DEVADATTA
Translated by John D. Ireland

Surely no one of evil desires
Is born again in this world.
Know that he goes to the bourn of those
Who live in the grip of evil desires.

I heard how Devadatta was
Regarded as a wise man,
One developed in meditation
Who shone as it were with fame.

Having thought himself his equal,
He assaulted the Tathāgata
And went to the four-doored frightful place,
Avīci the Unremitting Hell.

When one plots against an innocent
Who has done no evil deed,
That evil merely affects the one
Corrupt of mind and disrespectful.

One who thinks he could pollute
The ocean with a pot of poison
Would not be able to pollute it —
Awesome is that mass of water.
It is similar in attacking with abuse
The Tathāgata who has reached perfection
And ever dwells with peaceful mind —
Abuse has no effect on him.

A wise man should befriend such a one
And constantly follow after him.
A bhikkhu who goes along his path
Can reach the end of suffering.

Itivuttaka 89 (The Buddha’s Sayings, BPS, p.66).
DID THE BUDDHA INSULT DEVADATTA?

Étienne Lamotte

I

The Buddhist tradition has justifiably shown itself to be severe in connection with Devadatta, the Buddha Śākyamuni’s cousin who, having entered the Order of bhikṣus, attempted to supplant the Master as head of the Community in which he was blameworthy of three grave offences: he provoked a schism, threw a rock from a mountain top in order to crush the Buddha and inflicted a mortal wound on a nun. Finally, the ground opened under his feet and he was cast alive into the great hell.

The Buddha himself was unable to contain his indignation when Devadatta proposed he retire and leave the Community to his care. These are the terms in which the Vinaya\(^1\) reports the event:

"At that time the Lord, surrounded by a large assembly in which a king was present, was expounding the Dhamma, while remaining seated. Then Devadatta, having risen from his seat and adjusted his outer robe on one shoulder, bowed with joined hands before the Lord and said to him, "Lord, the Lord is now worn out, aged, grown old; he has had his time and is at the end of his life; Lord, may the Lord now be content with devoting himself to dwelling happily in the present life and may he entrust the Community of monks to me. It is I who shall lead the Community of monks".

"Enough, Devadatta, renounce the desire to lead the Community of monks". And a second time . . . And a third

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1. Vin II, 188–9 (Pāli texts are cited according to the Pali Text Society editions).
time Devadatta said to the Lord, "Lord, the Lord is now worn out, aged, grown old. . . It is I who shall lead the Community of monks".

"Devadatta, it is not even to Sāriputta and Moggallāna that I would entrust the Community of monks. Why, then, should I entrust it to you, corpse (chava), lickspittle (khelāpaka)?"

Then Devadatta said to himself, 'In an assembly in which a king is present, the Lord treats me as a 'lickspittle' while he upholds Sāriputta and Moggallāna'. Irritated and dissatisfied, he greeted the Lord and, having circumbulated him keeping him to his right, he went away.

Such was Devadatta's first piece of maliciousness towards the Lord.'

The word khelāpaka which attracts our attention here has many variants: khelāsaka and khelopaka in the Vinaya manuscripts, khelāsaka in the Samantapāsādikā, khelāsika in the Dhammapada Commentary. Khelāpaka and khelāsika are listed in the Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary which defines them as: 'An abusive term 'eating phlegm' (?').

However, to take this term in its strongest sense is to not follow the exegetical tradition initiated by Buddhaghosa who opts for a figurative sense. Indeed, in the Samantapāsādikā we read:

Khelāsako 'ti ettha micchājīvēṇa uppannapaccayā ariyehi vanabbā khelāsadīsā, tahārūpe paccaye ayaṃ ajjhoharati 'ti kava khelāsako 'ti bhagavata vutto.

'The means of subsistence resulting from wrong livelihood should be vomited by the Noble Ones like spittle. That is why the Lord says khelāsaka, 'should be vomited like spittle', in order to explain that Devadatta consumes means of subsistence of that type'.

Buddhaghosa's authority cannot be questioned and it is in recommending his interpretation that modern exegetes have in their translations somewhat mitigated the strictness of the terms chava and khelāpaka (khelāsaka, khelāsika) addressed by the Buddha to Devadatta.

Rhys Davids and Oldenberg: I would not give over the Bhikkhu-samgha, Devadatta, even to Sāriputta and Moggallāna. How much less, then, to so vile (chava) and evil-living (khelāpaka) a person as you.'

Malalasekera: 'Not even to Sāriputta and Moggallāna would I hand over the Order, and would I then to thee, vile one, to be vomited like spittle?'

E.J. Thomas: same translation.

Miss I.B. Horner: 'I would not hand over the Order of monks even to Sāriputta and Moggallāna. How then could I to you, a wretched one to be vomited like spittle?'

However, the Pāli Vinaya is not alone in assigning insulting words to the Buddha. They are also found in other disciplinary collections which have come down to us in Chinese translation. Some of them follow the Pāli Vinaya in interpreting the insults in question in a figurative sense by comparing Devadatta to spittle

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6 Vinaya Texts III (SBE xx), Oxford 1895, 238–9.
that should be vomited. This is the case for the Vinayas of the Mahiśasakas and Dharmaguptakas, the closest to the Pāli Vinaya and translated at the beginning of the fifth century, the first by a monk from Kāśmir, Buddhajīva (in 424-6), the second by another Kāśmirian monk, Buddhāyāsa (in 408).

According to the Mahiśasaka Vinaya\textsuperscript{10}, the Buddha treated Devadatta as a 'fool' (\textit{yi chih} 易 黠), and according to the ancient editions of the Sui (581-617) and Sung (1004-48), as 'like spittle' (\textit{ju hsein t'o 如 滅 嘴}). Similarly, the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya\textsuperscript{11} claims that he called him 'foolish man' (\textit{ch'i\text{h} jen 猶 人}), 'body of tears and spittle' (\textit{t'i t'o chih shen 涕 盼 人}).

Other later Vinayas take the insults in their proper meaning and in particular claim that Devadatta had really swallowed spittle. According to the Sarvāstivādin Vinaya\textsuperscript{12}, the Buddha said to his rival, 'You are a "lickspittle" (\textit{tan t'o 嘚 嘔}), a "fool" (\textit{ch'i\text{h} jen 猶 人}), a "corpse" (\textit{szǔ jen 死 人}).' According to the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya\textsuperscript{3}, his terms were: 'You are an "ignoramus" (\textit{wu chih hih 無 智}), a "fool" (\textit{ch'i\text{h} jen 猶 人}), an "eater of spittle" (\textit{shih t'o che 食 嘔 者}).' Similarly, the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadesa\textsuperscript{14} which uses the Sarvāstivādin Vinaya as its book of discipline puts these words on the Buddha's lips: 'You are a "maniac" (\textit{ku\text{u}ang jen 狂 人}), a "corpse" (\textit{szǔ jen 死 人}), a "cougher of spittle" (\textit{sou t'o jen 喉 嘔 人}).

In brief, we find ourselves faced by a dual tradition: one,

represented especially by the Pāli sources, for which Devadatta was a vile person 'to vomit such as spittle', the other, more realistic and probably Sarvāstivādin in origin, in the terms of which Devadatta had really swallowed spittle.

II

This divergence can be explained by another passage in the canonical texts narrating how Devadatta, in possession of supernormal powers of a worldly nature (\textit{pothujjanika iddhi}), resorted to various transformations in order to beguile the crown prince Ajātasattu and thus ensure advantages, respect and renown for himself. Chronologically, this episode took place before his insolent request during which the malign disciple called upon the Buddha to entrust the Community to him.

Here again the texts are classed in two groups: in the first, Devadatta limits himself to infantile games aimed at frightening the prince; in the second, he pushes impropriety so far as to swallow Ajātasattu's saliva.

First group of texts

The Pāli Vinaya\textsuperscript{15} records the facts in the following way:

'While Devadatta, having retired into solitude, was plunged in meditation, this reflection came to his mind, "Who can I charm so that, due to his good disposition towards me, many advantages and honours will accrue to me?" Then Devadatta said to himself, "Prince Ajātasattu is young and has a fine future. What if I were now to charm Prince Ajātasattu? When he is well-disposed towards me, many advantages and honours will accrue to me".'

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\textsuperscript{10} T 1421, ch.3, 188-20. (Chinese texts are cited according to the Taishō Issaikyō edition by Takakusu and Watanabe, 1924–9.)

\textsuperscript{11} T 1428, ch.4, 592b13–14.

\textsuperscript{12} T 1435, ch.36, 258b7.

\textsuperscript{13} T 1450, ch.13, 169b25–6.

\textsuperscript{14} T 1509, ch.26, 256b11–12, 252b15–16.

\textsuperscript{15} Vin II, 184–5.
Then Devadatta, having adjusted his bedding and taken up his alms bowl and robe, set out for Rājagaha and, in due time, reached Rājagaha. There, having disposed of his own form and transformed himself into that of a young boy wearing a girdle of snakes, he appeared on the lap of Prince Ajātassattu. Then Prince Ajātassattu was terrified, anguished, anxious and trembling. Thereupon Devadatta spoke thus to Prince Ajātassattu:

"Prince, are you frightened of me?"

"Yes, I am frightened. Who are you?"

"I am Devadatta."

"Lord, if you are truly Venerable Devadatta, appear in your proper form."

Then Devadatta cast off the form of a young boy and, wearing his cloak and other robes and holding his alms bowl, stood before Prince Ajātassattu.

Thereupon Prince Ajātassattu, wholly charmed by that marvellous wonder on the part of Devadatta, placed himself at his service, day and night, with five hundred chariots; and five hundred portions of cooked rice were supplied to Devadatta as a gift of food.

Some supplementary details are added by the Dhammapadā Commentary16. Having transformed himself into a young boy, Devadatta put four poisonous snakes at his hands and feet, placed a snake round his neck, rolled a snake round his head like a pillow, put a snake on one shoulder and, in this guise, appeared on Ajātassattu’s lap.

Mahiśasaka Vinaya17:

‘Having descended in a net, Devadatta appeared above the prince’s bed, in the form of a young boy, sucking his finger and lying down in a well-behaved way. Having seen him, the prince was very frightened and asked him, “Are you a god or a demon?”

He answered, “I am Devadatta; do not be frightened, do not be scared”. The prince said to him, “If you are Devadatta, resume your original form”. Thereupon Devadatta transformed himself and resumed his former bodily attitudes.’

Dharmaguptaka Vinaya18:

‘Devadatta went to Prince Ajātassattu and, making use of his supernormal power (rddhihī拉萨), rose in the air. Sometimes he expounded the Dharma while showing his body, sometimes he expounded the Dharma while hiding his body, sometimes he expounded the Dharma while showing half his body, sometimes he expounded the Dharma while not showing even half his body. Sometimes his body emitted smoke, sometimes it emitted fire. Finally, he changed into a child, his body adorned with a necklace of precious stones; he held onto the prince’s arm and, turning round, sucked a finger.

When the prince saw that transformation, he was frightened and his body hairs stood on end. Devadatta, knowing that the prince was frightened of him, said, “Do not be frightened! Do not be frightened!”

The prince asked him, “Who are you?”

He answered, “I am Devadatta”.

The prince went on, “If you are truly Devadatta, resume

16 DhpA 1, Pt.1, 118.
17 T 1421, ch.3, 17c21-5.
18 T 1428, ch.4, 592a9-18.
your own form."

He resumed his body as it had been previously.

Ekottarāgama19:

'Devadatta, hiding his proper form, assumed the body of a young boy and appeared on the prince's knees. Then the courtiers each reflected as follows, 'Who is that man? Is he a demon or is he a god?' They had not finished speaking when Devadatta once more transformed his body and again became as before.'

In all these sources, the account is still relatively simple. Devadatta transforms himself only into a little boy, whether or not encircled by snakes. He only wants to frighten Ajātasattu and, on the latter's request, immediately resumes his original form. He takes no action that could earn him the epithet of 'lickspittle'.

Second group of texts

This marks a turn and an evolution in the legend. Devadatta's intention is no longer to frighten, but to beguile the crown prince. To this end he multiplies transformations and changes successively into an elephant, a horse, an ox, which reach Ajātaśatru by passing through a wall and going out by a door, or vice versa. He also changes into a monk and even into a veil and a cap, which Ajātaśatru makes into a turban for himself. Finally, he takes the form of a child, adorned with a necklace of precious stones. Not the least frightened, the crown prince takes him in his arms, plays with him and ends by putting spittle in his mouth. Through love of gain and honours, Devadatta agrees to swallow it.

This new version of the facts appears first in the Chinese

Udānavarga20 and a Vinaya21 of unknown origin, both translated into Chinese in the years 382 and 383 CE by Chu Fo-nien. It also appears in the Samyuktāgama22 of the Kāśyapīya school translated in about the year 400 by a translator whose name has not been preserved. Finally, it is repeated and developed in the Sarvāstivādin Vinaya23, translated between 404 and 405 by Kumārajīva, and the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya24, an incomplete translation of which was made by I-ching between the years 700 and 712.

Furthermore, it is to this Sarvāstivādin recension that the great exeges of the fourth century turned: the five arhats of Kaśmīr who compiled the Mahāvibhāṣā25 and the or several Mādhyamika(s) who elaborated the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadesa26.

An examination of our texts enables us to specify the conclusions which we reached earlier. According to the oldest exegesis, represented by the Pāli-using Theravādins, the Mahāsākasas and Dharmaguptakas, the qualification kheḷāpaka or kheḷāsīka addressed by the Buddha to Devadatta was merely a 'rude word', an insult without any objective meaning. Later on, other exeges within the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika school wished to see in it a reproach concerning a real deed and, in order to justify their interpretation, modified the texts in consequence by claiming that Devadatta had 'accepted spittle' from Ajātaśatru.

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19 T 125, ch.47, 802c21-4.
20 T 212, ch.14, 687c23-8.
21 T 1464, ch.2, 859b22-9.
22 T 100, ch.1, 374b13-19.
23 T 1435, ch. 36, 257c4-12.
24 T 1450, ch.13, 168c7-16.
25 T 1545, ch.85, 442a1-8.
26 T 1509, ch.14, 164c21-3; ch.26, 252b22-6.
Transposed onto this level, the words addressed by the Buddha to his malign cousin or other disciples are not based on semantics and even less so on history, but enter the field of doctrinal controversy.

"From the night of his Enlightenment until the night of his Nirvāṇa, everything that the Buddha stated and taught is true and not false. His good word is distinguished by four characteristics: it is well-spoken, agreeable and pleasant, favourable to deliverance, and truthful." Among the eighteen exclusive attributes (avenikadharma) of the Buddha, it is accepted that all actions of body, speech and mind of the Tathāgata are preceded by knowledge (jñānapūrvargamā) and accompanied by knowledge (jñā-nānuparivartīn).

Therefore, if Sākyamuni treated Devadatta as a kheḷāpaka, it was because the latter had really swallowed spittle, and if that word seems harsh, it was nonetheless uttered for the good of the guilty one.

What remains is that such a term seems shocking on the lips of Śākyamuni who during his lifetime was, according to the happy expression of Alfred Foucher [tr.], 'the accomplished type of gentleman-monk'. On reading and rereading the early sūtras, one is struck by his natural distinction, care for seemliness and constant concern for propriety and proportion. Thus, whatever the baseness of Devadatta, one wonders if the Buddha did not give way to a gesture of impatience towards him.

At the instigation of the Jaina monk Nātaputta, Prince Abhaya, the son of King Bimbisāra, one day went to the Buddha in order to ask him a question, the gist of which was as follows: 'You have said and repeated that Devadatta was destined to misery, condemned to hell for a kalpa and absolutely incurable. Is it permissible for the Buddha to use such unpleasant and disagreeable terms concerning others? If so, in what way do you differ from ordinary men? If not, why are you so harsh?'

This was a double-edged question, but the Buddha replied without hesitation. 'If a word is false, the Tathāgata never utters it, be it pleasant or disagreeable. But if a word is true, justified and useful, be it unpleasant and disagreeable for others, the Tathāgata reserves the right to utter it at the appropriate time. And why? Because the Tathāgata has compassion for beings.'

It could not have been better put. Whether gentle or severe, every word of the Buddha conforms to the truth and has no other aim than the welfare of creatures.

His adversaries were not disarmed for all that, and continued to reproach the Buddha for the harshness of perfectly justified words.

