Truths: an Analysis’. Marion Meisig (Münster) spoke on ‘King Śibi in the Oldest Buddhist Chinese Version’. Bert Desseim (Ghent) examined a Miscellany on the Heart of Scholasticism (Tsa A-pi-t’an Hsin Lun), and ‘Buddhist Nikāyas through Ancient Chinese Eyes’ was the title of Wang Bangwei’s (Peking University) paper.

Mahāyāna Studies
Probing the purport of Candrakīrti’s philosophy, C.A. Scherrer-Schaub (Lausanne) presented ‘Candrakīrti’s Yuktisārthikāvṛtti’. Bhikkhu Pāśādika (Göttingen) spoke on ‘The Authorship of the mDo kun las btus pa (Sūtrasamuccaya)’, arguing for the likelihood of the traditional attribution to Nāgārjuna. Paul Harrison (Canterbury, New Zealand) ‘restored’ the meaning of Dharmakāya, demonstrating that its interpretation by several generations of modern scholars as an ‘Absolute Body’ cannot be supported by texts, at least for the early and middle periods. Jens Braarvig (Oslo), in ‘The Gaganagaṇjaparipṛcchā and Early Mahāyāna’, addressed the question of the date of compilation of such collections as the Mahāsaṃnipāta and Ratnakūṭa. Peter Ebbatson (Oxford) dealt with ‘The Structural Significance of Chapter 24 of the Mūlamadhyamakārikā’ in terms of recent Western analytical philosophy. N. Ross Reat (Queensland) spoke on ‘The Śālistamba Sūtra’ and the Origins of Mahāyāna Buddhism’. An important contribution was Akira Yuyama’s (Tokyo) ‘Some Remarks of Sino-Sanskrit Glossaries Preserved only in Japan’.

Tibetan Studies
Jose Cabazon (Iliff) reported on the Tsogs Gtam Chen mo, an oral text of the Byes College of Sera monastery. Robin Kornmann (Princeton) in ‘Epic Machinery in the Gesar, a Comparative Study’, discussed the famous Tibetan epic in terms of emergent written tradition and literary criticism. Alexander Macdonald (Paris X), ‘Zabs-dkar et le démembrément’, enlightened his audience with the lively and satirical verses of the lama Zhabs-dkar. Michio Sato (Iwate) dealt with ‘The Significance of Mi la ras pa’s Buddhism’.

Art History
John C. Huntington (Ohio) spoke on the date of ‘Tantric Cave’ 465 at Dunhuang, and Susan L. Huntington (Ohio State) on ‘Aniconism and the Emperor’s New Clothes’. Braj M. Sinha (Saskatchewan) spoke on ‘A Study of Avalokiteśvara’s Imagery in the Karanda-vyūha’.

Comparative Studies
Per-Arne Berglie (Stockholm) reflected on the concept of the antarābhava in ‘The Brahman who Tapped on the Skulls of the Dead’. P. de Silva (London) spoke on ‘Aversive Strategies for Behaviour Change in Early Buddhism’, comparing the techniques of aversion therapy with those recommended in the Pāli Nikāyas, such as the asubbhakammatthānas.
While many interesting and informative papers were given, the conference suffered from some problems in organisation. Two days of sessions were held in the several rooms of two different UNESCO sites, separated by a ten-minute walk. This created considerable difficulty in learning what was going on, in getting to papers in which one was interested, and in meeting fellow delegates to compare notes. Although described as 'panels' on the programme, the sessions were not organised on any theme; indeed papers on quite disparate themes were scheduled together. It is hoped that those participants who have not promised their papers to established periodicals will contribute them to the official Report which will, in addition, include abstracts from the remaining papers and summaries of the ensuing discussions.

(Bh.P and P.S.)

New Periodical
Asian Philosophy, an international journal of Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Buddhist, Persian and Islamic philosophical traditions will appear twice yearly from Carfax Publishing Co., P.O. Box 25, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 3UE. The contents of No.1 include Frank J. Hoffmann, 'Towards a Philosophy of the Buddhist Religion', and Klausermaier, 'The Nature of Buddhism'. The joint editors are Dr Indra Mahalingam (Dept. of Law, University College of Wales, Aberystwyth) and Brian Carr (Dept. of Philosophy, Nottingham University).

OBITUARIES

Agehananda Bharati (1923 - May 1991)

Born in Vienna of Czech parentage with the name of Leopold Fischer, he evinced an early interest in Indian culture and subsequently mastered Sanskrit and Hindi. During the early part of the Second World War he served as an interpreter to the ‘Indian National Army’ under S.C. Bose, but thereafter continued his studies of Sanskrit, Indian Philosophy and Ethnology at Vienna University. In 1947 he travelled to India where, four years later, he became the first Western monk to be admitted to the Sannyasi (Daśanāmi) Order, receiving the name of Agehananda Bharati which he retained for the rest of his life. For the next ten years he taught at the University of Delhi, Banaras Hindu University and other institutions and, after lecturing in Thailand and Japan, emigrated to the USA in 1961. He was initially associated with the Far Eastern Institute at the University of Washington, Seattle, but subsequently transferred to Syracuse University, New York, where, in 1971, he was appointed Chairman of the Department of Anthropology and Ford-Maxwell Professor of South Asian Studies. He recorded his experiences in Austria and India in The Ochre Robe (New York 1970; repr. Santa Barbara 1980), otherwise his only publications relevant to Buddhism are 'Modern Hindu Exegesis of Mahāyāna Doctrine' (Philosophy East and West XII, Honolulu 1962), 'Sakta and Vajrayāna, Their Place in Indian Thought' (Studies of Exoteric Buddhism and Tantrism, Koyasan University 1965), The Tantric Tradition (London and New York 1965; Delhi 1990; German ed., Freiburg 1977), 'Monastic and Lay Buddhism in the 1971 Sri Lanka Insurgency' (Religion and Social Conflict in South Asia, ed. Bardwell L. Smith, Leiden 1976), and

Bimal Krishna Matilal (1935 - June 1991)

A Sanskrit scholar and teacher who mastered both Indian and Western logic, B.K. Matilal succumbed to cancer at Oxford. Coming from West Bengal, he read Sanskrit and Indian Philosophy at the University of Calcutta and then studied at Harvard which awarded him a doctorate in 1965. He was thus enabled to lecture at the Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta (until 1970), and at Toronto for the next twelve years before being appointed as Spalding Professor of Eastern Religion and Ethics at Oxford.

He was the founder-editor of the Journal of Indian Philosophy (Dordrecht from 1970) which featured many of his writings that combined rigorous Western analytical methods and traditional Indian learning. His full-length works include Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis (The Hague 1971), The Logical Illumination of Indian Mysticism (Oxford 1977), Logical and Ethical Issues of Religious Belief (Calcutta 1982), Logic, Language and Reality (Delhi 1985), Perception. An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge (London 1986), Buddhist Logic and Epistemology (Dordrecht 1986), and co-ed. Sanskrit and Related Studies (Delhi 1991).

Anna Katherina Seidel (31 July 1938 - 29 September 1991)

One of the foremost Western exponents of Taoism, Dr Seidel died as a result of a viral infection following a liver transplant in a San Francisco hospital.


Leo Marvel Pruden (1938 - 30 October 1991)

We very much regret to report the death in Los Angeles of this specialist in Far Eastern Buddhism. Ordained in Japan as a
priest in the Kōyasan Shingon-shū (Japanese Tantric) lineage, he was a regular member of the Kōyasan branch temple in Los Angeles, where a memorial ceremony was held for him in December 1991.

Pruden graduated from UCLA, then obtained his doctorate from Harvard in 1971, his dissertation consisting of 'The Risshū-kōyō: An Annotated Translation', a Sino-Japanese (Kambun) Vinaya text. He also spent three years at Tokyo University where he studied the Ritsu tradition under Prof. Akira Hirakawa. He taught at the prestigious Brown University (Rhode Island) and Emerson College (Boston) before returning to his home state to teach at the Nyingma Institute and the Institute of Buddhist Studies (both in Berkeley). Between 1976-80 he served as Dean of Academic Affairs at the University of Oriental Studies (Los Angeles). Inaugurated in 1973 as the College of Oriental Studies, it was subsequently upgraded to University and then to American University of Oriental Studies. This was the first institution devoted exclusively to the study of Buddhism and Asian culture and was intended 'to create scholars in Oriental culture, philosophy, psychology, religion and languages and to better understanding between East and West'. M.A. and Ph.D degrees were offered in Buddhist Philosophy, Zen Studies, Comparative Religion, East-West Philosophy and East-West Psychology; B.A. degrees in Oriental Studies and Buddhist Ministerial Education; as well as Diplomas in Buddhist/Zen Studies. The late Vietnamese Dharma Master, Thich Thien-An, was its President, under whom Pruden lectured on Buddhism, Tantric Buddhism, Asian Languages (he was fluent in Chinese and Japanese, as well as studying many other languages), Buddhist Chinese, Buddhist Literature and History. In 1981 he became the University's second President, and a Doctor of Dharma course was pioneered together with related academic innovations. When not lecturing, Prof. Pruden travelled the world fund-raising for this University.

According to the Fall Quarter 1981 prospectus, Dr Pruden has translated numerous Japanese and Chinese works into English. His publications include articles, translations of Pure Land texts, and a book on Shingon (Japanese Tantric) ritual to be published by the Heian Press [7]. He has just finished a translation of [Mochizuki's] doctrinal History of Chinese Pure Land Buddhism'. However, the writers of this tribute have only seen his magisterial English translations of the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣyam (4 vols, Berkeley 1988-90) - which incorporates in its first volume his seminal essay 'The Abhidharma: The Origins, Growth and Development of a Literary Tradition', and of the Karmasiddhiprakarana (Berkeley 1988), from the French versions of, respectively, Louis de La Vallée Poussin and Étienne Lamotte. (He had intended to effect a similar secondary translation of Bhāvaviveka's Karatalaratna and was invited to translate at least one text for the Bukkyō Dendo Kyokai's ambitious, and so far unrealised, popular English edition of the Taishō Tripitaka.) He also contributed the entries for 'Gyōnen', 'Kōben' and 'T'ien-t'ai' for The Encyclopedia of Religion (ed. Mircea Eliade, New York 1984).

Pruden's relaxed manner apropos academic affairs and his unfailing sense of humour endeared him to colleagues and friends alike and both will miss his vibrant personality.

RBW/SBW
LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Dear Editor,

Whilst appreciating that Karel Werner's piece on *Rationality in Early Buddhism* in your last issue was mainly concerned with Frank Hoffman's book it seems to me that various of his preliminary and concluding remarks should not pass unchallenged. I can certainly accept that Buddhism is not rational in quite the simplistic way that some imagined earlier this century but we need to bear in mind that nothing is easier than to be irrational about rationality and that views about it have evolved as much as views about Buddhism. In science and philosophy rationality clearly has something to do with responsiveness and consistency in dealing with the available evidence. In politics and religion it also has something to do with the 'art of the possible', i.e. of assessing how far and in what ways opinions can be altered at any given point in time. 'Primitive' Buddhism was obviously subject to inherent constraints in both respects, i.e. it was a non-coercive creed forced to accommodate a range of popular beliefs light-years removed from our own and lacking access to documented history or modern techniques of research. We must judge it in that light.

Regarding more specific points in the article I feel bound to question whether the idea of the 'suprarational' (p.40) does anything more than provide dogmatists with an easy way of undercutting legitimate criticism. As far as I'm concerned all experiences are pre-rational in themselves no matter how trivial or exalted they might be, the function of rationality being to establish coherence and relationship between them.

Nor can I accept that Buddhism is 'not an empiricism' (p.44) simply because it does 'not provide knowledge in the way that science does' though I agree that the latter point is entirely fair. Gotama rejected reliance on tradition and metaphysical system-building in favour of an experiential progression which he thought could be replicated by others if they pursued his methods. This is surely an attempt to import the outlook of science into religion in a period when science itself was in any case not yet distinguishable from philosophy. Also I fail to see what approach other than radical empiricism could have produced the anatta doctrine.

Much more contentious than any of the above, however, is the charge of 'selective attitudes' directed at some twentieth-century interpreters, and with specific reference to the rebirth dogma. Now this might be read as a rebuke to those who have tried to argue that early Buddhism did not teach rebirth in the normally understood sense, but the following quote suggests rather a quasi-fundamentalist demand for orthodoxy (p.39): '... it [i.e. rebirth] is essential to the central doctrine of Buddhism which is the attainment of Nirvana/Nibbana, hardly conceivable as to be established in a single life'.

This statement may be conventionally correct but it completely ignores the gradualist and pragmatic bias of the Nikayas. If the Buddhist Dhamma is found to be more effective than alternatives in the understanding and containment of dukkha that is sufficient reason for embracing it. Whether one or more lives are available for its pursuit and what assumptions can safely be made about any final goal is necessarily of secondary significance. Perhaps Buddhist pundits should learn to apply the parable of the arrow to their own imponderables.

There is, of course, a more common line of argument to support obligatory belief in rebirth, though it is not mentioned
by Dr Werner. This is the view that the doctrine of kamma cannot be maintained without the support of the rebirth idea. A hostile critic might regard such a position as reason for rejecting both but, that aside, it seems to me to rest entirely on the unsupported inference that kamma translates into complete moral determinism. Such support is not to be found in the texts. At M II 214 moral determinism is a standpoint attributed to the Jains and at S IV 230 Gotama’s answer to a question as to whether it is also his is a denial accompanied by a list of factors other than ‘the ripening of kamma’ which contribute to human misfortune. There is also the indirect evidence of debates with brahmans claiming the superiority of their caste. In these moral determinism favours the brahmans because Gotama’s insistence that merit depends on behaviour not birth is exactly the kind of distinction that its rationalisations eliminate. I conclude that, in the view of early Buddhism, the human condition can only be partly explained by reference to kamma, in which case the idea can be examined empirically without any assumptions about rebirth.

It is perhaps rather ironic in this connection that Dr Werner states that Ian Stevenson’s case histories do not have the ‘power of empirical proof’ (p.47). I agree, but Dr Stevenson has nonetheless produced far and away the best prima facie case for rebirth precisely because he has brought debate about it into the modern world, has sought to apply a rigorously scientific methodology throughout, and has no ideological axe to grind. By comparison Buddhist traditionalists seem to have very largely backed themselves into a corner with the aid of a metaphysical house-of-cards which cannot make any concessions to critics without collapsing altogether.

Sincerely
David Evans

BOOK REVIEWS


Among the manuscripts which were discovered in Gilgit in 1931 were folios which N.N. Dutt was able to identify as part of the Mulasarvastivādin Vinaya Pitaka. A small number of these belonged to the Saṅghabhedavastu, which Dutt labelled the Śrāmanya-phala-sūtra (Gilgit Manuscripts, Vol.III, part IV, Calcutta 1950, p.xxii), because of its resemblance to the Pāli Samañnapalasutta, although it is not so entitled in the Sanskrit. The missing folios of the Saṅghabhedavastu were subsequently found and the whole text was edited by R. Gnoli (The Gilgit Manuscript of the Saṅghabhedavastu, Parts I & II, Rome 1977-78). Dr Meisig has now produced a synoptical German translation of three Chinese versions of this text, accompanied by critical footnotes, and an extensive glossary (pp.380-625).

One of the Chinese versions comes from the Dirghāgama of the Dharmaguptakas, the second from the Ekottarāgama of an unknown sect, while the third is an independent work, also of unknown affiliation. To his translations of these Meisig prefixes the Sanskrit version, in an unchanged reprint of the relevant portion of Gnoli’s edition, and a Pāli version which is a new edition made on the basis of the published recensions and the variant readings quoted in their footnotes. To this new edition is added what appears to be an impressive critical apparatus. On examination, it turns out to be a collection of the
divergent readings of the Pali Text Society's edition (= Ee), the Burmese Chàṭhasaṅgāyana edition (= Be), the Sinhalese Buddha Jayanti Tripitaka Series edition (= Ce), the Nàlanda-Devanāgarī-Pāli Series edition (= Ne), and two Siamese editions of 1893-4 and 1958 (=Se and Se3), with the footnotes from all those editions, even going so far as to include their misprints, e.g. niriyağate which Ne alleges Ee reads at D I 54,7 (it actually reads niriyașate). As Ne, in all but a handful of cases, is a repetition of Be, there is usually no point in quoting its readings. Since the footnotes to several of the Oriental editions consist of references to divergent readings in other traditions, much of what is quoted is repetition. We find, for example, on p.110 (ad D I 50,14) where Meisig's text has pattiko, the footnote: padiko va Se Se3 Ne (sya [Meisig consistently prints the abbreviation in this form instead of sva which Ne actually uses, and similarly si instead of st]) Be (sya [dito]). All this means is that the two Siamese editions read padiko, and the editors of Ne and Be have noted this fact. Even more absurd, we find, for example, on p.348 (ad D I 81,29, 31) where Ee reads āgācim, the footnote: āgācim Ee Ne (ro), which means that the editor of Ne has noticed that Ee (Reman!) reads āgācim. There seems little point in including such unnecessary information.

In his critical apparatus on p.137 Meisig refers to the divergent opinions of Bechert and the present reviewer about the nominative singular forms in -e which occur in Makkhali Gosàla's account of his own philosophy, and the differing views of Hinüber and Vogel about the difficult word patuva at D I 54,10, but for the most part he says nothing about the reasons behind his choice of readings in the edition of the Pāli text which he has produced. It would, for example, have been interesting to know why on p.122 of his edition he reads pucchiṭṭho in D I 51,22, but pucchiṭṭa in 51,24. It is clear that since both words are constructed with the verb abhijñāt to remember, recall', the form should be the same in both cases. Prof. von Hinüber has, in fact, shown ('Pāli as an artificial language', in Indologia Taurinensia X (1982), pp.133-40) that the correct form is the non-Pāli absolute in -ṭṭa, which Meisig lists as a variant, but dismisses as a wrong reading.

