ON THE VIBHAJJAVĀDINS
The Mahiṃsāsaka, Dhammaguttaka, Kassapiya and Tambapaṇṇiya branches of the ancient Theriyas

L. S. COUSINS

Summary

i. The first part of this article surveys the extant Pali references to the Vibhajjavada and to Vibhajjavādin(s), references which show clearly that the Pali pīkā writers know two distinct but related senses of the word vibhajjavādin. Firstly, it is an epithet for the Buddha, derived from passages in the Sutta-piṭaka, a usage which is found occasionally down to modern times. In another sense, it is a name of the followers of the Buddha and specifically for members of their own school which they believed to most truly represent the undistorted teaching of the founder. This second sense is first found in a late canonical passage and in the Dīpavamsa, but continues to be used sporadically down to the thirteenth century, if not later.

ii. Inscriptional evidence confirms that the Vibhajjavādins were part of the Theriya tradition and links them to the Mahāvihāravāsins and probably to the ‘Tambapaṇṇakas’.

iii. The relevant doxographic literature on the different schools shows how the different schools are related to one another.

iv. The tradition of the missionary activities connected with the early Vibhajjavādins is re-examined and it is suggested that we should

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2 On the Buddhist schools in general, see: Bareau 1955; Lamotte 1958; Shastri 957/58; Wang 1994.
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take that much more literally than has been the case in the light of the information we now have on the part played by Dhammagutta(ka)/Dharmaguptakas in the North-West.

Part One

Introduction

In the two previous articles\(^3\) in this sequence concerning the ancient Buddhist schools I have referred to the Vibhajjavādins/Vibhajyavādins without spelling out in full why and how I use the term. In this article I hope to remedy that omission and show that it is the best, or at least the most practical, name for a major group among the ancient Theravādins/\(^8\)Sthaviravādins. Adherents of this approach did not belong to either of the two groupings which we can identify: (1) those adopting the system of sarvan asti which eventually gave rise to the Sarvāstivāda school of Abhidharma and to more or less associated Vinaya systems; and (2) those espousing the concept of the puggala which was a major component of the systematic thought of another group of the later schools.

Vibhajjavādin is the historically correct term for a viewpoint which was adopted by the common ancestors of four of the classical schools of the early centuries CE: the Dhammaguttikas, located mainly in the North-West of the Indian subcontinent but spreading along the Central Asian trade routes; the Kassapiyas, probably located in the same area; the Mahimsāsakas, there and in parts of mainland India; and the Tambapanniyas, strongly established in Ceylon but active also in the Andhra region and other parts of South India and at some point spreading across South-East Asia. The name Vibhajjavādin remains current during all or most of the first half of the first millennium CE, but subsequently it gradually falls into disuse; eventually it is doubtful how far ordinary follow-

\(^3\) Cousins 1991; Cousins 1995.
Cousins – On the Vibhajjavādins

ers of the separate schools would still have identified themselves as Vibhajjavādin.

In what follows I present the evidence for this understanding both of the term itself and of the history of these schools.

*The origins of the name Vibhajjavādin*

It has long been recognized that the ultimate origin of the word vi-

bajja-vāda lies in the Subha-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (M II 196ff.) where the Buddha twice declares himself to be a vibhajja-
vāda on the question of the relative advantages of the household life and that of the renunciant, not an ek’-amsa-vāda as regards this⁴. The discourse itself makes it clear that this means that it is not a question of one lifestyle being unequivocally better, but rather that it depends on the way in which that lifestyle is followed⁵. This is a similar notion to that found in the Vajjīyamāhita-
sutta of the Anguttara-nikāya (A V 189f.) in which the gaha-pati Vajjīyamāhita denies that the Buddha one-sidedly (ek’-amsena) criticizes all practitioners of asceticism (tapas), asserting rather that he is a vibhajja-vāda, not an ek’-amsa-vāda in this matter⁶.

In these passages the Buddha is a vibhajja-vāda in the sense that he is ‘one who differentiates’ or responds critically. We should note that he is never simply described as a vibhajja-vāda or vibha-

jjā-vādin; it is always a question of being one who responds criti-
cally in a particular matter, as indicated by the pronoun ettha. In fact, elsewhere and on other issues, the Buddha’s position is repre-
sented as unequivocal; so for example he does not take a critical position on the question as to whether or not bad conduct of body,

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⁴ On the Vibhajjavādins see: La Vallée Poussin 1924, Vol I pp. LV–LVIII =
Karunadasa 2000.

⁵ Different answers to the question ‘kim-vādi?’ applied to the Buddha are given elsewhere. At A I 62, the answer is that he is both a kiriya-vādin and an a-kiriya-

vādin, i.e. effectively a vibhajja-vādin (Mp glosses: kim-laddhiko); cf. M I 108f.;
III 138f.; S II 35; 35; 38; 41; III 6f.; Vin I 40f.

⁶ Some MSS read vibhajja-vādi and ek’-amsa-vādi.
speech and mind should be performed. His position is unqualified: they should not be performed. Similarly the opposite three types of good conduct unequivocally should be performed\(^7\).

Although these are the only occurrences of the word *vibhajjavāda* in the Suttanta-piṭaka\(^8\), they are closely related to the slightly more frequent list of the four types of questions (*pañhā*-vyā-karana). *Ek’-amsa-vyākaranīya* and *vibhajja-vyākaranīya* are precisely two of the four ways in which a question can be correctly answered\(^9\). It should be emphasized that the Buddha could not have been referred to as a Vibhajjavādin on the basis of the canonical sources alone. (Arguably, there would in fact be some support in the *Nikāyas* for calling him an *ekamsa-vādin*. It is true that this exact term is not found, but in the *Poṭṭhapāda-sutta* (D I 191) we find the Buddha declaring that he has made known *ekānsikā* teachings, namely the Four Noble Truths.) The adoption of the epithet *vibhajja-vādin* actually requires some additional stimulus. We find that in the arising of a specific school named Vibhajjavādins.

**The earlier Pali sources**

1. The *Cullavagga* (Vin II 72)

Theoretically, the oldest surviving occurrence of Vibhajjavāda or Vibhajjavādin as the name of a Buddhist school is found at the end of the *uddāna* to a section of the *Cullavagga*. I.B. Horner translates the passage in question as:

The recitation is for the maintenance of true Dhamma among the teachers of the Vibhajja doctrines, and (*sic*)

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7 A I 57f.; cp. A IV 143; 280.
8 But cf. A I 225: “*Sabham nu kho, Ānanda, sīla-bbatam jīvitam brahma-cariyam upaṭṭhāna-sārem sa-phalan ti?* ‘Na khv ethha, bhante, ek’-ānsenā ti.” *Tena h’ Ānanda, vibhajjasū ti.*”
9 D III 329; M III 208; A I 197; II 46; cf. Mil 144f.; Peṭ 83; 95; 156; 165; 175; 180; 189; 230.
who, dwellers in the Mahāvihāra, illuminate Tambapannidīpa. This conclusion must be an addition to the text, made either in Ceylon or, less likely, in some area of the mainland under Sinhalese Buddhist influence. I would be inclined to render it simply:

This is the recitation for the preservation of the saddhamma of the Mahāvihāravāsin teachers who are Vibhajjavādins and the bringers of faith to the island of Ceylon.

Since there is no commentary on these two lines, there is no way of being sure of the date, but it seems unlikely to be much after Buddhaghosa at the latest and it could be a little earlier. So it is not in fact quite certain that this mention is earlier than the next.

We should note in passing that the mention of dipa may be either to distinguish the name of the whole island from that of similarly named districts in Ceylon and elsewhere or to distinguish references to the Tambapāṇṇi school from references to the island.

2. The Dipavamsa

Three times the Dipavamsa refers to bhikkhus or bhikkhunīs who are masters of the Vinaya of the Vibhajjavāda. Two of the references are at the conclusion of a lineage of nuns, while the third

10 BD V p. 95. The text in Oldenberg’s edition reads:

acariyānaṃ vibhajja-padānaṃ Tambapannidīpa-pasādakānaṃ Mahāvihāra-vāsīnaṃ vācana sad-dhamma-ṭṭhityā ti.

It should be noted that it is based only upon his two Burmese MSS, as the single Sinhalese MS available to him omitted the uddānas. Oldenberg hesitantly suggests the reading Vibhajja-vādānaṃ for the text’s -padānaṃ and IBH cites this reading from a Sinhalese edition. No 1956 cites Vibhajja-vādīnaṃ from a Sinhalese edition. So C 1977. An old MS of the Cullavagga is preserved in Ceylon: Fernando 1982.

11 Dip XVIII 41; 44: (nuns) vibhajja-vādī-vinaya-dharā and XVIII 1: (monks) vibhajja-vādā vinaya. In the latter case Vibhajja-vādā may mean: ‘followers of the Vibhajjavāda’, but note the variant reading vibhajja-vādi in one MS. It seems likely that the later unfamiliarity of the expression Vibhajjavādin Vinaya has led to errors.
probably originally concluded a lineage of monks. Since the specific context concerns nuns ordained on the island of Ceylon, the expression can only refer to an ancestor of the Pali Vinaya which I take to be the Vinaya as it was before the separation of the Ceylon school from some of its mainland counterparts.

3. The Visuddhimagga and the Abhidhamma Commentary
In a passage which occurs in both the Visuddhimagga and in the Abhidhamma Commentary we are told that one who comments [on *paticcasamuppada*] should do so only after joining the circle of the Vibhajjavādin(s) (Vibhajja-vādi-mandalam otarīvā), without rejecting the teachers, neither departing from his own *samaya* nor giving rise to another *samaya*. In the conclusion to the Visuddhimagga Buddhaghosa says that he wrote it at the request of Samghapāla, ‘a member of the lineage of the Mahāvihāravāsins, illustrious Theriyas (i.e. followers of Theravāda), best of Vibhajja-vādins’. We shall return to this passage later. Likewise, at the conclusion of the Abhidhamma Commentary the author declares he made that commentary ‘without departing from the doctrine of the teachers who are pupils of the Vibhajja-vādin(s)’.

Earlier in the same commentary (Kv-a 180), while discussing the *Suṇātā-kathā* of the Kathavatthu, it is suggested that a statement in Kv is made in order to establish the defect in an uncritical position (avibhajja-vādi-vāde). The point here is that the view that *suṇātā* is included in the fourth aggregate (presumably as a *cittaviprayukta-samskāra*) is attributed, correctly or not, to the Andhakas, defined by the Abhidhamma Commentary itself as a col-

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12 See Oldenberg 1879, p. 204n.
13 Vism 522; Vibh-a 130.
14 *... yā aṭṭha-kathā mayā tassa ācariyānaṁ vādaṁ avihāya Vibhajja-vādi-sissānaṁ.*
Cousins – On the Vibhajjavādins

lective name for four later South Indian Mahāsamghika schools. This is explained as the result of a failure to differentiate (avibha-
 jitvā): emptiness which may, from one point of view, be consid-
ered as included in the fourth aggregate must be distinguished from
emptiness as referring to nibbāna (which is not included in the ag-
gregates). Already we see the process well underway which leads
to the term Vibhajjavādin losing its specific reference to a group
of schools and becoming instead a term for orthodoxy. To see more
clearly how this occurs, we need to turn to another portion of the
Abhidhamma Commentary.

Moggalliputta Tissa and the Third Saṅgha

At Kv-a 7 we find what may in fact be the oldest account of the so-
called Third Council. Of course, the version in the Dīpavamsa
which dates from the end of the reign of Mahāsena or soon thereaf-
ter, i.e. c. 300 CE, is formally earlier. But it is clear that the
Dīpavamsa is assembling information from several sources and
one of those sources must be the old (probably Sinhala) commen-
tary to the Kathāvatthu. Although the extant Pali Kv-a cites the
Dīpavamsa, it is noticeable that it does not base its account of the
origin of the Kathāvatthu on the Dīpavamsa, but must rather be
following its own main source. So it preserves in part an earlier
version.

The Abhidhamma Commentary knows only of events occurring in
the Asokarāma. There is no suggestion of any kind of Council af-
fecting all Buddhist schools. The problem is caused by an influx of
outsiders, attracted by the ease of obtaining almsfood in the popular
and expanding Buddhist Saṅgha. These are identified, given

16 Following the chronology adopted here. By Geiger’s chronology, which re-
jects the Cūlavamsa account of the reigns of the kings following Mahāsena, that
would be c. 350 CE.

17 Frauwallner 1994. Frauwallner, following Geiger, accepts on the rather late
evidence of Mhv-t that Mhv’s source for this is the old Vinaya Commentary.
Even if correct, this would merely mean that it had already been imported into
the old Vinaya Commentary from Abhidhamma commentaries of some kind.
white clothing and expelled from the monastery. Given what we are told in Asoka’s Schism Edict, we may assume that a similar process of purification was carried out by Asoka’s ministers in monastic centres across his realm, but the King himself would naturally have participated only in the capital city. If there were different Buddhist fraternities (nikāya) at this time, and at least the difference between the Vinaya traditions of Mahāsamghika and Theravāda/Theriyā is likely to be earlier than this date, then the king would have taken no account of that. After the expulsion of outsiders other monks are summoned18 and asked what was the teaching (kim-vādi?) of the Buddha. They reply that he was a Vibhajjavādin and this is confirmed by Moggaliputta Tissa. The king accepts this and departs. It is only at this point that Kv-a refers to the composition of the Kathāvatthu and the third communal recitation (sangīti).

The important thing to note here is that this story gains its effectiveness precisely from the double meaning of the word Vibhajjavādin. If I am right about this, it can only have been composed at a time when the word was already known as the name of a school. The whole point of the story is that no one can deny that the Buddha was a vibhajja-vādin, since he is at least sometimes so portrayed in the canonical texts. Nor of course is it surprising if a leading figure of the Vibhajjavādin school asserts that he was a Vibhajjavādin. None of this gives us any reason to suppose that the Buddha would have been referred to in the third person as a vibha-jja-vādin prior to the adoption of the word as the name of a school.

**Vibhajjavādin in later Pali sources**

It is clear that the original basis for the adoption of the name Vibhajjavādin (see below) becomes to a large extent forgotten, especially in later Pali sources. Once the original disputes in a specific context had ceased to be of current interest, then attention would

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18 This may be intended to indicate the summoning of monks from affiliated monasteries i.e. from those belonging to the same nikāya.
naturally be drawn to the usage of *vibhajja-vāda* in the canonical texts and its explanation would inevitably be based upon that. Since that explanation is likely to have always been known and could even have been part of the reason for the adoption of the word as the name of a school in the first place, there would be little to stand in the way of that kind of development. That said, it must be remembered that the tradition never entirely forgot that this was one name for itself, alongside various others. It suffices to quote Kassapa, a thirteenth century Pali writer in the Tamil country:

For this Vibhajjavāda is called the Doctrine of the Elders (Theravāda) because it was guarded and handed down without adulteration by such Elders as Mahākassapa (i.e. in the first two communal recitations).\(^{19}\)

The Vinaya ṭīkā of Vajirabuddhi (Vjb), commenting on the story of Moggaliputta Tissa, explains that [the Buddha] is the Vibhajjavādin because he speaks after having made distinctions and illustrates the point by referring to the very beginning of the Canon where the Buddha responds to a series of criticisms by the brahmīn Vṛṇa. On each occasion the Buddha indicates that there is one way in which the criticism is valid, even although that is not what the brahmīn is referring to. So for example, accused of being an annihilationist, the Buddha replies that there is one way in which this is correct—he does speak of the annihilation of unskilful dhammas. Vjb in fact goes on to expand the point by showing that there are occasions when the Buddha says things which, taken uncritically, would seem to espouse various of the types of wrong view. One example of Vajirabuddhi’s exegesis will suffice. The Abhidhamma couplet: ‘conditioned dhammas, unconditioned (ap-

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paccayā) dhammas’ could be taken as espousing the partial eterna-

lism (ekacca-sassatika) view20.

A full exegetical explanation of the term Vibhajja-vādi-mandala
is presented in the Mūlaṭīkā and commented on by the Anuṭikā21.
Referring to the evidence of Moggaliputta Tissa’s reply to the Em-
peror Asoka, it states that the disciples of the Perfectly Awakened
One are Vibhajjavādins because they speak after having made dis-
tinctions. So Vibhajja-vādi-mandala is the circle i.e. the commu-
nity (sāmāha) of the Vibhajjavādins. An alternative explanation of
Vibhajja-vādi-mandala as the circle, i.e. the entourage (parīsā), of
the Vibhajjavādin (= the Buddha) is also given. This is closely
linked to the immediately following emphasis on not going outside
the standpoint of one’s own school (saka-samaya) and not intro-
ducing that of another school. The Mūlaṭīkā and Anuṭikā give
various examples which refer directly to the Sarvāstivādin Abhid-
harma.

Part Two

The inscriptive evidence

Inscriptional evidence for the use of the term Vibhajjavādin is lim-
ited but crucial. In 1955–56, during the excavation of a monastic
site at Nāgārjunakoṇḍa, a stone slab was discovered near the en-

20 Vjh 27f. (to Sp I 61); cf. Sp-ṭ (to Sp I 61): Vibhjitvā vadatī tī Vibhajja-vādi,
“atti khy eso brāhmaṇa pariṣṭo” tī ādinā (Vih III 2tf.). Api ca sossata-vādi ca Bhaṇγavā: “atti, bhikkhave, ajātām abhātām ... anākhatan” (It 37; cf. Ud
80) tī ādi vacanato; ekacca-sassatiko ca: “sappaccayā dhammā, appaccayā
dhammā” tī (Dh p. 2) vacanato. Vajiprabuddhi goes on to cite a number of
passages in which the Buddha can be taken as espousing the following wrong
views: antānākta; amaravikkhepi-pakkha; adhicca-samuppannika-pakkha;
sañña-vāḍādi; uccheda-vāḍa; dīṭṭha-dhamma-nibbāna-vāḍa.

21 See Appendix A for the text and translation of these passages. The Buddha is
referred to as the Vibhajjavādin in a list of epithets at: Sadd I 74. Vibhajjavāda is
mentioned at: Sv-ṭṭ I 200; 454; Ps-ṭṭ II (B′) 233.
Cousins – On the Vibhajjavādins

trance to the stūpa\textsuperscript{22}. The slab contained a third century CE inscription (underneath an incised pair of feet with a bodhi tree in railing to one side), referring to ācarīyanaṃ Theriyānam Vibhajjavādānaṃ Kasmira-Gandhāra-Yavana-Vanavāsa-Tambapāṃpinīdipa-pasādakanaṃ Mahāvihāra-vāsināṃ, i.e. ‘to the Theriya teachers\textsuperscript{23}, followers of the Vibhajjavāda, bringers of faith\textsuperscript{24} to the Kashmir, Gandhāra, Bactrian and Vanavāsa peoples and to the island of Ceylon, dwellers in the Mahāvihāra’. It is clear that the epithets are moving from the general to the particular—first the Theravādin/ Sthaviravādin\textsuperscript{25} half of the Saṅgha, then the Vibhajjavādīn section of the Theravādins, then mention of a particularly

\textsuperscript{22} Sircar and Lahiri 1960. According to Sircar and Lahiri, the characters are similar to those of epigraphs of the reign of the Ikṣvāku king Virapuruṣadatta i.e. middle of the third century.

\textsuperscript{23} For Theriya as equivalent to Theravāda-Theravādin, see the concluding verses to Vism; Pj I 78 (cf. 98); Mhv III 40; V 1; and a number of times in the Cūlavamsa: XXXVIII 45; XL I 17; XLII 17; XLIII 30f.; XLVIII 68; LI 16; 61. And for Therivāya—vāya: XLI I 8; XLIV 8; 80; XLVI 8. Also, the introduction to Vin-vn-pṭ refers to Buddhadatta as Theriya-vamsa-dīpa and Sv-pṭ III 372 (vl.) has: cattu-mahānīkāyēsu theriyēna ti attho ‘the meaning is: the Theriya among the four chief nikāyas’.

\textsuperscript{24} Skilling 1993, p. 168 n.3 cites Dip VIII and Mhv XII 43. Other examples of this usage of pasād- (and pasād-) are Sp I 65ff.; Ap I v. 437 (p. 36) etc.; Mil 14; 88 etc. and many related canonical passages. It does not refer to an initial conversion, but to any arousing of faith. See Vism 214; pāṇḍita-vedanyato parikkhaka-jana-ppasādakan ti sātham, saddheyyato lokīya-jana-ppasādakan ti sahayatjanām and the comment in Vism-māṭ, Walters renders it: ‘pleasers of Sri Lanka’. I do not know why he says that ‘the term itself fell into utter disuse’. See: Walters 1992, p. 316. It and related expressions are found in various later texts, e.g. Upās 138; Sp-t (B’ ) I 332, etc.

\textsuperscript{25} Peter Skilling (Skilling 1993 p. 154 n.2) states that the term Sthaviravādin is not evidenced in the Sanskrit sources which generally use (Ārya) Sthavirā(-nikāya) i.e. Thera, but he cites BHSD for the only attested forms: Sthāvira- and Sthāvīrya-. Given the interchangability of Theriya and Theravāda in the Pali, however, it seems likely that this would be a subsequent development. In general, a vṛddhi formation such as Sthāvira would be considered better style at a later date.

141
noteworthy feature of the Vibhajjavādins and finally the name of the particular branch of the Vibhajjavādins to which they belong.

I take it that ‘Mahāvihāravāsin’ here refers to the Mahāvihāravāsins as the specific school centred on the Mahāvihāra at Anurādhapura. Although there are other mahāvihāras, all references to Mahāvihāravāsins as such designate the school of the Great Monastery in Anurādhapura and that must be so here, given that the context is specifically nikāya allegiance.

This inscription is closely related to another Nāgārjunakonda inscription of similar date, an inscription which states that the female lay disciple (uvāsikā) Bodhisiri constructed a cetiya hall in the Cūla-Dhammagiri-vihāra (= Cūla-Dhammagiri-vihāra) in the eastern part of Vijayapura at Siri-pavata (Śrī-parvata), dedicated to certain ācarīyas (sic)\(^{26}\). Some characters which probably specify more about these teachers are missing, but we are then told that they brought faith to the island of Ceylon and to eleven other places, including the three mentioned in the inscription discussed above. Then we learn that these teachers are Theriyānam Tambapa\(<m>\)nakānam, i.e. Theravādins of the Tambapannaṇaka school. Bodhisiri mentions a previous donation at a Sinhalese monastery (Sīhala-vihāra); so the presence of Sinhalese monks in Andhra in the reign of Māthariputa (or earlier) cannot be disputed. Indeed, links with this region are clear enough from Pali literature, since an Andhakā-ṭṭhakathā on the Vinaya was used by the author of the Vinaya Commentary and some knowledge was available on the views of the Andhakas\(^ {27}\). The reference to a ‘Sinhalese mon-

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\(^{26}\) EI XX 22f.

\(^{27}\) This has been much discussed and variously considered to have been the work of Theravādins living in the Andhra country or a commentary in the Andhra language. Either of these is possible. A third suggestion that it could be a commentary of the Andhaka school is highly unlikely, since we know of the term ‘Andhaka’ only as a collective designation in Kv-a for a group of schools. See Karunaratne 1985 for an inscription which may possibly belong to the reign of Kaniṭṭha Tissa [167–186 CE] and may refer to a donation by this king (Maḷa-
Cousins – On the Vibhajjavādins

astery’, presumably the one where the shorter inscription is located, would seem to imply that in the present case the Tambapanṇakas are not Sinhalese. This may be why they do not refer to themselves as Mahāvihāravāsins and probably means that the Tambapanṇakas (although originally deriving from Ceylon) had been established in this area for some time.

A further inscription from Amarāvatī mentions an elder who is Theriyaṇa Mahāvinayadharasa “a great Vinaya reciter of the Theriyas”28. Moreover, there are a number of inscriptions which mention Theras in a manner which could be intended to refer to the Theriya school—there is no way of being quite sure in a given case, although there can be little doubt that Theriyas are meant in some instances29.

It is likely that the name Tambapanniya originally referred simply to monks living in the island of Taprobane. Later, around the second or third centuries CE, when missionaries went out from Ceylon to South India (and perhaps South-East Asia) they would naturally be referred to as Tambapanniya. Then by extension the name Tambapanniya would be adopted by their disciples and so a monastic fraternity known by that name would come into being on the mainland30. Later this name (like Vibhajjavādin) tended to go

28 A seal from Raigat is according to Agrawala evidence of the presence of “a monastery of the Sthaviravādī bhikshus”: JNSI XXIII p. 409 (Agrawala); Thaplyal 1972 p. 214 & pl. XXIII,2.
29 e.g. an inscription at Guntupalle JESI V (1978) p. 51 (Sarma) (Therasa bhayaṭā Nādasa aṭevāṣika Sānādasa dānam Sovā[m]) and some of the inscriptions at Kanheri: JESI V (1978) 110ff. (S. Gokhale).
30 For a more detailed discussion of the name Tambapanniya in literary and epigraphic sources, see my unpublished paper: “Tambapanniya and Tāmraśātīya”. The combined information makes it clear that the Tambapanniyas were Theriyas (i.e. Theravādins), Vibhajjavādins and some of them were Mahāvihāravāsins. *Vasumitra does not know the Tambapanniya either under that name or under a name corresponding to Tāmraśātīya. This may be because it
out of use and was gradually replaced by Theriya and Theravādin (no longer used by most other non-Mahāsāṃghika schools) or by Mahāvihāravāsin.

So far, the Pali evidence by itself suggests that the Ceylon school knew that the name ‘Vibhajjavādin’ referred to the tradition to which it belonged. Although by itself this is perhaps not decisive, when the epigraphic evidence from the mainland is compared with the textual passages, it is conclusive. We have already seen the inscription from Nāgarjunakoṇḍa. That inscription already demonstrates that the Mahāvihāravāsins were Theriyas and Vibhajjavādins. It can be compared directly with the conclusion to Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga cited above.

The inscription (in a form of Middle Indian relatively close to Pali) reads:

\[ \text{sidhaṃ ācariyanaṃ theriyaṇaṃ vibhajavādānaṃ kasmiragandhāra-} \]
\[ \text{yavanavanavāsaṭambapāṇṇadipapasādakanaṃ} \]
\[ \text{mahāvihāravāśinaṃ navagasathusanaathavyajanavinichhayavisaradanaṃ ariyavasa-} \]
\[ \text{pavenidharanaṃ} \]
\[ \text{vihāre bhagavato pādasamghādānīn̄patiṭhapito sa-} \]
\[ \text{vasatānāṃ hitasukhatanaṅya} \]

In the later standard Pali orthography:

\[ \text{Siddham! Ācariyānaṃ Thēriyānaṃ Vibhajjā-vādānaṃ Kasmira-} \]
\[ \text{Gandhāra-Yavana-Vanavāsa-Tambāpaṇṇi-dipa-pasādakānaṃ Mahā-} \]
\[ \text{vihāravāsīnaṃ navanga} \]
\[ \text{Satthu-sāsana-attha-vyañjana-vinicchaya-} \]
\[ \text{visārādānaṃ ariyavamsa-pavēṇ-dhārānaṃ vihare Bhagavato pādasamghājñīnī patiṭhāpitā sabbasattānaṃ hita-sukha} \]
\[ \text{ti.} \]

had not yet been realized in Kashmir or neighbouring parts that the Ceylon school had become a separate branch.

31 This has to be fem. instr. sing. of athanā < arthanā. Similar expressions are found in other epigraph(s). As is common with inscriptions of this period, the writing of long vowels is erratic.