Apart from the occasional criticism, at least two serious actions were brought against the Buddha.

\[\text{Cf. Abhayarājājumārasutta, M 41, 392–6 (tr. I.B. Horner, Middle Length Sayings II, London 1957, 60–4). This sutta has no parallel in the Madhyama, but was known by a Northern source: it is cited in the Daśabhūmikavibhāṣā by Nāgārjuna, T 1521, ch.11, 79b4.}\]
The pretext for the first were the torments and illnesses endured by the Buddha in his last existence: heretics accused him of having assassinated the young Sundarī; Činčāī claimed she was pregnant by him; a rock thrown by Devadatta crushed one of his toes; he was injured by an acacia thorn; he suffered from migraine when King Virūḍhaka massacred his compatriots, the Śākyans; invited by the brahmin Agnidatta, then rejected, he was forced to eat barley; following a cold draught, he developed backache; for ten years he thought he should devote himself to austerities; seeking alms-food in a brahmin village, he received nothing and had to return with his bowl empty.

How can it be explained that such a holy person had to undergo those nine torments?

This provoked a fine controversy between scholars. For some of them, the Buddha was, like the average mortal, subject to the fruition of actions required to expiate faults in his former lives; for others, those torments and illnesses resulted solely from ineluctable physical conditions; for yet others (in this case, the Mahāyānists), the Buddha's indispositions were simulated, mere skilful means (upāya) aimed at winning over beings.

Another action of which the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadesa has preserved the record was also brought against the Buddha by exegetes and scholars. It is based, no longer on the torments endured by the Lord, but on supposed faults for which he became blameworthy after his enlightenment.

Here again, there are nine counts of indictment:

1. The Buddha expounded the Dharma to an assembly of heretics without doubting he was believed: this was a sign of thoughtlessness.
2. He displayed his body to the Jaina master Saccaka Niganṭhaputta.
3. He displayed his tongue and cryptorchis to Ambattha, Brahmāyu and Sela.
4. He treated his disciples as fools.
5. He insulted Devadatta by treating him as a fool, a corpse and a lickspittle.
6. He used a stone bowl whereas he had forbidden such a usage to his monks.
7. He abstained from adjudging certain difficult problems and declared them to be reserved or undefined points (avāyākravastu).
8. He sometimes taught the doctrine of Self and sometimes the

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31 On this accusation, see my Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse I, Louvain 1944, 507–11.
33 Samanapāsasutta in which the Buddha taught the 'Four Brahmin Truths' to various wandering ascetics, Antabhāra, etc.: A II, 176–7; Sānyukta in T 99, ch.35, 251a20–b19; T 100, ch.11, 450k6–451a10; Ekottara in T 125, ch.18, 639c1–11.
34 M I, 233; Sānyukta, T 99, ch.5, 366a2–3; Ekottara, T 125, ch.30, 716b4–5.
35 D I, 106; M II, 143; Sn, 107–8; T I, ch.13, 87e14–17; T 20, 2636b24–6; T 26, ch.41, 688b27–8; T 76, 885a4–7.
36 The Buddha used a stone bowl which had been given to him by the Four Great Kings of the gods (caṭurmahārajājikadeva). In contrast he only allowed his monks bowls made of iron or earthenware, cf. Pāli Vin II, 112; Mahāsākha Vin, T 1421, ch.26, 170a2–3; Mahāsāṃghika Vin, T 1425, ch.29, 462a11; Sarvāstivādin Vin, T 1435, ch.37, 269b8.
37 Problems on the infinity of the world, etc., which number ten in the Pāli texts, but fourteen in the Sanskrit writings. The Buddha judged them to be useless to deliverance and refused to express an opinion on them; cf. D I, 187–8; M I, 43; S IV, 395; A V, 193–4.
He was also a "lickspittle". Devadatta, coveting gain (lābha) and honours (sakāra), changed into a young boy (kumāraka) with a heavenly body and manifested himself in the arms of Prince Ajātaśatru. The prince blew in his mouth and gave him spittle to swallow. That is why Devadatta was a lickspittle.

**Objection** — Devadatta, who possessed the concentrations (samādhi), had renounced sense-desires (vītarāga). How could he still swallow another’s spittle?

**Answer** — In that person, bad dispositions (duṣṭacittā) were profound, but his faculties were sharp (tikṣṇendriya). Having renounced sense-desires (vītarāga), he could transform himself. When he swallowed the spittle, he lost his sharp faculties but, after a time, recovered them. That is why he was called "lickspittle".

Moreover, Devadatta had said to the Buddha, "The Buddha is worn out (jīrṇa). Since he has always cherished solitude (viveka), may he enter the forest and devote himself to the joys of absorption (dhyāna) and may he entrust the Community to me". The Buddha answered him, "Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana possess great wisdom, they are good men, gentle and pure, and yet I would not entrust the Community to them. How, then, could I entrust it to you who are a fool, a corpse, a lickspittle"?

It is for such reasons that the Buddha, although he has no attachment to things, (on occasion) utters harsh words, but only with the aim of winning over beings.

The texts do not tell us the outcome of the action, but if there was a verdict, we can surmise that the Buddha emerged as

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38 The Buddha explained himself on this subject in the Ānandasutta, S IV, 409-4; T 99, ch.34, 24569-25; T 100, ch.10, 444c.
39 In principle, the Buddha affirmed the existence of dharmas in the Hinayāna and denied their existence in the Mahayāna.
41 Note by translator: in Traité II, op. cit., 1673, the author translates this phrase as "but when he so wished"; the rest is unchanged.
white as snow from all accusations made against him and that it was solemnly acknowledged that 'all actions of body, speech and mind of the Tathāgata are preceded by knowledge and accompanied by knowledge'.

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Ed. See also Biswadeb Mukherjee, Die Überlieferung von Devadatta, dem Widersacher des Buddha, in den kanonischen Schriften (Dr. diss. Göttingen Univ. 1966, publ. in Münchener Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft series, 1966).

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DEVADATTA AND THE FIRST BUDDHIST SCHISM

André Barelau

The Buddhist tradition, mainly represented by the Pāli canonical texts of the Theravādins, attributes to Devadatta the first attempt at a schism (samghabheda) in the monastic Community founded by the Buddha. This was said to have taken place in the very lifetime of the latter, who succeeded in dissipating the serious threat which hung over the company of his disciples and who naturally seized the opportunity to give his monks useful instructions with a view to averting any danger of schism in the future.

Apart from secondary details probably added to an earlier version, the Theravādin account is credible on the whole. A first glance, therefore, hardly excites any scepticism, especially if, like the majority of those who study early Buddhism, one has confidence in the Pāli texts and considers them to be the most faithful to the early tradition, as well as being the most orthodox and the most authentic.

Is this really so? In an attempt to find out, the Theravādin sources need to be compared with those of other early schools (nikāya), at least with the documents that have come down to us, usually in their Chinese translations. Since a schism was a very serious attack on monastic discipline, it is dealt with in the vast collections devoted to such, the Vinaya Pitakas. In fact, apart from that of the Theravādins transmitted in its original Pāli, we possess complete Chinese translations of those of the Mahāsāṃghikas, Mahiśāsakas, Dharmaguptakas, Sarvāstivādins and Mūlasarvāstivādins. The last has also reached us in a Tibetan translation and large sections of its Sanskrit text have been discovered since the beginning of this century.
In each of these various Vinaya Piṭakas, schism is treated in two quite different places: it is the subject of a special chapter of Skandhakas and also that of a small part of the Bhiksuvibhaṅga, to be precise the 10th and 11th serious offences called samghāvaśeṣas (Pāli, sanghādaśesas), especially the former in connection with Devadatta. We can disregard the parts of the Bhiksuni-vibhaṅga which also deal with schism (14th and 15th samghāvaśeṣas of the nuns) because there is no mention of Devadatta in them.

Here are the references to the Skandhaka chapter which interests us in the various Vinaya Piṭakas:

Mahāsāṃghika: Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō (= T) edition, 1425, p.489c.
Mahāsāṃghika: T 1421, pp.164a-166b.
Dharmaguptaka: T 1428, pp.909b-913c.
Sarvāstivādin: T 1435, pp.257a-267a.
Mūlasarvāstivādin: T 1450, in entirety.

These are the passages concerning the 10th and 11th samghāvaśeṣas in the various Vinaya Piṭakas:

Mahāsāṃghika: T 1425, pp.281c-284c.
Mahāsāṃghika: T 1421, pp.16c-21b.
Dharmaguptaka: T 1428, pp.590b-596c.
Sarvāstivādin: T 1435, pp.24b-26b.
Mūlasarvāstivādin: T 1442, pp.700b-705a.

Quite considerable differences are noticeable between the texts belonging to these various schools, as much in the second series (samghāvaśeṣas) as in the first (Skandhakas). Furthermore, there are often quite important differences inside one and the same Vinaya Piṭaka between the two chapters pertaining to those two series. They concern not only textual details, in which they are numerous, but also the main elements, in particular scenes and episodes in which Devadatta plays a part, generally to the fore.

A comparative study of these various texts is therefore of great interest straightaway. We will, however, disregard the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya Piṭaka, which here as elsewhere is much too prolix, often confused and encumbered with legendary digressions, because of the very late date it was completed and because it provides us with no useful information for historically-orientated research. Moreover, due to lack of space, we will examine only the main elements, a careful study of which will not lead us seriously to modify our analysis and its conclusions.

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We will first examine the chapter on schism contained in the Skandhakas. For the Mahāsāṃghikas, it is summarised in a few lines: in Śrāvasti, the Buddha answers questions from Upāli and gives him a definition of samghabheda and some explanations essential to that subject, but he makes no allusion to any real attempt at a division of the Community, nor, consequently, to the author of such an offence, whether named Devadatta or otherwise. So, here we find by far the most simple version, certainly the oldest, the original version of this chapter. Proof of this is that we find it again in all the texts of the other schools, in the same form of a conversation between Upāli and the Blessed One, but always amplified and variously developed, without any definite localisation except for the Sarvāstivādins who retained that of Śrāvasti. Furthermore, this conversation is always placed at the end of the chapter, to which it serves as a conclusion, which is an indication of its original nature.

In all the other Vinaya Piṭakas, it is preceded by a very long account which forms the essence of the chapter and which
narrates in detail the actions of Devadatta and the reactions they provoke from the Buddha and his disciples. Moreover, the action always takes place in Rājagṛha and the surrounding area, except for a few minor episodes, related only by certain versions and consequently later additions, which are located elsewhere, in Kauśambi, Vaiśālī or among the Śākyans. It is therefore quite clear that very early on, in the tradition of all the schools of the Sthāvatīvid group, to which belonged the Theravādins, Mahiśāsakas, Dhammaguptakas and Sarvāstivādins, Devadatta was accountable for the first attempt at schism and that that event was set in Rājagṛha and its neighbourhood.

The texts of the Mahiśāsakas and Dhammaguptakas, schools whose close relationship is well known, contain three important episodes. In the first, Devadatta wants to impose on the whole community five rules of austerity (dhūrītāngā), but the Blessed One gives his disciples the freedom to practise them or not as they wish; five hundred monks accept Devadatta’s proposals and follow him wherever he chooses to reside, which causes the schism. Shortly afterwards, Sāriputra and Mahāgālayana go to that place on their own initiative; Devadatta thinks he sees in them two prestigious new adherents and, before going to sleep, entrusts them with instructing his own followers; the two great disciples profit from this by winning back their audience to the ideas of the Buddha and they take the five hundred monks back to the latter; when Devadatta awakens, he notes his solitude and dies of chagrin. On the return of the repentant schismatics, the Blessed One defines the manner with which they should be treated, i.e. indulgently. Numerous variations of details are noticeable in the two texts, as well as the addition of some secondary scenes in one or the other. Moreover, three Jātaka-type tales are inserted in the Dhammaguptaka’s account and four in that of the Mahiśāsakas, only two being common to both versions; the

Buddha uses them to show his monks that Devadatta and his five hundred monks had already behaved in a similar manner in some of their previous lives.

We again find the above three episodes in the Pāli text of the Theravādins, but it adds many others, the majority of which are clearly aimed at blackening the personage of Devadatta, making him a hateful criminal. The first part recounts at great length the circumstances which led seven young Śākyans and their barber Upalī to become monks and later acquire various spiritual advantages; Devadatta appears there as only a very minor character, hardly mentioned at all, much less important than Anuruddha and Bhaddiya who occupy the front of the stage; all that we learn about him is that he was a young Śākyan, that he received the monastic ordination (pabbajjā) and that shortly afterwards, due to his own efforts, he acquired the supernormal power (iddhi) of ordinary people (pāthujjānīka).

Devadatta uses this power to attract the favours of Prince Ajatashatru, who later drives to kill his father, King Bimbisāra, in order to take his place on the throne of Magadha. As for himself, he hopes to replace the Buddha at the head of the monastic community and he impudently proposes this to him in front of the assembly of monks, arguing that the Blessed One has become old and tired, and that he should now enjoy a peaceful retirement. The Buddha’s resolute and scornful refusal having cruelly hurt his pride and stirred his hatred, Devadatta then decides to kill his master, first by having him assassinated by two hired killers, then by throwing a rock at him from the top of the Vulture Peak, finally by having him crushed by an intoxicated elephant, but all these attempts fail, since the Buddha is protected by his supreme holiness.

The three episodes already narrated by the Mahiśāsakas and Dhammaguptakas are placed at the end of the Theravādīn account,
and in the order in which they were in the two preceding texts; hence, as is logical, Devadatta dies of chagrin at the end of these three accounts. If the Pāli version adds some new episodes consisting especially of instructions given by the Blessed One to his monks, it is also distinguished from the preceding two by the insertion of a single Jātaka-type story, which was already present in the Mahiśāsaka and Dharmaguptaka versions and must have been the only one to appear in the common account from which all three are derived.

The Sarvāstivādin text, placed in a slightly different order, contains the majority of the episodes narrated by the Theravādins which we have just examined. It lacks a scene in which the Blessed One teaches the monks how the five hundred disciples of Devadatta brought back by Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana should be treated, and in particular the long series of episodes with which the Pāli account opens, telling of the ordination of the seven young Śākyans and the circumstances which led up to it.

For the Sarvāstivādins, it is replaced by a quite different and much shorter series, centred on Devadatta, narrating his solemn ordination, his exemplary conduct for twelve years, which enables him to acquire a perfect knowledge of the teaching, then his wish to obtain supernormal powers: he goes to the Buddha and asks him to teach them to him, but his master refuses, foreseeing the wrong use to which he will put them; Devadatta then addresses the same request to the greatest disciples, one by one since they all refuse him, except for Ananda who satisfies his desires.

Some new episodes also appear in the Sarvāstivādin version: first of all, greed increases in Devadatta, fanned by the offerings heaped on him by Prince Ajātasatru, then pride arises in him to the point where he considers succeeding the Blessed One as head of the Community; as his vices grow, his supernormal powers decrease.

While staying in the land of the Cedis, Maudgalyāvana learns of this retrogression from a friendly deity, then from his own meditation, and he goes to report the matter to the Buddha. Slightly later the virtuous monks complain of being deprived of sufficient alms by the people of Rājagṛha who reserve all their generosity for Devadatta and his disciples, so the Buddha announces a rule concerning the equitable distribution of alms. Later again, the Blessed One performs various wonders in order to divert the inhabitants of Rājagṛha from their excessive admiration of Devadatta and bring them back to himself. Finally, the Sarvāstivādins narrate four Jātakas, two of which already appeared in the Mahiśāsakas' text and one of these two also in that of the Dharmaguptakas.

If we use only these different versions of the chapter on sanghabhedā contained in the Skandhakas, we could reconstruct the development of Devadatta's legend according to three main stages:

1) This personage is not named (Mahāsāṃghikas) and his responsibility for an attempt at schism is unknown or disregarded. Moreover, the chapter is reduced to a few indispensable definitions addressed by the Buddha to Upāli.

2) Devadatta provokes a division in the Community, since he considers the monks' conduct to be insufficiently austere, and he comes up against the Blessed One's indulgence which seems to him excessive. He draws in his wake five hundred monks, but Śāriputra and Maudgalyāvana go to expound the good word to them and return them to the heart of the Community, this setback causing the death of Devadatta (Mahiśāsakas and Dharmaguptakas). His only wrong was to have provoked this temporary division of the Sangha, by demonstrating that he was more strict than the Buddha himself, but nothing leads us to think that he was other than sincere and that his action was nothing but pure
of bad intentions.

3) Devadatta is truly devoured by greed, pride and ambition although, according to the Sarvāstivādins, he had been a monk of exemplary conduct and great knowledge for twelve years, whereas, if we are to believe the Theravādins, his passions were revealed shortly after his ordination. He wishes to replace the Buddha at the head of the Community, he becomes a mere tool in the hands of Prince Ajātaśatru, whom he incites to dethrone and kill his father Bimbisāra in order to reign more quickly in his place. Three times he tries to kill the Blessed One or have him killed and, if he fails, he nevertheless causes the Buddha’s blood to flow (Theravādins, Sarvāstivādins). He therefore commits two of the five most serious offences, the fruition of which is immediate (ānantaryya), namely, schism and a flow of blood from the body of the Buddha, and he is in fact even responsible for another offence of this kind, patricide, committed by his friend Prince Ajātaśatru. The wish to accuse Devadatta of these three offences and also to have wanted to kill the Buddha is too obvious for us to have any confidence in this new portrait of the person in question; to every appearance, this is nothing but deliberate calumny, aimed at making Devadatta perfectly odious.

