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THE QUESTION OF NOT-SELF IN THE EXPOSITION
OF THE GREAT PATH
(‘attributed’ to Aśvaghoṣa)
Translation from Sanskrit of the Nairātmyapariprécchā
by Eric Fallick

Hymn to the Awakened One!

Then those non-Buddhists with imagination and conjecture, views (relying) on mental perception, having approached the Mahāyānist, respectfully (having) made cupped hands, asked a question about not-self. ‘Son of Noble Family, it is explained by the All-Knowing One that the body is without self. If the body is without self, (then) there is no Supreme Self. Then, from where do laughing, crying, playing, anger, pride, jealousy, backbiting, etc. arise? Will your reverence be pleased to free us from this doubt? Is there a Supreme Self in the body or not?’

The Mahāyānist2 said, ‘Sirs! Certainly, the two are not said here — that there is a Supreme Self in the body and that there is not. In it being said, Sirs, that there is a Supreme Self, there is wrong prattling. If there were, then how (come), Sirs, in the head hair, nails, teeth, skin, body hair, veins, flesh, bones, fat, marrow, muscles, spleen, intestines, tubular vessels, head, hands, feet, limbs, in the whole body having been examined inside and outside, no Supreme Self is seen?’

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According to the Sanskrit, yāna also means ‘path’; however, according to S. Mukhopadhyaya’s ed. (Viśabhārati Studies 4, Calcutta 1931), the Tibetan rendering corresponds with ‘vehicle’ only.

2. Reading singular here and in the following for the plural of the Ms. to be consistent with the singular above of ‘Kulaputra’, and context.
The non-Buddhists said, 'The Supreme Self is not seen with the fleshy eye, Son of Noble Family. We do not see (it), (but) sometimes (those) with the divine eye see (it).

The Mahāyānist said, 'Sirs, (those) with the divine eye also do not see (it). How is that to be seen of which (there is) no appearance, form, or formation?'

The non-Buddhists said, 'Then there is not (a Supreme Self)?'

The Mahāyānist said, 'In saying, Sirs, "there is not", there is also wrong Prattling. If there were not, then how could laughing, crying, playing, anger, pride, jealousy, backbiting, etc. be possible? Therefore, "there is not" cannot be said. Neither of these two things are (to be) said.'

The non-Buddhists said, 'If, Son of Noble Family, it is said neither "there is" nor "there is not", then what support will there be?'

The Mahāyānist said, 'Sirs, there is not any support.'

The non-Buddhists said, 'Like empty space?'

The Mahāyānist said, 'Just so, Sirs, just so, like empty space.'

The non-Buddhists said, 'If so, Son of Noble Family, then how (are) laughing, crying, playing, anger, pride, jealousy, backbiting, etc. to be seen?'

The Mahāyānist said, 'They are) to be seen like illusion, a dream, like magic.'

The non-Buddhists said, 'Of what kind are "illusion", "dream", "magic"?'

The Mahāyānist said, 'Illusion is only designation, not to be admitted. Dream is only appearance, its own form emptiness by nature. Magic is artificial contrivance. Thus, Sirs, all are to be seen as illusion, dream and magic. Moreover, two divisions are pointed out, namely, conventional truth and ultimate truth. "This is self", "this is other"; so soul, man, person, doer, feeler — this is called conventional truth. Imagining money, son(s), wife, etc. — this is called conventional truth. Where (there is) no self, no other, so no soul, no man, no person, no doer, no feeler, no money — that is the middle way of things. On which this is said:

'Conventional truth and ultimate truth — (these) two divisions are shown.

Conventional truth is the worldly way, and ultimate truth the supramundane.

(Having) entered the way of conventional truth, beings fall under the power of the defilements.

For a long time, they wander in Samsāra, not knowing ultimate truth.

Conventional truth is the worldly way, (hence) the unwise imagine it.

From unreal imagining they experience sufferings.

They do not see the path of freedom, blind fools, common people; they arise and cease in the five destinies forever.

They wander stupefied like a wheel (turning), enveloped in the way of the world.

They do not know the ultimate truth in which becoming is stopped.

Wrapped up in the net of being, they wander through birth and death again and again.

As both the sun and the moon go and come back again, so they die in the world and are born again.

All conditioned states are impermanent, unstable, transitory in an instant.

And hence the knower of ultimate truth would avoid the state of conventional truth.

Which(ever) devas, gandharvas, nymps, etc. (are) in the abode of heaven, there is perishing of all (of them); all that is the fruit of conventional truth.

Siddhas, vidyādhara, yaksas, kinnaras, mahoragas, they (eventually) go to hell again; all that is the fruit of conventional truth.

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3 Various kinds of supernatural beings.
And having reached the state of being Śakra or of being a World Monarch, the highest (mundane) state(s), (there is still) birth again in the womb of an animal; all that is the fruit of conventional truth.

Hence, having quit all this divine great pleasure of heaven, the wise (one) would constantly develop the transparently luminous mind of awakening.

Without self-nature, without support, all empty, without a dwelling place, gone completely beyond diversification; (this is the) mark of the mind of awakening.

No hardness, no softness, and not hot nor even cold, no contact and not to be seized; (this is the) mark of the mind of awakening.

Neither long nor short, not round, not triangular, not thin and also not thick; (this is the) mark of the mind of awakening.

Not white and also not red, not black and not yellow, without colour and shapeless; (this is the) mark of the mind of awakening.

Unchangeable, without fallacious appearance, without supposition, offering no obstacles, without form, resembling the sky; (this is the) mark of the mind of awakening.

Transcending cultivation, not the range of non-Buddhists, having the form of transcendence by ultimate knowing; (this is the) mark of the mind of awakening.

Unparalleled, without appearance, unseen, and calm indeed, pure by nature, not an object; (this is the) mark of the mind of awakening.

And thus all is (just) resemblance (of reality), insubstantial, like a bubble; and transient, without self, like an illusion and a mirage; like a lump of clay, like a water jar, much multiplied diversification; joined together with desire, aversion, etc., but only dream and illusion.

As a lightning flash in a cloud is not seen even after an instant, (so) by seeing transcendence by ultimate knowing, one would bring about the highest state.

Thus, constantly playing, laughing, talking, weeping; so dancing, singing, instrumental music — all that is certainly like a dream.

All conditioned states of all living beings are like illusion and dream.

And dream is the conception of mind, and mind is like the sky.

Who would constantly practise this principle of transcendence by ultimate knowing, he, freed from all evils, attains the highest state.

This is that supreme awakening revealed by all the Buddhas.

Having practised meditation here, one obtains Nirvāṇa, liberation.

As many faults (as there are) of conventional truth, (there are) as many virtues of the final beatitude.

Final beatitude would be unproduced; it is not stained by all faults.

Then, those non-Buddhists were satisfied and free from (vain) imagination. Then, practising meditation they gained knowledge of the Great Path.

The Question of Not-Self in the Exposition of the Great Path is ended.

* * * * *

4 bodhicitta.
5 prāpañca.
6 Following Vaidya's emendation of kṛṣṇa for kṛṣṇam in Lévi's ed.
7 prajñāpāramitā.
8 Apparently, a description of the 'sudden' enlightenment experience.
9 Lit., 'composing, putting together' or 'meditating'.
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THE BEGINNINGS OF THE BUDDHA'S TEACHING ACCORDING TO THE EKOTTARĀGAMA

André Bareau

A single Ekottarāgama has come down to us in its Chinese translation by Sanghadeva and dating from 397-398. It is an apparently complete collection of sūtras, the origin of which remains a mystery. Although it contains numerous passages which are clearly Mahāyānist, it is obvious that these are only late additions inserted into a work which belonged to a school of that early Buddhism commonly called the Hinayāna. There is still discussion on the nature of this early school and several hypotheses have been proposed on the subject, the most satisfying being, in our opinion, that it formed part of the group derived from the Mahāsāṃghikas, without being more specific. A careful examination of several of its sūtras, compared with the parallel texts of the Theravādins, Mahāsāṃghikas, Mahīśāsakas, Dharma-guptakas and Sarvāstivādins, as well as those of the Mahāvāstu, in fact show very clearly many similarities with this last work as well as with the Vinaya Pitaka of the Mahāsāṃghikas and, in contrast, just as striking and numerous differences from the Pāli canonical texts and those of the Mahīśāsakas, Dharma-guptakas and Sarvāstivādins which have been preserved in their Chinese versions.

This is particularly apparent when we compare the long sūtra of which we give a translation below with parallel texts taken from the canonical works of other early schools. We have added to it the text of another much shorter sūtra narrating an episode in the traditional biography of the Buddha which immediately precedes the series of episodes constituting the long sūtra. Although separated from the latter in the Ekottarāgama (= EA), it would normally be joined to it and it too presents several interesting peculiarities which appear in a comparative examin-
ation. No other sūtra of the same collection contains an account of the other episodes in the part of the biography of the Blessed One which occurred between the Enlightenment and his return to Kapilavastu, not even a different account of certain of them which are narrated in the long sūtra. We can therefore consider the latter as forming, along with the short sūtra which immediately precedes it, a partial biography of the Buddha analogous and in part parallel to those found in particular in the Vinaya Pitakas of the Theravādins, Mahiśāsakas and Dharmaguptakas, and which we have studied in our Recherches sur la biographie du Bouddha: de la quête de l’Éveil à la conversion de Sāriputra et de Maudgalyāyana².

Such a partial biography is absent from the Vinaya Pitakas of the Mahāsāṃghikas and Sarvāstivādins, but we do find accounts of several separate and scattered episodes in the Mahāyamāgama and the Saṃyuktāgama of the latter. The same applies to the Mahāvastu of the Lokottaravādins. As for the Mūla-sarvāstivādins, whose canonical texts were visibly fixed in writing very late, they have left us, apart from a partial biography, analogous to that of the Theravādins, Mahiśāsakas and Dharmaguptakas, in their own enormous Vinaya Pitaka, a long sūtra entitled Catuspariṣat and which is practically identical to that biography; this in fact is a kind of lengthy development of the biography narrated in the Vinaya Pitakas of the Theravādins, Mahiśāsakas and Dharmaguptakas, which on the whole have the same layout as the former, with several supplementary episodes and especially an abundance of wonderful new details.

The partial biography in the EĀ consists in the main of the following chapters, which are each subdivided into several episodes:

1) The end of the Buddha’s stay in the place of the Enlightenment.

2) The stay in Vārānasi and ordination of the first five monks.

3) The stay in Uruvilvā and conversion of the three Kāśyapa brothers.

4) The return to Kapilavastu and conversion of the Śākyans.

If we compare this with the accounts in the Vinaya Pitakas of the Theravādins, Mahiśāsakas and Dharmaguptakas, as well as with the Catuspariṣatsūtra, all four of which have the same general layout, it is noticeable that the EĀ ignores the Buddha’s stay in Rājagṛha, where he converted Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana, but, conversely, it adds a long account of the Blessed One’s return to Kapilavastu, about which the other four works are silent, at least in their partial biography. In other words, the fourth and last chapter differs: in the EĀ it narrates the events located in or directly connected with Kapilavastu whilst, in the other four texts, it is a matter of episodes localised in Rājagṛha. We should add that the EĀ does not contain any sūtra in which these last are narrated, whereas the three Vinaya Pitakas recount, in other places, the Buddha’s return to his native town and various events which followed shortly afterwards. However, it cannot be concluded from this that the school to which the EĀ belonged was unaware of this stay of the Blessed One in Rājagṛha, since this is highly likely to have been narrated in other parts of its Tripitaka, in particular in its Vinaya Pitaka, or in its Mahāyamāgama or Saṃyuktāgama. All the more can we presume the existence of an early stage in the composition of the partial biography of the Buddha again reduced to the first three chapters below: that is, the stay in the place of the Enlightenment, the journey to Vārānasi and the stay in Uruvilvā with the conversion of the three Kāśyapa brothers.

Let us now examine the first chapter. In the EĀ, it is reduced to only two episodes which, furthermore, are closely linked in their meaning, between each other and with what follows, that is, the second chapter. Briefly, it is reduced here to what forms the end of the first chapter in the three Vinaya Pitakas and the Catuspariṣatsūtra, to what is in brief, although located in the place of the Enlightenment, as is all this first chapter, a transition towards the second chapter, recounting the journey to Vārānasi where the Buddha converted his five former companions and thus founded the monastic Community. If the EĀ does not contain an
account of the other events which immediately followed the Enlightenment and which are narrated in the other four works, this does not necessarily mean that those episodes were unknown to the school to which it belonged, for reasons similar to those we pointed out earlier in connection with the fourth chapter. In the EÀ, then, this first chapter is no more than an introduction to the second chapter: the Buddha at first recoils before the futility of teaching but, the god Brahma having made him change his mind, he then seeks to know to whom he should first expound his Teaching of deliverance, which leads him to choose his five former companions, at present staying near Vārāṇasī. We should note that, in the main, the account of these two episodes in the EÀ scarcely differs from the narratives contained in the other four works, which leads us to infer an already well-established tradition from which these five accounts derive.

A single important detail distinguishes the EÀ text from the other four: the precise location of the episode. In fact twice, at the start of the small sūtra (593a) and the large sūtra (618a), it locates the scene 'in the land of Magadha, under the tree of the site of the Enlightenment (bodhimanda)', without in any way stating that this spot was very close to the village of Uruvilvā as do the other four works. This is all the more surprising in that the village of Uruvilvā will indeed be named by this same Agama, as by the other texts, and on several occasions, in the third chapter. This astonishing silence has led me to suppose that the memory of the exact site of the Enlightenment could have been lost quite early by the Community, or even perhaps that it had never been known, and that the location of the Bodhi near Uruvilvā would have been determined, in some way or other, approximately two centuries after the Parinirvāna of the Buddha, by the account of the conversion of Kāśīapa, an account which everything leads us to believe was purely legendary.


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The second chapter, centred on the Blessed One’s stay in Vārāṇasī, has the same composition as that which corresponds to it in the three Vinaya Pitakas and the Catusparisatsūtra, namely, the following episodes:

1) The encounter with the brahmin ascetic Upika (?), whom the Buddha is unable to convince.
2) The Blessed One’s welcome to Vārāṇasī by the five ascetics.
3) The setting in motion of the Wheel of the Dharma.
4) The conversion of the five disciples, who become monks.

Nonetheless, there lack the other discourses which the Buddha also addressed to the latter in Vārāṇasī, but as the other sources, including a Theravādin sutta in Pāli and a Sarvāstivādin sūtra, differ over the nature of that teaching, the Agama is silent on the matter and merely confirms what we can infer from this divergence, namely, that this fifth episode was a relatively late addition. However, our sūtra narrates two scenes which appear in the other four works, that is, the proclamation by the gods concerning the setting in motion of the Wheel of the Dharma and the advice given by the Buddha to his five monks on the organisation of their life.

Immediately after having given those instructions to the five men, the Buddha goes to Uruvilvā in order to expound his Teaching to the ascetics who live there. The EÀ therefore ignores the other episodes located in Vārāṇasī or on the return road by the three Vinaya Pitakas and the Catusparisatsūtra: the successive conversions of Yaśas, of the latter’s companions and of the groups of epicures, as well as the interventions by Māra narrated by the Theravādins and in part by the Dharmaguptakas. The whole of this intermediate chapter therefore seems to have been established later than the others and only in the group derived from the Stūvarvādins to which belonged the Theravādins, Mahāsākas, Dharmaguptakas and, also most likely, the Mulasarvāstivādins. We can see in this an additional indication in favour of the hypo-
thesis according to which our EĀ would have had its origin in a school derived from the Mahāsāṃghikas.

The third chapter narrates the marvels performed by the Blessed One with the aim of converting Kāśyapa of Uruvilvā and his five hundred disciples. The number of episodes is slightly less than in the other four works and in this we can see an indication of relative antiquity all the more noteworthy in that, if several marvels narrated by all or part of these four other texts are ignored by the EĀ, all those which it describes are also recounted by those four works. This is the list of them, in the order in which they are told:

1) The Buddha's victory over the fierce Nāga.
2) The marvellous journeys of the Blessed One.
3) The marvels performed around the worship of fire.
4) The Buddha guesses Kāśyapa's thoughts and accomplishes a marvellous journey.
5) The visit of the four Divine Kings.
6) The visit of Śakra Devānāmīndra.
7) The visit of Brahmā, king of the gods.
8) The cleaning of the rags.
9) The marvel of the flood.
10) The conversion and ordination of Kāśyapa of Uruvilvā.
11) The conversion and ordination of the other two Kāśyapas.
12) The discourse to the three Kāśyapa brothers and their thousand disciples.

Finally, it will be noted that the EĀ text only differs from the others, in this chapter as in the two preceding ones, by details in the account of the episodes they have in common, such divergences being of the same nature and degree of importance as those which distinguished between each of the three Vinaya Pitakas in the same parts, and that the account in the EĀ is generally slightly shorter and simpler than the other three, which may also be an indication of relative antiquity.

In brief, for these first three chapters, the EĀ text seems to have remained, on the whole, the most faithful to the original common version than those of the three Vinaya Pitakas of the Theravādīns, Mahāsāṅkakas and Dharmaguptakas, and, even more so, than that of the Catusparisatsūtra of the Mulasarvāstivādins.

It is quite different with the fourth chapter of the long sūtra in the EĀ, in which the Blessed One's return to Kapilavastu is substituted for the stay in Rājagṛha narrated by the other four works. The account of this return of the Buddha to the Sākyans and the first episodes which immediately follow is indeed found in the three Vinaya Pitakas, but in other places, remote from the partial biography, therefore separate from it, and furthermore their layout is very different from that of the EĀ, as is also the whole of their narration, as we shall see:

The EĀ text consists of the following episodes:

1) The Buddha considers returning to Kapilavastu.
2) He sends the monk Udaya to announce to King Śuddhodana the approaching arrival of the Blessed One.
3) The latter arrives in Kapilavastu, where he is solemnly welcomed by the king and the people.
4) Converted by the Buddha, the king orders the Sākyans to enter the monastic Community in large numbers, which is done.
5) The royal family comes in great pomp to lead the young Sākyan princes who are to be ordained as monks.
6) The Buddha welcomes the latter with predictions and answers favourably the various questions of the king.
7) The Blessed One praises various monks.

Now, not only is this layout not found anywhere else, even in the Mahāvastu which also recounts the return of the Buddha to the Sākyans, but those of the analogous accounts in the three Vinaya Pitakas and the Mahāvastu differ greatly from each other. It is quite clear that these five narratives were established very late by collating previously separate episodes and by adding to them several new elements, apparently conceived at the time for various reasons.

Moreover, the account in the EĀ is much closer to that of the Mahāvastu than those of the three Vinaya Pitakas, not so
much in their layout as by their tone and by the abundance of secondary elements and details in which the marvels play a major part. In contrast to what we noted for the first three chapters, the fourth is therefore clearly more recent in its composition and style than the parallel accounts in the three Vinaya Piṭakas. It naturally ensues that it was added to the first three long after the latter had been grouped in a whole and fixed in their redaction.

Let us now examine, in order to compare them with that of the EA, the accounts of the Blessed One’s return to Kapilavastu contained in the three Vinaya Piṭakas and the Mahāvastu.

This is the Theravādin version:

1) The Buddha arrives in Kapilavatthu, makes his alms-round in the town and enters the house of a certain Sākya Sudhodana.
2) There, a woman indicates the Buddha to her son Rāhula as being his father and urges him to claim his inheritance.
3) The child follows the Blessed One in the street and he receives novitiate ordination as his inheritance.
4) The Sākya Sudhodana comes to protest against this ordination and asks the Buddha, who agrees, to forbid henceforth the ordination of minors not authorised by their parents7.

The Mahīśāsaka account is very different:

1) Learning that the Buddha has just arrived near Kapilavastu, King Sudhodana comes to visit him, expresses his wonder and listens to the ascetic’s discourse.
2) The king asks to become a monk, but the Buddha refuses.
3) Having returned to his palace, the king issues a proclamation by means of which he condones the ordination of the Sākyans.
4) Mahāprajāpati Gautamī asks the Buddha for ordination and is refused.

The Dharmaguptaka Vinaya Piṭaka does not anywhere narrate the Blessed One’s return to Kapilavastu, but it does relate separate episodes connected with that return: the ordination of the child Rāhula and the protest of King Sudhodana, the ordination of the young Sākyans and Mahāprajāpati Gautamī’s request for ordination8. It should be fully noted, since it is important, that the accounts of each of these three distinct episodes are very close in the three Vinaya Piṭakas, proving once again the close relationship which existed between the Theravādins, Mahīśāsakas and Dharmaguptakas, and conversely very different from those of the Agama and the Mahāvastu.

The latter narrates the first return of the Blessed One to Kapilavastu thus:

1) Learning of the Enlightenment, the Sākyans inform King Sudhodana of it.
2) At their suggestion, the latter sends Chandaka and Udāyin to invite the Buddha to come to Kapilavastu.
3) The Blessed One confers ordination on the two messengers.
4) He sets out for the town of his youth.
5) The king comes out with a large retinue to welcome the Buddha, but the sight of the monks scandalises him and he returns to his palace.
6) Learning of this, the Buddha sends Kālōdayin to give the king the requisite explanations to make him change his attitude.
7) The king and his subjects pay a visit to the Buddha.
8) Princess Yaśodharā, ex-wife of the latter, miraculously cures Queen Gautamī of an eye disease.
9) The Buddha converts King Sudhodana by means of a discourse9.

The Mahāvastu, furthermore, recounts the ordination of the young Sākyans10, and its account is, here again, much closer to the EA’s than those of the three Vinaya Piṭakas, with which it nonetheless has several similarities, as we will see further on.

Let us compare, to begin with, the accounts of what is the

7 Mahīvagga, PTS edition, I, pp.82-3.
8 T 1421, 185b.
9 T 1428, 809c–810a, 590b–591c, 922e.
return proper of the Blessed One to Kapilavastu. Non-existent for the Dharmaguptakas, as also in the Mahāsāṃghika and Sarvāstivādin Vinaya Pitakas, it is reduced to a few lines for the Theravādins, where manifestly it is merely a short introduction to the account of Rāhula’s ordination, which creates the category of novices. It is slightly more developed for the Mahāśāsakas, where it serves to introduce a long account of Mahāprajāpati Gautamī’s request for ordination, which would lead to the foundation of the Order of nuns, but it is very different from the Pāli text for other reasons. Learning of the arrival of the Buddha, Ārya Śuddhodana, who here is the king of the Sākyans, courteously comes to pay him a visit, he praises him, listens to him discoursing, then asks him for ordination, which is refused by the Blessed One; this last event is entirely unknown to the other canonical works. Finally, on returning to his palace, King Śuddhodana lets his Sākyan subjects know that he permits them to become Buddhist monks; we can see, in this very short scene, the origin of the initial and much more complex episode in the account of the ordination of the young Sākyans in the EĀ and Mahāvastu, which we will examine further on.

In these last two works, the account of the Buddha’s return to Kapilavastu is very different from the two preceding ones and, first and foremost, very much longer. Several scenes precede the arrival of the Blessed One in the town of his youth, whilst, for the Theravādins and Mahāśāsakas, the narrative begins precisely with this arrival. However, the EĀ and Mahāvastu differ here completely since, if the former attributes the initiative for the journey to the Blessed One, who wishes to return among the Sākyans and sends the monk Udāya to King Śuddhodana to announce to him the forthcoming arrival of his son11, the latter re-

11 Noteworthy is the Mahāyānist element inserted in the words the Buddha addresses to Uruvilvā-Kāśyapa to explain to him his intention of going to Kapilavastu: this double allusion to the bodhisattva career is evidently a late addition to a version which was itself probably posterior to the beginning of the Common Era, or slightly older.
3) Several young princes decide to become monks.
4) After consulting his brother Mahānāman, Anuruddha makes the same decision.
5) The young Sākyans come in great pomp to ask the Buddha for ordination.
6) The barber Upāli had cut the Buddha’s hair in the past.
7) The latter confers ordination on him first, while the young Sākyans are bidding farewell to their families and friends.
8) At the request of the Blessed One, the young Sākyans who have in turn become monks bow down before Upāli, copied by the king and his subjects, which astonishes the king’s counsellors.
9) In order to explain this, the Buddha recounts the jātaka of Gangapāla, according to which, in a former life, the king and his court had already bowed down before the future Upāli.

In the Mahāvastu, as in the EA, all the action takes place in Kapilavastu, whereas that town is only named once in the three Vinaya Piṭakas accounts, where it is nowhere stated where the young Sākyans dwell. Furthermore, the Mahāvastu and EA give a very important role to Sudhdhana, king of the Sākyans, whilst the other three narratives do not breathe a word of him. In the first two texts, the king, desirous of supplying the Buddha with many ksatriya disciples, orders the Sākyans to give the Sangha a son from each of their families, a decision which is clearly ignored by the other three accounts. The Mahāvastu and EA also name Sudhdhana’s three brothers, who are absent from the three Vinaya Piṭakas. In the first two texts, the young Sākyans come in great pomp, accompanied by the king, his court and subjects, to ask the Buddha for monastic ordination, whilst, in the other three, Anuruddha and a small group of his friends run away in secret and only with their barber Upāli. Finally, Bhaddiya, who plays such an important part in the three Vinaya Piṭaka narratives, is completely ignored by the EA and merely named by the Mahāvastu among the other young princes of the Sākyan royal family.

12 Cullavagga. PTS ed., II, pp.180–1, for the Theravadins. T 1421, 16c–17c, for the Mahāsāhasas.
13 T 1428, 590b–591c.

As regards other points, the Mahāvastu account is nonetheless closer to those of the three Vinaya Pitakas than that in the EA. Firstly, it presents Anuruddha as being the brother of Mahānāman and not Nanda, and it quotes at some length the conversation between these two young Sākyans, whilst the EA reduces this to a short paragraph. The Mahāvastu gives the five monks ordained in Vārānasi the same names as those by which they are known in the Vinaya Pitakas, that is, Ajñāta Kaundinya, Aśvakin, Bhadraka, Vāśpa and Mahānāman, whilst the EA names only the first in the second chapter recounting the Buddha's stay in Vārānasi, and adds to it, at the end of the fourth chapter, besides Vāśpa and Mahānāman, Subhrgu (?) and Udaya; the last should certainly be identified with the monk sent by the Blessed One to King Śuddodana in Kapilavastu to announce the forthcoming arrival of his son. This Udaya, whose worth is praised by the king and the Buddha in the last but one scene of the sūtra, therefore plays an analogous, though reversed, role to that of the messenger sent by Śuddodana to the Buddha in the Mahāvastu and who bears a name extremely close to his, Udayin. Nonetheless, the two men differ greatly, since this Udayin is a lay Sākyan, whom the Blessed One ordains against his will, but we are led to think that it was originally a matter of the same person, having evolved differently later on in the tradition represented by the Mahāvastu and in that to which the EA belonged. Finally, another important feature concerns the barber Upāli, who plays a far from negligible part in the three Vinaya Pitaka accounts and even more so in that of the Mahāvastu, but who is totally ignored by our sūtra.

As we can see, the account of the young Sākyans' ordination in the Mahāvastu is in some way an intermediary between those of the three Vinaya Pitakas and that of the EA. This is an additional indication that the last work belonged to a Sūtra Pitaka of a school at least as remote from the Theravādins, Mahāsāsakas and Dharmaguptakas as were the Lokottaravādins, authors of the Mahāvastu. Since these last derived from the Mahāsāṃghikas, it is clear that the authors of our EA formed part, with all the more reason, of a school which also originated in the Mahāsāṃghikas.

Bureau — EĀ on the Buddha's Teaching

1-1) (593a) Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was in the land of Magadha, under the tree on the site of the Path (Bodhimanda). At that moment, the Blessed One had attained the Path a short time before. He then gave rise to this reflection: 'Now, my teaching is extremely profound, difficult to see clearly, difficult to grasp, difficult to perceive and know, impossible to meditate on. It is perceptible and knowable [only] by those who have a subtle and excellent knowledge of cessation, who analyse the meaning and principles, those who practise without tiring and find in that their joy. If I were to expound this excellent teaching to men, they would not accept it with confidence, they would not serve it and neither would they practice it. Immense [for me] would be the fatigue, it would then be harmful. At present, it is therefore appropriate for me (593b) to remain silent. Why should it be necessary for me to expound the teaching?'