32 or navaka-.
“Success! Decorative slabs\textsuperscript{33} of the feet of the Lord have been estab-
lished with a request for the welfare and happiness of all beings in the
monastery of the teachers of the \textit{Theriya} school, the \textbf{Vibhajjavādās}
who were bringers of faith to Kashmir, Gandhāra, Bactria, Vanavāsa
and the island of Ceylon, the \textbf{Mahāvihāravāsins} who are skilled in
defining both the letter and the spirit of the ninefold teaching of the
Master and keepers of the line [of practice] of the four \textit{ariya-vaṃsa}.\textsuperscript{34}

Here is the conclusion to the \textit{Visuddhimagga} (Vism 711f.):

\begin{multline}
\textit{Vibhajja-vādi-setthānaṁ Therīyānaṁ yasassinaṁ,}
\textit{Mahāvihāra-vāsinaṁ vaṃsa-jassa vibhāvino,}
Bhadanta-Saṅghapālassa suci-sallekha-vuttino,
Vinayācāra-yuttaśa, yuttassa paṭipattiyaṁ,
khanti-soracca-mettādi-guna-bhūsita-cetaso,
ajjhanaṁ gahetvāna, karontena imaṁ mayā
saddhamma-ṭhiti-kāmena, yo patto puṇṇa-saṅcayo
ussa tejena sabbe pi sukham edhantu pāṇino.
\end{multline}

“After being requested [to write the \textit{Visuddhimagga}] by the insightful
Venerable Saṃghapāḷa, of pure and simple lifestyle, skilled in behav-
iour according to \textit{Vinaya}, dedicated to practice, his mind adorned with
such qualities as endurance, gentleness and loving-kindness, a \textbf{member of the lineage of the Mahāvihāravāsins}, illustrious \textbf{Theriya},
\textbf{best of Vibhajjavādins}, I did this, desiring that the \textit{saddhamma}
should last—by the power of the heap of \textit{puṇṇa} I have obtained, may
all living beings gain happiness.”

I have highlighted the close similarity of phrasing in the two
sources by bold-facing the parallel terms. There seems no doubt
that for Buddhaghosa and for the author of this inscription in the
third century CE the Mahāvihāravāsins were Vibhajjavādins. This

\textsuperscript{33} According to Sircar, the intended reading is either \textit{saṅghādā nipatiṭhipiṁ} or
\textit{saṅghādā nipatiṭhipiṁ}.

\textsuperscript{34} Mhv XXXVI 38 confirms emphasis on this practice in Ceylon in the reign of
Voharika-Tissa (third century CE) while the large number of mentions of it in
post-canonical works shows that it maintained its importance in subsequent tra-
dition.
connects directly with the evidence of the literature on the different Buddhist schools.

Part Three

The literature on the Eighteen Schools

In his long chapter on the Buddhist schools, Étienne Lamotte states that he aims merely to set out the state of the sources, ‘without complicating further a matter that is already complicated enough’\(^{35}\). This is probably intended as a criticism of Béreau’s claim to have reconstructed the actual affiliation of the schools. His own account is a very useful collection of material, but it does to my mind tend to confuse by setting out many different accounts, as if they are all independent sources of evidence of equal value. In essence, as we shall see, Béreau’s claim must be correct.

1. *Vasumitra*

The work on the schools attributed to a *Vasumitra* is of uncertain date but cannot be later than the early fourth century CE nor probably earlier than the first century. On the whole a third century date seems reasonable. It was certainly the work of a Sarvāstivādin of the North-West and it is likely that he was an adherent of the Mahāyāna. At all events, this is explicitly stated in a verse found in the later translations, beginning with Paramārtha: “Le grand Bodhisattva Vasumitra, … vrai moine de la race des Sākya …”\(^{36}\) More importantly, the preceding verse (which is in all translations)

\(^{35}\) Lamotte 1988, p. 529.

\(^{36}\) Béreau 1954, p. 235. If the Chinese is rendering Sākyabhikṣu here, it would be taken by Schopen (in inscriptions) to indicate specifically a Mahāyānist. But see my forthcoming article: “Sākiya-bhikkhu” (to appear in *Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism* 23). In this I show that the term Sākya(-bhikṣu) simply indicates Buddhists or Buddhist monks in general. In any case, the reference to *Vasumitra* as a bodhisattva is sufficient to show that he was considered to be a Mahāyānist by the later tradition.
makes clear *Vasumitra’s agenda. In Bareau’s French translation: “En s’appuyant sur leurs propres traditions, on expose ces opinions afin que l’on s’en dégoûte.” The objective then is to set out the opinions of the various schools, based upon their own Āgamas, so that people will reject them.

This means that we must suspect that part of *Vasumitra’s objective is to present Mainstream Buddhism as divided, disputatious and dogmatic. It could then be contrasted with (early) Mahāyāna, which was put forward as a non-sectarian movement, focussing on the more profound aspects of the truth. Obviously, others would see things differently. But the important thing to note here is what it tells us about *Vasumitra’s likely bias. It has of course been widely recognized that this treatise gives undue prominence to the Sarvāstivādins and to the traditions of the North-West. But we need also to note that it is intentionally exaggerating the degree of difference among the various schools and probably their number.

*Vasumitra has chosen to present the early schools as eighteen. It is likely that this number is both too large and also too small. On the one hand, *Vasumitra has struggled to find eighteen major schools. On the other, it is likely that the Buddhist Saṅgha had little central organization in the early period and there must have been large numbers of effectively independent local groupings of monks and monasteries.37 No doubt such effective devolution of authority was a major reason for its early success. But for our purposes it is the somewhat later situation when various larger-scale schools have arisen that is more relevant. Here we can note that the number eighteen is certainly adopted for symbolic and mnemonic reasons, as was pointed out already in 1903 by Hendrik Kern.38 In a number of cases the name of a school which divides is retained together with the names of the schools into which it divided. More probably, in some of these cases, when school A divides into school B and school C, only the two schools B and C continue to exist and both consider themselves to be school A. The literature

37 See also: Bechert 1993, p. 12.
tends to count this as three schools rather than two. Looking at it from an historical perspective, this is not entirely wrong. But there would never have been more than the two schools at one time.

So the eight Mahāsāṃghika schools mentioned by *Vasumitra may in fact be only four or five, the five Pudgalavādin schools may have been only three or four and others in the list of eighteen are suspect. On the minimalist interpretation, then, only eleven of the eighteen can have been simultaneously in existence as distinct major schools of any kind in the early centuries CE. Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that these schools were evenly spread across the whole of the subcontinent. For that we need to turn again to the inscriptive evidence.

2. Inscriptional references to the schools

Lamotte states:

The inscriptions in Kharoṣṭhī and Brahmī show that, in the first two centuries of the Christian era, most of the Hīnayānist sects were disseminated throughout India.

This is simply contrary to the data he earlier presents (p. 523ff.). Eight of the nineteen names of schools given in *Vasumitra are not found in the list of inscriptions he gives, although a few additions can now be made to the list. Relatively few can be shown by inscriptions alone to have existed in more than one region.

We do, however, have a rather good idea of what must have been the situation in most of the territories ruled by the Kuśānas. The earlier Chinese sources frequently refer to five schools. It is true that there is some variation in the list, but it virtually always names the Sarvāstivādins, *Dharmaguptakas, Mahiśāsakas and the *Kāśyapīyas. The variation is over whether to include Mahā-

30 See Cousins 1991, pp. 48–50; Cousins 1994, p. 29, n. 12. In particular, the *Samkṛantivādins are a very obscure early Sarvāstivādin branch included to make up the numbers; they do not appear to be mentioned in any source not dependent on Vasumitra’s treatise.

Cousins – On the Vibhajjavādins

samghikas or Vātsiputriyas, but part of the reason for this variation can be deduced. Sometimes the intention is to refer to five related recensions of a single Vinaya and the Mahāsamghikas must be excluded. Most often, however, the intention is to refer to the five main schools present in the North-West, in which case the Vātsiputriyas should be omitted, at least for the early period.

All the four names which do not usually vary are mentioned in a number of inscriptions from the North-West and as far east as Mathurā\(^1\). The Vātsiputriyas are only cited in one inscription from this area. (Strictly, it is the Sāmitīyas who are mentioned in a second century inscription from Mathurā, but they refer to themselves as Vātsiputrikās in an early Gupta inscription from Sarnath.) The situation is slightly more complicated for the Mahāsamghikas, since there are a number of inscriptions which mention the Mahāsamghikas in general, but also one or two apparently mentioning specific branches of that tradition\(^2\). It might then be the case that our list of five schools has a Sthavira bias, but it is equally possible that only one Mahāsamghika school was of importance in the region—presumably the Lokottaravādins.

Contrast this with another region for which we have some evidence—the area of present-day Andhra Pradesh. Of the five

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\(^1\) To be precise, the Dhammaguttiyas are not recorded in inscriptions outside of the area of present-day Pakistan and Afghanistan except at Mathurā in Kuśāna times. The home territory of the Kassapiyas may also have been the North-West. Epigraphic evidence again places them in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The inscription at Karîl which refers to an upāsaka as ‘Vivasaka’ is unlikely to be anything to do with the Suvārṣakas. (The donor may in fact be from the North-West.) The reference to the ‘Kaśapīya Arahanta’ in an earlier cave inscription from Bhāposā is probably Jain. According to Tāranātha the Kaśyapiyās had disappeared by the seventh century. Hsüan-tsang could only obtain their Vinaya in the Swat valley.

\(^2\) Bah[usuṭi]jaka at Palaṭū Dherī (Konow p. 122); Kakatiḍa (probably for Kukutika = Gokulika/Kukutika) at Mathurā. Since the former of these is said to have arisen from the latter, we cannot be sure that these are not references to the same school. The reading Bahusutika is doubtful and in any case may simply be an epithet: ‘the learned Kaśyaviya monks’.

149
schools so important in inscriptions from the Kuśana region, the Sarvāstivādins, *Dharmaguptakas and *Kāśyapīyas are completely unknown. The Mahāsāṃghikas in Andhra are probably of a different school. So, of the five, only Mahāśāsakas are attested here. Vātsīputrīyas too are not mentioned.

In fact, on the basis of the inscriptions from Amarāvatī and Nāgārjunakonda we can draw up a new list of at most seven schools: Aparaseliyās, Pubbaseliyās, Rājagiri(ka)s, Siddhatthakas, Bahuṣutīyas, Mahāśāsakas and Tambapanṇakas. This would give five branches of the Mahāsāṃghika school and two branches of the Vibhajjavādin group, but there are problems with some of these, as we shall see. There is no epigraphic evidence for the existence of Sarvāstivādins or Pudgalavādins here or south of here. In fact, to the south of the Śātavāhana region there is no epigraphic evidence for the presence of any school other than the Ceylon school, although it is obviously likely that the various Mahāsāṃghika schools of the Śātavāhana region had penetrated further south.

Further north in the cave inscriptions of western India we find a different set of five or six schools: Aparaseliyās, Cetiyās, Bahuṣutīyas, Dhammadattarīyas and Bhadrāyanīyas. Interestingly, the southern Tambapanṇakas do not appear, whereas two of the western Pudgalavādin schools are now found. Again, the five major schools of the North-West are absent or poorly represented: no inscriptions of Sarvāstivādins, *Dharmaguptakas or Mahāśāsakas. There is probably no mention of the Kāśyapīyas; there may be no mention of Lokottaravādins, unless they appear as simple Mahāsāṃghikas. For other parts of India we largely lack inscriptional evidence of schools, other than at the major pilgrimage sites in the homeland of Buddhism. But inscriptions there cannot be used as

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43 I exclude the Hemavatas from consideration here, since their inscriptions are found at a much earlier date. A solitary reference to Mahāsāṃghikas at Karī may be to one of these schools i.e. Aparaseliyās, Cetiyās or Bahuṣutīyas.

44 If the Mahāsāṃghikas of the North-West are in fact the Lokottaravādins, that particular school might not have been present either here or in the adjacent Śātavāhana region.
evidence for the presence of a given school in Māgadha as a whole. Nor do we know what schools might have predominated in Orissa or Bengal to the East, nor in Sindh to the west. Most probably, however, had we evidence for the latter area we would find around six schools, the majority of whom would be Pudgalavādins.

The pattern that is to be expected for most of India in the early centuries CE is then one in which in most localities there would be two or three related major schools and perhaps two or three other schools with a significant presence. Whether there would also have been a smaller presence still of a number of other schools, not evidenced in the inscriptions or the reports of the Chinese pilgrims, is another matter and one which it is impossible for us to assess at present. No doubt too, there would have been many individual wanderers of an ascetic bent.

3. The lists deriving from Vasumitra
Étienne Lamotte very conveniently sets out under the heading of ‘lists with two divisions’ some seven different sources (p. 529ff.). This material can, however, be misleading, if it is not realized that five of these are simply versions derived from the sixth—the treatise of Vasumitra (given second) 45. What is interesting about these later versions is the changes which they have made and the reasons for them.

Probably the most interesting of all, from this point of view, is the Pali version. Erich Frauwallner has presented evidence that the account of the formation of the eighteen schools in the Dīpavamsa does not derive from the old commentarial tradition of the Mahāviṃśa and may in fact be from an Abhayagiri source, significant no doubt in the light of that monastery’s tendency towards the Mahāyāna 46. In any case, there can be no doubt that it derives ultimately from Vasumitra’s treatise.

45 See Table A, p. 152 for comparison of the non-Mahāsāṅghika schools. (That of Taranātha is omitted, as it is based on Bhavya I.)
46 Frauwallner 1994, p. 24. However, the initial version given at Kv-a 2–3 may not derive from Dīp.
**TABLE A: *VASUMITRA’S LIST***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dip V 39ff.; / Kv-a 3</th>
<th><em>Vasumitra</em></th>
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<td>1. Theravāda</td>
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<td>1. (also <em>Haimavata)</em></td>
<td>2. <em>Haimavata</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Vajjiputtakā/Vacchi-</td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Dhammattarikā/^uttariyā</td>
<td>4.</td>
<td>4.</td>
<td>4.</td>
<td>6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Bhaddayānikā</td>
<td>5.</td>
<td>5.</td>
<td>5.</td>
<td>7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Chandagārikā/Channāgār-</td>
<td>7.</td>
<td>7.</td>
<td>7.</td>
<td>9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Kassapikā/Kassapiyā</td>
<td>10. (also <em>Suvarṣaka)</em></td>
<td>9. (also <em>Dharmasuvarṣaka)</em></td>
<td>10.</td>
<td>4. <em>Suvarṣas</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.</td>
<td>10. (also <em>Uttariya)</em></td>
<td>11. <em>Sauḍrāntikas</em></td>
<td>12.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Samkantikā</td>
<td>11.</td>
<td>11.</td>
<td>11.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Suttavādā/Suttavādi</td>
<td>11.</td>
<td>11.</td>
<td>11.</td>
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<tr>
<td>[Mahāsamghika 5+1]</td>
<td>[Mahāsamghika 7+1]</td>
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<td>[Mahāsamghika 8+1]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The table entries are placeholders and need to be filled with actual characters.*
Presented with that treatise, the monks of Ceylon (or monks of any tradition located in the south) would have a number of immediate problems:

(i) It would have been obvious that something was wrong with the account of the Mahāsāṃghikas, since some well-known schools from the Andhra region (notably the Rājaγirikas and Siddhatthikas) appeared to be missing in an account probably created far away in the North-West. This problem was largely solved by adding a supplementary list of six schools which are supposed to have arisen later than the initial eighteen.47

(ii) There is no apparent mention of the Ceylon school and the Sarvāstivādins are treated as effectively the original Sthaviras. Since the Ceylon monks were confident of their own lineage as an authentic presentation of the original teachings, they responded by placing their own tradition at the head of the Sthaviras as the root.

(iii) It is probable that they preserved some memory of their own closeness to the Mahīṃsāsākas and knew that their own tradition had separated from that school. So they exchanged the Mahīṃsāsākas with the Sarvāstivādins so as to make the former school the origin of the other branches of the Sthavira tradition. This has the result of separating the Mahīṃsāsākas from the Dhammaputtas and Kassapīyas, although practically every other source we have groups those three schools together.48 But this might not have ap

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47 Dip V 54: Hemavatikā Rājagirikā Siddhathā Pubbāpara-seliṇā, | APARO Rājagiriko chaṭṭhā uppannā aparāparā. || (but read Aparo Vājiṛiyo); Kv-a 5: Aparāpana pana Hemavatikā, Rājagirikā, Siddhatthikā, Pubba-seliṇā. Aparaseliṇā, Vājiṛiṇā ti aṇā pe cha ācāriya-vādā uppannā; Mhv V 12–13: Hem[av]ātā Rājagirīyā, tathā Siddhatthikā pi ca | Pubba-seliṇa-bhikkhu ca, tathā Aparaseliṇā || Vājiṛiṇa cha etehi, Jambudipamhi bhinnaka | Dhamma-ruci ca Sāgaliṇā, Laṃkā-dipamhi bhinnakā. || The Rājagirikas and Siddhatthikas are mentioned together in Kv-a nine times; the Rājagirikas also twice alone. Neither of these (nor the Mahāsāṃghikas as a group) are found with etarahi. No views are ever ascribed to the Vājiṛiṇas or Hemavatikas.

48 See Table B, p. 154.
### TABLE B: THE VIBHAJAVĀDIN SCHOOLS IN LISTS DERIVED FROM *VASUMITRA*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dip V 39ff.; / Kv-a 3</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mahimsāsakā (vl Mahi-)</td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sabbatthavādā/Sabbathi-</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>2. (also *Vibhajyavādin/*Hetuvādin/?Muruntaka)</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Dhammaguttā/ikā</td>
<td>4.</td>
<td>4.</td>
<td>4.</td>
<td>3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Kassapikā/Kassapiyā</td>
<td>5. (also <em>Suvarṣaka)</em></td>
<td>5. (also <em>Dharmasuvarṣaka)</em></td>
<td>5.</td>
<td>4. <em>Suvarśas</em> 5. <em>Kāsyapīyas</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Suttavādā/Suttavādī</td>
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<td>7.</td>
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<tr>
<td>[Pudgalavādin 5]</td>
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<td>[Pudgalavādin 4]</td>
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</table>
peared problematic at this time in Ceylon where the Dhammagut-tas and Kassapiyas of the North-West appear almost unknown. Notably, only one view is attributed in the Kathāvatthu Commentary to the latter and none at all to the former. Alternatively, and perhaps more probably, the list or one of its sources is actually derived from the mainland Mahīṃsāsakas. In that case some of these changes might already have been made before the list reached the island.

(iv) The author of the old version of the Abhidhamma Commentary which must be the immediate source for this material had an additional and, I believe, crucial problem. Since he wishes to present a list of Buddhist schools in the context of the introduction to the Kathāvatthu, whose promulgation he placed in the reign of Asoka Moriya, the list he has received will not do. It contains two schools which were believed to be post-Asokan: the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas. He again solves this problem by using the supplementary list. This would now have left him short of the obligatory eighteen, if it had not been for the fact that he has changed the list from one in which there are eighteen schools in two divisions i.e. a total of twenty names to one in which the two roots are counted as part of the eighteen. Even so, the Suttavādas (otherwise mentioned only in the *Śāriputra-paripṛcchā list) may be a kind of invention to fill out the number.

4. *Bhavya

The only truly useful extant textual source of information which is independent of *Vasumitra is contained in the *Tarkajvalā, a treatise attributed to *Bhavya or *Bhā(va)viveka, preserved only in Tibetan. The date of this work is not certain, since it is unlikely to

49 Earlier source material for Kv-a would not have mentioned them because at that time they would not have been seen as a different school to the originators of that material. Later material has probably not been added because little was subsequently known in the South about their later views.

50 See Table C, p. 156.
### TABLE C: THE MAHĀSAṂGHIKĀ SCHOOLS COMPARED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dip v 39ff.; / Kv-a 3</th>
<th><em>Vasumitra</em></th>
<th><em>Bhavya (Lists I/II)</em></th>
<th><em>Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā T. 468</em></th>
<th><em>Śāriputraparipṛcchā T.1465</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mahāśaṃgītikā/Mahāśaṃghikā</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>0.</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Gokulikā</td>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.</td>
<td><em>Lokottaravādin</em></td>
<td>2.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ekabbohārā/ekikā</td>
<td>2.</td>
<td>2.</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Paṇṇatti(vādā)</td>
<td>6.</td>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Bahussutikā/ākā or Bāhuḷiyā/ikā</td>
<td>5.</td>
<td>4.</td>
<td>4.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Cetiya/Cetiyavādā</td>
<td>7.</td>
<td>6.</td>
<td>5.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Rājagirikā/iyā</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Siddhatthikā</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Omitted in the earliest translation.
be the work of the Bhāvaviveka who lived in the sixth century\textsuperscript{51}. Most probably it belongs to the period between the seventh and tenth century, but in any case the information it contains must be relatively early. It shows no trace of the later organization into the four mahā-nikāyas or ārya-nikāyas and does not know the three Sinhalese schools.

In fact, *Bhavya gives three lists, but the first of these is a simple reproduction of *Vasumitra. The third list is given together with details as to the views of the different schools. We may suppose that this final section of the *Tarka-jvālā has been taken verbatim from an earlier source. That source must have been one of the Pudgalavādin schools because both the introduction and the last portion show substantive knowledge of the Pudgalavādin tradition as a whole, but it is clear that independent information on the non-Sāmitiya branches is distinctly lacking. Nevertheless, what is said on the Pudgalavādins is quite independent of *Vasumitra or indeed any other non-Pudgalavādin source known to us. Tibetan writers do in fact attribute this list to the Sāmitiyas, but this could derive from a source which uses ‘Sāmitiya’ as a generic name for the Pudgalavādin group of schools. It is also possible that the origin has been inferred from the contents.

The rest of the information in List Three is obtained by combining the information from *Vasumitra in List One with the information in List Two\textsuperscript{52}. In effect then the author i.e. a Pudgalavādin prior to *Bhavya has utilized two lists from elsewhere to make a better version, adding in information, already known to him, about the Pudgalavādins. It is clear that this author does not know the three Ceylon schools, at least two of which were certainly well-known by the seventh century\textsuperscript{53}. So, whatever the date

\textsuperscript{51} Ruegg 1990.
\textsuperscript{52} See Table D, p. 159.
\textsuperscript{53} I tSing at the end of the seventh century already tells us that there were three branches of the ‘Āryasthaviraniṇikāya’ and these can only be the three Ceylon schools we find in later Sarvāstivādin sources (Lamotte 1988, p. 545). Hsūan-
of the *Tarkajvalā in general, the source(s) for this section must
date from somewhere in the period between the third and the sixth
century, most probably towards the middle of that range54.

What follows from this is that List Two predates the creation
of the Sāmitiya account. It must then at least precede the sixth century
CE and is probably earlier than the fifth century CE. Therefore it is
a relatively early account which is independent in important res-
pects from *Vasumitra. What is significant about this version is
that it emphasizes the separateness of the Vibhajjavādins; they are
treated as one of three roots with the Theriyas and the Mahā-
samghikas. So where did this list come from? Tāranātha believed it
to be of Mahāsamghika origin, but he is certainly wrong about that.
The reason that he or his sources thought so is quite clear. The en-
larged list of Mahāsamghika schools it contains gives just that im-
pression, but it is a false impression. As soon as it is compared
with the additional six schools mentioned in the Pali tradition, it is
obvious that the two are related.

The exact form of the relationship cannot be determined and it
may well be that both derive from some common source. But what
is clear is that *Bhavya’s List Two is a mainland Vibhajjavādin ac-
count of some kind. Its distinctive account of the four Vibhajja-
vadin schools must then be their self-perception i.e. they (or at
least some of them) saw themselves as a distinct set of four,
closely related to one another. That relationship could in principle
lie in Vinaya, in Abhidhamma or in both. Studies of the transla-
tions of the Mahāsāsaka and Dharmaguptaka Vinayas preserved in
Chinese translation do seem to support a close relationship be-
tween them and the Pali Vinaya-piṭaka. A similar doctrinal rela-
tionship would be confirmed if it could be shown that the *Sāripu-
trābhidharma-sāstra is a work of one or more of these schools, as
indeed has been the view of most scholars.

54 It exists also as an independent treatise in Tibetan; see the French translation:
Bareau 1956.
**TABLE D: *BHAVYA’S SECOND AND THIRD LISTS***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dīp v 39ff.; / Kv-a 3</th>
<th>*Vasumitra</th>
<th>*Bhavya (List II)</th>
<th>*Bhavya (List III)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Sabbatthavādā/Sabbatthikā</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Theravāda</td>
<td>2. (also *Haimavata)</td>
<td>0. *Sthavira &amp; Vibhajyavādin</td>
<td>0. *Pūrvasthavira</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. *Haimavata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mahimsāsakā (v.l. Mahi-)</td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>3.</td>
<td>3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Dhammaguttā/ikā</td>
<td>4.</td>
<td>5.</td>
<td>4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Kassapikā/Kassapiyā</td>
<td>5. (also *Suvarṣaka)</td>
<td>4.</td>
<td>6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Saṃkantikā</td>
<td>6.</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Pudgalavādins 5]</td>
<td>[Pudgalavādins 5]</td>
<td>[Pudgalavādins 4+1]</td>
<td>[Pudgalavādins 3 or 4+1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Mahāsāṃghikas 5+1]</td>
<td>[Mahāsāṃghikas 8+1]</td>
<td>[Mahāsāṃghikas 8+0]</td>
<td>[Mahāsāṃghikas 8+0]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

List III is certainly a Śāṃtiya production, as it is integral with the main account. It’s account of the Mahāsāṃghikas is identical to List I i.e. it is based upon sources closely related to *Vasumitra. Its description of the Śāṃtiyas is independent of other sources, no doubt because it is the only Pudgalavādin source we have. It is unclear from it whether there were 3, 4 or 5 Pudgalavādin schools, but 4 is most probable.

List II is Mahāsāṃghika in origin, according to Tāranātha. He, or his sources, have inferred that from the number of Mahāsāṃghika schools whose names do not occur in *Vasumitra. But in fact this is an error. The list is closely related to the list in the Dipavamsa. In particular we should note that of the 6 ‘later’ schools mentioned in Dip and the Abhidhamma Commentary, 5 are given. The only omission is the Vājīriyas who are quite aberrant — not known from any non-Theravādin source and the original verse in Dip is corrupt. Their views are never given in Kv-a. They are invented to make the number up to 6. (This could possibly be an oblique reference to Mahāyāna; cf. Vetūl(ak)jā, Mahāsuññatāvādas in Kv-a.)
Particularly significant here is perhaps the mention of the Rājagiriyas and Siddhatthikas. Inscriptional evidence for these schools is at best doubtful. Since they are unknown in any other list, it seems likely that they derive in fact from the *Kathāvatthu Commentary* where their views are mentioned a number of times. This might mean that List Two has been influenced by the *Dipa-vamsa* or a similar Pali source, but not necessarily. The source could also be an earlier recension belonging to a mainland Vibhajjāvādin group of some of the material in the *Kathāvatthu Commentary*.

Suffice to say, the evidence from the inscriptions at Nāgārjuna-kōṇḍa, from various Pali sources and from the doxographical writer whose material has been utilized in *Bhavya* combines to present a single and convincing picture of a group of several related Vibhajjāvāda schools. To add to that, there is one further aspect to be taken into account from the same inscriptive and textual sources. I turn now to the issue of the ‘so-called missions’.

**Part Four**

*The spread of the teaching*

Older scholarship interpreted the well-known Pali accounts of the missions inspired by Moggaliputta Tissa in the reign of Asoka in the light of the Emperor’s own inscriptions and essentially took them relatively literally. Doubts eventually arose and more recently workers in this field have sharply distinguished the activities of the Emperor evidenced in the inscriptions from those described in the Pali accounts. Alongside this has come a general tendency in Buddhological scholarship to turn more and more to evidence pre-

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55 See Kieffer-Pulz 2000, p. 295, n. 53. The Siddhārthas are mentioned in a surviving Sanskrit Vinaya commentary: Sanghasena 1968, p. 76. (The editor believed this to be Mahāsamghika, but that is doubtful.) No views of theirs are referred to as *etaraḥi* ‘nowadays’ which suggests that the mentions of them were embedded in earlier recensions of the *Kathāvatthu commentary*. 