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Let us now see how the different versions of the chapter in the Bhikṣuvibhaṅga on the 10th and 11th samghāvaśesas narrate this story. This will enable us to make some useful comparisons with what we have just examined and analysed.

Two elements are common to all these versions. The first is a part consisting of definitions and commentaries of words and expressions, corresponding in some way to the conversation between Upāli and the Buddha which we found in all the Skandhaka texts dealing with schism. The second, which is of particular interest to us, is the part played throughout by Devadatta as a fomenter of this scission in the Community. However, if all these texts agree over the major responsibility of this personage, they differ to a lesser or greater degree over details, as was the case for the versions of the first series.

According to the Mahāsāṃghikas, Devadatta wishes to break up the Community assembled in Rājagṛha around the Buddha, and he uses all his powers of various means aimed at doing so, without, however, those means being defined. We are merely told, although in detail, that he wishes to impose rules of discipline contrary to the various classes of all those instituted by the Blessed One, that he likewise teaches points of doctrine alien to those which the Buddha expounded and explained in the nine kinds of canonical texts, and that he does so by using words, expressions and meanings quite different from those employed by his master.

Without providing the same details, these reproaches are also addressed to Devadatta by the other versions, in this series and in the preceding one, but it is clear that these accusations are a simple generalisation of all those that could be brought against any schismatic in the future, and this does not tell us much at all about Devadatta’s actions themselves in the precise circumstances in which he found himself.

In brief, by wishing to present him with the features of a typical and complete schismatic, the Mahāsāṃghikas totally neglected to transmit that precious information which would have enabled us to understand this personage, the profound reasons which led him to divide the Community and the means by which he attained that aim. Hence, they are distinguished from other authors belonging to the other schools who claimed to have informed us in detail on these various points, without however agreeing completely among themselves, as we have noted.
The rest of the Mahāsāṃghikas' text shows Devadatta successively rejecting the counsel and warnings of the virtuous monks, then those of the Blessed One. Shortly afterwards, he addresses the monks of the ‘group of six’ (śadvārgika), to whom all the Vinaya Piṭakas attribute the majority of offences which lead the Buddha to promulgate new rules of discipline; not only do those six wrongful ascetics very quickly become disciples of the schismatic, the latter draws numerous other monks in his wake.

Like Devadatta, his followers reject the objuries of their brother-monks who remain faithful to the Buddha, then those of the latter in person. Finally, the Blessed One explains to the Community how it should act towards Devadatta, then towards his disciples.

The lengthy Mahāsāṇakas and Dharmaguptaka versions begin with an account of the events which culminated in the monastic ordination of the seven young Śākyans, including Devadatta, and their barber Upāli. This narrative is similar to that which opened the Theravādin text in the Skandhaka series, with many variations in detail. The Mahāsānakas and Dharmaguptakas next tell how Devadatta obtained supernormal powers and made use of them to beguile Prince Ajātaśatru, then how Maudgalyāyana learned from a friendly deity about Devadatta’s bad intentions and quickly went to inform the Buddha of them.

After which, the personage in question asked to lead the Samgha in place of the Blessed One, then aspired to impose five rules of austerity (dhūtānga) on the Community, before inciting Ajātaśatru to kill his father, then to attempt himself to kill the Buddha or have him killed by an enraged elephant (this episode is not known to the Dharmaguptakas), by hired assassins and finally by a rock. The Mahāsānikas add at the end two scenes in which the Blessed One attempts in vain to make Devadatta renounce his desire for a schism, then teaches the monks how they should treat the schismatics. As for the Dharmaguptakas, they insert in their version a legend telling of the birth of Prince Ajātaśatru, in order to introduce this personage into their account.

Hence, the Mahāsānakas and Dharmaguptakas here complement their respective versions of the Skandhakas with a majority of episodes also related by the Theravādins. The authors of these three schools therefore delved the depths of the tradition which was common to them, with the difference that some used it more fully here than in the Skandhakas, in contrast to what the others did, but the entirety of these episodes are again found in both series of each of these three schools, which serves to emphasise once again the close relationship which bound them together.

The Theravādin text is therefore much shorter here than in the Skandhakas, since it omits the long initial account of the circumstances which led to the ordination of the seven young Śākyans and Upāli. Apart from the sections common to all the schools as defined above, it contains only the following episodes: Devadatta wants to impose the five rules of austerity (dhūtānga) on the whole Community; he rejects the counsel and warnings of the good monks, then of the Blessed One himself; the latter explains to his disciples how they should treat the repentant schismatics.

The Sarvāstivādins version is also much shorter here than in the Skandhakas, evidently for the same reasons. Driven by his jealousy of the Buddha, Devadatta wishes to break up the Community, and he informs a group of friends of this; in front of the assembled monks, he tries to impose his five rules of austerity and assume command of the Samgha by citing the Blessed One’s old age; he rejects the objuries of the virtuous monks, then those of the Buddha.
Finally, some Jātaka-type tales are inserted in certain of the texts of this series: that of the Mahāsāṃghikas contains two of them and that of the Mahīśasakas another, but none of these three has already appeared in the versions of the Skandhakas.

As we can see, in this second series the Theravādins and Sarvāstivādins narrate the essentials of Devadatta's manoeuvres in relation to a schism, as did the Mahīśasakas and Dharmaguptakas in the first series and, reciprocally, these last two schools give us here the full account of Devadatta's misdeeds, which the Theravādin and Sarvāstivādin versions contained in the Skandhaka series.

We can therefore establish more clearly that, for the common tradition used by these four schools, there were indeed two kinds of action for which Devadatta was reproached: first, those which were directly aimed at a schism, namely, the proposal to impose the five rules of austerity on all the monks, and the claim to the leadership of the Samgha in place of the Buddha; then, the actions which made Devadatta an abominable criminal, namely, the intimidation of Prince Ajātaśatru, who was driven to patricide, and the three attempts at killing the Blessed One. All the actions of the second kind are closely linked to the desire ascribed to Devadatta of leading the Community, since their goal was to do away with the Buddha, who refused to relinquish the leadership of the Samgha.

The Mahāsāṃghika text seems to have been derived from another tradition, since none of the episodes narrated by the other four schools appears in it, not even in the form of a mere allusion. It is limited to the strictest essentials, namely that Devadatta provokes a schism, without supplying any precise details on the reasons which drive him to act in this way nor on the means he uses to attain this end, that is, on the proposals he presents in the assembly of monks and which divide the latter: imposition of the five dhūtāṅgas, then replacement of the Blessed

One by himself at the head of the Community.

It might be considered that the Mahāsāṃghikas were content to summarise this last tradition by suppressing all the elements which they judged superfluous, but, as we have seen, they immediately after give numerous details on all the points of discipline and doctrine where Devadatta is in disagreement with, even in opposition to, the Buddha, that is, on absolutely everything.

This excess of detail, by means of which they wish to make that personage a complete contrast to the Blessed One, 'the anti-Buddha' we could say, the resolved destroyer of his master's entire dispensation, is evidently a generalising fiction which certainly has its place in a Vinaya Pitaka and of which, moreover, we find parallels in all the other versions, but it hides from us the real, limited and precise manoeuvres for which Devadatta was then reproached. The Mahāsāṃghikas' silence on this subject is an enigma to us.

Was their tradition truly unaware of how that personage had caused this schism? Had it forgotten? Had it still not conceived it? Did the Mahāsāṃghikas have other reasons for suppressing these actions of Devadatta? We must not lose ourselves in conjecture, but their silence makes somewhat suspect the precise accusations brought by the other four schools against the means employed by Devadatta to break up the Community, namely, the imposition of the five rules of austerity on all the monks and the claim to the place occupied by the Buddha at the head of the Samgha.

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In brief, the only elements on which all these texts agree are that the first schism was carried out by a certain Devadatta, in Rāja-grha during the lifetime of the Buddha.
The historicity of this personage might be questioned, were it not that we possess the later, but precise and undoubted evidence of two great Chinese pilgrims, Fa-hsien at the beginning of the fifth century, and Hsüan-tsang in the second quarter of the seventh century. The former found, near Śrāvastī, a community of disciples of Devadatta, who paid homage to the last three predecessors of the Buddha, but not to the latter.1 Showing their scorn for the Lord Gautama, they indirectly confirmed the difference which had set their founder against his former master and which had led him to separate from him and form his own community. Hsüan-tsang records the existence of followers of the latter in three monasteries in Bengal, where they lived and abstained from milk and curds, thus displaying their adherence to a stricter diet than that of other Buddhist monks.2 This fact tends to prove that the true reason for the schism from which their school emerged was indeed Devadatta's will to impose on the whole Community certain austerities of a dhūtāṅga type.

We can note another interesting point: neither the Mahāsāṃghikas nor the Sarvāstivādins make the slightest allusion to Devadatta's belonging to the Śākyan clan nor, even less so, to his kinship with the Buddha. Neither is the latter mentioned anywhere in the texts of the Theravādins, Mahāśāskas and Dhammaguptakas. Consequently, it is most doubtful that this personage was a Śākyan, and even more so that he was a relative of the Buddha as later works were to claim, without for all that agreeing on the names of his father, the Buddha's brother, or of his own brothers, which is significant.

From all this we can deduce, with a high degree of credibility if not certainty, two points: a certain monk named Devadatta provoked a schism in the Community in Rājagaha, taking with him a quite considerable group of disciples, but nonetheless much less than the majority of the Sangha, who remained faithful to the Buddha; contrary to what the accounts in the Vinaya Piṭakas give us to understand, the school thus constituted did not rapidly disappear with the ignominous death of its founder but lasted for more than ten centuries, as is proved by the evidence of Fa-hsien and especially Hsüan-tsang; Devadatta was not a Śākyan but probably a Magadhan, which would explain at least in part the success of the schism among the monks of Rājagaha.

With a lesser degree of certainty, but with nevertheless a high level of probability, we can place certain other elements which appear in several of our texts and which seem to confirm later reasoning. It is highly likely that Devadatta had been a monk enjoying a good and solid reputation, that he had therefore deserved the respect of his brother-monks because of his years of ordination and his qualities, particularly of his austerity. Without that, he would hardly have had any chance of taking in his wake a considerable group of disciples in order to form a school which was to last for at least a thousand years. This makes all the more probable the accusation brought against him by four of the five texts of having wanted to impose on all the monks five kinds of austere practices (dhūtāṅga), but we will return to this further on.

It is also very probable that this schism occurred before the decease or Parinirvāṇa of the Buddha. This would in fact distinguish it essentially from all the similar events that divided the Community after the Buddha’s disappearance, without their authors being truly accused of having caused samghabhedaśas and hence of having broken away completely and definitively from

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1 Fa–hien, Kao sêng ja hsien chuan T 2085, p.86a; Samuel Beal, Travels of Fa–hien and Sung–yun, London 1869, p.82.
the Samgha.

The basic difference is that, in the case of Devadatta, the Community was undoubtedly united under the authority of the still living Buddha, whereas, in all the other cases, the absence of this unifying factor allowed each of the groups resulting from the division of the Samgha to claim they remained faithful to the Blessed One’s teaching and therefore represented the orthodoxy or orthopraxis depending on the subject of litigation.

Moreover, it is extremely probable that the event in question occurred towards the end of the Buddha’s life, when he was already old and tired, as we are clearly led to believe by the arguments ascribed to Devadatta in order to justify his claim to replace his master at the head of the Samgha. This would explain why the schismatic, obviously much younger than the Blessed One, had had the time to acquire a good reputation and the authority which enabled him to take a considerable and resolute group of monks in his wake.

This would also clarify his desire to impose the five dhá-tángas: in this way he wished to return to the austere practice of Buddhism of the early days, when the Buddha was a young master, full of vigour and energy, of a small band of young ascetics as fervent and decided as him to attain Nirvána quickly, able to be satisfied with what was strictly necessary for survival. At that time, the Ganges basin had not yet experienced economic prosperity brought by urbanisation and political concentration, the young Buddha was not yet well enough known to be the object of a real cult and the generosity of powerful princes and wealthy merchants.

What Devadatta implicitly reproaches the Buddha for, by wishing to return to these earlier practices, is to have gradually given way, under the influence of the tiredness of old age and pressures exerted as much by wealthy lay donors as by monks too attached to worldly things, to an indulgence which he, Devadatta, considers as a form of laxity, as a danger to the future of the Community and of Buddhism as a whole.

By allowing ourselves to be obfuscated by all the canonical texts, particularly those of the Theravādins preserved alone or nearly so in their original Indian language, we too often forget that the Buddha lived for quite a long time after the Enlightenment and would have experienced a certain normal evolution of character and mind, as well as the rather rapid transformation of the Gangetic society and civilisation of his era. In brief, what Devadatta wanted was a return to the pure sources of Buddhism which emerged at the occasion of the Enlightenment and which, if they had not dried up with time, at least half a century, had nonetheless lost a part of their power and become in some way bogged down and denatured.

The authors of the Vinaya Piṭaka texts lived after the Parinirvāna, as is proved by their belonging to various schools whose origins, at least for three of them, postdate the reign of Aśoka. They therefore lived in a period when the mode of existence of the Community had much changed. They dwelt in monasteries or they benefited from material comforts much superior to those known to the Buddha’s very first disciples, and they considered that as wholly just, wholly in conformity with the teachings of the Blessed One, because the Samgha had gradually become accustomed to it over the course of time.

They therefore could not understand the meaning of the reform which Devadatta had claimed to impose on all the monks two centuries or more earlier, that return to the original austerity, which seemed unbearable to them. For them, the intentions of that personage could but be bad, dictated not by excessive virtue but by the will to harm the Buddha and his disciples, by hatred,
by jealousy, by pride.

How could one claim to obliged the monks, all the monks, to practise those austerities, to eat only food received as alms (the four Sthaviravādin versions), not to eat flesh or fish (idem), to have no other roof than the leaves of trees (idem) or to live as forest ascetics (āranyaka) (Theravādins), to wear only rags picked up from the dust (pāṃśukūla) (Theravādins, Dharmaguptakas, Sarvāstivādins), to have only one meal a day (Sarvāstivādins), not to eat salt (Mahiśāsakas, Dharmaguptakas), not to consume curdled milk (idem)? Unable to give up their life, far more coddled than that of the first disciples, they accused him who had wanted to impose such renunciations on their distant predecessors of having acted in pure maliciousness, and, in order to justify further their resentment and condemnation of his action, they invented other crimes, from all evidence extremely serious, of which he was purportedly the author.

We might now think that the schism for which Devadatta was supposedly to blame was one of the very first episodes, occurring during the Buddha's lifetime and precisely towards its end, of the long battle which set the rigorists against the laxists throughout the history of Buddhism, at the very heart of the monastic Community. This battle gave rise to sometimes violent conflicts and it was the major theme of various predictions (vyākarana) attributed to the Blessed One on the subject of the decline of Buddhism, a decline the cause of which is always defined as the progressive abandonment of the ascetic life by the monks.

That this first schism took place in Rājagṛha is also not lacking in significance. The attempt at reform desired by Devadatta in the direction of a return to the early austerity may in fact be interpreted as a reaction against the easiness of material existence from which the Samgha in Rājagṛha began to benefit towards the end of the Blessed One's life.

This easiness was the consequence of the political and consequently economic rise of the kingdom of the Magadhas in the second half of the fifth century BCE, and the cult which all or part of the royal family of the land, naturally imitated by the population, then developed for the person of the Buddha and the monks his disciples, thus laying the basis of the Buddhist religion.

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3 As a result of the most recent research concerning the date of the Buddha's life, I think that this took place wholly in the fifth century BCE and that the Parinirvāṇa occurred in about 460, within more or less a few years, and not in about 480 as I used to believe. The results of the latest archaeological excavations in the Ganges basin seem to be determinants for lowering this date by nearly a century.
DID HSÜAN-TSANG MEET THE FOLLOWERS OF DEVADATTA?

Paola G. Tinti

With the arrival in India of the Chinese pilgrim Fa-hsien in 400 CE, a tradition began of Chinese monks willing to travel to the subcontinent to find original versions of sacred books, visit Buddhist sites and learn Sanskrit. These monks collected an enormous amount of information regarding the regions they visited and the people they met, with special regard to Buddhism, and reported on them in their memoirs. For this reason their descriptions are of incomparable value for the study of the history and religions of the areas they visited.