At that moment, the god Brahma, who was in the Brahma heaven, knew from afar what the Tathāgata had thought. Just as a strong man bends his extended arm, in an instant he disappeared from the Brahma heaven and drew near the Blessed One. Having bowed down at the latter's feet, he remained standing on one side. Then, the god Brahma said to the Blessed One: 'This Jambudvīpa will assuredly be destroyed, and the three worlds (dhātu) will lose the Eye. The Tathāgata has reached dignity (arahatva), complete and perfect Enlightenment (samyaksambodhi). Having appeared in the world, he should disseminate the Jewel (raina) of the Teaching (dharma), since now he has not [yet] disseminated the flavour (rāsa) of the Dharma. I wish only that the Tathāgata may everywhere expound the profound (gambhīra) Dharma to all beings (sattva). Moreover, among beings, there are those whose faculties (indriya) are such that they are easy to save. If they do not hear [the Dharma], they will definitely lose the Dharma-Eye (dhammacaksus), they will become children abandoned by the Dharma. Just as utpala flowers, kumada flowers, pundarika flowers, even if they have already emerged from the ground, have not yet emerged from the surface of the water and are not yet open and spread, at that moment, those flowers, because they wish to appear gradually, have not yet emerged from the water; or else, then, those flowers have just
emerged from the surface of the water; or again, then, those flowers are no longer covered over by the water; it is exactly the same for those kinds of beings who, being oppressed and overwhelmed by the sight of birth, old-age, disease and death, have faculties (indriya) which can ripen. If they do not hear the Dharma and they die, would that not be just as unfortunate? Now is the right time, and I wish only that the Blessed One may expound the Dharma to them.

Thereupon the Blessed One, knowing what the god Brahma was thinking in his heart, because of his goodwill (maitri) and compassion (karuna) towards all beings, uttered these verses (gatha):

The god Brahma comes now to exhort the Tathagata to open the doors (dvāra) of the Dharma. Those who hear it will obtain firm faith (sraddha) and will analyse the essence of the profound (gambhīra) Dharma.

Just as he who stands on the summit of a high mountain observes the kinds of beings everywhere, now that I possess this Dharma, having ascended this embankment, the Dharma-Eye (dharmacaksus) appears to me.

Then, the god Brahma reflected thus: 'The Tathagata will certainly expound the profound and excellent Dharma to beings. He could not restrain himself from jumping for joy and, having bowed down at the feet of the Blessed One, he returned to his heaven. Then the god Brahma, having heard what the Buddha had said, rejoiced and applied himself to practise accordingly.

2) (618a) Thus have I heard. At one time the Blessed One was in the land of Magadha, at the foot of the tree on the site of the Enlightenment (Bodhimaṇḍa), when he had just become a Buddha.

At that moment, the Blessed One reflected thus: 'At present, I have obtained this extremely profound teaching (dharma), difficult to understand, difficult to grasp, difficult to see clearly, difficult to know, most subtle, most mysterious, (618b) perceptible and knowable by the wise. At present, to whom should I expound this teaching in the first place? To whom shall I make my teaching understandable?'

Then the Blessed One reflected thus: 'Araṇāra Kāḷāma has all his faculties (indriya) fully ripened (vipakva); he should therefore win deliverance first. Moreover, he is waiting for me to possess the teaching.' As soon as he finished that reflection, there was a god in space who said to the Blessed One: 'Araṇāra Kāḷāma died seven days ago.' At that moment, the Blessed One reflected thus: 'What a misfortune that his life should have ended without having heard my teaching! If he had heard my teaching, he would have been able to understand it.'

At that moment, the Blessed One reflected thus: 'At present, to whom should I expound my teaching in the first place and can I act so that he may understand it? No, Uḍraka Rāmaputra should win deliverance first. I will go and expound it to him and, when he has heard my teaching, he will be the first to be able to understand it.' As soon as the Blessed One had reflected thus, there was a god in space who said to him: 'Yesterday, in the middle of the night, he came to the end of his life.' Then the Blessed One reflected again: 'What misfortune that Uḍraka Rāmaputra's life should have ended without having heard my teaching! If he had heard my teaching, he would have been able to understand it.'

Then, the Blessed One reflected thus: 'Who, then, will be the first to hear my teaching while being able to understand it?' At that moment, the Blessed One further reflected: 'Five monks (bhikṣu) have many [internal?] riches. They have followed me since my birth'. Then, the Blessed One reflected as follows: 'Where are those five monks at present?' Immediately, by means of his divine eye (divyacaksus), he saw the five monks in Vārānasi, in the [Flight of the] Sages [Wood, Rṣipatana] in the Deer Park [Mrgadāya], a place where they had settled. 'Now, I am going to expound the teaching to them first. When they have heard my teaching, they will be able to understand it.' At that, the Blessed One gazed attentively at the tree of the Path for seven days without blinking his eyes. Then, the Blessed One uttered these verses (gatha):

In this place where I am now, I have undergone the sufferings of births and deaths. Taking up and wielding the axe of wisdom (prajñā), I have definitely severed the roots
which had been planted originally.

'The divine kings have come here, and Māra with his vassals, but once again I subdued them with my means (upāya) in order to don the headress of deliverance (vimukti).

'Now, at the foot of this tree, I am seated on the diamond-seat (vajrāśana). Having acquired omniscience (sarvajñāna), I have attained irresistible wisdom (prajñā).

'Seated at the foot of this tree, I have seen the suffering (duhkha) of births and deaths. Having quitted the origin of deaths, old-age and disease have [ceased for me] definitively and without there being any remainder (anavaśesa).

II-1) When the Blessed One had uttered those verses, he rose from his seat and set out with the desire of going to (68lc) the town of Vārānasī.

At that moment, the brahmin ascetic (brahmacārin) Upika (?) from afar saw the Blessed One whose radiant form glowed and eclipsed the light of the sun and moon. Having seen him, he said to the Blessed One: 'Gautama, where is your master now? On whom do you rely, having gone forth from home, for studying the Path? What teaching do you, ever joyful, give? Where have you come from and where do you wish to go?' Then the Blessed One, turning to that brahmin ascetic, uttered these verses:

'I have become an arhat, in the world I am the best and I have no equal. Among gods and mankind, in this world, I am now the best and the most high.

'I have no master nor have I equals. Alone and honourable, having no superior, I am cold and have no more fire.

'Now, I shall set turning the Wheel of the Dharma (dharma-cakra) by going to the kingdom of the Kāśī. Now, making use of the nectar of immortality (āmṛta) I shall distribute it to the blind [living in] darkness.

'In the land of Vārānasī, on the territory of the Kāśī kings, in the place where five monks dwell, I wish to expound the subtle and mysterious Dharma.

'So that they may achieve the Path at the earliest and obtain the superknowledge (abhiṣāna) of the destruction of their impure streams (āsravakṣaya) by dispelling the origin of bad phenomena (dharma). That is why I am the supreme Conqueror (jina).

At that moment, the brahmin ascetic sighed, bowed his head, joined his hands, snapped his fingers, smiled, showed the way and departed.

2) Then, the Blessed One went to Vārānasī. At that moment, the five monks saw him coming from afar. Having seen him, they debated and decided this together: 'There is the ascetic (śramana), Gautama who is coming from afar. His mental nature is confused and troubled, his mind is not unified and pure. So let us not speak to him, so let us not get up to go to him and so let us not invite him to sit down either'. Thereupon, those five men also uttered this verse:

'That man should not be shown respect, neither will we look at him with friendship; we will not make him welcome; neither will we invite him to sit down'.

When the five men had uttered that verse, they remained silent.

Gradually, the Blessed One drew near those five monks. Then, the five monks each rose in turn and went to meet him: they offered him a seat which they had prepared and they gave him water which they had drawn. Once the Blessed One was seated before them, he reflected as follows: 'These foolish stupid men were finally not able to accomplish what they had agreed'. At that moment, the five monks addressed the Blessed One calling him 'Venerable' (āyuṣmanta ?).

Then, the Blessed One said to the five monks: 'Do not call 'Venerable' him who has attained supreme (anuttara) complete and perfect Enlightenment (samyaksamboḍhi). (69a) Why? At present, I have achieved supreme complete and perfect Enlightenment, I have acquired immortality (āmṛta) which is good. Pay great attention! Listen to my expounding of the Dharma! Then, the five monks said to the Blessed One: 'O Gautama, formerly when you practised the austerities, you were not even able to obtain the teaching of superior men, all the more so today when your mind is confused and troubled, and you say you have attained the Path!'
The Blessed One said to the five men: ‘Have you in the past heard me utter lying words?’ The five monks said: ‘No, O Gautama’. The Blessed One told them: ‘The completely and perfectly Enlightened Tathāgata (samyakasambuddha) has acquired immortality. All of you, pay great attention! Listen to me expounding the Dharma to you!’ At that moment, the Blessed One further reflected: ‘At present, I am quite able to subdue these five men’.

3) Thereupon, the Blessed One said to the five men: ‘Know this, there are Four Truths (satya). What are those Four? The Truth of suffering, the Truth of the origin of suffering, the Truth of the cessation of suffering, the Truth which permits escape from suffering. Of these, what is called the Truth of suffering? Birth is suffering, old-age is suffering, disease is suffering, death is suffering, grief, lamentation, torment, pain, sorrow, sufferings which cannot be evaluated or expressed; reunion with what one dislikes is suffering, separation from what one likes is suffering, not obtaining what one wants is also suffering; in brief, the five aggregates of grasping (upādānakanda) are suffering; that is what is called the Truth of suffering. What is the Truth of the origin of suffering? The apportionment of the craving (trṣṇā) for feelings (vedanā), which works tirelessly, the desire which constantly clings to the mind, that is what is called the Truth of the origin of suffering. What is the Truth of the cessation of suffering? Whatever acts so that this thirst ceases, is destroyed without leaving any remainder and does not arise again, that is what is called the Truth of the cessation of suffering. What is called the Truth which permits escape from suffering? It is the Noble Eightfold Path (aśtāṅgika Patha (āryamārgā), that is, right (samyācār) view (dṛṣṭi), right intention (kalpa), right speech (vāc), right action (karmanta), right livelihood (ājīva), right effort (vyāyāma), right mindfulness (smṛti) and right mental concentration (samādhi). That is what is called the teaching of the Four Truths.

‘Moreover, O you five monks, in this teaching of the Four Truths, with regard to the Truth of suffering, the eye appeared [in me], knowledge appeared, higher knowledge appeared, enlightenment appeared, light appeared, wisdom appeared, concerning things (dharma) which had not yet been heard before. Moreover, that Truth of suffering is real and stable, it is not futile, it is not false, it is absolutely not otherwise, and that is why the Blessed One teaches is called the Truth of suffering. With regard to the Truth of the cessation of suffering, concerning things which had not yet been heard before, the eye appeared, knowledge appeared, higher knowledge appeared, enlightenment appeared, light appeared, wisdom appeared. Moreover, that Truth of the origin of suffering is real and stable, it is not futile, it is not false, it is absolutely not otherwise, and that is why the Blessed One teaches is called the Truth of the origin of suffering. With regard to the Truth of the cessation of suffering, concerning things which had not yet been heard before, the eye appeared, knowledge appeared, higher knowledge appeared, enlightenment appeared, wisdom appeared, light appeared. Moreover, that Truth of the origin of suffering is real and stable, it is not futile, it is not false, it is absolutely not otherwise, and that is why the Blessed One teaches is called the Truth of the origin of suffering. With regard to the Truth of what permits escape from suffering, concerning things which had not yet been heard before, the eye appeared, knowledge appeared, higher knowledge appeared, enlightenment appeared, light appeared, wisdom appeared. Moreover, that Truth of what permits escape from suffering is real and stable, it is not futile, it is not false, it is absolutely not otherwise, and that is why the Blessed One teaches is called the Truth of what permits escape from suffering. O you five monks, know this, concerning those Four Truths in their three cycles (parivarta) and twelve aspects (akāra), those who do not know them in accordance with their reality do not achieve the supreme (anuttara) dignity (arhatvā), complete and perfect Enlightenment (samyakasambodhi). By me have these Four Truths, their three cycles and twelve aspects been analysed and known in accordance with their reality. That is why I have achieved the supreme dignity, complete and perfect Enlightenment’.  

4) While this teaching was being expounded, the dust and stain of Ājñāta Kauṇḍinya were destroyed and he attained the pure Dharma eye. Then the Blessed One said to Kauṇḍinya: ‘At present, you have obtained the teaching by attaining the teaching’.
Kaundinya replied: 'Yes, O Blessed One, I have attained the teaching by obtaining the teaching'.

At that moment, the terrestrial deities, having heard those words, made this proclamation: 'Now, the Tathāgata, being in Vārānasī, has set in motion the Wheel of the Dharma for gods, mankind and the Māras, that which neither the Māras, nor the gods, nor mankind, nor non-human [spirits] (amanusya) are able to set in motion. Today, the Tathāgata has set in motion that Wheel of the Dharma, and Ajñāta Kaundinya has obtained the teaching of immortality (amriadharmā). Then the four Divine Kings, having heard the proclamation by the terrestial deities, had it recalled and transmitted by saying: 'Ajñāta Kaundinya has obtained the teaching of immortality'. Then, the Thirty-Three gods, having heard it from the four Divine Kings ... the Yāma gods, having heard it from the Thirty-Three gods ... the Tuṣita gods, having in turn heard that proclamation ... the Brahma gods also heard that proclamation: 'The Tathāgata, being in Vārānasī, has set in motion the Wheel of the Dharma for gods, mankind and the Māras, that which neither the Māras, nor the gods, nor mankind, nor non-human [spirits] are able to set in motion. Today, the Tathāgata has set in motion that Wheel of the Dharma. He then gave Kaundinya the name of Ajñāta'.

At that moment, the Blessed One said to the five monks: 'May a second man remain to receive the teaching and three men go to seek alms. The food which those three men obtain will be consumed by the six men together. When those three men remain to receive the teaching, the two men will go to seek alms. The food which those two men obtain will be taken and consumed by the six men'.

Then, he instructed them and, at that moment, they grasped perfectly the teaching of Nirvāṇa free of birth, they grasped just as perfectly [what was] free of birth, free of disease, free of old-age, and free of death. Thereupon, the five monks became full Arhats. At that moment, in the universe of three thousand great thousand worlds, there were five Arhats, and the Buddha was the sixth.

Then, the Blessed One said to the five monks: 'All together, go and seek alms among men, but take care not to travel alone. Furthermore, those among living beings (sattva) whose faculties (indriya) are fully ripened (vipakva) should obtain deliverance. Now I am going to the village of Uruvilvā to expound the Dharma to those who dwell there'.

III-1 Then, the Blessed One went to the village of Uruvilvā. At that time, on the bank of the Nairāñjanā river, there Kāśyapa (619c) was dwelling. He knew astrology and geomancy, there was nothing he did not penetrate or know perfectly. He could calculate and count the trees and flowers, and he knew them all. He led five hundred disciples whom he instructed and educated each day. Not far from Kāśyapa, there was a stone house in which a poisonous Nāga lived.

Then, the Blessed One approached Kāśyapa and, having reached him, said to him: 'I wish to pass the night in the stone house. If I am given permission, I will go and stay there'. Kāśyapa replied: 'I do not refuse, but there is a poisonous Nāga there and I fear that you may hurt or harm each other'. The Blessed One said: 'O Kāśyapa, I no longer can undergo pain, that Nāga cannot harm me. If I am given permission, I will pass the night there'. Kāśyapa replied: 'If you wish to dwell there, go and stay there as you wish.'

Thereupon, the Blessed One went to the stone house, set out his seat and passed the night there, seated with his legs crossed, his body straight, his mind correctly fixed on what was before him. At that time, the poisonous Nāga, seeing the Blessed One seated, spat fire and poison. Then, the Blessed One entered the mental concentration (samādhi) on goodwill (maitrī), after which, having withdrawn from the mental concentration on goodwill, he entered the mental concentration on flames and light (īvalanotka-samādhi). Upon which, the fire of the Nāga and the light of the Buddha operated together at the same time.

At that moment, Kāśyapa got up in the night to observe the constellations (nāksatra). He saw that, in the stone house, there was a great fire and a great light. Having seen that, he said to his disciples: 'That ascetic (grāmana) Gautama has a perfect bearing but at the moment, he has been made uneasy by that Nāga, and
he is most worthy of compassion. Nonetheless I did say these words to him: There is a wicked Nāga there, you therefore cannot stay the night there'. Then Kāśyapa said to his five hundred disciples: 'Take pitchers of water and climb tall ladders in order to extinguish that fire and act so that that ascetic is saved from that danger'. Then Kāśyapa, leading his five hundred disciples, went to the stone house in order to extinguish that fire, some taking water and throwing it, others setting up ladders, but they were unable to put out the fire, all being drawn by the supernormal power of the Tathāgata.

At that moment, the Blessed One entered the mental concentration on goodwill and acted so that, gradually, the Nāga was no longer irritated. Thereupon, that wicked Nāga felt fear in its heart; from east to west it fled rapidly trying to leave the stone house, but it could not leave it. Then the wicked Nāga came towards the Tathāgata, entered the Blessed One's alms-bowl (pātra) and remained there. At that moment, the Blessed One touched the body of the wicked Nāga with his right hand, then he uttered these verses:

'Release for the Nāga is extremely difficult, the Nāga reunites with other Nāga. O Nāga, do not arouse a thought of wickedness, since release for the Nāga is extremely difficult.

'In the past, numerous as the sand-grains of the Ganges were the complete passings away (parinirvāna) of the Buddhas, but you have never encountered them, because of the fire of anger.

(620a) 'Thanks to a wholesome (kuśala) thought concerning the Tathāgata, you have abandoned that poison of hatred. Having rejected the poison of anger, you can now be reborn in the heavens (svarga).

Then, the wicked Nāga put out its tongue and licked the Tathāgata's hand, then it gazed attentively at the Tathāgata's face.

The next day, early in the morning, the Blessed One took the wicked Nāga in his hand and, having drawn near Kāśyapa, said to him: 'Here is the most cruel and violent wicked Nāga. Now it is subdued'. Then, Kāśyapa, having seen the wicked Nāga, was afraid in his heart and said to the Blessed One: 'Stop! Stop! O ascetic! Do not come near, as that Nāga is about to do harm'. The Blessed One said: 'O Kāśyapa, fear nothing! I have subdued it and it will do no more harm. Why? Because this Nāga has received the teaching of deliverance'.

Thereupon, Kāśyapa and his five hundred disciples praised what was wholly extraordinary, wholly unique and what had not existed before: 'This ascetic Gautama has very great prodigious power, since he was able to subdue that wicked Nāga and act so that it does no more harm. Although this is so, he is not like me, who have obtained the truth of the Path'.

Then, Kāśyapa said to the Blessed One: 'O great ascetic (mahāsramana), accept my invitation for ninety days. Whatever you may require in the way of clothing, food, seats and couches, remedies against illnesses, I will provide in full'. Then the Blessed One accepted Kāśyapa's invitation by remaining silent.

At that moment, the Blessed One took the Nāga and put it in the ocean (mahāsamudra), and that wicked Nāga, after the end of its life, whether the latter was long or short, was reborn in the heaven (svarga) of the four Divine Kings.

2) Then the Blessed One returned to dwell in the stone house. Kāśyapa, having procured all kinds of food and drink, went to see the Blessed One. 'The food and drink are ready, you may go and have your meal'. The Blessed One said: 'O Kāśyapa, go ahead of me, I will follow later'. After Kāśyapa's departure, he went to the land of Jambudvīpa, he took a jambu fruit from under the jambu tree and then returned, arriving before Kāśyapa in the stone house, where he sat down.

At that moment, Kāśyapa saw the Blessed One in the stone house and said to him: 'O ascetic, by following which path did you reach the stone house?' The Buddha said (620b) to Kāśyapa: 'After your departure, I went to the land of Jambudvīpa, where I took a jambu fruit and I have returned to sit down here. O Kāśyapa, know this, that fruit is very good and very perfumed, you may eat it'. Kāśyapa replied: 'I do not need it, may the ascetic take it himself and eat it'. Then, Kāśyapa reflected as follows: 'That ascetic has extreme supernormal powers, he has great prodigious power, since he can go to the land of Jambudvīpa and
take that good fruit there. Although this is so, he is not like me [who have obtained] the truth of the Path'. At that moment, the Blessed One, having had his meal, returned there where he passed the night.

Early in the morning, Kāśyapa approached the Blessed One and said to him: ‘The time for the meal has come, you may go and eat’. The Buddha said to Kāśyapa: ‘Go ahead, I will come later’. After Kāśyapa’s departure, he went to the land of Jambudvīpa, he took an āmalaka fruit and returned. Arriving at the stone house before Kāśyapa, he sat down there.

Kāśyapa said to the Blessed One: ‘O ascetic, what path did you follow to come here?’ The Blessed One told him: ‘After your departure, I went to the land of Jambudvīpa, I took this fruit from there and came back. It is very good and very perfumed. If you would like it, take it and eat it’. Kāśyapa replied: ‘I do not need it, may the ascetic take it himself and eat it’. Then Kāśyapa again reflected as follows: ‘That ascetic has extreme supernormal powers, he has great prodigious power, since, after my departure, he took that fruit and came back. Although this is so, he is not like me, for I have obtained the truth of the Path’. At that moment, the Blessed One, having had his meal, returned there where he passed the night.

The next day, Kāśyapa approached the Blessed One and said these words to him: ‘The time for the meal has arrived, you may go and eat’. The Buddha said to Kāśyapa: ‘Go ahead, I will come later’. After Kāśyapa’s departure, the Blessed One went to Godāniya, (620c) where he took a haritaka fruit and arrived before Kāśyapa back in the stone house, where he sat down.

Kāśyapa asked the Buddha: ‘O ascetic, which path did you follow to come here and sit down?’ The Buddha said to Kāśyapa: ‘After your departure, I went to Godāniya and there I took this fruit, which is very good and very perfumed. O Kāśyapa, if you would like it, you may take it and eat it’. Kāśyapa replied: ‘I do not need it, may the ascetic take it himself and eat it’. Then Kāśyapa again reflected as follows: ‘That ascetic has extreme supernormal powers, he has great prodigious power. Although this is so, he is not like me, who have obtained the truth of the Path’. Then, the Blessed One, having had his meal, returned there where he passed the night.

The next day, Kāśyapa approached the Blessed One and said to him: ‘The time [for the meal] has arrived, you may go and eat’. The Buddha said to Kāśyapa: ‘Go ahead, I will come later’. After Kāśyapa’s departure, the Blessed One went to Pārvavideha, where he took a vibhīlaka fruit and arrived before Kāśyapa back in the stone house, where he sat down.

Kāśyapa asked the Buddha: ‘Which path did you follow to come here and sit down?’ The Buddha said to Kāśyapa: ‘After your departure, I went to Pārvavideha, there I took this fruit and returned. It is very good and very perfumed. O Kāśyapa, if you would like it, you may take it and eat it’. Kāśyapa replied: ‘I do not need it, may the ascetic take it himself and eat it’. Then Kāśyapa again reflected as follows: ‘That ascetic has extreme supernormal powers, he has great prodigious power. Although this is so, he is not like me, who have obtained the truth of the Path’. Then, the Blessed One, having had his meal, returned there where he passed the night.

3) At that time, Kāśyapa wished to celebrate a great sacrifice.
His five hundred disciples took axes to cut firewood. They raised their axes, but the latter did not fall. Then, Kāśyapa again reflected as follows: 'That is certainly caused by the ascetic'. Then, Kāśyapa asked the Blessed One: 'At present, we wish to cut firewood. Why do the axes not fall?' The Blessed One said to him: 'Do you wish that the axes may fall again?' — 'We wish it to be done so that they fall again.' Immediately, the axes fell once more.

At that moment, the axes having fallen once more, they could not be raised again. Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: 'Why do the axes not rise?' The Blessed One said to him: 'Do you wish it to be done that they rise again?' — 'We wish it to be done that they rise again.' The axes rose immediately.

At that moment, Kāśyapa's disciples wanted to light a fire, but the fire could not be lit. Then, Kāśyapa further reflected in this way: 'That is assuredly caused by the ascetic Gautama'. Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: 'Why does the fire not light?' The Buddha said to Kāśyapa: 'Do you wish it to be done that the fire lights?' — 'We wish it to be done that the fire lights'. The fire lit immediately.

At that moment, they wished to put out the fire, but the fire would not go out. Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: 'Why does the fire not go out?' The Buddha said to Kāśyapa: 'Do you wish it to be done that the fire goes out?' — 'We wish it to be done that the fire goes out'. The fire went out immediately.

4) Kāśyapa again reflected as follows: 'That ascetic Gautama (62a) has a perfect looking face, as exists rarely in this world. I would like to celebrate a great sacrifice tomorrow. The king and the people of the country will all come to assemble [here]. If they see that ascetic, I will not receive any more offerings. If that ascetic were not to come tomorrow, that would be most fortuitous'. At that moment, the Blessed One knew what Kāśyapa had thought in his mind. The next day early in the morning, he went to Uttarakuru and he took some spontaneously [grown] rice. He then went to Godāniya where he took some milk, then he went to the Anavatapta river, where he consumed his meal. He remained there until the end of the day, then, towards evening, he returned to the stone house where he passed the night.

The next day Kāśyapa approached the Blessed One and asked him: 'O ascetic, why did you not come yesterday?' The Buddha said to Kāśyapa: 'Yesterday, you reflected thus: 'That ascetic is quite perfect, as exists rarely in this world. Tomorrow I shall celebrate a great sacrifice. If the king and the people of the country come, they will stop making offerings to me. If he were not to come, that would be most fortuitous'. I knew immediately what you had thought in your mind and I therefore went to Uttarakuru, where I took some spontaneously [grown] rice. After that, I went to Godāniya where I took some milk, then I went to the Anavatapta river, where I had a meal. I remained there until the end of the day, then, towards evening, I returned to the stone house, where I passed the night'. Then Kāśyapa reflected as follows: 'That great ascetic (mahāśramana) has extreme supernormal powers, he really has prodigious power. Although this is so, he is not like me, who have obtained the truth of the Path'. Then, the Blessed One, having had his meal, returned to the stone house where he passed the night.

5) Now, during the night, the four Divine Kings approached the Blessed One and listened to him [giving] a discourse (sūtra) on the Dharma. The four Divine Kings had a brilliant light and the Buddha also emitted a light such that it illuminated the hills and the countryside, penetrating them uniformly. In the night, Kāśyapa saw that brilliant light.

The next day, early in the morning, he approached the Buddha and said to him: 'What was that brilliant light which, last night, illuminated the hills and countryside?' The Blessed One said to him: 'Last night, the four Great Kings came here to listen to my teaching. It was the brilliant light of the four Great Kings'. Thereupon, Kāśyapa again reflected as follows: 'That ascetic has extreme supernormal powers, since he is able to cause the four Divine Kings to come and listen to him [giving] a discourse on his Dharma. Although this is so, he is not like me, who have obtained the truth of the Path'. Then the Blessed One, having had his meal, returned there where he passed the night.

6) In the middle of the night, Śakra Devānāminda approached the Blessed One in order to listen to his Dharma. The brilliant
light of the ruler of the gods illuminated the hills. At that moment, Kāśyapa, having risen in the night to observe the stars, saw that brilliant light.

The next day, early in the morning, Kāśyapa approached the Blessed One and asked him: 'O Gautama, last night there was a brilliant light, quite extraordinary and unique. What was the cause of that brilliant light?' The Blessed One said to him: 'Last night, the ruler of the gods, (962b) Śakra, came to listen to my discourse. That is why there was a brilliant light.' Thereupon, Kāśyapa reflected as follows: 'That ascetic Gautama has extreme supernormal powers, he has great prodigious power since he can cause the ruler of the gods, Śakra, to come here and listen to his discourse on the Dharma. Although this is so, he is not like me, who have obtained the truth of the Path.' Then the Blessed One, having had his meal, returned there where he passed the night.

7) In the middle of the night, Brahma, the king of the gods, emitting a great brilliant light, approached the Blessed One in order to listen to a discourse on the Dharma. Then, Kāśyapa, having risen during the night, saw that brilliant light.

The next day, he approached the Blessed One and asked him: 'Last night, there was a brilliant light, double that which [usually] illuminates and which surpassed the bright light of the sun and moon. What was the cause which emitted that brilliant light?' The Blessed One said to him: 'O Kāśyapa, know this, last night great Brahma, king of the gods, came to me in order to listen to my discourse on the Dharma.' Thereupon, Kāśyapa again reflected as follows: 'That ascetic Gautama has extreme supernormal powers, since he can cause my paternal ancestor to come to that ascetic in order to listen to his discourse on his Dharma. Although this is so, he is not like me, who have obtained the truth of the Path.'

8) At that moment, the Blessed One, having obtained a worn out discarded robe the colour of which had faded, wished to wash it. He reflected as follows: 'In what place am I going to wash this robe?' At that moment, Śakra Devānāminā, knowing what the Blessed One was thinking in his mind, magically created a bathing pool, and he said to the Blessed One: 'You may wash that robe here.'

At that moment, the Blessed One again reflected as follows: 'In what place am I going to tread underfoot this robe while washing it?' Then, the four Divine Kings, knowing what the Blessed One had thought in his mind, raised a large square stone, placed it at the water's edge and said to the Blessed One: 'Here, you can tread underfoot that robe.'