160
served in Chinese and Tibetan translation, alongside a gradually
growing body of material in Sanskrit and various Prakrit dialects.
This was in part no doubt a justified reaction to a one-sided and
over-simplified understanding of Buddhist history, but like most
such scholarly reactions it has probably gone too far. Indeed, we
now see a tendency to rely on Sarvāstivādin source-material in just
as uncritical a manner as the way in which people used sometimes
to rely on Theravādin sources.

This is particularly true in the matter of the missions. It is per-
haps unfortunate that the discovery of important inscriptional evi-
dence in the 1950s came at a point when this over-reaction was
well under way. It has to my mind, prevented a proper evaluation
of this evidence. So I will now examine that.

If the material available is set out in tabular form, some things
are rather clear. The second inscription from Nāgārjunakondā
sets out the essence of this. In the first place we have three places
in the North-West—Kashmir, Gandhāra and ‘Bactria’. These
names collectively designate territories of varying extent which in
the centuries after the end of Mauryan rule were ruled by a number
of different invading dynasties: Greeks from Bactria, Kṣatrapas
and Kuśāṇas. All the lists of missions begin with Kashmir and/or
Gandhāra and this must be because of the prominence in subse-
quent Buddhist history of this region. Indeed the Mahāvaṃsa
comments (in Geiger’s translation, p. 84): “Since then Kasmīra and
Gandhāra shine with yellow robes and prize above all the three
things.” With these three places we should probably include the
mentions of Cīna-Cilāta and of Hīmavanta, although it is less
certain exactly what is meant here.

But see now: Willis 2001. This arrived too late to be taken into account here.
See Table E, p. 162.
58 cf. Mil 121; 331; 359; Ap II 358f.
59 Vṛbh 28: Mahīṃsaka-maṇḍalāṃ Andha-raṭṭhan ti vadanti ... Paṇca pi
raṭṭhāni paṇca Cīna-raṭṭhāni nāma. This takes the reference as to the trans-
Himalayan countries, including China.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \text{Nāgārjunakonda} \text{ A} )</th>
<th>( \text{Nāgārjunakonda} \text{ B} )</th>
<th>( \text{Mahāthūpa} )</th>
<th>( \text{Missions} )</th>
<th>( \text{Missions} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kasmira</td>
<td>Kasmira</td>
<td>Kasmiramandala</td>
<td>1. &amp; 2.</td>
<td>Kasmira-Gandhāra-( \text{raṭṭha} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cina-Cilāta</td>
<td>Kelasavihāra</td>
<td>7. Himavanta</td>
<td>8. Himavantapadesabhāga(^1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ujjēniyaṃ Dakhiniṇagiri</td>
<td>2. Mahimsa</td>
<td>3. Mahisakamaṇḍala(^2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tosali</td>
<td>Viṅjha</td>
<td>5. Mahāraṭṭha</td>
<td>6. Mahāraṭṭha</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avaratma</td>
<td>4. Aparantaka</td>
<td>5. Aparantaka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{Vamga} )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanavāsī</td>
<td>Vanavāsa</td>
<td>Vanavāsa</td>
<td>3. [Vanavāsa]</td>
<td>4. Vanavāsi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yava[na]?</td>
<td>Yavana</td>
<td>Alasanda Yonanagara</td>
<td>6. Yonakaloka</td>
<td>7. Yonakaloka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da[mila]?</td>
<td>Pallavabhoga</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Himavantadesabhāga. Vjb 28: \textit{Pañca pi raṭṭhāni} pañca Cina-\( \text{raṭṭhāni} \) nāma.

\(^2\) Vl. Mahimsakamaṇḍala. According to Vjb and Sp-\( t \), ‘they say’ this is Andhaka-\( \text{raṭṭha} \).
In last place in all the Vibhajjavādin lists we have Ceylon under one name or another. We should note also that in an apparently non-Vibhajjavādin list of missions found in the Mahākarma-vibhaṅga, Kashmir and Sinhala-dvīpa are also mentioned, although most of the missions in that list are from the time of the Buddha. Lamotte is very dismissive of the Sinhalese chronicles here, but his distinction between the mainland tradition and Ceylon seems quite anachronistic. The island was not in some area culturally distinct from the mainland. Nor was it particularly far away. The relative rapidity of water transport in ancient times, as against travel by land, placed it in good communication not only with the coastal regions but also with the valleys of both the Ganges and the Indus. That may well be why the Sinhalese speak a north Indian language and it is almost certainly why Buddhism reached there relatively rapidly. It is certainly why it went from there to various other places at a later date.

Lamotte in fact suggests that the version in the Mahākarma-vibhaṅga is more reliable than the Sinhalese because it portrays the kind of gradual process which is almost certainly the actual way in which Buddhism spread. This is a very peculiar suggestion, since all the Sanskrit text has done is to include missions which were believed to have taken place in the Buddha’s lifetime, such as to Avanti. The Sinhalese tradition too believed that Buddhism spread to such places in the lifetime of the Buddha; that is why their list does not mention those places in an account of what happened, in their view, two and a half centuries later.

The Mahākarmavibhaṅga is probably a short chronology text and presumably therefore allows only a century for the process. It mentions only six missions. For the winning over of Śūrparaka by Pūrṇa it cites as its source the Adhīyadhaśataka which Sylvain Lévi understood as a section in some work from the old canonical literature. We may guess that similar sources underlie the tradition that Mahākāśyapaka was responsible for Avanti and that Piṇḍola

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60 Lévi 1932, p. 61ff.
Bhāradvāja converted the mythical land of Pūrvavideha. These three are famous arhats from the time of the Buddha; so too is Gavāmpati, the apostle of Suvarṇabhūmi. The remaining two names are Mahendra who brought faith to the rāksasas in the Simhala island and Madhyandina who went to Kashmir. We may, knowing the Pali and other sources, be inclined to locate the activities of these last two in the reign of Asoka, but nothing leads one to suppose that this is the intention of the Mahākarṇavibhaṅga. Rather, it is clearly intended to locate all these events in the lifetime of the arhats who lived on after the death of the Buddha.

That this is so is made rather clear by the fact that two traditions about Ceylon have been conflated—the Buddha’s visits to the island when he subdued rakkhasa and yakṣhas and preached to the nāgas and the subsequent mission of Mahinda to human beings. So we may be rather confident that the Mahākarṇavibhaṅga is a reworking of some elements of Vibhajjavādin tradition about the missions, incorporating Sarvāstivādin traditions but retaining the two most famous names of the missionaries and four of the places. The origin of that reworking can be inferred from the content, but is made even clearer by the fact that only a page before the Mahākarṇavibhaṅga refers to the Vinaya of the Mahīśāsakas ‘who belong to a different lineage’ as the source for something else.62

The whole account of the missions can be dismissed as entirely invented. But there are major objections to any such dismissal. The account may be propaganda but even propaganda has to have some basis. Otherwise it has no plausibility and will be ineffective. In fact, it seems much more likely that the story of the spread of Buddhism by Vibhajjavādin missionaries is correct in substance. That this is a viable interpretation of the evidence has been clear for some time. The new discoveries from Afghanistan make it much more likely.

62 Lévi 1932, p. 60 n. 8. The MSS are corrupt here; so this is partially Lévi’s correction. There is in any case a reference to gotrāntariyā and their Vinaya. Note also the reference to Suvarṇa-bhūmi and Simhala-dvīpa together on p. 53.
Cousins – On the Vibhajjavādins

I do not intend to set out those discoveries here. This has been
done by Richard Salomon in a very clear and capable manner and I
need only refer to his Ancient Buddhist Scrolls from Gandhāra.
From that it emerges clearly that the Dhammaguttaka school had a
major role in the area. This is how Salomon describes the situation:

The textual and epigraphic material presented here makes it possible
to conceive a situation wherein the Dhammaguptaka school was the
predominant one, at least in parts of the north-western region, in the
earlier part of the first century A.D., while it enjoyed the patronage of
the Indo-Scythian kings\textsuperscript{63}.

He goes on to note that at a later date the Sarvāstivādins appear to
have gained the upper hand and that this parallels the situation
which has been also posited for early Central Asian Buddhism. To
this we can add that the closely related Mahimsāsakas are already
attested from an inscription of 69 CE, while other inscriptions refer
to the Kassapiyas from c. 20 CE. In other words, everything sug-
gests that three of the Vibhajjavādin schools played an important
role in the area. Put in another way, nothing precludes the possi-
bility that the common ancestor of these three schools was indeed
largely responsible for spreading Buddhism to this area. More to
the point, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the promul-
gators of the tradition of the missions had quite sufficient evidence to
justify their belief. Their school was indeed well established in the
area at a relatively early date.

That the account of the missions is correct in substance for the
island of Ceylon can of course hardly be denied. A school which
sometimes calls itself Vibhajjavāda or Vibhajjavādin was certainly
present there from an early date. Indeed, there is, as far as I know,
no credible evidence for the presence of any other school on the is-
land in the early period. What then of the other missions? I shall
leave out of discussion here the issue of the mission to Suvanap-
bhūmi, since it is unclear how early that tradition is and to exactly

\textsuperscript{63} Salomon 1999, p. 180.
what area it refers—if indeed it does refer to a very precisely defined area.

The remaining missions, according to the Pali sources, were sent to regions in Southern India. Vanavāsa is in the modern state of Karnataka, Aparanta(ka) in the region of Gujarat, while Mahāraṭṭha corresponds approximately to Maharashtra. The location of Mahimsaka is less certain and has been much debated64. Many scholars have related it to the town of Māhismatī which is almost certainly modern Maheshwar in the Nimar district of south-western Madhya Pradesh i.e. in the valley of the Narmadā. This seems to fit some references but not others. Other scholars have sought to identify it with (southern) Mysore. A grant of the Kadamba king Viṣṇuvarman in the village of Herbaṭa (modern Hebbata in the Tumkur district of Eastern Karnataka) refers to the village as in the Mahiṣa-viṣaya65. This fits quite well with the later Pali tradition which understood it as the Andhra country. One possibility is that the four areas taken together represent the route for expansion down the western coast.

Do we have any reason to suppose that Vibhajjavādin missions were particularly successful in this area? I think that we do. One thing that seems certain about the Pali Canon is that the works it contains were not in general produced in Ceylon. This is obviously the case for the earlier portions which derive from the shared heritage of Indian Buddhism. More importantly, we can refer to the Abhidhamma-pitaka which is a substantial endeavour, apparently unique to this school, although no doubt closely related to the Abhidhamma literature of other Vibhajjavādin schools. Even if we suppose that the final recension of that took place in Ceylon, the bulk of its contents must originate elsewhere. Somewhere on the mainland the forefathers of the Ceylon tradition were present in

64 See Gupta 1973; Gupta 1977.
sufficient numbers to carry out such a major undertaking. Where? I believe it has to be in this area, but I would like to suggest more than that.

The question has often been discussed as to the ultimate origin of Pali. I do not wish to address that here. However, I do wish to consider a related matter. Why is the Pali Canon in Pali and not a local language? I believe this question gains greatly in urgency now that it is almost certain that the Dhammaguttakas had a canonical literature in their local Gāndhārī dialect. Why did the Vi
bhajjavādin school in Ceylon use Pali and not their local dialect? The natural explanation is that the Sinhalese did so because the texts came to them in that form. But had they come to Ceylon in a closely related form of Prakrit, this would have quite naturally changed to Sinhāla Prakrit. It did not. It seems to me that there is one obvious reason for this. What if it came to Ceylon from a country where a Dravidian language was the vernacular tongue?

Now there are good reasons why a Buddhist community in a Dravidian country might have preserved the Buddhist scriptures in the Prakrit dialect in which they originally arrived there. The task of translation would obviously be far greater, especially if the Dravidian language in question had not yet come under much Sanskritic influence. That they might have done so is also suggested by the fact that the southernmost inscriptions of Asoka are not translated into any form of Dravidian, indicating that the administrative language of this area was not Dravidian. Instead a dialect from Eastern India is used, identical with or close to that of the capital city of Pāṭaliputra. The contrast with the North-West where local dialects and administrative languages were used is striking. It seems almost certain that the population of the southern parts of the Mauryan empire did in fact speak a Dravidian language at this date, although I suppose one might postulate a ruling class of northern origin that later becomes absorbed.

If this line of thinking is correct, then it seems very plausible to look towards Vanavāsa in modern Karnatakā66. This may be why

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66 And perhaps a southern Mahiṃsa(ka)?
all our sources mention that area as an important one. Particularly
striking in this respect is the second Nāgārjunakoṇḍa inscription
which mentions only Vanavāsa alongside of the North-West and
Ceylon. One would think that in relatively nearby Nāgārjunakoṇḍa
they would certainly have known whether or not the Vibhajja-
vādins were prominent there.

Conclusion
The texts referred to in Part One together with the Appendix (pp.
170ff.) are sufficient to demonstrate the currency of the name Vib-
hajjavādin among the Theriyas of South India and Ceylon in the
first millennium CE. There is every reason to suppose that it was an
early name for their tradition, a name shared with others and, per-
haps partly for that reason, gradually going out of use.

Inscriptional evidence collected in Part Two and elsewhere
makes it clear that in the third century CE there were (or had been)
Sinhalese monks in Nāgārjunakoṇḍa. One inscription refers to
monks who are Theriyas, Vibhajjavādas and Mahāvihāravāsins;
another to those who are Theriyas and Tambapanṇakas. Both in-
scriptions claim to be members of the school which brought the
faith to Ceylon among other places. Material presented here and
elsewhere shows that the Tambapanṇakas, the Tambapanṇiyas of
Pali sources and the Tārmapanṇiyas/Tāmraśāṭiyas of northern
sources are identical. This is simply one branch of the Vibhajja-
vādins and probably the name by which they were normally known
in India prior to the development (or dissemination) of the three
Sinhalese nikāyas67. Only at a later date does the name Theriya or
Theravādin become attributed to them, when it is no longer current
in the usage of the other surviving non-Mahāsaṃghika schools.

67 Walters 1997, I p. 105 writes: “The implication that Therāvāda was originally
and exclusively a Sri Lankan nikāya, and not an Indian one, is explicit in the
later lists of the eighteen schools … ” While this is essentially correct, it is
anachronistic to apply modern names of countries to ancient South Asia as rei-
ified entities.
Cousins – On the Vibhajjavādins

Part Three looks at the evidence from the doxological accounts and inscriptions. An examination of this evidence tells us much about both the geographical spread of the various schools and their major affiliations. The four schools of the Dhammaguttikas, Mahīṃsāsakas, Kassapiyas and Tambapaṇṇīyas emerge clearly as the main branches of the Vibhajjavādins with the first three particularly strong in the North-West and the last predominating further south.

In the light of this, Part Four returns to the issue of the legends of the Buddhist missions. It seems clear that whatever the traditions about these may or may not tell us about events in the third or second century BCE, they do certainly correspond to what we know of the geographical spread of the schools early in the first millennium CE. They must then have some historical basis. Vibhajjavādins really were the school predominant in Ceylon and Gandhāra at an early date, as well as being present, if not predominant, in other parts of Central Asia, China, South India and South-East Asia by around the third century CE at the latest. No other school had a comparable spread at this date.

There remains only one area of doubt. A considerable amount of information is preserved in the northern literature as to views believed to have been held by Vibhajjavādins. It is sometimes suggested that this evidence is, or may be, incompatible with the Vibhajjavādins in question being closely related to the Theravāda of Ceylon. I do not believe that this is in fact the case, but space does not permit me to address this large topic on this occasion. I hope to return to it subsequently. However, if the evidence presented here is correctly understood, then the outline history of the school now known as Theravāda is as follows:

The initial impetus for the spread of Buddhism in Tambapanī was no doubt the influence, direct or indirect, of Asoka and it may

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68 According to Wang 1994, p. 172: the Buddhists in ancient China generally considered the Samantapāsādkā (in its Chinese translation) “to be related to the Dharmaguptakas, or more precisely, as they said, to the southern Dharmaguptakas.” I have not so far been able to confirm this from any other source.
well be the case that the Theriya tradition (i.e. non-Mahāsāṃghika) was introduced in the reign of Vijaya. However, its subsequent growth and success owed much to influences from Dravidian-speaking lands in or around the second century BCE and it was these influences which determined the particular form of the Buddhist tradition which came to dominate there: the Vibhajjavādin. Subsequently the patronage of the Ceylon kings at Anurādhapura enabled the creation of one of the major centres of the Buddhist world. In due course, the tradition developed there, now becoming recognised as a separate branch of the Vibhajjavādins and was able, sometime around the first century CE or a little later, to spread out into Southern India (and quite possibly parts of South-East Asia). There its three major nikāyas eventually became recognised collectively as one of the four main branches of the Buddhist Saṅgha, especially after the other three Vibhajjavādin schools became little known or completely absent in most parts of India.

APPENDIX

(a) Source passage in the Abhidhamma Commentary and the Visuddhimagga

(Vibh-a 130 ≠ Vism 522): ... tassā attha-samvannanam karontena, Vibhaja-vādi-maṅḍalāṁ otaritvā, ācariyeṅ anābbhācikkhantena, saka-samayaṁ avokāmantena, para-samayaṁ anāyūhantena\(^6\), suttāṁ appatibāhantena, vinayaṁ anulomentena, mahāpadesa olokentena, dhhammaṁ dipentena, atthaṁ saṅghahantena\(^7\), tām ev'

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\(^6\) Vibh-a (Se 1922): ācariyam.

\(^7\) So Vism (B' VRI; C' 1920; E’ 1950; N’ 1972); Vibh-a (S’ 1922; C’ 1932; B’ 1960; N’ 1961). Both PTS editions and Vism (S’ 1922); Vibh-a (v1 to S’ 1922) have: anārāhantena which would mean ‘without introducing’. The PTS reading seems to be the result of contamination by rt: dosāropana-.

\(^71\) So Vibh-a (S’ 1922; C’ 1932; N’ 1961); Vism (C’ 1920; S’ 1922; E’) and v1 to Vibh-a (E’): saṅgāhantena; Vism (E’ 1950) gāhantena.
Cousins – On the Vibhajjavādins

attham punar-āvattetvā, aparehi pi pariyāyehi⁷² niddisantena ca yasmā attha-saṁvaññanā kārabba hoti ...

“... one who is making a commentary on the [paticcasaṁuppāda-vibhaṅga] should make it, [only] after having entered the circle of the Vibhajjavādin(s). [He should do so] without misrepresenting the teachers, without departing from the system of our own school, without giving rise to the system of another school, without setting aside Sutta, while conforming to Vinaya, paying attention to the [four] great apadesa, revealing the letter, grasping the meaning and explaining that meaning in other ways after rephrasing (āvattetvā) it. Therefore ...”

Various commentarial passages on the first part of the above are given below.

(b) the Abhidhamma subcommentaries


Mūlaṭṭākā: “The disciples of the Perfectly Awakened One are Vibhajjavādins because, [when asked by King Asoka]: ‘Venerable sir, what kind of vādin⁷³ was the Perfectly Awakened One?’’, the Elder Moggaliputta Tissa declared: ‘[he was] a Vibhajjavādin, your Majesty’. For his disciples speak only after distinguishing (vibhaṭṭa)

⁷² Vism (E¹; N² 1972); pariyāyantarehi.
⁷³ In the Sutta passages, of course, this means simply ‘what does he teach?’. But I translate differently here, because there is an underlying reference to the question: ‘is he a Vibhajjavādin or a Puggalavādin or a Sarvāstivādin?’
the different kinds of *venayika* and so on\(^{74}\) or [after distinguishing] the different kinds of robes, etc. i.e. those which can or can’t be used or after distinguishing the eternalist and annihilationist doctrines. However, things which must be rejected such as the statement that the self and the world are eternal have been rejected [by the Buddha]. [The Buddha also] spoke [unequivocally] of the destruction of passion, etc. as eternal and of the annihilation both of passion, [hatred and delusion] and of bodily, [verbal and mental] misconduct. Therefore, his disciples do not exclude the other three kinds of question (i.e. those to be answered unequivocally, [to be answered by a counter-question and to be rejected]) and hence do not give answers only [to questions] which are to be answered after distinguishing.”


Anuṭikā:

[Objection:] “What is the significance of the ablative case of the word *vuttattā*?”

[Reply:] “It signifies the cause.”

[Objection:] “If it is held to signify the cause, it is false that the disciples are Vibhajjavādins; for the disciples of the Buddha are not Vibhajjavādins [merely] because of the words (*vuttattā*) of the Elder Moggaliputta-Tissa.”

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74 Referring to Vin III 1 ff.

75 The three kinds of cause do not seem to be found earlier than the ṭīkās (except for Nett-a (B\(^{5}\)) 38 VRI). The concept develops from exegesis of the different senses in which the second and fourth truths can be said to be causes.
Cousins – On the Vibhajjavādins

[Reply:] “Not so. In fact there are three kinds of cause: a) the cause which enables one to know something; b) the cause which acts; c) the cause which enables one to reach something. In this case it is the cause which enables one to know something which is meant. Therefore, when the Elder was asked ‘Venerable sir, what kind of vādin was the Perfectly Awakened One?’ the answer [to the question] is known because of his words at that time: ‘[he was] a Vibhajjavādin, your Majesty’. [The question]: ‘Venerable sir, what kind of vādin was the Perfectly Awakened One?’, and the declaration that: ‘[he was] a Vibhajjavādin, your Majesty’ show that this is the meaning i.e. that the disciples of the Perfectly Awakened One are Vibhajjavādins.”


Mūlaṭikā: The Vibhajja-vādi-maṇḍala is the circle (maṇḍala) i.e. the community of the Vibhajjavādins. Alternatively, they also say that the Vibhajja-vādi-maṇḍala is the entourage of the Vibhajjavādin. Without misrepresenting them: explaining the correct meaning spoken by the teachers.


Anuṭikā: The Vibhajja-vādi-maṇḍala is the entourage of the Vibhajjavādin: the words beginning with ‘not misrepresenting the teachers’ were said in order to show how one is considered to have entered (otiṇṇo nāma) that [Vibhajja-vādi-maṇḍala] in that [second] sense. For not departing from the system of one’s own school is entry to the [circle of the Vibhajjavādin] in the highest meaning (param’-attha).

Mulañ̄kā: Declaring such things as that ignorance is a root condition for fortune-giving and immovable constructings⁷⁶ and affirming such doctrines as the Puggalavāda which are rejected in the Kathāvatthu is known as departing from the system of one’s own school. [He explains] without departing in that way.


Anuṭṭikā: Those in other nikāyas declare: “There is an unafflicted (asamkiliṭṭha) ignorance⁷⁷ that is not abandoned by the path. Hindered⁷⁸ by that [ignorance], even those who have destroyed the āsavas do not know specific details about such things as names and clans. It operates even in skillful citta arisings.” In reference to that, [the tīkā writer] said: Declaring such things as that ignorance is a root condition for fortune-giving and immovable constructings.

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⁷⁶ Excluded at Tikap 73f. for the Pali hetu-paccaya, but it is likely that there is an intended reference here to the Sarvāstivādin hetu-pratyaya.

⁷⁷ This is a reference to the akliṣṭa-ajñāna of the northern sources. See: Dhammajoti 1998 for a very detailed treatment. (He is unaware of this passage in the Anuṭṭikā, cf. p. 67.) On p. 87 he refers to the view of one of Hsuan-tsong’s disciples that akliṣṭa-ajñāna can be kusala.

⁷⁸ The link between nivuta and ignorance is found already at M III 131; S II 24 (avijjāya nivutassa bālassa), A II 54, etc. Other passages link it to the nīvaraṇas, e.g. M II 203; Nidd 146; Patis I 163 and especially to the (additional) sixth nīvaraṇa of ignorance: It 8. In the nivuta-kathā at Kv 480ff., it is the verb corresponding to nīvaraṇa (nivuto nīvaraṇaṃ jahati?).
Cousins – On the Vibhajjavādins

This is simply an example [of what is false] from the alternative viewpoint of conascence condition\(^79\). The word ‘ādi (‘and such things as’) implies the inclusion of such positions as: “even in unskilful citta a knowledge arises which is afflicted understanding” [and] “moral precept which is not mental is a kind of materiality known as non-communicating materiality.”\(^80\)


\textit{Mālatīkā}: Without giving rise to the system of another school i.e. free from the activity of introducing defects. Some say that this means: ‘not combining it with the system of another school, with the idea that something is appropriate and should be accepted.’

Vibh-anuṭ: \textit{Para-samayāyūhanam para-samaye vyāpārāpattiyaḥ}. Yo tattha saka-samayena viruddho attho, tassa vā dipanena siyā, para-samaye vādārapanena vā; tesū purīmāṃ ‘ācariye an-abbhācikkhantena’ ti iminā apānītan ti itaraṃ dasset: \textit{para-samayaṃ ... pe ... anāyūhanenā} ti. \textit{Asampiṇḍentenā} ti upacay’-attham sandhāya vādanti; āyāhana-saddo pana upacay’-attho na hoṭṭi ti keci-vādho na sārato gahebabbo.

\textit{Anuṭṭikā}: Giving rise to the system of another school is due to engaging in activity in regard to the system of another school. Any meaning (\textit{attha}) in that which is contrary to the system of our own school must be so either because of the way in which it is explained or by the introduction of the teachings [propounded] in another system. Because the former of these [two possibilities] is excluded by the statement: ‘without misrepresenting the teachers’, he shows that the second [is excluded] by the statement: \textbf{Without giving rise to the}

\(^79\) i.e. these statements are only false in terms of conascence, not from the alternative viewpoint of stimulus condition \(\text{upanissaya-koṭi}\). Ignorance can indeed be a cause of subsequent good states.

\(^80\) A reference to the Vaibhāśika notion of \textit{avijñapti-rūpa}.

\(^81\) So Vibh-mṭ (B’ 1960); Vism-mṭ (B’ 1977; S’ 1981): \textit{suttaṃ}. 175
system of another school [i.e. free from the activity of introducing defects]. They say that \textit{[anāyūhāna means] not combining} with reference to its sense of accumulation, but since the word \textit{āyūhana} does not have the sense of accumulation, the doctrine [attributed to] some people should not be considered sound\textsuperscript{82}.

(c) \textbf{The commentary on the Visuddhimagga} =Vism-mh\r{\texttt{t}} II (B\textsuperscript{5} 1960) 240f. (to Vism 522)


The disciples of the Perfectly Awakened One are Vibhajjavādins because, [when asked by King Asoka]: ‘Venerable sir, what kind of vādin was the Perfectly Awakened One?’, the Elder Moggaliputta Tissa declared: ‘[he was] a Vibhajjavādin, your Majesty’. For his disciples speak in accordance with what was said by the Teacher after distinguishing \textit{(vibhajja)} the different kinds of \textit{vēnayika} and so on. They speak after distinguishing the different kinds of feeling—pleasant and so on—i.e. those which should or shouldn’t be pursued (D II 278f.) and the different kinds of robes, etc. i.e. those which can or can’t be used after distinguishing the eternalist and annihilationist doctrines. However, things which must be rejected such as the statement that the self and the world are eternal have been rejected [by the Buddha]. [The Buddha also] spoke [unequivocally] of the destruction of passion, etc. as eternal and of the annihilation both of passion, [hatred and delusion] and of bodily, [verbal and mental] misconduct. Therefore, his disciples do not exclude the other three kinds of question (i.e. those to be answered unequivocally, [to be

\textsuperscript{82} Probably \textit{asampīdentena} was originally a \textit{lemma} for the reading: \textit{anārīhāntenā}.}
Cousins – On the Vibhajjavādins

answered by a counter-question and to be rejected]) and hence do not give answers only [to questions] which are to be answered after distinguishing.