A long time after Fa-hsien’s journey another monk, Hsüan-tsang, came to India between 629 and 645. Unlike his predecessor, Hsüan-tsang extensively toured Pundavardhana, Kamārūpa, Samatata, Tāmralipti and Karnasuvarna1. Accordingly, his account of the eastern part of the subcontinent2 is rich in interesting data and is considered the most important source on the condition of Buddhism in the area at the time. His account is important because there is a lack of archaeological material predating the eighth century. In fact, according to Béreau:

No document has yet been discovered which attests the presence of the Theravādins, or of any other school, in this vast region, so that, were it not for the testimonies of Hsüan-tsang and I-ching, it could be doubted that this part

1 I use the form of geographical names as restored by Watters 1905: 184, 186, 188, 190 and 191.
2 Beal, trans, 1884, 2194–204.
of India was converted to Buddhism before it was governed by the Pāla kings from the eighth century on (Bareau, 1981, 2).

Moreover, when Hsūan-tsang returned to China, one of his disciples, the monk Hui-li, compiled his biography\(^3\) so that we have a very important secondary source available\(^4\). This biography is of great value since it can be considered a supplement to Hsūan-tsang’s own account: ‘What is obscure or half told in one is made clear in the other\(^5\).

While travelling around Kārṇa-suvarṇa, Hsūan-tsang, who otherwise mostly met monks who followed the Shāvīra school in East India\(^6\), found that:

There are believers and heretics alike amongst them. There are ten sāṅghārāmas or so, with about 2000 priests. They study the Little Vehicle of the Sammatiya (Ching-tiang-pu) school. There are fifty Dēva temples. The heretics are very numerous. Besides these there are three sāṅghārāmas in which they do not use thickened milk (ū lok) following the directions of Dēvadatta. By the side of the capital is the sāṅghārāma called Lo-to-wei-chi (Raktavīti), the halls of which are light and spacious, the storeyed towers very lofty. In this establishment congregate all the most distinguished, learned, and celebrated men of the kingdom (Beal 1993, 2: 201-2).

Some differences can be found in the narrative of the memoirs and the biography of Hsūan-tsang with respect to the numbers of temples and monks the pilgrim found in Kārṇa-suvarṇa,\(^7\) but this can easily be considered a minor imprecision and there is no reason to believe this part of the journey did not take place. Likewise, although Watters states that Hsūan-tsang’s ‘.. location of Kārṇa-suvarṇa.. is not in agreement with the rest of the narrative, and we must apparently regard that place as 700 li to the north-east instead of north-west of Tāmralipi\(^8\), this discrepancy does not undermine the overall legitimacy of Hsūan-tsang’s report.

Hsūan-tsang’s reference to a sect of Devadatta’s disciples is of interest. According to the Pāli Canon, Devadatta was the son of a maternal uncle of the Buddha, who had been converted by the Buddha himself when he visited Kapilavatthu after the Enlightenment\(^9\). After years in which he had become a respected member of the Sangha, Devadatta is said to have started a series of manoeuvres, including three attempted murders, in order to take control of the Sangha from the Buddha. The enmity between the

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3 Beal, trans., 1911.
4 For what concerns the part of the pilgrim’s journey to East India, the order of the trip is very differently told in the two books. According to the biography, instead of following the Puṇḍava-rāhulā, Kāmārūpa, Sāmatātu, Tāmralipi and Kārṇa-suvarṇa itinerary, Hsūan-tsang went from Puṇḍava-rāhulā south-east to Kārṇa-suvarṇa, then south-east to Sāmatātu and finally to Tāmralipi. Only much later would he have gone, if he went at all, to Kāmārūpa. In any event, there is no doubt that Kāmārūpa is described in both texts as a non-Buddhist country, thus eliminating any possible controversy on this issue.
5 Cranmer-Byng 1911, v.
6 In fact the only region where the Chinese monk met followers of the Great Vehicle is Puṇḍava-rāhulā.
7 The number of temples is identical, but the number of priests goes from 2,000 to 3,000. According to the biography, there were two temples with supposed followers of Devadatta, not three.
8 Watters 1905, 2: 192.
9 For all references to Devadatta in the Pāli Canon see: Mulalasekera 1974, I, 1106-11.
two is not limited to this life, as illustrated in many Jātakas. However, Devadatta's efforts to overthrow the Buddha resulted in failure and, when all his followers left him for the Buddha, he fell ill and eventually died swallowed up in the Avīci hell.

The Chinese monk identifies the ascetics as Devadatta's followers because they do not use thickened milk, a proscription he attributes to Devadattas although this does not agree with the account in the Pāli Vinaya Piṭaka. In the Pāli text, the five points on which Devadatta confronted the Buddha, in Pāli dhutanga\(^{10}\), do not include the exclusion of milk and its derivatives. According to the Pāli text, Devadatta declares:

It were good, Lord, if the monks, for as long as life lasted, might be forest-dwellers; whoever should betake himself to the neighbourhood of a village, sin would besmirch him. For as long as life lasts, let them be beggars for alms; whoever should accept an invitation, sin would besmirch him. For as long as life lasts, let them be rag-robe wearers; whoever should accept a robe given by a householder, sin would besmirch him. For as long as life lasts, let them live at the root of a tree; whoever should go under cover, sin would besmirch him. For as long as life lasts, let them not eat fish and flesh; whoever should eat fish and flesh, sin would besmirch him (Vinaya Piṭakam, Cullavagga, VII.3.14).\(^{11}\)

Besides that of the Theravadins, other schools have produced versions of the Vinaya which have been preserved in Chinese translation. These are:

- Mahāsārmagikas
- Mahāśāsakas
- Dharmaguptakas
- Sarvāstivādins
- Mūlasarvāstivādins.

Of the last we have a Tibetan version as well as some parts of the Sanskrit text\(^{12}\). According to Bureau, the exclusion of milk from the monk's diet is mentioned in both the Mahāśāsaka and Dharmaguptaka versions\(^{13}\). He also gives us a list of seven (or eight, depending on the method of counting) different points that, variously combined in the above Vinayas, would account for the five dhutangas of Devadatta, which are always five, but not the same five\(^{14}\). This is incompatible with my findings. Firstly, I have traced the presence of the point regarding milk in a Tibetan text\(^{15}\) as well as in a Chinese Mahāsārmghika one.\(^{16}\) Since it is the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya that survives in Tibetan it is surprising that Bureau missed this and found the same point about milk only in

\(^{10}\) This term indicates a set of practices appropriate to a scrupulous person leading to the 'shaking off' of evil dispositions or obstacles to spiritual progress. A list of 13 such practices is given in passages of the Pāli Canon where they are also discussed, together or separately. See Rhys Davids – Sude 1921–25, 342.

\(^{11}\) sādhu bhante bhikkhaṁ yāvajīvanam āruññhakaṁ āssu, yo gāmantiṁ osareyya vajjam nam phuseyya. yāvajīvanam piñcinipatukaṁ āssu, yo nimantiṁ sādīyeyya vajjam nam phuseyya. yāvajīvanam pāmsukālikā āssu, yo ganapaticivaram sādīyeyya vajjam nam phuseyya. yāvajīvanam rukkamālikā āssu, yo channaṁ

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\(^{12}\) Bureau, 1989–90, 1.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., 13.

\(^{14}\) Ibid.

\(^{15}\) Dulva, iv, f.453 as in Rockhill 1884, 87. Unfortunately Rockhill does not mention which edition of the Tibetan Vinaya he refers to, so that I cannot locate the original text. According to Rockhill the same list is in the Udānavarga, p.204.

\(^{16}\) Taishō Tripiṭaka 24: 149, text 1450, part B (text available only in Chinese). Translated for me by Glen Dudbridge, Professor of Chinese at Oxford.
the Mahāśāsaka and Dharmaguptaka versions. Secondly, in both versions of the Vinaya I examined, the list of the five points differs from any combination hypothesised by Buret, containing some elements not listed by the French scholar and some in contrast to what is generally believed was Devadatta’s philosophy. These are:

1. The cramana Gautama makes use of curds and milk; henceforth we will not make use of them, because by so doing one harms calves. (2) the cramana Gautama makes use of meat; but we will not use it, because, if one does, living creatures are killed. (3) The cramana Gautama makes use of salt; but we will not use it, because it is produced from a mass of sweat (rngul khrod-nas byung). (4) The cramana Gautama wears gowns with cut fringes; but we will wear gowns with long fringes, because by his practice the skilful work of weavers is destroyed. (5) The cramana Gautama lives in the wilds; but we will live in villages, because by his practice men cannot perform works of charity (dana) (Rockhill 1884, 87-8).17

It therefore appears that there is some confusion about Devadatta in the Buddhist literature.

Watters suggests that:

With reference to the Brethren who abstained from the use of milk, curds, and [sic: word apparently missing in Watters’ text] as articles of food our pilgrim’s statement that they did so as followers of Devadatta may have been the suggestion of a Mahāyānist Brother. All Mahāyānists are supposed to abstain from milk food, and I-Ching states expressly that it is unlawful food (Watters 1905, 2:192).

I cannot find any evidence suggesting that Mahāyānists should abstain from milk products, but even if this were the case, the attribution of this rule to Devadatta must be later. It is agreed that Devadatta was a contemporary of the Buddha, if not a relative of his, and that he attempted to divide the Order during the lifetime of the Blessed One. Following the date provided by Gombrich, the Buddha’s Parinibbāna occurred in c. 404 BCE18, but the expression «Mahāyāna» (or its equivalent in the local language) has been used by Buddhists from perhaps the first century BCE. 19. It is therefore absurd to use the term Mahāyāna in reference to Devadatta or his followers. Also, Vinaya rules are not Mahāyāna20 and all mentioned here are Sthavira, thus it would be impossible to place Devadatta in the Mahāyāna tradition on these grounds.

As for the allusion to I-ching’s work, the Chinese pilgrim outlines in a paragraph of his text the Vinaya rules followed by the Indians regarding food. He relates that food is classified as soft and hard and that each group is made of five kinds of food, milk not belonging to any of the two groups. Then he adds:

We may regard milk, cream &c., as besides the two groups of the five mentioned above; for they have no special name given in the Vinaya, and it is clear that they are not included in the proper food (Takakusu, trans., 1896, 43).

Even if this were the case, it would not account for the identi-

17 Note that in the Chinese text of the above footnote, the five points are arranged in the same way.

19 Williams 1989, 2.
20 On this point, see Gombrich 1988, 112.
fication of some ascetics as the followers of Devadatta on the basis of the exclusion of milk from their diet.

Because of the above considerations I believe that it is improbable that Hsūan-tsang ever came across any adherents who owed eating practices to Devadatta. If the followers of Devadatta ever really existed and survived their founder, to the extent that Hsūan-tsang found two or three of their monasteries as late as more than a thousand years after the decease of the Buddha, one would expect to find archaeological or textual evidence of their existence, and yet there is none. What the pilgrim might have come across is a sect of ascetics who followed a particular diet which excluded milk. Because of the Mahāśāṃghika Vinaya that he probably knew (since it had already been translated into Chinese), Hsūan-Tsang may have assumed that these were followers of Devadatta. Moreover, Chinese people do not traditionally use dairy products, so Hsūan-tsang may have been particularly sensitive on this issue and been happy to find some ascetics who appeared to him to follow this Chinese tradition.

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EKOTTARĀGAMA (XXII)

Translated from the Chinese Version by
Thích Huyễn-Vi and Bhikkhu Pāśādika
in collaboration with Sara Boin-Webb

Tenth Fascicle
Part 19
(Supplication)\[1\]

2. \[2\]Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in
the Vārāṇasī District, at the Rṣis' Deer Park\[3\]. Then the Exalted
One said to the bhikkus:\[4\]: There are these two modes of behaviour
(vṛtti) which a person in quest of the [highest] truth should avoid.
Which are the two? Desiring, craving for objects of sensual
pleasure which by its very nature (dharma) is low, vulgar and
unprofitable. On the other hand, all [sorts of] mortification

\[pīdana\], many acts of harming (vihimsana) and endless [tor-
menting] thoughts. These are the two modes of behaviour which
a person in quest of the [highest] truth should avoid. Having
given up these two modes of behaviour, on my own I gained
the highest truth and became fully enlightened. Vision arose,
superknowledge (abhiññā) arose, my mind became [truly] calm. I
obtained all supernormal powers (rddhi) and realised the fruition
of reclusehip — Nirvāṇa.

Now what is the supreme path leading to Full Enlightenment,
making for vision, for superknowledge, for one's mind to become
[truly] calm, for obtaining all supernormal powers and for
realising the fruition of reclusehip — Nirvāṇa? It is this very
noble eightfold path, viz. extraordinary (adhika) views, extra-
ordinary prevention (pratikāra), extraordinary speech, extra-
ordinary bodily action, extraordinary livelihood, extraordinary
skill in means (upāya-kausālya), extraordinary mindfulness,
extraordinary concentration\[7\]. This is what is called the supreme
path.

At this time I have become fully enlightened, vision has
arisen, superknowledge has arisen, my mind has become [truly]
calm, I have obtained all supernormal powers and realised the
fruition of reclusehip — Nirvāṇa. Therefore, O bhikkus, one
should train to give up the above-mentioned two modes of
behaviour and practise in accordance with the supreme path.—

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1. The first sūtra of Part 19, to which this subtitle refers, was translated into
French by A. Bareau in his article ‘Les débuts de la prédication du Buddha
selon l’Ekottara-āgama; see Bulletin de l’École française d’Extrême-
Orient LXXVI (Paris 1988), p.78ff.; Bareau also refers to this sūtra in his paper
‘Le Buddha et Uruvilva’ in Indianisme et Bouddhisme, Mélanges offerts à Mgr.
Étienne Lamotte, Louvain-la-Neuve 1980, p.5ff.
2. See T2, 593b24 ff.; Hayashi, p.162ff. Cf. S V, p.420ff. (Dhamma-
cakkavattatā—Vagga); Hayashi, ibid., additionally mentions as parallel M I, 160ff.
(Ariyapariyesanasutta) the relevant portion of which, however, cannot be
regarded as either a textual or thematic parallel to the present EA passage.
3. The Chinese has what corresponds with Rṣi-mrgādāya, not with Rṣipatana
Mṛgadāva.
5. Lit. ‘a student of the Way’ (學道者) for pabbajita; for antā (‘extremes’
the Chinese has 事 (‘action’, also = vṛtti).
6. It is noteworthy that EA here does not have anything corresponding to self-
mortification (ātmakāmāhī = 自苦行).
7. Cf. BSR II 2, p.15, n.15, where four versions of the āryaśīṣṭāṅgikamārga, all
differing slightly from each other, are referred to. A remarkable innovation with
the wording in this fifth version is the change from ‘right’ (sāmyaṅc = 正) to
‘extraordinary’ (adhika = 等).
After listening to the Buddha's words, the bhiksus were pleased and respectfully applied themselves to practice.’

4. “Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Śrāvasti, at Jetr’s Grove, in Anāthapiṇḍada's Park. Then the Exalted One said to the bhiksus: In the world there are these two living beings (dehin) who are not frightened when becoming aware of lightning and thunder. Which are these two living beings, O monks, who are found in the world and who do not experience fright on becoming aware of lightning and thunder, are the lion, king of beasts, and the arhat with whom the malign influences have come to an end (kṣīṇāsrava).

Therefore, O monks, one should train to become an arhat with whom the malign influences have come to an end. Thus, O bhiksus, one should actually train. — After listening to the Buddha’s words, . . . applied themselves to practice.’

5. “Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Śrāvasti, . . . Then the Exalted One said to the bhiksus: There are these two modes of behaviour (dharma) which do not allow of a person’s being wise. Which are the two? (1) To have an aversion to consulting experienced and capable persons and (2) to be much given to slothfulness (middha) and lethargy (avīrya-citta). These are, monks, the two modes of behaviour that do not allow of a person’s being wise. There are, therefore, two modes of behaviour which allow of a person’s obtaining perfect wisdom. Which two? (1) To be eager in asking others to clarify something and (2) to be full of vivacity rather than sloth. It is, O bhiksus, these two modes of behaviour which allow of a person’s being wise.

One should train to overcome [the above-mentioned] modes of karmically unwholesome behaviour. Thus, O monks, one should actually train. — After listening to the Buddha’s words, . . . applied themselves to practice.’

6. “Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Śrāvasti, at Jetr’s Grove, in Anāthapiṇḍada’s (T2, 595a) Park. Then the Exalted One said to the bhiksus: There are two modes of behaviour which render a person poor and destitute. Which are the two modes? (1) When seeing others practising generosity (dana), preventing this and, moreover, (2) being oneself unwilling to be generous. These are, O monks, the two modes of behaviour rendering a person poor and destitute. Then, monks, there are two modes of behaviour rendering a person estimable. Which two? (1) When seeing a person distributing things to others, gladly supporting him [or her in this charitable act] and (2) oneself taking delight in being generous. These are, bhiksus, the two modes of behaviour rendering a person estimable.

Thus, O monks, one should train in practising generosity and in overcoming of acquisitiveness. — After listening to the Buddha’s words, . . . applied themselves to practice.’