At that moment, the Blessed One reflected further as follows: 'In what place am I going to expose this robe to the sun? Then a tree deity, knowing what the Blessed One had thought in his mind, lowered the branch of a tree and said to the Blessed One: I only wish that you may expose that robe to the sun here.'

The next day, early in the morning, Kāśyapa approached the Blessed One and asked him: Formerly, there was no pool here and now there is a pool here. Formerly, there was no tree here, and now there is a tree here. Formerly, there was no stone here, and now there is a stone here. For what causes are there these transformations?' The Blessed One said to him: 'Here itself, last night, the ruler of the gods, Śakra, knowing my wish to wash a robe, made this pool as a bath. I also reflected thus: 'In what place am I going to tread underfoot this robe while washing it?' Then the four Great Kings, knowing what I had thought in my mind, brought this stone. I also reflected thus: 'In what place am I going to expose this robe to the sun?' Then a tree deity, knowing what I had thought in my mind, lowered a branch of this tree'. Thereupon, Kāśyapa again reflected as follows: 'That ascetic Gautama, despite his supernormal powers, (621c) is not like me, who have obtained the truth of the Path'. Then, the Blessed One, having had his meal, returned there where he passed the night.

9) In the middle of the night, a large black cloud rose and much rain fell; the great Nairājanā river overflowed, seething in the extreme. Then, Kāśyapa again reflected as follows: 'This river is overflowing and seething. The ascetic will assuredly be carried off by the water. Let us go and see right now.' Immediately, Kāśyapa and his five hundred disciples went to the river. At that moment, the Blessed One was walking on the water, without his feet being wetted by the water. From afar Kāśyapa saw the Blessed One who was walking on the water. He again reflected as follows: 'It
is quite extraordinary, quite unique: the ascetic Gautama is able to walk on water. I also am able to walk on water, but not so that my feet do not get wet. That ascetic, although he has those supernatural powers, is not like me, who have obtained the truth of the Path.'

At that moment, the Blessed One said to Kāśyapa: ‘You are not an Arhat and, furthermore, you do not know the Path (mārga) of the Arhats. You do not even understand the name Arhat, with greater reason [how] could you have obtained the Path? You are a blind man whose eyes see nothing. The Tathāgata shows you impressive marvels and you say: “He is not like me, who have obtained the truth of the Path”. You have just uttered these words: “I am able to walk on water”. At present, it is exactly the right time: can we walk together on the water? If you wish to abandon now your thoughts of false ideas (mithyādhyātā), this will mean that you will undergo no further torments for a long time to come’.

10) Then Kāśyapa, having heard the words of the Blessed One, bowed down at his feet and said to him: ‘At present, I repent of my faults, I sincerely acknowledge that they are unjust (adharma) and that they offend the Tathāgata. I only wish that he may accept my repentance’. This [he said] three times. The Blessed One said to him: ‘I accept that you correct your faults, for you yourself are able to acknowledge that they offend and importune the Tathāgata’.

Then Kāśyapa said to his five hundred disciples: ‘May each of you pursue what suits you. At present, I myself am taking refuge in the ascetic Gautama’. Immediately, the five hundred disciples said to Kāśyapa: ‘We also have previously had [good] thoughts concerning the ascetic Gautama. Since he subdued the Nāga, we have wished to pay homage to him. If our master himself takes refuge in Gautama, we five hundred disciples all take refuge in Gautama too.’ Kāśyapa answered them: ‘Now is the appropriate time. Furthermore, my mind is [still] firmly clinging to delusion (moha); although I have seen many marvels, my mind has all the same not understood and that is why I boasted, saying: “My Path is right and correct”’. Then Kāśyapa, leading his five hundred disciples, who preceded, followed and surrounded him, approached the Blessed One. He bowed down at the latter’s feet, then, standing to one side, said to him: ‘I only wish, O Blessed One, that you would permit us to become ascetics (sramana) and cultivate pure conduct (brahmacārya) concerning the eternal teaching of the Buddhas. If you say “Welcome, O monks (bhikṣu)”, we will become ascetics (sramana).

At that moment, the Blessed One said (622a) to Kāśyapa: ‘Welcome O monk! Correctly cultivate pure conduct concerning this subtle and marvellous teaching’. Thereupon, Kāśyapa and his five hundred disciples totally transformed the clothing they wore by making them into kāśyayas, they themselves removed their hair as if they had been shaved, then seven days passed.

The five hundred disciples then said to the Blessed One: ‘We only wish that the Blessed One would permit us to become ascetics (sramana). The Blessed One said to them: ‘Welcome, O monks!’ At that moment, the five hundred disciples immediately became ascetics (sramana), they wore kāśyayas and themselves removed their hair.

11) At that time, by following a water course downstream, there was a brahmin ascetic (brahmācārin) named Kāśyapa of the River (Nadi), who dwelled at the water’s edge. Then Nadi-Kāśyapa saw all the utensils used for incantations floating on the water, and he reflected as follows: ‘Alas, my elder brother has drowned in the river!’ Immediately Nadi-Kāśyapa, leading his three hundred disciples, followed the water course upstream and looked for the corpse of his brother.

From afar he saw the Blessed One seated under a tree and Mahākāśyapa with his five hundred disciples who preceded, followed and surrounded him, to whom [the Buddha] was expounding his Dharma. Having seen them, he advanced close to Kāśyapa and said these words to him: ‘Is this thing good? Formerly, you were a master, and now you are a disciple. Why, O elder brother, have you become a disciple of that ascetic?’ Kāśyapa answered him: ‘This place (sthāna) is marvellous, nothing surpasses this place.’ Then Uruvilvā-Kāśyapa, addressing Nadi-Kāśyapa, uttered this verse:
This master is honoured by men and gods. Now I serve him as my master. When the Buddhas appear in this world, it is extremely difficult to encounter them.

When Nādi-Kāśyapa heard the name Buddha uttered, he was filled with joy and could not restrain himself from jumping. Advancing, he said to the Blessed One: 'I wish that you would permit me [to follow] the Path'. The Blessed One said to him: 'Welcome, O monk! Correctly cultivate pure conduct (brahma-caryā) in order to put a definite end to suffering'. Thereupon, Gaja-Kāśyapa immediately became an ascetic (śramaṇa), he wore a kāsāya and he himself removed his hair as if he had shaved his head, then seven days passed.

At that moment, the Blessed One, dwelling on the river bank, under a nyagrodha tree, having only recently become a Buddha, was at the head of a thousand disciples, all elderly and aged. Then, the Blessed One instructed and educated them by means of three subjects. What are these three? Instruction-education concerning the bases of supernormal power (rddhipada), instruction-education concerning the teaching through predication, instruction-education concerning the teaching.

What is called instruction-education concerning the bases of supernormal power? When the Blessed One causes his appearance to multiply, then make it return to one, or else when he appears and disappears, or else when he passes through any stone wall without encountering an obstacle, or else when he emerges from the ground or enters the ground as if in a water course without coming up against an obstacle, or else when he sits down cross-legged in empty space, or else when he flies in space like a bird without encountering an obstacle, when he emits an immense flame like a mountain of fire, when he takes in his hand the sun or moon, whose supernormal power is nonetheless immense, when he goes, in his body, to the god Brahma, such are the bases of supernormal power shown by the Blessed One.

What is called instruction-education concerning the teaching through predication? When the Blessed One instructs his monks [saying to them]: 'Abandon this, take that! Approach here, depart from there! Think of this, reject that! Examine this, do not examine that!'; when he says to others: 'What [is meant by]: cultivate this, do not cultivate that? You should cultivate thoughts of Enlightenment (sambodhyaṅga) and discard the three fetters (samyojana); when he says to others: 'What is meant by: Examine this, do not examine that? You should examine the three wholesome things (kuśala?) of the ascetic (śramaṇa), namely, the happiness (sukha) of release (niḥsarana), the happiness of the absence of hatred, the happiness of the absence of
anger'; when he says to others: 'What [is meant by]: do not examine that? These are the three sufferings (duḥkha) of the ascetic. What are those three? The examination of craving, the examination of hatred, the examination of anger'; when he says to others: 'What [is meant by] recalling? What [is meant by] not recalling? Now, recall the Truth of suffering, recall the Truth of its origin, recall the Truth of its cessation, recall the Truth of the Path, do not recall false Truths, the eternalist view (dṛṣṭi), the non- eternalist view, the finite view, the infinite view, that according to which the life principle (jīva) is the same as the body (kāya), that according to which the life principle is different from the body, those according to which the Tathāgata exists after the end of his life, or the Tathāgata no longer exists after the end of his life, or he exists and does not exist, or that he neither exists nor does not exist. Do not build up such recollections'.

What is called instruction-education concerning the teaching? (622c) Furthermore, do this setting out, do not do that setting out, do this arriving, do not do that arriving, remain silent and utter these words: 'Take a robe like this, do not take a robe like that, enter the village like this, do not enter the village like that', this is what is called instruction-education concerning the teaching. Then the Blessed One, by means of those three subjects, instructed and educated the thousand monks. Thereupon, those monks, having received instruction from the Buddha, all those thousand monks became Arhats. At that moment, the Blessed One having seen that the thousand monks had become Arhats, there were in Jambudvīpa a thousand Arhats and five [original] monks (bhikṣu), the Buddha being the sixth and their master.

IV-1) He resumed his seat and turned towards Kapilavastu. At that moment, Uruvilvā-Kāśyapa again reflected as follows: 'Why is the Blessed One sitting turned towards Kapilavastu?' Then Uruvilvā-Kāśyapa knelt before the Blessed One and said to him: 'Without [wishing] to enquire, [I wonder] why the Tathāgata is sitting turned towards Kapilavastu'. The Blessed One said to him: 'When a Tathāgata dwells in the world, he must accomplish five tasks. What are those five? 1) Setting in motion the Wheel of the Dharma. 2) Expounding his teaching to his mother. 4) Leading worldlings (prthajjana) to establish themselves in the conduct of the bodhisattvas. 5) Transmitting to them the peculiarities of the bodhisattvas. Such are, O Kāśyapa, the five duties (dharma) which the Tathāgatas must accomplish when they appear in the world'. Then Uruvilvā-Kāśyapa further reflected as follows: 'It is because the Tathāgata has remembered his family and his native land that he is sitting turned towards them'.

At that moment, the five monks gradually arrived on the bank of the River Naiṣāṇīyā. Having approached the Blessed One, they bowed down at his feet and sat to one side. Then, from afar Venerable Udaya saw the Blessed One sitting turned towards Kapilavastu and, having seen him, reflected as follows: 'The Blessed One assuredly wishes to go to Kapilavastu to see his parents and his village'. Thereupon, Udaya knelt before the Blessed One and said to him: 'At present, I would like to ask a question. I only wish to express it'. The Blessed One said to him: 'Whatever you wish to ask, ask it'. Udaya said to the Blessed One: 'I have observed that the mind of the Tathāgata is turned towards Kapilavastu'.

2) The Blessed One said to him: 'It is just as you say. O Udaya, know this, in bygone days I went to King Śuddhodana and [I promised him] I would return later. That is why a messenger should first be sent to the kṣatriya caste to inform it that the Tathāgata will be coming later. Go and tell the king that, in seven days' time, the Tathāgata will come to the king'. Udaya replied: 'Yes, O Blessed One'.

Immediately, Udaya rose from his seat, put his robes in order, bowed down (623a) at the feet of the Blessed One and, having disappeared from in front of the Blessed One, went to Kapilavastu, to King Śuddhodana, where he remained standing before the king.

At that moment, King Śuddhodana was sitting in his great palace with his women. Then Udaya flew in space, and King Śuddhodana saw Udaya who, holding his alms-bowl (pātra) in one hand and his stick (danda) in the other, was standing before him. Having seen him, he was frightened in his heart and uttered these
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replied: ‘Millions of gods and a thousand disciples, the four Divine Kings stand constantly to his right and left’. The king then said: ‘What appearance has the clothing he wears?’ Udaya replied: ‘The clothing the Tathāgata wears are called kāśāyas.’ The king asked: ‘What nourishment does he take?’ Udaya answered: ‘The body (kāya) of the Tathāgata is nourished by the Teaching (dharma).’ The king again asked: ‘O Udaya, might I see the Tathāgata?’ Udaya replied: ‘O king, do not be so concerned, in seven days’ time the Tathāgata will come and enter the town’. Thereupon, the king could not restrain himself from feeling extreme joy, and with his own hand he poured out a drink and offered it to Udaya.

Then, the king had the drums beaten loudly and ordered the people of the kingdom to level and tidy the roads by removing impurities, to pour perfumed liquids on the ground, suspend banners and parasols, and play music of inestimable [quality]. He also ordered all the blind, deaf and mute not to show themselves, since, in seven days’ time, Siddhattha would come and enter the town. Then King Sudhodana, having learned that the Buddha would be coming and entering the town in seven days’ time, could not sleep [for all that time].

3) Then, the seventh day having arrived, the Blessed One reflected as follows: ‘Now, it is appropriate for me to go to the land of Kapilavastu using the bases of my supernormal powers’. Immediately, the Blessed One, leading his monks, who preceded, followed and surrounded him, went to the land of Kapilavastu. Having arrived there, he went to the north of the town, in a śāla grove.

At that moment, King Sudhodana learned that the Blessed One had arrived at the śāla grove, to the north of the town of Kapilavastu. Then King Sudhodana, leading a throng of Sākyans, went to the Blessed One. At that moment, the Blessed One was again reflecting as follows: ‘That King Sudhodana comes himself, in person, does not suit me. I should now go to meet him. Why? Because [my] feelings of acknowledgement and respect towards my father and mother who raised and fed me are profound’. Thereupon, the Blessed One, leading his company of monks, went to the town gate by flying in space seven fathoms from the ground.

words: ‘Who is this? A man or a non-human [spirit] (amanusya)?
A god or a demon? A Yakṣa or a Rākṣasa? A god or a Nāga? A
demon or a spirit?’ Then King Śuddhodana asked Udaya: ‘Are you
a man?’ Furthermore, he addressed Udaya with this verse:

‘Are you a god? Are you a demon? Or else a Gandharva?
At present, what is your name? I would now like to know’.

Then Udaya answered the king with these verses:

‘I am neither a god nor a Gandharva. Here, in the land of
Kapilavastu, I was a man from the land of a great king.
‘My master is Śākyamuni, who formerly destroyed Māra
Pāpimāt’s horde, which was eighteen million [demons strong].
Of that sage (arhat) am I a disciple’.

Then King Śuddhodana addressed Udaya with this verse:

‘Who destroyed Māra Pāpimāt’s horde which was eighteen
million [demons strong]? Who is named Śākyamuni? Whom do
you now praise?’

Then, Udaya uttered these verses:

‘Once the Tathāgata was born, heaven and earth every-where underwent a great quake. His aspiration he has entirely
fulfilled, and now he is called Siddhārtha.
‘He has vanquished Māra Pāpimāt’s horde, which was
eighteen million [demons strong]. He is named Śākyamuni;
today he has realised the Path of the Buddhhas.
‘That man is a lion (sinha) of the Śākyas, of that Gautama
am I a disciple. Today I have become an ascetic (sramana), my
former name was Udaya’.

At that moment, King Śuddhodana, having heard those
words, was filled with joy in his heart and could not restrain him-
self [from jumping]. He said to Udaya: ‘O Udaya, is the crown
prince Siddhārtha still alive now?’ Udaya replied: ‘The Buddha
Śākyamuni is alive now’. The the king asked him: ‘Has he
come a Buddha now?’ Udaya replied: ‘Just now, he has become
(Ś236b) a Buddha.’ The king again asked: ‘Today, where is the
Tathāgata dwelling?’ Udaya answered him: ‘The Tathāgata is now
in the land of Magadha, under a nyagrodha tree’. The king asked:
‘What men are the disciples who serve and follow him?’ Udaya
At that moment, King Śuddhodana saw the Blessed One, who was of incomparable propriety, extremely rare in this world, whose faculties (indriya) were calmed and pure, who did not think of a host of things, whose body bore the thirty-two marks (laksana) and the eighty signs of loveliness which adorned his body. He broadcast thoughts of joy and, immediately bowing down, uttered these words: ‘I am of the royal caste of ksatriyas and my name is King Śuddhodana’.

The Blessed One said to him: (623c) ‘May the great king enjoy unlimited longevity! That is why, O great king, control and transform yourself by means of the correct teaching and do not make use of false teachings. O great king, know this, those who control and transform themselves by means of the right teaching, at the breaking up of their body at the end of their life, are reborn in good places, in heaven (svarga).

Immediately, the Blessed One, walking in space, went to the palace of King Śuddhodana and, having reached it, sat down on a seat. When the king saw the Blessed One sitting, [his mind] concentrated, with his own hand he served him a drink and offered him all kinds of food and drink. When he saw that the Blessed One had finished his meal, he poured pure water [onto his hands] and took a small seat in order to listen to the discourse.

Then the Blessed One disclosed to King Śuddhodana what is mysterious in meaning. What he spoke of was a disclosure of giving (dana), a disclosure of morality (sila) and a disclosure of rebirth in heaven (svarga), [explaining] that desire (kama) is an impure practice and that release (nihsarana) is happiness (sukha). When the Blessed One saw that the king’s mind was open and had understood, he expounded to the king the whole teaching which the Buddhas the Blessed Ones always expound: suffering, its origin, its cessation and the Path. Then, while King Śuddhodana was on his seat, his dust and stains disappeared and he obtained the eye of the Dharma (dhammocaksus), [which is] pure (saddha). At that moment, the Blessed One, having expounded his Dharma to the king, rose from his seat and departed.

4) Then King Śuddhodana assembled the throng of Śākyans and uttered these words: ‘The ascetics (sramana) are very ugly in appearance. That a [man] of the ksatriya caste leads a company of bramhins is not appropriate. That a [man] of the Śākyan ksatriya race returns and obtains a company of ksatriyas is excellent.’ The Śākyans replied: ‘Yes, O great king! As the great king teaches, that a [man] of the ksatriya race returns and obtains a company of ksatriyas is excellent.’ Then the king proclaimed in the land: ‘Wherever there are two brothers, let one be taken to follow the Path. May those who do not do so be censured and punished severely.’ When the Śākyans had heard those instructions of the king, wherever there were two brothers, they took one to follow the Path, and those who did not follow those instructions were censured and punished severely.

Then Devadatta, of the Śākyan race, said to the Śākyan Ānanda: ‘King Śuddhodana has today ordered that, wherever there are two brothers, one should be taken to follow the Path. Now, leave home in order to study the Path. I myself shall stay at home in order to occupy myself with household tasks.’ Then the Śākyan Ānanda jumped for joy and answered: ‘Yes, since my elder brother has just given me that order’.

Then, the Śākyan Nanda said to the Śākyan Ānārudda: ‘King Śuddhodana has ordered that, wherever there are two brothers, one should be taken to follow the Path and those who do not do so will be censured and punished severely. Now, leave home, I will remain at home’. At that moment, the Śākyan Ānārudda, having heard those words, was unable to restrain himself from jumping for joy and replied: ‘Yes, since my elder brother has just given me that order’.

5) Then King Śuddhodana, leading the Śākyan Dronodana, the Śākyan Suklodana and the Śākyan Amrtdana, approached the Blessed One. At that moment, he was driving a four-horse chariot, a white chariot, with a white parasol and harnessed to white horses. (624a) The second Śākyan was driving a blue chariot, with a blue parasol and harnessed to blue horses. The third Śākyan was driving a yellow chariot with a yellow parasol and harnessed to yellow horses. The fourth Śākyan was driving a red chariot, with a red parasol and harnessed to red horses. Then all the Śākyans came together, some mounted on elephants, others mounted on...
Then King Suddhodana said to the Blessed One: ‘I only wish that the Blessed One would instruct these new monks as he instructed Udaya. Why? because that monk Udaya possesses extreme supernormal powers. I wish that the monk Udaya would remain in my palace for a long time in order to instruct and educate, so that the totality of living beings (sattva) may acquire peace for a long time. Why? Because that monk possesses extreme supernormal powers. As soon as I saw that monk Udaya, I broadcast thoughts of joy and I reflected as follows: “If the disciple possesses those supernormal powers, all the more so must the Tathagata possess incomparable supernormal powers.” The Blessed One said to him: ‘Yes, (624b) O great king, it is just as the great king says: that monk Udaya possesses extreme supernormal powers, he possesses great supernormal power’.

7) Then the Blessed One said to the monks: ‘The foremost of the disciples through his immense knowledge and learning (bahuśruta) of whom the king of this land has thought is the monk named Ajjāta Kaundinya. He who exhorts and wins over people is the monk Udaya. He who possesses rapid and keen knowledge is the monk Mahānāman. He who moves about by flying joyously and constantly is the monk Subhrtr? ( ). He who comes and goes in emptiness is the monk Vaspa. He who has many disciples is the monk Uruvilvā-Kāśyapa. He whose mind is able to examine emptiness is the monk Nadi-Kāśyapa. He whose mind is able to relinquish examining is the monk Elephant (Gaja-Kāśyapa). Then the Blessed One expounded to King Suddhodana the subtle and mysterious Dharma at length. When the king had heard the Dharma, he rose from his seat, bowed down at the feet of the Buddha and departed backwards. Thereupon, the monks and King Suddhodana, having heard what the Buddha had said, received it contentedly and applied themselves to practise accordingly.

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ON PARAJIKA

Ann Heirman

The Buddhist monastic discipline consists of a certain number of precepts to be followed and ceremonies to be performed. The precepts to be followed by monks and nuns are collected in a work called Prātimoksa and are recited at the bi-monthly posadha ceremony. The Prātimoksa is twofold: the one for monks consists of eight categories of precepts, that for nuns of only seven. The most important class contains the pārājika\(^1\) precepts, four for monks, eight for nuns: abstention from sexual intercourse, stealing, taking human life, lying about one's spiritual achievements; and, only for nuns, having physical contact below the armpit and above the knee, being together with a man and doing eight wrong things\(^2\), concealing a grave offence of another nun, and persisting in accompanying a suspended monk. Committing any of these acts entails a pārājika offence and leads to a permanent, lifetime exclusion from the Order.

All extant Vinayas to a large extent agree on the contents of a pārājika and on the consequences for anyone committing such an offence. Nevertheless, a clear etymological explanation of the term pārājika is not at all obvious. Up to the present day, several hypotheses based on Pāli, Prakrit and Sanskrit sources have been suggested. In order to determine whether or not the Vinayas surviving in their Chinese translation can give them a broader basis, we can confront these hypotheses with the explanations of the term pārājika found in these Chinese Vinayas.

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2. According to T(aishō) 1428 (Szu-chen Lü, Dharmaguptaka Vinaya, = Dharma), p.76a24–27, touching the hand, touching the clothes, going to a secret place together, being in a secret place, talking together, walking together, leaning against one another, and making appointments. The eight wrong things differ slightly from Vinaya to Vinaya.
Let us first have a look at the information given in the bhiksuni-vibhanga of the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravāda (= Mā-L.) school and in the Pāli Vinaya:

The Mā-L. school: Roth, BhīVin(Mā-L.), p.85, §123, gives the following explanation: pārañjiketi pāram nāmcayate dharma-jiṇānaṃ tato jīna ojīna samjñāna parinīnaḥ / tenāha pārañjiketi ।, translated by É. Nolot in Règles de discipline des nonnes bouddhistes, (Paris 1991), p.68 [tr.]: “Excluded” [pārañjika] means: one calls "the other side" [pāram] the knowledge of the Dharma; she is separated from it, deprived of it, totally devoid of it, cut off from it [jīna ojīna samjñāna parinīnaḥ]; therefore it is said that she is excluded.

From the above, it is clear that the Mā-L. school sees pārañjika as a compound of pāra, ‘on the other side’ (= dharma-jīna) and of jīna, ‘deprived of’. In this context, G. Roth, ‘Terminologisches aus dem Vinaya der Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravādins’, ZDMG II, 1968, pp.334-48 (= Roth, 1968), p.342, points to the Jaina technical term pārañcika, identified by a Jaina commentary as a derivation of pāra, ‘on the other side’: Brahkalpabhāsya, V.4971: pāram-tiram gacchati yena praścaṭtenāsevīta tat pārañcikaṃ, translated by Roth, ibid. [tr.]: ‘The fulfilled expiation because of which he ends up on the other side, that is pārañcika’. Both the Mā-L. school and the Jaina commentary explain the term as being derived from pāra. Nevertheless, the original meaning of the term remains obscure. Roth, ibid., further points to the term pārañcika, used in R.P. Kangle, The Kauṭilya Arthaśāstra, and seen as a ‘dislocation (of a hand or a foot)’ [tr.]: ‘Given the meaning “turned away, separated” present in pāra, pārañcikam could very well point to a kind of physical injury that consists of bringing the limbs out of their normal position by turning them away from the parts of the body or from the body that supports them, as a result of which they are left without function’. The term pārañjika is thus, according to Roth, connected to the term pārañcika and is the result of a phonetic evolution. Only the later commentators concentrate on the second part of pārañjika, proposing secondary etymological explanations based on vīj and vaj. We will return to this later. For the moment we can state that the explanation of the term pārañjika as proposed by Roth perfectly coincides with the theme.

3 Written in a transitional language between Prakrit and Sanskrit (see G. Roth, ed.), Bhiksuni-Vinaya, including Bhiksuni-Prakirnaka and a summary of the Bhiksuni-Prakirnaka of the Arya-Mahasamghika-Lokottaravadin (Pataña 1970) (= BhīVin(Mā-L.), pp.l-vi).

4 Quotation based on S.B. Deo, History of Jaina Monachism from Inscriptions and Literature (Poona 1956), p.377. — Related to the term pārañcika is the term pārañcicya (Deo, op. cit., p.378; Roth, 1968, pp.342-3). Earlier U. Wogihara, Asanga’s Bodhisatvabhidhi, Zweiter Teil: Lexikalische aus der Bodhisatvabhidhi (Leipzig 1908), pp.34-5, had already pointed to the connection between the Buddhist term pārañjaka and the Jaina term pārañcika. He considers the Jaina term to be a derivation of pārañjaka and, as S. Lévi, Observations sur une langue précanonique du bouddhisme (Journal Asiatique 10ième Série, XX, 1912, pp.495-514), later states that, via an intermediate form *pārañcika, one came to pārañjaka. — Concerning the phonetic relation between pārañcicya and pārañjaka, see also P. Thieme, Indische Wörter und Sitten (ZDMG 93, 1939, pp.105-37), p.137; Kleine Schriften (Wiesbaden 1971) II, p.792 (Addendum 1939).


6 Wogihara, op. cit., Part II, pp.34-5 (see n.4) and S. Lévi, op. cit., pp.505-6, already suggested that pārañjika is a derivation from pārañc, parāc; ‘turned away from’. Via the intermediate form *pārañcika one then comes to pārañjika. Lévi concludes [tr.]: ‘The *pārañcika offences would be those that cause a total and definitive separation from the Saṅgha’. 
‘decapitation’ as found in the Pāli Vinaya and several Chinese Vinayas. For a monk or nun, the committing of a pārājika offence equals a decapitation. As a decapitated person can never again stand up and function as a human being, a monk or nun committing a pārājika offence permanently falls back and can never again function as a member of the Buddhist community.

Pāli Vinaya: Oldenberg, Vin III, bhikkhuvisibhaṅga, p.28, translated by I.B. Horner, The Book of the Discipline I (London 1938, 1992), p.48: ‘Is one who is defeated? means: as a man with his head cut off cannot become one to live with that bodily connection, so is a monk indulging in sexual intercourse not a (true) recluse, not a (true) son of the Sakyan; therefore he is called one who is defeated.’

This explanation is found after the first pārājika precept for monks (i.e. sexual intercourse). The explanations following the other pārājika precepts are parallel.

The Chinese Vinayas display the following explanations:

Mahā-bhikkhuvisibhaṅga, p.4c21-23: ‘Pārājika’ implies that one falls back; it implies that one is bad; it implies that one cuts off one's head; it implies that one is no longer a śramaṇa.

Mahā-bhikkhuvisibhaṅga, p.23b23-c2. Pārājika implies that one falls away from the knowledge of the doctrine and that one does not share in the fruits of the Path. This is called pārājika.

In this way [it is applied to] the subsequent knowledge, the conventional knowledge, the knowledge of the awareness of another, the knowledge of frustration, of the origin, of cessation and of the Path, the knowledge of the destruction of impure influence and the knowledge of non-origination. One falls away from these knowledge and does not share in the fruits of the Path. This is called pārājika. Furthermore, pārājika implies that one falls away from Nirvāṇa and that one does not share in the fruits of realisation. This is called pārājika. Furthermore, pārājika implies that one falls away from pure conduct and that one does not share in the fruits of the Path. This is called pārājika. Furthermore, pārājika is an offence one may have
committed, but that one is not allowed to confess or to repent of. Therefore, it is called para\={j}ika.