The Vibhajja-vādi-maṇḍala is the circle (maṇḍala) i.e. the community of the Vibhajjavādins. Alternatively, they also say that the Vibhajja-vādi-maṇḍala is the entourage of the Vibhajjavādin. Alternatively, it is because he teaches conditioned arising which is the middle way that avoids both extremes, only after distinguishing the eternalist and annihilationist [views], that [both] the Lord and, since they speak in accordance with him, his disciples are called Vibhajjavādins. The rest is as previously explained.


After having entered i.e. after plunging into; this means ‘being a Vibhajjavādin’. One can hardly be called one who has entered the circle of the Vibhajjavādins merely as a result of [physically] standing among Vibhajjavādins, while oneself not being a Vibhajjavādin. Not misrepresenting the teachers by explaining an incorrect meaning not

83 B3; N 1972; S3 divide as hetu paccayo.
84 So B3 and N 1972; S3 1981: anūdhātenta.
spoken by the teachers. Declaring that ignorance is a root condition for fortune-giving and immovable constructings and affirming such teachings as the Puggalavāda which are rejected in the Kathāvatthu is known as departing from the system of one’s own school. [He explains] without departing in that way. Without giving rise to the system of another school i.e. free from the activity of introducing defects. Some say that this means: ‘not combining it with the system of another school, with the idea that a particular sutta should be accepted.’

(c) The ganthipada on the Visuddhimagga = Vism-gp (Cª 1954) 59f. (to Vism 522)


The circle of the Vibhajjāvādin: the Lord distinguishes dhammas by various ways of exposition and teaches them in order to benefit those who require training. Just as when he was addressed by the brahmin Vehārāja with eight kinds of abuse, such as ‘the reverer Gotama is a denier of action’ the Lord taught that this was not the case, only after distinguishing by various ways of exposition. [He taught] similarly in such cases as when he said: ‘Bhikkhus, I declare that robes are of two kinds: those to be used and those not to be used’. His circle is the assembly of bhikkhus. Teachers means teachers of the Āṭṭhakathā; for one should expound what was said by them.

85 So emend. Text: bhikkhā samāgamam. Or, bhikkhā samāgamum?
(d) Sānkhepa’attrha-jotanī, i.e. the Visuddhimagga-cullaṭikā =
Vism-ç (Ś 1987) 95 (ad idem)

Vibhajja-vādi-maṇḍalan ti ettha Bhagavatā yathā-dhammaṁ vibhajja
vutte sevitabbādike kusalādike khandhādike ca dhamme yathāvato
anuvadana-vasena vibhajja vadanti ti Vibhajja-vādino, laddhi-dosa-
virahita Buddha-sāvakā ye Mahāvihāra-vāsino nāma jātā, tesam
maṇḍalam samuham. Oṭaritvā ti tap-paryāpanna-bhāvena ogāhevitā;
Vibhajja-vādi hustvā ti attho. Ācāryehi avuttassa viparīṭa-thanassa
adhipanena te anabbhācikkhaṇṭena. Para-vādinā attano vādassa
vutta-dosaṁ sampaṭicehanto saka-samayaṁ vokkamati nāma;
visahati ti attho. Kathāvattthu-ādisu paṭikkhita-puggala-vādādike
vadanto para-samayaṁ ārāhati nāma; attano vādena saha para-
vādāṁ sampiṇḍetī ti attho.

The circle of the Vibhajjavādins: the Lord spoke after making
distinctions in accordance with dhamma. In this passage the
Vibhajjavādins are those who speak after distinguishing because they
speak truly about dhammas—skillful, [unskillful and undeclared] and
aggregates, [elements and bases] as to whether they are to be pursued
or not, [speaking] in accordance with [what the Lord has said]. Their
circle is the community of these disciples of the Buddha, free from
defects of opinion, who have become known as Mahāvihāravāsins.
After having entered: after plunging into i.e. because they are
included in that [circle of the Vibhajjavādins]; this means ‘being a
Vibhajjavādin’. Not misrepresenting the teachers: by not explaining
the correct meaning not [already] given by them. Accepting a faulty
statement (dosa) made by the adherent of another teaching (vāda) into
one’s own teaching is known as departing from the system of one’s
own school; this means that he is not able [to keep to it]. [He explains]
without departing in that way. Affirming such doctrines as the
Puggalavāda which are rejected in the Kathāvatthu and elsewhere is
known as adopting the system of another school; this means that he
combines another teaching with his own teaching.

There is also a brief comment on this passage in Vibh-a-y² (C° ed.
K. Paññāsekha, dated to BE 2436), p. 79.
Abbreviations
Abbreviations used in this article are those of V. Trenkner et al., *A Critical Pāli Dictionary*, Copenhagen, 1924–.

VRI: the text cited has been seen only in the digital edition published by the Vipassana Research Institute.

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Cousins – On the Vibhajjāvādins

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COMING TO BE AND PASSING AWAY
Buddhist reflections on embryonic life, dying and organ donation

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Many ethical issues and problems cluster around the beginning and end of human life, such as abortion, the use of embryonic tissue, euthanasia, and the ‘harvesting’ of organs of the dead. With recent advances in our knowledge of the human genome, no doubt many new issues will be raised in the future. On such topics, it is surely appropriate to be aware of what the world’s great religious traditions have to say about the nature of human life, its beginning and ending.

Buddhism sees a human rebirth as rare and precious, and I have argued elsewhere that classical Indian Buddhism has a basic assumption against abortion and euthanasia (Harvey 2000, 286–352). I will not emphasise these arguments here, but look in more depth at the understanding of life in the womb and in the process of dying. While in principle human life is seen to have clear points of starting and ending, marked by the arising of ‘relinking’ (pati-sandhi) consciousness in the womb and the departure of the deceasing (cuti) consciousness, these are only part of complex processes of change in which clusters of conditions develop and mature, or gradually fall apart. In this paper, I propose to delineate how these changing processes are mapped by the Pali tradition, Abhidhamma-kosā-bhāṣya, and some of their modern interpreters, and end with a discussion of Buddhist views on organ donation.

Embryonic life
In the first part of the following discussion, ‘embryo’ or ‘foetus’ will be used equally for the being in the womb at any stage of development, even though there is a usage in which ‘zygote’ means
fertilised egg, ‘embryo’ refers to the womb-being for the first eight weeks, and ‘foetus’ for the being after this time.

In Buddhism’s rebirth-perspective, human life is not seen as something that gradually emerges as an embryo develops. Consciousness is not as such an emergent property of this process, but is itself seen as one of the conditions for it to occur, as expressed in a passage from the Dīgha-nikāya:

Were consciousness (viññāna), Ānanda, not to fall (okkamissatha) into the mother’s womb, would the sentient body (nāma-rūpa) be constituted there? ‘It would not, Lord.’ ‘Were consciousness, having fallen into the mother’s womb, to turn aside from it, would the sentient body come to birth in this present state?’ ‘It would not, Lord’ (D II 62–3).

Thus the flux of consciousness from a previous being is a necessary condition for the arising and development in the womb of a body (rūpa) endowed with mental abilities which amount to sentience (nāma, literally ‘name’): feeling, identification, volition, sensory stimulation and attention (S II 3–4). In the monastic code, it is said that ‘from the mind’s first arising, from (the time of) consciousness becoming first manifest in a mother’s womb until the time of death, here meanwhile he is called a human being’ (Vin III 73).

The commentary (Vin-a 437) explains this time as ‘from the first relinking mind (paṭisandhi-citta), with the commentary on the above D II 62–3 passage (D-a 502) also using this term for the consciousness which falls into or enters the womb1. ‘Relinking’ mind or consciousness is a commentarial term for the consciousness which connects to a new life, right at the start of life in the womb. Buddhagosa sees it as arising immediately after the ‘falling away’ (cuti) consciousness which occurs at the end of the previous life (Vism 460, 554), which mirrors the canonical Paṭṭhāna, which says the same of the ‘arising’ mind (I 312–12; see CR 338–39). The Vibhaṅga holds that from the moment of ‘arising’

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1 See also Paṭis I 52, Vism 528, 600.
(uppati) in a new life, all five khandhas are present (p. 411), including feeling, identification, constructing activities, and consciousness.

The Paṭṭhāna holds that the subtle physical basis (vatthu) for both mind-organ (mano) and mind-consciousness (mano-viññāṇa)2 is present from the time of ‘relinking’. Not only the physical basis of mind, but the mind itself is present from conception. The Vibhaṅga holds that the mental sense (manāyatana) and the sense of touch are seen as present from ‘the moment of arising’ (Vibh 413). While some schools held that the subtle matter sensitive to light, sound, smell and taste—and thus perhaps the relevant forms of consciousness—were present from then, both the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins5 held that these gradually developed later, with the former holding that this took seventy-two days in all (Kv-a 148), i.e. around ten weeks.

Now the degree of consciousness present from ‘relinking’ need not be seen as always, or necessarily, existing at the level of conscious awareness6. The Theravādins, for example, accepted a form of latent consciousness present in dreamless-sleep (see Harvey 1995, 155–66; Collins 1982, 225–49), known as bhavanga, which also occurs in the womb (Vism 614) if not disturbed by any more active form of consciousness7. Nevertheless, full consciousness can occur in the womb. A Dīgha-nikāya passage on the four modes of ‘descent into the womb’ (gabbhāvākkanti) explains that a being may be:

1. ‘without clear awareness’ (asampajāno) when

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2 Paṭṭh.1.5; see CR I 6.
3 Paṭṭh.1 70; CR I 74. Cf. Vism 613 explains that at the instant of relinking consciousness arising, the physical bases of mind, sense of touch, and gender, arise.
4 In the form of the body-sense-element and mind-consciousness element, but not body-consciousness-element or mind-element (mano-dhātu) (Vibh 414).
5 As interpreted by Vasubandhu at Abhidh-k-bh II 14b.
6 Thus Keown prefers the term ‘sentiency’ to ‘consciousness’ for viññāṇa, since it is not restricted to the mental sphere in quite the same way (1995, 25).
7 Cf. also the ālaya-vijñāna.
(a) falling into the womb (कुचिः ओक्कमति; D-a 885: at relinking),
(b) staying in it, or
(c) leaving it at birth;
(2) ‘with clear awareness’ just at (a),
(3) ‘with clear awareness’ at (a) and (b),
(4) ‘with clear awareness’ at (a), (b) and (c) (D III 103, 231)\(^8\).

In the Suttas, it is also said that Gotama was ‘mindful and with clear awareness’ at the time of entering his mother’s womb (M III 119), whereas later texts give further details for which beings the above four types of ‘descent’ pertain to:

(1) ‘humans who have a worldly nature’ (D-a 885–6), ‘beings without great actions and great knowledge’ (Abhidh-k-bh III 16–17),
(2) eighty great elders (D-a 885–86), cakkavatti kings (Abhidh-k-bh III 16–17),
(3) two chief disciples, pacceka-buddhas and bodhisattas (D-a 885–86), pacceka-buddhas (Abhidh-k-bh III 16–17),
(4) perfect Buddhas (D-a 885–86 and Abhidh-k-bh III 16–17)\(^9\).

This implies that it is easier to have ‘clear awareness’ early on when in the womb than later. While this may seem odd to us, it must be based on the idea that the more spiritually advanced are able to sustain clear awareness for a longer period in the womb. Now the lack of ‘clear awareness’ for most beings in the womb does not imply a complete absence of thought, for D-a 885 sees it as simply equivalent to being ‘confused’ (सम्मुल्ला), and Abhidh-k-bh III 16 talks of one who lacks clear awareness having various confused thoughts about where he is when in the womb, whereas

\(^8\) Cf. Abhidh-k-bh III 16–17. Kritzer (2000) discusses interpretations of these in various Sanskrit texts such as the विभाषा, Abhidharmaकोशा-भाष्य and योगचाराभिमृ.

\(^9\) The विभाषा discusses six different views on which type of beings are involved in these four situations (Kritzer 2000, 15–18).
one with clear awareness knows what is happening to him or her. Moreover, Vism 500 describes the embryo as suffering in various ways due to both the process of growth—‘for ten months he undergoes excessive suffering’—and his mother’s movements, great pain arising if an abortion is carried out. Abhidh-k-bh IV 53a–b describes the embryo, at each of its five stages of development (see below), as experiencing the results of karma, which again must entail some kind of conscious experiences. Thus life in the womb entails being at least vaguely conscious, sometimes aware.

The above shows, then, that classical Buddhism sees human life as starting right at the start of pregnancy, and that mental life of some kind is possible from this time. This is reflected in the fact that, while a person must be twenty to be ordained as a full monk (Vin I 78), this age is reckoned from conception, not leaving the womb:

When in his mother’s womb, the first citta has arisen, the first consciousness appeared, his birth is (to be reckoned as) from that time. I allow you monks, to ordain one who is aged twenty from being an embryo (gabbha-vīsam) (Vin I 93).

Here, Vism 499 sees such ‘birth’ as meaning ‘relinking’.

Yet while there has been reference to ‘conception’ above, modern biological knowledge shows that there are two key events at the start of life:

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10 Kritzer (2000, 7–8) sees a possible source for this as a passage in the Mūla-sarvāstivāda-vinaya (Taishō 1451, 257c19–258c6).
11 Though Vibh 415–16 holds that only pleasure or indifference is felt at the actual moment of arising in a new life, not pain.
12 Collins expresses the view, based on the Tibetan tradition, that the ‘very subtle consciousness’ present in the embryo need not imply ‘wakefulness or awareness’ prior to the development of sense-organs (1999, 199).
(1) *fertilisation* of the ovum by a sperm, which takes place in the oviduct or Fallopian tubes, normally five minutes to an hour after intercourse’ (Keown 1995, 78) and

(2) *implantation* of the fertilised egg in the lining of the womb, which takes place six or seven days later, and takes eight or nine days to complete its attachment (Keown 1995, 77).

As Keown reports:

Cell division within the embryo continues during its journey to the uterus which takes about five days, at the end of which the original single cell will have multiplied to over one hundred (Keown 1995, 76).

At what point might Buddhism see ‘relinking’ consciousness arising, so that there is a ‘human being’? Of possible relevance here is a Majjhima-nikāya text which describes the three conditions which must all be met for a human life to start:

If there is, here, a coitus of the parents, and it is the mother’s season, and a gandhabba is present: it is from the conjunction of these three things that there is descent of the embryo (gabbhassāvakkanti) [and not if only the first, or only the first and second, condition is met]. Then, monks, the mother for nine or ten months carries the embryo (gabbha) in her womb with great anxiety for her heavy burden. When it is born, she feeds it with her own life-blood … that is to say, mother’s milk (M I 266).

Here, there must both be the appropriate physical conditions of sexual intercourse at the right time of the month, and also the presence of a gandhabba. The latter term indicates a being who is ready to be reborn (M-a II 310). While the developed Theravāda view is that gandhabba, here, is just a way of talking of the in-

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13 After fertilisation itself, when the sperm penetrates the outer layer of the ovum, about twenty-four hours later the two sets of twenty-three chromosomes fuse together (Keown, 1995, 82). Collins (1999, 197–8) reports that as ‘Sperm may remain in the female reproductive tract for as long as forty-eight hours before reaching the ripe ovum’, this fusing may be up to three days after intercourse.
stantaneously-transmitted consciousness of a being who has just died, as they accept no between-lives interlude, the Sarvāstivādins—and also the Mahāyānists—saw it (Skt. gandharva) as the name for a between-lives being (Abhidh-k-bh II 4, 10, 13–15, 40). Indeed, even in the Theravāda collection of Suttas, there is a good body of evidence to support the idea of such a between-lives state, with the gandhabba as a kind of mutable, restless ‘spirit’ seeking out a new rebirth to ‘fall’ into (Harvey 1995, 98–108). Vasubandhu even describes, in a Freudian-sounding way, how the gandhabba observes the sexual intercourse of its future parents: if it is male, it is sexually attracted to the mother and is hostile to the father, and vice versa if it is female. It attaches itself to where the sexual organs meet but then dies, so that there is ‘re-linking’ and the start of a new life (Abhidh-k-bh III 15a–b).

What, though, is one to make of the above term gabbhassāvakkanti, which can mean either descent (avakkanti) ‘of the embryo’ or ‘into the womb’, as gabbha can mean ‘embryo’ or ‘womb’ and the ending -assa could be either genitive or dative. The commentary (M-a II 310) favours the former meaning, which makes sense, given that the passage goes on to use gabbha to clearly mean the embryo. Now this ‘descent’ of the embryo is clearly not that of its exit from the womb at birth- for the above passage sees this as coming later. Could it be read as alluding to ‘descent’ of the fertilised ovum to implantation? This seems ill-supported by the above passage, for no literal ‘descent’ need be meant. Avakkanti has an alternative form okkanti, and the verbal form of this, okkamati, is used of ‘falling’ asleep (Vin I 15). The word can also mean simply ‘enter’.

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14 Gabbhassa avakkanti in the citing of this passage at Mil 123.
15 At D III 103, above, the term gabbhāvakkanti (without the -assa) probably means ‘descent into the womb’. At Vin II 278, on the other hand, a pregnant woman is described as samisinna-gabbhā, ‘with an established embryo’.
16 The future form of which is used on consciousness ‘falling’ into the womb at D II 62–3, above.
Keown raises the issue of whether the embryo might ‘descend’ some time after the three conditions of the text had been met, at implantation, with the gandhabba present, but not entering the womb till then—but sees no hint of such a time delay in the above passage (1995, 74–5). After some analysis, he holds that in modern terms, ‘we have every reason to locate the descent of the intermediate being at fertilisation’ (Keown 1995, 78), this being a very clear point of origin, from which everything else follows (Keown 1995, 79). He says, ‘we might picture the consciousness of the intermediate being engulfing the fertilised ovum in a psychic field, rather like a magnetic field surrounding a magnet’ (Keown 1995, 81). In a similar way, David Stott, based on the views of his Tibetan teachers, such as Karma Thinley Rinpoche, says that when the sperm and ovum fuse, ‘in a chain reaction of interdependence, the attaching mental continuum loses its distinct identity and is thus “fused” with the sperm and ovum’ (1986, 11), such that, ‘Once the seed and ovum come together, there is a sentient being’ (Stott 1992, 174).

Thus we can say that Buddhism sees a human being, endowed with some form of consciousness, as present from the time of the fusing of sperm and egg at fertilisation. For the period after this, the Śānyutta-nikāya describes five stages of life in the womb, each one leading onto the next: kalala, abbuda (literally ‘swelling’), pesī (literally ‘lump’), ghana (literally ‘swelling mass’), then the pasākhā, the ‘extremities’ such as hair and nails. The commentary (S-a I 301) explains these stages, each lasting seven days:

1. the kalala is like a drop of oil on a hair tip;
2. the abbuda is like a drop of sap on a hair tip;
3. the pesī is like a swelling on a hair tip;
4. the ghana is like a swelling of the womb itself;
5. the pasākhā is like a swelling of the extremities of the body.

17 S I 206, cf. Nidd I 120 and Mil 40; translations from McDermott 1998, 180. See also the 14th century Thai work, The Three Worlds According to King Rang (Reynolds & Reynolds 1982, 115–118). The latter calls the fifth stage that of the pāṇca-sākhā or ‘five-branched’, which has five protuberances that become the hands (including palms and fingers at the end of seven days), feet and head. After another seven days, the hair and nails have developed. Thus, after 42 days (i.e. six weeks), all the basic features of a human have developed.

18 Cf. Hindu views on the subject, as described in Lipner 1991, 55–6.
(2) the *abbuda* (‘swelling’) is like water in which flesh has been washed;
(3) the *pesi* (‘lump’) coagulates as a piece of flesh soft like refined lead;
(4) the *ghana* (‘swelling mass’) is like a hen’s egg;
(5) the extremities then develop, with the hands, feet and head appearing in the fifth week, with the embryo mature at 22 weeks, and born after ten lunar months, i.e. around 40 weeks\(^1\).

Given that the *kalala* is seen as the first stage of embryonic growth, it is worth reflecting on what might be being referred to. One meaning of the word is ‘mud’ or ‘soil’, but Mil 49 uses the word to refer to the yolk of a hen’s egg. While ancient Indian thought saw the woman’s contribution to conception as blood, to go with the man’s sperm, rather than an ovum (Keown 1995, 75–7), the *kalala* as like an egg yolk is rather close to the idea of an ovum. An interesting passage here is Mil 125, part of a discussion (pp. 123–30) on non-standard ways of getting pregnant. In dealing with the case of a nun who became pregnant after she put (*pakkhipi*) semen into her vagina (Vin III 205–06), the word *kalala* is used in both its senses:

‘Revered sir, when the seed (*bījam*) meets with well prepared soil (*kalale*), does it germinate quickly?’

‘Yes, sire.’

‘Even so, revered sir, the nun having her season, when the *kalala* blood was ready, by the semen being placed in the arisen surge (of blood), with that as origin, it was put in (*pakkhipi*) the *kalala*: by that the embryo was established for her\(^2\)’.

This all seems to imply that the *kalala* is like a tiny drop of oil which, yolk-like, is fed by female blood and quickly germinates semen just as well-prepared soil does a seed, and which remains as

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\(^2\) Note that at *Milinda’s Questions* I 174, I.B.Horner’s translation of Mil 125, not used here, is rather approximate.
the first phase of the developing embryo, which would correspond to the time between fertilisation and implantation.

The above outline of five stages of embryonic growth broadly accords with the modern view, in which week five sees the first signs of a nose, jaw and limb buds, and internal organs begin to form. By week eight, the foetus is about one inch long and the head begins to look more ‘human’, with the brain gradually developing (along with the central nervous system), and its convolutions developing between weeks 20 and 30. Research done in 1994 has also shown that foetuses of 23 weeks demonstrate ‘very clear pain response’ in terms of a huge surge in hormonal stress level, though David Alton, who wishes to tighten up the UK abortion law, has said that there was already ‘longstanding evidence that unborn babies, as early as seven to eight weeks, can feel pain’\textsuperscript{21}. He also says:

By 18 weeks a child has sentience, and is no different except in size and weight from the child at 28 weeks. By 20 weeks … its heart is pumping … it has all its organs functioning; it has a complete skeleton, reflexes, and much else besides\textsuperscript{22}.

In the womb, many fertilised embryos die, at any stage of development, due to miscarriage or genetic defects, an unfortunate fact of which Buddhism has long been aware (Mil 301–2, Vism 236, Vin-a II 468f.). Of course, this is no more relevant to the ethics of abortion than the fact of adult death due to illness is relevant to the ethics of killing. The ethics of the situation is also not altered by the fact that many ova are never fertilised and so never implant\textsuperscript{23}.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{The Guardian}, 8 July, 1994. Collins (1999, 201) alludes to recent research showing foetal response to sound at around 20 weeks or even 14 weeks. Accordingly, in a reconstruction of traditional Buddhist views in the light of scientific evidence, she tentatively proposes 14 weeks as the time when ‘subtle consciousness’ enters the embryo. Her rationale for this is that, just as ancient Buddhist cosmology needs updating, so do its views in other areas.

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{The Guardian}, 5 October, 1987.

\textsuperscript{23} Keown (1995, 85–91) also raises the question of whether the development of identical twins, from the splitting of the embryo in the first two weeks after fer-
The relevance of the age of the foetus to the ethics of abortion

In law, it is often the case that abortion is permitted on certain grounds on foetuses of a certain age. In England and Wales, abortions can be carried out up to 28 weeks (though foetuses can survive from 23 weeks), while France only allows them up to 10 weeks. What might Buddhism have to say in this area?

In the Petavatthu, there are two stories on jealous elder wives causing younger ones to miscarry or abort, one at two months, the other at three months.24 In both cases, the women falsely swear they did not do it, and go on to be reborn as ill-smelling ghosts due to the deed and the lie. They also suffer in having to devour their own children, as they had sworn they would if they were lying in their oaths (Pv I 6 and 7). Here, the karmic result is the same whether the foetus is two or three months old, and McDermott sees this as evidence that the age of an aborted foetus is not seen by Buddhism as affecting the seriousness of the act (1998, 160–61). Keown also holds that causing the death of a foetus is as grave an offence as killing an adult (1995, 93), and Stott holds that a foetus is:

not a ‘partially souled’ being nor a ‘potential’ being but an embodied sentient being, however small. It would thus be difficult for any Western Buddhist to make the claim that the smaller the foetus, the less serious the abortion (1992, 176).

Yet there is some ambiguity in the textual evidence. Given the Buddhist view of embryonic life, it is not surprising that causing an abortion is seen as a serious act:

When a monk is ordained he should not intentionally deprive a living being of life, even if it is only an ant. Whatever monk deprives a hu-

24 And see Reynolds & Reynolds 1982, 98 and Dhp-a 45–53.
man being of life, even (antamaso) down to destroying an embryo (gabbha-pātanam upādāya), he becomes not a (true) renouncer, not a son of the Sākiyans (Vin I 97).

The penalty for a monk intentionally causing an abortion is permanent expulsion from the Saṅgha:

Whatever monk should intentionally deprive a human being of life ... he is also one who is defeated [in the monastic life], he is not in communion ... Human being means: from the mind’s first arising, from (the time of) consciousness becoming first manifest in a mother’s womb until the time of death, here meanwhile he is called a human (Vin III 73).

It is clear from the second of these passages that causing an abortion is seen as a case of murder, and the commentary on Vin I 97 says that the offence is committed even if the foetus is only in its first phase, as a kalala (Vin-a 437–38). Yet Vin I 97, by using the word ‘even’, implies that, just as killing an ant is the least serious case of killing an animal, so killing a foetus is the least serious case of killing a human. Of course, even this is seen as a serious, grave offence (which actually entails the same monastic punishment, expulsion, as any other killing of a human\(^2\)), yet this does not prevent other acts of murder from being more morally serious.

Does the unskilfulness of abortion increase as the foetus gets larger? Trevor Ling, based on a study of views in Thailand and Sri Lanka, says:

In general it can be said that in Theravāda Buddhist countries the moral stigma which attaches to abortion increases with the size of the foetus. This is an aspect of the general Buddhist notion that the seriousness of the act of taking life increases with the size, complexity and even sanctity of the being whose life is taken. It is relatively less serious to destroy a mosquito than a dog: less serious to destroy a dog than an elephant; it is more serious to take the life of a man than of an

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\(^2\) Also at Vin IV 124–25, dealing with the killing of animals, the punishment only varies according to such matters as intention and foreknowledge of the monk, with no discussion of killing of different kinds of animals.
Harvey – Coming to Be and Passing away

elephant, and most serious of all to take the life of a monk. It would thus be less serious to terminate the life of a month-old foetus than of a child about to be born (1969, 58)\(^2\).

Here, there is probably an allusion to a key commentarial passage at M-a I 198:

‘Onslaught on breathing beings’ is, as regards a breathing being that one perceives as living, the will to kill it, expressed through body or speech, occasioning an attack which cuts off its life-faculty. That action, in regard to those without good qualities (guṇa)—animals, etc.—is of lesser fault when they are small, greater fault when they have a large physical frame. Why? Because of the greater effort involved. Where the effort is the same, (it is greater) due to the object (yatthu) (of the act) being greater. In regard to those with good qualities—humans, etc.—the action is of lesser fault when they are of few good qualities, greater fault when they are of many good qualities. But when size or good qualities are equal, the fault of the action is lesser due to the (relative) mildness of the mental defilements and of the attack, and greater due to their intensity\(^2\).

Keown argues that the size criterion in this passage only applies to animals, not humans, for whom degree of virtue is seen as crucial (1995, 96, 99). He argues that all human life is seen as equally valuable, but that extra virtue gives additional value to a person, too (p. 97). However, the above passage does acknowledge that it is morally worse to kill some animals than others—even though the same monastic penalty applies—and worse to kill some humans than others.