It is possible that von Hinüber's article appeared too late for Meisig to take account of it, although it should have been possible to insert the necessary reference to it when the dissertation was being prepared for the press. Meisig notes (p.viii) that his work on the Śrāmanyaphalasūtra was finished early in 1984, and he has not taken account of anything published thereafter. Later that year Prof. G. MacQueen of McMaster University published an article entitled 'The doctrines of the six heretics according to the Śrāmanyaphala Sūtra' (Indo-Iranian Journal 27 (1984), pp.291-307). This was based largely on the portion of his 1978 Harvard dissertation (entitled 'A Study of the Śrāmanyaphala Sūtra', and quite unknown to Meisig) which studied the section of the Sūtra dealing with the teachings of the six heretics. It is clear from that article, in which MacQueen states that he translated into English the three Chinese versions used by Meisig and also the Chinese translation of the Mūlasarvāstivādin version, that the two dissertations deal with the text in different ways, complementing each other rather than overlapping. It is good to know that MacQueen's dissertation has also been published, since the appearance of both in print will be a great help towards the study of this very important text.

K.R. Norman

In the foregoing review of Konrad Meisig’s Das Śrāmanyaphala-Sūtra, the present reviewer noted that the author had taken no account of Prof. MacQueen’s dissertation on the same text. It is good to see the latter has now appeared in print.

Seven versions of the Śrāmanyaphalasūtra exist, in part or in whole. Only the Pāli edition and two of the Chinese versions are called ‘The fruit of the śramaṇa’s life’, although references to the work in the traditions of other schools indicate that this was its correct name. The Pāli Sāmañña-phalasutta is part of the Theravāda Dīghanikāya; the Sanskrit version is part of the Saṅghabhedavastu of the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya, as is the Tibetan recension and one of the four Chinese versions. Chapter I of the book describes these versions, and gives translations of the relevant portions of the Sanskrit and the four Chinese versions. In these extracts MacQueen has decided (p.29) to give the Indian technical terms in their Sanskrit form, since there is no way of telling what the particular form of the Prakrit(s) underlying these Chinese recensions might have been. This decision, however, leads to a situation whereby those acquainted with Pāli will be surprised to read (p.121) that the Pāli edition states that the event occurred on the posadha of the fifteenth day.

Chapter II aims to determine the relationships between these various versions, and to reconstruct the ancient text which may be thought to underlie the Śrāmanyaphalasūtra text family, although MacQueen makes it clear (p.116) that he is not claiming that his reconstruction of this version is identical with the earliest form that the text ever had. To this end, he divides the Śūtra up into its component portions (the opening formula, the beginning of the narrative, the journey to the Buddha, the meeting between King Ajataśatru and the Buddha, the king’s question and the Buddha’s reply, etc.), and considers the relevant section, if it exists, of each of the seven versions.

It is clear that there are considerable differences in the order in which the six heretical teachers are introduced in the various recensions, and in the doctrines ascribed to each of them, and MacQueen devotes much of this chapter to an investigation of these problems, checking his deductions against the evidence available to us from other sources. In view of the attacks upon the Pāli version of the Buddhist Canon which have become more common in recent years (p.167), it is very interesting to observe that he comes to the conclusion (already made known in his article, ‘The doctrines of the six heretics according to the Śrāmanyaphala Sūtra’, op. cit.) that the version of ‘The visit to the Six Heretics’ to be found in the Pāli Sāmañña-phalasutta comes closest to his postulated ancient text, although it is by no means identical with it. He further concludes (p.189) that the results arrived at for this section are representative of the general situation regarding the text as a whole, and the Pāli version is to be regarded as the most archaic of our seven texts. This view is supported by the fact that the Pāli version seems to have been closed to additions at an earlier date than the others, some of which contain details found in Pāli only in Buddhaghosa’s Commentary, a state of
affairs to which the present reviewer has also drawn attention. MacQueen notes, however, that any reasonable solution to the affiliation problems of the versions would have to accept that borrowing had taken place between the various traditions (p.195), which would seem to indicate that monks were sometimes acquainted with texts of other sects.

Although the long section of the Sūtra dealing with the rise of a Buddha and the training of a śramana who has gone forth in faith, culminating in the destruction of the āsravas and his victory over rebirth, seems to be ancient, MacQueen ignores it, on the grounds that it is not uniquely connected with the Śrāmanyaphalasūtra. He points out that, although the section is related at length in the Pāli version of the Sūtra, being merely abbreviated elsewhere, this is because that is the first sūtra in the Dīghanikāya in which it occurs. In the Chinese Dirghāgama it is similarly dealt with at length in the first sūtra in which it occurs, which, because of the different order of sūtras, is not the Śrāmanyaphalasūtra.

Chapter III deals with themes and thematic change, examining the changes which have taken place in the meaning of the Sūtra and the way in which they have come about. The study is put into the context of Hinayāna canonical literature as a whole, so that it makes a contribution to our understanding of early Buddhism in general. Variations in the story of the Buddha's mastery as a teacher and his conversion of the parricide Ajātaśatru demonstrate a developing divinisation of the Buddha, whereby Ajātaśatru shows respect for the Buddha at an early stage of their meeting and has no need to test him. MacQueen shows that the Śrāmanyaphalasūtra also deals with the theme of prasāda 'peace (of mind)', for it is Ajātaśatru's mental turmoil and his desire for release from it that sends him on his visit to the Buddha. The emphasis upon this theme varies from text to text, and is particularly strong in one of the Chinese versions, which is entitled 'the fruits of one intent on tranquillity' instead of '... the śramana's life'. It seems likely that this translation is based, to some extent, upon a misunderstanding of the Prakrit samana, which was assumed to be from samana 'calmness', rather than from śramana. The greatest change of all is to be found in the version in the Chinese Ekottarāgama, where the importance of the change from external mastery to inward mastery which typifies the activities of a śramana is greatly reduced and emphasis is laid instead upon the idea that meritorious action brings reward here and now. It seems clear that this change is due to an affiliation of the Chinese Ekottarāgama with Mahāyāna teachings, probably because the text was actually transmitted by Mahāyānists.

The book is reproduced from the typescript of MacQueen's Ph.D. thesis. Other than the removal of the summary and the title page of the thesis, it shows no change from that work (except for the mysterious moving of one line on p.269). The occasional misprint in the original has not been corrected, nor has the Bibliography been brought up to date. There is, for example, no reference to MacQueen's own article in the Indo-Iranian Journal, mentioned above. MacQueen laments [p.14] the non-appearance of a portion of the Sanskrit version. This has since been published (in 1978) and does indeed constitute a whole with the previously known portion. The relevant portion of the text is reprinted in Konrad Meisig's
book, which is also omitted from MacQueen's Bibliography. Only the briefest note on the reverse of the title page tells the observant reader that this work was completed over ten years ago.

In this book MacQueen has shown what can be gathered from a detailed comparative study of a single text. Taken with Meisig's work, which complements MacQueen's rather than overlaps it, it enables a critical study of the Śrāmanyaphalasūtra to be made, which sheds light not only upon the history of the text itself, but upon the history of Buddhism as a whole during the early centuries of its existence.

K.R. Norman


This is the fourth of Bhikkhu Bodhi's translations of individual suttas from the Pāli Canon. Whereas translations by other scholars contain, at best, occasional extracts from the aññakathā in the footnotes, or include portions of the commentarial exegesis in the body of the work, this book has the merit that it contains not only the translation of the canonical text itself but also translations of very extensive quotations from the aññakathā, the old tikā upon the text and a more recent tikā.

The Sutta tells of the visit paid to the Buddha by King Ajātasattu and of his question: 'Is it possible to point to any visible fruits of the samana's life?' Before answering the question, the Buddha asks if Ajātasattu had asked the same question of anyone else. Ajātasattu states that he has done so, and recounts his visits to the six heterodox teachers who were the Buddha's contemporaries. Each of them, when asked the same question, had failed to answer it, but had merely given a brief account of his own doctrines. The Buddha then sets about answering the question himself. He points out fourteen fruits of the samana's life, the first two being tangible and temporal. He then proceeds to the twelve higher fruits, the four jhānas and the eight cognitive achievements known as viśa. Of these, six are the abhiññās and the other two are insight knowledge (vipassanaññā) and the knowledge of the mind-made body. Prefixed to these twelve higher fruits is the description of the course of training which is the cause of their attainment, starting with the arising of a Tathāgata and the gaining of faith in him, which leads to the entrance into homelessness. The course culminates in the knowledge of the destruction of the āsavas, i.e. the attainment of Arahantship, which is the ultimate fruit of the samana's life. At the close of the discourse, Ajātasattu declares himself a follower of the Buddha by going to the Buddha, the Dhamma and the Sangha for refuge.

After a brief introduction (pp.1-15), Bhikkhu Bodhi gives the complete translation of the Sutta (pp.16-51), supplying the paragraph numbers of the PTS edition of D I to facilitate cross-reference to the text, although, for reasons which are not explained, he occasionally departs from the PTS numbering, either running paragraphs together or sub-dividing them so that the paragraph numbers sometimes differ by one, and very occasionally by two. He then gives the commentarial exegesis on the Sutta (pp.52-185), dealing with it portion by portion, translating the aññakathā, and the purāṇa-tikā upon that, and occasionally the abhinava-tikā as well, but omitting the grammatical portions of the Commentaries and at times abridging some of the less important 'scene-setting' paragraphs. On occasion he expands the translation, but does not always
make it clear that he is doing so. So, for example, he expands (p.35) the long lists in the Sutta (§ 56) of single words specifying wrong modes of livelihood, etc., by incorporating the explanations given in the Commentary. Similarly, he sometimes expands the translation of the latter by incorporating material from the tīkā.

He states that his aim is to include ‘everything of fundamental doctrinal or political importance, while omitting the less relevant digressions as well as the copious grammatical and etymological clarifications which have no meaning for an English reader’. While accepting that this is probably true of the average non-technical English reader, it does not necessarily apply to anyone who is sufficiently interested in the Buddha’s teaching to wish to read the original Pāli of the Sutta and to refer to the Commentary for an explanation of some of the grammatical problems which the text offers. Such a person will find Bhikkhu Bodhi’s work gives little help with the translation of commentarial explanations. It is true that these portions are difficult to express in anything like intelligible English, but the fact that it can be done is shown by Bhikkhu Nāṇamoll’s various translations and the rendering of the Dhammapada-āṭṭhakathā by Palihawadana and Carter. In fact, despite Bhikkhu Bodhi’s statement, he does include some of Buddhaghosa’s etymological speculations, e.g. pp.172, 173 note, 180.

There are already two complete translations of the Dīghanikāya into English, the older one by T.W. Rhys Davids and the more recent one by Maurice Walshe. Rhys Davids’ translation of the Sutta is good, but his English is somewhat archaic and occasionally ponderous. Walshe is more up to date, sometimes more accurate, but occasionally he seems to avoid a difficulty, intentionally or otherwise, by paraphrasing slightly. If there are verbal reminiscences of both Rhys Davids and Walshe in Bhikkhu Bodhi’s version it is not surprising, since he states that he consulted both of these, inter alia. The differences between the three versions are not great and can be described as variations of presentation, rather than content.

Since both translations were consulted, it is strange that occasionally Bhikkhu Bodhi chooses the interpretation which seems less likely. Thus, in the description of Nīganṭha Nāṭaputta’s doctrines, he translates the four restraints, each one of which contains the word vāri, as ‘restrained with regard to all water’; ‘endowed with the avoidance of evil’; ‘cleansed by the avoidance of evil’; ‘suffused with the avoidance of evil’. In these interpretations he is following Rhys Davids, who was in turn following Buddhaghosa. It seems unlikely, however, that when each restraint contains the word vāri, it should be used in one of them in the sense of ‘water’, while in the other three it is to be taken as the equivalent of vāraṇa (‘restraint’). Walshe would seem to be more correct in translating all four occurrences as ‘curb’. It cannot be that Bhikkhu Bodhi is over-awed by the Commentary, since in § 41 he follows Rhys Davids in differing from Buddhaghosa’s construing of a sentence.

Such minor points apart, Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation is to be recommended as being both accurate and readable, and we look forward to his next translation of a Pāli sutta.

K.R. Norman

The systematic comparison of selected Pāli suttas with corresponding versions in Chinese or other languages continues to produce valuable results. The Aggaṅnasutta (D 27) has three separate Chinese parallels, referred to here as DA (the Chinese Dirghāgama text), MA (the Chinese Madhyamāgama text) and E (the Chinese independent text (=Einzeltext)). Since D (the Pāli text) seems clearly to be an amalgam of somewhat disparate elements, the comparison is in this case exceptionally fruitful. The two elements concern, respectively, the origin of things in general and the origin of the four castes or classes.

In the English summary (p.67) it is said: “The Buddha’s word (buddhavacana) is not preserved in its pure form. The Buddhist canons consist of many heterogeneous layers. Most of these layers are of secondary origin. They were invented by later redactors. These additons should be recognised and eliminated by comparing the parallel versions of a text”. This is the task undertaken by Dr Meisig. He has performed his task of sifting skilfully, and though I have no Chinese, I feel that his handling of the Chinese material is trustworthy, and the Chinese-Pāli-German glossary (pp.171-235) inspires total confidence despite this reviewer’s inability to make a serious attempt to check it. The transcription used, incidentally, is not the now fashionable Pinyin but follows Unger’s Einführung in das klassische Chinesisch (1985), which is close to the familiar Wade-Giles. My only reservation in principle concerns Meisig’s statement that most of the heterogeneous layers in the texts were ‘invented by later redactors’. While this may be so, it is at least possible that some were introduced from parallel branches of the tradition of no less authenticity than those elements that are common to all versions (some of which, conversely, could also be redactional inventions). This consideration, however, does not invalidate the work of sifting undertaken here.

Meisig’s work in this particular text-complex is really a re-examination and continuation of the work of Ulrich Schneider (Indo-Iranian Journal 1 (1957), pp.253-85) on the basis of a literary analysis of the content of the Pāli Aggaṅnasutta alone. Schneider’s main contention was that the cosmogony (aggaṅna) to which the Pāli sutta owes its name was not in fact included in the original text. The basic research is summarised in the long chapter, pp.1-66, somewhat curiously designated Einleitung. The other two main parts of the work are the Synopse (pp.73 (after the English summary) -169, and the above mentioned glossary, followed by a bibliography (pp.241-9). The Einleitung is in four parts: Textkritik, Literarkritik, Formkritik and Redaktionskritik. A first sifting showed that the tradition falls into two groups: DA + MA (from a common source ‘x’) and D + E (from a common source ‘y’). The assumed archetype dates from a period before the splitting up into schools (DA is from the Dharmaguptakas and MA from the Sarvāstivādins, while the school to which E belongs is uncertain). DA is held to represent the nearest approach to the archetype, while MA has been ‘contaminated’ from a ‘y’ source.

Using the sophisticated tools of critical analysis, Dr Meisig makes out a good case in support of Schneider’s contention that the cosmogonic section was indeed at an early (pre-Asokan) stage introduced into a discourse dealing with the four estates. The conclusion that the Sūtra “establishes the social relevance of the "Four Noble Truths". It rejects the Brahmical ideology of varna and announces an ethic of salvation for everybody’ is true if unexciting. We have here, then, another example to show that by about 250 BCE the Canon was already (or still) in a state of flux. Of course a totally (or almost totally) fixed Canon in the form of the Pāli Tipiṭaka only came into being somewhat later in Ceylon. This, however, applies only to the form of the
teaching, and does not necessarily militate against the claim of the Theravāda school to have preserved the content faithfully (which it demonstrably did better than the Sarvāstivādins). When it comes to the discussion of Buddhist origins, this point is well worth bearing in mind.

The English summary is a useful aid in following the sometimes involved argument, even for readers who have no trouble with German. It is a pity, though, that Dr Meisig, with such a brilliant command of Chinese, Sanskrit and Pāli, could not have put it in better English. He should have had some help with this.

Maurice Walshe


In articles in JRAS 1902 and JPTS 1902-3, Edmund Hardy gave information about an enlarged version of the Mahāvamsa (covering the same period of time as, but twice the length of, the Mahāvamsa which Turnour had edited in 1837), which he had discovered in the Bibliothèque Nationale. It was written in Cambodian script and ascribed to a monk named Moggalāna. Wilhelm Geiger later discovered another copy of the text in Cambodian characters in the Colombo Museum, and made use of both manuscripts when preparing his new edition of the Mahāvamsa in 1908.

When G.P. Malalasekera was preparing his edition of the Mahāvamsa-ṭikā, Geiger sent him transcripts of these manuscripts, and when Malalasekera later suggested the desirability of publishing the work, Geiger supported the proposal. The edition, based on these two manuscripts and three others which has come to light, appeared in 1937 as Volume III of the Aluvihāra Series of the Royal Asiatic Society (Ceylon Branch). Although all the manuscripts were in Cambodian characters, or acknowledged to be copies of Cambodian manuscripts, Malalasekera, rightfully fearful of prejudicing the study of the author and origin of the text, preferred to give it the name 'Extended Mahāvamsa', rather than 'Cambodian Mahāvamsa'. In a lengthy introduction he considered the relationship between this text and the Mahāvamsa, Mahāvamsa-ṭikā, and other chronicle texts. He came to the conclusion that the author of the Extended Mahāvamsa did not have a copy before him of the Mahāvamsa, but both works borrowed from a common source or sources. The author did, however, have access to the Mahāvamsa-ṭikā, and in many passages the Extended Mahāvamsa is merely a versification of the corresponding passages of that work.

Malalasekera’s edition has been out of print for many years. Finding that the RAS (Sri Lanka Branch) had no plans to reprint it, the PTS requested, and were given, permission to publish a reprinted edition. Malalasekera was forced to leave many questions, including the authorship, date and provenance, unanswered. Since he wrote, more information has become available about the history of Pāli works in South and South-East Asia, and it is hoped that the re-appearance of this text will awaken interest in, and perhaps lead to a solution of, these and other problems.

K.R. Norman


Among the Sanskrit manuscripts discovered in Gilgit in 1931 were several examples of the Avadāna (Pāli Apadāna) type of
In 1980 Hisashi Matsumura successfully submitted a study of four of these Gilgit Avadānas (Mandhâvatvādāna, Mahāsuddarśanāvadāna, Candraprabhāvadāna and Viśvantaravādāna), prepared under the supervision of Prof. J.W. de Jong, for the Ph.D. degree at the Australian National University, Canberra. His particular choice of texts was made because they all have Tibetan and Chinese parallels, which greatly assist in the establishment of the Sanskrit text. The Mahāsuddarśanāvadāna has two parallels in the Kṣudrakavastu and the Bhaiṣajyavastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinayavastu, and another Sanskrit parallel text in the Central Asian Sarvāstivāda Mahāsuddarśanasūtra which forms a portion of the Sanskrit Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra (in the Pāli Dīghanikāya the Mahāsuddassanasutta is a separate text). In his 1980 study Matsumura gave copious references to these parallel versions in his notes.