Dharma, bhik\={s}uvibh\=a\=nga, p.571c6-6: ‘Why is it called para\={j}ika?’ It is as if one cuts off someone’s head and he cannot stand up again. This is also to be applied to a bhik\={s}u. If he commits such an offence [i.e. a para\={j}ika], he cannot again become a bhik\={s}u. Therefore it is called para\={j}ika.

Sarva, bhik\={s}uvibh\=a\=nga, p.2c16-18: ‘Para\={j}ika’ implies that the fall is without an equal. The offence is corrupt and serious. If one commits such an offence, the fall is without an equal, one is no longer called a bhik\={s}u, one is no longer a shrama\=na and one is no longer a S\={a}ky\={a} disciple. One loses the capacity of a bhik\={s}u.

M\={u}la, bhik\={s}uvibh\=a\=nga, T 1442, p.630c6-10: ‘Para\={j}ika’ is the most serious and the most hateful offence. It is reprehensible and inadmissible. If a bhik\={s}u commits [such an offence], he is no longer a shrama\=na and he is no longer a S\={a}ky\={a} disciple. He loses the capacity of a bhik\={s}u and he goes against Nirv\=ana. He falls back. Defeated, he cannot be saved. It is as if one cuts off the top of a t\=ala tree, this tree cannot grow again. In the same way, one cannot flourish, grow or increase. Therefore it is called para\={j}ika.

Although the explanations in the Chinese Vinayas are not completely parallel, essentially they all say the same thing: whoever commits a para\={j}ika offence falls back for ever. It is striking that two Chinese Vinayas (Mah\=i and Dharma), like the P\={a}li Vinaya, compare the committing of a para\={j}ika offence to a decapitation, while in the M\={u}la, it is compared to a ‘decapitation’ of a t\=ala tree.

From the above, it is clear that the theme ‘decapitation’ is to be found in several Vinayas. This points to an initially common understanding of the term para\={j}ika. Very soon, however, the original understanding of the term was lost and commentators or translators concentrated on the second part of the term. This can be seen in Buddhaghosa’s commentary on the P\={a}li Vinaya (fifth century CE), Smp l, p.259: para\={j}iko ti para\={j}iyo para\={j}ayam \=apanno, translated by Horner, BD I, p.38, n.3: (para\={j}ika) is ‘defeated, fallen on defeat’. Buddhaghosa? thus considers the term para\={j}ika to be derived from para\={j}-\=ji, ‘to be defeated’. As long as there is no better explanation, Horner supports the idea of ‘defeat’, as can be seen in her translations (see above). She thus agrees with T.W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg, Vinaya Texts (Delhi 1975), Part I, p.3, n.2, who also have a preference for Buddhaghosa’s explanation and translate the term para\={j}ika as ‘involving defeat’. With the exception of T 1442/3 – a late translation of the bhik\={s}u- and bhik\={s}uvibh\=a\=nga of the Mulasarv\=av\=t\=iv\=ad\=a (beginning eighth century CE) – no Chinese Vinaya, however, mentions the idea of ‘defeat’. Even in the P\={a}li Vinaya, this is not found. Moreover, since not even one context allows us to say that a monk or nun is defeated by something or someone, the suggestion of para\={j}ika being a derivation of para\={j}-\=ji seems very unlikely.

Accepting the idea of ‘defeat’, Horner, Rhys Davids and Oldenberg reject the opinion of E. Burnouf, who considers

22 According to O. von Hin\=uber, A Handbook of P\={a}li Literature, (Berlin–New York 1996), p.109, it is not at all certain that Buddhaghosa is the compiler of the Samantap\=\=ask\=ik\=a.

23 The idea that a monk or nun committing a para\={j}ika has been defeated and cannot be saved anymore is also found in the Chinese M\={u}la, T 1442, bhik\={s}uvibh\=a\=nga, p.630c8–9 (¼ T 1443, bhik\={s}uvibh\=a\=nga, p.914a) (see above). Also the Tibetan Mulasarv\=av\=t\=iv\=av\=ad\=a Vinaya supports this idea (see E. Waldschmidt, Bruckstücke des Bhik\=suni-Pr\=atimok\=ka der Sarv\=av\=t\=iv\=ad\=a (Leipzig 1926, Wiesbaden 1979), p.71).

24 See Horner, BD I, p.xxvi: ‘Although it may be grammatically incorrect to refer para\={j}ika to para\={j}-\=ji, to my mind no more convincing derivation has so far been put forward’.

25 E. Burnouf, Introduction à l’histoire du bouddhisme indien, (Paris 1876), pp.268–9 [tr.]: ‘\ldots which I derive from para (retro) and adj (abigere), ‘offence
pârâjika to be a derivation from para- vaj, meaning to 'exclude (one who is guilty)'. Rhys Davids and Oldenberg argue that the Vedic vaj ‘to exclude’ is not found in Pâlî texts and is never, even in Vedic texts, combined with the prefix para-. This is contested by O. von Hinüber (‘Die Bestimmung der Schulzugehörigkeit buddhistischer Texte nach sprachlichen Kriterien’, in H. Bechert (ed.), Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hinayana-Literatur 1 (Göttingen 1985), p.62, n.14), who points to the fact that forms derived from the Vedic vaj are attested in Pâlî texts. Following H. Smith (Saddantita, la grammaire pali d'Aggavamsa V, 2 (Lund 1996), p.1601, s.v. pârâjika), von Hinüber, ibid., says that the term pârâjika is, without any doubt, a derivation from *para- vaj, meaning ‘to chase away’. Early in the Pâlî tradition, the term is then no longer understood by the Buddhists themselves. However, this hypothesis encounters some problems. First, in the explanations of the term pârâjika given by the Vinayas, the idea ‘to chase away’ is never present. Instead, it is said that a monk or nun ‘falls away from’: 鍾 (Mahi, Sarva), 退出墮落 (Mahâ), 墮落崩倒 (Mula). Secondly, the common term used to express ‘to exclude permanently from the Order’ is the Sanskrit term ānas, Pâlî nassati, Chinese 滅 (jiu). Although the idea ‘to chase away’ does not seem impossible in the context of a pârâjika offence, the above-mentioned problems throw some doubt on the hypothesis that pârâjika is derived from para- vaj.

Summarising, we can say that Roth’s etymological explanation of the term pârâjika as derived from para(n)c, ‘turned away from’, finds support in the Chinese Vinayas (Mahi, Dharma and Mula) and in the Pâlî Vinaya. Von Hinüber’s opinion that pârâjika is derived from para- vaj cannot be excluded, although no explanation of the term in the Vinayas supports this hypothesis. Etymologies based on para- vj or on para, ‘on the other side’ and jina, ‘deprived of’, have to be seen as secondary attempts to explain the term pârâjika.

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26 See also von Hinüber, A Handbook, p.10: ‘The rules of the first group are called “rules referring to expulsion (from the samgha)” using the Vedic verb para-aj found in Pâlî only in this context and therefore no longer understood by the Buddhists themselves at a rather early date’.
28 See Nakamura, op. cit., p.1357, s.v. 滅周磨.
ON THE CONTENTS OF THE OLD TURKISH MAITRISIMIT

Hans-Joachim Klimkeit

The figure of Maitreya in the history of Central Asian religion has hitherto been only partially examined and evaluated. One important publication on Maitreya, the collection of individual studies on the future Buddha in various countries edited by A. Sponberg and H. Hardacre, totally ignores the Central Asian Maitreya¹, although Sylvain Lévi wrote an important article on Maitreya in Central Asia as long ago as 1932². And the Turcologist Annemarie von Gabain, in the supplements (Beihete) to her facsimile edition of the versions of the Maitrisimit, a Buddhist Maitreya work presumably of the ninth century, found at Sāgim and Murtuk (near Turfan), has drawn attention to the figure of the coming saviour in Central Asia³, and at the same
time pointed out the close relationship between parts of the Maitrisimit and the Chinese source of the Tibetan work, 'The Wise Man and the Fool', which itself goes back to Central Asian sources⁴. Among the Central Asian works there is also a Maitreyasamiti in Khotanese, which was first made known by E. Leumann, and later translated into English by R.E. Emmerick⁵. The Turfan texts of the Maitrisimit which A. von Gabain published in facsimile were edited in 1980 by Sinasi Tekin, and translated into German⁶. Work on the Hami version of the Maitrisimit from the second half of the eleventh century⁷ and found in 1959 provides the writer with an opportunity to take a look at the figure of Maitreya in Central Asia, in honour of a colleague and friend who has distinguished himself for many years by his generosity in helping others.

The edition of the Hami manuscript of the Maitrisimit is not yet complete⁸. Only when this work is finished will it be possible to undertake a complete edition which includes texts from Turfan and Hami and, in addition, pays attention to the Tocharian source insofar as this has been edited.

Before we consider the figure of Maitreya in this work, it should be mentioned that the Maitreya cult has a long history in the Turfan oasis. It stretches from the earliest inscriptions to the latest texts from the period of threatening Islam. A Chinese

¹ A summary of the contents seems to the writer to be useful, because the often incorrect order of pages in the edition of the Turfan manuscripts (see nn.3 and 6), as well as the generally fragmentary state of the material, make an approach to the text for outsiders sometimes very difficult. The quotations in the present article refer to the Hami manuscript of the Maitrisimit (cf. n.8). Proper names of Sanskrit origin occurring in the text which are not found in Indian literature are given in reconstructed Sanskrit form.


4 Beihete II (see n.3), p.12.


7 J. Hamilton dates the text to 1067 (letter to the writer, 27.5.1989).

temple inscription from Turfan that is one of the oldest Chinese documents from Central Asia, dating from 469 CE, already praises Maitreya. And in a later Uighur text, the Insadi-Sutra, which mentions figures from Christianity, Manichaeism and Islam (‘Mother Mary’, Mani and Mohammed), the writer expresses the hope of receiving Maitreya’s help in coping with foreign religions — which must mean primarily Islam, which was then advancing into Central Asia.

The Maitrisimut describes, apparently in the form of a play, the various scenes of which are introduced by exact indications of location, two different phases of the life of Maitreya in this world. First, we learn something about his life on earth in the time of the Buddha Śakyamuni. In this existence he is born as the son of a Brahmin from the village of Senānā near the town of Uruvilvā in Magadh. Already at the age of eight he had ‘swallowed up and learnt all textbooks and all wisdom’ (Ch. I, p.5b, ln.6ff.). Then he travelled from Central India to the southern land of Daksināpatha, where he ‘astonished the [Brahmin] Bādhari and other great sages by (his) [teaching] and (his) [wisdom]’ (loc. cit., ln.6ff.), although he had submitted himself to him (Bādhari) as his teacher.

9 O. Franke, Eine chinesische Tempelinschrift aus Idikutāshri bei Turfan (Türkistan), Berlin 1907.
10 Franke, op. cit., p.5.
12 The corresponding passages have been re-edited by Zieme, loc. cit., p.247ff.
14 The story of Maitreya as a pupil of Bādhari (or Pali Bāvari) is not unknown elsewhere in Buddhist literature. See S. Lévi, ‘Maitreya le consolateur’, p.373.

The introductory chapter of the Maitrisimut first treats of the special powers of the Buddha, referring to various well-known Buddhist tales. It also treats various aspects of the Buddhist teaching.

Chapter 1 tells of the 120-year-old Brahmin Bādhari who lives in Daksināpatha, and who makes a great sacrifice there in order to be reborn in Brahmā’s realm.

Chapter 2 shows how Maitreya leaves this Brahmin, to whom he had committed himself, in order to go with his relative Ajita and fifteen other pupils of Bādhari to the place where the Buddha Śakyamuni is living, i.e. Mount Pāśānaka in Magadha. The Buddha is able to answer the unspoken questions of his visitors. He preaches the doctrine to them, and as a result they attain various grades of sanctity. Maitreya is ordained as a monk by the Buddha Śakyamuni himself. This event, we learn, establishes the festival of the ‘Great New Day’ (ulay yangi kūn). Maitreya’s companions also allow themselves to be ordained, after they have abandoned the Brahmin Law.

Chapter 3 tells how the Buddha’s foster-mother Mahāprajāpatī Gautamī planted and harvested cotton with her own hand in order to make it a splendid garment for the Buddha. She wants to give this garment to the Buddha as a gift, but he tells her to give it to the community. When she tries to give it to Ananda, the Buddha repeats his demand, adding that a gift to the community is a gift to himself. We can take this as a justification for gifts to the Order. The text uses this as an excuse for speaking of various kinds of gifts and good deeds.

In Chapter 4, the Buddha Śakyamuni makes prophecies about the future, when the Bodhisattva Maitreya, descending from the Tusita heaven, will appear on earth in order to gain his enlighten-
ment and to teach the doctrine. At one point we learn that this will be in 56 million years (Ch.1, p.6a, In.20ff.)\(^{17}\). In any case, people will then live for 80,000 years and ideal conditions of life will prevail. Chapter 4 then describes the particular spiritual gifts of Maitreya, who will be distinguished by his loving attitude towards all. As a monk he participates in the life of the Buddha Śākyamuni's Order. No one can rouse him from profound meditation except Śākyamuni himself, who repeats the prophecies about his future Buddhahood. For his part, Maitreya promises to teach the doctrine and to lead innumerable beings to salvation. The Buddha Śākyamuni then appoints him as his successor and entrusts all beings to his care. All beings in need of release then see quite clearly that Maitreya accepts them as property held in trust (urunçaq) (p.13b, In.10ff.). 'For this reason,' it is said, 'all beings became [glad] and happy, and bowing [they honoured] the noble Maitreya, who had attained the dignity of a successor (lit. 'crown prince', tigin oğa) (In.14ff.). As regards the members of the community, they beg for the blessing of (later) meeting (him) again' (p.15a, In.5ff.). The Buddha Śākyamuni explains in detail which good deeds will lead to their actually meeting him. This is the end of Chapter 4, which, according to the colophon, bears the title 'Performance of the Consecration for the Succession'.

While Chapter 5 gives a description of the splendour of the city of Ketumati, and Chapters 6 and 7 are only fragmentarily preserved, Chapter 8, according to the colophon of the Sāngim version, bears the title 'The Descent of Indra, King of the Gods, to Earth'. The passages preserved describe the joys of life in the city of Ketumati. The same applies to Chapter 9, which deals inter alia with the god Indra's appearance in Ketumati.

Chapter 10, 'Descent of the Bodhisattva Maitreya to Earth from the Tusita Heaven', is well preserved. In the Hami version we gain an impression of the situation in the Tusita heaven where Maitreya dwells, having left the world in order to come here three months before the Buddha's decease. In the Tusita heaven he preaches to the gods and declares his wish to descend to earth. When the gods beg him to try and attain the enlightenment he wants to seek on earth here in heaven, he states firmly that one can only gain enlightenment as a human being on earth. And so the gods descend with him to earth, in order to be born as human beings.

The parents of Maitreya, whom, looking down from the Tusita heaven, he has chosen, are the Brahmin Brahmapās\(^{18}\). He dwells at the court of King Śāṅkha of Ketumati as chaplain (purohita) and his wife Brahmapāti. In this way the pattern is later confirmed, in that Maitreya, like all the other Buddhas, gives up court life in order to seek enlightenment, although he is not the son of a king but of a Brahmin. The departure from the king's household is a standard motif of the Buddha legend. This is also the reason why Maitreya's mother is actually termed 'Queen' (qatun) Brahmapāti\(^{19}\) and she is said to have been surrounded by 'ladies of the court' when she gave birth to the bodhisattva\(^{20}\).

As in the case of the conception and birth of every Buddha, that of Maitreya is accompanied by signs in the heavens, as described in Chapter 11. The gods are seen to be overjoyed, and the newborn child takes the usual seven steps after his birth and states that this is his last birth. On the fifth day after his birth he is carried with great veneration into the city of Ketumati where King Śāṅkha pays him homage along with his court and the citizens. As usual, his mother dies after seven days and enters the 'Land of the Gods' (ingi yiri = Skt devaloka). Then the sooth-


\(^{18}\) The name of Maitreya's father is usually Subrahman. In the Divyāvadāna, the narratives of which in part — 21 out of 38, including the Maitreyāvadāna (= Divy, No.3) — belong to the Vinaya of the Mulasarvāstivādins, he is also called Brahmapās.

\(^{19}\) Tekin, loc. cit., p.106. Cf. also p.109.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., p.107.
Sayers prophesy to his father that his son will one account remain in this palace, but will leave home and gain Buddhahood. The account of the bodhisatta’s schooling is lovingly dwelt upon. In this case his own father Brahmāyus is the teacher, who is profoundly impressed by the boy’s knowledge. Chapter 12 tells how the young Maitreya is given a jewel-encrusted staff. Here we meet the important figures of the final times, King Sankha and Mahāpranaṇā, but the fragmentary nature of the Hami text does not enable us to understand much of the context, and in the Sāgim version this chapter has not come down to us at all.

On the other hand, the following Chapter 13 is preserved in entirety. We hear of a dream of the bodhisatta’s wife, here called Simanā, foretelling disaster. Maitreya consoles her, but interprets the dream for himself as a sign that he will soon be separated from her. Five dreams which the bodhisatta now has himself confirm him in his intention to leave the palace and seek bodhisatta-hood. Now comes the full description of the scene in the women’s quarters, in which the bodhisatta makes the decision to leave the world. Amid auspicious signs in the heavens and on earth he departs from his own palace (p.7b, ln.2-6) and drives in his richly-adorned chariot to the Supaspati park, where he meets a monk with alms-bowl and alarm-staff. The monk explains that he has given everything up in order to gain inner peace, and preaches to him of Nirvāṇa as the end of suffering. Then Maitreya decides to become a monk also. He orders his charioteer Sārathī to return home with his valuable clothes and jewellery. Then he shaves off his beard and hair, and becomes a monk. 84,000 youth who have accompanied him also spontaneously adopt the monastic life. For his monk’s robe, Maitreya receives from the god Indra the same garment that earlier Buddhas have worn. This is the end of Chapter 13 (Hami version).

Chapter 14 is called ‘The Way to the Bodhi Tree’. This chapter is a central section inasmuch as it describes how Maitreya attained enlightenment. It broadly follows the lines of the corresponding passage of the Buddha legend, though the motif of the six-year search is lacking. The events, too, are in part exaggeratedly miraculous. Here, as also in the comparable texts, the circumstances of the enlightenment form a prefigured drama in which everything is already fixed for Maitreya, and the possibility of any outcome other than the expected one is not even considered. Not only the bodhisatta, but also the other participants already know the role of the future Buddha and the success of his efforts. The action is thus largely fixed, being modelled on the schematic acts of former Buddhas. And yet our text, despite all its resemblance to other classical descriptions, goes its own way.

After a gap of five sheets at the beginning, we hear of the prophecies of the Nāga king Kṛtya, who foretells the future life of Maitreya. Then we learn how splendidly adorned the Nāgapuspa tree is, under which Maitreya will attain enlightenment. Soon, he takes his seat under this tree. It is expressly emphasised that this is the place where the other Buddhas, each under his own tree, gained enlightenment.

Under the title ‘The Gaining of the Incomparable Buddha Dignity’ Chapter 15 tells of the spiritual powers the bodhisatta gains through meditation. He sees beings in the various realms right down to hell, and reads their thought. Above all, in the fourth meditation, he is aware of his former existences. He also recognises the twelve links of Dependent Origination, which are displayed in detail. Many beings come to see Maitreya, ‘King of the Rṣis’, to venerate him and hear his doctrine of the Noble Eightfold Path. Even gods come to accept his teaching. King Sankha becomes a monk in Maitreya’s company, having handed over his throne to his son. The chapter concludes with Maitreya’s
declaration that he must liberate and save innumerable beings just as former Buddhas have done.

Chapter 16, which deals with the beginnings and dissemination of the doctrine, is entitled 'Buddha Maitreya's Turning of the Wheel of the Law.' Here the events associated with the enlightenment are described. We hear first how King Śāṅkha, along with 84,000 princes, abandons worldly life and becomes a monk with them. Then Maitreya preaches to these monks the Four Noble Truths and the doctrine of the Noble Eightfold Path. The monks 'destroy' their passions and gain śrōtāppanna status. Maitreya's preaching has the effect that 'the way to Nirvāṇa' opens, and the 'way to the three hells' is closed (p.4a, In7ff.). And now Śāṅkha and his numerous companions attain Arhatship.

The course of the narrative is interspersed with that of the ancient kings Vāsava and Dhanaśrimita, who lived in the time of the Buddha Ratnasīkha. We learn that it was prophesied that King Dhanaśrimita would attain the status of a cakravartin king. In the Buddha Śākyamuni's time he appeared as a monk named Ajāta; in Maitreya's time he is the cakravartin king Śāṅkha. But King Vāsava is born as Maitreya.

A homily is also included concerning the merits one can gain in order to have a better existence in one's next life. Then follows Maitreya's prophecy that, like all previous Buddhas, he will have two great disciples. They are Rṣidatta and Pūrṇa.

After a further section on the reward of good works follows a story about Brahmarṣi, Maitreya's father. He decides to give up his profession of house chaplain and become a monk in the train of his son. He joins the Order with 84,000 house chaplains. Then Maitreya's son, the 'dignitary' Sumana, decides to become a monk together with 84,000 pupils, whereupon he becomes an Arhat. Finally, Queen Yaśovatī, wife of the cakravartin king Śāṅkha, decides to become a nun; she is followed by the king's 84,000 consorts. After the Buddha's discourse, they abandon their passions and become Arhats. Chapter 16 ends with the call to do good deeds in the Buddha's teaching, promising as reward rebirth in the 'land of the gods' and a meeting with Maitreya when he returns to earth.

The following Chapters 17-19 in the Hami version have not yet been edited. In the Sāṅgim version some pages of these chapters are preserved. According to these, Chapter 17 deals with the rich Sumana's donation to the Order. He invites the Buddha and his followers to a meal and then establishes a large monastery for them. The text takes this as an excuse to speak of the blessings of giving.

In Chapter 18 we hear how the dragon-king Jalaprabhāsa honours the Buddha with gifts for seven days. Following this, the Buddha preaches in extenso on the merit of giving gifts, and on the numerous rebirths his hearers have undergone. Then follow various instructions to listeners from the city of Ketumati.

Chapter 19 concerns the Arhat Mahākāśyapa, who occupies a position of honour in the community; the Buddha justifies this by referring to his former good deeds. We hear further about the Buddha's younger brother, Prince Nanda, about Devadatta and about a wealthy man called Śrīgopta, who planned to kill the Buddha. The partly brief stories about these figures are only fragmentarily preserved. The same is true of stories about the murderer Aṅgulimāla, King Ajātaśatru, the executioner Śvāsa, and others.

Chapters 20-25 form a special section describing the hells and their torments and the evil deeds that lead to rebirth there. The corresponding chapters on the heavens are much less well preserved.

In the Maitrisimit we have a Turkish Buddhist text which claims in the colophons to have been 'rendered' (yaratmīś) from 'Indian' (ānātūkāk) into Tocharian (tovīrī), and 'translated' (avirmīś) from Tocharian into Turkish (türk tili). In fact, considerable portions of the Tocharian version have been found. There probably never was a direct Indian source, and there are no Tibetan or Chinese parallels. The word yaratmīś, which denotes the rendering from Indian, could be taken to mean a 'composi-
tion' from various Indian sources\textsuperscript{24}. In any case we must admit that the author(s) had a good knowledge of both the doctrinal and the narrative material of Indian Buddhism, and made independent use of it, often presupposing that certain tales were known, and merely alluding to them.

\textit{Hans-Joachim Klimkeit}

\textit{Bonn}


\textsuperscript{11} Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was wandering through the border area of Magadha and in due course arrived at the City of Vaiśālī. With a great number of bhikṣus, altogether five hundred persons, [he] put up at Āmarapāli’s Park north of Vaiśālī. Having heard that the Exalted One had come and was staying in her park together with five hundred bhikṣus, a woman, Āmarapāli [by name], had a carriage made ready [which was decorated with] precious wings, and mounted it. She drove from Vaiśālī City to the access to a hidden track\textsuperscript{2} and then made her way to the Exalted One’s whereabouts. She alighted from the carriage and went on foot to where the Exalted One was. When he saw that woman at a distance come, he said to the bhikṣus: Everybody should absolutely be on his guard lest wrong thoughts should arise in him.\textsuperscript{3} – On her arrival at the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item According to the variant reading 即道 instead of 侠道 (chivalrous track) followed by Hayashi.
\item In the following, at MPS 10.8 – 10.14 the bhikṣus are admonished at some length as to how to be strenuous (kathān ca bhikṣur ātāpi bhavati ), fully aware (...samprajāño bhavati ) and mindful (...pratisr {\textsc{m}}do bhavati ), whilst this admonition is given in the Pāli at Ambapāli’s Park before Ambapāli’s knowing of the Buddha’s and his sāṅgha’s arrival there. The occasion for the admonition in MPS and EĀ, consisting in the latter, though, of only one sentence, seems more plausible than in the Pāli passage: ‘a courtesan, having adorned herself with all that which embellishes her, and a body of women surrounding [her]’ approaching the sāṅgha, Cf. MPS 10.5: ...sarvāl [ankāraṁ alankāt {\textsc{m}}{\textsc{t}}rōgānān anvāhindayitvā ][anvā {\textsc{q}} here not in the sense of ‘having roamed through’ (BHSD, p. 42b), but after the Tibetan transl. bud med kyi tshogs kyi bskor nas and Mahāvīyut. 6942; cf. also SWTF I, p. 92: [anvāhindayitvā, lit.:] ‘sich von jemdm.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
place where the Exalted One was, the woman bowed down her head at [the Buddha's] feet and sat down on one side. Now the Exalted One expounded [to her] the most excellent (atipraññā) Teaching. Thereafter the woman said to the Buddha: May the Exalted One, together with the order of bhikṣus, kindly accept my invitation [to tomorrow's meal]. – The Exalted One consented by silence, and the woman, understanding that by his silence he had accepted her invitation, rose from her seat, bowed down her head at [his] feet and left.

By that time [all] male and female [inhabitants of] Vaiśāli, great and small, had heard that the Exalted One was staying at Āmrapāli's Park with a great number of bhikṣus, altogether five hundred persons. In the city there were five hundred youths (kumāra); 4 they mounted various kinds of carriages [decorated with] precious wings. Some of them mounted white carriages [drawn by] white horses; their clothes, parasols, banners and streamers, retinue – all were in white. Others mounted red... blue... yellow carriages [drawn by] yellow horses; their clothes, parasols, banners and streamers, retinue – all were in yellow. They looked majestic and extraordinarily smart, behaving like kings. They left Vaiśāli City and drove towards the place where the Exalted One was. While they had not yet reached the [main] road, they met that woman, moving [with speed] and whipping her draught-animals galloping towards the centre of the city. – You are a woman that should be ashamed of herself, the youths [shouted] and wanted to know from her why she was whipping her

(acc.) begleiten lassen' (i.e. ['Āmrapāli] having caused a body of women to accompany [her]). Cf., however, DPPN I, p. 155, n. 1, referring to D-Atṭhakathā II, 545: saying 'that just before Ambapāli's visit to him, the Buddha admonished the monks to be steadfast and mindful, lest they should lose their heads about her.'

4 Somewhat reminiscent of the following description of the youths of Vaiśāli and their carriages is the account, albeit in a different context, of the Buddha's visit to Vaiśāli, including a brief reference to Āmrapāli's gift of her park to the Buddha and the sangha, found at Mvu(B), pp. 206 ff., 246.

draught-animals, 5 steering her carriage with great speed towards the centre of the city. – My dear friends (bhadrā), the woman informed [them after having brought her carriage to a halt], I would have you know that I have invited the Buddha and his order of bhikṣus to tomorrow's meal. It is just for this reason that [I] am driving my carriage [at speed]. – To this the youths replied: We would also like to [treat] the Buddha and his order of bhikṣus to a meal. Now [we] offer you one thousand ounces of pure gold for giving us the exclusive right to [treat] them to a meal tomorrow. – Stop talking, sons of a great clan, 6 the woman said, I do not comply. – The youths went on offering her two, three, four, five – up to one hundred thousand ounces of gold, [asking her whether she would] agree or not to give them the right [to treat] the Buddha and his order of bhikṣus to the next day's meal. The woman [, however,] insisted: I do not comply because the Exalted One has repeatedly spoken of two kinds of longing (chanda) which man cannot give up. Which are the two? The longing for benefit (kīta) and the longing for long life (āyus). Who could guarantee my still being [alive] tomorrow? So I have invited the Tathāgata first, and now I have got to make all the preparations. – All the youths shook their fists, 7 [saying]: Very much so is our standing that of men, and [we] are not like a woman. 8 – Having

5 牛, lit. 'cow, ox, buffalo', here preferably in the sense of paśu, 'an animal in general', so that 牛 can be rendered as 'draught-animal'. It is rather strange that only in EĀ Āmrapāli's draught-animals, i.e. cows or oxen, are mentioned. Was it unthinkable for Chinese readers that a woman's carriage could be pulled by horses like that of a man? A clue is possibly provided in W. Eberhard, Dictionnaire des symboles chinois, Seghers, Paris 1984, p. 77 (under 'cheval'): According to mythological conceptions subsequent to the era of the Yi-jing, the male principle (yang) is symbolised by the horse and the female principle (yin) by the cow.