Now in the case of foetuses, they may be reborn beings of greater or lesser virtue, but as this cannot be known by a person contemplating an abortion, this cannot be a relevant consideration for assessing their degree of fault if they had an abortion. The

\(^2\) Apart from this, he cites a Thai non-Buddhist popular belief that the khwan or spirit is only properly established in a child three days after birth, making it properly ‘human’ (p. 58).

age/size of a foetus is, broadly, knowable, and while the above passage does not apply the size criterion to humans, it does say that the intensity of bad motive, and of the means used, make the act worse. Now to abort a foetus at five months—by inducing contractions—arguably does entail more forceful means than to do so at, say, two months, by scraping out the uterus. This would mean that the act of the abortionist would be worse when the abortion is later—and also the act of the woman requesting the abortion if she knew that more violent means were to be used. In any case, with a later abortion, the woman would have a more developed relationship with the foetus, which would mean that her motivation to have an abortion at this stage would probably have to be more intense, and perhaps perverse, in order to go through with the abortion.

Thus on these two grounds, rather than size per se, a later abortion would be worse than an earlier one, though an early one would still be a grave act. Both these points are contained in a statement of Dr. Pinit Ratanakul, who holds that Thai Buddhists believe in the uniqueness and preciousness of human life irrespective of its stages of development … To destroy any form of human life will yield bad karmic results … The gravity of these results depends on many factors, such as the intensity of the doer’s intention and effort, as well as the size and quality of the being that was killed … In the case of induced abortion, the stages of the development of the fetus aborted influence the degree of the karmic consequences for those who perpetrate abortion. These different stages also imply different degrees of the potential of the fetus which itself influences the weight of the karmic consequences (1998, 56).

He thus sees Thai women’s preference to have earlier rather than later abortions as appropriate. While this preference may be partly

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28 Saying this would seem to imply that it is worse to kill someone that one has a positive relationship with—relative or friend—than a stranger. Though this is never exactly spelled out anywhere, the fact that it is seen as a terrible act to intentionally kill a parent might be seen to imply that it is also particularly bad, though to a lesser degree, to kill any relative.
Harvey – Coming to Be and Passing away

because a late abortion is more difficult to hide from others, this is not the only consideration.

So, it is clear that Buddhism sees abortion as akin to killing an adult human, but that does not mean that all such acts are equally bad. As a parallel, note that in American law, murderers may get different sentences, depending on the circumstances and motive of the act. Those who kill in self-defence or in war are also treated differently. Thus there can surely be degrees of badness in abortion as in other forms of intentional killing.

Nevertheless, it is clear from Vinaya passages quoted above that deliberate abortion is always worse than killing an animal, which would include killing, say, an elephant, seen as a noble animal in Buddhism, or a chimpanzee, which is nowadays seen as the most developed of animals. As I think that there are Buddhist grounds for saying that an abortion becomes worse according to the age of the foetus, so we could say that abortion is not as bad as killing a new-born baby—though in the last few months of pregnancy, the difference may be minimal. We could thus say that the evil of an abortion lies somewhere between the evil of killing a chimpanzee and the evil of killing a baby, other things being equal (see Harvey 2000, 321–26).

Robert Florida argues that it is less bad to abort a younger foetus as this entails inflicting less pain, the degree of suffering caused being the criterion of how bad an action is (1998, 16; 2000, 144). He goes too far here, though, for Buddhism would still object to painlessly killing someone. That someone feels pain in being killed is only part of the evil of killing29, though when a killing entails more pain, it is appropriate to see it as worse. As regards the extent to which foetuses suffer, we have seen that scientific evidence sees this as starting to occur at 23 weeks or earlier, as indicated by a huge surge in hormone stress level30. While Buddhist texts see

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29 Keown 1995, 35–6 appropriately argues against taking sentiency as the ‘essence’ of a living being, yet goes too far in seemingly seeing degree of pain inflicted as irrelevant to assessing the evil involved in a killing.

pain as entailed at any stage in the womb (Vism 500) and some sense of touch as present from the beginning (Vibh 413; Abhidh-k-bh II 14b), it seems valid to say that a more developed foetus would be more sensitive to pain, such that a later abortion would accordingly be worse if the foetus were not anaesthetised.

The question of the criteria for death
At the other end of a human life, issues arise relating to death. If Buddhism sees all intentional killing as unwholesome and against the precepts—which applies to genuine cases of euthanasia—we need to know what it is for a person to still be ‘alive’ and thus capable of being ‘killed’: what are the criteria for being ‘alive’ and being ‘dead’? The type of scenario which particularly raises this issue is that of a patient in a ‘persistent vegetative state’ (PVS). Here, a patient is in a coma as the neocortex of their brain has been damaged. If this continues for a long time, the damage may be regarded as irreversible. If the brain-stem of the patient is undamaged, they can breathe themselves (though artificial respiration may be added as an aid), digest, their heart will beat (though may need help in regulating it), and their body will retain certain reflexes such as dilation of the pupils and, usually, swallowing, yet the senses do not seem to work, and no voluntary movements are made (cf. Keown 1995, 160; Mettānando 1991, 210). Being permanently without any sign of conscious awareness and the ability to make decisions, two questions can arise:

1. is the patient still a ‘person’ with value?
2. is the patient alive?

Some would regard the life of a human who is not a ‘person’ as without value, such that it is not unethical to kill them. Buddhism, however, does not see the value of life as residing in personhood (Keown 1995, 27–30). This is shown by the fact that animals and humans in the womb have value and should not be killed. Some Buddhists would still say that a life without volition (Van Loon 1978) or awareness/sentiency (Redmond 1991, 19–20, 22, 23)
would be without value. Yet even were one to accept these criteria, which are debatable\(^{31}\), there seems no way of knowing that, in the inner recesses of a patient’s mind, these qualities are not present, albeit in an attenuated form. Buddhism accepts many meditative states in which consciousness behaves in non-ordinary ways. It also accepts ‘formless’ rebirths, where consciousness is not accompanied by any kind of body. It is therefore hard to be sure that physical tests will always be able to detect existing states of consciousness. Indeed, the remaining consciousness may be reflecting on the dying process so as to help prepare for death, so as to attain as good a rebirth as possible (Mettānando 1991, 210). Vism 554 says that, as a person is dying ‘his body gradually withers like a green palm leaf lying in the glare of the sun, and when the faculties of eye, etc., have ceased and the body faculty [sense of touch], mind faculty and life faculty remain on in the heart-basis alone\(^{32}\), then consciousness, which has as its support the heart-basis still remaining at that moment,’ remains until there is deceasing (cuti) consciousness followed by relinking (paṭisandhi) consciousness (Vism 554). Thus there is a phase when a dying person cannot see or hear but has some remaining consciousness and can be seen to be in the process of preparing for death.

Is a patient in a PVS alive, then? It seems that, by Buddhist criteria, he would be. Keown (1995, 145–58) has a good review of the relevant textual material. Two passages (S III 143 and M I 296) affirm that a body is dead and ‘will-less (acetana) like a log of wood’ when it is without three things: ‘life (āyu), heat and consciousness (viññāṇa)’. It is explained that ‘life’ and heat depend on each other, like the light and flame of a lamp, and that the five sense organs depend on heat (M I 195). The ‘life-activities’ (āyu-samkhāras) are not states that are felt, otherwise one would die in the meditative state of the ‘cessation of cognition and feeling’ (M I

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\(^{31}\) See Keown 1995, 32–7, 143–44, 160–61. Such criteria would also seem to give scant grounds for not killing a person who was unconscious and insentient under anaesthetic! Cf. note 29.

\(^{32}\) Cf. the situation at conception (p. 185, above).
This is a state attained by advanced meditators in which all functions of the mind shut down, and on the way to attaining it, breathing ceases (M I 296 and 301). Unlike a dead body, which has no life or heat, and has the sense organs ‘wholly dis-integrated’, a person in the state of cessation still has life and heat, and his sense-organs are ‘clarified’. It is left ambiguous as to whether consciousness still occurs in this state, and the different Buddhist schools had different opinions on this. In his study of the state of cessation, Griffiths sees it as a state in which a person may seem dead (M I 333; Vism 380), as they do not breath and ‘heartbeat, blood pressure, body temperature and metabolic levels in general have all fallen to a very low level’ and mentally, a person is in a state which Western medical observers might liken to a profound cataleptic trance (1986, 10–11). It lasts for up to seven days (Vism 707).

The above shows that Buddhism holds it possible to be in a state in which there is no breathing, and no detectable mental activity, and yet be alive. A persistent vegetative state is not the same as the state of cessation, but shares some of its qualities. One difference is that a person continues to breathe, unaided, in the PSV. Buddhism would clearly not regard one in such a state as dead, then, and to remove intravenous or tube feeding from such a person would be to kill him or her.

A famous case of this type was that of Tony Bland, who in 1989 was crushed in a football stadium disaster and was in a PVS. In 1993, the UK House of Lords ruled that the food provided to him by a tube was a form of futile treatment, and could legally be withdrawn, even though this would lead to his death. The death which followed was in a heavily sedated state (Keown 1995, 159–68). This was in accord with the recommendations of the 1988 Euthanasia report of the British Medical Association, which opposes active euthanasia, but accepts that futile treatment, which it sees as

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33 The Vibhanga says that ‘life-faculty’ (jivitindriya) is sometimes associated with feeling (p. 125), just as it is sometimes associated with consciousness (p. 131).
including artificial means of feeding, may be removed from terminal patients\textsuperscript{34}. Keown (1995, 162–64), however, rightly disputes whether feeding could be regarded as ‘futile treatment’. Firstly, he points out that feeding, even if done by nurses, could not be seen as medical treatment unless it was of a kind specifically selected to cure an illness, which it was not. Even if it were regarded as ‘treatment’, its only possible aim was to sustain life. As it was succeeding in doing so, it could not be seen as ‘futile treatment’, i.e. treatment which was not attaining its goal.

In a somewhat similar case in 1995, the Irish Supreme Court decided that a woman who had lain in a coma for twenty-three years could have her feeding-tube removed, even though she was not in a PVS but could still recognise people. The grounds were that feeding by tube was an intrusive and unusual method of feeding which interfered with the integrity of her body\textsuperscript{35}. Yet the view of a dissenting judge on the court seems correct: the action was intended to cause death by starvation. If someone cannot feed herself, it is the duty of others to help her, by whatever means.

To say that a patient in a PVS is alive, and should not be starved to death, is not to say that extraordinary medical means should be used to keep them alive indefinitely. A patient in such a state is very prone to infections. As Keown argues, ‘it does not follow that there is a duty to go to extreme lengths to preserve life at all costs’ (1995, 167). Such a person could be seen as beyond medical help, such that any medical treatment would be futile, as it could not restore health. If relatives wished medical complications such as infections to be treated, they should be, unless resources are genuinely not available. If not, the condition should go untreated, so as to allow nature to take its course, and the patient die\textsuperscript{36}.

What, though, of a patient whose brain-stem has died, so that they cannot breath unaided (which those with live brain-stems

\textsuperscript{34} The Guardian, 6 May, 1988.
\textsuperscript{36} cf. Mett\'anando 1991, 209–11, though he only talks of withholding treatment, including life-support, if resources are needed for others in intensive care.
usually can), and are without any reflexes: are they then to be regarded as dead, so that no action can be seen as ‘killing’ them any longer? Keown (1995, 151–58) argues that brain-stem death should be taken by Buddhism as the correct criterion for death. He points out that Vin III 73 defines killing as the ‘cutting off of the vitality-faculty (jīvita-indriya)’ and that Vin-a II 438–39 specifies this as the physical vitality-faculty rather than the mental one, which in any case depends on it (1995, 148). The commentary on M I 296 identifies ‘life (āyu)’ with this material vitality-faculty (M-a II 351), and the Abhidhamma defines this as:

That which, of these material states, is life (āyu), persistence, continuance, lastness, movement, upkeep, keeping going, vitality, vitality-faculty (Dhs § 635).

Buddhaghosa says it ‘has the characteristic of maintaining conascent types of matter. Its function is to make them occur. It is manifested in the establishment of their presence’ (Vism 447). It is identified with ‘vital breath’ (prāna) (Abhidh-k-bh IV 73ab), but clearly not with the physical breath, for as ‘life’, it is seen as occurring from the moment of conception, due to past karma (Abhidh-k-bh II 45b). It is thus clearly not identified with any organic structure or function, such as breathing, but as Keown says, seems to denote ‘the basic biological processes of life’ (1995, 149). As ‘life’ and heat are compared to the light and flame of a lamp, they can be seen as two processes which keep biological processes ‘burning’, i.e. functioning.

Keown refers to the meaning of prāna in Buddhist medicine, and in Buddhist influenced Ayurveda (Indian traditional medicine) as ranging ‘from the gross physical process of respiration to the flow of subtle energy which was thought to regulate the internal functioning of the body’ so as to regulate ‘respiration, heartbeat, swallowing, digestion, evacuation, menstruation, and many other bodily functions. In this capacity it seems to be closely related to
the autonomic system’ (1995, 149). He goes on (p. 151) to cite Mettānando (1991, 204) as saying, ‘This group of interrelated bodily functions attributed to the prāna we now recognize as bodily functions maintained by the nuclei of the brainstem’. While Keown holds that, as ‘life’ and heat always occur together, so permanent loss of body heat seems to be ‘the only empirical criterion offered by the early sources as a means of determining death’ (1995, 151), he concurs with Mettānando in taking brain-stem death as signifying the end of life. Mettānando sees this as entailing that prāna and consciousness have gone (1991, 206), and Keown sees it as meaning there is no body-heat, presumably as he sees the brain-stem as its cause (1995, 152). Keown holds that early Buddhist texts see ‘death is the irreversible loss of the integrated organic functioning which a living organism displays’ (1995, 155), as when M I 296 says that death involves the ‘disintegration of the sense-organs (indriyāni viparibhinnāni)’. At death, often referred to as the ‘break-up of the body’, the operation of the sense-organs ‘is no longer co-ordinated as it would be in a living, self-regulating organism’ (1995, 156). He regards the brain-stem as carrying out such a ‘co-ordinating function’, without which ‘the organism ceases to be a unified whole and can no longer survive’, even if components can survive a while longer: the heart continues to beat for up to an hour (1995, 155), and remains alive for an hour or so even after this stops, and the skeletal muscles live for another six hours (Barnard 1978, 201). Thus irreversible brain-stem death is the best criterion for determining that death—an end to integrated organic functioning—has occurred, this being simultaneous with consciousness leaving the body (1995, 158). Keown does not actually identify ‘life’/‘vitality-faculty’ with the brain-stem, but sees it as closely related to it.

An influential criterion for when death—irreversible loss of ‘integrating function of the organism as a whole’ (Bartlett 1995,

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37 In Tibetan Buddhist thought, consciousness is said to be mounted on the prānas or winds which circulate through many channels in the body (Sogyal 1992, 248–49).
271)—has occurred, is that of the 1968 report of the ad-hoc committee of the Harvard Medical School. This sees death as occurring with ‘the complete absence of brain functions at all levels including cerebral, midbrain, brainstem and even upper spinal levels’ (Keown 1995, 142). This implies loss of spontaneous respiration and often of spontaneous heart-beat (Hämmerli 1978, 187–88). The criterion was framed so as to allow the ‘harvesting’ of organs, particularly kidneys, for donation (Hämmerli 1978, 187) from certain patients who had been attached to a life-support system to sustain breathing and heart-beat. Tests to see if ‘death’ according to the above criterion has occurred include failure to respond to sensori stimuli, no reflexes, pupils remaining enlarged, even in the light, no spontaneous breathing, swift fall of blood pressure after removal of artificial support for circulation, all after repeated examination, and a flat Electroencephalogram (EEG) (Hämmerli 1978, 187–88; cf. Keown 1995, 142). For these tests to be a reliable indicator that the Harvard definition of death has been satisfied, all the tests would have to be repeatedly negative. Just a lack of spontaneous breathing (which occurs in the meditative state of cessation) would not be enough, nor would a flat EEG reading, which can be due to hypothermia (Keown 1995, 157). A proper test for irreversible loss of spontaneous breathing would entail repeatedly switching off the ventilator over a few days, or very occasionally a few weeks, to see if breathing restarted (Hämmerli 1978, 189). As to how long it is switched off for each time, Keown suggests that this is three minutes, but raises the question of whether this is long enough to test the body’s own powers of spontaneous breathing (1995, 155). Ratanakul reports cases of people ‘coming alive’ several hours after death has been announced by the Harvard tests, which is used in urban Thailand, but it is unclear how rigorously the tests were applied in such cases (1990, 26).

Yet on Buddhist grounds, there remain some residual doubts as to whether brain-stem death is the best criterion for death. It is said that the vitality-factor is seen as existing from the time of conception, before the brain-stem has developed. Likewise, the Paṭṭhāna refers to ‘that material form’ which mind (mano) and mental-
consciousness (mano-viññāna) are supported by\textsuperscript{38} as a ‘basis’ existing from the time of conception (Paṭṭh 70). Buddhaghosa, perhaps influenced by Hindu ideas (Sugunasiri 1995), equates this with the ‘heart-basis’ (hadaya-vatthu) (Vism 537), this being a tiny region of the physical heart (Vism 256) and dependent on the blood (Vism 447). Mettānando holds that the prāna was also traditionally seen as located in the heart (1991, 204). The Sarvāstivādins, on the other hand, did not specify what the physical ‘basis’ of mind was, and the modern Theravāda writer Jayasuriya holds that the ‘heart-basis’ is best seen as referring to the entire nervous system, including the brain, which is of course dependent on the blood (for oxygen etc.) (1963, Appendix A)\textsuperscript{39}. Sugunasiri goes further than this, by pointing out that if the material basis for mind exists from conception, and the nervous system does not start to develop till eighteen days after this, then perhaps the material basis of mind can be seen as present in all cells, perhaps in the DNA (1995, 423–24). If this is the case, can one be sure that a person is dead even after brain-stem death, if the blood is still circulating by artificial means, or while bodily cells still survive even after this has stopped?

If not, then it seems that turning off an artificial respirator which is supporting a ‘brain-dead’ person may actually be to kill them. Yet here, as in other aspects of Buddhist ethics, intention is crucial. From the Tibetan tradition, Sogyal Rinpoche has said that to continue a life-support system when there is no chance of recovery may be imprisoning the patient in a useless body, so it is better to switch off the machine (if this is all that is keeping them alive) and let them die naturally in a peaceful atmosphere (Sogyal 1992, 372). Kalu Rinpoche has also affirmed that for a doctor who does this at the patient’s (previous) request, no bad karma is generated if they do so with the aim of helping the person and relieving their suffering (Sogyal 1992, 374). In such cases, ending treatment which is futile, but without the intention to kill may be acceptable.

\textsuperscript{38} Paṭṭh I 5, translated by U Nārada, CR I 6.

\textsuperscript{39} On the mind-body relationship, see Harvey 1993.
Organ donation

What of the removal of organs from brain-dead persons? They may well be completely past the point of no return (even return to a living coma), but is the death process complete? If organs are ‘harvested’ to transplant—which must be done from a ‘fresh’ corpse—or an autopsy is done too quickly, might this disrupt the last lingering phase of consciousness before it leaves the body for its next rebirth?

The idea of organ-donation is appealing to Buddhists, as it accords with ideals of compassionate generosity, illustrated by stories of Bodhisattas giving away parts of their bodies. In Jātaka story no. 499, king Sivi gives his eye to a blind brahmin, and Śāntideva discusses such acts in his Śikṣā-saṃuccaya. He cites the Nārāyana-pariprcchā as saying:

[T]he Bodhisattva must regard as medicine his frame composed of the four great elements, and say, ‘Let all creatures take it of me as they require it, a hand, for such as need it, or a foot, for such as need it’ (Bendall & Rouse 1971, 24).

But today, while live donation of an organ (e.g. a kidney) would pose no problems per se for Buddhists, some are concerned that donation after complete brain-death might be prior to the final point of death, and so disrupt the transition to the next life (Tsomo 1993). Richard Hayes reports that a North American study of Buddhist clergy from a range of traditions found most of them strongly opposed to taking organs from a body till several days after death (when they are no longer of any use), with Tibetans being most

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40 J IV 401–12; Cp I 8. See also Khoroch 1989, chapter 2. In Sanskrit texts, the king is called Śibi.

41 Charles Jones reports that in Taiwan, a bank for bone-marrow, from live donors, has been started by the nun Ven. Cheng-yen (Zhengyan), founder of the Buddhist Compassion Relief Tz’u-Chi Association, which has three million members (‘Re:Buddhism and Autopsy’ posting on Buddha-L internet discussion forum, September 28, 1995).

206
opposed, and Japanese least opposed. Nevertheless, Sogyal Rinpoche reports that some Tibetan masters see organ donation as a very positive action, and that if done with full sincerity, will not disrupt the rebirth process, even if pain is felt due to the organ being taken, but enhance the process due to the good deed being done. Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche holds that it would be acceptable to take organs even before the heart stops if death would otherwise occurred in a few minutes, and the donor is sincere and in a compassionate state of mind (Sogyal 1992, 376–77). Sogyal Rinpoche implies that things might be expedited by a ritual called phowa to transfer the consciousness of the patient to the next rebirth (Sogyal 1992, 266). Such views seem controversial among Tibetans, though.

While Theravādins believe rebirth immediately follows death, even they tend to leave a body for one to eight days before disposing of it (Tsomo 1993, 31). During this time, the consciousness of the deceased is seen as hovering in and around the body (Terroriel 1979, 258). Tibetan Buddhists, on the other hand, have elaborate ideas concerning death. Once a terminal illness begins, a person is seen as entering the bardo, or ‘transition’, of dying. The life-energies or prānās are seen to gather in the heart before the last breath is taken. Vital signs cease, and modern doctors would pronounce the person dead, though a slight warmth is seen to remain in the heart. It is seen as usually taking about another twenty minutes for the ‘inner respiration’ to cease, though this may take place very quickly, in the case of a sudden, accidental death, and

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43 However, in Thai popular tradition, the corpse of someone who dies as a result of violence, or of a woman who dies in pregnancy or childbirth, is quickly cremated. This is because it is believed that the person becomes an angry spirit, and it is seen as best to despatch them to their next life as soon as possible (Terroriel 1979, 264).
may also last for up to three and a half days\textsuperscript{44}. During this time, most people are unconscious, though accomplished meditators may contemplate the ‘innate luminosity of the mind’. The end of ‘inner respiration’ is seen to be the moment of death, when consciousness leaves the body and the \textit{bardo} of dying ends (Sogyal 1992, 104). After this comes the \textit{bardo} of the intermediate existence, lasting for seven days or less, though it is sometimes repeated in a cycle of up to seven seven-day periods, leading up to the time of rebirth (Sogyal 1992, 287, 342, 291; Mullin 1987, 192).

Among the signs of consciousness having departed, the strongest is a drop of blood and pus being emitted from the nostrils or sexual organ. To cremate the corpse before consciousness has left is seen as almost the same as murder, and may lead to an unfavourable rebirth for the deceased. Likewise, it is customary not to disturb the body for three days, to ensure consciousness has left it, for to touch it is seen to disturb the consciousness and lead to it having an unfortunate rebirth (Sogyal 1992, 265).

Some accomplished meditators are held to remain seated or lying in meditation after breathing ceases but prior to the departure of consciousness. They do not appear to get rigor mortis\textsuperscript{45}, and the region round their heart remains warm, which was observed to be the case when Gyalwang Karmapa died in an American hospital in 1981, the warmth being detected thirty-six hours after he died (Sogyal 1992, 266–67). Mullin also reports the death of one of his teachers, who ‘sat in meditation’ for three days after breathing and heart-beat had stopped, before his head fell to one side, showing the death process was complete. This practice of ‘retreating to the heart’ in death is called \textit{tuk-dam} (Mullin 1987, 103). For a particularly accomplished meditator, it is believed that consciousness

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\textsuperscript{45} Rigor mortis normally lasts 10–72 hours, before the rigidity wears off, though with elderly frail people, it can be short and feeble, and so might not be noticed. My thanks to Liz Williams, my research student, for this point.
may remain in the body for months. One Panchen Lama is said to have remained in meditation for almost a year after he stopped breathing, with the body not decomposing. Given these ideas, then, organ donation would only seem acceptable if (1) the donor were unambiguously alive and the donation would not cause death, or (2) the donor had died in a sudden accident, or (3) had died some days ago, but the body had been kept ‘fresh’ by artificial ventilation; (3) assumes, though, that the full dying process would continue till its culmination once the brain-stem was dead.

Japan and Israel are the only two developed nations not to recognise complete brain-death as the criterion of human death, and, as of 1988, Japan had 7000 brain-dead people on life-support machines, there being around 2,600 diagnosed per year (Hardacre 1994, 585, 599). This is due to a reluctance to allow organ transplants from what may be still living donors. Consequently, death is only recognised as occurring when all heart-beat and breathing, even artificially generated, have ceased, and the pupils do not dilate (Hardacre 1994, 585). While senior doctors wish to recognise the brain-death criterion, the profession is widely divided on the issue, and a highly influential Patients’ Rights Committee has charged certain transplanting doctors with murder (Hardacre 1994, 586). In particular, there is a concern that legalising transplants from the brain-dead will lead to a disproportionate diagnosing of brain-death for the handicapped and mentally impaired (Hardacre 1994, 586, 592). Nevertheless, various committees have reported in favour of adopting the brain-death criterion, and of allowing donation where the donor (by a ‘living will’), or surviving family, is agreeable, and this may in time become law (Hardacre 1994, 587–88). Public interest in the issue is great, and religious leaders have gradually begun to make statements on it.

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46 Mullin 1987, 80, citing the views of Ge-she Nga-wang Dar-gye. Of course such non-decomposition could be due to the cold and dry air where it was stored. My thanks to Liz Williams, my research student, for this point.
Japanese distaste for organ transplantation is partly rooted in the Confucian ideal of burying a body whole, as it is seen as a gift from Heaven and one’s ancestors, and should be respected accordingly\(^\text{47}\). Moreover, in Japan, the individual is seen to come into existence in and through social relationships, and these relationships are seen as continuing after death. Thus the idea of an individual suddenly ending due to a mere biological fact is seen as odd, and the body remains a focus of reverent ritual after biological death (Hardacre 1994, 593–94; Becker 1990, 545)\(^\text{48}\). Such a view is sometimes backed up by linking it to Buddhist ideas of the inter-relationship of all through the principle of Conditioned Arising, a key concept in Japanese Buddhism (Hardacre 1994, 596). While Japanese Christians tend to favour organ donation on grounds of altruism, it seems that Japanese Buddhists make little reference to comparable Buddhist notions in this context. The idea of causing anguish for a dead person’s family, so that another person can have a possible small elongation of their life, is generally seen as not worth it (Hardacre 1994, 598).

Nevertheless, there are Japanese Buddhist voices in favour of the brain-death criterion of death. Daisaku Ikeda, head of the Sōka Gakkai, has alluded to early Buddhist ideas (as preserved in the Abhidh-k-bh) of life as present while vitality (jīvita), heat and consciousness still occur in a body (see above). He sees these as existing before the brain develops, and as continuing for as long as spontaneous respiration does, such that death occurs when a brain-dead person is attached to a respirator (Ikeda 1994, 93; Hardacre 1994, 595, 601). He holds that when a person is in a coma, due to the cerebral cortex being destroyed, there are still subtle emotions


\(^{48}\) According to LaFleur 1992, the high abortion rate in Japan is partly because of similar considerations: the foetus is not yet part of the human community.
as mental currents in the underlying ‘storehouse (ālaya-) consciousness’ described by the Yogācāra school. Moreover, the three stages of dying are those in which first the five sense-consciousnesses, then mind-consciousness, then the mind-organ (manas)—normally supported by various brain-structures, including the brain-stem—become latent within the ālaya-consciousness (Ikeda 1994, 167–68). Other Buddhists also see the ālaya-consciousness as the co-ordinator of all mental and physical functions, and death as occurring when it leaves the body. As they see it as related to the nervous system, they see brain-death as a good criterion for death, as integrating functioning ends in a matter of days after brain-death, even where artificial respiration continues (Hardacre 1994, 595–96). Such people have not declared themselves in favour of organ-transplantation, but nor have they objected to it. They seem vague, though, as to whether brain-death or consequent ending of all ‘integrating functioning’—which they seem to confuse with the remnants of life in unintegrated muscles—is the criterion for death. Some Zen Buddhists, though, seem willing to overcome what they see as purely cultural reluctance to donate organs in Japan (Tsomo 1993, 34–5). **Conclusions**

In exploring such issues, I am relating Buddhist textual sources, and contemporary views based on them, to scientific ideas on human developments, so as to cast a light on issues of contemporary ethical concern. In doing so I am seeking both to clarify what Buddhism has, historically, said on certain issues, but also to see how such Buddhist ideas may inform issues of contemporary debate. In this, I see a parallel to the activity of Applied Theology in Christianity, where, likewise, the ideas of a religious tradition are clarified and extended to inform an approach to contemporary issues.
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Buddhist Studies Review 18, 2 (2001)


Abbreviations

Pali Text Society editions, except in the case of Abhidh-k-bh and Paṭṭh.