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Thanks are due to Peter Skilling, Nonthaburi, Thailand, who has kindly provided the following pieces of information (his letter of 15 April 97): ‘There are a few interesting correspondences between...’
the Ta pao tsang ching, The Storehouse of Sundry Valuables, translated by Charles Willemen (BDK English Tripitaka 10 I [Berkeley 1994]) and EA:


NEWS & NOTES

UKABS Meeting

The first Annual General Meeting of the UK Association for Buddhist Studies will be held at SOAS (London University) on 30 June. The two guest speakers, Profs Richard Salomon (University of Washington, Seattle) and Tim Barrett (SOAS), will speak respectively on 'The British Library Kharoṣṭhī Manuscripts and their Implications for the Hypothesis of a Gandhārī Canon' and 'Did I-ching go to India? Problems in using I-ching as a source for South Asian Buddhism'.

Further details from Dr Peter Harvey, Reader in Buddhist Studies, School of Social and International Studies, University of Sunderland, Chester Road, Sunderland, Tyne & Wear SR1 3SD (tel. 0191-515 2174; e-mail: peter.harvey@sunderland.ac.uk).

Conference on Buddhism, Science and Psychotherapy

A conference entitled The Psychology of Awakening was held at Dartington Hall, Devon, November 7-10 1996, and brought together thinkers and practitioners in a three way dialogue between Buddhism, Cognitive Science and Psychotherapy. This presented an opportunity to enquire into such topics as the relationship between Buddhist and Western theories of mind, the Buddhist quest for enlightenment and psychology's understanding of 'endarkenment', and the use of awareness practices in psychotherapy. Interest in such topics was apparent as conference places swiftly filled long before the day, finally attracting a waiting list over twice as long as the number of participants, leaving many people disappointed.

In the event an impressive international list of speakers presented their current ideas. On the scientific side Francisco Varela introduced the possibility of a science of interbeing involving a broad view of mind fully in tune with Buddhism. Sue Blackmore explored the idea of self as a persistent meme, a unit of information like a gene stored in the brain. On a practical level Jon Kabat Zinn spoke of the integration of Buddhist mindfulness practice in his work in mainstream medical fields,
while John Welwood suggested that a dialogue between Buddhism and psychotherapy may not be entirely a one-way street, and that Western psychotherapeutic skills may have a part to play for Buddhist practitioners in the West. On a more personal level, Robin Skynner delighted the audience in sharing his experience of life as a therapist. Around these plenary presentations unfolded a wide range of parallel talks and workshops. Amongst those presenting papers were Stephen Batchelor, Guy Claxton, Thubten Jinpa, John Crook, Christopher Titmuss, Maura Sills, Leon Redler and many others. Broadly speaking these presentations fell into three major divisions: those addressing broader philosophical issues such as suffering and awakening, discourse concerning concepts of the self, and many practical presentations arising from the interface of Buddhism and Western psychotherapies in action.

It was a weekend of great richness, so much so, in fact, that the major criticism amongst the congratulations expressed in the final gathering was that the fare had been too plentiful with insufficient time for reflection and open discussion. Perhaps this may be remedied at the next conference which is scheduled for November 1998 on the theme of Buddhism, Self and Society. It will again be held at Dartington Hall. A book of papers from the 1996 conference is also in preparation.

(Report by Gay Watson)

Lecture Series at SOAS

In his capacity as the Bukkyō Dendō Kyōkai Visiting Professor and sponsored by the Department of the Study of Religions, Dr A. Piattigorsky delivered a series of ten lectures on the 'Philosophy and Terminology of Early Buddhism' between mid-January and mid-March.

Under the auspices of the Circle of Inner Asian Art (based in the Dept of Art and Archaeology), Prof. Boris Stavisky from the Russian State University for Humanities, Moscow, was the guest speaker on two occasions in March. Based upon long experience as a fieldworker in the former Soviet Central Asian republics, he spoke on 'Kushan Bactria-Tokharistan: problems of history, culture and art', 'The Archaeology of Central Asia and the "Kushan Question" in the light of research carried out between 1966 and

1993' and 'The Fate of Buddhism in Middle Asia in the First Millennium as reflected in archaeological data'. Summaries in English were circulated at the meetings although simultaneous translation was arranged. The New Year had opened with an illustrated talk by Dr Mary Stewart on 'Chinese Pilgrim Monks and Inner Asian Monasteries' which was essentially based on Hsuan-tsang's memoirs (translated by S. Beal as Buddhist Records of the Western World). Future lectures (at 6.00pm) in Room B 102, Brunei Building, will include the 'Chronology and Iconography at Tabo' (Prof. Deborah Klimburg-Salter, 1 May) and the 'Developing World of Iranian Buddhism' (Dr David Scott, 11 June), followed by a seminar on 'The Forgeries of Dunhuang Manuscripts' on 3 July (5.30 - 7.00) in the Lecture Theatre in the main building of SOAS.

It is apposite to cite last year's publication of Les Arts de l'Asie Centrale. La Collection Pelliot du Musée Guimet by the Réunion des Musées Nationaux, Paris, with the text in English translation produced by Serindia Publications, London. Under the general editorship of Jacques Giès (who is also the main contributor), the two French volumes include 457 colour plates and 196 black and white illustrations of the entire collection of paintings, sculptures and textiles brought back by Paul Pelliot, mainly from Dunhuang. This publication complements Roderick Whitfield's equally definitive three-volume study of The Art of Central Asia. The Stein Collection in the British Museum. For a brochure and details of the limited edition of the French compilation, contact Serindia Publications, 10 Parkfields, London SW15 6NH; tel: 0181-788 1966 or fax 0181-785 4789.

A special two-part symposium — 'Silk Road Archaeology in the Twentieth Century (highlighting the work of Aurel Stein)' and 'International Scholarship on the Discoveries' — will feature during the proceedings of the 35th International Congress of Asian and North African Studies. These will be held in Budapest during 7-12 July.

Inner Asia

This annual (price £15) represents 'Occasional Papers of the Mongolia and Inner Asia Studies Unit' at the University of
Cambridge and is devoted to original research on the history, cultures, politics, economics and religions of Mongolia, Tuva, Buryatia, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Hoh-nuur and adjacent areas. Further details may be obtained from the Secretary of the Unit, Ms Annik Williams, c/o Faculty of Oriental Studies, Sidgwick Ave, Cambridge CB3 9DA (tel. 01223 335102).

Recent News from the Pali Text Society

Following the success of K.R. Norman’s revised version of the grammatical portion of Wilhelm Geiger’s Pāli Literature and Language, the Society is funding the translation of a new Pāli grammar by V. Perniola. A.K. Warder’s new edition of the translation of the Patisambhidāmagga is now available at £30.50.

Last year the Society published K. R. Norman: Collected Papers VI, Indexes to the Dhammapada, Index to the Vinaya-Piṭaka and Aṅguttaranikāyaṭṭikā I. Two books which have long been unavailable have also been reprinted: Mabel Bode’s edition of the Sūsanavāsa and Mrs Rhys David’s translation of the Dhammapada and the Khuddakapāṭha, collected together in Minor Anthologies I. All four volumes of Minor Anthologies are now available and, as with all sets of PTS books, a discounted price applies when a complete set is purchased at a single time. Works so far published in 1997 include a critical edition of the Bhesajjamaṇṭúsas by Jinadasa Liyanaratne, a new translation of the Dhammapada by Prof. Norman, and a paperback volume of his translation of the poems of the Theragāthā. Other works expected to be published in 1997 include the second volume of Peter Skilling’s study of the Tibetan Mahāśūtra-s, an edition and translation of the Therīgāthā-athakathā by William Fruitt, and a critical edition and translation of the Therī-apadāṇa by Sally Mellick Cutler.

OBITUARIES

U Thittila (10 July 1896 - 3 January 1997)

Undoubtedly the seniormost Theravādin bhikkhu, with 81 vassas to his credit (despite an understandable hiatus during the Second World War when he served as a stretcher bearer throughout the ‘blitz’ in London), this learned and revered sayadaw passed away peacefully in Rangoon (Yangon) in his 101st year.

He was born in the village of Padiya, Piyawbwe District in central Burma, just ten years after the country’s complete subjugation to the British Crown. In an atmosphere where education was in the hands of the bhikkhus, it was natural for the second son of U Aye and Daw Htwe to be impressed by the gentle piety of his elders and the teachings of the Pāli texts imparted by his main teacher, Sayadaw U Kavinda, who ordained him at fifteen. His vocation was confirmed when he heard a Dhammaadesanā on the Abhidhamma in Mandalay. Under Sayadaw U Okkantha he received the upasampadā ordination in Moulmein in 1916.

Soon after, he entered the Masoyein Monastic College in Mandalay where, after two years’ intensive study under Sayadaw U Ādīccavamsa, he was selected (from an entry of 5,000 candidates) as the Pāthamayaw Scholar of all Burma. He then entered the Pariyattisasanahita (the highest Burmese monastic examination which entailed memorisation of no less than fifteen volumes of the Tipiṭaka) in 1923 and was one of only four who passed out of a total of 150 entrants. The immediate outcome was appointment as head of the education department and monastic school in the capital.

Ten years later he went to India where he read English and Sanskrit at Santiniketan University (1933-4) and acquired conversational English at Adyar. He was elected President of the South India Buddhist Association and for the next four years
evinced...selfless and untiring interest in the cause of the revival of Buddhism' in that region. Wanting to study English educational methods, family upbringing and child training first-hand, he sailed for England in summer 1938 and accepted an invitation to deliver his maiden Dhamma talk in the country at The Buddhist Society, London. To improve his knowledge of the language he enrolled at the London Polytechnic and, later, joined Dr Stewart's Burmese-English Dictionary committee. During the War, bereft of any material support, he was obliged to accept whatever employment was forthcoming, including broadcasting on the BBC's Burma Service. He also delivered two series of seventeen talks each to the Workers' Educational Association, visited patients in hospital and inmates in prison and, finally, visited and addressed schools and even stayed with families to observe and record parental, school and societal influences and conditioning.

U Thittila's Dhammaduta career in the West began immediately after the War when, at the request of students of Buddhism, he taught the essence of the Abhidhamma via a text he had memorised prior to becoming a sāmanera, the Abhidhammathasangaha. This was systematically imparted over a period of four years. Between 1949 and 1951 he undertook over 250 teaching engagements (not including visits to Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Denmark, Norway and Sweden), apart from fulfilling the duties expected of a bhikkhu, being, moreover, the sole representative of the Sangha in the UK. During this latter period he was based at the short-lived Sāsana Kārī Vihāra, a two-roomed centre near Victoria Station financed by Burmese supporters. When funding proved insufficient to maintain this property U Thittila accepted an invitation to lecture on Abhidhamma at Rangoon University from 1952, a responsibility he carried out for the next eight years.

In Buddha Jayanti Year (1956) he was awarded the prestigious title of Aggamahāpañīta and, subsequently, attained the distinction of Abhidhajamahāraṭṭhabhuṭhu (1990) and Abhidhaja Aggamahāsaddhammājotika (1993).

In 1959 he accepted an invitation from the Association for Asian Studies (University of Michigan) to lecture on American campuses. For nearly six months he travelled alone throughout the continent delivering over 160 lectures, in addition to informal meetings, including a series of twelve lectures (ten on the Abhidhamma) at the University of Hawaii. Three trips were undertaken to Australia, the first in 1954 to Sydney and Melbourne, where he also made three radio broadcasts. Two years later he visited Japan for a month's lecture tour and discussed meditation techniques with Zen masters. He also called at Hong Kong and Singapore and, on other occasions, Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia and Nepal. Finally, he accepted personal invitations to teach Abhidhamma in England in 1964, 1982, 1983 and 1985, after which he 'retired' to his native Burma. There, due to his seniority in the Sangha, vast knowledge and practical experience, he was appointed Ovādācariya to the central council of the country's Sangha Mahānayaka, to the trustees of the Shwedagon, Sule, Kaba Aye and a majority of other pagodas in Rangoon; also examiner to the capital's Abhidhamma Propagation Committee.

During his periods in England after the War U Thittila was the guest of his devoted dāyakas and Abhidhamma students, Robert and Claudine Iggleden. The latter edited the transcripts of her teacher's talks for private publication under the title Essential Themes of Buddhist Lectures given by Ashin Thittila (Bangkok 1986) and, to honour and celebrate his 100th year (1996), she also edited A Buddhist's Companion. An Exposition and Selected Quotations of Ashin Thittila (it is from her biographical accounts that this notice was prepared). Otherwise, U Thittila contributed a
clear and concise summary of 'The Fundamental Principles of Theravāda Buddhism' to Kenneth Morgan (ed.) The Path of the Buddha (New York 1956, Delhi 1993). However, he will mainly be remembered as the translator of the Vibhaṅga as The Book of Analysis (PTS 1969, 1988). This major undertaking took two years to accomplish and successfully realised its aim of presenting, for the first time in a Western language, a Buddhist elucidation of the workings of the mind.

Throughout his long and fruitful life, he adhered to the traditional three-fold guiding principles of pariyatti, patipatti, pātivedha (learning, practice, realisation). His modest demeanour concealed a wealth of knowledge and experience which, like the incomparable teacher and exemplar he was, was imparted in the again traditional graduated (ānuṣṭambha) manner to thousands of students and enquirers throughout the world.

May he attain Nibbāna!

Chandrabhāl Tripāṭhi (1929 - 1996)

Born in Khambhāt (Cambay), Gujarāt, he was brought up as an orthodox Hindu and Sanskritist. After receiving local primary education he studied at Peṭlād College (1947) and Viṭṭhalbhāī Patēl University in Vidyānagar (1948-50) where he read Sanskrit, Psychology and English. He gained his B.A. from Bombay University in 1950, thereafter read Law for a year at L.D. Law College, Ahmedābād — doubtless to oblige his attorney father — and simultaneously practised as a high school teacher whilst majoring in Sanskrit and Ardhhamāgadhī at Vidyānagar and Gujarāt from whence he obtained his M.A. in 1954.

That year he went to Göttingen to continue Indological research under Prof. Ernst Waldschmidt. Awarded an Alexander von Humboldt Foundation scholarship for the years 1955-57, he became associated with the Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden in 1958. In the same year he married Erika Piel and in 1959 was appointed Lecturer in Modern Indian Languages at Göttingen. For his doctorate he edited and translated Fünfundzwanzig Sūtras des Niḍānasaṃyukta (published as Vol.VIII in the Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden series, Berlin 1962). He then prepared a Catalogue of the Jaina Manuscripts at Strasbourg (Leiden 1975) which was accepted as his 'habilitation' dissertation in 1971 by the Freie Universität, Berlin, to where he transferred and subsequently became Professor of Indian Philology and Art. He retired in 1989.


B.N. Puri (2 January 1916 - 26 January 1996)

One of the most distinguished historians in modern India, Baij Nath Puri gained both M.Litt and D.Phil from Oxford. He was elected President of the Indian History Congress (Ancient India) in 1959, Indian Oriental Conference (Greater India) in 1966 and Punjab History Congress, Patiala, in 1982. He subsequently occupied the Chair of Ancient Indian History and Archaeology and became Head of Department at Lucknow University, a joint
position he held for five years. He was invited to join the Editorial Board for the UNESCO-sponsored project, *History of civilizations of Central Asia*, Vol. II of which he edited with János Harmatta and G.F. Etemadi in 1994. To this he contributed Chapters 8 and 11, 'The Sakas and Indo-Parthians' and 'The Kushans', and, with others, Chapter 14, 'Religions in the Kushan Empire'. Earlier he had participated at the epoch-making conference on the Kuṣāṇas in Dushanbe in 1968 and at a subsequent meeting in Kabul in 1982. He had already written on *India under the Kuśāṇa* (Bombay 1950) and was presented with a felicitation volume in his honour, *Culture Through the Ages* (ed. S.D. Singh, Delhi 1996), but undoubtedly he will be best remembered for his masterly, if not unique, survey of *Buddhism in Central Asia* (Delhi 1987, 1993).

**BOOK REVIEWS**

The *Catalogue of Palm Leaf Manuscripts kept in the Otani University Library*, Otani University Library, Kyoto 1995. lxxxi, 778 pp. No price given.

The Otani University Library possesses a large collection of palm leaf manuscripts of Pāli texts in the Khmer, Burmese, Mon and Lan Na scripts. Of these 64, in the Khmer, Burmese and Mon scripts, were in all probability donated by the King of Siam soon after the discovery of the Buddha's relics at Pipravā in 1897. These manuscripts have cover boards (some painted) and are wrapped in beautiful Indian cloth, and consequently are in a good state of preservation. It is not known how the rest of the collection came to the Otani University Library. The majority are in the Lan Na script, but a few are in the Khmer script. Lacking cover boards, they have been kept in envelopes and are not so well preserved.