In the work under review Matsumura has reproduced his edition of the Gilgit text, while on the facing page he has presented an edition of the Central Asian version of the Mahāsuddarśana text, with the notes at the end. Not only is this arrangement easier for the reader, since the readings of the Central Asian manuscripts do not have to be sought amidst the whole critical apparatus as in the earlier work, but it enables Matsumura to include in footnotes on each page transliterations of all fragments of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, including some new fragments which were not available to Waldschmidt when he published his edition of that text. The variant readings in the fragments from Central Asia are such that it is not possible to amalgamate them together and produce a collated text, which justifies Matsumura’s adoption of such a method of presentation. He expresses the view that a comparable method will become prevalent in other cases where it proves impossible to reconstruct the prototype of any text.

In the first of two appendices the versions of the Mahāsuddarśana story as it appears in the Tibetan translations of the Bhaiṣajyavastu and Kṣudrakavastu are given on facing pages. The second appendix gives the very truncated version of the Mahāsuddarśana story which appears in the Sanskrit version of the Bhaiṣajyavastu, also found in Gilgit. There is a list of abbreviations and an index of Sanskrit words which are discussed in the notes. In an addendum a recently identified fragment of a Mahāsuddarśanaśūtra manuscript, too small to give any new information, is edited. At the end of the book four charts give information about the condition of the extant Central Asian manuscripts, and the relationship between the Mahāsuddarśanasūtra and the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra.

A portion of the extensive introduction to this book is devoted to a discussion of the relationship between the various versions of the Mahāsuddarśana text. It is clear that despite all the study which has been devoted to this text, many problems still remain to be solved about the differences in the order of episodes in the various versions. All those who are interested in the relationship between the various Hinayāna schools and their literature will be grateful to Dr Matsumura for the very painstaking way in which he has set out the available Sanskrit and Tibetan material for the further study of the Mahāsuddarśana story.

K.R. Norman


Although the JPTS does not aim to be an annual publication,
nevertheless the editor had collected enough material of a publishable standard to be able to produce Volume XII within a year of the appearance of Volume XI.

As befits the Council's decision that the Journal should publish short Pāli texts, translations, and commentaries on texts, catalogues and handlists of Pāli books and manuscripts, and similar material, the greater part of this volume (pp.65-168) is devoted to a translation by Ann Appleby Hazlewood of the Saddhammapāyana, the text of which appeared almost exactly one hundred years ago in the Journal for 1887. In another article Dr Supaphan Na Bangchang reproduces (pp.185-212) the text of a letter written in Pāli by the Aggamahāsenāpati of Siam to the royal court at Kandy in 1756 as part of an exchange of missions and letters following an appeal from Ceylon to Siam for help in religious matters. She prefixes to the letter a summary in English. A related article by Prof. O. von Hinüber (pp.175-83) considers, and identifies where possible, the list of texts which are said in that letter to have been sent from Siam to Ceylon because there was such a lack of Dhamma texts in the island. He shows that although they are said to number ninety-seven, there seem in fact to be only seventy-five different texts, some of them quite unknown at the present time. The same author adds a short additional note (pp.173-4) on the oldest dated manuscript of the Milindapañha, which formed the subject of an article he contributed to JPTS Vol.XI.

Prof. Sōdō Mori contributes an article (pp.1-47) on the Uttavihārathākathā and Śamāsāsāra (based on his 'Study of the Pāli Commentaries', published in Japanese in 1984), examining at length all the references in the Pāli Commentaries to these two sources, which seem not to belong to the Mahāvihāra tradition in Ceylon. There is a set of lexicographical studies (pp.49-63) by the present reviewer, and two notes by Prof. R. Gombrich on points arising in Chapter IX of the Visuddhimagga (pp.169-71).

The volume ends with notices from the Council of the Society inviting suitable people to apply for the Society's Research Fellowships in Pāli Studies, and from the Editor soliciting suitable articles, preferably in camera-ready form, for publication in further numbers of the Journal.

K.R. Norman


Reading this book has been a frustrating experience. On the one hand, here is an obviously earnest scholar who has worked his way through a vast corpus of canonical material (not only in Pāli, but also in Sanskrit, both hybrid and classical, and Chinese) in order to get as accurate an idea as possible, through textual analysis and interpretation, of the earliest teachings and practices of Buddhism. On the other hand, the final result of all this effort and learning is rather less than enlightening.

This is a slim volume, but working one's way through it can be an exhausting task. Time and again one finds oneself struggling with opaque or confusing statements, sometimes because of the language they are couched in, sometimes because of the lack of detailed enough substantive back-up (in the form of references, quotations, etc.) for them.

Some of the discomfort, certainly, is due to the poor English translation, and that is not the author's fault. The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), with whose financial assistance the book was translated, did not get very much value for their money. Every now and then there is a good enough approximation to common English usage but, for
the most part, syntax, vocabulary and style are generally far from idiomatic, and not infrequently downright wrong. This does not make for easy reading.

The main difficulty, however, lies in the manner of exposition. At first sight, this appears to be a highly structured study, starting with an ‘Outline of the most ancient form of Buddhism’ and following up with chapters on ‘Dhyāna-Meditation’ (which covers the four rūpa jhānas, or formal absorptions; incidentally, why ‘dhyāna’ and not ‘jhāna’, since the book is supposed to deal primarily with the Pāli Canon?), ‘Discriminating Insight’ (i.e. the way of vipassāna, or insight meditation), ‘Sphere-Meditation’ (the four arūpa jhānas, or formless absorptions, and ‘Karma’.

Unfortunately, this promising framework is filled out in a decidedly patchy manner. There are problems, as already mentioned, resulting from the scarcity of detailed material for

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1 Examples can be found on every page, but here are just a few by way of illustration: ‘But is there also a logical ground for this feeling? It is.’ (p.xxx). ‘. . .the Anattapariyāya, which even more unlikely was preached at the first encounter. . .’ (p.36). ‘At a fast day he advises them to collect food. . .’ (p.97). ‘. . .the sentence obviously added . . . does not have had to play a role . . .’ (p.30).

2 In the Mahāpaḍānā sutta, which does not seem to be composed before Asoka . . (pp.99–100). ‘Because the text . . . does not enter upon this point, it seems permissible to look for an explanation at other places in the canon’ (p.11). ‘In later times an earnest wish is assumed to do more with good karma than only make such a choice between possibilities that could anyway result from one’s karma’ (p.99, n.2).

2 Plus an appendix on ‘Mysticism in the Āṭṭhakavagga’, which, as the author informs us, is a portion of an earlier learned paper on the older parts of the Sutta Piṭaka.

some of the interpretations or suggestions put forward. The author is quite aware of this, and pleads for forbearance at the very beginning of the ‘Preface’: ‘Not many details are discussed as the book is still intended to be an introduction to early Buddhism. I hope that Buddhist scholars will accept this limitation and concentrate on the main lines’ (p.vii).

All the same, when rather speculative conclusions are introduced by conjectural terms such as ‘presumably’, ‘we may assume’, ‘probably’, ‘very likely’ and so on, a minimum of underpinning is clearly desirable. In fact, evidence is supplied with regard to certain points, but not to others that need it just as much. There is an unevenness here which extends also to the organisation and discussion of the material, so that at times I had difficulty in following the argument. This, of course, may well be my fault rather than the author’s. But an introduction to a subject should surely aim at maximum clarity of exposition.

Actually, a lot of the difficulties are probably due to the genesis of the book. The author’s original intention was to introduce university students to the ideas and meditative practices of early Buddhism’ (p.vii). What we have here, then, would seem to have been, initially, a sort of working manual, presumably for the use of the author’s own students and under his guidance. Used in this kind of context, i.e. as an educational aid, the manual proved no doubt perfectly useful, as any gaps or uncertainties could easily be dealt with, and additional information supplied, orally by the author in the course of normal university tuition. Problems arose only when the author decided that ‘it seemed worth the effort to bring the results of this attempt to the attention of Buddhologists outside the

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3 e.g. pp.xiii, 63, 68, 70, 77, 81, 87, 88, 93.
Netherlands by translating it into English' (p.vii). This meant a change of target readership and a change of language. On both counts, the translation has not been a success. As regards the language, the serious shortcomings of the translation have already been pointed out. As for the substance, whatever recasting did take place for the benefit of fellow Buddhologists outside the Netherlands was clearly not comprehensive enough.

Vetter takes as his starting point the studies of Frauwallner and Schmithausen and 'to avoid making things too complicated', he concentrates on 'only three of the most striking tenets analysed by Schmithausen' (p.xxi). Incidentally, Vetter's repeated use of the word 'tenets' (with its philosophical and dogmatic connotations) is symptomatic of a tendency in which he is far from being alone among Buddhologists without direct personal experience of the practices taught by the Buddha: a tendency to consider the Buddha's teachings as a set of theoretical philosophical principles (tenets) rather than as pragmatically oriented instructions for psychological action.

But to return to Vetter's argument. The three 'tenets' are three soteriological paths, and the main thrust of the discussion runs, as far as I can see, something like this:

Path No.1 is 'dhyāna-meditation' (i.e. the practice of tranquillity, samatha), involving the four formal absorptions (rūpa jhāna). This would seem to be the earliest Buddhist way of salvation and was based originally on the sole practice of the Noble Eightfold Path (being the applied exercise of the middle way between sensual pleasure and self-mortification). The Four Noble Truths would have been added somewhat later as a theoretical framework to the experience of right samādhi, the goal and culmination of the Eightfold Path. Subsequently, the realisation of at least one of the three kinds of special knowledge (i.e. knowledge of recollection of past lives, knowledge of the passing away and reappearance of creatures in various worlds, and knowledge of the Four Noble Truths) as a condition of enlightenment would have been added as well (pp.xxi, xxiii-xxxii).

A further development (Path No.2) of the 'dhyāna-meditation' tradition can, thinks the author, 'be dismissed as not having been taught by the Buddha, at least not in an early period of his long career as a teacher' (p.xxii). This consisted in the addition to the 'dhyāna' path of the four formless absorptions (arūpa jhāna) culminating in the cessation of all perception and feeling (sannāvedayitanirodha). Vetter recognises that this 'does not seem to be an ancient Buddhist [his underlining] means of finding salvation' (p.xxii).

Path No.3, the way of 'discriminating insight' (i.e. vipassanā) would seem to have emerged somewhat later than the first 'dhyāna-meditation' path (although still going back to very early times) and was related to the formulation of the twofold chain of Dependent Origination (paṭiccasamuppāda) and the realisation of non-self (anattā): 'One is freed from all desire - and thereby later from rebirth and suffering - when, with
discriminating insight (P. pañña) one segments oneself [my emphasis] in [sic] five constituents and recognises each as being transient and therefore suffering, i.e. unsatisfactory, and, consequently, as not worthy of being called self or mine' (pp.xxii-xxiii). (Note here again the self-defeating conceptualising tendency already seen above in connection with the term 'tenets': to say that, in insight meditation, one 'segments oneself' into five constituents, implying an exercise in intellectual analysis, is to miss the whole point, i.e. that the meditator actually observes the aggregates as experiential data, and that it is precisely this choiceless observation that has a salutary effect).

Always according to the author, in the soteriology of 'dhyāna-meditation', from its earliest to its late form, liberation is achieved through the destruction of the cankers (āsavakkhaya, viz. sense desire, desire for existence and ignorance; later 'views' was added as a fourth canker), whilst the way of 'discriminating insight' leads to liberation through freedom from desire. The two methods are essentially distinct, though attempts were made, in the course of time, to combine them into an integrated system. Vetter agrees that perhaps the oldest method in the practice of insight was to use dhyāna-meditation... in aid of the path of discriminating insight (p.xxxv). What he fails to recognise is that the Buddha's distinctive contribution lay precisely in the development of mindfulness (sati) to achieve insight (vipassanā), and that the combination of samatha and vipassanā was altogether the earliest typically Buddhist meditative practice. It is by now generally agreed that samatha meditation altogether (and not just the formless absorptions, as Vetter suggests in his path No.2) is, taken by itself, a clearly pre-Buddhist technique. It is only when used as a preparation or adjuvant for the development of insight that it becomes integrated into the Buddhist path. As I have suggested before6, the long-standing debate as to the relative importance of tranquillity (samatha) and insight (vipassanā) practices for the achievement of liberation is a largely unnecessary one. The weight of informed opinion among authors who are both textual scholars and expert practitioners is that the jhānas, by themselves, do not lead to the supramundane states of stream-entry and subsequent stages. What must be borne in mind in this connection is the crucial distinction (most lucidly made by Ven. Henepola Gunaratana in his fundamental study of the subject7 between 'mundane' jhānas - which are the ones addressed in discussions of this kind - and 'supramundane' jhānic states, i.e. the levels of absorption at which the paths and fruits occur8. It is the confusion between these two that has generated so much argument.

Since Gunaratana's study, and Prof. King's notable one on the relationship between pre-Buddhist and Buddhist meditation9,

5 This is not the only example of confusingly idiosyncratic translation in this book. Pañña is, of course, wisdom, and insight (vipassanā) the means of achieving it.

7 The Path of Serenity and Insight. An Explanation of the Buddhist Jhānas (Delhi 1985).
there is, I submit, little room for argument and confusion on the issues which are of central concern to Dr Vetter. Unfortunately, he has not taken either of these two basic works into account.

*Amadeo Solé-Leris*


On pp.5-6 the author, in beginning his justification for writing a social history of Buddhism, quotes Gibbon: 'The theologian may indulge the pleasing task of describing Religion as she descended from Heaven, arrayed in her native purity. A more melancholy duty is imposed on the historian. He must discover the inevitable mixture of error and corruption which she contracted in a long residence on earth, among a weak and degenerate race of beings'.

Not, of course, that the history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka could possibly be called a story merely of error and corruption - far from it, but the faithful chronicler must record such things (or what he sees as such) equally with the shining examples of religious purity and devotion to be found in the story of the Sāsana. Whatever shortcomings Sinhalese Buddhism may have shown at times, it is its glory to have preserved the Theravāda tradition, to have committed its scriptures to writing, and to have passed the tradition on to neighbouring countries. Thus, if some of us draw our inspiration from the Burmese meditation teachers or from the forest monks of North-East Thailand, we should not forget the old Sri Lankan monks who brought that tradition to them in the first place. But of course Buddhism does not operate in a vacuum but among ordinary people (some of them in the robe) who sometimes do show themselves to be, if not 'weak and degenerate', at least over-credulous and lacking in spiritual discrimination, or too much subject to worldly motives.

Prof. Gombrich's approach is 'metaphysically neutral', which is very right and proper. 'What makes any religious innovation acceptable?' (p.10). Answer: if it seems to offer solutions better than those already available to current problems. (Parenthetically, this reviewer is a Buddhist because Buddhism seems, indeed increasingly, to do just that!) An illuminating section discusses the inadequacies of Marxian and Weberian theory. Popper's view of 'unintended consequences' fares rather better at his hands. 'The Buddha could not have foreseen most of the consequences that have flowed from his preachings' (p.18). This statement may be disputed by some Buddhists, though they would be wrong to do so even on a fundamentalist view of the texts: had he foreseen everything with the omniscience he in fact disclaimed (though it was inevitably attributed to him!), there would have been no need for him to amend a single one of the Vinaya rules as first laid down.

A feature of Sinhalese Buddhism is its conservatism. This is typical of the island as a whole: we are told that the Tamil of Jaffna is more archaic than that of India 35 miles away. Thus, the monks of the Mahāvihāra resisted with great tenacity and success the efforts of the rival Abhayagiri monastery to import new-fangled 'Mahāyāna' ideas. On the whole the changes that did take place in the Sangha were social not doctrinal, so that the letter of the Dhamma was preserved with considerable exactitude even when its spirit tended to be neglected. Sad, though humanly unsurprising as this is, the achievement involved should not be discounted. The spectacle of a land-owning and even slave-owning Sangha divided into
\textit{nīkāyas} that were barely on speaking terms is not a pretty one, and the time came when discipline was so lax that valid ordinations could only be undertaken by the importation of good monks from Thailand (1753). Nevertheless, the Dhamma survived in Ceylon despite its demise in India. It survived the Portuguese and the Dutch (neither of whom controlled the interior), and it even survived (with some help from the Theosophists) the Christian missionising of the Victorian English. Which goes perhaps to show that even he who merely counts another’s cattle performs an invaluable service as long as he keeps count accurately.

The story in modern times of what Prof. Gombrich aptly calls ‘Protestant Buddhism’ is told skillfully and sometimes amusingly. The process of coming to terms with the modern world was a difficult one for some, and no doubt the confrontation with Buddhists from other lands, and above all with \textit{Westerners} who took Buddhism seriously enough to join the Sangha and meditate must have seemed almost shocking. This is a rich book, full of insights as well as out-of-the-way information. One of the few criticisms I have to offer concerns the omission of any reference to the great German bhikkhu Nyanatiloka and his no less distinguished disciple Nyanaponika and their school. Surely they deserve a place in the story?

\textit{Maurice Walshe}


Indian Mahāyāna as a whole has received scant attention from either specialists or ‘popular’ writers for far too long. Although there are numerous studies and monographs on various parts and schools of Indian Mahāyāna the subject as such is rarely treated overall. On the infrequent occasions when Indian Mahāyāna is tackled generally the origins of Mahāyāna are skated over lightly, whereas closer attention is given to Chinese and Japanese developments. Happily, Dr Williams’ book is not of this type. He not only deals at length with Mahāyāna Buddhism in India but also devotes a large introductory section to the antecedents of Indian Mahāyāna and to its links with the earlier ‘mainstream’ schools. Out of a total of ten sections or chapters seven are taken up with Indian Mahāyāna in its various forms. The remainder deal with Tibetan, Chinese and Japanese aspects which, though they are only sketches, are sufficiently detailed to show some of the main features of latter-day developments in the Far East. The major part of the book, therefore, presents us with a substantial description and discussion of Mahāyāna doctrine and practice in its Indian form.