6 族姓子, lit. kulagotraputra; cf. Karashima, p. 619: 'a son of a great clan (a translation skt. kula-putra).'

7 Lit. 'hands'; cf. DII, p.96: anguli pōthesum, 'they snapped their fingers'.

8 In this connection it may be annotated that it also seems strange (cf. above n. 5) that nearly throughout this EĀ sūtra Āmrapāli is not referred to by her name, as in all the parallels to this story, but by the 'woman'. Cf. Eberhard, op. cit., p. 124 (under 'enfants'), on sexist discrimination in a 'celebrated'
had their say, all of them turned round and drove away.

The youths proceeded to where the Exalted One was. They bowed down their heads... and stood at one side. When the Exalted One had seen the youths come, he said to the bhikṣus: O bhikṣus, look at the majestic appearance and the gorgeous dress of these youths; they look exactly like Śakra⁹ being on tour. - Then the Exalted One said to the youths: There are two kinds of essential disposition (vastu) which are virtually non-existent (anupalabdha) in the world. Which are the two? (1) The habit of a person never to neglect rendering [others] a small service (upakāra), (2) let alone a great one. These are the two kinds of essential disposition, young men, which are practically non-existent. You should know, repeatedly bring back into your minds, recognise and [finally] overcome being careless about rendering [others] a small service, let alone a great one. - After [this exhortation] the Exalted One uttered the following versesⁱ⁰:

He who knows how to render [others] a service
And realises [that this should be done] repeatedly,
Being always mindful and communicating [this Knowledge] to people, [will be] endowed with
Insight-knowledge, himself being revered and followed,
[whose] name will be known to gods and men.
Thus, young men, [the Buddha went on,] one should know and train. - Then the Exalted One expounded to all the youths the subtle (sūkṣma) Teaching. After listening, they rose from their seats, bowed down... and left.

Meanwhile during the night, the woman had many sorts of choice food and delicacies prepared and all the seats arranged. Very passage from The Book of Odes (Shi-jing).

early in the morning almost at dawn, [Āmarāpāli thought to herself]: Now it is going on for the proper time; if only the Exalted One would care to call in at my humble home. – In time, the Exalted One put on his [outer] robes and took up his alms-bowl. Heading the bhikṣus accompanying [him] in order of seniority,¹¹ he entered the city of Vaiśālī and went to the woman's house. Having seen that the Exalted One had taken his seat, the woman served the meal to the Buddha and then to his order of bhikṣus with her own hand (svaḥastam). When the Buddha and the order of bhikṣus had eaten and fresh water had been passed round, a small seat, inlaid with gold, was brought and placed in front of the Buddha. Then the woman said to the Exalted One: Hereewith [I] should like to offer this park of Āmarāpāli to the Tathāgata and his order of bhikṣus. May, as in the past and at present, also in future many [members of] the order be lodged (prati-vas) in it. May the Exalted One kindly accept this park. – At the instance of that woman the Exalted One accepted it and then uttered these verses of laudatory blessing¹²:

The effect of [this donation of] a park is
That [prerequisites for] the refreshing coolness [of nirvāṇa]
Are given; [the park is like] a bridge [helping] people
To cross over [to ultimate freedom]. [If they appreciate
This bridge] as a short cut, making [use of the analogy
Between the malign influences and] a privy,¹³ then
Take a rest [from them and finally], day and night,
Realise [ultimate] peace (kṣema) – such happiness is

¹¹ Lit. 前後, 'in front and behind, earlier and later'.
¹² For this unusual expression (咒願, lit. mantra-prañidhi) see the common term abhyanumodanā (after SWT II, p. 130: 'consenting happily, approval, words of blessing (in verses)') at MPS 12.6.
¹³ Cf. Foguang, p. 4938c f. (under 腹藏) where, in commenting on the word 'cesspit, latrine', for instance, the Linji lu (cf. P. Dejéville, Entretiens de Lin-tsi, Paris 1972, p. 63) and the present EA verses are referred to. As for the latter, it says that the 'privy' can be regarded as skill in means (方便) helping man to get rid of all impure things (垢穢), to purify body and mind and finally realise 安隱, kṣema; that in this way the 'privy' eventually be conducive to ultimate peace and immeasurable happiness if one makes good use of the analogy of the latrine and its clean-up.
Beyond imagination. [He who] lives in accordance with The Teachings and rules of moral training (sīla) will After death certainly be reborn in a heavenly world. When the Exalted One had uttered these words, he rose and left. After listening to the Buddha's words, the woman was pleased and respectfully applied herself to practice.

Eleventh Fascicle
Part 20
(A Spiritual Friend)

1. Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Śrāvasti, at Jetū's Grove, in Anathapindada's Park. Then the Exalted One said to the bhikkhus: One should keep close company with a spiritual friend (kalyāṇamitra) lest one should fall into the habit of doing evil and be convinced of [the harmlessness of] evil action. Thus, O bhikkhus, by keeping close contact with a spiritual friend one is finally convinced of one's progress (bhūyobbhāva) and growth (vṛddhi) [in regard to the following]: considerable growth in learning (śrūta), generosity (dāna), insight-knowledge (jñāna) and wisdom (prajñā). If a bhikkhu keeps close company with a spiritual friend, he will not fall into the habit of doing evil. But if he keeps company with a bad friend (pāpamitra), he will lose trust (śraddhā), be wanting in moral training, in learning, insight-knowledge and wisdom. This for this reason, O bhikkhus, you should keep close company with a spiritual friend and not with a bad friend. Thus, O bhikkhus, you should train. After listening to the Buddha's words, the bhikkhus (T2, 597a) were pleased and respectfully applied themselves to practice.

2. Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Rājagaha, at Karandā's Bamboo Grove, together with a great number of bhikkhus, five hundred persons in all. In order of seniority, by turns [they] were expounding the Teaching. At the same time, Devadatta was heading five hundred bhikkhus, passing by in the proximity of the Tathāgata. On seeing Devadatta at some distance heading his apprentices, the Exalted One uttered these verses:

One should not keep close company with a bad friend; One should not be so stupid (bāla) as to deal with [such A person]. One should keep company with a spiritual Friend who is pre-eminent (viśīṣṭa) among men who are Without blemish to the core. Cultivating the friendship of A bad friend will necessarily [bring about] the roots [miśla]. Of all sorts of what is karmically unwholesome (akusala), [Plunging one] into darkness (tamas) for an eternity.

When Devadatta's five hundred disciples had heard the Exalted One utter these verses, they went to where the Exalted One was, bowed down... and sat down at one side. They [felt] under compulsion to get up [again] and confess to the Exalted One their offences (aparādha): We have been confused and foolish enough not to [rely on a spiritual] friend. If only the Exalted One would acknowledge our remorse (kaukṛtya) and forgive us (ksamam). Then the Exalted One accepted the confession of those five hundred bhikkhus and forgave them. Furthermore, [he] expounded [to them] the Teaching so that they regained their fundamental trust (śraddhāmiśla).

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14 These verses of blessing substantially differ from those at MPS 12.7-12.9, although one common element is found in both versions: generosity (dāna) results in sugati, divyam. While there are no Pāli parallels to MPS (ibid.) at D II, p. 98 and Vin I, p. 233, Waldschmidt quotes one found at A III, p. 40 (Sihasutta): 'Dadaṃ piyo hoti, bhajanti nam bahū... devānam sahavyagata ramantī te... tādino ramantī sasse sugatassa sāvakā tī.

15 The versified summaries (uddānagāthā) at the end of this 19th and other fascicles are not translated because corresponding summaries are given in Lancaster.

16 There is some resemblance of this EĀ sūtra — not a parallel — to a) A I, 7.10 (p. 13), 8.1. (p. 14); b) Tripathi, pp. 78 (Nip. I, 17.42), 155 (adapted): (nāham ekadharmam api samanupāsyāmi yena anupannāś ca pāpeka akusālā dharmā notpa yo d y a jante utpannāś ca brahmonte; anupannāśa kusālā dharmā upadannāe, utpannāś ca bhūyobbhāvavṛddhihīvutānām gacchānti yathā kal (yānami) ātā-yad... yathā (pāpamitratrayā... evam...)


19 I.e. 門徒; here notably, not the characters for 'pupil, disciple' (弟子, śiṣya, śrāvaka) are given as below.
Afterwards the five hundred bhikṣus stayed at a secluded, quiet place, wisely reflecting (manasi-kr) on the profundities of the Teaching. Consequently, the five hundred bhikṣus attained [what is striven after by] sons of good family who go forth into homelessness in order to follow the way [leading to Nirvāṇa] and who lead the unsurpassed holy life out of faith and resolution, namely arhatship. Now they knew in accordance with fact: Birth and death have come to an end, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, and there will be no more entering a womb (garbha). – After the five hundred persons’ realisation of arhatship and after listening to the Buddha’s words, the bhikṣus were pleased and respectfully applied themselves to practice.\(^{20}\)

**Additional Abbreviations**


Traité = É. Lamotte, Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra)

\(^{20}\) As for this story in which the Buddha, on seeing Devadatta being followed by 500 monks, just alludes to him as pāpamitra and himself – instead of Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana according to other sources – wins back the 500 monks as his disciples and later arhats, cf. BSR 14, 1 (1997), pp. 3-18 (É. Lamotte, ‘Did the Buddha Insult Devadatta?’) and pp. 19-37 (A. Bareu, ‘Devadatta and the First Buddhist Schism’). For further EĀ material on Devadatta cf. also BSR 11, 2 (1994), pp. 167-71; BSR 12, 2 (1995), pp. 162-8. In the light of this latter EĀ material, Bareu’s observations regarding the Mahāsāṃghikas on Devadatta (cf. in particular *ibid.* pp. 27, 31) would need revision if the school affiliation of EĀ as belonging to the Mahāsāṃghika canon – as often suggested – could be demonstrated.

Concerning the material in BSR 12, 2, pp. 162-8, mention has yet to be made of Lamotte’s summary at Traité, pp. 1771-2. Cf. also Monika Zin, ‘Der Elefant mit dem Schwert’ in F. Wilhelm (ed.), *Festschrift Dieter Schlingloff*, Reinbek 1996, pp. 331-44 (the elephant Dhanaḍāla / Nālāgiri with a sword as a subject of Buddhist art of EĀ provenance).
Thích Thiên Châu (Hò đắc Cử) (23 February 1931 – 5 October 1998)

After an apoplectic stroke eight years ago that had left Ven. Dr Thích Thiên Châu completely paralysed and after his recovering from it by dint of unremitting effort to such an extent that he could be active almost as normally as before, all of a sudden he peacefully passed away in his study of Institut Bouddhique Trúc Lâm (Veľuvana-Vihāra) at Villebon-sur-Yvette on the southern outskirts of Paris.

With his death in particular the Vietnamese Sangha, his numerous lay disciples and also Western friends and students have lost one of the most distinguished mahāsthaviras, who embodied not only mature scholarship of a high standard but also the ‘salvatory skill’ of a truly compassionate meditation master and the elegant, tranquil beauty of Vietnamese Zen (Thiền) poetry.

Thích Thiên Châu was born in Huế where he obtained his B.A. in 1950. After his becoming a monk he attended Huế Buddhist Institute to study the Dharma in Vietnamese and classical Chinese and took the institute’s diploma in 1956. Since he had gained remarkable proficiency as a Dharma teacher, for the next four years he lectured all over the country and thus became widely known among Vietnamese Buddhists. During that time he was also a lecturer at the Buddhist institutes in Huế and Nha Trang.

At the beginning of a decade of the most gruesome events in Vietnamese history, the Vietnamese Sangha Council, with a view to strengthening and protecting Buddhist culture at home, was working towards a unification of the Theravāda orientated communities in South Vietnam and of the All Vietnam Mahāyāna associations. All its efforts aimed at creating a Unified Buddhist Congregation of Vietnam in order to promote high standards of education, charitable works, international relations etc. It is actually against this back-
schools of the Personalists whose shrewdly formulated tenets concerning a pudgala vs the pan-Buddhist nairātmyavāda did not fail to provoke prolonged interschool debates, thereby tremendously enriching Buddhist literature and philosophical thought. The outcome of his academic preoccupation with Pudgalavāda lore was, as mentioned, two dissertations written under the guidance of two well-known authorities, viz. the professors André Bareau and Paul Demiéville, entitled a) Le Traité des trois Lois (Le Tridharmakāsāstra): Étude doctrinale et philosophique du San fa tou louen; b) Les Sectes personnalistes du Bouddhisme ancien (Pudgalavādin): Aperçu historique et doctrine spécifique des Sectes personnalistes dans le contexte du Bouddhisme ancien. It can with good reason be said that through these two probes into the world of Pudgalavāda thought Thích Thiền Chậu distinguished himself in his own right as the leading Pudgalavāda specialist. Fortunately, the latter dissertation, admirably translated into English by Sara Boin-Webb, was published in 1997 by the Vietnam Buddhist Research Institute in Ho Chi Minh City under the title The Literature of the Personalists of early Buddhism, of which an Indian reprint is in preparation. In addition the titles of two articles by him treating the same subject should not be left out here: a) The Literature of the Pudgalavādins’ in The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 7, 1 (1984), pp. 7-16; b) ‘Les Réponses des Pudgalavādin aux Critiques des Écoles Bouddhiques’ in ibid. 10, 1 (1987), pp. 33-53.

Although Thiền Chậu had become resident in France in 1967, he was widely-travelled, participating in numerous conferences and lecturing on both academic topics (cf., for instance, his contributions to Dictionnaire des philosophes, Paris, 1988) and more popular themes such as Buddhism vis-à-vis Christianity or the natural sciences. Frequently he visited his native country to teach the Dharma as he was previously used to. During his prolonged stays in Vietnam he, moreover, acted as vice-president of the Vietnam Buddhist Research Institute (formerly Van Hanh Buddhist University) in Ho Chi Minh City and also as vice-president of the Committee of Translation and Publication of the Vietnamese Tripiṭaka. In this connection an important article from his pen should be mentioned which appeared in Van Hanh Bulletin 1-3 of Van Hanh University (Saigon, 1972, pp. 5-34): ‘La littérature bouddhique vietnamienne’. The reader is informed, for instance, about most interesting historical details concerning the transference of the Chinese Tripiṭaka to Vietnam in the early 11th century and the preparation of two Vietnamese recensions of the Chinese xylograph Tripiṭaka, one of them mentioned as having consisted of 500 fascicles (i.e. actually only a small portion of the entire corpus of canonical writings in Chinese). Apart from having started and edited two journals in Vietnamese, Thiền Chậu wrote about half a dozen books in Vietnamese, one of them being a translation of the Dhammapada. His writings are still quite popular in his native country and with overseas Vietnamese communities. A special feature with all his Dharma books are his numerous translations of significant single Pāli discourses into Vietnamese and his own pieces of Thiền-inspired poetry. One of his main concerns certainly was to bring about an appreciation of and return to the original Pāli sources on the part of Vietnamese devotees of Thiền-cum-Amidism. One of his perhaps lifelong dreams came true in 1998, a few months before his premature death, when at the acme of his mission he became the co-founder of the first Buddhist university in his native Huế.

Finally one more aspect of Thiền Chậu’s multi-faceted carana may be mentioned. When one of his Huế disciples, Dr Kim Lan Thai, had finished her studies and research in Western philosophy at the University of Munich, it was thanks to her initiative that for about three decades he went to Munich and Upper Bavaria once or twice every year to introduce so many of her international students of philosophy to Buddhist meditation and culture. Thus Ven. Thiền Chậu really lived up to the ideal of doing something meaningful bahujanahitāya lokānukampāya in the East and West.

Bhikkhu Pāsādīka
ObituarieS

John Derek Ireland (28 November 1932 - 29 October 1998)

Generally known as 'Jack' to his friends, this private scholar of the Pāli Canon finally succumbed to emphysema at his Surrey home.

Born in Highgate, North London, he and his family soon moved to Hampstead Garden Suburb where he lived until the death of his mother in 1984. Thereafter, his work prompted a move to a more accessible home, in the equally quiet and leafy suburb of Sutton.

Although he evinced a healthy scepticism of received religious wisdom at school, he passed Religious Knowledge with credit but had no opportunity to pursue Comparative Religion as would have seemed his natural inclination. However, two years after leaving school, in 1951 at the age of 18 he was browsing in a bookshop and 'chanced' to see a new Penguin paperback, Buddhism by Christmas Humphreys - the first book on the subject published in post-War Britain. In a remarkable experience, he spontaneously entered a state of samādhi. In elation, he 'knew' he was a Buddhist, had always been a Buddhist, and always will be a Buddhist'. Years later he wrote 'I can hardly believe how fortunate I am to have experienced it... The implicit trust and confidence in the Buddha that arose at that time has sustained and guided me in so many ways'. Jack read other books, attended talks at The Buddhist Society and met other Buddhists. However, he was obliged to undertake National Service which, in his case, took the form of two years in the Royal Army Medical Corps in Germany. Immediately afterwards he embraced the study of Buddhism wholeheartedly, learning Pāli to enable him to comprehend fully the Buddha's teachings in its most authentic recension. He met and studied with several teachers (including Bhikkhu Kapilavatudha and Trungpa Rinpoche) and joined various organisations. In later years he pursued a more solitary course, but corresponded with a number of Buddhist friends and scholars around the world.

In civilian life he had unexpectedly pursued a scientific career. Qualifying in Chemistry at evening classes, he studied at the Institute of Medical Laboratory Technology prior to joining the Department of Chemical Pathology at the National Hospital for Nervous Diseases in Queen Anne Square, London, in 1949. He became a Senior Technician but, with the retirement of his professional mentor in 1971, he transferred to the nearby Homoeopathic Hospital where he stayed two years until 1974. From the following year until his early retirement in 1993 he found congenial employment in the Haematology Department at St. George's Hospital, which later relocated from Hyde Park Corner to Tooting, South London.

Jack was a very private individual and it may come as a surprise to learn that he displayed a keen interest in other than Buddhist textual studies. He enjoyed reading Dornford Yates, P.G. Wodehouse, Joseph Conrad, Charles Dickens, Hammond and Michael Innes, Donald Westlake - writers who used language well and with humour. He was also a virtuoso pianist, having mastered the keyboard by his teens when he composed pieces for piano and orchestra and even submitted some to his famous namesake, the composer John Ireland. He would immerse himself in the work of a particular composer for months at a time, practising daily with quiet concentration till he had a thorough understanding of the music and the composer's intention - a similar approach made his translations from the Pāli so effective. He could express in a clear and straightforward way a seemingly complex text or piece of music. Selflessly, he would seek out the inner truth of the music. Yet his intellectual rigour was always tempered by his sense of humour and human feeling, so that his playing always had warmth and a light touch.

Apart from contributions to the journal of the English Sangha Association (Sangha, The Buddhist, The Buddhist Way) during the 1960s, his translations and exegetical writings regularly featured in Buddhist Studies Review from 1990 onwards. For the Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy, he contributed essays - The Preparatory Path and Comments on the Buddha Word, and original translations - The Discourse Collection (20 suttas from the Sutta-Nipāta), (with others) Samyutta Nikāya: An Anthology, Vangisa: An Early Buddhist Poet (from the Theragāthā) and, most notably, The Udāna: Inspired Utterances of the Buddha and The Itivuttaka: The Buddha's Sayings. With reference to the last two texts, he confided to a friend in the last letter he penned:
'I feel I could die contented in the knowledge that I have done something to repay the great happiness the Buddha-dhamma has brought me in this life.'

As his knowledge of Pāli developed, he devoted most of his time to the study and translation of the texts into English. His use of the English language was beautiful whilst his writing was always precise and straightforward. With patience and concentration he would hone each sentence until its meaning was clear and simple. His translations, his own legacy to Western Buddhism, will undoubtedly remain of value for many years to come.

Based on a fuller biography by his sister, Jill Rose, to whom thanks are due for permission to edit her account.
from 1938-66 by I.B. Horner. In an introductory chapter, the author expounds the structure of the Pāli monastic discipline. The bulk of the work provides a detailed study of all the rules for nuns in the Pāli Vinaya, bhikkhunivibhanga (section for nuns). Each rule has been translated into German. In a very comprehensive way each rule is also related to all relevant information in the Pāli Vinaya and by doing so the author provides a clear picture of the discipline for nuns.

In the notes, the author gives a new translation of the commentary on the rules given in the Vinaya. Furthermore, she translates the commentary of the Samantapāsādikā (a commentary on the Pāli Vinaya written in the fourth-fifth century CE) and, if relevant, of the Kāśyapīvita (a commentary on the Pāli pātimokkhas probably written in the fifth century); differences between the commentaries are discussed. These first translations of the commentaries add a significant surplus value to the work.

The structure and contents of the rules for nuns and monks are compared in detail. The author hereby advances many interesting and innovative hypotheses on the differences between both communities. Also, Cullavagga X, a chapter of the Pāli Vinaya dedicated to nuns and containing the story concerning the first nuns, is critically analysed. In a most interesting way, this chapter provides an overview of the history of development of the community of Buddhist nuns.

In the final part of the work, the author gathers all the findings resulting from her analysis in a condensed survey of the life of the Buddhist nuns and their relation to the monks. Two indexes complete the work: one contains all references to the analysed passages of the Pāli tradition, and another contains Pāli technical terms. Regrettably, there is no German index that would facilitate consultation.

Some remarks should be made. As the title mentions, the present work analyses the monastic discipline for nuns of the Theravāda School and readers will certainly gain a clear understanding of this school's disciplinary code. However, hypotheses based on one tradition cannot simply be transferred to other Buddhist traditions, since several elements differ significantly from school to school. Given such differences, readers should be careful not to apply findings that are based only on the Pāli tradition to other lineages without further checking. For instance, the author draws particular attention to the content of the bimonthly instruction given by monks to nuns. Starting from a detailed analysis of the Pāli Vinaya, she concludes that the instruction predominantly concerns the rules of the Vinaya (pp. 241, 376, 384-5, 453-7, 462-3). Only if nuns do not follow the eight garudhammas — eight 'important rules' that subordinate nuns to monks and that were imposed on the first nun as a condition for creation of a community of nuns — these eight rules have to be explained again. This solidly grounded theory clearly describes the way in which nuns depend on monks. It is not improbable that other Buddhist traditions reason in the same way. Still, before generalising this theory to other traditions, a detailed checking of all relevant data has to be done, the more since, at first sight, some traditions seem to point to a different direction: Mahāsīkā Vinaya (Mahā) T(aishō) 1421, pp. 45c8, 90a25-26; Dharmaguptaka Vinaya (Dharma), T 1428, p. 649a1-2; Sarvāstivāda Vinaya — bhiksuni-prātimokṣa of the Sarvāstivāda (Sarva), T 1435, pp. 82a2-6, 345c8: the instruction concerning the eight important rules; Mahāsīki Vinaya (Mahā), T 1425, p. 346a23-24: the instruction concerns abhidharma and vinaya; Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya (Mūla) T 1443, p. 798a29-b1: the instruction concerns morality (śīla), meditation (samādhi), wisdom (prajñā) and rules (dharma).

Still more caution is needed in those cases where it is implied that findings based on the Pāli Vinaya are valid for other traditions. Some examples:

* The author attaches great importance to the fact that nuns, obliged to live in villages, necessarily live close to lay people, while monks can also live outside villages and, consequently, away from the common life. This situation gives rise to many rules dealing with relations between nuns and the laity. One such rule is that nuns may not go to court to bring a charge against lay people. In the Pāli Vinaya, no rule of this kind is found for monks due, according to the author, to the lesser contact that monks have with the laity (pp. 71-4, 74, n. 3). Monks even have to ask permission to enter a village when not at mealtime. This
reasoning is based on the Pāli Vinaya, but it cannot be sustained in other lineages. All traditions say that a nun may not take a matter to court. Is this always the consequence of close contact between nuns and the laity? Apart from the fact that monks, too, have extensive contact with the laity, it is to be mentioned that according to some traditions nuns also have to ask for permission to enter a village (Dharmabuddhi, T 1428, p.736b27-28; Sarva, T 1437, p.484b5-4; Mūla, T 1443, p.994b16-c23) and that, according to at least one tradition, a monk who brings a layman to court commits an offence (Dharmabuddhi, T 1428, p.719b2). Also interesting is the fact that most traditions, including the Pāli, mention that a dispute arose between nuns and a layman concerning a dwelling after the death of a benefactor, his son reclaims a dwelling once given by his father to the Buddhist community (Pāli Vin IV, pp.222-5; Mahāvīra, T 1421, p.80b5-c9; Dharmabuddhi, T 1428, pp.718b25-719b6; Sarva, T 1435, p.309a14-c5). Two traditions (Mahāvīra and Sarva) mention that the benefactor had first given the dwelling to the monks who later passed it on to the nuns. Also in Mūla, T 1443, p.936b4-c5, a dispute is said to have arisen when the son of a deceased benefactor claims his inheritance. The preceding data make clear that the context that gave rise to the rule that prohibits a nun to go to court is likely to have been rather complex and, surely, is more specific than a mere close contact between nuns and lay people. A study concerning this context could undoubtedly benefit from a comparison between data of different traditions. In this specific case, we might have to focus on the weak position of women when property is concerned, rather than on close contact with lay people.

*After committing a samghāvasa (Pāli samghādisa) a monk who has hidden this offence has to undergo a parivāsa penance, the duration of which depends on how long the monk had been keeping silent. Subsequently he has to undergo a māṇatva (Pāli māṇatta) penance lasting six days. A nun, however, has to undergo the latter for two weeks. During these periods the punished monks and nuns live separated from the community. To account for the difference between monks and nuns, the author states that a nun cannot live alone and that even during a māṇatva penance she has to be accompanied by another nun. In order to prevent this second nun from being separated too long from the community, a parivāsa period is not imposed on nuns (pp.104-5). This theory is entirely based on the Pāli Vinaya. Since the other traditions do not have a parivāsa period for nuns either, this implies that the author's findings necessarily have to be valid for these other traditions. This needs further checking. Does every tradition provide a companion for a punished nun? At least in the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya we could not find one.

To conclude, we can state that the present work provides the reader with a clear and thorough understanding of the discipline for nuns according to the Pāli tradition. It contains many original and refreshing ideas and provides a detailed analysis of the rules for nuns and their relation to those for monks. Although the work would have benefited from a comparison with other Buddhist traditions, all in all it promises to become a major reference work for all engaged in Vinaya studies.

Ann Heirman


This is the seventh volume in the series previously published by Princeton University Press but now published exclusively by Motilal Banarasidas: it is the first of several volumes in the series to be devoted to Buddhist philosophy. Like the previous volumes, this is a collaborative effort, being described as edited by Karl H. Potter 'with' Robert E. Buswell, Padmanabh S. Jaini and Noble Ross Reat, and having a total of seventeen contributors. The format follows that of previous volumes in the series: about one quarter of the volume is taken up with introductory essays, while the other three quarters comprise summaries of representative texts.

In the introductory essays Reat discusses 'The Historical Buddha and His Teachings', Potter 'The Buddhist Way to Liberation', Buswell and Jaini 'The Development of Abhidharma Philosophy' and Potter again 'A Few Early Abhidharma Categories'. The volume includes summaries of twenty-three texts: all seven works of the Theravāda Abhidhamma-Piṭaka, six of the seven
works of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma Piṭaka (the Prajñaptibhāṣya being omitted on the grounds that its contents ‘do not belong in the field of philosophy’), three works from the Theravādin Khuddaka-Nikāya that are an Abhidhamma type (the Mahāniddesa, Cullaniddesa and Paṭisambhidāmagga), three early Theravādin paracanonical exegetical works (the Petakopadesa, Nettipakarana and Milindapañha), two early Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma manuals (Dharmaśrī’s Abhidharmahṛdaya/Abhidharmasāra and Ghoṣaka’s Abhidharmamārtta), the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma commentary (the Mahāvyabhāṣā), and the only early Abhidharma work which survives outside Theravādin and Sarvāstivādin circles (the Śāriputrābhidharmāsāstra).