Abhidh-k-bh  *Abhidharmakośabhāsyam*, translated from Louis de La Vallée Poussin’s French translation by Leo M. Pruden, Asian Humanities Press, Berkeley, Cal., 1988–90. References are to chapter and section numbers in original text.

As  *Atthasālinī*

Cp  *Cariyāpiṭaka*

CR  *Conditional Relations*, i.e. Nārada’s Paṭṭh translation.

D  *Dīgha-nikāya*

D-a  Commentary to last item.

Dhp-a  *Dhammapada* commentary.

Dhs  *Dhammasaṅgāṭī*

J  *Jātaka*

Khp-a  *Khuddapāṭha* commentary.

Kv-a  *Kathāvatthu* commentary.

M  *Majjhima-nikāya*

M-a  Commentary to last item.

Mil  *Milindapañha*

Nidd  *Niddesa*

Paṭṭis  *Patisambhidāmagga*

Paṭṭh  *Paṭṭhāna* (Pali Publication Board edition, reference is to marginal pagination.)

Pv  *Petavatthu*

S  *Sānīyutta-nikāya*

S-a  Commentary to last item.

Vibh  *Vibhanga*

Vin  *Vinaya-piṭaka*

Vin-a  Commentary to last item.

Vism  *Visuddhimagga*
THE ANGUPTARA-NIkāYA REVEALS ITS SELF

ERIC FALLICK

At A J, 149-50, there occurs a brief but rather interesting and attention-grabbing verse passage. Since an alternative to the old PTS translation could be useful and the Nālandā-Devanāgari-Pāli and Dhammagiri-Pāli-ganthamāla Series versions differ in a small but significant way from the PTS ed. (see n.7), it may be worth attempting another translation here. Even if one prefers not to consider these verses as a survival of earlier Buddhism missed by the scissors of the authors/editors of the Theravādin Canon or risk being misconstrued as an atta-vādīa, they at least serve as another

1 For a recent notice of this passage, see Chr. Liudtner, ‘From Brahmanism to Buddhism’, Asian Philosophy 9, No.1, 1999, p.28. There can, incidentally, I think, be no doubt that Liudtner is correct in pointing out the importance of RVeda X, 129 for early Buddhism (see also his ‘Observations on the Brahmapagavaga’, BSR 16, 2 (1999), pp.181-8). In fact, the connection is even more obvious, striking and valuable if one confines oneself to the oldest texts, rather than assuming, contrary to the evidence, that the whole Pāli Canon may be taken en bloc as representing ‘early Buddhism’, that the Buddha taught the Skanda-vādiva/numerical list-type doctrines contained therein, etc. The argument is further strengthened if, instead of taking RV X 129 as a ‘cosmogony’ (the source, I believe, of the obscurity of its interpretation), one takes it as an early expression of vijjñāavādā/brahmavāda – a position supported by brief comments at Satapathabrāhmaṇa 10.5.3.1 (text and translation in, e.g., Vasud Deva S. Agrawala, Hymn of Creation (Nāsadīya Sūkta, RVeda X, 129) [Nāsadīya Sūkta Vyākhya], Varanasi 1963, pp.40-1).

2 To postulate that the Buddha may not always have been averse to the application of the term simna to the One, Unconditioned, Absolute Reality, is not at all the same as saying that he accepted the validity of the individual, empirical self or ānākkara. Indeed, in the oldest extant full-length Buddhist text, the Ājñānakavagga of the Sutta-Nipātā, it is clearly stated (v.916) that asmita is the root of papātīpa.

reminder that the question of the nature and content of earliest Buddhism or ‘what the Buddha taught’ is not so clear cut as, for example, the ever-proliferating number of ‘Introduction to Buddhism’-type books would have us believe. There is, however, at least one possible indication suggestive of greater antiquity for these verses than their surroundings. The accomplished ascetic is referred to in these verses by the term ‘muni’, which, along with ‘brāhma’, is the ideal or term for the liberated saint in original, esenial, yogic Buddhism prior to the ‘arhat’ of the later doctrinal Buddhism constructed by the cenobium.

Nowhere in the world is an evil deed performed in secret: your Self, man, knows whether (it is) true or false. Indeed, friend, you neglect the noble Self that is the witness in yourself (and) conceal the self being evil. Devils and Tathāgatas see (, however,) the fool faring wrong (ly) in the world.

Certainly, therefore, the sage (following) the sovereignty of the Self and (who is) master of the world, intelligent, a meditator, master of things, faring in accordance with Dhamma, and a striver after truth is not lost.

That sage, being such (a one), having overcome Māra, having

3 Cf. G.F. Allen, The Buddha’s Philosophy, London 1959; and the Aṭṭhaka- and Pārāyanavagga of the Sutta-Nipātā. In the Nālakasutta (= Nālakaprapāsa of the Mahāvastu), maupuyan is explicitly identified as attān padan.

It is of interest to note that the term ‘arahat’, along with most of the other technical terms and formulas characteristic of the later development, does not appear at all in the oldest texts.

4 attā ta, literally ‘the Self of you’. There is no possibility here of taking attā as the reflexive pronoun.

5 sakki = Skt, śākṣi.

6 muni.

7 This translates atidhipatyeyako following the Nālandā and Dhammagiri editions (which follow the Chaṭṭhasalāgāvayana edition); the PTS ed. reads atidhipa sato cae. The difference is significant in that the reading followed here suggests the sovereignty of the Self over the limited ‘self’, whereas the PTS ed. reading (which, of course, is also supported by manuscript authority) suggests more that oneself should fare (mindful) as master of oneself.

216
vanquished Death, and who, possessed of the foremost, has reached the end of birth, wise, knowing the world, does not experience all things.

Are these verses a small piece of, in the words of Saṃyutta-Nikāya II, 266, the original drumhead that failed to be replaced by the later pegs so successfully inserted by the cenobitical monastic creators of ‘Hinayāna’ Buddhism? Perhaps, one can really only find out by one’s Self.

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4. Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Śrāvastī, at Jetū's Grove, in Anāthapindada's Park. Then the Exalted One said to the bhikṣus: Now it is apposite for me to say [the following] – there are persons who are like lions and those who are like sheep. Listen attentively and take heed (śrūta ca suṣṭhu ca manasi-kūrta) of what [I am going to say]. – We shall, Exalted One, replied the bhikṣus. [In order to] instruct them, the Exalted One went on: How does a person resemble a lion? There is [for example] a bhikṣu, someone who receives what is respectfully offered (satkāra): robes, alms-food (piṇḍapāta), lodging (śayanāsana) and medicine for treating the sick. Having received and then enjoying (pari-vihūya) them, attachment does not arise in his mind; neither thoughts of desire arise in him nor any [wrong] perception. Not [entertaining] any [wrong] ideas whatsoever, he is absolutely certain about the Teaching (dharma) conducive to emancipation.

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1 See T2, 599c5 ff.; Hayashi, p. 181 ff.
2 Regrettably, at BSR 11, 2 (1994), p. 157 f., the Sanskrit verb forms are given in the singular instead of the plural, as in the stock phrase quoted above.
3 For 世界 read 世界.
4 Lit.: 'At that time the bhikṣus received instruction from the Buddha; the Exalted One said...' 
5 衣被 rendering cīvāra seems peculiar to EĀ. Cf. BSR 11, 2 (1994), p. 160, n. 7, where the above two characters are translated separately rather than as a compound.
6 病瘦医薬 rendering ānapratibbāhāsāja seems peculiar to EĀ. As for the transl. of the term, cf. SWTF, 12th fascicle, p. 259 s.v. cīvāra.
spectfully applied themselves to practice.9

9 The second half of the EĀ discourse has a parallel at S II, p. 228 f.: Sāvasthi... Dāruna bhiṅkhave lābhasatkarāsīlo... pe... adhigamāya... Sēyathāpi bhiṅkhave pīṭhakā gūthādi gūthapūra pūṇā gūthāassa... Noteworthy is the v.l. mīśhaka of the Nālandā ed. (S II-III, p. 191) for pīṭhakā, and equally remarkable is a Sahihalese v.l. for the same word given by the Nālandā ed. in n. 3: elokā, 'ewe, female sheep', instead of 'beetle'. For the English transl. of S see F.H. Woodward, Kindred Sayings II, PTS, London 1922 ff., p. 155: 'At Sāvasthi: Dire, brethren, are gains, favours, and flattery... Just as if a beetle, dung-eating, dung-filled, stuffed with dung...' The scarab beetle is, of course, readily associated with dung, and it seems altogether unlikely that a sheep, notwithstanding a certain amount of whimsy, should feed on dung. So the simile of the dung-beetle may perhaps be more plausible than that of the dung-consuming sheep.

The editors of T and Akanuma point out as a parallel to the above Pāli sutta a place in the Chinese SĀ: T2, 346a18-25. In this text, however, thematically a parallel cannot be seen. In the given SĀ passage the Buddha compares existence in Samsāra to nauseating ordure, and the only element shared with the S discourse is the word 'ordure/dung'.

Interestingly, there is another SĀ version quoted in Bh. Pāśadika, Nāgarjuna's Sūtrasamuccaya, A Critical Edition of the mDo kun las bu pa, Copenhagen 1989, p. 99 f. which, although deviating in some points, is a parallel both to S II, p. 228 f. and the second half of the present EĀ text. Since the translation of the Yai dag par ldan pa’i lha passage in the Sūtrasamuccaya, also prepared by the editor of the Tibetan text, is not easily accessible, it may be quoted here (slightly amended) as it appeared in Linh-Son’ – publication d’études bouddhologiques 12 (1980), p. 31: ‘Under a Nyagrodha tree there stood a large flock of sheep. Among that flock there was a sheep that fed on dung. It went to a dung-pit to have a good meal and, having eaten to its heart’s content, it put in front of itself a heap of dung and sat down. Having turned its head, it just looked down on the other sheep. Similar [is the behaviour of] a monk who is overcome and obsessed by [longing after] gains, honours, and renown. He enters a village, a town, or a city to collect alms. There he eats to his heart’s content clean and tasty food and is also [invited] to lunch the following day. Carrying extra [portions of] the alms [to which he had been invited], he goes his way. Then he says to his [fellow] monks: Venerable Sirs, we have partaken of this clean and delicious food to our heart’s content. These [extra] portions I do not require. It will be all right to throw the remains away; but if you like, have them. – Thus that [monk] just looks down on other well-behaved and deserving monks. In this way, monks, gains, honours, and renown are harmful (dārura).’

7 Lit.: ‘if’.
8 Lit.: ‘always these thoughts arise’.

220

Ekottarāgama XXVIII
5. "Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Śrāvastī,... the Exalted One said to the bhikṣu: If there is a person who knows [how] to appreciate, [he or she], never being oblivious of small favours, to say nothing of great acts of kindness (upakāra), deserves honour (satkārāya). Should [that person] be a thousand or one hundred thousand yojanas away from here, [he or she] would not after all be far away; [that person] would, as it were, be close to and not estranged from me. For this reason a bhikṣu should know that I always admire and praise someone who knows how to appreciate. Those who do not know how to appreciate great acts of kindness, let alone small favours, are neither close to me nor am I to them. Even if [an ungrateful person] formally wears [his or her] samghahītī11 in my presence, [he or she] is after all far away. Therefore, I never say one [should] not appreciate. For this reason, O bhikṣu, you should be mindful of appreciating [and you should] not imitate [others who do] not appreciate.12 Thus, O bhikṣu, you should train. – After listening to the Buddha’s words, the bhikṣu were pleased... to practice."13

10 As plausibly indicated at T, loc.cit., but not in Hayashi, 反復 should be read 彼復, lit. ‘back/return – again/restore’. The term 知反復者 (pratikāra-vedin) could be freely rendered as ‘grateful’ (kritājña); the slightly different translation given in this discourse because below, at T2, 601a12 ff., the standard rendering of kritājña is found: 報恩 (cf. Fougaut, p. 4107a: 知恩者).

11 I.e. the formal outer ‘double robe (diguna)’ in contrast to the inner (antaravāsaka) and upper (uttarāsanga) garments which are single (ekaccīya: Vin I, p. 289) – see EncBuddh IV, 2, p. 183 f., s.v. civara. The meaning of ‘waist-cloth’ for samghahītī at BHSD, p. 549, is not correct.

12 These words of the Buddha may seem overly emphatic, the common human weakness of ingratitude notwithstanding; it should be kept in mind, however, that early Buddhists were confronted with the teachings of influential materialistic philosophers.

13 Cf. A I, p. 61 (II.4.1): Asappurisabhāmiḥ ca vo bhikkhave desissāni sappurisabhāmiḥ ca/ tam sunīṭha... Asappuriso bhikkhave akatānī hidoti akatavedī... Cf. the English transl. at F.L. Woodward, Gradual Sayings I, PTS, 1932 ff., p. 56: ‘Monks, I will teach you the condition of the unworthy and that of the worthy. Do ye listen to it... Monks, the unworthy man is ungrateful, forgetful of benefits...’

6. "Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Śrāvastī,... the Exalted One said to the bhikṣu: There are person(s) who are lazy (kusāda), who do not embark on14 virtuous actions (sucarita) and who in their deeds (kriyā) meet with misfortune (vyasana); on the other hand, there are those who are capable of not [succumbing to] laziness, who put effort (vīrya) into [what is to be done] and who are most accomplished (pranīta) in respect of all that is karmically wholesome so that there is an increase in what is [truly] advantageous. Thus [with reference to the latter persons] it will take the bodhisattva Maitreya thirty aeons until he becomes a Buddha by realising full and complete enlightenment. All on his own (āmanā) he will make use of the force of effort (vīryabala) and utmost determination15 so that in future [he], Maitreya, will be [my successor]. Also in the past, innumerable beings, like the sands of the [River] Ganges, [became] foremost arhats16, Fully and Completely Enlightened Ones. All of them succeeded in realising Buddhahood on account of their utmost determination. With the help of this “skill in means” (upāyakauśalya) one should know that laziness is conducive to suffering, leads to miserable destinies (durgati) and in one’s deeds one will meet with misfortune. If [on the other hand] one is capable of utmost determination and of putting forth effort, all that is karmically wholesome, all virtues [will be accomplished] so that there will be an increase in what is [truly] advantageous. Therefore, O bhikṣu, you should be mindful of putting forth effort and do not

14 Lit.: ‘saw/beget’ – 4vap.

15 Cf. the English transl. at F.L. Woodward, Gradual Sayings I, PTS, 1932 ff., p. 56: ‘Monks, I will teach you the condition of the unworthy and that of the worthy. Do ye listen to it... Monks, the unworthy man is ungrateful, forgetful of benefits...’

16 Tentatively: 阿毘阿羅訶 – agrārhat (cf. agrāśrāvaka).
be negligent. Thus, bhikṣuṣ, you should train. – After listening to the Buddha’s words, the bhikṣuṣ were pleased... to practice."\(^{17}\)

7. ‘Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Śrāvasti,... the Exalted One said to the bhikṣuṣ: A bhikṣu who lives in the forest (āranyaka) should cultivate two things. Which two? Tranquillity (śamatha) and penetrating insight (vipaśyanā).\(^{18}\) If a bhikṣu, living in the forest in serenity, realises tranquillity, he perfects the discipline (vinaya) with [all] its rules of moral training (sīkṣāpada), without deviating from the [proper] way of deportment (īryāpatha), without breaking the vows and by developing all virtues...

\(^{17}\) As for this sūtra, Akanuma, Hayashi and Lancaster refer to Divy, p. 481 (= Divy(V), p. 313). The Divy story is the Rūpāvatyaavadāna, summarised in M. Winternitz, A HISTORY OF INDIAN LITERATURE II, Delhi 1983 (revised ed.), p. 278 f. (in Winternitz the bodhisattva heroine is Rūpāvatī instead of Rūpāvatī). The only common feature, however, found in the present EĀ sūtra and in Divy is the mention of the bodhisattva Maitreya. Whilst in the latter text Maitreya advances towards Buddhahood for forty kalpas, in EĀ it takes him thirty aeons to do so; the moral in EĀ is that determination and viśva-bala should be aspirated to whereas in Divy dīnapāparanitā, the perfection of liberality, is extolled. The Divy passage has apart from the EĀ Gilgit fragments (Tripathi, p. 81, § 18.21) (not in Ōkubo) – close parallels, as pointed out and quoted in Tripathi, p. 159 ff.; It, p. 18 ff.; EĀ Turfan fragments, § 18.2; Avadānāstaka (Vaidya ed.), p. 80 ff. However, unlike Divy, in none of the latter places is Maitreya mentioned.

Another interesting feature in EĀ is the Mahāyāna simile of the sands of the Ganges (Gangāndivāvālākāsāma) which is employed, for instance, in the Kāṣyapa-parivarta (A. von Stüel-Holstein ed., sections 158, 159) or in the Lankavatāra Sutra (B. Nanjio ed., pp. 229-34). Cf. also D.T. Suzuki, Studies in the Lankavatāra Sutra, London 1930, 57, pp. 148-53, on ‘The Parable of the Sands of the Gangā’. When comparing the EĀ and the Kāṣyapa-parivarta Gangā sand similes and the Lankavatāra ‘parable’ with each other, the EĀ simile appears to be the most rudimentary, in a unique manner substituting ‘imnumerable beings, like the sands...’ who became Buddhas for the rather limited traditional number of prehistoric Buddhas. A very elaborate treatment of the same simile which Suzuki considers a parable is the above-mentioned Lankavatāra passage, settling forth in this place mainstream Mahāyāna soteriology-cum-philosophy.


Ekottarāgama XXVIII

(guna). If, furthermore, a bhikṣu who is fond of solitude has realised penetrating insight, he exactly knows in accordance with fact:\(^{19}\) This is unsatisfactoriness (duhkha), the origin (samudaya)\(^{20}\) of unsatisfactoriness, its final cessation (dukhkhanirodha) and what has necessarily to be done (avasya-kārīya) in order to overcome unsatisfactoriness\(^{21}\). – By dint of such penetrating insight, his mind is freed from the malign influences of desire (kāmāsvara), of becoming (bhava) and of ignorance (avidyā); consequently he gains the [insight] knowledge of [this] freedom, knowing in accordance with fact: Birth and death have come to an end, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, and there will be no more coming into existence. Also in the past, so many beings [became] foremost arhats\(^{16}\), Fully and Completely Enlightened Ones precisely on account of these two things [enabling them] to achieve perfection (nisspati); and thus also the Bodhisattva when sitting under the King of Trees (the Bodhi Tree), he first concentrated on these [two] things, viz. tranquillity and penetrating insight. After realising tranquillity, the Bodhisattva, the Great Being (mahāsattva), succeeded in subjugating Mara, the Fiend (śatrū); and furthermore, after realising penetrating insight, the Bodhisattva duly gained the state of possessing the three knowledges (traividyattā)\(^{22}\) and obtained the Highest, Complete and Full Enlightenment. Therefore, O bhikṣuṣ, a monk, living in the forest, should be intent on skill in means in order to practise these two things. Thus, bhikṣuṣ, you should train. – After listening to the Buddha’s words, the bhikṣuṣ were pleased... to practice.\(^{22}\)

\(^{19}\) Cf. Hirakawa, p. 371: 如實見知 = yathābhūtāparijñāna.


\(^{21}\) Cf. ibid., n. 17 (to be corrected to: dukkhanirodhasāvāmi).

\(^{22}\) See BHSD, p. 260a; Sootihill, pp. 79a, 66b; Nyanatiloka, s.v. te-vijja.

\(^{23}\) Cf. A I, p. 61 (at Hayashi, p. 183, n. 14, ‘A, II.3.15’ should be corrected to ‘A, II.3.10’): Dve ’me bhikkhave dhammā vijjātāgāvyā. Katame dve? Samatho eva viṣṇān ca... Cf. the English transl. at Woodward, Gradual Sayings 1, p. 55 f.: ‘Monks, these two conditions have part in knowledge.’
8. ‘Thus have I heard. At one time... in Śrāvastī,... the Exalted One said to the bhikṣus: If a bhikṣu who lives in the forest at a secluded, quiet place remote from the crowds, he should always reverentially (gauravajāta) cultivate a mind that is content (tuṣṭa). If, on the other hand, a bhikṣu, living in the forest at a secluded and quiet place, does not reverentially cultivate contentment (tuṣṭi), he will mainly occupy himself (vi-nil-√yuj) in staying with big crowds for the sake of what people talk about [because] he does not know what a forest-dweller’s practice (dharma) should be like. How then has a bhikṣu, [although] fond of solitude, no reverential attitude and does not cultivate contentment? The answer is [this], O bhikṣus: First the āranyaka bhikṣu, staying at a secluded, quiet place and avoiding the crowds, continually puts effort into [what is to be done] and does not [succeed to] laziness and arrogance (māna)\textsuperscript{24}. First he is well aware of the necessity of what [he should] practise. If, in the course of his forest-dwelling and abiding at a secluded, quiet place, he becomes lazy and arrogant, he will involve himself in all [sorts of] misconduct (duṣcara), staying with big crowds for the sake of what people talk about. – Such an āranyaka bhikṣu is lazy and lacking in effort. For this reason, bhikṣus, a bhikṣu who is fond of solitude, living at a secluded, quiet place and avoiding the crowds, should always be gentle\textsuperscript{25} and cultivate contentment. Being rid of laziness and arrogance, reverentially\textsuperscript{26} and mindfully putting effort into [what is to be done], with unwavering determination and wholeheartedly taking upon oneself (upa-sam-√yud) all that is karmically wholesome – thus, O bhikṣus, you should train. – After listening to the Buddha’s words, the bhikṣus were pleased... to practice.’

9. ‘Thus have I heard. At one time... in Śrāvastī,... the Exalted One said to the bhikṣus: There are two persons who are not fit (asamartha) for enunciating Dharma words. Who are the two persons? a) The person who gives teachings on trust (śraddhā) without himself having trust – a most problematic situation; b) the person who gives teachings on generosity (dāna), himself being in the grip of avarice (māṣarya) and lust (rāga) – also a most problematic situation. Moreover, bhikṣus, if a person gives teachings on trust without himself having trust, in his mind there will arise aversion (dveṣa), aggressiveness (pratigha) and [a proneness to] hurting (upaghāta). O bhikṣus, a person giving teachings on trust without himself having trust, with aversion, aggressiveness... arising in his mind, is comparable to a [fierce] dog whose fierceness increases and which becomes more and more angry and aggressive after injuring its muzzle. Moreover, bhikṣus, if a person who gives teachings on generosity, himself being in the grip of avarice and lust, in his mind there will arise aversion, aggressiveness and [a proneness to] hurting. A person’s giving teachings on generosity, his being in the grip of avarice and lust and his mind being increasingly filled with aversion, aggressiveness... are comparable to an abscess which, not yet being fully developed\textsuperscript{27}, is becoming unbearably painful [because of] its being cut open with a lancet. These, O bhikṣus, are the two persons whose setting forth the Dharma is [most] problematic.

Then, bhikṣus, there are two persons whose setting forth the Dharma is not at all problematic. Who are the two [persons]? a) The person who gives teachings on trust, himself having trust, and b) [the person] who gives teachings on generosity without himself [being in the grip of] avarice and lust. If, bhikṣus, a person gives teachings on trust, himself having trust, in his mind there will arise joy (prīti), and he will be free from perturbation (vikāra) and remorse (kaukṛtya). A person’s giving teachings on trust, having trust

\textsuperscript{24} ‘Being without arrogance’ (māna) clarifies as to why above stress is placed on gaurava (‘respect, reverence’) in the expression ‘reverentially’: forest-dwelling as a hermit is one of the special ascetic practices (dhūtāntas) a practitioner of which naturally has to guard against having a tendency towards arrogance vis-à-vis Sangha members who do not practise any of the dhūtāntas. As for preceding notes on the dhūtāntas, see BSR 13, 1 (1996), p. 57, n. 6.
\textsuperscript{25} Cf. Hirakawa, p. 107: 下心 = mrundu cittena.
\textsuperscript{26} Translated after Hayashi; T2, 600b29 has: 無有恭敬, ‘without respect’.
\textsuperscript{27} Lit.: ‘hot’.

226

227
himself and a mind full of joy, free from confusion (vyābhicāra) and perturbation, are comparable to prescribing a sick person a medicine which cures his illness and makes him healthy again. Moreover, if a person who gives teachings on generosity, without himself being in the grip of [avarice and] lust, in his mind there will arise joy, and he will be free from remorse. A person’s giving teachings on generosity, his being free from avarice and lust, full of joy and without remorse, are comparable to a decent, well-groomed man or woman of a cheerful disposition [whom] someone approaches with a beautiful flower which is offered [to him or her] and which makes [them] look much more colourful. Furthermore, [that virtuous person’s teaching generosity is comparable to someone’s] offering that [decent] man [or woman] fine clothes and ornaments whose recipient then becomes all the happier. These, bhikṣus, are the two persons whose setting forth the Dharma is not at all problematic. So, bhikṣus, one should aim at having trust, at being generous and at being free from avarice and lust. Thus, O bhikṣus, you should train. – After listening to the Buddha’s words, the bhikṣus were pleased... to practice.'

Additional Abbreviations


SĀ = Saṃyuktāgama.

28 Lit.: *[with] bathed hands and faces*. 

REVIEW ARTICLE:

CHR. LINDTNER

This is a well produced book on a highly significant topic – the many parallels between the New Testament and Buddhist classics. The author is unusually qualified for dealing with the difficult task. He is a Doctor not only of Law but also of Theology. He taught Hindu Law at the University of London from 1949 to 1982, and has devoted himself to the New Testament since 1957. From 1977 to 1995 Derrett has published six volumes of Studies in the New Testament, with Brill in Leiden, as well as many other books and learned papers on Dharmastra, Buddhism and the New Testament. Claiming that his new book is without sanctimony or prejudice, he says that he sees himself as a detective, who cares not where the evidence leads him. This is not a work of apologetic, he writes in the Preface.

By 1935, after decades of controversy, the Indologist M. Winteritz wrote that ‘the view must be rejected that Buddhist literature has exerted a direct influence upon the gospels’ (p.21). In recent years our knowledge has increased on several fronts, D(reutt) says, and in 1995 it was asserted (by Gruber & Kersten) once again that Jesus was educated by the Buddhists.