This proper emphasis on the early Indian doctrines is all the more valuable because it enables the Chinese reconstructions and interpretations to be perceived more clearly and related more accurately. In general then, this book is warmly to be welcomed, if only for the reasons mentioned above.

The book is divided into three parts: an Introduction dealing with Mahāyāna origins and the first Mahāyāna sūtras, then five chapters under a main heading of ‘Wisdom’ followed by four chapters under the heading of ‘Compassion’. This scheme has clear advantages for the ‘Wisdom’ part and it perhaps contains the best of the expositions. In this ‘Wisdom’ part we find excellent presentations of the Prajñāpāramitā texts, the Madhyamaka and the Tathāgatagarbha doctrines, as well as a section on Yogācāra, here called Cittamātra, which is somewhat less sure in its coverage of this important lineage. In the last part, under the heading of ‘Compassion’, there are sections on
the Bodies of the Buddha, the Bodhisattva Path, Faith and Devotion, and the sequence begins with a section on the Lotus Sūtra. It is not entirely clear to this reviewer why this last part should be headed ‘Compassion’, despite the fact that it contains one very good section on Compassion and the Bodhicitta. From the contents of this final group of topics it might have been better entitled ‘Skillful Means’ (upāyakauśalya). Also, by starting it off with a piece on the Lotus Sūtra (p.141) following a section on Chinese (Hua-yen) Buddhism, it displaces the Lotus from its primary position as one of the originating texts of the Mahāyāna and may give the erroneous impression that the Lotus is a late text with Chinese affiliations.

Addressing the sections in a little more detail, the Introduction is most refreshing in that it faces squarely the perennial problem of Mahāyāna origins. Perhaps one should not be so critical of scholars in the Buddhist field who seem to have maintained an unspoken pact of silence on this matter until comparatively recently. Their defence would probably be that it is only in the last two decades that sufficient material has come to light for worthwhile hypotheses to be constructed. Even so, A. Béreou had set out the bare bones of the fundamental data as long ago as 1955 (in Les Sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule, Paris 1955). It is therefore with considerable pleasure and interest that one follows Williams’ solid discussion of the problem in the round, rather than certain particular points of it. Perhaps it will now be legitimate to regard his work as a forerunner of much more of the same kind. In particular, his identification of the Ajitasaṅgastūra, a text discovered in Gilgit, as indicating ‘... a stage of proto-Mahāyāna...’ (p.26), is another piece of the vast jigsaw set in place. He also firmly rejects the idea, already fairly widespread, that Mahāyāna was a movement inspired by, and a result of, lay pressure. On pp.22-4 he points up the evidence that early Indian Mahāyāna was very much a monastic movement with little widespread support at the beginning. And on p.6 he says ‘... Mahāyāna appears to have been an unimportant minority interest until well into the CE...’. This reviewer concurs with that but would add that the whole Indian Buddhist Sangha, particularly the Mahāsāṅghikas and the Sarvāstivādin, had become much more responsive to lay needs and aspirations long before any Mahāyāna appeared. Doubtless the fact would not have been lost on the ‘minority interest’. On another important aspect of this matter, Williams makes it clear (p.5) that he believes Mahāyāna to have arisen as a result of development, not from schism. Then he confronts the difficulties over the authorship of the first Mahāyāna sūtras. He states (p.29) that it is not always absurd ‘... that a Mahāyāna sūtra may contain elements which go back to the Buddha...’. Nevertheless, he seems to follow Lamotte in favouring the view that these first sūtras were authored under the impact of visionary instructions whilst in deep meditation. On p.30 he writes ‘... the origins of these texts [are not derived from] the historical Buddha... but rather with visionary experience and inspiration by [other] Buddhas who continue to exist... in their Buddha Fields or Pure Lands...’. Although this reviewer does not rule out such a possibility, it would seem even more likely that because Mahāyāna came into existence by means of a long evolutionary development, the minority of monks who took part in that development were sustained and inspired by deeper insights into Śākyamuni’s teaching by ‘diligently studying the sūtras’ containing his words. The working hypothesis on this aspect which is favoured by this reviewer has been set out elsewhere. However that may be, the introductory section of this book presents a most persuasive case for the origins of Indian Mahāyāna which takes account of the latest work and
which conforms to the known data.

In the first main part, headed 'Wisdom', the sections on the Prajñāpāramitā and the Madhyamaka are well supplied with useful expositions of the main themes. On p.46 especially, the crucial matter of the Two Truths is well expressed and emphasised. Also, on p.49, it is said that the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras '... are speaking from the point of view of the Buddha's non-dual, non-perceptional awareness...' which is, of course, the basis of the Two Truth doctrine, i.e. that the awareness of an enlightened being is of a different order to that of ordinary mortals. What both are aware of is the same: pure, clear and all-embracing for the former, but defiled, obscure and narrow for the latter.

The section on the Madhyamaka is not overburdened with explanations of explanations as is sometimes the case, but the necessary expositions are crisp and to the point. The main description of śūnyatā (pp.60-3) is a good example. Here, the primary matter is stressed, i.e. that śūnyatā concerns 'the absence of inherent existence' (presumably niḥsvabhāva) in all conditioned events, concepts and whatever. This understanding of how things really are is the result of the acquisition of the perfected prajñā and, as is said on p.62. '... Emptiness is the ultimate truth (paramārthasatya). ... about the object being analysed...'. The section also contains a further elucidation of the Two Truths doctrine (pp.69-72) in rather more detail and from the Tibetan standpoint.

When the next section (Ch.4 'Cittamātra') comes to be considered some criticisms seem to be in order. The title of this chapter is rather idiosyncratic inasmuch as the major school discussed is the Yogācāra or sometimes, the Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda. 'Cittamātra' is presumably Tibetan nomenclature for this school and the use of this title perhaps indicates the author's Tibetan orientation. No criticism of that is intended but it is liable to confuse the interested public if a practice common to almost all European Buddhist scholars of this century is cast aside. This school continues to be called 'Yogācāra' though some of its doctrines are described as 'cittamātra'. Here, the only reason given for the change of name is that it '... refers to its principal classical doctrine... '(p.82). On that reasoning it might equally well be called the 'Ālayavijñāna' school.

Although this chapter deals with two important doctrines in some detail, it is much less informative than the subject warrants. The Ālayavijñāna and the Three Aspects are key topics but, set out on their own as they are here, they do less than justice to the wide-ranging scope of Yogācāra teaching. Not even a passing mention is made of Yogācāra's major contribution to the long-standing difficulties involved in the ancient doctrines concerning karmic retribution (vipāka), i.e. the characteristic teachings of the 'seeds' (bīja) and 'perfuming/impregnation' (vāsanā). Nor is there any indication of the extensive attention given in this school's main text to the elaboration of the Bodhisattva Path. Large sections of the Mahāyānasūtrakārama, Mahāyānasamgraha and Vījñaptimātratasiddhi are devoted to a reworking of the ancient system of the Five Paths. The development of the seeds (bīja) under the trace influences (vāsanā) over the whole enormous length of the Bodhisattva's career, leading to the critical 'turning around of the base' (āsrayaparāvrtti) are prime Yogācāra themes, indeed they are part of the overall context in which ālayavijñāna is to be understood. None of this finds a place in the author's Ch.4 and as a consequence the picture of Yogācāra which is conveyed is distinctly stunted and reduced to a rather selective presentation.
The first part, 'Wisdom', is rounded off with sections on the Tathāgatagarbha and the 'Flower Garland' tradition, particularly in China. It is noticeable that in Ch.5 the Chinese idea of the 'Buddha-nature' is equated with the specifically Indian doctrine of the Tathāgatagarbha (p.98). In this connection it is perhaps of interest to note that in the Chinese dossier of the bSam-yas debates, Kamalaśīla challenged Mo-h-yen's (the Chinese monk Mahāyāna's) use of the Buddha-nature idea as being little more than heretical doctrine (see Demiéville's *Le Concile de Lhasa*, Paris 1952, p.107). Williams, however, seems to distance himself from the more extreme developments of the Buddha-nature teaching. On p.107 he says '.. quite wrong.. that all beings are already enlightened..'; and on p.112 he says that the Chinese theme that stones and grasses can be 'saved' is not an Indian idea. On the other hand, it is not too difficult to understand how such doctrines came to be developed from the indisputably Indian ideas of 'cittamātra' and 'vijñāpatimātra' which render all external objects into mental projections. However that may be, he is of the opinion that the theory of the Buddha essence is an important one in East Asian Buddhism.

The second part, 'Compassion', contains a useful chapter on the Trikāya doctrine and a substantial chapter (Ch.9) on the Path of the Bodhisattva. Somewhat unaccountably the latter chapter contains a potted history of the entry of Buddhism into Tibet (pp.187 ff), but it also expounds with considerable skill the integrated progress through the Pāramitās within the ten stages of the Bhūmis. Unfortunately, this chapter ends on a note of confusion and uncertainty (p.214) which could well undermine the reader's confidence.

The tenth and last chapter is concerned with Faith and Devotion and includes descriptive pieces on some of the major Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas and certain Buddhas. For this reviewer, by far the most stimulating and interesting part of this chapter is the detailed treatment of the practice of buddhānusmṛtī (Recollection of the Buddha-qualities). This is a topic rarely accorded such attention and is only occasionally mentioned in Buddhist studies. This deficiency is all the more remarkable when one recalls that the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśā describes this form of meditation as one of the most important practices for Bodhisattvas. This section is followed by another good piece on the Buddha-fields (kṣetra). The work is concluded by a splendid fifteen page bibliography, which includes details of many of the major European translations and studies as well as recent scholarly studies normally buried in learned periodicals.

There are few misprints, which is a blessing. Apart from those included in the corrigenda, three others should be mentioned: on p.81 'Abbidharma' should be 'Abhidharma'; on p.186 'mediator' should be 'meditator'; and on p.199 'concern' should be 'concern'.

A final criticism of what is certainly a work of great value to students and to general readers alike. The author tends to sprinkle his pages with some lighthearted exclamations. Humour is a precious commodity and can be used judiciously with wholesome effect, but when it descends to levity, as on p.240 '.. So there!', it then becomes excessive and out of place in a serious work.

None of the criticisms expressed here detract from the fact that this book deserves a special welcome in that it enters the enormous empty space presently existing in the field of Indian Mahāyāna. Not only does Dr Williams address the subject as a whole but he also deals cogently and informatively with many of the necessary topics. More than that, he deals with vital topics hardly ever mentioned elsewhere. He is to be warmly
congratulated on the subject matter and on the substance of the work he has now presented to the public. This reviewer is at least grateful to him for the fact that there is at last a book on Indian Mahāyāna that can be recommended to students and enquirers.

Eric Cheetham

A Note from Paul Williams

The Editor has very kindly offered me the opportunity to reply to Eric Cheetham's review of my book. I am indeed grateful to the latter for his appreciative review, with which I am reasonably satisfied. The notion of a 'Reply' suggests some radical disagreement which it seems to me does not exist. I would like to offer, however, a few observations in response to some of his comments.

First, concerning the origins of the Mahāyāna, Mr Cheetham attributes to me rather less caution than I usually like to hold. He writes that I seem 'to follow Lamotte in favouring the view that these first sūtras were authored under the impact of visionary instruction while in deep meditation'. Our reviewer then gives a truncated quote from the book (p.30), apparently expressing my view, to which he has added some material in square parentheses. It may be in place to cite a fuller version of the actual text: 'More important, however, is a tradition found in the Mahāyāna sūtras themselves which would associate the origins of these texts not with the historical Buddha. . . . but rather with visionary experience and inspiration by one of a number of Buddhas who continue to exist on a higher plane. . . .'

This teaching, which to my mind provides a convincing basis for understanding the origins of at least some of the Mahāyāna sūtras...' It should be clear that I do not suggest that all Mahāyāna sūtras can be explained in this way, and I do not make the bald statement that these texts cannot be derived from the historical Buddha. I am saying, however, that there are texts which themselves indicate an origin of new Dharma teachings from a Buddha met in meditative experience, and this no doubt explains some of the early Mahāyāna material. I am not necessarily in disagreement with Cheetham's comments on the 'diligent study of the sūtras', although reference to 'deeper insights' carries with it an implicit value judgement which I think I would want to avoid.

Cheetham devotes particular critical attention to my treatment of Cittamātra. He is right in thinking that I chose 'Cittamātra' as a title on the basis of the common Tibetan designation of the school as sems tsam. The exact name of the school as a whole, taking all the texts and doctrines attributed to it together, is a little unclear. 'Vijñānāvāda', of course, refers to a doctrine, as does 'Cittamātra'. I accept, however, Cheetham's critical point that in referring to the tradition itself as Cittamātra I may cause needless confusion in departing from the standard practice among scholars. I have indicated clearly in my text, I think, alternative designations. The problem, however, in Cheetham's comments on my treatment of Cittamātra, here as elsewhere, is that he has assumed that in this chapter I set 'but to treat reasonably fully a whole school, the school usually known in Western writings as 'Yogācāra'. I did not. In designating the second section of my book as 'Wisdom' I intended in the main to treat some Mahāyāna understandings of 'the way things really are', together with some of their ramifications and implications.
Thus I called the chapter 'Cittamātra' because this term is in its Tibetan version in standard usage in at least some Mahāyāna circles in a way in which 'Vijñānavāda' (or 'Alayavijñānavāda') is not, and it designates perfectly well the principal teaching of the tradition concerning the way things really are. Since I set out only to treat certain ontological topics within the Yogācāra school, the fact that I omitted some other topics important to that school may be regrettable but is nevertheless justifiable, particularly given the limitations on space imposed by the publishers. I agree that the Yogācāra contribution to discussions of karma, and the Bodhisattva Path, are important. The latter does get some treatment later in the book, when the relevant topic is treated, but not everything could be covered. More serious would be the claim that my treatment of the ontology is distorted as treatment of ontology (the way things really are) by these omissions. Cheetham rather implies that it is, but this would require further detailed argument than has been given in the space of his review.

In reviewing my treatment of the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine, Cheetham states that I seem to distance myself 'from the more extreme developments of the Buddha-nature teaching'. He gives two quotes from my book as indicating my own views on the topic. However, his first quotation from p.107 of the book ('... quite wrong... that all beings are already enlightened...') in the original context is not given as my own observations but as something that explicitly follows the dGe lugs treatment of the Tathāgatagarbha. This is the dGe lugs position. I do not state in the book that it is my own view, my 'distancing from extreme developments'. Indeed I would not use the word 'extreme', which is a relative term and carries with it implications of a value judgement which in this context I would not be prepared to defend. Again, Cheetham indicates that I hold that the saving of stones and grasses is not an Indian idea. I am much more cautious. What I actually say is that this idea has 'no precedents... as far as I know... in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism'. I agree with him that once the doctrine of Cittamātra is taken cosmologically (and combined with that of the Tathāgatagarbha) the saving of stones and grasses may well follow. The interesting question, however, is whether the cosmological interpretation was explicitly drawn before the so-called Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna in China, which, as I indicate in the book, was a text capable of harmonising splendidly with certain Neo-Taoist cosmological speculations which had already taken place.

Lastly, my levy! Inappropriate attempts at humour are distressing, and even appropriate attempts are distressing to those who do not find them funny. For that I apologise. Mahāyāna doctrine is a difficult topic, and can be deadly boring both to read and write about. In a book aimed at students some lightness of touch and pace becomes 'skilful means'. The problem is that what is mildly amusing to one person may be offensive to another. One cannot tickle all the people all the time! However, in the example Mr Cheetham chooses to cite, my use of 'So there!' on p.240, I think he has not quite appreciated the point. In context I am discussing the way in which certain early Mahāyāna sūtras show a rivalry between each other, each trying to outdo the other. Thus we are told at one point that the Buddha-field of Mañjuśrī is much better than Amitābha's Sukhāvati. And in the Vimaladattāparipṛchchāsūtra the future Buddha-field of Vimaladattā, at present an eight year-old girl, is said to be much better than that of Mañjuśrī. Vimaladattā had already been following the Bodhisattva Path for sixty aeons when Mañjuśrī made his vows. The whole thing is reminiscent of children's games. We have a vision of
Vimaladattā, the eight year-old girl, poking her tongue out and saying ‘So there!’ Of course, to make this point is no doubt unnecessary as simple description. However, it does say something - and it is more fun to read than simple description. In this case at least I am unrepentant. So there!

Paul Williams


According to our author, the project of the Buddha was ‘to establish philosophy on a firm foundation’ (p.99). This had subsequently become distorted, and ‘religionized’ and ‘psychologised’. Nāgārjuna sought to re-establish the original emphasis. For Nāgārjuna, Nirvāṇa is a ‘philosophical solution to philosophical problems. It is neither an ethical nor a religious ideal, but is a proper perspective or a focus that one ought to adopt to be able to have a proper grasp of things in the world’ (p.102). Padhye is concerned to oppose those who interpret Nāgārjuna as a monist, absolutist, nihilist, or as a ‘mystic’ (mysticism, he tells us, involves God, and there is no evidence that Nāgārjuna wanted to establish a God - p.16). His concern with the tired issues of absolutism and nihilism in the interpretation of Madhyamaka suggests that Padhye has read few of the most recent writings on the tradition, a suggestion confirmed by his bibliography, which lists hardly anything published after 1980, and makes no mention of the works of Lindtner, Hopkins, or the principle works of de Jong (referred to by Padhye as ‘Jung’!), May, Ruegg, Robinson, or even Streng’s book on Emptiness. It appears that Padhye reads neither French nor, crucially, Tibetan. Although he claims to expound what Nāgārjuna really meant, his account rests on the Madhyamakakārikā (MMK) as embedded in the Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti (he appears unaware of de Jong’s text-critical amendments to the de La Vallée Poussin edition), together with occasional references to the Vighrabhyāvatā (Vig.) and one reference to the Sanskrit Ratnāvalī fragments. Although he uses Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā, Padhye ignores the Madhayamakāvatā, written according to Candrakīrti himself as an introduction to the MMK. Our author is thus also extraordinarily poorly read in Madhyamaka works, including those works attributed by Candrakīrti to Nāgārjuna. He makes scarcely a mention of the Prajñāpāramitāśūtras, and seems to have read very little in other Buddhist thought.