Reat’s introductory essay is heavily reliant on the late Edward Conze’s understanding of the development of Indian Buddhism, taking little account of material published since the 1960s. To be fair, part of the problem here is obviously the time lapse between the commissioning of the various contributions to this volume and final publication: thus Buddhist Hermeneutics, edited by Donald Lopez and published by the University of Hawai’i in 1988, is described on p.579 as ‘forthcoming’, while Potter’s preface is dated June 1989. Indeed, the whole volume suffers from not being able to refer to a number of important publications that have appeared since. But this fails to explain entirely the gaps in Reat’s reading. Perhaps most curiously, as a co-editor of the volume, he does not appear to have read Buswell and Jaini’s essay. If he had he would know that it is inaccurate to talk of a ‘Theravāda’ and a ‘Mahāyāna’ version of the second council, that there is no reason to suppose that the Sarvāstivādin Vasumitra (author of the Samayabhedorcaramacakra) was a Mahāyānist, that the split between the Mahāsāṃghikas and Sthaviravāda seems not to have occurred at the second council, that it is extremely problematic to talk of the Mahāsāṃghikas as ‘eventually becoming’ the Mahāyāna’ (cf. pp.22-3, 77-8), and that both the Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins regard the works of their respective Abhidharma-Piṭakas as ‘the word of the Buddha’ (cf. pp.25, 80). Reat’s essay opens with the suggestion that, ‘with some reservations’, scholars today generally accept that the historical Buddha was born in 563 BC/BCE (p.3); I should have thought that these days precisely the opposite is true: the general consensus is that the Buddha was not born in 563 BCE, but some time during the fifth century BCE. Nevertheless Reat confidently proceeds to outline a chronology of the development of Buddhism based on this date of birth of the Buddha. And in persistently talking in terms of there being two kinds of Buddhism in ancient India, Theravāda and Mahāyāna, Reat also appears unaware of the publications of Harrison, Schopen and Williams pertinent to the question of the origins and nature of the Mahāyāna (some of which were certainly published before 1988). Perhaps most out of line with current scholarship, which tends to the view that the Mahāyāna remained a small movement into the early centuries of the Common Era, is Reat’s unqualified assumption (p.30) that already in the third century BCE the Mahāyāna existed in a form such that Aśoka could choose not to favour it. His suggestion (pp.25-6) that the commentarial phase of Buddhist tradition is somehow exclusively Theravādin and that commentarial literature of the Sarvāstivādins and Mahāyānists does not survive (or was never produced in the first place) is bizarre. What are, for example, the Saṅgītiparyaya and Mahāvībhāṣā (both of which are summarised in the present volume) if not commentaries? And is not the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsāstra a commentary on the Perfection of Wisdom in 25,000 lines? Also inaccurate, or at least problematic, is the statement that the Pāli commentaries represent translations of works originally composed in Sri Lanka and in Sinhalese. Tradition in fact has it that the commentaries were brought to Sri Lanka from northern India by Mahinda in the third century BCE and subsequently translated into Sinhala Prakrit; later these were edited and rendered into Pāli. While this tradition is no doubt not exactly historical, an Indian provenance for at least some of the material incorporated in the Pāli commentaries seems certain. Puzzling is the suggestion that dependent origination is ‘a doctrine of little importance in Mahāyāna Buddhism’ (p.27) when it features in many Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras.

Rather more useful is Buswell and Jaini’s discussion of ‘The Development of Abhidharma Philosophy’. Indeed, this constitutes one of the best summaries of the development of Abhidharma
literature available: particularly useful are the references to contemporary Japanese scholarship on the development of Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma. Perhaps one of the most important points to be brought out in this essay is that a mātiκā/māṭikā of triplets and couplets should be considered basic to the common Abhidharma method and not a peculiarity of the Theravādin Abhidhamma (see pp.86-8). Yet despite its title Buswell and Jain’s essay remains, as I have indicated, more of a discussion of the development of Abhidharma literature than of philosophy per se.

This brings me to what is, I think, the main problem with the volume. As part of a series entitled Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, what it rather conspicuously fails to do is to explain what Abhidharma thought is about. Each of the introductory essays in turn skirts the problem of presenting the basic principles of Abhidharma thought; and given that the fundamental canonical Abhidhamma texts are not of the nature of discursive expositions — which is precisely why the later tradition approaches Abhidharma through the medium of summary manuals and commentaries — the reader who refers to this volume in the hope of learning what Abhidharma is about will, I fear, be left in the dark.

Certainly, to have within the covers of a single volume a survey of the contents of twenty-three Abhidharma texts is extremely useful; particularly useful for those working on Theravāda Abhidhamma and who have no Chinese are the summaries of the Chinese materials, especially the 55-page summary (the longest in the volume) of the Mahāvibhāṣa; equally, the summaries of such texts as the Kathāvatthu and Milindapañha provide useful and readable overviews. However, certain fundamental canonical Abhidhamma texts do not really lend themselves to straightforward summary, and a more descriptive account of their contents and method as opposed to a tabular summary might have been more appropriate. While I appreciate the difficulties in summarising Abhidhamma materials, I have to say that I am doubtful whether anyone unfamiliar with the Dhammasaṅgani will have any clearer an idea of what it is about after reading Potter’s 30-page summary; part of the problem here is that Potter fails to bring out clearly the manner in which the Dhammasaṅgani is an explication of the 22 triplets and 100 couplets of the Abhidhamma māṭikā and how this is crucial for the understanding of the Vibhaṅga and Paṭṭhāna.

But let me try to illustrate what I see as the general problem with this volume with a specific example. In 1981 L.S. Cousins published an article “The Paṭṭhāna and the Development of the Theravādin Abhidhamma” (Journal of the Pali Text Society (1981), pp.22-46) in which he showed that the basic principles of the consciousness process (citta-viṭṭhi) which is well known from the Pāli commentaries are already embedded in the system of causal relations set out in the Paṭṭhāna. This is an important finding which, as well as telling us something about the history of a significant Abhidhamma theory, shows how the system of thought underlying the canonical texts is not immediately apparent but needs to be worked out. Yet no clue is given here as to Cousin’s findings, either in the introductory essays or in the summary of the text. Curiously, Potter seems to know of the article since he refers (p.337) to Cousins’ views on the dating of the Paṭṭhāna, but he gives no reference to it; Bond also refers (p.404) to Cousins’ dating of the Nettipakaraṇa in the same article, but the reference (p.590) is faulty, omitting the volume number and citing JPTS 1984 instead of 1981.

Somewhat regrettably, not to say irritatingly, for Pāli scholars, the editors have failed to standardise references to Pāli texts. While the notes to the introductory essays generally seem to follow the standard set by A Critical Pāli Dictionary, referring to the volume and page number of the Pāli Text Society’s editions, most of the summaries give references to the Nālandā devanāgarī editions edited by Kashyap. The PTS editions may not be the most reliable or accurate, but they are the most widely available and most generally referred to in the scholarly literature, making them the closest to a scholarly norm in the field of Pāli studies. Ironically, in the one instance where the use of an edition other than the PTS edition is something of a necessity — the Cullaniddesa — no attempt has been made to consult any other edition, and instead of a summary of the text we are offered a brief essay on the problematic nature of the 1918 PTS edition. The contributor (Grace G. Burford) comments in passing that the PTS

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edition is also difficult to obtain; in fact it was reprinted in 1988, no doubt just as she was sending off her contribution.

There are also inconsistencies in the translation of technical terms (e.g. on p.141 sasamkhārena is rendered both as 'from instigation' and 'from prompting', and on p.69 samyojana is given as 'hindrance' despite the fact that the Glossary-Index gives the more exact 'fetters'). On p.337 tikā, 'subcommentary', is confused with ika, 'triplet'. The translations 'realm of matter' and 'relating to the material world' for rūpa-dhātu and rūpāvacara respectively, which give the impression of a grosser sphere of existence and experience rather than a more refined and subtle one, seem to me particularly misleading in a technical Abhidharma context. (If one really wants to preserve in English translation the verbal connection between rūpa as physical things and rūpadhātu/rūpāvacara as a sphere of existence and experience, then perhaps one should reconsider 'matter' as a translation of rūpa.) And the use of Pāli/Sanskrit terminology gets tangled in places: śāsavatarāda (sic) is given as Pāli on p.37, pancaśīla is followed by pānātipāta on pp.49-50. Pāli is often (but not consistently or always accurately) sanskritised (e.g. ciittatāsīka in the context of the Paṭṭhāna on p.338), and the spelling 'Buddhapāsa' is used throughout. I also could not help wondering why Dharmaśri alone warranted the title bhadanta. The problem with the Glossary-Index is that one can look up dukkha and find that it is translated as 'frustration', but there is no way of finding out what Pāli/Sanskrit term a particular English translation represents. And two further significant omissions of publications that were already in existence when this volume was in preparation are S. Dietz, Fragmente des Dharmakṣaya-Text in Sanskrit aus Gūgīt (Gottingen 1984) and J. Van den Broeck's (trans.), Le saveur de l'immortel (A-p'i-t'an Kan Lu Wei Lun): La version chinoise de l'Amṛtarasa de Ghoṣaka (Louvain-la-Neuve 1977). Some of these may amount to little more than minor quibbles, but their extent does tend to undermine one's confidence in the volume as a whole.

Lest I appear over critical and even unappreciative of the efforts of the team of scholars who have worked on this volume, I should add that some of its weaknesses simply reflect the current state of our understanding of the development of Abhidharma thought. In an area as vast and as important for the history of Buddhist thought, and yet as under-researched, as Abhidharma, this volume might be regarded as a welcome and important addition to the materials for its study, but it remains nevertheless somewhat disappointing.

Rupert Gethin


Candrakīrti is in no need of an introduction to students of Madhyamaka; nearly all of his extant works are available in modern (partial) editions and translations. His commentary on Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is available in Sanskrit and Tibetan. There are good translations by Schayer, May, de Jong and others. His commentary on the Catūḥsataka is only partially available in Sanskrit, but there is a complete Tibetan version. Chapters XII and XIII have been edited and translated by Tom J.F. Tillemans, Materials for the Study of Aryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti, Vienna 1990 (cf. my review in The Adyar Library Bulletin 55 (1991), pp.126-30). Another indispensable recent work is that of Cristina Anna Scherrer-Schaub, Yuktisātikāvṛtti. Commentaire à la soixante et seconde de cette traduction par le Maître indien Candrakīrti, Brussels 1991 (cf. my review, ibid., 56 (1992), pp.198-200). Full references to modern editions and translations of these and other works of Candrakīrti may be found in the bibliographies of Erb (pp.xxix-xxxii) and Scherrer-Schaub (pp.318-47).

Felix Erb's heavily annotated edition and translation of about the first half of Candrakīrti's SSV is, as far as it goes, a valuable work, the result of many years of careful philological study. This is especially clear from the fact that about one third of the book (pp.105-204) consists of notes, largely discussing textual problems. This, again, has to do with the sad fact that the Tibetan version
of the ŚSV — unlike the Tibetan versions of Candrakīrti's other works — is often in an amazingly poor shape. The many corruptions can be traced back to the lost Sanskrit manuscript(s), to the incompetence of the translators or to the careless transmission of the text on Tibetan ground. Erb provides a brief and good account of these problems (pp.30-2).

To the best of our knowledge the ŚSV is never quoted by later Indian authors. Is the ŚSV, nevertheless, one of Candrakīrti's authentic works? This question is also taken up by Erb (pp.14-20) and, on the basis of various internal and external criteria, he votes in favour of the traditional attribution to Candrakīrti. With this opinion I agree.

On the other hand I disagree with Erb when he maintains that the Pañcaskandhaprakāraṇa (PSP) — edited with an introduction by myself in Acta Orientalia 40 (1979), pp.87-145 — is not authentic but in fact the work of a (strange) 'Deutero-Candrakīrti' (p.106). If I understand him aright (p.105), one of his major reasons for rejecting the authenticity of the PSP is that Candrakīrti in his other — probably later — works, in matters of Abhidharma, refers to the authority of the Abhidharmakośa (bhaṣya) of Vasubandhu, not to the PSP, then — if I understand Erb's argument correctly — he (i.e. Candrakīrti) would, later on, have referred his reader not to Vasubandhu's work on Abhidharma but to his own. But Erb's argument is hardly valid. Without good reason he tacitly presupposes that the PSP was intended to replace the work of Vasubandhu, but this is by no means the case. The PSP is in itself only intended as a brief summary (mdo bsdius, pp.95 and 145) of Abhidharma. It was written, not as an original contribution, but as an introduction to Abhidharma, or as Candrakīrti says, for those with unclear minds (p.95), for 'Buddhist lazybones' (bad pa med pa'i rten 'di don du... p.145). In other words, the author of PSP expects those of his students who are not 'lazybones' to go on with their Abhidharma studies, i.e. to continue with their study of the Abhidharmakośa (bhaṣya), etc. What could therefore be more natural than that Candrakīrti, later on, would refer to the authority of the Abhidharmakośa(bhaṣya), etc. — the major authority for the PSP — also? As suggested not only by common sense but also proved by the texts themselves (see e.g. Yuktisāṭikā 30), students would start with Abhidharma before advancing to Madhyamaka.

It was therefore natural for Candrakīrti to complete a summary of Abhidharma, giving it at the same time the particular Madhyamaka touch (§10 on praṇīṭā), but without in any way intending to consign all the huge old works on Abhidharma to oblivion. (For further, positive arguments in favour of the authenticity of the PSP, I have nothing further to add to what I have already said in 1979.)

When it comes to style as an argument of authenticity we should be circumspect. A certain similarity with regard to quotations, locations, technical vocabulary, etc., is not always sufficient to prove the authorship of several works. When we compare the various commentaries of Candrakīrti with another, stylistic discrepancies can be observed. This is most clearly the case when we compare the first and second parts of his commentary on the Catuḥsataka with one another. Still, there is no reason (as far as I am aware) to doubt the authenticity of the commentary as a whole. This, then, means that dissimilarity of style can also be an argument in favour of authenticity. Of course, there is really nothing odd in this, it merely goes to show the versatility we expect from a good writer.

In this connection Erb draws attention to the fact that Candrakīrti in the ŚSV uses the term rnam par rig pa smra ba, or viṃṇāpyāvāda, whereas in his other works he uses rnam par shes pa smra ba, or viṃṇānapāvāda. Fortunately Erb is not so hypercritical as to conclude that the ŚSV is therefore not to be ranked among the authentic works of Candrakīrti! (Note that viṃṇānapāvāda is used in Bodhicittavivaraṇa 26; a Mādhyamika — even before Vigrahavāvarta 69 — would describe himself as a śūnyatāvādīn, cf. Kāśyapapravarta §123; I would be surprised if viṃṇāpyāvāda could be found before Vasubandhu, for whom viṃṇāna and viṃṇaṭī can be interchangeable — as also with Candrakīrti.)

Erb's edition (pp.212-68) and translation (pp.35-103) of the Tibetan text is a very solid piece of work, though some readers will probably find that he has burdened the text by inserting too many brackets and figures. The final outcome is cumbersome. This, however, may be a matter of style and taste. I for one, with
most classicists, prefer a ‘clean’ page to read.

Considerations of space make it impossible for me to comment upon all the uncertain readings and emendations proposed by Erb. Since there is enough for a small book, I will confine myself to a few random observations. References will be to the page of the translation and the Tibetan text, and the notes.

1. The first line of the prose (p.23/211, n.172) most probably read gambhirātyudārabhāvārtha, which would be a synonym of pratiyāsamūpārtha, or dharmārtha; reading and meaning being supported by Pras., pl: saddharmatotayasya gambhirabhāva, and YS 1: gambhira...pratyayārtha, and RĀ 4.79: atyaudāryāti-gambhīrya. See also n.272, p.131. Emend translation accordingly. — Moreover, Nāgārjuna’s students are described as enthusiastic about his writing such a scientific work, bya bar nes pa ’di la, cf., for the whole passage, tattvārthanirnaya, used by Nāgārjuna in RĀ 1.98 (quoted by Candrakīrti in Pras., p.188). Change translation with n.174 accordingly. — Note that the main misfortune of a bāla — as opposed to an ārya — is that he suffers from abhiniveṣa. Mahāyāna, then, is Aryan philosophy with a therapeutic scope. The distinction between the ārya and the bāla is a locus communis of all Indian darśanas, and very frequent in Candrakīrti’s works.

2. The quotation from Āryadeva (p.36/212, n.201) raises the question of vijnāna without an ālambana. The dharma, the pratyayārtha which is gambhīra, nirālambana, anālaya, etc., is to be realized by a buddhi that is, likewise, nirārya, gambhīra, etc.; see YS 1, RĀ 1.75, Śatapāñčaśatka 35 (buddhi-gambhīrya). — Erb’s reconstruction of the verse (n.201) is impossible, above all because he lets the relative and the demonstrative pronoun refer to two different subjects, cf. the rule quoted by himself n.942: yatratōṣ ca nityam abhisambandhah. — For the yogic idea of mind without support, see YS 34, MK 18.7 (quoted p.129, n.266).

3. In the commentary to the first verse of SS (p.36/212) Candrakīrti takes up the two truths. The distinction is admitted by the ārya as well as the bāla. Truth is a function of knowledge. Relative or practical truth has to do with language and communication, whereas absolute truth transcends language and mental activity. The main canonical authority (for Candrakīrti and all other Mādhyamikas) is provided by the Aksāyamatinirdeśasūtra, a fine critical edition of which was brought out by Jens Braarvig, Oslo 1993 (see my review in The Adyar Library Bulletin 38 (1994), pp.244-6). The definition of paramārthasatya runs: yatra jñānasāyapy (or cittasāyapy) apracārah, kah punar vādo ‘ksarānām (Braarvig, pp.73 and 165, from Pras.). Note also that the same sūtra has a third aspect of truth, viz. laksana-satya (p.73). This probably also inspired the common Madhyamaka refutation of laksana-laksya. It is one Truth (eka o r advaya) with three ‘aspects’. What Candrakīrti, as a writer, does is a case of the satyakausālāya of a bodhisattva recommended by the Aksāyamatinirdeśa (p.73). — For kṛta(k)a as opposed to akṛtrima, see also Acintyastava 7, 8 and 44. From the Aryan point of view, true reality is never ‘made up’. The idea of reality as unborn is Vedic.

4. Candrakīrti’s paraphrase of Catuhṣatakā 8.19 (n.262) seems to support my conjecture nāryayā (for nānyayā); a barbarian does not understand the Aryan language, i.e. Sanskrit: klo klo phags pa ’i skad mi ’ses pa la... On the other hand, one could still advance arguments to support the reading nānyayā. The meaning would then be that a mleccha cannot be taught in any other language (add: than his own). The question is closely related to another: were Āryadeva and Candrakīrti prepared to teach Buddhism to ‘barbarians’ in other languages than Sanskrit? Can one really hope to understand Madhyamaka without knowing the Sanskrit language?

5. For some additional observations on MK 18.7 (n.266), see my paper ‘Laṅkāvatārasūtra in Early Indian Madhyamaka’, in Asiatische Studien 46/1 (1992), p.265, with n.33. For the term cittagocara, see Bhāvanākrama 35-36 (= Laṅkāvatāra 10.176-7). quoted ibid., p.271.

6. If a Mādhyamika normally follows the authority of laukika or śāstra (cf. Akutobhaya 81 bstan bocs dan ’jig rten dan rig byed las grags pa ’i phyir rab tu grub), provided it be reasonable, sopapattika, certain Buddhists are in conflict with the means of cognition when they claim that the mind and mental phenomena can occur without any external ālambana, or artha. — This leads to a debate between Candrakīrti and an opponent, such as
Dignāga (p.48/220). Unfortunately, Erb has partly confused the rôle of the two parts of the debate. The sentence beginning 'o na mo gšam gyi bu... šes smra (p.220) still belongs to the opponent. Candrakīrti answers 'di ni yod pa ma yin te (and Erb’s n.398 thus proves superfluous). — It is not true that it is the name of ‘something’ that creates an ālambana of vijñāna, for in that case the corresponding negation would, logically, not create such an ālambana. But, obviously, it does. — In the following section rnam par šes pa ‘di... Candrakīrti (not his opponent) argues that vijñāna can have abhāva as its object, and finally asks for the opponent’s definition of ālambana. But what do You think ālambana means (slar khyod kyi dmigs pa’i don ci zig yin)? The opponent’s definition of ālambana as transfer of an image is rejected, for how can something that does not exist transfer anything? If it could, how could we distinguish it from something that exists etc.? Here Erb’s n.401 should be deleted, and the text should stand as it is: de ’di dag ni ’gal la! — meaning that vijñāna is in internal conflict with its own content.

In n.407 the de ni should be retained. Candrakīrti explains that a given vijñāna is neither identical with its (empirical) ālambana, nor different. With the dmigs pa’i rnam pa las tha dad pa yan ma yin te it is still Candrakīrti speaking, not the opponent.

In n.409 the ‘dis should be retained. It refers to vijñāna.

In n.410 Erb wrongly inserts a negation — and contradicts himself with n.411.

In short, to function, vijñāna depends on a nīmitta. The (canonical) ideal of the sūnyatāvādin is that vijñāna becomes anīmitta, it must not even have nirvāṇa as its ālambana. This is expressed in the famous verse (n.421) by Aryadeva, who (in accordance with the Sālistambasūtra and Lankāvatārasūtra 10.8) identifies vijñāna as a biṣṇa of life in samsāra, and visaya as its gocara — just like MK 18.7.

The sentence ‘Es ist (nämlich) nicht so... (p.53/223: mu stegs...) is possibly a rhetorical question; so read: ‘ist es nicht so...’. The following ‘dir means ‘here (in Buddhism)’, as opposed to the case of the Tīrthikas just mentioned.

The paragraph that starts on p.56/225 (n.491) need not be directed against Bhavya — the opponent who does ‘not really understand the Madhyamakāśāstra’. A main point is that one cannot at the same time affirm and deny the svalaksana of the eye, though it is of course true that the eye exists in one sense and does not exist in another sense. In my opinion Candrakīrti is conducting a monologue with himself until the Vijnātivādin breaks in (p.57/226). — The emendation proposed in n.495 is not required. — On p.226 the sentence ‘di dag kho na bden par yod la, gzan ni rmo’ns pa’o is a common canonical quotation. The entire paragraph must be read in the light of Bhavya’s extensive discussion of svabhāvatraya in Madhyamakahrdaya/Tarkajvala, Chapter 5.

8. The first paragraph on p.67/233 is an echo of Sālistambasūtra (likewise on pp.68 and 71), and Erb’s deletion of the dam in n.654 is unwarranted (avīḍyā and biṣṇa serve as the internal and external hetu etc.). — In the following paragraph, which ends with rnam par grol lo (!), Candrakīrti’s argument is an echo of passages such as Acintyastava 19-20 (cf. The Adyar Library Bulletin 56 (1992), p.198), Lankāvatārasūtra 3.36. The opponent’s question begins with the jī litar na. How can we understand that all things are empty if we cannot experience it?

9. On p.82 Erb has problems (n.822) with the meaning of thags kyi yon tan gyi mthshan ŋid pas (p.244). It has, however, nothing to do with something (what?) that ‘durch die Eigenschaften der Fäden (tantuguna) charakterisiert ist (mthshan ŋid pas)’. Apart from the fact that the pa(s) in mthshan ŋid pas is not accounted for, the yon tan gyi must no doubt be construed with the following word. Candrakīrti is thus speaking of the guna- (or gaul-n)-laksanā, a metaphorical locution, in other words he is using a common Sanskrit expression corresponding to the Buddhist upādāya (prajñapti). — On p.82, read ne bar brten nas for ne bar brten pas (cf. p.244).

10. In n.838 Erb speculates about the gan gi phyir (p.243), suggesting various emendations. However, the most simple solution is to keep the text as it stands and construe the gan gi phyir with the de yan in the next line: That from which these... are said, that, too, is not born, yataḥ/yasmat... tad api...

II. On p.85 I find that Erb takes too much liberty with the text
which reads gaṅ gi tshе sems la yan rten cin 'brel par byun ba du ma mi srid pa de'i phyir. It makes good sense as it stands: Since, moreover, many (moments of mind) do not arise depending on one (moment of) mind, therefore... In itself this is a final additional argument, briefly stated, as is the example.

12. On p.87 (n.870) Erb finds no demonstrative pronoun corresponding to the gaṅ gi tshе (p.247). However, the equivalent pronoun is to be found in the de'i tshе. This again means that only one party in the debate (where Erb's assignment of rôles is not entirely convincing) is here speaking.

13. Candarkirti ends by saying that ātīmabhāva only exists to the extent that laukikadarśana is taken as pramāṇa (p.102/259). In order to enlighten common people it is necessary to use and take certain concepts for granted without further analysis. The technical term is dpyad na ma grub, which may be avicāra-siddha (ma brtags par 'na grub pa) in Pras. pp.67 and 172. Other synonyms are avicāraikaramaniyā, avicāramanohara, etc., see my note in Journal of Indian Philosophy 9 (1981), p.196. This means that one must know personally how things really are, but there is no need to dispute what common people normally consider true or false. The assignment of rôles is to be understood accordingly.

In the original Sanskrit, we may assume, Candarkirti's commentary was not easy reading; in the Tibetan version, we may be sure, it was even less so. It is, therefore, only natural that in spite of the careful work done by Erb, many problems still remain to be recognised as such, and to be solved, or at least discussed. Experience shows that difficult texts such as this have to go through several critical editions before becoming final.

The fundamental work has been done by Erb and all scholars of Madhyamaka should be grateful to him for all the efforts he, for many years, has put into the study of one of Nāgārjuna's minor but authentic works, and its commentaries.

Chr. Lindtner


This is a translation from the Chinese of the final chapter of Aryadeva's magnum opus, with the commentary of Dharmapāla. The historical importance of this document lies in the fact that it presents the Yogācāra position as opposed to that of Madhyamaka. The bone of contention is the proper interpretation of a fundamental concept of Mahāyāna shared by both parties in the debate, viz. prajñāpāramitā.

Dharmapāla's main opponent was Bhāvya (rather than Bhāvaviveka), but the nature of the extant source materials makes it very difficult to determine their mutual relationship with the philological precision required for a sound grasp of the philosophical arguments exchanged. It is impossible to read Dharmapāla without also consulting Bhāvya's Prajñāpradīpa and Tarkajyālā, etc. Likewise it is impossible to read Bhāvya without also reading Asaṅga, Dignāga, etc. In other words, these documents were written by and for insiders. The ancient readership - mainly learned Buddhist monks in India - was assumed to have a background knowledge of arguments, texts and personalities etc. that are often no more than names to us. Much has been lost, and what has survived is often of a fragmentary nature.

One must be aware of these difficulties to excuse the shortcomings that must inevitably characterize pioneer translations of abstruse texts such as the chapter here translated from Hsūan-tsang's free Chinese version of the now lost original(s).

That there was a dispute between Bhāvya and Dharmapāla can hardly be doubted. However, there is not a single direct reference to Bhāvya's name or works in the text here translated. But there are many allusions and quotations in common.

Dharmapāla concedes that all things are empty. He also accepts the distinctions between the two truths. He argues on the basis of āgama as well as yuktī. There is no trace of any influence from Dharmakīrti, though his commentary on Dignāga's Alambanaparīkṣā suggests that he may have known him (as did Bhāvya, in his Ratnapradīpa).

The Kāśyapaparīvarta is one of Dharmapāla's main auth-
orities, as it is the authority for Nāgārjuna, Bhavya and Candrapāla. He, too, is concerned with the madhyāmā pratiṣṭhā between the extremes of astī and nāstī. Reality, the absolute truth, is non-dual (advaya), as in Madhyamaka. It is ineffable, as opposed to the superficial truth that can be articulated. ‘Because the being of reality is nonexistent, we talk about the nonbeing of reality’, he says in words that seem to be an echo of a passage in Bhavya’s Tarkajñāla. Most of Dharmapāla’s quotations from scriptures are also found in the Tarkajñāla, showing the close relationship between the two texts. The real is simply the absence of the unreal. The reality of unreality is real. So reality is not separate from the unreal.

While the commentary on the first twenty-two verses with a few exceptions could have been written by a Madhyamika, Dharmapāla’s proper Yogācāra position is given in the commentary on the final three verses (23-25).

Āryadeva’s ‘unreal imagining’ in 23 is now identified with the abhūta-parikalpa of Madhyāntavibhāga, which again is identified with the paratantravabhāva. Dharmapāla’s position shows the influence of Dignāga when he claims that paratantravabhāva is a real vacamātra that can be the direct object of pratyakṣajñāna. As such it exists. What the dispute between the two schools of Mahāyāna is fundamentally about, then, is whether paratantravabhāva exists or does not exist.

The Aksayamatinirdeśa makes a distinction between texts that should be taken literally (nītartha) and texts that have a deeper intention (neyārtha). Here our authors find the Buddha’s own admission that there is room for different interpretations of the scriptures.