D. divides, conveniently, previous researchers into three categories: 1) ‘maximalists’, such as Seydel, Edmunds, Carus and, most recently, Gruber & Kersten (The Original Jesus, 1995), prepared to find parallels everywhere; 2) ‘minimalists’, such as Windisch, Pfleiderer, Bergh, Beth, Garbe et al., who admit at least the possibility of Buddhist influence on the NT Gospels; and 3) ‘nihilists’, such as C.R.E. von Hartmann, G.W. Stewart, Aiken, Carl Clemen (a ref. to his Religionsgeschichtliche Erklärung des Neuen Testaments, Giessen 1924, is missing), E.J. Thomas, Har
Dayal, J. Estlin Carpenter, A. Schweitzer, La Vallée Poussin, Lamotte, Berger & Colpe and many others – not prepared (at least openly) to admit any influence at all. D. is, with his new book, prepared to admit a mutual influence. His reasons are simple, clear and convincing. Buddhist missions were surely senior to the first Christian missionaries. They were ‘entrepreneurs in the same line of business’, working in the same fields, they examined each other’s stock, and they ‘put their heads together’. Hellenism was ‘a fine area for propagandists for a religion’. These arguments are good commonsense arguments but not quite true.

The Introduction (pp. 19-39) discusses the background to the Question, the Definition of the Question, Parties and Postures (‘maximalists’, etc.), Criteria for Classifying Parallels, An Obstacle Removed, and Dates.

Fifty-five parallels are listed on pp. 45-82. They fall into four categories:
1) Cases where the NT may have gained from Buddhist models (1-11);
2) Cases where Buddhists seem to have adopted NT material (12-29);
3) Cases where literatures may have gained reciprocally (30-39);
4) Cases where it is impossible to claim that either influenced the other (40-55).

A chapter on ‘Modalities’ (pp. 83-96) considers how actually ‘confabulations’ between Christians and Buddhists could occur. Asoka’s missions. The spread of Buddhism and of the Greek language. The Bactrian king Menander. The Jews. The Gandhāra school of sculpture. A Bactrian attempt to put the Buddhist faith into Greek: νασα ο θεός νασα ο δούνασιν νασα o σαγγο Homage (nāmas) to the Buddha – to the Dharma – to the Sāṃghā! Clearly, the missionaries met and ‘put their heads together’.

So the Conclusion (pp. 97-101) must be that there was not only contact but also influence. This influence, however, did not have to do with ‘doctrine, only with presentation’ (p. 97). (So, the Holy Sepulchre is saved, I may add!) Appendices on ‘Redemptive

Lindtner – Review Article

Suffering’ and on ‘Similar Problems Provide Similar Solutions’ as well as a Bibliography of texts, Asoka’s and Greek and Iranian Inscriptions, and modern studies, and an Index of Biblical References conclude the book.

CRITIQUE

First of all, I must say that I am pleased to see that Derrett is now much more open to the old question of Buddhist influence on the NT Gospels than he was previously (as in his debate with the German scholar Norbert Klatt, for instance).

I am pleased, of course, because I myself hold the thesis that the NT Gospels are free translations (imitations) of the Buddhist Gospel. The NT Gospels were not merely influenced by the Buddhist sources. They were, in all respects based on them. The Greek, I hold, was done directly from the Sanskrit, and the first to do so was – not Mark – but Matthew. Furthermore, I maintain that ‘Matthew’ was originally composed in the Greek language, not in Aramaic. Matthew was, as suggested by the famous notice of Papias, the first to combine the (Buddhist) logia in the Hebrew dialect – i.e. in the Hebrew dialect of the Greek language. He combined them with materials from the OT. The entire story of Jesus, from birth to death, nearly all persons and places, and even the teachings (gospel, justice, parables, kingdom of heaven, baptism etc.) and the four main events (below) were taken from the Baudhhas. Matthew, I claim, admits this fact in several places, e.g., 11, 12 (‘violent men steal it’). There are several other such confessions, see the ‘self-portrait’, Mt 13, 52.

Obviously, I cannot, within the limits of a review or even of a review article, provide the necessary evidence for my novel (some would say sensational) thesis. I must therefore refer my readers to my forthcoming publications on the Buddhist sources of the NT Gospels. From this position my view of Derrett’s book is as follows:

D. commits some fundamental errors. He claims inter alia:
1) The amount of gospel not found anywhere in Buddhist texts
2. Satan and the Temptation. D. is on the right track when he mentions Māra, the Buddhist Tempter, but he comes closer when he also mentions Bimbasāra. The main proof is given by the CPS 27a, 15-17, where the Sanskrit states that Bimbasāra is upariprāśāda-tala-gata: he went up to the flat roof of his palace (in Rājagaha, Magadha). This is rendered almost literally by Mt (‘Matthew’) 4, 5, as estēsen (auton) epi to pterygion tou hierou, he placed him (not himself!) on the pinnacle of the holy (temple). Each of the four words are there: upari becomes epi, etc. The original location was thus Rājagaha, not ‘Jerusalem’. The very high mountain in Mt 4, 8, was originally Gayaśīrṣa, CPS 27b. 5. King Bimbasāra(s) became the diábolos, the Devil, partly under the influence of Māra. Mt combines Buddhist sources only having a word or an idea in common – exactly as he combines OT sources, as known, passim. To combine different passages that only have a word or an idea in common is a fundamental principle of translation from Sanskrit into Greek. It is fundamental to contemporary Jewish literature.

3. Sons of God. Simply translates Sanskrit deva-putra, where it is used in the singular as well as in the plural – exactly as in Mt. Occurs numerous times in the MSV.

5. Jesus as King. Either the Bodhisattva, as a kumāra, becomes a cakravarti or a Buddha. The inscription saying that Jesus was the king of the Jews is translated from the inscription (samjñā) saying twice: Ikṣvāku-rāja, Ikṣvāku-rāja. The king of Ikṣvāku becomes the king of the Jews and the king of Israel, Mt 27, 37 & 42. The source, also for the crucifixion, is SBV I, p.26. The name of Kristos is based on Sanskrit sittakas, as in rājyāhisekenabhī-sittakas, ibid. The whole story of Jesus as a king makes no sense unless one understands that he was originally Gautama who could have become a king, as did his eponymous predecessor, Gautama. Jesus was never ‘anointed’ by anyone anywhere at any time – only, perhaps, by the ‘sinner’ (who was partly Āmra) – which would not make him a real king.

6. The Beloved Disciple. This was originally Ānanda, with a play not only on the meaning of that name, joy, but also on the
role Ānanda plays in the MPS, the direct source.

7. The Paraclete. An old problem, but references to Maitreya
or Ānanda are secondary. The direct source is MPS 41, 2, from
which it is evident that Pārīmokṣaṇa replaces the Buddha as a
teacher and refuge when he himself has passed away. Greek
Paralēktos is simply a direct translation (imitation) of the Sanskrit
Pārīmokṣaṇa. Sense and sound have been preserved very nicely, as
expected.

8. ‘I and my father are one’. The ‘father’ of Jesus was originally
the father Brahmad whent out the Buddha to teach the Dharma.
The Buddha claims to be brahmabhūta. Thus the father (of all
beings) and the Buddha, Jesus, are one.

Common adage. Usually the Buddha teaches the mārga.

10. ‘I have overcome the World’. Sanskrit lokātīka. Common
adage. Precise source uncertain.

11. Jesus’ Fasting in the Wilderness. This was originally the
Bodhisattva in the wilderness. Sanskrit āśrama-padaṃ becomes,
very nicely, Greek eremion tonon. Sense and sound retained.
Nearly all consonants likewise. Source: SBV I, p.96.

The following are cases where D. assumes the Buddhists have
adopted NT materials. In all cases this assumption is wrong.

12. Baptism. The Greek is baptism. In some cases the Greek
word renders Sanskrit upasampada, in others sambodhi(s). In the
first case all consonants are retained, in the second, most (p and b
correspond, as do d and t, and k and g, etc.).

In the (legendary) life of the Buddha there are four great
events, and places of pilgrimage, MPS 41, 5-14. The place of his
birth, of his sambodhi, of his first preaching the Dharma, and of
his death. These four events have been taken over by Mt. As for
the place of birth, Lumbini becomes Bethlehem, the Dharma-
cakrapravartana in Varanasi becomes the Sermon on the Mount
(of which Mark and Luke will know nothing), the Parinirvāṇa in
Kuṣinagara becomes the death in Jerusalem.

The second great event is not immediately obvious. The Bodhi-
sattva wakes up as Buddha – to sambodhi – along the Nairajñana
river. This becomes Jesus who is baptised at the Jordan. The
original consonants are fairly well preserved, considering the fact
that hardly any other river could come into consideration as
replacing the Nairajñana. This is also the beginning of the end of
John. John was simply the Bodhisattva – the Buddha before he
became Buddha. Once the Buddha is there the Bodhisattva is no
longer there. So Jesus and John are but two sides of the same
person. As a rule ho-bap-tis-tès renders bo-dhi-sat-tvas. Jesus
replaces the Baptist, exactly as the Buddha replaces the Bodhisattva.

Matthew ends his Gospel by referring to baptism in the name of
the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. This is the
upasampada with the triple sarana-gamana (translated as ‘in the
name of’, same number of syllables in Greek). So, to repeat, Greek
baptisma translates sambodhi(s) as well as upasampada.

Nearly all original consonants are retained.

12A. Jesus’ Message to John the Baptist. Again taken from
the Buddhist source by Mt ‘the tax collector’, i.e. ‘thief’. Jesus replaces
John, exactly as Buddha, Tathāgata, replaces Bodhisattva. Mt 11,3
contains an obvious pun on the word Tathāgata, the one to come.

13. The (pre-Christian) Baptist sent emissaries. Not at all. The
king sent emissaries to the Bodhisattva in the wilderness. This has
combined with the event, above, where the Tathāgata replaces himself,
Bodhisattva = John. Accordingly ho baptistès also translates
bodhisattvas, as said. This is fully consistent with the
fact that baptisma translates upasampada and sambodhi.

(imitates) Sanskrit upasthāpakas, the attendants of the Buddha,
first the five, later the twelve, or more. In Mt they are combined
with the sixty disciples sent out by the Buddha in CPS 21. So the
original attendants become apostles. The confusion must be
deliberate. Mt knew his sources very well. The source is again SBV

15. The Parable of the Sower. Unfortunately, it has escaped D.
that G. Roth pointed out the Jaina source for this parable. The
figures mentioned at the end of the parable are the same as in the
Indian source. So there can be no doubt about the secondary na-
tature of the NT parable. Moreover (a fact that escaped Roth), the names of the four maidens can be identified in the Greek text (Greek parabolos, incidentally, usually translates Skt paryāyās).


17. Defilement. Buddhist source, in this case is from the Āma-gandhasūtra. Proved by the fact that the otherwise strange Greek word akmēn, Mt 15, 15, is a hap. leg. With its three consonants it contains a pun on the first three consonants of Amagan(dha). At the same time, so typical of Matthew, there is also a pun on the location Magadh. This Magadh, again, is mentioned as the otherwise Mysterious Magadhān in Mt 15,39.

18. (Beelzebul) and abuse of the Holy Spirit. Buddhist source: the Tathāgata as bāhulika, combined with Devadatta’s sin of saṃgha-bheda. The Holy Spirit is, as a rule, the Saṃgha. (When Jesus is born from the HS, the word translates Deva-nikāya. The two Sanskrit words nikāya and saṃgha are nearly synonymous.)

19. The Widow’s Two Coppers. Lacking ref. to Hans Hass, 1922 (who, however, mentioned in the Bibliography, p.121). Buddhist, but Mt has combined several sources, all of which I have not yet identified.

20. Simeon. Buddhist again, but also using the story of the visit of Asita and Nālada, as given in SBV I, p.52.

Luke 2, 36, contains a play on these names: ‘There was also a prophetess, Anna, the daughter of Phanuel, of the tribe of Asher’. The Sanskrit source is MSV I, p.52. Asita, the ṛṣi, came along with his bhāgineya, his sister’s son, called Nālada, to see the little child in the palace in Kapilavastu. The ṛṣi becomes Asher, Nālada becomes Phanuel, and the famous prophet Asita becomes the prophetess Anna. Luke is, in his typical fashion, loyal to his source in the sense that it speaks of two men and a sister. He simply combines anew. (The Asita story is given with many variants, see J.W. de Jong in Mirja Juntunen et al (eds.), Saurāhdyamangalam, Stockholm 1995, pp.161-73. The variant points to the MSV recension as the source of Matthew, here as, if I am not mistaken, always.)


22. This and the following six examples all have a Buddhist source that can be shown to be prior to Mt etc. It would, however, require too much space to point out the details here.

29. The Ascension of Christ. The story about Jesus parting and being carried up into heaven is partly based on MPS 19, 23, where the body of the Buddha is carried up to Brahma-loka — in smoke, that is. Moreover, the idea of ‘physical resurrection’ is based on the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka 15, 6-7. The Buddha did not really die. He assembles his crowd of disciples and shows himself to them on the Gṛdhrakūṭa. He was not completely extinct at that time. It was but a device of his; repeatedly he is born in the world of the living, etc.

Conclusion for now: All examples where D. suggests that the Buddhas borrowed from the Christians were actually the other way round. Comparing the Greek and the Sanskrit texts word for word — the only sound method — there can be no doubt that the Greek is secondary.

Thirdly, D. provides some ‘Cases where he thinks that the Literature may have Gained Reciprocally’. Again, D. is mistaken. In all cases the Buddhist source has priority. This goes, e.g., for the story of Walking on the Water and Peter’s Faith. It has often been discussed, by Garbe, by D., by Klatt, etc. However, the exact source has escaped all previous researchers. The evangelists have combined different passages from the CPS, where all the elements may be identified. The main source is CPS 24r, where the Buddha, staying with Kāśyapa, shows himself as a master of the water element. In Mt 14, 29, for instance. Greek hy-da-ta translates Sanskrit u-da-ka, CPS 24r 3. Mt, as usual, imitates sound and sense.

34. Christ’s Flesh and Blood. Based partly on the MSV stories of previous kings of Vāraṇasī who sacrificed their flesh and blood to yakṣas, partly on MPS 42, 20, avalokayata bhikṣavas tathāgatasya kāyam; vyavalokayata bhikṣavas tathāgatasya kāyam. These
words (combined with OT) are the very source of Mt 26, 26-29. And so they are also the source of the most sacred of all Christian sacraments and celebrations: The Holy Communion, the Eucharist. In the light of this identification it is rather difficult to agree with Derrett when he says (p.97) that the Buddhist influence that he believes to have established does not have to do with ‘doctrine, only with presentation’.

The simple fact is that ‘the body of the Tathāgata’ is translated by ‘the blood of the covenant’. Luke, to the same effect, translates the same words by ‘the new covenant’. The Sanskrit word kāyam, body, is found in the Greek sōma, body, Mt 26, 26 par. The so-called New Testament, in short, is, to speak the historical truth: The Body of the Buddha.

37. As for earthquakes, it will be sufficient here to point out that whenever earthquakes occur in the Gospels, they already occur under the same circumstances in the MPS. The Greek seismos egeneto megas, Mt 28, 2, is a literal translation of the standard mahāprthivicalo bhūt (MPS passim). As usual, the sense and the number of the original syllables are retained.

Fourthly, Derrett lists some ‘Cases were it is impossible to claim that Either influenced the Other’ (pp.77-82). Actually, all these cases can be traced to a Buddhist source that has the priority.

For example, that of the Children in the Marketplace. This is originally the Bodhisattva (not the Buddha) in the harem. These children piped, and the others would not dance. They wept and wailed, but the others would not mourn. Taken along with the otherwise odd remark in Mt 11, 7, about John, i.e. Bodhisattva, as a ‘reed-bed swept by the wind’, the reader of the Greek will have no difficulty in identifying the original source in the SBV I, p.81 (below).

Here we read that the women in the Bodhisattva’s harem are tired from nṛtta-gita-vāditra, dance, song and play. But the Bodhisattva is not interested. In a verse describing the sight of the exhausted women lying like a bed of lotus struck by the wind, he exclaims: vātāhataṃ kamalaśaṇḍam āvāpavīddham – of which Mt 11, 7, is a literal translation: kalamon hypo anemou saleuomenon. Clearly kamala becomes kalamon, vāta, wind, becomes anemou, wind, and the participle apavīddham becomes the participle saleuomenon. The image changes a bit, mainly because a kalamon, a reed, is not exactly the same as a kamala, a lotus. But it sounds almost the same, the consonants are retained. The image fits with the women, not with John.

The obscurity of the image in Matthew proves the priority of the Buddhist source, where it is clear. Needless to add, the man dressed in silks and satin, Mt 11, 8, was originally the Bodhisattva, dressed as an Indian prince. Who in the world would expect John in the wilderness to be dressed so luxuriously – unless he knew that John was a pseudonym for Bodhisattva! One must look in palaces for that, as Matthew adds with a grin. His readers could not know that he was thinking of a palace in Kapilavastu!

51. The Transfiguration of Christ, Mt 17, 5 par. The main source is CPS 3 (for the transformation motive), 4 (Trapaśa and Bhallikas become Petros and Iakōbos) and 5 (for the offering motive), 6 (for the seven days: 6 or about 8 in the Gospel; for the cloud out of season, a-kāla-megha, misunderstood as ‘bright’ though it means ‘out of season’, and for Muci-lindas becoming Moses and Elias), 7 (for the protection motive, Sanskrit phapa, hood, becomes Greek skēnē, shelter), 8 (for the voice of God, Brahmā Sābhāpati), 10 (for the change of the countenance of Jesus/Buddha), etc. There is nothing, apart from the odd way of combination, that cannot be traced back to the CPS. The original location was Uru-bilvā, CPS 1, which is transformed into a high mountain, Greek oros hypsēlon. The Sanskrit is in the locative, Uru-bilvāyām. The o-ros ‘translates’ u-ru, just as the hyp-sē-lon imitates bil-vā-yām. A few consonants in common are sufficient to establish an imitation. Still, cases such as Trapaśa(s), Putras and Subhadras, all becoming Petros, are not at all rare. They prove that ‘Matthew’ took great pains to get the consonants right.

Missing portions of the CPS, as it were, are found elsewhere in Matthew. There is not one chapter that has not left its trace in Matthew. In 17, for instance, a woman of the harem sees Yaṣa(s)
is no longer in his great bed. In Matthew 28, 1, Mary M. sees that Jesus is no longer in his tomb. Both women act similarly, they run off to tell a man what they have experienced, etc. Here the name of Yasás has made Matthew think of the name of Jesus. Sanskrit anītārā becomes ‘another’ Mary! And so on and so forth.

I think these few examples are sufficient to show what I have in mind when I say that the Gospels are free translations, or adaptations, from the Sanskrit. The Greek term is hermēneía. There is, of course, and never has been any Aramaic intermediary. The numerous puns would have been lost, and one could not explain how Mt, etc., succeeded in translating words and phrases with the same number of syllables and with the same consonants as in the original. They would have been largely lost had the Greek been a translation of a translation from Sanskrit. The Greek imitates the Sanskrit.

So, all in all, if one takes my position, one must accept Derrett’s thesis that Buddhism influenced the NT Gospels as true. However, with only rare exceptions, the examples given by him are supported by valid reasons. Also, he has only identified such a small fraction of the sources that he comes to the wrong conclusion that ‘the amount of gospel which is not found anywhere in Buddhists texts . . . is vast’ (P. 25). As opposed to D., I hold that the amount of gospel found in Buddhists texts is, indeed, vast.

In 1882 Max Müller wrote the famous words: ‘I should feel extremely grateful if anybody would point out to me the historical channels through which Buddhism influenced Christianity. I have been looking for such channels all my life, but hitherto I have found none’. Since then many scholars, including most recently Derrett, have suspected the existence of such a ‘channel’. And right they were. But no scholar seems to have suspected or identified the ‘channel’ as – an imitation. The result is a sort of collage, or mosaic, and if one does not have the original from which the little pieces were removed – how can one identify it as such? It is only after the Sanskrit of the MSV became available that the identification has become possible.

None of the examples suggesting Christian influence on Buddhism, according to D., are valid. For the cases left open or uncertain by D., Buddhist sources can, in fact, be pointed out. The Buddhist influence not only concerns presentation, but also doctrine (just a few examples given above).

Let me add that, according to common theological wisdom, the style or genre of the Gospels is unique. There is no real parallel in ancient (Greek or Jewish) literature. True, but there is an obvious parallel in the Buddhist sūtras. All the elements that serve to characterise the Gospels as literature are there. Take any Buddhist sūtra, and it is immediately obvious that the Gospels are composed in direct imitation of a sūtra, e.g., the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra. Prose and verse, persons and places, indications of time and circumstances, etc., everything is taken over from the Buddhist sūtra style. The Gospels are copied from the sūtras. There are four Gospels, just as there are four major collections of sūtras. The Saṅghabhodavastu begins exactly as does Matthew. The MPS (which is also found as a part of the MSV, as is the SBV) ends exactly as does ‘Matthew’. Jesus, it is claimed, has three x fourteen ancestors = forty-two. The Buddha has a long list of ancestors. There are seven Buddhas each of which is associated with six different persons, in all forty-two, assigned to three different periods, as in Matthew’s kulavamsa. The narrator in the MSV is the disciple Maudgalyāyana who, therefore, becomes ‘Matthew’ – a pseudonym that elsewhere translates mahesa, and even Deva-datta. This also goes to show what I mean by translation in the sense of imitation.

One final point. As all students of the NT know, a certain Bishop Papias of Hierapolis is the source of a very important piece of testimony that has often been discussed: ‘Matthew compiled the logia in the Hebrew dialect, and each (person) interpreted them as he was able’. Finally, this famous notice finds its simple solution in a way that none of the approx. twenty papers about Papias I have consulted have an idea about. It means that Matthew combined the Buddhist logia (and the OT logia likewise) and each of the other evangelists interpreted them in his own way.
This is precisely the conclusion I have come to from comparing the Greek with the original Sanskrit. The expression ‘Hebrew dialect’ refers not to some lost Aramaic original, but to the peculiar Greek language into which the Sanskrit was translated. It simply means what modern scholars call ‘New Testament Greek’. The language is Greek, but the strange dialect is Jewish, as is the new sūtra-style.

Even if nearly all his arguments are erroneous or uncertain, Derrett deserves credit for being prepared, as a detective, to accept Buddhist influence on the NT Gospels ‘without sanctimony or prejudice’. Hopefully other scholars will show the courage it takes to deal with the controversial issue in a free and open manner. New Testament theologians still have a lot to learn about ‘The Body of the Buddha’.

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BOOK REVIEWS


The present work is a re-edition of a study published in 1955 by the Sino-Indian Cultural Society in Santiniketan. It mainly aims at giving a detailed overview of the different prātimokṣa traditions. To the 1955 edition, an appendix (V) that explains the contents of a prātimokṣa text and its place among other Vinaya texts, has been added.

In the prātimokṣa versions of the different schools, the majority of the precepts generally coincide, although the order and some details may vary. The most important differences are found among the saṅkṣa (Pāli sekihīya) precepts that concern the daily behaviour of monks and nuns. These differences are probably because this section was originally considered to be an ‘open category’ consisting of undetermined number of precepts (see also E. Waldschmidt, Bruchstücke des Bhikṣuni-Prātimokṣa der Sarvāstivādins mit einer Darstellung der Überlieferung des Bhikṣuni-Prātimokṣa in den verschiedenen Schulen, Leipzig 1926, p.3: ‘Gli saṅkṣa-dharmas gelten als sanbhulu dharmas (Mahāvy. 256), Chin. 行學法, ihre Anzahl steht nich genau fest und ist sogar in derselben Schule Schwankungen unterworfen’). However, Pachow (pp.9-10, 35, 55) also refers to the fact that many saṅkṣa precepts are commonly observed by all schools and thus belong to a very early stage. He further points out that many of these injunctions are extrapolations based on already existing saṅkṣa precepts, except for those of the Dharmaguptakas concerning pagodas (p.46).

In his work, Pachow makes a comparative compilation of the prātimokṣa texts of the following schools: Pāli, based on I.P. Minayeff (ed. & tr.), Prātimokṣa Śūtra, St. Petersburg 1869, and
we should keep in mind, that since the first edition in 1955, many more recent studies on virtually every aspect treated in the introduction have appeared. Consequently, several of Pachow's conclusions may sound somehow dated. Still, his references to Pāli, Sanskrit, Tibetan, as well as Chinese Vinaya data, remain an interesting working instrument.

The most timeless part of Pachow's work is undoubtedly his compilation of all the prātimokṣa precepts of the above mentioned traditions. In this compilation, every Sarvāstivāda precept is compared to the equivalent precepts of the other schools. In this way, the work provides an interesting overview of the different traditions, supplied by a detailed concordance (in Appendix IV). It should be noted, however, that, although differences are indicated, they are seldom discussed. In addition, a few equivalents might be misleading, especially in the saīkṣa section due to its feature as an 'open category'. We learn, for instance, that according to the Sarvāstivāda text edited by Finot, a monk can only enter a layman's house without covering the head (nodguṇṭhikayā . . .) or without a turban on the head (na vesītāsirasa . . .) (p.170). According to G. von Simson in his Prātimokṣasūtra der Sarvāstivādins I, Göttingen 2000, p.306 (see next review), however, the latter expression should be interpreted as 'etwas auf den Kopf gemacht haben', 'den Kopf bedeckt haben'. This implies that the Sarvāstivāda text has two very similar precepts. Consequently, when Pachow (p.170) mentions that other traditions have only the first stipulation and thus do not mention a turban, some caution is needed, at least for the prātimokṣa translated into Chinese. The Chinese texts not belonging to the Sarvāstivāda school (T 1422: Mahāsāṃghika; 199a22; T 1426: Mahāsāṃghika; 554b18; T 1430: Dharmaguptaka, 1028c9; T 1454: Mūlasarvāstivādin; 506c14; T 1460: Kāśyapīya, 664b203) all have 覆頭 (c) 'to cover the head', an expression that fits both Sarvāstivāda stipulations. The extant original Indian texts reveal that for the Mahāsāṃghika and Mūlasarvāstivāda schools, the Chinese translators indeed most probably translated a term equivalent to nodguṇṭhikayā [cf. N. Tatī, Prātimokṣasūtram...
of the Lokottaravādīmahāśāṅghika School, Patna 1976, p.30; A.C. Banerjee, Prātimokṣa-Sūtram (Mūlasarvāstivāda), Calcutta 1954, p.32); for the Dharmaguptaka school it was probably a term equivalent to na veṣṭitaśīrasa. [cf. von Simson, op. cit., pp.153-4]. As for the Chinese Sarvāstivāda prātimokṣa (T 1436, 477a28-b2), the text contains an initial stipulation saying 裹頭, and a second saying 襲頭, ‘to put a kind of turban on the head’.

The above should not, of course, detract us from Pachow’s remarkable effort of putting together the different prātimokṣa versions even when not transmitted in the original language. We should be grateful to Motilal Banarsidas for re-editing W. Pachow’s work in the Buddhist Tradition Series for, although several other works on the prātimokṣa have appeared in the almost fifty years between the first and second edition [e.g. C.S. Prebish, Buddhist Monastic Discipline, The Sanskrit Prātimokṣa Sūtras of the Mahāsāṅghikas and the Mūlasarvāstivādins, University Park & London 1975; O. von Hinüber, Das Pātimokkha-sutta der Theravādin. Seine Gestalt und seine Entstehungsgeschichte, Studien zur Literatur des Theravāda-Buddhismus II, Stuttgart 1999], Pachow’s work still remains a very valuable instrument for all those interested in Vinaya studies.

Ann Heirman


The present work is the result of a thorough study of the extant Bhikṣuprātimokṣa manuscript fragments of the Sarvāstivādins. The study aims at providing a critical edition of this most important Vinaya text.

In 1913, L. Finot (see previous review) published a manuscript of the Bhikṣuprātimokṣa, the lacunae of which he tried to fill, as far as possible, with the help of a badly damaged second manuscript and several small fragments. Since this publication, numerous other fragments have been discovered in various collections in Berlin, London, Paris and St. Petersburg. Many of these fragments were edited in the first volume of the present work, published by Georg von Simson (Prātimokṣa der Sarvāstivādins I, Göttingen 1986). In the now published second volume, numerous other fragments, newly identified and transliterated by J.-U Hartmann and K. Wille, have been added. This second volume also contains a more thorough transliteration of Finot’s second manuscript. Through the identification of all these extant fragments, von Simson establishes a text tradition and gives a critical reconstruction of a nearly complete Buddhist Sanskrit text of the Bhikṣuprātimokṣa.