Padhye argues that the notion of pratityasamutpāda has two meanings in Nāgārjuna’s writings. The ‘commonsensical’ view sees it as a theory of causation explaining how things come to be in the world. This, Padhye asserts, is incoherent because there cannot be a necessary connection between things presented sequentially (he appears to be following Hume rather than Nāgārjuna here). Thus the commonsense world is false. However, Padhye asserts that the pratityasamutpāda also has another ‘philosophical’ meaning which reveals the true nature of the world as the Buddha wanted to expound it. This true nature is of things which really, truly, exist. They are discrete separate particular things, which occur and cease, although not in causal relationships. They are the genuinely real. Thus the Buddha’s, and Nāgārjuna’s, project was to distinguish what really is the case from what is not, and free mankind from in particular the ‘bewitching platonism’ which makes us think that certain entities, like universals, exist when in reality they do not. Nirvāṇa lies in seeing things in this new light. In itself it is
nothing to do with religion. According to Padhye the understanding of Nirvāṇa as the cessation of greed, hatred and delusion, or the highest bliss, was a misinterpretation of the teaching of the Buddha (p.97).

All this is quite extraordinary, and Padhye’s evidence for his thesis seems to me to be very slim indeed (in spite of the fact that he repeats his view again and again, presumably in the hope of making it more convincing). Padhye takes from Nāgārjuna the statement that if something is dependently originated it could not be inherently existent (have a svabhāva). He seems to conclude from this that all the ‘commonsense objects’ which are dependently originated do not exist (p.42). However, he also takes from the MMK 18.9 the characterisation of tattva, reality, as being not dependent on the teaching of another, tranquil, not differentiated by verbal differentiation, non-conceptual and so on, and from Candrakīrti (on 18.8) tathya (= tattva) as that which is invariable (yasya anyathāvartam nāsti). Since inherent existence would be unchanging, it follows that Nāgārjuna is affirming inherently existing objects, tattva, that is, svabhāvas as ‘genuinely real things’ (pp.44-5). This is supported by Candrakīrti’s occasional references to a type of svabhāva which is not denied by the Madhyamaka (on MMK 5.8 or 22.11, for example). Unfortunately Padhye has not read Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra. There, in his commentary on 6.181-2, Candrakīrti explains that the Madhyamaka reference to a true svabhāva is not a reference to any truly existing thing, but rather to the true way of things itself, the dharmatā (= tathya/tattva) which is invariable, which remains the case whether Buddhas occur or do not. It is not a strange realm of really existing things, but the truth, the fact that all things, without exception, lack inherent existence. This is the way the Madhyamaka tattva has always been interpreted by Prāsaṅgika commentators like Candrakīrti. As Atiśa puts it in his Satyadvayāvatāra, ‘If one examines with reasoning the conditional as it appears, nothing is found. That nonfindingness is the ultimate. It is the primeval way of things’ (dharmatā: v.21).

Padhye’s treatment of his meagre Sanskrit sources is cavalier in the extreme. He cites, in support of his position that Nāgārjuna ‘not only repudiates svabhāva of dharmas but also holds that some items, free from dharmas, are self-existent, they are real... even though ungenerated’ (p.35), the commentary on Vig. 60 (or 61 in the edition used by Padhye). We do not negate the svabhāva of dharmas nor do we affirm the svabhāva of anything (artha) separate from dharmas (my tr: na hi vayam dharmaṁ svabhāvan pratiṣedhayāmo dharmaṁ niruktasya vā kascidaraṁyasya svabhāvamatyupadhyacācāmāhī). It is clear in context, however that Nāgārjuna is stating that the Mādhyamika does not make an inherently existent denial of things. The bizarre suggestion that for Nāgārjuna something free from dharmas really inherently exists is the exact opposite of what Nāgārjuna is saying (in reply to an opponent in Vig. 10). Again, Candrakīrti tells us, according to Padhye, that texts which are interpretable (neyārtha) are those which indicate the proper mode of investigation leading to philosophical illumination. Definitive texts (nītārtha) lead to freedom from bewitchment through misleading impressions etc. (p.27). The actual text in the Prasannapadā is a quote from the Aksayamatisūtra which states that interpretable sūtras are those which introduce the Path; definitive those which introduce the Result (on MMK 13). Once more, Padhye refers to the famous statement in Vig. 29 that ‘if I had any thesis then I would have this fault. I do not have a thesis, therefore I do not have any fault’. For Padhye this means that Nāgārjuna is simply stating
the Buddha's own theory, not any of his own (p.44; cf. pp.135-6). This is absurd, and Padhye offers no evidence for it at all. It directly contradicts both the context of the Vighrahavāyavartani, in which the opponent has argued that Nāgārjuna's words themselves must inherently exist, and Nāgārjuna's own commentary, which states that there can be no thesis when all is empty. That is, emptiness applies to his own thesis as well. At one point our author gives a strange and previously unknown textual variant which appears to support his own theory. He tells us that according to Nāgārjuna we should 'accept those knowledge claims that are acceptable and reject those that are not so' (p.77). His reference is to MMK 22:11ab, which in the Vaidya edition which Padhye claims to have used reads: śūnyam iti na vaktavyam aśūnyam iti vā bhavit/ i.e. 'Empty' is not to be said; nor should there be 'non-empty'. This reading of the Sanskrit text is confirmed by Tucci's manuscript, unknown to Louis de La Vallée Poussin, but used by J.W. de Jong as a basis for his 'Textcritical notes on the Prasannapada' (Indo-Iranian Journal 20, 1978). It corresponds to the Tibetan: stong ngo zhes kyang mi brod de / mi stong zhes kyang mi bya zhing // The verse clearly states that neither empty nor non-empty are to be asserted, and does not oppose the rejection of some things with the acceptance of others. Padhye, however, cites a variant version: śūnyam iti na vaktavyam aśūnyam yadi vā bhavit/ i.e. 'Empty is not to be said if it should be non-empty'. He gives no source for this variant, which is obviously incorrect. According to his bibliography Padhye used only the Vaidya edition of the MMK embedded in the Prasannapada, that is, a reprinting of the de La Vallée Poussin edition. One is forced to ask where such a convenient misreading comes from?

According to our author Nāgārjuna has never characterised his philosophy as śūnyavāda. Ratnakīrti (he must mean Candrakīrti) also repudiated this as a name for the Madhyamaka philosophical position (p.129 - Padhye attacks the liberal meaning of śūnya as 'empty', i.e. non-existent, but seems unaware of the development of this term as a technical word in Buddhist thought). As a matter of fact, however, Padhye is simply wrong. Nāgārjuna refers to the Madhyamaka as śūnyatāvādins (which is the same thing) in Vg. 69 plus commentary. Candrakīrti speaks of śūnyatādārśana for Madhyamaka in his commentary on MMK 18:5, and of śūnyatāvāda on 24:13 (for other examples see the references in Yamaguchi's index to the Prasannapada).

Padhye's interpretation of Nirvāṇa as 'philosophical enlightenment' is equally astonishing, and totally fails to appreciate Nāgārjuna in the context of the Prajñāpāramitāśūtras and the Mahāyāna. The Mahāyāna itself is scarcely mentioned in the book, although a study of the complete text of the Ratnāvalī, accepted by Padhye as a work of Nāgārjuna, not to mention other works by the Master, would show how committed Nāgārjuna was to the bodhicitta, the twin Bodhisattva accumulations of merit and wisdom, Buddhahood as an ultimate goal, and the ten bhūmis of the Bodhisattva's career. In spite of Padhye's claim that the Buddha's and Nāgārjuna's notion of Nirvāṇa was not religious, and had nothing to do with the mistaken idea of a cessation of greed, hatred and delusion, this is precisely what Nāgārjuna says Nirvāṇa is in Śūnyatāsāpata 73!

Padhye's ignorance of Buddhist thought is impressive. Without comment he translates dharma in the context of Buddhist philosophy by one of its non-Buddhist (e.g. Nyāya) meanings as 'quality' or 'property', as reflected in the predicate of a subject-predicate sentence (pp.79 ff). Thus to say that all dharmas are śūnya is to say not that all things without
exception are empty (of inherent existence), but rather that all really existing particulars cannot be captured in everyday subject-predicate language. This is because predicates require shareability. Padhye seems to have little knowledge of Vaibhāṣika thought, where a dharma is a dravya, a fundamental and unique real rather than a shareable property. Dharmas are what is actually there. To say that all dharmas are empty is to say nothing about predicates, but rather to assert that nothing is actually there as inherently existing at all (cf. Aṣṭasāhasri-kāraṇānáyānā by Ārya Vacaraṃ: Even if perchance there could be anything more distinguished [than Nirvāṇa], of that too I say that it is like an illusion, like a dream; Conze tr., p.99).

Padhye's book is repetitive, full of misprints, and the English style is extremely clumsy and difficult to follow. Carelessness is frequent. At one point Padhye claims that Stcherbatsky moved from an earlier theory of pratityasamutpāda in Buddhist Logic to a later theory in The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa. Buddhist Logic was published in 1930, although the Dover edition used by Padhye appeared in 1962. The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa was originally published in 1927, the Indian edition of Padhye in 1977! The present work is based on an inadequate study of Madhyamaka texts, particularly the many works of Nāgārjuna reasonably attributed to the Master, and an insufficient knowledge of Buddhism. Its author seems to have been concerned to produce a new theory, and find it in the few texts he used, regardless of evidence to the contrary. His theory bears no resemblance to that of any commentator on Nāgārjuna. It is to be regretted that he has spent more time combatting writers like Stcherbatsky than consulting with the Tibetans in India who, whether correct or not, embody a living and illuminating lineage of Madhyamaka interpretation. Padhye's book was originally his doctoral thesis. I regret that it seems to me to be completely inadequate.

Paul Williams


This unpretentious little booklet by a member of the Western Buddhist Order who is a practising meditation teacher should prove especially helpful to beginners, but even experienced meditators will benefit from its sensible advice. In clear and straightforward language, and with the help of drawings, it describes the various postures that can be adopted for sitting meditation and explains how to maintain them without undue strain, including practical suggestions on ways to make sitting practice easier.

A few simple exercises are described and illustrated which, regularly practised, will help to loosen one's joints and strengthen one's muscles. The exercises are drawn from different systems, including Hatha Yoga (the author was formerly a yoga teacher), T'ai Chi, conventional physical training and the Alexander technique.

The main body of advice and exercises is prefaced by a few general remarks on meditation in Buddhism and the importance of awareness of the body in this connection. This 'introduction' is, on the whole, as clear and sensible as the rest of the work although, perhaps inevitably, the striving for brevity and
simplicity (it is only three and a half pages long) has entailed much oversimplification. Especially the bald statement that ‘mindfulness is a state of near-meditation’ (p.7) is, as it stands, apt to mislead the beginners for whom the booklet is primarily intended, since it ignores the important distinction between the general attitude of mindfulness one endeavours to keep up outside formal settings and the full exercise of mindfulness in the practice of satipatthāna (the four foundations of mindfulness), which is the essence of insight meditation (vipassanā).

Attention must also be drawn to a slip in terminology: the second of the five hindrances to meditation is ill-will (vyāpāda) and not, as stated on p.11, anger (kodha), which is only a particular manifestation of the more general condition.

However, the occasional imperfection in no way detracts from the overall quality and usefulness of this eminently sensible piece of work. A truly practical guide which can be warmly recommended to all meditators.

Amadeo Solé-Leris


The Preface mentions, as if in one breath, in categoric and condensed statements, often linked together in long chains of clauses and subclauses, virtually all the problems and questions the enquiring mind has ever occupied itself with, from the beginning of philosophical thought in antiquity to the latest re-examination and critical assessment of scientific axioms and theories. It thus shows the breadth of the author’s interest which he wishes to share with the reader without, in his own words, intentionally trying to prove any preconceptions. Perhaps unintentionally, however, he does reveal to the reader his view of reality in the ultimate sense: it is that which does not change and which is ABSOLUTE; and it is to him synonymous with NON-DUALITY and NOTHINGNESS. The question is: what part does this Absolute, non-duality or nothingness play in the fluid world which we inhabit, in our experience of evil and suffering and in our hope for salvation? The book would seem to be a survey of the human search to provide the answer, and may be summarised as follows:

Chapter 1, ‘Maya, the appearance of reality’, is obviously concerned with the non-absolute, i.e. with the relative experience of reality on whatever level we encounter it. In this context it mentions many attempts to ascertain, describe or explain the nature of the changing reality of our experience made by scientists through experimentation as well as theoretical thought, by philosophers through speculation and analysis and by Indian religious systems.

Chapter 2, ‘Science, the philosophy of nature’, would seem to be trying to show the implications of the world as māyā to science which, we are told, deals not with truth but only with verisimilitude and is circumscribed by dubious metaphysics and what passes in it for proof is not proof at all. Scientific laws are based on faith, dogma, tradition and superstition of a certain kind and the same goes for religions. Neither scientific nor religious conventions can be known as true, they can only be taken to be true. Sciences, religions and philosophies can be built up from arbitrary foundations unrelated to truth or reality, valid only within their own sphere or terms of reference. The author scans the whole area of modern science from classical physics to the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics with
references to logical operations and mathematical calculations and with the accompaniment of quotations from philosophers old and new and concludes that 'seemingly modern ideas have ancient pedigrees'.

Chapter 3, 'Philosophy, the nature of science', comments first on the disagreements of philosophers throughout the history of philosophy, then on various inadequate definitions of philosophy and on what its task is or should be. The author then blames philosophy, when occupied with logical analysis of thought, for not justifying the logic it uses. He further condemns some philosophers for their system-building without producing satisfactory evidence for the systems. The author then gives an elementary survey of the beginnings and progress of philosophy from ancient Greece to modern times, with accounts of the teachings of a number of individual philosophers from Socrates to Wittgenstein and Ayer.

Chapter 4, 'The problem of evil', suggests that evil and suffering can hardly be anything other than our interpretations of events and experiences. The solutions of authoritarian religions help only if one is a believer or has broken down, is frightened or in a panic, ready for a mental or physical straitjacket. Hinduism and Buddhism do not require strict belief for the practice of their paths. Their requirement is dispassionateness and non-attachment. The Bhagavadgītā provides the best practical rules for that purpose.

Chapter 5, 'Non-duality, nothingness', restates the tenet that everything we know in the universe, including ourselves, is in a state of flux. Metaphysics is the search for the immutable against which changing states can be measured. If conflict of appearance were all there is, the appearances would not be understood as conflicting. All knowledge presupposes Non-duality. In agreement with the tenor of Indian philosophy based on the Upaniṣads and culminating in Śankara, the author understands non-duality to mean the identity of the Absolute and the individual self, foreshadowed in the experience of deep sleep without dreams. The Advaita system shows that without the Absolute there would be no basis for any kind of knowledge on the relative level which is, of course, limited and valid only pragmatically. Nothing can be said about the Absolute except that it is one and indivisible and that it undergoes no change. The author then paraphrases the Madhyamaka dictum about the identity of Samsāra and Nirvāṇa by a rather anecdotal and not very meaningful saying: 'NIRVANA is the reality of SAMSARA, SAMSARA is the falsity of NIRVANA, both are Nothingness'.

Chapter 6, 'Reincarnation in rebirths', subscribes to the once current but unproven and now challenged view that the theory of rebirth is later than the Vedas and then mentions its appearance or traces in other traditions: Greek, Christian, Judaic, Druidic and, of course, Vedānta and Buddhism. The author sees the best argument for rebirth in the inexorable law of cause and effect which becomes the doctrine of karma in the context of the theory of rebirth, but has some difficulty in reconciling it with the notion of the unreality of the phenomenal and relative world. With respect to the Absolute all life and all matter are one.

Chapter 7, 'Appearance and Reality', a metaphysical theme, is dealt with even more anecdotally than the preceding topics. It touches on the disparity between fate which men cannot control and their reactions to it, on the problems of Christian belief, idealistic philosophy, political systems of democracy and dictatorship, the role of law and policing in society and many other areas. When he returns to the philosophical aspect of the theme, he seems to identify himself with the proposition that
we cannot describe the outside world or even know that there is an outside world independent of sensory perception. It is back to the earlier and often repeated statement that we can only have theories, but if reality is that which does not change, as established by Advaita Vedānta, our theories cannot get at it, because reality is not physical or phenomenal. To know that is wisdom.

Chapter 8, 'What there is', summarises the preceding pages and selectively repeats some of the assertions in them, adding a few new ones. We can only have theories about the world. The world is māyā. There is no conclusive verification in science. The Absolute is realised as self-identity through self-experience. Truth is silence.

At first glance the book may impress one by the sheer breadth of its horizon. There are in it many reasonably accurate characterisations and condensed observations from the field of the history of philosophy, from the works of individual philosophers, from the field of various sciences and from the modern theories of physics, mathematics and logic, as well as some pertinent criticisms of the religious scene. At second glance and particularly when reading the book carefully, one is much less impressed. One drawback is its style. It is not narrative, does not give a systematic account of any topic it touches on, does not provide any analyses of problems it throws up and does not offer reasoned conclusions. Its assertions are not argued. It suffers from repetitions and often jumps from one point to another and heaps together paradoxical, even contradictory statements with many epithets, synonyms and homonyms. The author cannot resist what may appear to him to be a witty or startling formulation just for the sake of it, even if it does not seem to make much sense in the context. He lacks the discipline needed for writing a text readable to others. It was very difficult to bring in some system and produce the summaries [Ed. abbreviated] of his chapters given above. His writing makes an impression of personal notes written down when ideas occurred to him while reading other books. But he did not think them through and did not try to elaborate them and put them into the form of an argued or systematic presentation.

In dealing with the philosophical problem of reality and truth the author never makes clear when he speaks about them as absolute values and when he deals with relative reality and pragmatic truth on the phenomenal, everyday level. He is not unaware of the difference, but does not shrink from making statements which confuse the two levels and produce thereby a startling and paradoxical effect. From this position he makes some of his sniping remarks, often unfair or misleading, which criticise some philosophies and scientific theories. The matter is, however, entirely clear in the Madhyamaka system where it is known as the doctrine of the Two Truths. But the author never even mentions it, let alone explains its Buddhist use, its influence on the Advaita Vedānta and its equivalents in Western thought.