The best framing hypothesis for future work is probably this: Dharmapāla’s commentary was written after Bhavya’s Tarkajñāla. Later on Bhavya wrote the appendix to Prajñāpradīpa XXV, restating his position, referring to the same canonical sources mentioned also by Dharmapāla. All these texts were known to Candrakīrti, who also wrote a new commentary, orthodox Madhyamaka, to Āryadeva’s Catuḥṣataka. Candrakīrti mentions Dharmapāla’s name and criticises him for his rashness. Finally, Bhavya wrote the Ratnapradīpa, which mentions Candrapāla and Dharmakīrti, but not Dharmapāla. After Dharmapāla no Yogācāra author is known to have dared publish a commentary on a fundamental Madhyamaka treatise. The final synthesis is made by Sāntarakṣita, the student of Jñānagarbha. Here (in his Madhyamakālaṃkāra etc.) Yogācāra has been included in Madhyamaka, not vice versa.

There are still numerous minor problems in the translation of Dharmapāla’s commentary. John P. Keenan, however, deserves our gratitude for the undaunted step that he has taken. Keeping in mind the difficulty involved one is even prepared to excuse the otherwise incredibly large number of misprints and wrong spellings, especially of Sanskrit words.

Chr. Lindtner


How do we know nothing? Is it through perception, inference or through some other means of cognition that we know that something in some way does not exist? Or is negative cognition a means of knowledge in its own right? About this question, and its many implications, there were different opinions among the classical Indian philosophers.

The great Mīmāṃsaka philosopher Kumārila was of the opinion that negation (abhāva) was a pramāṇa in its own right. His position is expressed in his Śloka-vārtika as follows: ‘In the case of an object where the aforesaid five means of knowledge do not function towards the comprehension of the existence of that object, we have Negation as the sole means of cognition. The ascertainment of the non-contact (non-existence) of an object depends upon the validity of this (negation) as a means of cognition’. He then goes on to state what he means when saying that the object of negative knowledge does not exist (still in the translation of Ganganāth Jha): The non-existence of curd in milk is called “Prior Negation” (prāgabhāva) (1); the non-existence of
milk in the curd is called "Destruction" (dhvamsa) (2); the negation of the horse, etc., in the cow and vice versa is known as 'Mutual Negation' (anyonyabhava) (3); the lower portions of the hare's head, being devoid of hardness and a supernumerary growth in the form of horns, is called "Absolute Negation" (atyanabhava) (4).

Since the Baudhas who, beginning with Dignaga (who was attacked by Kumara), normally recognized only two means of valid cognition, viz. perception and inference, one would — considering the great importance and influence of Kumara — expect them to devote some space to the refutation of his position on abhavapramana. The first Buddhist text to do so in an extensive way is Santarakshita's (ca. 725-88) Tattvasamgraha (vv. 1647-90) with the commentary of Kamalastra (ca. 740-95).

Thanks to the wonderful energy of Ganganath Jha, complete English translations of the great works mentioned above have already been long available. His translation of Kumara was reprinted in India 1983, and that of Santarakshita and his student in 1986. The Sanskrit texts are also easily available in several editions. No library of Indian philosophy is complete without these magnificent works on its shelves.

Birgit Kellner's translation is the first to appear in the German language. Apart from the translation with philosophical notes (pp. 1-42), it contains a study of the history of 'negative cognition' in the broader context of Indian philosophy.

One of the first Buddhist philosophers to criticize Kumara was Dharmakirti. This author is known for his theory of three logical reasons, the third of which, the anupalabdhihetu, serves to establish a negation. On the whole Santarakshita and Kamalastra follow Dharmakirti, but there are still several historical and chronological details that are obscure. In particular, there is reason to regret the present abhava of some of the lesser works of Kumara and Dharmakirti. The relative chronology not just of the authors but also of their works here involved is still largely uncertain.

In a rather loose way, I still think we can consider Kumara and Dharmakirti to have been 'contemporaries' (cf. my remarks in Acta Orientalia 41 (1980), pp. 27-37, and The Adyar Library Bulletin 56 (1992), pp. 56-62). Dharmakirti's date, in my opinion, is ca. 530-600 which, naturally, makes it impossible for me to accept ca. 580-650 for Kumara (Schmithansen, quoted by Kellner, p. 64, n. 99).

A new piece of evidence in support of my previous assumptions is now provided by the fact that Bhavya (ca. 500-70) in his Madhyamakahrdaya seems to have known and been influenced by Kumara in several respects. In Chapter Ten, Maimaattvamvara-virnayavatara (ed. in Studia Indologiczne 4 (1997) pp. 91-123), v. 15 ab quotes the Maimaaka as follows: na caasti kacit sarvajna nedanim darsyate yatah / This is most likely from one of the lost works of Kumara, or from his Slovakavarta, Codanasiiram 117 ab: sarvajna darsyate tavam nedanim asmadadibhibhah.

Bhavya's Madhyamakahrdaya-Tarkaivala also contains much material on abhava that should be taken into consideration when one wants to write the history of 'negative cognition' in Indian philosophy. Kellner's little nice book is a fine contribution to this important topic. It is also valuable in the sense that it shows how much research is still required before we can form any final conclusions even on such a fairly limited issue as abhavapramana.

This is, of course, only a first step. More research is needed to clarify the exact status of these texts and to establish their precise influence on later Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophers. It is clear, however, that the works of Kumara and Dharmakirti, as translated and interpreted by Ganganath Jha, are essential reading for anyone interested in the history of Indian philosophy.


In 1991, the great Belgian-born Buddhistologist, Hubert Durt, commenting on several of Gregory Schopen's 'recent eye-opening publications', expressed the hope to see them 'collected one day as a brilliant synthesis in a book form' (see H. Durt, 'Bodhisattva and Layman in the Early Mahayana', Japanese Religious 16, p. 5). This, perhaps is not exactly the volume that Durt envisaged (he was probably thinking more of a new work than an anthology of articles), but it represents a step in that direction. The twelve papers in this book originally appeared in different scholarly journals between 1984 and 1992. Many of them will already have been read and used by readers of this journal, but they deserve to be reread and reconsidered together as a collected set of articles.
that form a remarkably coherent whole. From the opening sentence of Chapter I ('The way in which the history of Indian Buddhism has been studied by modern scholars is decidedly peculiar... [p.11]), to the final words of Chapter XII ('Indian Buddhism is very much more than the sum of its śāstras' [p.278]), Schopen presents materials, insights and interpretations that consistently reinforce one another, that repeatedly come at some of the same themes from different angles and that, taken together, should serve to transform the ways in which we view and do Indian Buddhist studies.

To my mind Schopen's work is unquestionably the freshest, most exciting scholarship to have emerged in the field in half a century. He is amazingly prolific, unfailingly interesting, enriching, edifying and, more often than not, completely convincing. He is one of that rare breed of scholars who can view texts and traditions in at least three ways at once: (1) microscopically from close up (he is a nitty-gritty philologist who insists on meticulous readings of inscriptions and texts, who is acutely aware of problems of dating and the importance of 'place' in determining the meaning of words); (2) telescopically from a distance (he knows what to focus on, how to isolate the interesting); and (3) through a wide angle lens (he can 'zoom' back from his focal point to show how it fits into a greater picture, an overall context).

This greater picture, it should be added, is often rather different from that portrayed by other scholars. Schopen is unapologetically iconoclastic; in a sense, he seeks to do for Buddhist studies what Marx did to Hegel: to stand it on its head. He is a man with an agenda, who takes nothing for granted. He questions many of the too-easily assumed theoretical and methodological 'received ideas' of the field and he does not hesitate to counter (sometimes rather stingly) the specific conclusions of other scholars, both living and dead. This gives his work the impression of radicalness, but it is a radicalness without recklessness; Schopen is bold, but he is also cautious, and he knows where he is going. He seeks not only to tear down, but to build up, and he is usually right about both.

In order to give some idea of the contents and thrust of the book under review, I want to start by giving a chapter by chapter summary of the volume, although this can hardly do justice to the richness of the material. It should be pointed out preliminarily, however, that this anthology by no means represents all of Schopen's scholarship. None of his important contributions on the rise of the Mahāyāna, for instance, are included here, since (according to the preface) they are being reserved for a separate volume. Thus readers will not find here any of Schopen's work on Amitābha and the Pure Land in India, nor his studies of the Mahāyāna in Indian inscriptions, nor what is perhaps his often cited article, 'The Phrase 'sa prthivipradesaś caityabhūto bhavet' in the Vajracchedikā: Notes on the Cult of the Book in Mahāyāna' (Indo-Iranian Journal 17 (1975), pp.147-81). Nor does the volume contain any of his editions and translations of texts, or any of the many pieces he has published on death, funerals, relics, and the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya, since 1992.

Chapter I, 'Archaeology and Protestant Presuppositions in the Study of Indian Buddhism' (1991), forms an appropriate introduction to the book. It is basically an exploration of some of the Orientalist (and Protestant) presuppositions in the study of Indian Buddhism, showing how for most scholars 'textuality' has been overridden 'actuality' and epigraphical and archaeological remains that can tell us about that 'actuality' have largely been ignored. This amounts to a call for what Schopen has described in another chapter as 'an archaeology of religions', a study of Buddhism 'on the ground'. In this enterprise, the focus would be primarily on 'religious constructions and architectures, inscriptions, and art historical remains'. Texts would be used, 'but only those that could be shown to have been actually known or read at a given place at a given time...'. The concern would not be 'with what small, literate, almost exclusively male and certainly atypical professionalized subgroups wrote, but rather, with what religious people of all segments of a given community actually did and how they lived' (p.114).

Chapter II, 'Two Problems in the History of Indian Buddhism... (1985), uses the epigraphical record to show that certain basic assumptions commonly made by textual Buddhismologists about the distinction between lay persons and monastics in ancient and
mediaeval India simply do not hold. The monks and nuns of the inscriptions were rather different from the renunciants often portrayed in texts. They took the lead in participating fully in all the merit-making activities that are sometimes thought to be reserved for the laity: dāna, the stūpa cult, the transfer of merit. Here we find the emergence of one of Schopen’s principal themes: that monasticism in India shared many of the preoccupations of lay persons, and acted much more like them than is commonly thought.

Chapter III, ‘Filial Piety and the Monk in the Practice of Indian Buddhism: A Question of ‘Sinicization’ Viewed from the Other Side’ (1984), furthers this theme by showing how monastics also were very concerned about the health and post-mortem well being of their parents and took steps to ensure this. More specifically, Schopen uses the Indian epigraphic record to demonstrate that Buddhists in India were as preoccupied with this question as were Buddhists in East Asia, so that the whole question of the ‘transformation’ of Buddhism in China in its attempt to ‘accommodate’ Confucian notions of filial piety needs to be revisited. The point is an important one that Sinologists should take note of, and it is no accident that Schopen chose to publish the original article in the Chinese studies journal, T’oung-pao. Coincidentally, I tried to demonstrate the same thing, on the basis of Buddhist popular texts, at about the same time, but blissfully and blamefully failing to make use of the inscriptive material (see J. Strong, ‘Filial Piety and Buddhism: The Indian Antecedents to a “Chinese Problem”’ in Traditions in Contact and Change [Wilfrid Laurier University Press 1983]).

Chapter IV, ‘The Ritual Obligation and Donor Roles of Monks in the Pali Vinaya’ (1992), uses Vinaya texts to flesh out hints found in inscriptions and to show that the common assumption of scholars in the field that monks in India had ‘little or no role’ in the life-cycle ceremonies of the laity (birth, marriage, house-construction, sickness, death), as well as in ceremonial rites of passage of other kinds, of fellow monks, is clearly false.

Chapter V, ‘The Stūpa Cult and the Extant Pali Vinaya’ (1989), also focuses on the Theravāda Vinaya but uses as its point of departure the apparent absence of any inclusion in that Vinaya of rules and regulations for monks governing the construction of stūpas. This ‘absence’ has sometimes been taken by scholars as an indication that monks were not or should not be involved in the stūpa cult, but Schopen explores the variety of other texts that give or assume monastic rules for the building of stūpas and shows this conclusion to be unfounded. At the same time, he speculates (a bit needlessly, and perhaps recklessly, at least according to some of his critics) that such rules may have formerly been included in the Pāli Vinaya, though they are absent from it today.

Chapter VI, ‘Monks and the Relic Cult in the Mahāpari-nibbāna-sutta’ (1991), rereads the well-known sutta passage that is often taken as an injunction by the Buddha to his disciples not to preoccupy themselves with the cult of his relics after his death. Schopen here convincingly shows how this is a misreading of the text, specifically a misunderstanding of the term sarīra-pūjā, which here is taken to signify the preparation of the body prior to cremation. More problematically, he also shows that the Buddha’s interdiction was meant to apply only to the Buddha’s disciple Ānanda and not to the monks as a whole. This may well be true, but it seems to me that the context and full implications of this assertion need to be spelled out further. The point allows for a monk such as Mahākāśyapa later in the story to carry out the worship of the Buddha’s body prior to his cremation, but in the process the participation of the laity (the Mallas) in the Buddha’s funeral preparations seems to be given short shrift.

Chapter VII, ‘Burial AdSanctos and the Physical Presence of the Buddha in Early Indian Buddhism’ (1987), brilliantly examines the placement of the so-called ‘votive’ stūpas at various Buddhist archaeological sites, showing how these were actually mortuary monuments that clustered around the main reliquary stūpa in which the Buddha, or the saint, was thought to be ‘present’. This pattern is likened to that found in mediaeval cathedrals in the West where the tombs cluster around the altar or the apse of the church wherein are enshrined the relics of the saints. Here Schopen shows himself capable of using comparative material from the Christian Middle Ages (something he does with caution..."
and much wisdom) to elucidate previously unnoticed phenomena in Indian Buddhism.

Chapter VIII, 'On the Buddha and his Bones. . .' (1988), reinterprets a particular inscription at the site of Nāgārjunikonda, showing how (and why) it had been previously misunderstood as somehow reflecting Mahāyānist views (which Schopen denies are there). In so doing, he demonstrates how the Buddha was thought to be present in the relic chamber, thereby reinforcing the notion that 'the relic and the living Buddha do not appear to have been thought of as separate things' (p.154).

Chapter IX, 'An Old Inscription from Amārāvati and the Cult of the Local Monastic Dead. . .' (1991), similarly uses a single inscription as a point of departure for a fascinating, thorough and multi-faceted investigation of the topic of the burial of monks, whose remains and whose stupas are shown to have been treated in ways analogous to those of the Buddha. This article, the longest in the book, is perhaps paradigmatic of Schopen's work and style in general, and well worth reading for its richness. It is a piece of considerable complexity, combining the revelation of new patterns, the reordering in a much more convincing manner of a particular inscription, the critique of trends in the field, the resolution of philological and palaeographic problems, excursi that are fascinating essays in themselves yet always circle back to the main theme, discursive footnotes with rich bibliographies, all done and unfolded as though it were a detective story.

Chapter X, 'On Avoiding Ghosts and Social Censure. . .' (1992), tackles the question of monastic funerals, specifically as they are dealt with in the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya. Contrary to the claims of some that monks had nothing to do with the funerals of fellow monks but left that to the laity, Schopen manages to demonstrate how this was an important monastic pre-occupation. He delineates the various ritual stages of a typical monastic funeral and shows how it was related to issues such as the inheritance of the property of the deceased monastic. All of this helps him illustrate ways in which Buddhist monks were sensitive to brahmanical preoccupations with death and its impurity.

Chapter XI, 'On Monks, Nuns, and "Vulgar" Practices. . .' (1988-9), uses the epigraphical record to investigate the very beginnings of the appearance of images in Indian Buddhism. Schopen shows how, contrary to the common assumption that Buddha images were 'accepted' by the monastic élite only as a result of the demands and needs of 'the people', Buddhist monks and nuns actually took the lead in first sponsoring and setting up images. He then moves on to look at a change that took place in the fourth-sixth centuries, the emergence of 'a new kind of monk' (the Mahāyānist śākyabhikṣu) whose appearance curiously coincided with the disappearance of nun donors. The full implications of this are not spelled out, but the hint is there that the 'received tradition's' view that Mahāyānist and proto-Mahāyānist forces were responsible for a betterment of the position of women in Buddhism may need to be re-examined.

Finally, in Chapter XII, 'The Buddha as Owner of Property and Permanent Resident in Medieval Indian Monasteries' (1990), Schopen shows clearly how the Buddha, even though he was dead, was thought to inhabit certain parts of the monastery (e.g. the 'perfumed chamber') and to have legal rights over them and over certain goods and donations associated with them and their upkeep.

Enough has been said to suggest that, running through all of these chapters, there are a number of important recurrent themes. I have mentioned some of these, and there are others, both substantively specific ones (e.g. that parts of the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya may be older than is commonly thought), and more generally methodological ones (e.g. that it is wrong to accept the general practice of assuming that what is common to various sectarian versions of the same text is the oldest part — the Ur-text — while what is anomalous is a 'late addition'). In conclusion, however, I would like to turn to focus on a few points of a somewhat different nature and use them to raise some questions I have about Schopen's work in general as well as to express some desiderata.

Taken as a whole, this book contributes to an important and needed blurring of some of the distinctions that have often been assumed or asserted in the study of Indian Buddhism. These distinctions include such things as the demarcations between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, between Buddha and relic, between
Buddhism and its brahmanical context, to some extent between monk and nun, and even Buddhism in India and Buddhism in
China. But most obviously the chief distinction that is blurred
here is that between monastics and lay persons. Indeed, through-
out much of this work, as Schopen himself puts it, 'a picture of
the actual Indian Buddhist monk and nun is gradually emerging;
he and she differ markedly from the ideal monk and nun who
have been presented on the basis of textual material alone.
The actual monk, for example, unlike the textual monk, appears
to have been deeply involved in religious giving and cult practice
of every kind from the very beginning. He is preoccupied not with
Nirvāṇa but, above all else, with what appears to have been a
strongly felt obligation to his parents, whether living or dead. He
is concerned as well, for example, with the health of his
companions and teachers...'
(p.252).

One question that immediately surfaces in my mind from a
reading of this passage is: 'what about the laity?' Schopen's focus,
as the very title of his book implies, is on the monastics and in
presenting a much more realistic, down-to-earth and non-élitist
portrait of their rôle in Indian Buddhism. It would be ironic if,
after all this, these monks (not to mention the stones and bones)
somewhere still managed to eclipse the laity. My first desideratum,
then, would be for more attention to be paid to what the in-
scriptions say about the average layman and laywoman. One of
the significant and praiseworthy thrusts of Schopen's work is to
suggest that monks are more like laymen than we thought; a
parallel investigation of what the inscriptions tell us about actual
lay persons might, it seems to me, complementarily reveal that
the lay persons are more like monastics than we thought. If
distinctions are blurred they need to be blurred from both ends.

Secondly, much of what Schopen concludes about monastics
in Buddhist India has, of course, also been pointed out by
anthropologists who study 'actual monks' in South and South-east
Asia. And this leads me to another question, on which concerns
the relationship between epigraphy and anthropology. It is
impossible to do field work in ancient and mediaeval India, so
Schopen turns to lithic sources, but his motivation in doing so is
rather similar to that of anthropologists who want to understand
the actuality of a culture or religion as it is practised. I am not
suggesting, of course, that the contemporary practice of Buddhism
in present-day societies should be used as a guide to under-
standing its practice in ancient India — there are real dangers
with such an assumption and Schopen is well aware of them —
but I do think that, at times, there can be illuminative parallels.
For instance, in doing field work some years ago in Northern
Thailand, one of the routine things that my research assistant
would determine (this was a habit of his) was the statistical
question of 'how many donations [at a given festival] were made
to the Buddha,' and 'how many to the monks,' for such con-
tributions are made at different places, for different purposes
and are disposed of differently. Much the same thing is
emphasised, without contemporary reference, in Schopen's chapter
on the Buddha as an owner of property in mediaeval Indian
monasteries, but how metaphoric is this notion of ownership?
Schopen seems to take it quite literally, and yet it is clear in
Thailand (as I think it probably was also in mediaeval India) that
what the laity have designated as the 'Buddha's share' will not
actually be disposed of by the parinirvanised Buddha but by the
monks to use for the purpose of devotions to that Buddha,
including the maintenance and upkeep of parts of the monastery
that are 'his'. In other words, 'the Buddha' is not so much the
'owner' of this property as he is the monastic 'budget line' for
income and expenditures.

It may be, of course, that ultimately there is not much differ-
cence between viewing the Buddha as 'owner' and the Buddha as
'budget line', but it seems to me that there is, in the former meta-
phor, more personification and hence more reinforcement of the
notion that the absent Buddha is nonetheless a 'living presence'
or 'present in his relics'. This sort of slippage, however, needs further
investigation and reflection. As sympathetic as I am to assertions
of this kind — that a relic or a stūpa or an image 'is' the Buddha,
or is the Buddha, or is 'the Buddha' — I do not know how to take
all those quotation marks and italics. I worry at times that late
twentieth century Buddhologists studying relics and images and
stūpas may be sliding too easily into old Lévy-Bruhlian notions of
'participation mystique', without addressing some of what
Jonathan Z. Smith has called the 'thorny methodological questions' that they raise (see his 'I am a Parrot (Red)', History of Religions 11 [1972], p.393). I would very much like to see Schopen address these issues, perhaps in the same context of Orientalism that he so nicely presents in his first chapter.

I would also like to see him reflect more on the relationship of 'contemporaneity to actuality', on the apparent assumption that a fairly literal reading of inscriptions indeed reflects 'what religious people of all segments of a given community actually did and how they lived' (p.114). The great attraction of inscriptions seems to be that they are often datable and locatable (as texts often are not) and so they give us a contemporaneous picture of what particular individuals did at a specific place and time. But, of course, there are dangers in that assumption. I would suggest, therefore (and there is nothing new in this), that just as anthropology has much reflected on the methods and theory of field work — on the perspectives it opens up as well as on the blinders it imposes — there needs to be a similar systematic reflection on the methods, perspectives and potential biases of epigraphy, especially in the context of Indian Buddhism. Do these inscriptions always reflect the actualities of their time and place? In what ways do they do so? Why were they written? Were they meant to be read? Who read them? What stories do they tell? Were they meant to be taken literally? What is the relationship between stereotypical formulae and individual feelings and thoughts? etc. Schopen occasionally touches on these questions, but he could raise them more systematically, for, of all the people working in the field, he is best situated and qualified to provide us with the answers.

Finally, with all of this in mind, I would like to express one last desideratum by returning to Hubert Durt's wish mentioned at the beginning of this review. Many of the articles in Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks are important, significant works in their own right. Read together, I have suggested, their significance increases. But still, there is something about them that remains... and here I am searching for a word... titillating. Durt was right; what is needed is 'a brilliant synthesis in book form', something that would be equally stimulating but that would draw together all the threads in a sustained presentation of 'Indian Buddhism As It Was'. Greg Schopen may or may not write this book, but he certainly could and many think he should.

John Strong


In the introductory remarks to this tenth fascicle of the Göttinger Sanskrit Dictionary, the general editor and the redactor state that with the beginning of the letter kha (p.153 ff.) L. de La Vallée Poussin's edition of 'Nouveaux fragments de la Collection Stein' (Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland (1913), pp.843-55) will no longer be lexicographically exploited because in style and language the text — rather to be considered pieces of religious lyrics — considerably deviates from the other sources serving as a textual basis for SWTF. On the other hand, on p.11 a list of eight works is given, including editions/re-editions to be used as additional lexicographical material for the dictionary, comprising, for example, J.-U. Hartmann, D. Maue. 'Die indisch-türkische Bilingue TT VIII G'; in: R.E. Emmerick, W. Sundermann, I. Warnke, P. Zieme (eds), Turfan, Khotan und Dunhuang, Vorträge der Tagung "Annamarie von Gabain und die Turfanforschung", Berlin 1996, pp.147-63. To J.-U. Hartmann is due another edition of new fragments belonging to the so-called 'Yoga Manual': 'Neue Fragmente aus dem "Yogalehrbuch", in: F. Wilhelm (ed.), Festschrift Dieter Schlingloff, Reinbeck 1996, pp. 127-35. Since D. Schlingllof's Ein buddhistisches Yogalehrbuch (Berlin 1964, 66) is drawn upon for compiling the dictionary, one wonders why Hartmann's new fragments have not yet been listed among the source materials; they will be, as the redactor asserts, in the next SWTF fascicle in...
In respect of usefulness and scientific value, to the present fascicle also applies what has been said about the ninth fascicle of SWTF (cf. BSR 14, 2 (1997), p.191). The enhancement of information and knowledge already available can, for instance, be demonstrated by consulting the entry kṣānti on p.145. Whilst the Petersburg Dictionary gives only three renderings of kṣānti, ‘geduldiges Abwarten, Geduld, Nachsicht’, to which Monier Williams adds three more, viz. ‘endurance, indulgence, the state of saintly abstraction’, Edgerton concentrates on the specific meaning of the word as a technical term occurring in Buddhist Sanskrit works: kṣānti, ‘intellectual receptivity; the being ready in advance to accept knowledge’. In addition to the meanings provided in the Petersburg Dictionary and by Edgerton, SWTF adds one more special meaning of kṣānti, viz. ‘das Gefallenfinden, Gefallenhaben an’, being a quasi-synonym of māti, ruci, drṣṭi, as L. Schmithausen points out. The PTS Dictionary also refers to the quasi-synonymous diṭṭhi and ruci without, however, giving the additional meaning of khanṭi/khanṭi. (Cf. A.P. Buddhodatta who, in his Concise Pāli-English Dictionary, Colombo 1957, inter alia, has for khanṭi ‘wish’, being synonymous with ruci, ‘liking’.) It may not be redundant to refer, in this context, to an interesting quotation from the Arthavargiya, found in Asanga’s Bodhisattvabhumi (N. Dutt ed., p.33):

anupago hy asau kena upādaddita
dṛṣṭaśruta kāntim asamprakurvan /
These verses parallel Sutramāța 897cd:
anupayo so upayam kim eyya
dūthe sute khanṭim akumbamāna /

There is only one printing error in this reviewer has come across: on p.125 the names of the four companions of Devadatta are mentioned in a dvandva-compound: Kokālikā-Khandad[da]r[ī]t[va]-Kaṭāmoraka tisyaamudradatta; the two latter names read correctly, as shown in the following lines, . . . Kaṭāmorakaṭisyata-Samudradatta.

On p.102 a compound is given which, taken from the Yogalehrbuch, refers to a yogin’s visualisations: kāṭagārā-vasṭabha, am svam aśrayaṃ paśyati is rendered by the editor of the manual and cited here as ‘Ließe [der Yogi] seine eigene Gestalt von Tempeln ersättt’ (‘the [yogin] sees his own figure stiffened/benumed by temples’). Since this Central Asian yoga manual aims at providing practical instructions on how to meditate and since bodily and mental numbness and torpidity are something to be avoided or got rid of, according to the context, as far as can be made out, the present reviewer does not think the rendering ‘von Tempeln ersättt’ a felicitous one. (This point will have to be dealt with in some detail on another occasion.) The alternative renderings under this entry, ‘in Tempeln eingeschlossen; von Tempeln unähnlt’ (other possible translations would be ‘supported by/resting on temples’) are borne out by the gloss on a similar entry (avasṭabhaḥ) found in BHSD, p.76.

Bhikkhu Pāsādika


Considering the enormous contribution of German philologists to all fields of Indology, including Buddhology (or Buddhist studies), it is quite amazing, but nevertheless true, that this is the first comprehensive Pāli-German dictionary ever to appear.

Prof. Mylius has had the broadest possible readership in mind when compiling this handy dictionary: its main purpose is to provide the lexical basis for an understanding of the Pāli Canon. It should be of use not just to Indologists but also to historians, ethnologists, historians of religion, etc. Of course, there is no intention to replace the indispensable dictionaries (CPD, PED, Andersen’s Glossary, etc.) on which it is largely based. As the experienced author of a Wörterbuch Sanskrit-Deutsch and Wörterbuch Deutsch-Sanskrit, Mylius is well aware of all the usual problems that an editor of such a dictionary has to face, and it would be tedious to mention these in a brief review. His
book is intended to be practical, and it is from this perspective that it should be judged for its merits. It would, obviously, be unfair to criticise the author for not giving references to the sources, for not indicating whether a certain word is common usage or not, for not informing the reader that a certain term only occurs in certain contexts, etc. Yet these are matters that the reader must always keep in mind can be misleading. Take, for example, the word tattato, an adverb corresponding to the Sanskrit tattvatas, meaning 1. wahrheitsgemäss, wirklich, or 2. genau, sorgfältig. Without checking the original source, the reader could easily form the impression that tattato is ‘good and standard Pāli’. But tattato only occurs twice in the Jātakas (according to PED) and is unknown in canonical usage. It must have been introduced from Sanskrit tattvatas at a fairly late date. Considering the importance of the concept of tattva in Sanskrit literature in general the uncritical user of the dictionary could easily form the wrong impression that tattva was also, at an early date, a fundamental Buddhist concept. That would be a serious error.