In the first chapter, this critical reconstruction is preceded by a comparison between two versions of the text: an older version (A) and a second version (B) in use from the sixth century on in Central Asia. The chapter also contains a detailed overview and description of all fragments identified as belonging to the Bhikṣuprātimokṣa. We equally find an overview in the manuscript of the Bhikṣuvibhaṅga, as well as references to translation in Chinese, Tocharian and Old Turkish. This chapter also contains the transliteration and edition of the Sarvāstivādin Bhikṣuprātimokṣa fragments that were not yet edited in the first volume. Finally, we also find a transliteration and edition of some newly identified fragments of the Mūlasarvāstivādin Bhikṣuprātimokṣa, as well as one fragment attributed to the Dharmaguptakas (Pelliot Pr.44). Von Simson hereby notes (p.153, n.7) that the attribution of the latter fragment to the Dharmaguptakas is not final, given the fact that the Sanskrit śālka rules 7 and 8 (na veṣṭitaśīrasa...; cf. p.306, (Sarvāstivāda) śālka B 13 and B 14: ‘B 13. Wir wollen nicht mit bedecktem Kopf ein Haus betreten: Das sollen wir lernen. B 14. Wir wollen uns nicht mit bedecktem Kopf in einem Hause hinsetzen: Das sollen wir lernen’) are lacking in
the Chinese version of the Dharmaguptaka prātimokṣa. The latter statement is based on W. Pachow's study (see previous review) of the prātimokṣa, pp.188-9. However, a closer look at the Chinese Bhikṣuprātimokṣa of the Dharmaguptakas reveals that these rules are in fact enumerated among the saṅkṣa rules and, moreover, are exactly the rules 7 and 8: '不得覆頭入白衣舍，' / '不得覆頭入白衣舍坐...’ ("we should not with our heads covered enter a layman’s house’ / ‘we should not with our heads covered take a seat in a layman’s house’ – T 1429, p.1021a3-2). There, consequently, seems to be no problem in attributing P.Skt.Pr.44 to the Dharmaguptakas.

In the second chapter, the editor reconstructs the Buddhist Sanskrit text of the Bhikṣuprātimokṣa. This reconstruction represents a text that was in use from the sixth century on in Central Asia. It has been called version B. An older version (A) can be partially reconstructed. The sites where the manuscripts were found indicate that the B version possibly originated in Qizil near Kuča. It is further clear that both versions mutually influence each other, and that both were acquainted with the Mūlasarvāstivādin Bhikṣuprātimokṣa. As for the Chinese translation by Kumārajīva, the present study reveals that it is closer to version A than to version B, and that the same is equally valid for the Chinese translation of the Bhikṣuvibhānga. The differences between the two versions concern the choice of words or word variants, as well as some minor divergences in the rules or even in the order of the rules. Although on numerous points versions A and B can thus be distinguished, on several other points it is shown to be impossible to attribute a variant to either of the versions. Moreover, even the fragments belonging to one version are not homogeneous. In these cases, the editor chose the most frequently used or the most logical form (p.15). A very detailed and elaborate critical apparatus further gives all the variant readings.

Finally, the critical reconstruction of the Sarvāstivādin Bhikṣuprātimokṣa is followed by a translation into German and by a very detailed index of all words found in the text. In this way, it is possible to have a precise insight into the technical and non-technical vocabulary used by the Sarvāstivādins and to have a

better understanding of the Buddhist Sanskrit terms that lie behind the translations of this text, in the first place the Chinese translation.

In conclusion, the present work provides a most thorough study of the Bhikṣuprātimokṣa of the Sarvāstivādins. It is an indispensable instrument for all researchers interested in Buddhist Vinaya studies.

Ann Heirman


After completing his translation of the Udāna-āṭṭhakathā, which was noticed in an earlier number of this journal (BSR 12, 1, 1995, pp.71-2), Dr Peter Masefield turned his attention to yet another commentary written by Dhammapāla, this time the Itivuttaka-āṭṭhakathā. Once again, he found that the usual English translations which are given for stock phrases in the canonical text do not fit with the way in which those phrases have to be translated when they occur as lemmata in the commentary. As in the case of the Udāna, therefore, Masefield has decided to make a translation of the Itivuttaka in which all words and phrases are translated in accordance with their explanations in the commentary. This results, of course, in what is for the most part a word-for-word translation, which will be of great help to those trying to understand the original Pāli text of the Itivuttaka.

There is, however, the complication that the commentator tends to give an explanation where modern readers would scarcely expect one. For example, each sūta begins with the words vuttam h‘ etam bhagavată, where h‘ (the elided form of hi) is an emphatic particle stressing the word vuttam, 'said'. The commentarial tradition was well aware of the significance and use of this particle and, in his commentary on the Petavatīthu, Dhammapāla states, 'hi-saddo avadhārge ‘The word hi is used for emphasis’. Sometimes the significance of the word is not obvious, and the
commentator on the Sutta-nipāta states, ‘Hi-kāro nipāto pada-
pūraṇa-matto “The particle hi is merely a line-filler”’.

For this reason many translators omit it and merely say, ‘This was said by the Exalted One’, as F.L. Woodward did in his translation of the Itivuttaka (As it was said, Sacred Books of the Buddhists VIII, 1935). Others add ‘indeed’ or some fairly in-
nocuous word. In his commentary on the Itivuttaka, however, Dhammapāla explains ‘hi iti jātu vībāyattāi etasmin at the nipātō “hi is a particle used in the meaning ‘unquestionably’”. Consequently, Masefield uses this translation in every sutta. According to his stated aim he is correct to do so, but it must be admitted that this constant repetition becomes very tedious for the reader.

This translation of the Itivuttaka is accompanied by extensive notes, justifying the choice of text to be translated and explaining the reasons for the translation adopted. There is an index of subjects and names. There are lists of words omitted from the Pāli-English Dictionary and the Critical Pāli Dictionary, and of suggested amendments to incorrect interpretations in those dictionaries.

When the promised two-volume translation of the Itivuttaka-
āṭṭhakathā appears it will be possible to read it in conjunction with Masefield’s translation of the Itivuttaka, and it will become clear that in the light of the former the latter makes excellent sense.

K. R. Norman

Book Reviews

for 1977, and gives information about what the Buddhists knew of the Jains.

Ute Hüsken: ‘The Legend of the Establishment of the Buddhist Order of Nuns in the Theravāda Vinaya-Piṭaka’ (pp.43-
69). This is an English translation of the essay ‘Die Legende von der Einrichtung des buddhistischen Nonnencorrens im Vinaya-
Piṭaka der Theravādin’, which was published in 1993 in the Festgabe for Heinz Bechert.

Öskar von Hinüber: ‘Tuvaṭṭati/tuvaṭṭeti Again’ (pp.71-5). This article shows that there is no reason for doubting the meaning ‘lies down’ (nipājaṭi) which is given for tuvaṭṭati and tuvaṭṭeti by the Pāli commentators.

Joanna Jurewicz: ‘Playing with Fire: The pratīyaśasmitāpāda from the Perspective of Vedic Thought’ (pp.77-103). In this article the similarities between Vedic cosmogony and the Buddhist pratīyaśasmitāpāda are pointed out.

Mettanando Bhikkhu and Öskar von Hinüber: ‘The Cause of the Buddha’s Death’ (pp.105-17). Ven. Mettanando Bhikkhu, who is a qualified doctor, gives a medical assessment of the Buddha’s symptoms as described in the Pāli texts, concluding that the Buddha did not die of eating sūkara-maddava, as tradition states, but from Mesenteric Infarction. In an appendix on the Buddha’s last meal, Professor von Hinüber gives an account of the various interpretations which have been offered of sūkara-maddava, but does not include the suggestion made by Sir Harold Bailey (‘Pāli sūkara-maddava’, South Asian Studies 8, 1992) that there are etymological reasons for believing that sūkara meant ‘mushroom’.

Öskar von Hinüber: ‘Lān̄ teenager as a Centre of Pāli Literature During the Late 15th Century’ (pp.119-37). Professor von Hinüber gives an account of the literary activity in Northern Thailand in the later fifteenth century, and particularly the grammatical and commentarial works of Nānakittī. He suggests that one reason for the obscurity into which these works fell was the conquest of Lān̄ teenager in 1555, which led to the merging or absorption of its Pāli tradition into the exegetical tradition of Burma.

Jacqueline Filiozat: ‘Nine Pāli Manuscripts in the Vatican
Library’ (pp.139-60). Pāli manuscripts were sent back to Italy by Catholic missionaries towards the end of the eighteenth century but of those listed in publications of 1792 and 1793 only a small number can still be traced in the Vatican Library. Mme Filizot describes nine such manuscripts and gives a list of the texts which they contain.

The volume ends with a book review: K.R. Norman: review of W. Pruitt & R. Bischoff: *A Catalogue of the Burmese-Pāli and Burmese Manuscripts in the Library of The Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine* (pp.161-4), and two indexes: K.R. Norman: ‘Index of Grammatical Points Discussed in the Notes to Elders’ Verses I’ (pp.165-8) – such an Index was included in Elders’ Verses II, The Group of Discourses and Word of the Doctrine, but not in Elders’ Verses I; A. Roock: ‘Combined Index of K.R. Norman’s Collected Papers I-VII’ (pp.169-231) – each volume of K.R. Norman’s Collected Papers has an index. This combined index obviates the need to consult each one to see if any particular word has been discussed in those papers. An index to Collected Papers I-VI was published in Japan in 1997, and to this has been added the index to Collected Papers VII.

K. R. Norman


Writing in the Afterword to the Pali Text Society’s *Pali-English Dictionary* in 1925, William Stede told the story of how, when studying Pali in 1904, he was undecided whether to buy a copy of Children’s *Dictionary of the Pāli Language* (which had been published in 1875) or wait until the new *International Pāli Dictionary* appeared in 1905 or 1906. Little did he dream that, since the First World War was destined to put paid to the IDP plans, he would have to wait until he himself finished that Dictionary in 1925. He concluded that Afterword by expressing the hope that he would see within the next twenty years a second edition of the Pāli Dictionary which would come nearer to his ideal of the ‘perfect’ dictionary.

In the event, his guess about the date of publication of the second edition was even more incorrect than his guess about the first edition. It was to be more than 75 years before Volume I of the second edition, containing the letters A-Kh, would be published. I am sure, however, that Stede would have agreed that that volume has indeed come nearer to the goal of a perfect dictionary, and was well worth waiting for.

There are differences between the two dictionaries. Unlike PED, DOP includes the words in the Pāli lexical text Abhidhanappadipikā; it omits the (often lengthy and by now frequently outdated) etymologies, deeming it sufficient to give Sanskrit (and sometimes Prakrit) equivalents; it gives extensive quotations rather than mere page references; although it aims to include every word found in the Pāli canonical texts and the āṭṭhakāṭhās, it does not include those compounds whose meaning is immediately apparent.

One of the editor’s aims has been to provide a picture of the language, syntax and even grammar of the Canon and Commentaries, and to that end detailed information is given on declensions and parts of verbs.

DOP is essentially a dictionary of the texts published by the Pali Text Society but, since the majority of those texts were published many years ago and contain many doubtful readings, Dr Cone has very often quoted alternative readings from Burmese, Sinhalese and Thai editions to aid the reader and ‘to point out the fallibility of all editions’. Even so it has proved impossible to define accurately the meaning of some words, which have consequently had to be left uncertain.

The great increase in the number of Pāli texts published since 1925 and the more extensive treatment afforded to their vocabulary has led to this first volume being slightly larger than PED. It is planned to complete the dictionary in two further volumes of about the same size.

K.R. Norman

The purpose of this book is to give access to practically all passages containing or hinting at the five (upādāna)khandhas (Pāli khandha) in the Pāli Vinaya-piṭaka and the main Nikāyas of the Sutta-piṭaka. The author, or compiler, claims that 'such a quantitative approach especially makes sense, when certainty about release from rebirth is mentioned as a result of contemplating the five items in solitude . . . or of immediately understanding the teaching . . .' (p.13). So, in some sense, the real purpose of Vetter's new book is 'soteriological' (p.14).

Accordingly, Vetter numbers, quotes and translates the passages that contain (more than one of) the five items and/or the terms upādānakkhandha and khandha. The translations suggested by Vetter are rūpa as body, vedanā as feeling, saññā as ideation, sankhāra as impulses, and viññāna as sensation (p.20).

His choice is justified in a long Introduction (pp.9-82, esp. 20-82). Then follows a discussion, etc., of the khandha passages in the Vinaya-piṭaka (pp.83-9), the Dīgha-nikāya (pp.91-8), Majjhima-nikāya (pp.99-151), the Samaṭṭha-nikāya (pp.153-294), and the Aṅguttara-nikāya (pp.295-309). Four appendixes list occurrences of rūpa, etc., upādānakkhandha and khandha; Khuddaka-nikāya verses containing the term khandha; formulas; and an index of ancient names and terms. Sources, mainly secondary and modern, are provided pp.347-57.

The work as a whole has the character of a notebook compiled for the author's personal use. However, it can be used by others as a sort of introduction to Buddhism, a manual of meditation on impermanence – sarvam anityam iti. It is surely a must for Pāli philology and lexicography.

Chr. Lindner

Book Reviews


The topic of both texts is vyāpti, the connection between the logical reason and result (effect). Both authors are late, Jñānaśīrṣita being the teacher of Ratnakirti (first half of the eleventh century). The Vyāptinirnaya should be read along with the Vṛṣṭiparīcā on which it largely depends (as in the case of other works by Ratnakirti). Both authors depend heavily on Dharmakirti for their epistemological views. The main opponents are, in both cases, Trilocana, Vācaspati and Kumārila.

Not surprisingly, the final word, the conclusion of Jñānaśīrṣita, runs: tasmat prayākṣanupalambhasambhāvai hetupalabhadhāvavaya vyāptisiddhir iti sthitam. Logical causality is established on the basis of perception and non-perception. This was, by and large, already Dharmakirti's view. The differences in Ratnakirti are minor but interesting, having mostly to do with style.

Each text is only available in one Sanskrit manuscript, and both have been edited before. However, the meticulous work of Horst Lasic is not in vain. The Ratnakirti book was first presented as Diplomarbeit (= M.A.) in Vienna in 1994, whereas the one on Jñānaśīrṣita is a dissertation (=Ph.D.) from 1999, also in Vienna.

The Sanskrit text is in both cases an obvious improvement compared to those of Anantalah Thakur, their first editor. Many emendations, mostly obvious, could be made. A few uncertain readings remain. The German translations are good, as are the notes. Each volume contains a very careful analysis of the argument and exhaustive indexes of Sanskrit words as well as indices locorum.

Horst Lasic and his friends and colleagues in Vienna deserve our gratitude for these two nice little volumes. C.L.

Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya is one of the most important works of scholastic philosophy in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism. According to Paramārtha’s biography, Asaṅga was born in Puruṣapura (modern day Peshawar) in Gandhāra. Originally ordained as a Hinayāna monk, he later converted to Mahāyāna, but his earlier scholastic studies formed the basic doctrinal framework of the Abhidharmasamuccaya. While his major Abhidharmic work, the Mahāyānasamgraha, focuses on doctrines associated with the developed Yogācāra tradition such as cognition-only (viśñaptimātratā) and the basis consciousness (ālayavijñāna), the Abhidharmasamuccaya is mainly concerned with doctrines shared in common with non-Mahāyāna Abhidharmic scholastic philosophy, particularly the system of the Sarvāstivādin tradition.

The text is divided into two sections: ‘Compendium of Characteristics’ (Lakṣaṇasamuccaya) and ‘Compendium of Determining’ (Viniścayasamuccaya), each of which has four chapters. Chapter One of the first section begins with discussions of three well-known Buddhist philosophical terms: aggregates (skandha), elements (dhātu), and sense spheres (āyatana). This is followed by a fairly standard exposition of the Four Noble Truths (āryasatya), with the difference that, instead of expounding the fourth Truth, the Truth of the Path (mārgasatya) in terms of the well-known Eightfold Noble Path (āryaśāntamārge) schema, Asaṅga uses the framework of five paths: path of accumulation (sambharamārga), path of preparation (prayogamārga), path of vision (darsāmarāga), path of meditation (bhāvanāmārga), and path of perfection (niṣṭāmārga).

The second chapter, entitled ‘Discerning the Doctrine’ (Dharmavinīcaya), focuses on the twelvefold division of the Buddha’s teaching. The following chapter discusses the path, followed by a discussion of the bodhisattva’s career. The final section outlines the rules and procedures of debate (vāda). The structure of the work is similar to several important Hinayāna Abhidharma works, and begins with a question regarding a particular topic, followed by an often lengthy response, which is generally broken down into sections by Walpola Rahula in order to help the reader follow the exposition. Rahula also provides a helpful overview of the various sections of the text in the opening section.

The present work is an English translation of Rahula’s classic translation into French, originally published in 1971 under the title Le Compendium de la super-doctrine (Philosophie) (Abhidharmasamuccaya) d’Asaṅga, (École française d'Extrême-Orient, Paris). Rahula’s translation was based on the Sanskrit manuscript brought back from India by the Indian scholar Rāhula Śaṅkṛtyāyana in 1934 (which comprised approximately two fifths of the original work) and a text that attempted to reconstruct the missing portions published by V.V. Gokhale in 1947. Rahula compared the Sanskrit manuscripts available at his time with Tibetan and Chinese versions of the text, and the result was an exacting work with few real flaws. This was already noted in an extensive review of Rahula’s translation published by J.W. de Jong, which has been translated and included in this volume at the end. As de Jong noted, there are some contestable interpretations in Rahula’s translation, and some textual misreadings, but these are very rare. His French translation was notable both for its overall accuracy and for the readability of a dense and tersely written scholastic text.

Sara Boin-Webb, well known to Buddhologists for her exacting translations of several works by Étienné Lamotte, again provides a faithful and readable translation of Rahula’s work. I checked several long sections of Rahula’s original against her translation, and found no errors of translation or interpretation. Boin-Webb is clearly well versed in Buddhist thought, which enables her to negotiate the difficulties of rendering technical
French into comprehensible English that also faithfully reflects the doctrinal content of the text. The decision to include de Jong’s review was a good one, since this article expands on Rahula’s rather brief introductory remarks, discussing the various recensions of the text in Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese, Indian and Tibetan commentaries, important Japanese scholarship on the Abhidharmasamuccaya and other topics related to the present work, as well as problems in Rahula’s work. Rahula’s translation is already well known to Buddhologists who read French, but Boin-Webb’s English translation will certainly be welcome to those who either do not read it or who have difficulty with a technical work like this. She is to be commended for the high quality of the translation of this important text.

John Powers
(Australian National University)


When it comes to the study of ancient Indian Buddhist hymns (stotra) and letters (lekha), scholars owe a particular debt of gratitude to the efforts of Prof. Michael Hahn (Marburg) and his students for a great number of good critical editions and annotated translations.

In her book, Die buddhistische Briefliteratur Indiens (Wiesbaden 1984), Siglinde Dietz published and translated nine Buddhist letters (now only available in Tibetan, the Sanskrit being lost). In addition to this she offered an analysis of twelve letters, discussing their authorship, purpose, sources, etc. (see my review in Journal of the American Oriental Society 105, 4 (1985), pp.802-3). Thanks to the initiative of Dharma Publishing, two of the most important of these letters have now finally become generally available to the English readership, namely the Mahārājakānika-

lekha of Mātrceta and the Śisyalekha of Candragomin. The former is only available in Tibetan, the latter is the only lekha still extant in Sanskrit, apart from the most important of them all, Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvali (edited in Sanskrit and Tibetan by Michael Hahn, Bonn 1982).

Mātrceta is the Buddhist stotrapāram par excellence. D.R. Shackleton Bailey published his celebrated Śatapārṇikāśatka, Cambridge 1951; and Jens-Uwe Hartmann brought out the Varnarhavarpaśotra, Göttingen 1987. Further contributions appeared under the editorship of our old friend Kameswar Nath Mishra, Glimpses of the Sanskrit Buddhist Literature, Sarnath 1997. Also important is the Viṣeṣeṣṭava (or Viṣiṣṭeṣṭava) of Ud-ghanasiddhasvamin, Bonn 1993. Mātrceta’s lekha and Udghaṇa’s stava, along with Aṭṭhā’s Vimalaratnalekha, were translated into Danish by the reviewer in 1998. Danish versions of Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvali and Suhjilekha appeared Copenhagen 1980 and 1981 respectively.

As Hahn correctly points out (p.xxxvii), Mātrceta’s letter (consisting of 85 stanzas) is characterised by the utmost simplicity of its style: ‘The charm of this little work lies in its simple yet well-chosen similes and its warm human tone. While the letter is written to King Kaniska, its content, rich with the wisdom of age and experience, appeals to any feeling human being’. On the other hand it must be kept in mind, now that the Sanskrit has been lost, that Mātrceta’s simplicity can be ‘deceptive’ (p.xxxvi). As to the text and its translation, which I had the opportunity to read in the proofs, I have no objections.

Hahn has invested considerable efforts into establishing a good text of the 116 Sanskrit verses (in various metres) of which Candragomin’s dharmakāvya entitled Śisyalekha consists (p.130). Interestingly, Hahn suggests with good arguments that Candragomin’s dharmakāvya may have been conceived as a kind of counterpart to Kālidāsa’s famous khandakāvya, the Meghadūta (in 115 stanzas). If so, this would mean that ‘two streams of Indian literary tradition flow together in the “Letter to a Disciple” – the
Buddhist Studies Review 18, 2 (2001)

Buddhist epistle and the fully-fledged poem of a limited size, the so-called Khaṇḍakāvyā’ (p.ii).

The Sanskrit text of the Śiyalaśekha is available in three manuscripts, the best of which is an old palmleaf manuscript from Nepal, now in the University Library, Cambridge. The Sanskrit text still offers a few problems, mostly grammatical, discussed by Hahn in his extensive notes. Only in a few minor cases do I disagree with his solutions:

8c: Read yatasaṃsthitaḥ (in one word) for tat saṃsthitaḥ (in two words).

15d: satyasthitā-, to remain in truth, rather than to be ‘truthful and constant’. Cf. e.g. Álokaṁala 38d: ... satye vyavatiṣṭhate, and Lankaśatrasūtra 10, 266a: satyasthitim.

27d: I prefer to retain the Ms. reading jarābhujāḥ: Death holds the man he is about to swallow in the arm of old age (so that he cannot escape).

28d: jīvatā in the sense of ‘the will to survive’ seems to be confirmed by jīvantā and jīvaḥ in 51d.

61a: ātmīya-, selfish’, as usual.

63b: Still problematic. One expects the fruit rather than the seed to be śīvaṃ.

65: Hahn (p.169) takes stanzas 65 and 66 as syntactically belonging together. I disagree, also with his translation. He translates a kuryāṃ, but the text reads kuryāt. Also, abhivāñcitaṃ is a noun, not an adverb (as is claimed on p.297). The sense is: When one has attained the state of a human being, one must only (eva) think of realising one’s true wish, namely the bodhicitotpāda. The idea is extremely common, as in 63 and 64. The reason is given in c/d: life is so fickle that there is no time for anything else. The following stanza, 66, deals with the person who fails to follow the good piece of advice offered in 65.

73: Corresponding to normal Buddhist usage and to the three dangers listed: desire(s), wealth and women in d, māyā, marici and the (ud)akacandra-taraṅga should be translated as illusions and mirages and the waves with the water moon, respectively. It is not a question of ‘the wavering image of the moon’ in the water of a mirage brought about by illusion’, as poetically suggested by Hahn. For ref. see e.g. my Master of Wisdom, p.158 (v.3), with ref., p.239.

76c: The obvious misprint here (and in 29c) to be corrected in the second edition.

95c: The emendation kati ke (for Ms. kalike) is still not satisfactory. Note that Ms. reads gamitā (not gamitāḥ). On p.279, the editor notes: ‘What I miss is the pronoun corresponding to yaiḥ (my ital.) in line a’. This leads him to suggest the emendation ke ’pi. The ‘missing pronoun’, however, is to be found in the tān in 96a! This, then, leaves us with the difficult reading gamitākalike. But before this problem can be solved, it must be clear that daśāḥ in line d is the subject, not the object (accusative). The three adjectives ramyā, samāś ca viṣamāś ca (nice, normal and bad) thus all go quite naturally with daśāḥ, the (three) conditions of life. Now, then, we can either emend gamitā to gamitāḥ, which thus goes with daśāḥ, but which leaves us with a different kalike, or, retaining the reading gamitākalike, we can read kāle krameṇa (for kālakrameṇa) making gamitākalike an adjective of kāle. This would make good sense. The author says that he has spent the conditions of life in a time that has gradually had its divisions of time forced away, krameṇa being thus the agent of gamita. This presupposes an adjective ākalika, meaning ‘(by) little divisions of time’ (from the noun kalā). Time has been gradually and inevitably diminished. See Pañjini 2, 2, 18, and, I assume, Candra’s own grammar (not at hand) for the use of ā. Thus, the text of the Ms. makes very good sense, and no emendation is required. The English translation of stanzas 95 and 96 must be changed accordingly. The Tib. dus kyi rim pas should be corrected to dus ni rim pas etc., as suggested by the Tippana (as quoted on p.278). Tib. me tog suggests an impossible Sanskrit reading karpik, but supports kāle, likewise ib. dus kyi rim pas is given as a variant reading, i.e. kālekrameṇa (p.279). This means that Tib. supports Ms. after all.

96a: For more on the technical term ājavamjaya, see Prasannapadā, p.218, n.2. (tr. J. May, p.169, n.529). Note again the
formation with Ā- (as in ā-kalika, above).

97c: The reading tannisphalāḥ, ‘being of no advantage to the (ir mothers)’, to be taken with ko nāma, seems acceptable to me. An easier emendation, if required, in the light of 98c, would be tā nisphalāḥ. A fem. adjective in the accusative plural, meaning ‘loving’, or the like, may possibly be needed. The vatsalāḥ suggested by Michael Hahn has the sense required, but is too far from the form of the nisphalāḥ of the Ms. The simplest emendation, supported by Tib., is no doubt nisphalāḥ, in the common sense of ‘reaping no advantage’ (namely, from the son who abandons them so that they have no advantage from him). I think tā nisphalāḥ is the correct emendation if an emendation is required at all.

Invitation to Enlightenment appears as a separate volume in the Tibetan Translation Series in which many important works (including the Samdhinirmocanasūtra, Lalitavistara, Jātakamālā, etc.) have already been published. The founder and the staff of Dharma Publishing have for many years spared no efforts in producing classical Buddhist books that are highly pleasing to the mind as well as to the eye. Dharma Publishing has, as Michael Hahn acknowledges with heartfelt thanks, produced these books with both great care and elegant taste. In particular, the reviewer is grateful to see that it was decided to include a Tibetan and a Sanskrit vocabulary of the Mahārājakānakalekha and the Sīyalekha respectively. Along with the facsimile of the palmleaf manuscript of the Sīyalekha, the latter takes up more than fifty pages of this beautiful and useful book.

Chr. Lindtner
EDITORIAL STATEMENT

This second issue of Buddhist Studies Review for 2001 contains two more papers (by L. S. Cousins and Peter Harvey) from the Fifth Annual Conference of the UK Association for Buddhist Studies, 30 June – 2 July 2000. The conference was hosted by the Centre for Buddhist Studies at the University of Bristol and we are grateful to the University’s Faculty of Arts Research Fund for a grant towards conference costs.

Rupert Gethin
(Joint Editor for this issue)
Centre for Buddhist Studies
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