Another drawback is an almost total lack of precise references, while assertions about what philosophers, scientists and other authors have to say on various topics abound. To trace them to their sources for verification would be a superhuman task, probably even for the author. Many pronouncements the author makes are obviously second-hand and highly debatable, especially those concerning individual philosophers, and they are obviously drawn from the author's reading of some history of philosophy (such as Russell's, which is listed in the bibliography). The language, grammar and syntax in the book also leave a lot to be desired. Some
sentences just do not make sense.

The title and subtitle of the book sound very promising, but the presentation of the teachings of the Advaita Vedânta as well as the Madhyamaka Buddhism in the book is very patchy, inaccurate, often trivial or anecdotal and altogether unhelpful. The same goes for the connection between some tenets of Eastern religions identifiable also in Western thought. A newcomer will be puzzled by the author’s treatment and will learn hardly anything from it. An educated reader may recognise that a number of valid ideas have been brought together in the book, but he will learn hardly anything new from it. And a specialist in any of the fields the author has ventured into will most likely detect all the inaccuracies. They abound also in the glossary and appendices, along with insufficient explanations. The author’s way of transliterating Indian words ignores accepted academic standards now often adopted even in popular publications.

The book can be commended as an effort of a self-taught amateur in comparative philosophy. But it comes nowhere near the standards which are needed for the popularisation of philosophical ideas and scientific results, and the author has not grasped the basic principles of academic work in terms of documentation, analysis, argument and presentation.

Karel Werner


Ch. 1. Morinaga’s paper tells us of the rigours (niwazume) awaiting the Zen novice in Japan - a candid account set in wartime and post-WW2 conditions. This is worth reading just for the sketch of his meeting with Gôtô Suigian and zendô-life, but one wonders how many contemporary Japanese will share Morinaga’s disdain for the morals of modern Japan - or feel that much nostalgia for the passing of the old order. The contrast between the modern liberal-democratic outlook and the rigours of life in a traditional Zen setting is a recurrent theme in this text (cf. Ch.10 and the Epilogue) and it is quite clear that Westerners have a different understanding of ‘authority’. To keep the thread here, it seems advisable to jump ahead to Ch. 3.

In Ch. 3, Kapleau is ideally placed to comment on the role of dokusan. As a Westerner steeped in Zen after long years of practice, he is only too conscious of the problems touched on above. Kapleau notes some of the chief objections that Westerners raise about dokusan - namely, that the business of ‘giving’ and ‘solving’ kôans has become superficial or artificial,
that the circumstances of the ‘encounter’ with the rōshi are too harsh and that the rōshi has too much power (pp.54-67). In reply, Kapleau makes a convincing argument for retaining this traditional feature of Zen training while admitting that it can be abused. As he notes, the merit of dokusan is that both rōshi and student must address the essential matter from the very core of their being. Here, ‘body-language’ says a lot for the student must ‘BE’ centred, not just talking or thinking about it and, if needs be, the rōshi concludes the ‘interview’ by providing the necessary corrective. Western psychotherapy offers the nearest parallel here despite being much more analytical. Its methods are equally open to abuse, yet few would argue that one or two bad analysts have rendered psychotherapy bankrupt. Real dokusan presupposes that the student is working on his or her own development, a convenient point upon which to return to Ch. 2 - ‘Zen Meditation’.

Ch. 2 provides a lively talk on zazen (ts'o-ch'ān). Some modern pundits are apt to believe that the old masters rejected zazen but, as Sheng-Yen notes, Ch'ān/Zen texts say relatively little about this discipline simply because most practitioners would have taken it for granted. Often the more overt references to zazen are critical, correcting a misguided (dualistic) view of this discipline, as in the well-known ‘tile-polishing’ dialogue between Huai-jang (677-744) and Ma-tsu (709-88) cited in this chapter. Happily, Sheng-Yen discusses ‘kōan zen’ (kan-hua ch'ān / kanna-zen) and ‘silent-illumination zen’ (mo chao ch'ān / mokushō zen) in a complementary light, but it is a pity that the sole Chinese contributor to this book did not say more about the Tang schools of Ch'an prior to the unfortunate rift which fatefuly influenced the Ch'an traditions as the first Japanese monks made their pilgrimages to China.

Ch. 4 touches on the vexed question of adapting traditional kōan training to Western needs. This complements Kapleau’s paper - the chief emphasis being on the kōan system developed by Hakuin, concluding with the prospect of finding ready-made kōans in Western sources. No doubt, Western culture is redolent with all sorts of ‘kōan-like’ idioms that might exert a salutary effect on minds ‘primed’ by zazen. Even so, do we really need a rōshi to tell us that there are kōans in the Bible, Eckhart or Blake? And what irony there is in Shimano’s suspicion that the words of Hakuin or other Far Eastern masters are bound to seem ‘alien’ to Westerners (pp.82-3), when many Occidentals feel that masters of Hakuin’s ilk spoke from a level of experience transcending all such temporal/cultural boundaries.

In Ch. 5, a long-time student of Kapleau, now acting as a teacher in his own right, gives us a very reasonable account of Hakuin’s ‘Zazen Wasan’ (Chant in Praise of Zazen):

The gateway to freedom is zazen samadhi,
beyond exaltation, beyond our praises,
the pure Mahayana.
Observing the precepts, repentance and giving,
the countless good deeds, and the ways of right living
all come from Zazen...

Hakuin Ekaku (1686-1769), the great reformer of Rinzai Zen, knew the rigours of zazen well and, from personal experience, how it can be misapplied. Low’s commentary is frank, by no means blind to the fact that zazen can become a narcissistic exercise, citing the example of a fellow Buddhist who felt it had become an escape from his social obligations. However, Low’s line-by-line commentary corrects this notion, showing how zazen should empower us to deal with the concrete demands of everyday life.

Ch. 6 is fascinating for its notes on the links between Zen
and poetry. Watson's paper touches on several different genres of Zen Buddhist poetry - from the gathā (chi) form, the most formal and didactic, to ceremonial verse; from T'ang verse to the more specialised forms of a later period, such as Hsüeh-Tou's (980-1052) versified comments in the 'Blue Cliff Records' (Pi-yen Lu) or Hui-kai's (1183-1260) verses in the 'Gateless Barrier' (Wu-men K'uan). Also discussed are the chōka and tanka forms in the Japanese tradition; the Literature of the Five Mountains' (gozan bungaku) and finally the haiku, in the right hands perhaps the consummate vehicle for expressing Zen-type insight. Surprisingly, Watson says relatively little about Matsuo Bashō, but offers the free haiku form of Taneda Santoka (1882-1940):

Buried in weeds
one roof
one man.

In Ch. 7 McRae outlines details of 'Early Ch'an' with emphasis upon some 'disputed questions' - the reliability of accounts dealing with the rift between the 'southern' and 'northern' Ch'an schools - plus the authorship of Hui-neng's 'Altar Sūtra' (T'an Ching). The issues at stake here are too complex to be unpacked in a review but briefly, McRae has one eye on the Tun-huang materials which have significantly altered our view of the early Ch'an tradition, not least Shen-hui's (694-758) role in the ascendancy of Hui-neng's 'southern school'. The late Hu-shih made much of this but where the latter saw the Hui-neng/Shen-hui link as the emergence of an heterodox strain in Chinese Buddhism, McRae de-emphasises Hui-neng's role and tries to show that many 'southern school' ideas were prefigured in 'northern school' teachings, revising the stereotyped view of Shen-hsiu as a pawn in the 'gradual-sudden' debate. McRae cites Buddhist sources which describe Shen-hsiu in glowing terms as a highly respected figure teaching in

Ch'ang-an and Loyang with the support of the imperial household, and clearly we cannot ignore this important figure. However, while McRae comes to Shen-hsiu's defence, dismissing Shen-hui's role as little more than that of a sectarian-cum-political one, I can't help feeling that Shen-hui was dealing with a genuine 'problem' in his critique of certain trends in the Ch'an tradition.

Ch. 8 explores the development of the Japanese schools. Yampolsky observes that the tendency to trace the origins of Japanese Zen back to Myōan Eisi (1141-1215) and Dōgen Zenji (1200-53) is something of an oversimplification, outlining a rather more complex picture, noting a wide diversity of schools and key figures, far too numerous to list here. Notable personalities here include Shinchi Kakushin (1207-98) who introduced the Mumonkan to Japan, Lan-chi T'ao-lung (1213-78), an emigré Chinese master and Musô Soseki (1275-1351), who set the style for all the Gozan temples - although many, many more are cited. Even early developments were marked by sectarian bitterness. The mention of Dainichi Nōnin (-1196?) is of some significance. An adherent of the now-forgotten (Rinzai-influenced?) Nihon Daruma school, this controversial figure seems to have upset people, not least Eisi and Dōgen. Yampolsky notes that Eisi's Kōzen gokokuron ('The propagation of Zen in defence of the country') was in part an attack on Nōnin's teaching. Moreover, Yampolsky notes that two lineages were present at Eiheiji - Dōgen's and the Nihon Daruma line of Nōnin, meaning that Dōgen's disciples would have been influenced by Nōnin's teaching, which would in part explain Dōgen's animosity towards the Rinzai school. But one transmission line of Sōtō Zen never reached Japan, thus its fortunes had to await the appearance of Keizan Jōkin (1268-1325), often called the 'second patriarch' of Sōtō Zen.
Inevitably, the main emphasis of Yampolsky’s paper falls on the vast ramifications of Rinzai Zen which sprang up in and around Kyoto and Kamakura during the fourteenth century - the so-called Gozan or 'Five Mountains' complex and the Otokan lineage (its title is a contraction of the names of its first three founders Daïō Kokushi [1235-1308], Daitō Kokushi [1282-1338] and Kanzan Egen [1277-1360]). In Yampolsky’s view, the Otokan lineage taught a much ‘purer’ form of Rinzai Zen than the Gozan centres, having escaped the syncretistic elements absorbed by the latter, although it, too, fell under the spell of formalism in later times. To this lineage belonged the colourful figure of Ikkyū Sōjun (1394-1481), author of the Kyōunshū or ‘Crazy Cloud Collection’. This paper concludes with an outline of Zen in the Tokugawa, spanning the period which saw the last Chinese masters arriving in Japan - the most notable of these being Yin-yüan (Ingen Ryūki, 1592-1673), the founder of Ōbaku Zen, culminating in the appearance of Hakuin Ekaku.

Ch. 9 is a study of ‘The Zen Institution in Modern Japan’. While somewhat dry and statistical, it is nevertheless interesting. It looks at the corporate and administrative role of the Zen centres, besides the daily regimen, ritual and spiritual life of individual temples. Foulk includes charts showing the complement of adherents attached to the main monasteries, temples and branch temples of different Zen corporations. For the record, the largest is the Sōtō school, with 14,718 temples, 26 monasteries and 6,885,381 adherents, as against the Rinzai’s 5,754 temples, 38 monasteries and 1,717,163 adherents. Twenty other corporations are listed, which gives some idea of the scale of Zen Buddhism in Japan. Part of this study looks at the training of Zen monks (pp.166-73). The strict regimen of the best monasteries will no longer shock Westerners, some of whom will know it from first-hand experience or imported variants.

Foulk observes that few Zen monasteries support themselves through agricultural endeavours but depend on the dāna of their patrons, though manual work still has its spiritual benefits. Institutionalisation has its price: Foulk mentions the hereditary Sōtō temples which are quite literally handed down father-to-son, wherein ‘Dharma transmission’ is almost automatic. By contrast, some Rinzai rōshis will refuse to bestow inka unless a genuine successor can be found. It is of note, too (p.175), that nuns still fare relatively badly within the institutions of Zen Buddhism, despite the new rights nominally accorded to them in recent years.

In Ch. 10 Kraft discusses the ongoing experiment to establish the makings of a ‘Western Zen’ in North America - a highly eclectic adventure involving everything from virtually ‘neat’ transplants of the traditional zendo-type environment (complete with Japanese-trained, Caucasian-born rōshis) to more home-grown innovations which incorporate at least some traditional elements - a kind of trial between tradition and innovation. Even the most conservative minded converts recognise that many traditional elements of Zen will have to go. There were bound to be problems introducing the ‘vertical’ power structure of Zen into a culture permeated by hyper-democracy and, certainly, the traditional Japanese attitude towards women is not welcome in the West. However, there is a natural hierarchy of learning and the problem needs to be faced. Who would learn maths or to play the piano without it? The crucial thing here seems to be the distinction between natural authority and institutionalised authority. It is of note that while Morinaga (Ch. 1) spoke of the need to give an unqualified ‘yes’ to the rōshi’s commands, most Westerners referred to in this book have retained a strong sense of inner reserve in such situations. It may be a spiritual duty not to
throw ourselves away in blind obedience but, by the same token, egotism often prevents us from humbling ourselves in the presence of a superior personality. Far Eastern Zen took root and flourished in an essentially monastic milieu but this does not seem to be the way that things will go with Zen in the West, where the claims of family/lay-life take priority and present fresh challenges. There can be little doubt that many of the problems discussed here reflect genuine anxieties but, to my mind, this chapter tends to confuse two quite different issues—namely, what it means to adapt Zen to Western needs and what it means to ‘institutionalise’ it. However necessary social institutions may be, the inner life of Zen is never reducible to an ‘institution’, be it Japanese or homegrown. Too much emphasis on external (cultural) problems might just be missing something vital. After all, old Joshu (Chao-chou) once said the Tao was like a ‘crystal ball’ which ‘reflects barbarians and native Chinese alike’. The ‘crystal ball’ (self-nature) is neither ‘barbarian’ nor an ‘oriental’ and, seen from this angle, perhaps problems felt over the East-West cultural divide take on a different hue. More discussion on this point would have helped keep the ethnic problem in perspective. There is a kind of ‘fire-is-hot-water-is-wet’ aspect to Zen which is so basic that it exists before and after all the institutional questions have been posed. However, without celebrating at least the psychological differences involved, would a Zen fully assimilated to Western culture have anything fresh and challenging to offer? Indeed, what strikes some Westerners as the most ‘alien’ thing about Zen is not the foreign garb at all, but its inner ethos and it is a fact that some Westerners begin to feel ‘itchy’ after taking up zazen, a compulsion to ‘do something’ almost for its own sake, rather than ‘let go’. The problem here is not a case of choosing between ‘active’ (Western) or ‘passive’ (Eastern) lifestyles, but of striking the right balance between the two, a question of whether our activity helps us to remain ‘centred’, or whether we lose ourselves. There is an ‘inner economy’ in nature and in the end that is all ‘Zen’ deals with. Thus, too much harping on about the inner demands of Zen training would simply mean that we are not yet ‘in the way’ and, likely as not unable to relate currently to the life around us. The global ecological crisis is sign enough that we have pushed external development to its extreme limit and perhaps the saving grace is that we are beginning to be forced back upon ourselves and driven within to reach a higher level of consciousness. Thus, the questions discussed in this book are far from academic. Eastern Zen grew from small beginnings—indeed, from the seeds planted by one or two dedicated people. Why try to count the harvest while we are still sowing?

Richard Hunn


The initial impact of this text is so pleasing, visually speaking, that one immediately suspects it is going to be yet another of those ‘coffee table’ books which actually turn out to be quite disappointing to read. Happily to say, however, Dr Stevens’ book is every bit as intriguing to read as its superb cover graphics and photographs are good to look at. Every page is fairly packed with fascinating observations about the ‘Yamabushi’ or ‘mountain priests’ of Mt. Hiei and the somewhat gruelling discipline they undertake on the circuit (kaihōgyō) of their sacred mountain. Over a seven-year training period...
punctuated by death-defying fasts and purification rituals, these ‘running Buddhas’ figuratively circle the globe upon a sacred mountain route which has deep symbiotic links with the ‘inner journey’ towards enlightenment. During one incredible 100-day stretch, they cover 52.5 miles daily - twice the distance of an Olympic Marathon. This and much more besides makes for intriguing and inspiring reading. Professor of Buddhist Studies and Aikido Instructor at Tohoku College of Social Welfare in Sendai, the author clearly possesses that rare gift of being able to combine academic skills with an insider’s feeling for a sacred tradition and it is hard to imagine anyone bettering this superb work on Japanese Tendai Buddhism. The enchanting photographs were taken by Tadashi Namba, a longtime devotee of the Yamabushi who is familiar with Hiei’s sacred places.

At one time, the ethos of Hiei’s ‘marathon monks’ would have seemed alien to most Westerners, even to the Western Buddhist community, but there is a growing recognition in the West (probably a spin-off from the martial arts) of a definite parallelism between physical and spiritual discipline - the art of breaking through the pain barrier, where body-mind dualism simply has no room. This means that ‘sport’ is increasingly being understood in terms of an ‘inner game’ where the notion of ‘competition’ becomes a source of inner enrichment and spiritual discipline, a challenge to ‘self’ rather than to ‘others’ (certain tennis players, please take note!). Thus, the example of the ‘marathon monks’ of Mt. Hiei, ‘spiritual athletes’ of a most extraordinary kind, will prove inspiring to a wide range of readers, Buddhist and non-Buddhist alike.

This work is divided into two parts. Part 1 - ‘The World of Tendai Buddhism’, provides abundant background information about Mt. Hiei and the Tendai school in Japan. Part 2 - ‘The Marathon Monks’, tells us about the ‘running Buddhas’ themselves and their well-nigh superhuman capacity to triumph over the most rigorous and arduous demands set by their course of training. Though replete with abundant historical background material, Part 1 is never dull but full of interesting nuggets about the living tradition of Mt. Hiei. Whilst it has served as home-base for all the major Japanese Buddhist schools in its time - having seen Zen monks like Eisai, Pure Land monks like Hōnen and Shinran or firebrands like Nichiren - Hiei’s primary claim to fame lies in its unbroken links with the Tendai tradition, founded by Saichō [Dengyō Daishi, d.822]. Besides giving readers an idea of the general historical basis of Tendai practice, though the Yamabushi of Mt. Hiei actually utilise an amalgam (shugendo) of various Shingon and Shinto elements besides the shikan (i.e. samatha-vipaśyanā) method and its ‘four samādhis’ (shishū sammal) introduced to Hiei by Saichō after his peregrinations to China.