The Introduction gives, in both Japanese and English, a description of the Otani University Library collection and of the way in which the *Catalogue* was prepared. It includes 26 pages containing 44 coloured plates illustrating some of the manuscripts and showing examples of the scripts employed and also some of the cover boards and wrapping cloths. There are tables of characters and numbers in the various scripts, and a bibliography.

The collection is listed in two sections: (1) the King's collection; (2) the remainder. The first collection (pp.1-686) contains a wide range of Pāli canonical texts, excluding the Dīgha, Samyutta and Anguttara Nikāyas, and of commentaries including tiṭikās and anufiṭikās. The collection of commentaries upon Abhidhamma texts is particularly rich. There are also some non-canonical Jātakas, and a selection of historical and grammatical texts.

The second section (pp.687-744) includes the manuscripts in Lan Na script and the Khmer manuscripts not included in the King's collection. Among the latter are the Milindapañha and some Abhidhamma texts. The Lan Na manuscripts were written in a mixture of Pāli and Lan Na, the majority of them being Jātaka texts. The value of these manuscripts lies not least in the fact that few studies of the Lan Na script have been made to
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date, and it is hoped that research in this field will now make
rapid progress.

The Catalogue gives detailed information — some of it ac-
cessible only to those who can read Japanese — for each text: the
title in the original script of the text and in Roman letters; the
classification number for that text given in the Critical Pāli
Dictionary; the Otani University Library accession number; the
language of the text and the script in which it is written; the
number of pages and the form of the palm leaves, including an
indication of the colours applied to the sides of the leaves; the
condition of the leaves. The Catalogue has been made on a
computer, and the use of an optical scanner has enabled the
compilers to include the first 1/2 lines and the last 1/2 lines of
each text in the original script. The final piece of information
concerns the relationship between the palm leaf text and
published texts, e.g., the equivalent pages in the PTS edition. Use
of the Catalogue is facilitated by a List of Titles, also in two
sections (pp.745-69 and 770-3), and an Index covering both
sections (pp.775-8).

T.W. Rhys Davids founded the Pali Text Society in 1881 for
the purpose of editing in Pāli, and if possible of translating into
English, such Pāli books as still existed in manuscripts preserved
in Europe or Asia, in order to render accessible to students the
rich stores of the earliest Buddhist literature which were lying
unedited and practically unused. He could have added ‘and
unknown’, for at that time very few libraries had catalogued their
holdings of manuscripts in Pāli and other South Asian languages.
In the century since the foundation of the PTS, lists and cata-
logues of manuscripts have been steadily appearing in the
Society’s Journal or as independent publications, and the holdings
of libraries of universities and other institutions are slowly be-
coming better known. It is clear that the Otani University Library
possesses a valuable collection of palm leaf manuscripts and now
that this beautiful and impressive catalogue has been published
we may expect to see an increasing number of scholars making
use of them.

K.R. Norman

The Dīgha Nikāya and its Commentaries. Dhammagiri-Pāli-
Ganthamālā, Volumes I-II. Vipassana Research Institute, Igatpuri
1993-95.

After the Sixth Council, which was held in Rangoon 1954-56, the
texts which had been approved at that Council were published in
an edition usually referred to as the Chaṭṭhasāṅgāyana (Sixth
Council) edition. In the 1960s the Nava Nālandā Mahāvihāra
published a Devānāgārī version of the Tipiṭaka and some of the
commentaries of this edition which, being priced very cheaply,
gave students the chance to acquire Pāli texts at a low cost. The
page numbers of the Chaṭṭhasāṅgāyana (= B⁴) and Pāli Text
Society (= E⁴) editions were printed in the margins, making it
comparatively easy to find any passage for which the page and
line number reference to either of those editions was available.
The Nālandā series has long been out of print, and copies are now
hard to come by. The Vipassana Research Institute has done a
great service by producing new versions of B⁴. The texts have
been entered into a computer and are produced from computer
printout in the Devānāgārī script. The development of font-
conversion programmes gives the chance of producing the texts
in any other script which is required. Commentaries not yet
published by the Pāli Text Society appear in Roman script.

The series has the same system of paragraph numbering as
B⁴, whereby the commentaries have the same paragraph numbers
as the text being commented upon. This means that one can
easily find the atṭhakathā or tiṅkā on any paragraph in a Tipiṭaka
text, but unlike the Nālandā editions it does not have the B⁴ or
E⁴ page numbers, so that it is very difficult to find a reference
given, say, in the Critical Pāli Dictionary, to B⁴ or E⁴ by page
and line number.

A distinctive feature of the series is the simultaneous pub-
llication of the Tipiṭaka texts with the commentarial literature, the
atṭhakathās, and the old and new tiṅkās where they exist. The
Dīgha Nikāya set may be taken as typical of the series. It consists
of eleven volumes: three volumes of nikāya, three volumes of
atṭhakathā (Sumāṅgalavilāsini), and three volumes of the old tiṅkā
(Līnānthappakāsāna), all in Devānāgārī script, and two volumes
of the Abhinava tiṅkā (on the Silakkhandhavagga) in both Deva-
nāgari and Roman scripts. Since the latter supplements the Pāli Text Society series, which lacks this text, it has at the bottom of each page references to the paragraph numbers, but not the page numbers, of Ej of the Digha Nikāyā.

The Publisher's Note prefixed to some of the volumes gives a description of the painstaking way in which the texts were entered into a computer and proof-read. It is therefore surprising that in the very first passage which this reviewer checked, one of particular interest to him in the Digha Nikāyā (D [Ej] III 152, 125), he found that the V.R.I edition has \textit{pabbajam} where the copy of Ej available to him reads \textit{pabbajam}. Only a detailed investigation would show whether this discrepancy is unique.

The volumes are well printed and bound. So far the Vipassana Research Institute has published in the Devanāgarī script the Dīgha, Majjhima, Samyutta, Anguttara Nikāyas and the first set of the Khuddaka Nikāyā, each with the commentarial literature. It is reported that rapid progress is being made with the remainder of the Sutta Piṭaka and the Vinaya and Abhidhamma Piṭakas. It is planned to publish, at some future date, all this material in CD-ROM form.

\textbf{K.R. Norman}


It is most gratifying that so soon after the excellent Dīgha Nikāyā translation of Maurice Walshe we now have this new rendering of Majjhima Nikāyā. In English there have been only two previous complete translations, that by Lord Chalmers now long out of print and the PTS published version by Miss I.B. Horner. When I began studying the Pāli texts in translation it was this latter version that I used and I am still grateful for the immense amount of time and effort that the learned translator spent on it. Present readers, if they do not know Pāli, are more fortunate since they can compare the present translation with Miss Horner's version. The appearance of this book, with which rather indirectly I was involved, is a cause for joy among those who would like to read an authoritative rendering with a fine array of notes based on the Pāli Commentaries.

A particularly helpful Introduction is followed by a summary of the 152 Discourses, each getting an average of five to six lines describing their contents.

The translation itself reads very well when one considers the difficulties inherent in rendering such a work, originally oral in nature and coming from such a different background to our own, into modern English. The original translation by Nānamoli was left in an unfinished and rather experimental state — this was polished by Bhikkhu Bodhi who has referred to several editions of the Tipiṭaka in order to gain the best understanding.

Everyone who reads this collection of discourses must be struck by the richness of the contents. We have here the Buddha discouraging not only to monks (bhikkhus) but also to householders, brahmins, kings and princes, various sorts of wandering ascetics — even a few of the gods. However, the vast majority are addressed to monks, 96 out of a total of 152. This of course reflects the fact that monks preserved these discourses through countless generations of bhānakas, or reciters. Discourses to the laity number only 22 or, if you count in brahmins, another 19. Wanderers of varied practices and beliefs are addressed in 12, and while a few monks address other monks, only one nun (bhikkhuni) does so. All this really does show the slanted nature of the suttas. Monks naturally preserved discourses addressed to them and those interested in them. They did not give much attention to the Buddha's discourses to the lay people. And there is hardly anywhere where the acknowledgement that a learned and well-practised laity also taught the Dhamma.

This bias must make the suttas difficult to read by the average Buddhist householder in the West. Suttas filled with exhortations to renunciation do not recognise the possibility of Awakening outside the monastic Sangha and they are not exactly reading conducive to harmonious family life! I have seen some examples of this in the course of my teaching career. Again, the kind of discourses which do address lay issues, besides being rare,
often contain only exhortations to give generously and keep the
Precepts. While these subjects are of course very important as the
basis for any religious life, yet they are not sufficient in today's
world. Readers will search in vain for examples of the Buddha
teaching meditation to lay people in these pages. Generally these
records convey the impression that the Buddha taught the pro-
duced Dhamma only to monks while most people merely
received the morality section. Whether this was actually the case
or whether distortion has occurred because of the nature of what
has been preserved in Páli, is not easy to say. However, I am
inclined to the latter. This bias towards the monastic Sangha has
to be born in mind when these suttas are read.

Here we have a finely-produced book containing inestimable
wisdom. No Buddhist can afford to be without it and its study
will provide many hours of satisfaction.

Laurence C.R. Mills

Index to the Mahāniddesa. L.S. Cousins. Pali Text Society, Oxford

The advent of powerful personal computers has led to a situation
where, after the initial labour of inputting a text into a computer
has been completed, anyone with the appropriate software can
easily generate indexes of words and pádas (both forward and
reverse), and makes analyses of metre, syntactical features, etc.
Although it has always been possible to do such things by hand,
the sheer amount of effort involved meant that such work has
rarely been done in the past, with the result that many Páli texts
lack even a basic word index.

Before one can use a computer to carry out such undertakings,
however, there still remains the problem of inputting the
texts. The invention of Optical Character Recognition (OCR)
machines held out hopes that it would no longer be necessary to
do this task manually, but a series of tests by the PTS revealed
that because of the difficulties posed by characters with diacritical
marks, the very best degree of accuracy which could be hoped
for was about 95%, which still left a very large amount of proof-
reading and correction to be done. The large-scale use of OCR by
the PTS has, therefore, been shelved until a greater degree of
accuracy can be obtained.

The index to the Mahāniddesa, begun more than ten years
ago, represents the Society's first attempt to publish an index
made in this way. The initial results were so discouraging that
there seemed little point in continuing with it. Since the hoped-for
superior equipment has not appeared in the intervening period,
however, Mr Cousins has with great persistence returned to the
task and corrected and revised his material until it was fit for
publication.

Since the words are listed as they occur, one has to have
one's wits around one when checking references. If, for example,
one is searching through the occurrences of the accusative
singular of sabba-, it is not enough to look at sabham; one must
remember that it may also occur in the forms sabham,
sabbañ and sabbban (and theoretically sabbhañ and sabbban).

The Index is complete, and when a word occurs more than
three times, the number of occurrences is given in brackets
before the page and line numbers. Readers can therefore see
that it includes 1528 occurrences of the particle ea (as well as the
occurrences of eca, e' and eà). It may not be immediately
apparent why nearly four pages should be devoted to this word,
but since the indexing programme lists them all, and it is easier
to include them rather than exclude them, there they are. It may,
however, be pointed out that ca is used in several different
senses, and anyone investigating the use of this particle may well
find a complete list of its occurrences in Mahāniddesa valuable.
Readers may also wonder why all 4920 citations of the particle
ti are listed. As the text of Mahāniddesa fills 510 pages, this works
out at approximately ten occurrences per page. Since Mahāniddesa
is a commentary, where every lemma is followed by ti, as is
every explanation, it is not surprising that the number of
instances is so high. An examination of the pattern of the
references shows, however, that ti is not distributed regularly.
Some pages have as many as 35 occurrences — those are clearly
devoted entirely to word for word commentary. Some pages have
very few or even no instances of ti. These are clearly pages
where commentary has been replaced by exegesis or narrative —
a fact not without interest for anyone making an analysis of the
structure of commentarial texts.  

K.R. Norman


Volumes XIV-XVIII of the Journal of the Pali Text Society (1990[x2], 1992[x2], 1993) were noted in an earlier issue of this journal (BSR 10, 1, 1993, pp.109-12). Sufficient material of a publishable standard was submitted to the editor to enable him to publish a second volume in 1993.

In Volume XIX Jacqueline Filliozat provides a survey (pp.1-41) of the Burmese and Siamese Pali manuscript collections in the Wellcome Institute in London, and the same author also gives a detailed account (pp.43-63) of the commentaries to the Anagatavamsa among the Pali manuscripts of the Paris collections.

Miss I.B. Horner's translation of the Vinaya Pitaka in six volumes between 1938 and 1966 was a masterpiece, but inevitably in such a vast undertaking there are errors, some trivial, some more important. The Society hopes that the short list of corrections to The Book of the Discipline provided by Thiradhanno Bhikkhu (pp.65-8) will induce other scholars to provide further lists of corrections.

In a survey of Theravadin literature in Tibetan translation (pp.69-201) Peter Skilling notes that the Kanjur contains translations of thirteen (actually fourteen, since one text comprises two) parittas and other independent Theravadin texts, and a portion of the Vimuttimagga, which is lost in Pali, while the Tanjur duplicates one of the chapters of the Kanjur (the portion of the Vimuttimagga) and also includes citations of or references to Theravadin texts within longer works. In addition, two texts, the Abhidhammatthasangaha and the Dhammapada have been translated from Pali into Tibetan in this century.

External *sandhi* in Pali is more flexible than in Sanskrit, and consequently causes more difficulties for beginners to the language, who ask in vain for a set of rules as clear-cut as those available for Sanskrit. A brief attempt to produce guidelines is given in Wilhelm Geiger's *Pali Language and Literature* (of which the second part was recently reprinted as *A Pali Gram-
considering another ten words which are either omitted from the Pali-English Dictionary, or given an incorrect meaning or etymology there, or misunderstood by translators.


In 'The Nigamānas of the Sumangalavilāsini and the Kankhāvitaranī' (pp.129-33) the new editor gives the nigamānas of these two texts, which are for unknown reasons omitted from the PTS editions. Jacqueline Filliozat continues with the task of making known the contents of the Pāli holdings in libraries, and gives a catalogue of Pāli manuscript collections in Burmese and Siamese characters kept in the library of Vijayasundararamaya Asgiriya (pp.135-91).

'The Monk in the Pāli Vinaya: Priest or Wedding Guest?' (pp.193-7) is a rejoinder by Richard Gombrich to comments which Gregory Schopen made in an earlier number of the JPTS (XVI, 1992, pp.87-107), disagreeing with certain statements about the role of Buddhist monks which Gombrich had made in two of his publications. The final article in the volume is a report by Janice Stargardt (pp.199-213) on a symposium held in Cambridge 18-19 April 1995 on the Pyu Golden Pāli Text from Śrī Ksetra in Burma. In a return to a practice adopted in the early days of the Journal, the Annual Report of the PTS for 1994 is given at the end of the volume.

All three volumes contain information about grants which the PTS makes for the study of Pāli, and invite contributions in the field of Pāli (not Buddhist) studies for future volumes of JPTS.

K.R. Norman


This is a bold, far-reaching study of early Buddhism intended to unravel the inter-relationships between three of its most difficult elements: the teaching of non-self, the nature and function of consciousness, and the nature of Nīrāvana. Although his work is based mainly on the Pāli Nikāyas, Harvey does not merely echo traditional interpretations but attempts to unearth from his source material hints and implications that have slipped through the filters of doctrinal orthodoxy. The book sparkles with illuminating insights and astute discussions. Finally, however, in the opinion of this reviewer, the author carries his argument through to conclusions that seem difficult to justify on the basis of the early Suttas themselves.

The book (based on the author's doctoral dissertation, 'The Concept of the Person in Pāli Buddhist Literature', Lancaster 1981) is divided into two parts, corresponding to the two words in the title: Part I focuses on the teaching of non-self (anattā), Part II on consciousness and Nīrāvana. Harvey approaches the non-self teaching by distinguishing two ways the word attā is used in the Suttas: (i) as a metaphysically loaded term denoting a substantial Self (which Harvey tags by the initial capital); and (ii) as a conventional term referring to the empirical person. The former is rejected by the Buddha, the latter accepted but as a constantly changing continuum of conditioned factors. Harvey deftly disposes of the assumption, widespread among previous generations of Western scholars, that the early Suttas tacitly accepted some kind of metaphysical Self that the Buddhist tradition itself had wilfully ignored. With persuasive arguments he shows that none of the attempts to justify such a Self can claim support from the Canon.

Nevertheless, Harvey argues, contrary to what is commonly supposed the Buddha does not directly deny the existence of a self. This is not because he somehow envisions a self transcending the categories of being and non-being but because a bald denial of self would have been sterile, a mere philosophical stance that does not conduce to insight and detachment; indeed, such a position might even have been mistaken for a kind of annihilation. Harvey views the anattā teaching as primarily a liberative strategy — though not as pure strategy (a view held in certain U.S.
circles), but as a strategy with an ontological base. Founded upon a recognition of the absence of Selfhood in all phenomena, the anatta doctrine serves as a lens through which to view the things with which we identify in order to break the bond of identification with them.