On the other hand, Mylius has saved the reader from nearly all such pitfalls by indicating when a given term is technical, in the sense that it belongs to zoology, law, grammar, etc. For all the references given in Sanskrit or even Vedic equivalents, the reader can only be grateful. The inclusion of a Sanskrit-Index (pp.378-438), enabling the reader also to check whether a given Sanskrit word has found its way into Pāli or not, is also, in my opinion, a very useful (and novel) addition to a Pāli dictionary.

The semantic problems of Pāli are still numerous and often quite complicated. If Mylius has committed any serious errors in this regard, they have at least escaped my attention so far. His translations, or interpretations, are generally admirably clear, natural and intelligent.

Ideally, a reviewer of a dictionary should probably withhold his final opinion until his daily usage has permitted him to become really familiar with the work of his colleague. But, for whatever it may be worth, my preliminary impression is clearly that this new dictionary of Pāli will prove very useful to the various groups of readers intended, and hopefully not just those whose native language is German. The dictionary is not merely useful for the study of Pāli texts but also to the extent that it clearly and implicitly, encourages its users constantly to check the original sources and the Sanskrit equivalents. As such it emphasises that Pāli and Buddhist studies are and should be part of Sanskrit and Indian studies in general.

In his Vorbemerkungen Mylius, in a general way, speaks of Buddhism as ‘one of the highest achievements of the human spirit’, and he also mentions that Buddhist studies have become increasingly significant in universities in the course of time. While I concur with his first remark, I have certain reservations with regard to the second. As far as I can see, the number of students and scholars who can actually read and understand a difficult Buddhist text in the original Oriental language is becoming smaller and smaller. The result is, inevitably, that Buddhist studies are becoming more and more superficial. It must be said very clearly that Buddhist studies can only be expected to thrive provided they are planted on the firm and broad ground of Indian philology in the traditional sense of that term. In many universities where Indian philology once flourished in this sense it simply no longer exists. This must be a cause of the greatest concern to all serious scholars.

Prof. Mylius’s dictionary may serve as an excellent patipakkha against some of these unfortunate modern developments.  


Bernard Faure’s Ph.D study of the Northern school, originally published in French under the two titles of La volonté d’orthodoxie dans le bouddhisme chinois (Editions du CNRS, Paris 1988) and Le bouddhisme Ch’an en mal d’histoire (École Française d’Extrême-Orient, Paris 1989), has finally made its revised and abridged English language debut. Although this is not the only book to cover the oft maligned Northern school of early Chan — consider John McRae’s revealing and complementary The
Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch'\an Buddhism (Hawaii 1986) — its presentation of the material is especially innovative because it incorporates social, historical, cultural, as well as non-Buddhist religious concerns. Faure develops his study by primarily examining several figureheads in the Dongshan (East Mountain) lineage, including Shenxiu (606-706) and Jingjue (683-750?), problematising the lineage’s historical association with the Lankâvatâraśatrâ, and finally, interrogating the school’s historical legacy as the ‘gradual’ component within early Chan. While it is unfortunate that the thorough research presented in the earlier French incarnations of this project did not attain a wider audience, this English representation will, I am sure, become required reading for all students and scholars of East Asian Buddhism.

The book has an introduction, seven chapters and a conclusion. The short Introduction (pp.1-12) outlines the research using three categories: ‘The Birth of a Lineage’, ‘The Problem’ and ‘Meditation and Doctrine’. In the first, the patriarchate is described as having been shaped by two early Northern Chan ‘historics’, first made famous through the research of Yanagida Seizan. These include the Lengge shizi ji (Record of the Masters and Disciples of the Lankâvatâra [school]) and the Chuan fapao ji (Chronicle of the Transmission of the Dharma Jewel). The development of the Chan lineage continued through Shenhui’s (684-758) Ding shifei lun (Treatise Establishing the True and the False), Lidai fapao ji (Record of the Dharma Jewel through the Ages), the seminal Baolin zhuai (Chronicle of the Baolin [monastery]), until it reached its consummation in the Song denglu (Records of the Transmission of the Lamp) and yulu (Discourse Records). Faure maintains that this development, which eventually labelled the Northern school as ‘gradualist’, is not ascribable to specific personalities, but rather to decentralisation during the period following the An Lushan rebellion of 755. The second topic presents both the need to reconstruct the perspective of the Northern school in the wake of Shenhui’s infamous accusations against Shenxiu at Huatai in 732, which have had lasting effects into this century, as well as reintroduce a plurality of mediaeval Chinese religious expression into the discussion of the development of the Chan lineage. The third theme outlines the means by which Faure works backwards from Japanese sectarian studies — which ultimately tend to legitimise only their own lines of transmission and practices — towards the critical point when syncretic, doctrinally inclusive tendencies in East Asian Buddhism gave way to exclusive, orthodox and heterodox characterisations, such as those of the Northern and Southern schools.

The core of the book is divided into three parts: the biography and thought of Shenxiu (Chapters 1 and 2); the development of the Northern school during and after Shenxiu’s eminent career (Chapters 3 and 4); and a survey of the relationship between the Lankâvatâra tradition and the Dongshan school (Chapter 6), a meticulous look at the Lengge shizi ji (Chapter 7) and its author (Chapter 5). The chapter on Shenxiu’s life remarkably juxtaposes the breadth of Buddhist canonical biographical and hagiographic materials against the inscriptions regarding Shenxiu found in the Quuntang wen (Complete Tang Prose) and his peculiarly lengthy biography in the Jiutang shu (Old Tang History) to present an image of Shenxiu as both politically astute, evinced through his relationship with Guangzhong aristocrats and Zhou dynasty literati such as Zhang Yue (667-730), as well as spiritually persuasive, verified by his position as guoshi (preceptor of state) under Empress Wu Zetian (r.690-705) and her sons Zhongzong (r.705-10) and Ruizong (r.10-21) (p.22). We learn that it was for Shenxiu that the practice of the court granting posthumous titles to eminent monks was initiated (p.24). The chapter on Shenxiu’s doctrinal background addresses the eclectic nature of Shenxiu’s thought with respect to the prominent trends of Huayan (pp.39-46), Tiantai (pp.38, 49-53), and Pure Land Buddhism (pp.53-8), as well as his conformity regarding the established practices of the Dongshan school including various ‘Contemplative Techniques’ (pp.58-67), the ‘One-Practice Samādhi’ (pp.67-9), Shouyi (‘Keeping the One’) (pp.70-2) and Zuochan (‘Seated Dhyanā’) (pp.72-4). Most notable in this chapter is the refutation of Shenxiu’s attribution within Korean Sŏn as a prominent Huayan master and commentator on the Avatamsakasūtra (pp.46-8).
In Faure's discussion of the Northern school after Shenxiu's death (Ch.3), he explores the nature of anti-Buddhist proscriptions and sympathetic Taoist policies under Emperor Xuanzong (r.712-55) (pp.76-84), competition between the monastic Northern school and rival schools (pp.84-93), as well as addressing the inception of the notion of the patriarchate under Shenxiu's disciple Puji (651-739) and the subsequent attacks against him by Shenhui (pp.93-100). Still, the especially syncretic nature of the post Shenxiu Northern school is perhaps best illustrated in Puji's famous disciple Yixing (683-727), who was both a Chan and Tantric practitioner, as well as close to Emperor Xuanzong (pp.78-9). Notably, Faure observes that Shenhui's fame and fortune — and conversely the Northern school's as well — were closely tied to the An Lushan rebellion because he helped to raise money for the imperial armies by selling monastic ordinances; a practice which eventually led to his instalment in the palace chapel in charge of religious observances under Emperor Suzong (r.756-62) (pp.90). Furthermore, in order to build the case against dismissing the Northern school's standing too prematurely, Faure points out, 'In 758, the year of Shenhui's death, Wang Wei compiled an address to the throne, on behalf of the ācārya (teacher) Shun, to thank Emperor Suzong for writing horizontal inscriptions of the stūpa of the masters Datong (Shenxiu) and Dazhao (Puji) at Songyu on Song shan' (p.91). Additionally, many of the most influential monks of post An Lushang Tang China — after the rise and fall of Shenhui and his Heze school — still claimed religious affiliation with the Northern school, including the monk Zhen from Fushousi who was admired by another famous Tang poet, Bai Juyi (p.92). Faure furthermore maintains that the transition from early to classical Chan in fact passed directly from the Northern school to the real southern school, that of Mazu Daoyi (709-88), and that significant remnants of Northern school thinking can be distinguished in the writings of the classical Chan Fayan lineage — including Fayan Wenyi (885-958) and Yongming Yanshou (904-75) — as well as in Korean and Japanese Buddhism (p.93).

In the chapters on the doctrinal evolution of the Northern School (Ch.4), and on Jingjue (Ch.5), Faure addresses characteristic issues — such as the harmony between scholarship and practice — which symbolise early Chan and subsequently exhibit the Northern school's eclectic thinking. Faure skilfully guides the reader through the quite complex development of the Lankāvatāra lineage in the wake of Xuanzang's (596-661) return from India and his subsequent dismissal of older Yogācāra texts (pp.138 and 147). Specifically, regarding the privileging of Guṇabhadra (translator of the Lankāvatāra-sūtra in 443) as the first patriarch of the Chan lineage in China found in the Lengqi shizi ji, Faure asks the question 'does not Guṇabhadra, converted into a dhyāna master, better represent for Jingjue the ideal of religious practice uniting scholarship and contemplation than does the 'ascetic' Bodhidharma?' (p.141). The last two chapters reveal the desire by Jingjue to 'establish the orthodox patriarchal tradition of Chan through the transmission of the Lankāvatāra-sūtra', by annexing the prominence of the pre-established Lankāvatāra school (p.145), and generate a great context for the Lengqi shizi ji. Faure investigates Tibetan recensions of the text to show not only that there may in fact have existed several revisions by either Jingjue or his disciples (pp.168-73), but also describes several textual difficulties only gleaned by thorough research and a well trained eye.

While many books cultivated from dissertations are comparatively thorough, few display equivalent critical analysis as either Faure's revised English language edition or his previously published books in French. The book is splendidly produced, with a full bibliography, glossary and character list. Unfortunately, the bibliography does not have characters. There seems to be a few typos (although 'Zhuangzi' on p.15 should read 'Zhuangzi', the author of the Xu gaozhen zhu 'Daoxin' on p.27 should read 'Daoxuan', 'He'nan' province on pp.79 and 95 should read 'Henan', the Vajraśekhara-sūtra' on p.95 should read Vajraśekhara-sūtra', and 'Wei-shan Lingyou' on p.104 should read 'Guishan Lingyou'). Bernard Faure and Phyllis Brooks should be thanked for their decision to release this volume which reifies his superior scholarship.

George A. Keyworth

Despite the frequent but passing references to Buddhism that may be retrieved from the index, this book is self-evidently about something else, and is reviewed here on the assumption that those professionally engaged in the study of Buddhism may in some cases have to find out something about Confucianism also, or even, if needs must, teach something about it. On that basis it can be commended as a good historical survey of the development of the Confucian intellectual tradition, though those requiring an alternative to the historical approach may find its brisk chronological narrative frustrating. The scholarship it incorporates is right up to date, save for one or two very recent items (such as an important new study of the Analects of Confucius by E. Bruce and Taeko Brooks), so that at a stroke it replaces tired old textbooks such as Fung Yulan's history of Chinese thought, even if it is much shallower in its approach, extending as it does to consider Korean and Japanese Confucianism within its relatively restricted length. The volume has clearly been designed to be user-friendly, with a lucid introduction and a helpful conclusion on 'Further Readings and Contentious Issues' (pp.201-5): the latter may have been banished from the main text itself in order to make for smoother reading, but they are certainly not ignored. On pp.207-11 there is even a conversion table between Wade-Giles and pinyin romanisation, which is more than volumes on Chinese Buddhism have to offer.

In short, this is the best buy on the market in English at the moment. But for the reader who wants something a bit more ruminative, even if equally concerned with native Chinese traditions rather than particularly slanted towards an account of Buddhism and its influence, I would also recommend a work in French, Histoire de la Pensée Chinoise by Anne Cheng, published in 1997 by Seuil in Paris. This work, which runs to some 650 pages, makes no excursions beyond China, and lacks the convenient features of Berthrong's volume, but it does involve the reader in a much deeper engagement with Chinese ways of thinking as a whole, for those with 240 francs to spend. I used to know an old-time American academic who had spent many years teaching in small colleges. He claimed he could teach anything, provided he was given time when he arrived at his new post to locate the best textbook available in town, and also the second best textbook, which he would assign to students. Verb. sap!

T.H. Barrett


I wish I hadn't read the Foreword to The Authority of Experience first. Certainly if I had casually picked the book up and read the Foreword, I would have put it straight down again and never found the gems contained in its ten chapters by various well-known writers on Buddhism and psychology. The book's title refers to two particular sources of authority, Western psychologystyle with its objective scientific methods, and Buddhism, with its emphasis on personal experience and development. The various essays in the book succeed well in exploring the conflicts and common concerns of the two, but the book itself is not without problems, starting with that Foreword.

Why was I so put off? Because after outlining the challenge of reconciling these two apparently disparate sources of authority, Pickering suggests 'the postmodern turn' is essential to the task. Now this 'postmodern turn' means talking a lot about discourse and deconstruction, about relativisation and problematisation, about the 'failure of the Enlightenment project' and of much of science and rationality, and about the rejection of reductionism and cognitivism in favour of eclecticism and pluralism. If you are of a postmodern turn yourself you probably won't mind all this rhetoric, but if not you may already be beginning to feel intimidated by the long and apparently meaningless words. But despair not. You might like to read the French physicist Alan Sokal's brilliant account of how, after a few weeks study of postmodern ideas and jargon, he wrote a spoof article that was accepted, and highly praised, by a top journal in the field (cf. A.
Sokal and J. Bricmont, *Intellectual Impostures*, London 1998). Or you could consult the website (http://www.cs.monash.edu.au — with a link to create new postmodern essays at \link\ postmodern.html) where a new postmodern article will be generated every time you visit — complete with accurate information and voluminous footnotes. These have helped me to accept what I should have known all along, that the postmodern turn is mostly twaddle.

This does not mean there is nothing of value in Pickering's own contribution on selfhood as a process. He encourages a new view that integrates facts with values. He discusses the critical observation of selfhood, and the discovery that self, like everything else, is impermanent — arising and passing away.

Where I part company with him is in his insistence that only postmodern psychology can see this, and in his rejection of cognitive psychology. Indeed he criticizes the scientific approach as coming to a view of the universe as merely the 'endless hurrying of meaningless matter' (p.154), when this seems to me rather an apt description of the world as seen through the eyes of impermanence and anattā. I think the cognitive sciences he so derides are doing a good job of throwing out false ideas of a 'soul' or any permanent, persisting, controlling, self.

Brian Lankaster seems to agree. He not only points out how Buddhism and cognitive psychology both reject the notions of an enduring self or permanent consciousness, but begins to develop a theory of how our brains construct the illusion that these things exist. The 'T' is a hypothesis, he says, — 'the hypothesis of a unified subject of perceptions, thinker of thoughts, and instigator of actions' (p.180). He goes on to ask how deep are the similarities between two traditions with such different aims — one to change the mind, the other to understand it. This is a question that in fact permeates the whole book.

So is the whole book a postmodern treatise? Mercifully not. There are one or two chapters with such delights as 'we can speak of all feedback/feedforward mechanisms — each individual being such a mechanism — as forming a set, which we can write (all feedback/feedforward mechanism)

Letting x stand for feedback/feedforward mechanism, we can write the same set as . . .' (p.77).

Just remember Sokal, and have confidence. It really is meaningless.

In the same chapter we find ' . . .three levels are discernible in man's building a model of man and his mind'. This sexist language pervades this chapter, which is odd considering the close connection between feminism and postmodernism. Thankfully this is not a problem in the rest of the book, but the spelling is. In just one paragraph of the Foreword we find 'cognitive science' and 'misuse of science' which can be confusing when you are already struggling with words like interiority, phenomenology and methodological pluralism. And it doesn't help you to follow an argument about experience and experiment when either or both are wrongly spelled. Substituting mediation for meditation is usually an obvious mistake, but phrases such as 'Padmal de Silva reveals how . . .' (p.52) will always require a second look, as will the use of 'affected' instead of 'effected' (p.65). I have never seen a book so full of seriously annoying errors.

Happily not all the book is so dire. Indeed it begins with a lovely chapter by Eleanor Rosch, who tells the traditional Tibetan story of the Wolf Man. A low caste woodcutter lives near the charnel ground in constant fear of the howling of wolves, but is transformed by the Dharma. Rosch's point, lightly and skillfully made, is that our modern mental troubles are nothing new. Current psychology provides a portrait of the mind much like the original, confused and terrified Wolf Man. We need a psychology that understands his transformation, how attention can be trained, the mind integrated and wisdom found. And for that, says Rosch, we need a body of psychologists who have personal experience of a new mode of being and knowing.

The vexed question of comparing Buddhist practice with psychotherapy is tackled by David Fontana, Padmal de Silva, Joy Manné and Padmasiri de Silva, and touched on by others. Are the transformations brought about through meditation and mindfulness the same as those sought in psychotherapy? Or can the task only start when psychotherapy leaves off? Are they quite opposed — with one being about selflessness and the other about the glorification of self and selfishness? Or should therapy support
the practice of meditation, as Manné suggests? We need better models of mind than those provided by twentieth century psychology to answer such questions.

Consciousness is another recurrent theme. Problems of translation complicate an already confusing concept, but many authors have helpful insights to offer. I also enjoyed Padmal de Silva's excellent simple summary of psychological ideas and terms in Buddhism.

If you are interested in psychology and Buddhism then this book contains some really worthwhile and enjoyable pieces — and perhaps you won't find its shortcomings as seriously infuriating as I did.

Susan Blackmore


This book contains twenty-eight readings from ancient 'Scriptures' — the Pāli suttas — round to accounts of modern students so that one would expect a wide and varied picture of meditation in a Buddhist setting. Naturally, some of the material presented here is of greater value, some of less, while much has had to be excluded due to lack of space. Accounts of all the varied practices within the many Buddhist traditions cannot easily be compressed into a book of this size, nor indeed into a volume many times this length. Still, the aim has been a worthy one though the editors have not really presented a balanced picture. In their Introduction they admit this by stating that they have failed to secure republication permission from translators of Dzogchen and Mahāmudrā texts as well as from contemporary meditation masters. This is not altogether surprising in view of the fact that the latter, such as some 'forest' teachers of N.E. Thailand discourage commercial publication of their works and emphasise the value of personal contact as well as the limited usefulness of the printed word; while the former traditions, though a few translations are now available from them, underline the guru's importance in leading the student to have an 'introduction' to his/her own mind.

Perhaps this accounts for the decided bias in favour of Theravāda tradition in this book. After all, no permission is required for translation of the Pali suttas, from which there are eight readings. The reviewer compared these selections with Venerable Nyanaponika's longer anthology 'Flowers of Deliverance' in his evergreen _Heart of Buddhist Meditation_ and much preferred the latter. The present selection, limited to eight in number from among the vast amount of sutta material, cannot cover all the spectrum of Buddhist meditative practice. Much more material could have been included had the book's layout been better planned. Instead, with each new reading begun on a new recto page, much space is wasted.

The editors also assume that the Pali texts, as well as their equivalents translated into Chinese (why have some not been translated here?) present the earliest but not a complete record of the Buddha's teachings and this perhaps accounts for the poor representation of Mahāyāna sūtras. Indeed, only one reading presents extracts of these in this book, a quotation from the old translation by Bendall and Rouse of Śāntideva's _Sīksāsamuccaya_.

The second section, in which this is included, is perhaps the most successful in this work. There we find Buddhagosa on the Earth Kasina, the Śāntideva selection already mentioned, Zhiyi (Chih-I) on Calm and Insight, Dogen on Seated Meditation, Mumon (Wumen) presenting some of his koans and, finally, Tsongkhapa on Fastening the Mind. Of these six, Zhiyi's writings are specially valuable and perhaps it is not too much to hope that soon a complete translation of his extensive works on the subject may become available.

The third section on 'Contemporary Masters' is overwhelmingly weighted in favour of various Theravāda traditions, six out of nine readings in fact. There is one from Zen and two from Gelugpa, scarcely a satisfactory coverage of contemporary Buddhist teachings on meditation. Of the Theravāda readings the reviewer found those of Achan Chah and Buddhadasa the most satisfying. The long extract from Shunryu Suzuki's _Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind_ is also excellent. Kathleen McDonald, a Buddhist nun in the Gelugpa Tibetan tradition, gives clear instructions for beginners, particularly those who have no teacher. While much of
what she has written is valuable, it is strange to find an outline for Inner Heat Meditation included. Such Vajrayāna teachings require personal transmission from a fully qualified lama, lacking which one could very easily find oneself in trouble. Teachings of this sort should really not be made public as their practice is limited to those within a particular lama’s circle of pupils.

Coming now to the last section, the weakest in the book, we find ‘Personal Accounts’ of various meditators published. Two out of five readings are by the editors of this book and all of them relate in some way or other to Theravāda. While it is easy to understand the publication of original texts and of ancient and modern masters of meditation, it is less obvious why accounts of meditators’ beginning practice are valuable. The Editors’ note that ‘A major reason why such accounts are rare is that meditators are often instructed not to discuss their experiences with anyone but their own teachers’ but rationalise that ‘making the relevant information available as material for research and discussion’ will be valuable. One might ask ‘To whom?’ ‘Research’ suggests academics in psychology departments, while ‘discussion’ among those who do not practise a particular teacher’s methods will be like evaluating the various types of mangoes without having even savoured one of them. Of the accounts presented here, Chris Kang’s struck this reviewer as the most interesting, while the ‘Experiments with Insight Meditation’ by Rod Bucknell was the driest and most method-orientated. Generally speaking, emphasis given to ‘method’ particularly in a Theravāda Viśeṣāna context, means that among Western practitioners little attention is given to personal devotion to a teacher, indeed to the Triple Gem. This account very much falls into this category and is really meditative investigations by the author having little to do with any Buddhist tradition. It is interesting that the author seems quite opposed to the insight tradition that the three characteristics (impermanence, dukkha and not-self) should be investigated to reveal the nature of mind and body.

In conclusion, the present reviewer feels that while the book contains some gems of meditative advice, at the same time it is not a well balanced presentation. The small space given to Zen is a case in point — while some readings could very well have been omitted.

Laurence-Khanipulo Mills


This book includes twelve contributions, most of which may be of some interest to students of Buddhism. Here is a brief survey of its contents.

Dermot Killingley writes about ‘The Paths of the Dead and the Five Fires’, and points out some Vedic antecedents of Jñānavākyas celebrated ideas that deces determines the fate of the person after death. He notes also the significance of the number five in the Veda, including the fires: ‘the sacrifice is fivefold. The beast is fivefold. Man is fivefold. This whole world, whatever there is, is fivefold. So he who knows this obtains the whole world’. — It is, I find, very tempting to draw a parallel to the Fire Sermon according to which ‘everything’ (not just the sense etc. but, in particular, the fire skandhas) is burning. The sermon, in other words, can be said to give the Buddhist interpretation of pāṇḍūvīdayā.

Peter Connolly, writing about ‘The Vitalistic Antecedents of the Atman-Brahman Concept’, argues that in some Upanisadic circles the concepts of atman and Brahman were developed on the basis of already existing conceptions of prāna, or the breath, but later on the ‘great Vedānta commentators wilfully misrepresented the teachings of the Upaniṣads’. — This is, I think, going too far. The concept of breath remains fundamental once we keep the practical, or yogic, aspects of Vedānta in mind. (Recall the discussion about Śaṅkara as the author of the commentary on Yogasūtra — with which I have no problem). The idea (or rather, the experience) that mind can be controlled through control of the breath is common Indian wisdom.

Mark Allen takes up the interesting and difficult problem of ‘The Oral Composition and Transmission of Early Buddhist Texts’. He agrees with Gombrich that the early Buddhist sutta texts were ‘deliberate compositions which were then committed to memory’.
Much remains unclear.

Sally Mellick Cutler discusses 'The Continuing Effect of the Buddha's Bad Karma'. Several episodes in the life of the Buddha suggest that he was still under the influence of ignorance or previous bad karma. This forced later Buddhists to come up with explanations in apology for their faith. Further relevant sources not mentioned here are to be found in Bhāvavā's Madhyamaka-ḥrdaya, Chapter X (on Bhagavit as omniscient, svaśajña, in reply to Jaina objections).


Robert Mayer, in 'Caskets of Treasures and Visions of Buddhās', draws attention to some Indic antecedents of the Tibetan gTer ma tradition. Two contributions (by Theodore Gabriel and Gavin Flood) are of no interest from the Buddhist point of view. Finally, L.S. Cousins writes about 'Aspects of Esoteric Southern Buddhism', and Hiroko Kawanami about 'Buddhist Nuns in Transition: the Case of Burmese Thilā-Shin'.

Both of these contributions contain useful observations.

One can hardly say that the book as a whole is a must for students of Buddhism but, as suggested by this brief survey, most of the contributions have something to offer its intended readers.

Chr. Lindner


There are three extraordinary things about this book that make it the best possible introduction to Buddhism: first, it is not an exposition of the subject designed to persuade you of its truth, nor a criticism of it designed to expose its fallacies, but a dialogue between two people, one a convinced and practising believer, the other a sceptic who cannot understand any thinking person taking it seriously; second, the two protagonists are both highly educated, intelligent and successful scientists writing in

French, well able if anyone to express themselves in Western terminology about this esoteric outlook; and thirdly, they are father and son, which is not just an attractive journalistic accident, but a guarantee that they wish to understand each other’s ideas, without trying or even hoping to convince the other one. The father lives in Paris, enjoying the fame of a respected savant and the good life that goes with it, while his son, after a brilliant start as a scientist, much to the disappointment of his father abandoned it all to study under a Buddhist teacher in Nepal and, after some years, taking the vows of a monk and accompanying as interpreter the Dalai Lama to Europe and America.

The Buddhism in question is the Buddhism of Tibet, revealing it, not as a rather superstitious, decadent form of it, but the general practice and belief of Tibet, the expression of an admirable if unfortunately pacific culture, whose suppression by the Chinese conquest of Tibet, like the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman Empire five hundred years earlier, drove its cultural leaders to seek expression abroad. That led to the growth of classical studies in Europe, and this book suggests that the spread of Buddhist studies in Europe today is filling a spiritual gap left by the decline of Christian faith and practice. Modern European philosophy has become a purely intellectual pursuit without any guidance for the way we conduct our lives: the Stoic and Epicurean systems of classical philosophy and Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy that helped shape Christianity have no modern equivalent. The totalitarian systems of communism and nationalism, of Stalin and Hitler, attempted to impose a political ideology that proved no more acceptable in the long run that the Christianity it sought to supersede.

The discussion turns on the contrast between the aims of long life, health and wealth spread over the whole population, which is the triumph of European science and the Buddhist insistence that what counts is individual control of the mind, liberating people from the thrall of suffering and even death. What puzzled the philosopher is the doctrine of the ‘emptiness’ of selfhood and reincarnation: what passes from one body to another if the self is an illusion? Buddhism teaches that enlightenment
comes, not from books, but from meditation which, if skilfully practised, can lead to a cessation of illusory thought and a realisation of the true nature of things, a nature that cannot be taught, but can only be achieved by each individual for himself. The contrast between the monk wholly devoted to this practice and the layman too busy with life and family is familiar enough to Europeans as Christian monks and nuns with a life of prayer and poverty compared to ordinary people.

The monk claims a scientific justification for his life in that it works, that it leads to satisfaction with or acceptance of the facts of life if not personal happiness.

Perhaps the most significant feature of the dialogue is its mutual tolerance, and here I think the philosopher scores. The monk, after all, has rejected all the achievements of European life as illusory, even an obstacle to enlightenment, while the philosopher accepts that Buddhist or other religious systems may suit some people, may indeed be what modern scientific humanitarian political life misses, but sees no reason to abandon his own way. But the monk scores in that he, and Buddhists in general, are not evangelical, do not set out to convert people or criticise those who are not being Buddhists, but they live their lives as conscientiously as they can, and willingly help other people only if they admire Buddhism and would like to learn more about it. The book left me with the impression that the Dalai Lama doesn't travel abroad like the Pope to advertise his spiritual role, but to gather moral support for his patriotic crusade to persuade the Chinese government to grant cultural independence for his country. Yet his spiritual influence bids fair to rival or even surpass that of the Pope.

Alban Cooke

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