The disciplines unique to Hiei were devised by Master Sō-ō after Saichō’s death and, despite many vicissitudes, they have survived to this day with various modifications. While the author writes with respect and reverence for the tradition, he does not try to hide the darker side of Hiei’s long history and, besides the brilliant example of many eminent Tendai monks, we are also told of Hiei’s periodic decline and transformation into a veritable mountain fortress, complete with its ‘warrior monks’ or sohei. Such objectivity stands us in good stead for Part 2, which might otherwise appear to be stretching our sense of credulity too far. It illustrates in word and picture form the astonishing discipline expected from the would-be gyōja of Mt. Hiei and one thing is certain - this is no exercise in mere ‘navel-gazing’, its demands are so arduous, idle time-servers or ‘rice-bag’ monks just wouldn’t get a look in. A hint of the rigours involved can be gleaned from the fact that, traditionally,
each gyōja has carried his shide-no-himo or 'cord of death' (hanging rope) and goma-no-ken (a little knife) with which to take his own life should he be defeated by the demands of training. Needless to say, such severity owes more to native Japanese 'seriousness' than it does to Buddhism per se and Westerners whose Buddhism has been tinged with a dose of Taoist gentleness will probably view this facet of the gyōja way with some doubt. As it is, few gyōja are encouraged to use the rope or knife these days anyway. But, such misgivings aside, one cannot help admiring the sheers guts of Mt. Hiei's 'mountain monks' and it would be unfair to cavil or indulge our Western prejudices on this point.

The intriguing thing about Part 2 of this book is that it is dealing not with remote and alien figures from a distant past, but with contemporary Japanese Buddhists, yet the two most recent gyōja - Utsumi Sunshō and Sakai Yūsai* - might well be straight out of mediaeval Japan so far as their dress and way of perpetuating this 'ancient path' is concerned. No doubt, the 'protestant Buddhist' mentality (East or West) might like to see the gyōja as little more than quaint but irrelevant relics of bygone days, clad in their white garments, flattened higasa hats and straw sandals. However, just reading the account of their 'mountain marathon' and 'pilgrimage to the inner self' through the timeless rites and practices of the gyōja way is a purifying and refreshing experience in itself, their austere simplicity and raw vigour presenting a stark and perhaps badly needed contrast to the effete weakness of modern urban life.

We need only take a glance at the picture of Utsumi emerging from the purifying experience of dōri to perceive that much more than empty formalism is at work here, and that we are indeed glimpsing a sacred rite of passage with genuine possibilities of spiritual transformation. The dōri ('entry into

the hall' at Myō-o-dō) is a nine-day confinement without water, food, rest or sleep, undertaken only after a 'marathon monk' has completed 700 days of kaihōgyō. The final rite of initiation for the marathon monks is the 100,000 prayer-fast and fire ceremony (jumannaï daigoma), a descendant of the ancient India homa fire sacrifice taken over by the Shingon tradition and adapted to gyōja purposes. As the author points out, it is preceded by a 100-day fast to dry out the gyōja and to prevent him expiring from excessive perspiration during the eight-day fire ceremony, where he must sit before a blazing cauldron, casting a total of at least 100,000 individual prayer sticks into its flames - symbolically representing the purifying energies of the deity, Fudo-Myō-o.

None but the most dedicated would even consider undertaking the formidable spiritual and physical tests of the mountain marathon' and, certainly, none but the most dedicated could ever hope to finish it. The rigours of mountain kaihōgyō are no less trying than the purification rites, often in unexpected ways. One of the monks shown in this book was actually attacked by a wild boar on the mountain fastness, sustaining a most painful foot-injury in the process, but he pressed on stoically to complete kaihōgyō despite passing out twice en route. With some justification, those who complete the full course of training are bestowed with the title 'Daigyōman Ajari' (Saintly Master of the Highest Practice) and thereafter regarded as 'living Buddhas' who dispense blessings to the whole world. Going by the benign expressions of Utsumi or Sakai, one can well believe it. While few of us will directly emulate the Yamabushi of Mt. Hiei, they serve as a sterling reminder of life's spiritual challenges and the fact that none of us truly live life to its fullest unless we also do kaihōgyō in our own way.
An extensive bibliography, glossary and index complete this most excellent book.

Richard Hunn

*Ed. In fact the latest gyôja, Tanno Ajari, featured in a unique film of ‘The Marathon Monks of Mount Hiei’ which was shown on Britain’s Channel 4 Television programme on 21 Sept. 1991.*


This is an introduction to Buddhism in its Nichiren form, written by the President of Soka Gakkai International, a ‘lay Buddhist organisation for the promotion of education, culture and peace’ with ‘over 1.3 million members outside Japan’. The plan of the book is ‘to take a close look at the four sufferings – birth, sickness, old age and death’, and ‘to illumine the truth and wisdom to sail calmly over the troubled seas of worldly suffering’. The concluding two chapters expound fundamental Mahayana doctrine.

For Ikeda ‘the Lotus Sutra alone contains the full perfect revelation of Shakyamuni’s enlightenment’ (p.13), ‘crystallised in universally accessible form by Nichiren Daishonin, the great Buddhist master of medieval Japan. The orthodox tradition emanating from him is called Nichiren Shoshu; it is this stream of Buddhism that our lay organisation, Soka Gakkai, exists to propagate’. There are thus plentiful quotations throughout the book from Nichiren and the Lotus Sutra and from T‘ien-tai Buddhism. Other Buddhist traditions and their scriptures are ignored. However, the evangelical righteousness of Soka Gakkai has mellowed with time, and the writing here is temperate.

‘The contemporary world’ in the title refers to the parallels and supporting evidence in respect of Dharma which Ikeda finds in contemporary science. This can be a hazardous and potentially misleading kind of undertaking. In fact, Ikeda offers a fragmentary miscellany of scientific findings which are impressively wide-ranging but unsecured in any critical context. They appear in a discursive collage together with bits of traditional Oriental knowledge, quotations from Nichiren, and so on. Many worthwhile points are made along the way amidst the commonplaces, but most of the material is no more than miscellaneous infilling of the Nichiren Shôshû structure.

In short, this is a modernistic popularisation rather than an essay in original discussion and systematic analysis. Ikeda’s strength is as a propagandist (in the best sense), organiser and inspirer, and it is to these ends that his prolific authorship is directed.

The book is written in a clear, even style and provided with a useful glossary and index.

Ken Jones


With ten million members world-wide and a steadily growing body of Western adherents, we will undoubtedly be hearing more about Nichiren Shôshû and the Soka Gakkai in the West. As Chairman of NSUK and Vice-President of the Nichiren Shoshu European Institute, the author is obviously well placed to give us an insider’s account of Nichiren Shôshû and the lively style of his book will readily appeal to modern readers. Less
certain, however, is the question of whether the ‘fundamentalist’
type approach of this work will appeal for the right reasons. Its
contents are set out as follows:

Part One: (1) The Ten Worlds; (2) The Meaning of Nam
Myôhô Renge Kyô. Part Two: (3) The Gohonzon; (4) The
Essentials of Practice; (5) Soka Gakkai International; (6) A
Lasting Peace. (Appendix: Chronological History of the Life of
Nichiren Daishonin).

Though quite readable where the author is discussing
Buddhism in the context of daily life - exploring the theme of
how the ‘Ten Worlds’ are all potentially present in the here and
now - this work nevertheless poses distinct problems once the
author begins to digress on the specific and, so it is claimed,
unique virtues of Nichiren Shôshû. While the author is
addressing modern Western readers and writes in a popular
style, the underlying message is still that of Nichiren (1222-82),
the late mediaeval Japanese dogmatist who rejected everything
but the Lotus Sûtra as a scriptural base, and everything but
worship of the Gohonzon and recitation of Nam Myôhô Renge
Kyô as the means (upâya) to enlightenment - as declared in his
Risshô Ankoku Ron of 1260 and subsequently reaffirmed in
several other declarations. While the Soka Gakkai represents
what the Japanese call ‘a new religion’, Nichiren Shôshû had its
beginnings in the somewhat acrimonious atmosphere of the
Kamakura period, a time of ‘religious’ (i.e. ‘Buddhist’) wars no
less violent than the previous era of secular strife. The era was
visited by relentless earthquakes, plagues and epidemics and,
to make matters worse, the threat of a Mongol invasion was
imminent. In this rather doom-laden atmosphere, Japan’s
religious leaders preached their vehement warnings about the
‘latter day of the law’ (mappô), vying with one another for
supremacy, frequently resorting to arms in the process. More
than once, Mount Hiei - home to several major Buddhist sects
became a veritable ‘religious fortress’ complete with armed
monks. Such was the psychological and social climate in which
Nichiren Buddhism was born, a time of acute religious paranoia
not unlike that which prevailed in late mediaeval Europe,
equally marked by schism in Church and State, with all kinds of
chiliastic fears and expectations in the air.

To be fair, the author does his best to play down the
dogmatic aspect of Nichiren’s doctrine, but in the final estimate
it is precisely that which underlies everything said in this book
and, more importantly perhaps, what has not been said in it.
This becomes more and more apparent as one moves further
into the text. Apart from a few dismissive and rather
ill-informed remarks in the preface about the development of
Western Buddhism, the full impact of other Buddhist schools
upon the West remains a residual mystery of little interest. The
same goes for any serious mention of the great expansion of
Mahâyâna Buddhist schools between the first and twelfth
centuries C.E., discussed only insofar as it sets the stage for the
appearance of Nichiren (though cursory references to the
T’ien-t’ai [Jap. Tendai] school do appear, this school having
propagated the teachings of the Lotus Sûtra long before
Nichiren’s time). Of course, had the author gone further in this
direction, elucidating the principles which have informed the
rest of Mahâyâna Buddhism for millennia, Nichiren’s teaching
would have appeared in a distinctly different light - as but one
of many upâya (skilful means) - a prospect which has been
studiously avoided. This is not merely a question of economy
or judicious use of space by sticking to the topic at hand, but of
placing Nichiren Buddhism in an historical and doctrinal
vacuum. Needless to say, once placed in the pluralistic context
of World Buddhism, the approach adopted by the author of this
book will be seen to have fudged a number of issues which all but outright converts to Nichiren Shōshū would have expected to see given fairer or more objective treatment.

No doubt chanting Nam Myōhō Renge Kyō does lead some people to enlightenment, but by the same token so might chanting Om Mani Padme Hum, reciting the Shinjyō (Heart Sūtra), the Nembutsu of Pure Land Buddhism, utilising the kōan (kung-an) in Zen Buddhism, the Tantric mandala visualisations of Tibetan Buddhism or the samatha-vipassanā techniques of S.E. Asia - in short, by resorting to a number of expedients besides those of particular importance to Nichiren Shōshū. In this respect, there can be little doubt that the author has been guilty of certain 'sins of omission', even if not quite guilty of any 'sins of commission'. As is to be expected perhaps, when the author gives us his account of 'Nichiren the man', he only tells us one side of the story. ... Nichiren the suffering hero, driven onwards by a singular sense of personal mission, persecuted and frequently exiled, suffering the bars of misfortune and an adverse fate. This is not concealed from the reader, it is true, but it is reported in such a way as to leave us entirely in the dark about the fanatical zeal and harsh intolerance which Nichiren brought to bear upon the task of propagating his self-defined brand of 'True Buddhism', and it remains to be seen whether Buddhists outside Nichiren Shōshū will be that interested in the false pathos surrounding the life-career of its founding-father. That a number of (Jōdo) Pure Land monks made serious attempts on the life of Nichiren Daishonin will only make thoughtful readers more cautious, rather than turning them into enthusiastic adherents, for they are bound to ask just what kind of actions were required to elicit such a response from others. That much should already be clear from the author's opening discussion of 'The Ten Worlds' where it is pointed out that the causative power of various mental states will necessarily invoke or call forth corresponding 'realms' or objective 'states' - as 'effect'. The fact that Nichiren made a regular point of vilifying all religious practices besides his own ('Nembutsu is the devil', 'Zen is poison') - even to the extent of petitioning to have all official support withdrawn from them - will not strike modern readers as an endearing quality. Taken in itself, of course, there is nothing about the central practice of Nichiren Shōshū (worshipping the Gohonzon and reciting Nam Myōhō Renge Kyō) which would prove harmful to modern students of Buddhism. Indeed, there are reasons for feeling that this type of Buddhism does satisfy certain spiritual needs and it would be invidious to suggest otherwise.

Needless to say, however, in the vastly different climate of modern World Buddhism, where open dialogue between traditions has become an established fact, the closed horizons of Nichiren Shōshū will make it seem something of a mixed blessing. On the credit side, it would be a pity to ignore the fruitful endeavours inspired by leading figures of the Soka Gakkai, Daisaku Ikeda's recent talks with Arnold Toynbee being a sterling example. Similarly, having met Dick Causton a few years back, I couldn't help feeling that he was a most kindly man with a definite sense of vision, perhaps badly needed in our time. But equally as true, it is difficult to ignore the dogmatic fog through which many rank and file Nichiren adherents seem to view their fellow Buddhists in schools besides their own. As it is, the cover blurb of Dick Causton's book is slightly less than truthful when suggesting that Nichiren Shōshū 'does not involve conforming to a specific lifestyle' and that 'its message is simply that those who commit themselves in faith, study and practice will achieve their goals'. Practically speaking, Nichiren Shōshū
does involve a specific lifestyle - that of exclusive devotion to the Go-honzon inscribed by Nichiren and the daily performance of gongyo (chanting Nam Myōhō Renge Kyō) - besides which, it seems, the rest of Buddhism can safely be placed in parenthesis and forgotten, a position hardly likely to foster 'the wider cause of human happiness, world peace and environmental harmony' otherwise said to be of interest to Nichiren followers.

Richard Hunn


This book is a line by line commentary by Geshe Kelsang Gyatso on a short text entitled `Training the Mind in Seven Points' by the twelfth-century Tibetan Geshe Chekhawa. The commentary is, as with his other books (see the review of his Heart of Wisdom: A Commentary to the Heart Sutra, by A. Saroop in BSR 5, 2, 1988, p.160 ff), a collaborative work by the author and his students at the Manjushri Institute in Ulverston, England.

Without the commentary, Geshe Chekhawa's `root' text (which is reproduced in translation together with the Tibetan text as an appendix) is more or less incomprehensible by itself, consisting as it does merely of a series of headings. However, it is revealed by the commentary to be an outline of a collection of meditation practices and good advice on the way to train the mind in developing the bodhicitta, the motivation of compassion and wisdom seeking enlightenment to benefit all sentient beings. Throughout the work there are constant references to Sāntideva's Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra (a previous publication by Geshe Kelsang Gyatso entitled Meaningful to Behold is a verse by verse commentary on this masterpiece) and, in fact, the 'Seven Points' of the root text and its commentary can be taken as an elucidation of or a sub-commentary on Sāntideva's work and a method of putting it into actual practice. The book stresses the practical application of mind training to cultivate compassion and extending it beyond formal meditation sessions into daily life as well as pointing out dangers to be overcome and avoided. Written in a clear and easy style, it makes it seem almost deceptively easy to practise, although in actuality very difficult to achieve.

One thing that may puzzle a general reader concerns several references to sentient beings as 'our kind mothers' (p.51), 'all these motherly beings. . .' (p.52), 'all these pitiful mothers. . .' (p.53) and even 'All mother sentient beings. . .' (p.63). Although nowhere explained in the book, these passages are evidently referring to the Buddha's teaching concerning the beginningless round of births and deaths and that it is difficult to find a being who has not at one time been one's mother (father, etc.). A note would have been useful here to obviate any confusion.

All in all, this is a useful and inspiring book for Buddhists generally and Mahāyānists in particular. Although originating from the Gelugpa tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, it propounds a teaching and practice not specific to any tradition, but useful to all who aspire to practise the Buddhist path.

John D. Ireland


There is a particular category of native Tibetan Buddhist works
known as grub-mtha' (siddhānta), inspired originally by similar Indian Buddhist texts, most notably those of Bhāvaviveka. From around the thirteenth century onwards, scholars of each of the main schools of Buddhism in Tibet produced such works, which basically comprise a survey and critique of the tenets and practices of the four main schools of Indian Buddhism as known to the Tibetans (the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra and Mādhyamika) with various sectarian sub-divisions. Some grub-mtha' texts also include a section on the non-Buddhist Indian schools. Naturally, the specific details of presentation differ according to which school of Tibetan Buddhism the author belongs, and indeed there are wide differences of opinion to be encountered, especially with regard to the tenets of the Mahāyāna schools. However, one characteristic of all these works is a clear attempt at ranking the various Indian schools of Buddhism into a sequential hierarchy. Similar systems of categorisation are well-known to students of Chinese Buddhism. These grub-mtha' texts are extremely important for the study of Tibetan Buddhism, but readers who make use of them must also be aware of the implicit suppositions and prejudices they contain. That is to say, they can tell us more about how Tibetans understood Buddhism as it had been transmitted to them, directly through the Indian pandits who visited Tibet and indirectly through the works of the great Indian Buddhist masters. Through various historical accidents, it happens that not all Buddhist viewpoints known or current in India were transmitted directly by their devotees to Tibet during the 'translation era' that began around the eighth century. For example, although virtually all the major works of the Yogācāra were translated into Tibetan at an early date, it seems that no scholars of Yogācāra were involved directly in the transmission of its teachings to Tibet. This had subsequent serious repercussions with regard to the manner in which Yogācāra is dealt with in the later grub-mtha' literature, where we actually find it presented from the biased standpoint of their main rivals, the Mādhyamikas. History has often shown us how unreliable it is to base one's opinions about one group upon the picture given of its by its enemies. The gradual rediscovery of various Gnostic texts has led to a radical re-evaluation of our understanding of the Gnostic sects that had hitherto only been based on the traditional Christian version. Therefore, in the case of Yogācāra Buddhism, it would perhaps be far better for students of Buddhism to disregard or relegate to the distant background what the Mādhyamikas and their Tibetan protegés have to say about Yogācāra theories and practice, and concentrate instead on studying what this school of Buddhism has to say for itself. Fortunately, there is now a small band of scholars who are beginning to do this in a satisfactory way.