In discussing the psychological underpinnings of the non-self doctrine Harvey makes a brilliant observation which is obvious when stated but which I have never seen formulated in quite this way: that this teaching "uses a deep-seated human aspiration [the desire for Selfhood], ultimately illusory, to overcome the negative products of such an illusion", i.e. the suffering that comes from attachment to selfless phenomena (p.44). Harvey shows that both the notion of Self and Nibbana share certain essential features, particularly permanence and blissfulness. What divides them is their relationship to the notion of 'I': the one reifies it, the other negates it. Thus he sees Nibbana as 'the virtual attainment of Selfhood. . . . everything that Self might be except that it is empty of l-ness' (p.53).

After discussing (in Ch.3-5) the ethical and psychological implications of the Buddhist views of selfhood and the world, in Ch.6 Harvey focuses on the process of rebirth, sometimes taken to be the 'thorn in the side' of the non-self teaching. He locates the crucial factor underlying the rebirth process in viññana, which he renders 'discernment' (a rendering with which I will deal below). While the Buddha has clearly rejected the claim that the same discernment migrates through Samsara, Harvey shows that the early Suttas view the stream of consciousness as continuing from life to life, thereby preserving personal identity. Between lives consciousness subsists in the form of a gandhabba, a spiritual entity which wanders about seeking suitable conditions for rebirth. Although this notion of an intermediary stage, the antarabhava, contradicts formal Theravada doctrine, Harvey points to several texts which strongly support the existence of such a state.

Part II, entitled 'Samsaric and Nibbamic Discernment', is devoted to a study of consciousness and its relationship to Nibbana. In the first three chapters the author discusses the place of 'discernment' in the empirical personality (7), in the doctrine of conditioned arising (8), and in the perceptual process (9). These are dense chapters which draw together a wide assortment of texts and offer a wealth of original observations on subtle points of doctrine. While I would not agree with all Harvey's conclusions here, his reflections are often incisive and illuminating.

In discussing the perceptual process Harvey attempts to settle the vexed question of the relationship between saññä and viññana. He explains saññä as cognition (pp.141-3), a rendering which to my mind is less satisfactory than the familiar 'perception' (which I also hold to be more accurate than 'conception' or 'ideation'). In contemporary psychology 'cognition' is generally used to denote the totality of conscious mental processes, and thus is clearly too broad to fit the narrower, more specialised function of saññä. On the other hand, 'discernment' seems much too specific as a rendering of viññana. In the Suttas viññana fulfills three major functions: (i) the 'bare cognition' of an object through a sense faculty; (ii) the discrimination and conceptual appreciation of the object's features; and (iii) the preservation of personal identity throughout life and across successive lives. Although 'discernment' corresponds well enough to the second function, the word hardly does justice to the other two. It thus seems that 'consciousness', which Harvey rejects because of its generality, remains precisely by reason of that generality the best rendering of viññana.

Ch.10 opens with a study of bhavanga, the life-continuum, which in the Abhidhamma serves as an underlying, dormant type of consciousness occurring in the intervals between active frames of mind. From there Harvey turns to the famous passage on the 'brightly shining mind' (pabhassara-citta). The Pali commentator interestingly identifies this mind as the bhavanga, on the ground that the latter, being a resultant consciousness, never occurs in immediate conjunction with defilements. This identification seems strange, for the bhavanga operates below the threshold of full awareness while the word pabhassara, 'brightly shining', conveys the sense of full awareness. Harvey, however, concurs with the commentator, though he regards the 'bright mind' only as an ever-present potential for enlightenment, not as a spark of enlightenment already actualised within the stream of normal
consciousness.

The next three chapters (II-13) take us to the climax of the book. Harvey's aim here is to elicit from the texts a clear conceptual picture of Nibbāna and to examine its relationship to the empirical personality. It is at this point that he swerves away from all established approaches to the interpretation of early Buddhism and fashions his own radical point of view. It is also at this point that I find his commitment to a predetermined conclusion outrides the care and restraint that characterise the preceding chapters.

In Ch.II Harvey rejects the apparent meaning of It 38-39, that the 'Nibbāna element with residue' (sa-upādisesanibbāna-dhātu) is the arahant's destruction of lust, hatred and delusion, arguing instead that this Nibbāna element is a transcendent 'timeless stopping of the entire personality' which the arahant can enter as a distinct meditative state. In this state the arahant temporarily 'participates in' Nibbāna through the complete stopping of his personality, the complex of the five aggregates. Now the Suttas do speak of a meditative state in which the arahant directly experiences the unconditioned Nibbāna during life, but Harvey seems to go to an unwarranted extreme when he asserts: (i) that the arahant's aggregates actually cease within this state; and (ii) that this state is itself Nibbāna. If (i) were the case we would not even be able to describe this state as an experience of Nibbāna, for in the absence of the aggregates experience itself would not be possible. The only meditative state the Suttas expressly mention as involving actual cessation of the mental aggregates is saināvedayita-nīrodha; but, as Harvey recognises, this cannot be identified with the arahant's meditative experience of Nibbāna. As to (ii), the Suttas indicate that in this attainment the arahant is percipient of Nibbāna, that he even 'touches the deathless element in his body' (It 46); but the meditative experience, being impermanent and conditioned, cannot be identical with Nibbāna itself.

In Ch.12 Harvey proposes an even more startling thesis: that Nibbāna is 'a transformed state of discernment', a viññāṇa which is 'stopped, objectless, unsupported'. The sole text that seems to lend credence to this proposition is an enigmatic verse which appears in full only at D I, 223, and in part at M I, 329-30. The verse speaks of 'discernment non-manifestative, infinite, accessible from all-round' (or, in the M version, 'shining in every respect'). Even the commentator feels compelled to identify this viññāṇa with Nibbāna and can avoid a clash with Theravāda orthodoxy only by glossing viññāṇa as 'what is to be known' (viññātātthā), i.e. as the object rather than the subject of awareness. This would be a unique case of viññāṇa being used in such a sense, and thus the commentator's gloss seems strained. While the verse may lend prima facie plausibility to Harvey's claim, he surely goes too far in stating that these passages 'clearly say' that Nibbāna itself is a form of discernment (p.201). At best they merely suggest such a view, but the many standard prose passages on viññāṇa and Nibbāna always describe viññāṇa as impermanent and conditioned, and never give even a hint that Nibbāna might be a transfigured type of viññāṇa. Thus, if we grant primacy to prose passages, it seems safest to conclude that the idea of Nibbāna as an unconditioned discernment would be a misinterpretation of this verse, the exact meaning of which remains problematic.

Harvey tries to bolster his position in several ways, which, on examination would be found to involve either misleading translations (e.g. of niruddha as 'stopped' rather than as 'ceased') or misinterpretations (e.g. of S II, 66, where ārammanā means 'causal basis' rather than 'object', as the commentary confirms). Read in context — and the section on the non-arahant makes this clear — the latter sutta is not saying that the arahant's 'unsupported discernment' (apatittihī-viññāṇa) is a transcendent objectless discernment, but that it is his normal consciousness unattached to his present personality and without a supporting condition for future re-becoming. When he expires 'with unsupported discernment' the birth process ceases and all five aggregates come to an end, including the unsupported discernment itself. This is the Nibbāna element without residue.

Harvey's interpretation of Nibbāna naturally raises the question of the relationship between nibbiṇic discernment and normal discernment. His handling of this question is ambivalent. Most often he insists on a radical cleavage between the two types of discernment, such that 'nibbiṇic discernment...cannot be seen...
as part of the discernment personality factor (or causal link)' (p.217). Yet, perhaps aware of the impasse this would lead to, he subtly crosses over to a more comfortable position: that nibbānic discernment is a 'radically transformed' version of the discernment aggregate, which stands unsupported when the other four aggregates (nāma-rūpa) fall away (p.249). Quite apart from the fact that either position is beset by insoluble problems, the very notion of a 'discernment' which has no mental adjuncts, takes no object, and performs no function of discerning borders on unintelligibility.

In Ch.13, the closing chapter, Harvey marshals the ideas developed in Ch.12 to attack the difficult textual passages on the nature of the Tathāgata, both during life and beyond death. His discussions of the 'untraceability' of the Tathāgata, and on how the Tathāgata is immeasurable and 'hard to fathom', are interesting, provided we put in brackets his repeated assertion that 'mysterious objectless discernment' is the Tathāgata's nature (p.232). When he turns to the tetralemma on the Tathāgata after death Harvey leads us to another surprise. He first points out, in accordance with mainstream Buddhist thought, that all four alternatives must be rejected because they presuppose the Tathāgata to exist as a substantial Self, a premise that undermines the validity of each position. But he then proceeds to distinguish between the verbs hoti and athi. He maintains that because the Suttas reject only alternatives framed in terms of hoti, which connotes becoming in a world of change, but never in terms of athi, there is no reason to deny that the Tathāgata exists beyond death in the sense of athi: 'Beyond death, a tathāgata exists in the form of nibbānic discernment' (p.243). Acceptance of this inference, however, is contingent on accepting Harvey's thesis that Nibbāna is objectless discernment, which to this reviewer seems untenable on the basis of the Suttas.

In sum, The Selfless Mind is in many respects a thought-provoking study which glistens with original insights, and this alone makes it well worth a careful reading. It is refreshing too to see a present-day scholar try to restore to early Buddhism the profound spiritual dimension so evident in the Suttas, which is sadly lost when the world-transcending Dhamma is made out to be an ancient Indian form of empiricism (or pragmatism or existentialism) packaged with a doctrine of rebirth and bundled up in saffron robes. Harvey's quest for a satisfactory interpretation, however, is undermined by his final thesis on Nibbāna as an objectless, unconditioned type of viññāna. This introduces into the Dhamma a perspective that is difficult to square with the Buddha's repeated assertion — never qualified or muted — that viññāna is dependently arisen and conditioned, and that Nibbāna is as much the cessation of viññāna as it is of the other four aggregates. Fortunately, Harvey shows an attitude of non-attachment to his own views, ending his Conclusion with the recognition that 'All views are not-Self'. This applies equally ro any contrary ideas put forth in this review.

A few factual errors in the book may be noted: At pp.52, 189: santām should be rendered 'peaceful' rather than 'real' (= Skt śāntam). At p.92: read 'Kumāra-Kassapa' for 'Mahā-Kassapa'. At p.123: read 'Vism. 463' for 'Vibh. 463'. At pp.124, 207: The PTS ed. of S III.87 seems to be unique in reading viññānattāhya, which Harvey sees as setting off the viññāna aggregate from the other four aggregates; the Sinhala and Burmese eds. read viññānattāya (as for the other aggregates), while SA (Sinh. ed.) reads rūpaṁ pathāya, implying that this reading fits the other aggregates too. At p.136: for 'S.IV.146-47' read 'S.III.146-47'. At p.170: it is the jhāna that lasts for only a single moment, not the javana. At p.195: despite AA V.80, vibhūta at A V.324-26 must mean 'disappeared', not 'clarified', as can be seen from Sn vv.874 and 1113. At p.211: in the passage at S IV.74, the word should beapatīthina, neg. pp. of patīthiyat; there is no relation to the neg. pp. appatīthita (see Critical Pāli Dictionary, s.v. appatīthina).

Bhikkhu Bodhi


As its subtitle makes clear, this is a very ambitious book: the perils and promises of spiritual life are subtle and manifold, and the variety of advice proffered by different traditions can be
quite bewildering. To try and provide a guide through the maze is a task demanding courage, dedication and experience. Jack Kornfield has all three qualities in abundance. He is so well-known as one of the leading teachers of insight meditation in the West that no introduction is needed, but it is worth recalling that his qualifications are particularly impressive.

Kornfield spent six years training in South East Asia, both as a layman and as a monk in Theravada monasteries in Thailand, Burma and India, and has been teaching insight meditation for the past twenty years. The author of several books on the subject (both on his own and jointly with that other influential teacher, Joseph Goldstein), he has co-founded two important centres in the United States: the Insight Meditation Society at Barre, Mass. (together with Goldstein) and the Spirit Rock Center at Woodacre, CA. He is also a practising psychotherapist, with a Ph.D. in clinical psychology.

This as regards experience. As for courage and dedication, they come through on every page of the book, as the author endeavours to give a comprehensive account of the subject in language which manages to be simple and straightforward without minimising the depth and complexity of the spiritual path.

A Path With Heart is rather more than a meditation handbook. It does, of course, cover the subject quite extensively, as practised in the Buddhist schools (mainly Theravada, but also Tibetan and Zen), and with frequent cross-references to other major spiritual traditions (Advaita Vedanta, Yoga, Sufism, Christianity, etc.), to illustrate the author's understanding "that there are many ways up the mountain — that there is never just one true way" (p.32). A point to which I shall return later.

For the moment, what has to be noted is the broad sweep of the book which aims to cover the whole compass of spiritual endeavour, i.e. not only actual meditation practice, but all the other aspects of one's life with which it is closely enmeshed in a dynamic reciprocal relationship, from the most humble everyday tasks (such as dishwashing, or cleaning floors) through the common occurrences of personal and professional life to the most striking examples of unusual states of consciousness. It does so methodically, tracing an outline of spiritual progress from first beginnings to spiritual maturity in a carefully articulated four-part presentation, clearly signposted by the main headings.

Part I. A Path with Heart: the Fundamentals, starts with lovingkindness as an essential first step (Ch.1) and details the groundwork for meditation practice, concluding with a chapter on mindfulness of breathing (Ch.5). Each chapter has a brief appendix with suggestions and instructions for simple meditation exercises to develop the qualities or deal with the problems discussed in it: to start calming the mind and sharpening choiceless awareness, to develop lovingkindness, and to carry out what Kornfield describes as the necessary healing of body, heart and mind prior to, and along with, traditional meditation. This need for healing is a recurrent theme of the book and to this, too, I shall have to return in a moment.

The title of Part II. Promises and Perils, is self-explanatory. In the six chapters it comprises, it deals with many of the lures and pitfalls that spiritual practitioners encounter in meditation. Most of the chapters, here as in the rest of the book, conclude with specific meditations for the reader to practise, e.g. 'Reflecting on Difficulty' and 'Seeing All Beings as Enlightened' (Ch.6), 'Making the Demons Part of the Path' — here the author uses the terminology of the Christian desert father Evagrius, warning against gluttony and desire, and the demons of irritation and fear. . . the noonday demon of laziness and sleep. . . and the demon of pride' and explains that, in Buddhist terms, they constitute the 'Hindrances of Clarity', being 'greed, fear, doubt, judgment and confusion' (pp.83-4) — and 'The Impulses that Move Our Life' (Ch.7), 'Reflecting on Your Attitude Toward Altered States' (Ch.9), 'Meditation on Death and Rebirth' (Ch.10) and 'Becoming Simple and Transparent' (Ch.11).

The nine chapters of Part III. Widening Our Circle do indeed range widely, drawing on Kornfield's experience both as a teacher and community leader and as a psychotherapist. Some of them pursue further the exploration of inner work, such as Ch.13, stressing that 'to fulfill spiritual life we must cease dividing our life into compartments.' because such compartments 'exact their toll in later life' (p.184), and Ch.15 on the development of generosity, fearlessness, compassion and a genuine perception of
interconnectedness. Others deal with practical matters, such as finding and working with a teacher (Ch.16), problems with teachers and communities and how to deal with them constructively (Ch.18), and the vital issues of how best to integrate the contemplative and the active aspects of the practitioner’s life in the context of Western (and, more specifically, American) society, such as learning to accept the ups and downs of spiritual endeavour and how to handle the transition from a retreat back to everyday life (Ch.12). Also the need to live daily life as meditation, i.e. with ‘wakefulness and freedom’, not only in one’s immediate circle of family and friends, but extending the same principles ‘to the work of our community, to politics, to economics, to global peace, or to service to the poor’ (p.293) since the world’s current problems are fundamentally a spiritual crisis, created by the limited vision of human beings’ (Ch.20, p.295).

Much of what is said in these chapters is not necessarily a matter of specific Buddhist teachings, but simply of (Dhamma-rooted) common sense. Elsewhere in this same section, however, the minimum elements of understanding and action according to the Buddhahadhamma are set out, including karma and the importance of intentions (Ch.19), the five precepts (Ch.20) and, most importantly, anatta (Ch.14). There is also a chapter on ‘Psychotherapy and Meditation’ (Ch.17).

The last section, Part IV. Spiritual Maturity (three chapters) draws together the many threads of the rich tapestry woven by the author. Before commenting on these conclusions, however, it is necessary to pause for a moment to look at the last two chapters just mentioned, which crystallise the two problems that I have with this book, i.e. the insufficient distinction between psychotherapy and meditation, and the reinterpretation of anatta in terms of a ‘True Self’ which is the result of the author’s resolutely syncretistic stance.