Though not in itself intended as a criticism, this somewhat lengthy preamble is intended to serve as a warning to the unware who may encounter this book (or others) by Dr Hopkins which presents a translation and exposition of a portion of the Geluk-pa grub-mtha' tradition, based in this case upon Jang-gya's major work. Hopkins himself makes no secret of the fact that he is a staunch devotee of the Geluk-pa school and its views and is, of course, quite entitled to be such. Again, although no personal criticism is intended, it is unfortunate that the many influential books produced by Hopkins and his 'Virginia' team (despite his disclaimer to the contrary) may lead the uninitiated to the idea that the Geluk-pa view of Buddhism is the orthodox version of Tibetan Buddhism, notwithstanding the fact that it has been criticised severely by every other school of Buddhism in Tibet! Perhaps it is up to others to make these criticisms better known, although, in the interests of good
scholarship, it might not be entirely unreasonable to expect some hint of this in Hopkins' books.

In this instance, *Emptiness Yoga* is a translation of the chapter on Prāśāṅgika Mādhyamika from Jang-gya's (*lCang-skya*) well-known *grub-mtha'* work, accompanied by a lengthy commentary by Hopkins. Jang-gya was a great scholar and practitioner, born in Mongolia during the eighteenth century. He resided for much of his life in Peking and several times seems to have acted in the role of diplomat between the Tibetans and Chinese during this troubled period. Apart from his personal writings, one of Jang-gya's most outstanding achievements was supervision of a project to translate the Tibetan collection of commentarial works (*bsTan-'gyur*) into Mongolian, as well as the compilation of an extensive Tibetan-Mongolian bilingual glossary in preparation for this task. Jang-gya's *grub-mtha'* is considered to be one of his major works. It has sections of considerable interest as it contains information derived from Jang-gya's study of Chinese Buddhist schools, although these do not appear in the chapter presented here by Hopkins. This chapter, on the Prāśāṅgika Mādhyamika, is fairly straightforward in composition - it covers a definition of the Prāśāṅgika position, its views on the self, the purpose of reasoning, its application to the refutation of the self in phenomena and in persons and, finally, dependent-arising. Jang-gya presents his understanding of the Prāśāṅgika school with clarity, based naturally enough on Candrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa. The views (or rather, the purported lack of views) of Prāśāṅgikas are well enough known, so they do not really require further description here.

However, one must challenge Hopkins' assertion that the Prāśāṅgika position is universally considered to be 'the highest insight into the nature of phenomena' in Tibet. While it is true that all schools of Buddhism in Tibet pay respect to the theories of this school, albeit with somewhat different interpretations, Hopkins must surely be aware that for most Nying-ma-pa and Ka-gyud-pa scholars the Prāśāṅgika position is not final. According to these schools, this honour goes to that maintained by the *ghan-stong* (emptiness-of-other) position of the so-called 'Mahāmādhyamikas', based especially on the scriptures of the Third Turning of the Wheel and the Ratnagotravibhāga that teach the *tathātagatagarbha* and are considered to rectify those shortcomings in standard Mādhyamika (whether Svātantrika or Prāśāṅgika) which belong to the level of the Second Turning.

Moreover, stepping outside the Tibetan view in general, one is also tempted to raise somewhat 'heretical' questions about Candrakīrti himself. As mentioned above, it seems that historical accident has played no small part in the formation of the views of Tibetan Buddhism. It is noteworthy that Candrakīrti was not given much prominence during the early period of translation and transmission of Indian materials to Tibet. The keynote of this period was the Svātantrika-Yogācāra synthesis taught by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. It was only after the suppression of Buddhism and its second main period of dissemination that Candrakīrti began to be noticed, culminating in Tsong-kha-pa's exegesis of the Prāśāṅgika school based on his works. One also notes that none of Candrakīrti's works were translated into Chinese during the heyday of T'ang translation work when one might have expected them to have been, had Candrakīrti been as renowned as the later Tibetan view claims. Quite apart from this question of whether Candrakīrti's interpretation of Nāgārjuna's intentions are accurate, one rather has the feeling that Candrakīrti was virtually unknown in India. Perhaps this overstates the case, but are not the diatribes, trivialities and arrogance that are characteristic of Candrakīrti's...
work (as well as of other Mādhyamika writers) indicative of the impatience of a person who remained largely ignored or unknown? Indeed, it is quite instructive to compare the general tone of Mādhyamika polemics with that of Yogācāra works. The most striking thing is that there is no mention of sectarian Mādhyamika whatsoever in Yogācāra texts, even the later ones. As far as we can tell from extant texts, they were quite simply ignored! However, further detailed research will be needed before this can be proved definitely.

The first and largest section of Hopkins' book is devoted to his own commentary on Jang-gya, in which he attempts to render the doctrine of emptiness ‘down...to everyday relevance’. While not completely unsuccessful or uninformative, the sheer repetitiveness of the Prāsaṅgika view combined with the turgid English style that is Hopkins’ speciality is guaranteed to alienate most readers. While I am aware that there is an on-going debate among Western Tibetologists regarding translation theory, with one camp preferring literal translations of all Tibetan terms and the other relying on paraphrase and terminology lifted from recent Western science and philosophy, nevertheless the subject matter of books like these is certainly difficult enough without burdening the unfortunate reader still further with uninformative literalisms and a clumsy translation style. Would not the general reader be best served by a translation method that avoided both the extremes alluded to above and also gave some consideration to the aesthetics of an elegant style?

Stephen Hodge


They are indeed remarkable women interviewed in this book, and it makes interesting reading. The introduction starts with a quotation from R.H. Blyth which draws attention to the Buddha’s comment that admitting women to the Order would be the ruination of his system, and adding that Zen shows ‘not so much antipathy to sex or a perversion of it...but rather a sublime indifference to it’. The women involved in the groups here are far from indifferent to sex and could fairly be described as sexist in the extreme. They seek to react violently against men and the dominance of Buddhism by men throughout the entire history of the religion. They have set up female establishments, run by female teachers, and with supreme irony one of these calls its women ‘monks’. One wonders how many regular monks would be pleased to be known as ‘male nuns’!

With the strong emphasis on feminism, it is hardly surprising that lesbians are attracted. Ruth Denison lives with her husband between bouts of teaching, uses eccentric methods and attracts especially lesbians. One of her pupils says that she ‘wanted to be free of male judgements, male values, and male standards of linear thinking and intellectuality’. That seems to sum up the attitudes of these teachers and their groups, even if not all of them are, as is this pupil, politically active and declared lesbian.

Perhaps the most surprisingly frank admission is that made by Peggy Kennett, known as Rōshi Jiyu. Asked why she turned to Buddhism she said (p.186) ‘The ONLY reason I turned away from Christianity was because I felt incredibly deeply called to be a priest. And there was no way I could be a priest in Christianity’. Aside from the fact that some Christian
denominations do have women ministers, it is an extraordinary attitude that if one could not be a priest in one religion then that was sufficient and sole reason to join another religion, where one's personal ambitions might be fulfilled. Perhaps this has something to do with the fact that some of Peggy's followers have been seen on British television in the guise of Roman Catholic dignitaries, Roman collars included.

Not all these teachers are militants, though, and one, Maurine Stuart, says 'I'm not really into the women's movement in a militant kind of way. I don't feel that I have been put upon in my life. I feel that I have had every opportunity as a woman'. Joko Beck says of Dharma transmission 'it's no big deal'. She also replaces the Buddha image with 'an uncut stone that only vaguely suggests a Buddha figure'. However, she seems quite correct in her assessment that many zendōs 'are the very picture of the ego in action (people trying to be important, vying for position) and that many Zen teachers are heavily invested in their own power and authority and the role they play. In other words, what true practice teaches us to look at (i.e. the ego in action) is being blindly fostered'. Much more of what Joko Beck says is very pertinent, as when she advises that teachers are there to help, but that the realisation must come from ourselves. One feels she has a great deal more to tell us.

As Jacqueline Mandell points out, women are inferior in Theravāda, and in Burma take third place after the monks and laymen enter the hall and sit. The overall impression after reading this curious book is that when things have worked themselves out over the course of a long period, and when women no longer feel themselves, or can feel themselves, to be inferior to men in Buddhism (or anywhere else), their undoubted talents will be absorbed into the general Buddhist stream of teachers and followers. This present reaction is violent and

extreme and needs time to mellow it.  

Jack Austin


There is a certain discrepancy between the title and the subtitle of the book. We normally understand 'folklore' not just as an account of the life of the common people, but as the collective culture as reflected in specific achievements of a people such as folk poetry, song and dance, special customs, folk festivals, etc. It is the subtitle which more correctly expresses what the book is about.

It starts with a survey of the sources in the three language forms mentioned, which is quite comprehensive, although not very informative, giving sometimes only untranslated and unexplained original titles of the listed works. A brief chapter on the historical background and milieu of Middle Indo-Aryan literature starts with a few hints about the ancient Harappan civilisation of the Indus valley, touches on the conditions at the time of the Vedic civilisation and gives a short characterisation of the era which saw the birth of Buddhism and Jainism, stressing the greater freedom and access to religious quest which these two and other non-Brāhmanic movements opened for women and members of the lower castes. The author also points out that one of the reasons why Buddhism captured the heart of the people was that it 'recognised Tantra without reservation' with its 'most popular feature' of 'emancipation
(mukti) through enjoyment (bhukti), leading to the development of the Sahāja doctrine, prescribing ‘easy means of attaining the desired end’. Another reason was the development of five practices: hero-worship of the deified Buddha, story-telling (Jātakas and Avadānas), worship of the Buddha image, the cult of the perfections (pāramitās), impressively illustrated by some Jātaka stories, and the Bodhisattva doctrine giving hope of the attainment of bodhi even to the common man. Aśoka’s conversion, of course, helped enormously.

The chapter on economic life lists the occupations mentioned in the sources, means of transport, and trade routes and trade centres. Then follows a chapter on food, drink, dress and decoration; by the last-named the author means jewellery. The chapter on crime, punishment and vice is followed by one on popular beliefs and practices which suffers from the author’s self-imposed limitation not to use Sanskrit sources; listed are beliefs in supernatural beings, spells, charms, bad omens and auguries, some customs associated with weddings and marriage, including sexual behaviour, treatment of diseases and funerary customs. A very short chapter on popular cults, creeds and worship is succeeded by a chapter on sports, pastimes and amusements which mentions the Swing festival associated with Pārvatī and names one or two other festivals, but gives no particulars. The brief chapter on manners, morals and ethical ideas refers mostly to relations between the sexes, both in and outside marriage.

The last chapter, on ‘miscellaneous matters relating to folklore’, is the longest and contains more information than the preceding chapters put together but, as can be gathered from the chapter’s subtitle, it is unsystematic. It presents sayings and proverbs, information on dwellings and rural settlements, instruments and utensils, again diseases and treatments, the position of women and low-class people and other topics already partly mentioned in previous chapters, including the one on literature, and relates some episodes from folk tales. More stories and some verses are further given in the Appendix and the book ends with a select bibliography, a glossary and a short index.

The book does not break any new ground and does not offer anything new to the scholar, student or general reader. It may be useful to students to whom previously published works on the theme are not available. Enough interesting material comes across to stimulate further interest, despite the style of the book which is rather dry, and is sometimes telegraphic or just enumerative. It further suffers from a certain lack of concept or plan as well as from the fact that the materials presented are not always consistently arranged into chapters where they belong by their headings. The bibliography is good on original sources, but poor on secondary literature in the line of theme, listing only T.W. Rhys Davids’ *Buddhist India*. The interested reader would be well advised to turn to the following: T.W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India* (up to Kanishka), (repr. Delhi 1971). Popular, no bibliography or references, competent and reliable.

Michael Edwards, *Everyday Life in Early India* (London 1969) looks at everyday life and the background between third century BCE to eighth century CE. A popular book which does not give bibliography or references, but is readable, competent and reliable.

Jeannine Auboyer (one-time Curator of the Musée Guimet), *Daily Life in Ancient India*, from 200 BC to AD 700 (London 1965; French ed. 1962). Bibliography of original (Sanskrit and Pāli) and secondary sources, references.

B.C. Law, *India as described in early Texts of Buddhism and
Jainism. London 1941.

Ed. See also S.C. Banerji and C. Chakrabarty, Folklore in Ancient and Medieval India. Calcutta 1991. This may well be identical to the work reviewed above but with the addition of Sanskrit material.


A book published in Poland, mainly in the Polish language, mostly dealing with ancient Indian culture and philosophy - and, on top of that, not a new or original work, but merely a reprint of scholarly papers published before the Second World War - is almost doomed to slip unnoticed into oblivion upon its very birth. And yet it would be a great pity should this reprint of the 'Artykuły wybrane', or Selected Papers', of one of Poland's greatest Indologists, Stanisław Schayer (1899-1941), suffer this fate.

Marek Mejor, a young Polish Buddhologist, has taken the initiative to have some of Schayer's most important papers reprinted. He has also prepared a careful bibliography of Schayer's publications, 107 items in all. More than half the book is taken up with articles in the Polish language. The remainder is in English or German: 'Die Weltanschauung der Brähmana-Texte', a review of O.O. Rosenberg's Problemy buddijskoj filosofii, 'Über die Bedeutung des Wortes Upaniṣad',

'Indische Philosophie als Problem der Gegenwart', 'Feuer und Brennstoff', 'Studien zur indischen Logik' (in two parts), 'Über die Methode der Nyāya-Forschung', 'Kamalāśīla's Kritik des Pudgalavāda', 'Pre-Aryan Elements in Indian Buddhism', 'Precanonical Buddhism', 'A note on the old Russian Variant of the Purushasūkta', 'Notes and Queries on Buddhism', 'Über den Somatismus der indischen Psychologie', 'New Contributions to the Problem of Pre-Hinayānistic Buddhism', and finally, five reviews.

Schayer was not just a good Indologist and Buddhologist, but also a good philosopher. Whilst reading this volume (most of which I read years ago), I found that a majority of his papers on Indian ways of thinking are still replete with perceptive and stimulating observations. Consider, for instance, Schayer's view on the value of the study of Indian philosophy (op. rec., p.373): 'Ihren Hauptwert für unsere Gegenwart erblicke ich darin, dass das Studium der indischen Gedanken zu einer Ῥήμα μάνα στομία werden kann, dass es uns zwingt, die überkommenen Anschauungen einer allseitigen Revision zu unterziehen, die Einseitigkeiten der abendländischen Tradition auf dem Gebiet des Erkennens aufzudecken, und endlich: dass es uns vor neue Probleme stellt und das geistige Leben des Abendlandes um neue Möglichkeiten bereichert. Und diese Aufgabe kann erfüllt werden, wofern es uns gelingt, überall das Eigenartige und das Unvergleichbare des indischen Denkens zu erfassen, die entscheidende Antithese zwischen Orient und Okzident in der ganzen Fülle, im ganzen Reichtum ihrer Problematik zu begreifen.'

I can imagine that the most immediate effect of this reprint would be a revival of the old discussion about the concept of 'Precanonical Buddhism' (compare the remarks in Conze's Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, p.10).
Among the papers in the Polish language, as far as I can judge, the one on anīyatā (pp.230-312) is the most important. A translation into English would be most welcome. Likewise, it is sincerely to be hoped that Marek Mejor will be able to provide us with further similar reprints of the opera minora not just of Schayer but also of Régamey, Kunst and Jaworski.

Chr. Lindtner


The author here discusses ‘The Beginnings of Systematic Epistemology and Logic’ (pp.1-44), ‘Buddhist Epistemology and Logic before Dharmakīrti’ (pp.45-91) and ‘Dharmakīrti’s Logic’ (pp.93-114). The fourth and final chapter (pp.115-80) deals with ‘The Pramāṇa-definitions of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of PV, 1-7’, i.e. Pramāṇavārtika II. 1-7.

The book is a fairly elementary introduction to pramāṇa, ‘the most basic notion of old Indian epistemology’ according to Dr van Bijlert. It is centred upon Dharmakīrti’s definition of pramāṇa, and the definitions and discussions before the time of Dharmakīrti. The author takes a very traditional approach to the understanding of Dharmakīrti’s epistemology. On the whole this is a useful and simple book that can be recommended to beginners in the field, whilst a convenient feature of it is the inclusion of Devendrabuddhi’s commentary to PV.

However, with his traditional view of Dharmakīrti, the author fails to understand Buddhist logic and epistemology in their proper setting. Let me briefly mention a few points here. The translation of svalakṣaṇa as ‘uniqueness’ or ‘particular’ is misleading. Its denotation is more epistemological, or psychological, than ontological. It is anything experienced as evident or obvious, needing no further explanation. For Dignāga’s view on yoga we cannot ‘turn to his Yogāvatāra’, since this is actually the work of Dharmendra - see my remarks in WZKS XXVI (1982). Often van Bijlert and others translate pramāṇa as ‘a means of valid cognition’, but for Dharmakīrti the term simply indicates valid cognition. This is his and Dignāga’s innovation, one that is determined by the Yogācāra system. Nor is the translation of pramāṇabhūta, said of the Buddha, ‘. . . who is a means of valid cognition’, or ‘der Erkenntnismittel ist’ (Vetter), etc., very happy. We would then, logically, want to ask: Is he prayakṣa or anumāṇa - or both? At the end of a compound -bhūta usually means ‘serves as’, or the like. If the term were to be understood to the effect that the Buddha had become, or was, pramāṇa, we would expect pramāṇībhūta, not pramāṇabhūta. In my opinion Dignāga had two things in mind when he chose to use this term. In a relative sense he uses it meaning ‘authoritative’, as, e.g., Patañjali does in the Mahābhāṣya I, p.39: pramāṇabhūta ācāryo . . . In an absolute sense, on the other hand, the term refers to the dharmakīya of the Buddha, traditionally considered to be pure cognition.

PV II. 1-7 is translated by van Bijlert in the light of Dharmakīrti himself and Devendrabuddhi. As far as it goes it is fine, but there are other ways of understanding this set of verses. In a paper presented at the Dharmakīrti Conference in Vienna (June 1989) I tried to argue that these verses are deliberately ambiguous, i.e. they can and should be read in more than one way. Apart from this, as said, my main objections to van Bijlert’s book is that it fails to recognise the Yogācāra background to Dharmakīrti’s philosophy. On this
issue the reader may wish to refer to my paper published in WZKS XXVIII (1984).

Chr. Lindner

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