Earlier on I mentioned the fact that the need for healing is much stressed by the author and, indeed, the healing of the wounded psyche, i.e. psychotherapy in the widest sense of the word, is a recurring theme in A Path With Heart. In Ch.17, Kornfield articulates in some detail his view, implicit throughout the book, that psychotherapy and meditation are ultimately inseparable, and that the latter cannot develop fully and properly without the former. Consider these statements:

‘What does Western psychotherapy do that traditional spiritual practice and meditation doesn’t? We have seen how frequently students in the West encounter the deep wounds that result from the breakdown of the Western family system, the traumas of childhood, and the confusion of modern society. Psychotherapy addresses in directed and powerful ways the need for healing, the reclamation and creation of a healthy sense of self, the dissolution of fears and compartments, and the search for a creative, loving and full way to live in the world’ (p.245).

‘Our deep personal work and our meditative work must necessarily proceed together. What American practice has to come to acknowledge is that many of the deep issues we uncover in spiritual life cannot be healed by meditation alone. Problems such as early abuse, addiction, and difficulties of love and sexuality require the close, conscious, and ongoing support of a skillful healer to resolve’ (p.245, my underlining).

Now this is the understanding of one who is both an experienced meditation teacher and a professional psychotherapist, and therefore not to be taken lightly. At the same time, I cannot help feeling that there is here a degree of what the French so aptly call ‘déformation professionelle’, a bias tending to see everything in terms of one’s own profession. Of course, no one in his senses would deny that going in for spiritual pursuits when one is all mixed up in one’s mind is a recipe for disaster. We all know cases of this, and we have all seen cases where psychotherapy has sorted people out sufficiently for them to be able to undertake meditation meaningfully. What worries me is the assumption that this is always the case, and that psychotherapy and meditation must proceed hand in hand, so to speak, all along the way.

Kornfield is well aware of the issue. After relating a particularly striking case history, he goes on to say: ‘...we might well ask the question: Are meditation and psychotherapy the same thing? Can psychotherapy lead to the same insights and freedom promised from spiritual work?’ (p.251). His own answer (pp.252-3),
though cautious enough, leaves one unsatisfied:

'In the best of therapy, we can find the deep realization of selflessness and nonattachment that comes in any spiritual path'. This is immediately qualified as follows: 'Does this mean that we can turn to therapy as the solution to all our sufferings and delusions? Not at all. Like meditation, psychotherapy is sometimes successful and sometimes not.' In any case, and this is his conclusion, 'the process of opening...is lifelong. In this process neither meditation nor therapy is the solution — consciousness is. Just as the insights of meditation practice are not fully sufficient for finding our way on a spiritual journey, neither are those of therapy.'

This, though it sounds sensible enough, is unsatisfactory. The reason being that it blurs the essential distinction between the instrumental purposes of psychotherapy — to achieve what Kornfield describes as 'a creative, loving and full way to live in the world' (p.245, my underlining) — and the ultimate purpose of spiritual practice generally, and of the Buddha's path in particular, namely to transcend the world altogether in the attainment of enlightenment. Of course, the person who has achieved Nibbāna in this world (saupādīsesanībba) does still, by definition, live in the world, and does so in the fullest, most loving and creative way conceivable (think of the Buddha's forty years of total dedication after his enlightenment), but this is the consequence (or, rather, one of the consequences) of enlightenment, not its purpose.

The purpose of psychotherapy, Freud used to say, is merely to bring people who suffer from patholgical conditions back to the level of 'normal suffering' inherent in the human condition. That is the point where true meditative work takes over.

Of course, the excessive insistence on an indissoluble interpenetration of psychotherapy and meditation reflects not only the possible influence of Kornfield's professional experiences but, through those, the state of Western society today, especially in North America (which is explicitly the area of his primary concern), where the USA have been described, perhaps not unfairly, as 'a nation with abuse fever' (Literary Review, October 1995, p.26). It is revealing that the terms 'abuse' and 'wounds' and references to the need for 'healing' abound throughout the book.

All this demonstrates the play of forces in any process of inculturation: the incoming message is adjusted and re-shaped in accordance with the needs of the receiving context. This is a process that the Buddha's message has been undergoing for over 2000 years in the countries of the East. It is now happening in the West, and Kornfield is a living example of it. The process has many positive and, indeed, necessary aspects. It can also, however, go too far and result in confusion and misunderstanding.

In the case of what is happening in the West today, one can see two dangers, One is syncretism: the idea that all approaches are equivalent, and Kornfield's is clearly a case in point. The quotation 'there are many ways up the mountain' cited earlier is given greater emphasis at the end of the book (and quite a few times, implicitly or explicitly, in between): 'all of the spiritual vehicles are rafts to cross the stream of freedom' (p.316). Like all categorical statements, this needs qualification. It is true, of course, that enlightenment, liberation, call it what you will, is not a matter of 'adopting one particular philosophy or set of beliefs or teachings, that it is not a cause for taking a stand in opposition to someone else or something else' (p.316). It is rather a matter, as Kornfield quite rightly insists, of achieving that 'spiritual maturity' which is the subject of Part IV of his book. And spiritual maturity does not come from dogma, organised religion or blind acceptance of any tenets, but from a quality of experiential understanding characterised by wisdom and love.

At the same time, one needs to recognise that not all rafts take you to the other shore. Some founder in midstream, others get stuck in swamps and marshes. All vessels (or vehicles) are not equal, or equivalent. True, as the author says 'there are a hundred thousand skillful means of awakening' (p.316) — but there are also many more unskillful ways of not awakening. Ultimately, the skilfulness of the means consists in providing some kind of compass to help navigate the raft across the waters. Entirely provisional though such guidance must of necessity be, it should at least head you in the right direction. It should, in the words of the Buddha's well-known simile, show you the way to Rājagaha. And this brings me to the second danger involved in inculturation, and the other main difficulty I have with A Path With
Heart, namely the understanding of anattā as 'True Self' and the
collection of 'Buddha nature' that permeates the whole book (see
in particular Ch.14: 'No Self or True Self?).

It is not possible, within the compass of a book review, to
undertake a detailed analysis of Kornfield's views on this crucial
point, and I hope I am not producing a caricature in trying to
summarise them but, as I see it, the underlying reasoning goes
something like this: 'No Self' means that the common samsāric
experience of 'self' is in fact without a core of substance, that it is
ultimately empty. So far, so good. But 'emptiness refers to the
underlying nonseparation of life and the fertile ground of energy
that gives rise to all forms of life' (p.200). Now, logically, that is
fair enough: the processes we call life must be sustained by
something. However, this is where the trouble starts, namely, the
all-too-human tendency to invest this 'ground of energy' with
deep significance and divine powers. Which is what Kornfield
seems to be doing when he talks about 'allowing the divine to
shine through our every action' and discovering 'that our very
breath and body and human limitations are part of the divine'
(p.314).

Now this is where the ways of the author and this reviewer
part: I do not think it necessary to equate the 'ground of energy'
with the conception of some sort of Godhead or Universal Soul,
nor do I believe that this is what the Buddha taught or inferred.
Kornfield seems to believe otherwise, e.g. 'out of it [the ocean of
life], our lives appear as reflections of the divine, as a movement
or dance of consciousness' (p.51, my underlining). This leads on to
the cosmological argument for the existence of God, wielded by
Western theologians for centuries: logically, there must be an
uncaused cause of everything, and this is obviously God. This is
presumably what Kornfield means when he talks about 'the uni-
verse and the consciousness that created it' (p.135, my underlining),
and from that it is a short step to attributing to this consciousness
the usual divine powers of an all-embracing god, creator and
maintainer of the universe, from whom everything flows, in-
cluding 'the gift of human life' (p.319), and back to whom
everything flows. And thus we are back to God, Brahmā or
whatever denomination one may choose, and to a conception of
the ultimate good as some sort of union, or merging, with this
all-embracing 'True Self'. Note how Kornfield places these various
collections on the same level: 'When Christian texts speak of
losing the self in God, when Taoists and Hindus speak of merging
with a True Self beyond all identity, when Buddhists speak of
emptiness and no self, what do they mean?' (p.200). Clearly, the
same thing. In this view, then the Buddhadhamma represents
simply one particular strand of the nondualistic contemplative
traditions and, of course, it does follow that it is only one of the
'many ways up the mountain'.

Now this is a bit surprising coming from a professed
Buddhist who started off by telling us that 'the core of the
meditations presented here comes from the Theravada Buddhist
tradition of Southeast Asia' and that 'It is this tradition that I
have followed and taught for many years, and it is this central
teaching that forms the basis of almost all Buddhist practice
worldwide' (p.9).

My problems with the 'True Self' approach and attendant
theistic implications is that, to the best of possible knowledge, the
Buddha never presented his teaching in this way (see my review
of J. Pérez-Remón's Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism,
BSR 5, 2, pp.176-82). The teaching of anattā leaves no room for
any kind of eternal Godhead, as W. Rahula says: 'According to
Buddhism, our ideas of God and Soul are false and empty.
Though highly developed as theories, they are all the same
extremely subtle mental projections, garbed in an intricate
metaphysical and philosophical phraseology' (What the Buddha
Taught, London 1982, p.52). It may be argued, and often has,
been, that to present the ineffable, inconceivable Ultimate in
some such way, i.e. in terms of 'True Self', divinity or creative
consciousness, may be helpful in getting people started on the
way by means of inspiring conceptions, and is thus part of 'skilful
means'. This may be so but, without disrespect to other traditions
(including some Buddhist schools that manage to sound quite
forcibly non-dual — on this subject see the essay by Bhikkhu
Bodhi 'Dhamma and Non-Duality', BPS Newsletter, 27 and 29). I
think it more reasonable to assume that the Buddha knew best
what he was about. In other words, while taking all possible
precautions to avoid spiritual pride, I believe we have to admit that there is a difference between the Buddha’s way and other ways. This was certainly so perceived by the orthodox Hindu schools, which criticised the Buddha’s teaching as ‘heterodox’ (and it is still classified as such in modern Indian manuals). And if we do believe that the Buddha’s instructions on how to get to Rājagaha are the best and most direct, and perhaps the only ones that will get us all the way there, no useful purpose is served by blurring the issue.

As for the conception of ‘Buddha nature’, Kornfield tells us that it is: ‘a goodness of heart, strength and wholeness that is our birthright. This basic goodness is sometimes called our original nature, or Buddha nature’ (p.50). And: ‘the gift of all wise teachers is encouragement to find within ourselves our Buddha nature’ (p.243). This, surely, is simply the other side of the medal of the ‘True Self’ belief. The transcendent and immanent aspects are both essential to the idea of a universal godhead: God-out-there and God-in-my-heart for the Christians, ātman and brahman for the Hindus, and so on. It would seem, therefore, that what has just been said by way of criticism of the ‘True Self’ is equally applicable to the ‘Buddha nature’.

All that the Buddha claimed, of course, was to teach ‘dukkha’ and the end of dukkha: the ultimate healing of the human condition. Kornfield, as one who has dedicated his life to the healing of human suffering in the ways accessible to him is, to this extent, a follower of the Enlightened One. Only, as I have tried to show, it seems to me that there is sometimes in his enthusiasm and in his search for ‘skilful means’ a certain confusion between ends and means, a syncretic tendency and a theistic tone which, at least to some minds, are more likely to be a hindrance than a help.

This being said, and in order not to end this review of a generously conceived book on a carping note, it must be acknowledged that Kornfield has a great deal to offer that is sensible and helpful, as summarised in the three chapters of Part IV, Spiritual Maturity of his book. [For completeness’ sake it should be noted that the book includes an Appendix: Insight Meditation

Teachers’ Code of Ethics, a bibliography and a brief glossary.]

So I shall conclude with a quotation from this final section:

‘As one matures in spiritual life, one becomes more comfortable with paradox, more appreciative of life’s ambiguities, its many levels and inherent conflicts. One develops a sense of life’s irony, metaphor, and humor, and a capacity to embrace the whole, with its beauty and outrageousness, in the graciousness of the heart’ (p.309).

The positive disposition that informs these words is certainly deserving of respect.

Amadeo Solé-Leris


The author’s aim in this book (which is a revised and enlarged version of his Buddhism and Society in Southeast Asia, 1980) is to offer the reader ‘a broad, holistic analysis of the Buddhist tradition as it has been shaped within the historical and cultural milieu of Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka’. He is aware of the complexity of Buddhism when looked at from such a perspective and particularly in the light of what he sees as the ‘seeming contradictions between the highest ideals and goals of Theravāda Buddhism and the living tradition in Southeast Asia’ which ‘has perplexed Western scholars’. But he assures us that, besides defining ‘ideal goals of moral perfection and ultimate self-transformation’, Theravāda Buddhism in S.E. Asia, like other great religions elsewhere ‘also provides the means for people to cope with the day-to-day problems of life and to justify worldly pursuits’ and that both these objectives have the sanction of canonical writings.

To achieve his aim the author concentrates predominantly on popular, social and modern aspects of Buddhism in S.E. Asia in three main sections of the book. The first one, ‘The Popular Tradition: Inclusive Syncretism’, outlines the ‘ideal action’ as understood from the paradigmatic stories of the Buddha’s life, the narratives in the Suttas and the Jātakas, supplemented by
contemporary local stories of saintly teachers as well as of exemplary, albeit innovative, behaviour of dedicated lay-followers. This section further deals with the diversity of practised rituals and their purpose, the phenomenon of ‘merit making’, the kathina ceremony, the consecration of a Buddha image, the use of paritta chants, various festivals and with what the author calls ‘rites of passage’; among these he counts joining the Sangha, weddings, ‘aging ceremonies’ (usually the sixtieth birthday celebrations) and funeral rites. Thus he shows that although the main aim of Buddhism may be the promotion of lofty pursuits of Nibbāna in forest retreats, the story of Buddhism in S.E. Asia is also ‘a richly nuanced epic tale with many subjects’.

The second section, ‘Buddhism as Civil Religion. Political Legitimation and National Integration’, deals with the historical forms of S.E. Asian monarchy and the problems of the modern S.E. Asian nation-states. Referring to the legend of Asoka, a convert from the cruelties of conquest to the duties of a righteous ruler, as the exemplary influence on later rulers who also often became patrons of Buddhism only after an initial violent period of conquest, he further resorts to the cosmic symbolism of the stūpa (as interpreted by John Irwin and others before him) to explain the macrocosmic connection and supramundane legitimation of S.E. Asian kingships. Sānci, Pagan (Shwe-zigon Stūpa), Borobudur, Angkor Wat, Bayon and Sukhothai (Vat Mahathat), as well as textual evidence, are used to illustrate the association of the notions of Buddha and king so that they became virtual mirror images of each other, at least in the minds of the people. The Buddha, of course, loomed larger in their minds as a veritable cosmocrator who ‘sacralised’ the land and became the ‘ground’ of political order through (mythical) visitations (leaving footprints which are still venerated), enshrined relics and consecrated images, but in hard reality it was the monarch who brought this latent potential into actuality. In modern times the identification between Buddhism and traditional states before they became colonies was used by later independence movements to rally people in the fight against colonial rule and after independence it was effectively exploited for the purposes of national integration and even justification of autocratic governments. Specific, albeit in details widely differing, examples of the process are analysed in the modern histories of Sri Lanka, Burma (now Myanmar), Thailand, Cambodia and Laos. The erosion of traditional values and institutions in S.E. Asia and the search for new roles and worthwhile tasks under the impact of dramatic events of our time are dealt with in the third section styled ‘Modernisation. The Dynamic of Tradition and Change’. Part of this process is also the changing role of the monk, sometimes taking place under the disapproving eyes of at least some lay Buddhist circles. Monks can nowadays be seen engaging in totally worldly (even consumerist) pursuits, taking political action, undergoing social work and getting involved in community and rural development schemes and lately also in conservation projects. Reformist movements had already started in the last century, but the acceleration of the process in recent times led to the forming of new sects or denominations. One trend, namely the renewal of the meditation drive in the Sangha, led to a considerable revival of Theravāda Buddhism through widespread lay involvement (even in teaching meditation), enhanced also by Western interest. One important result of this revival is the issue of the position of women, both in the Sangha and society, which awaits serious tackling. However, the most fundamental issue which Buddhism faces is, in the author’s view, whether or not the monk can continue to symbolise Buddhist values of lasting significance ‘and at the same time speak to the needs of societies in radical transition’. However, the future of Theravāda Buddhism will unfold not only in the area covered by this book, ‘but also in the West’. The author is convinced of the role of the West in contributing to ‘new and creative forms of religious thought and practice’. But there are also dangers — ‘globalisation’, commercialisation and other forms of ongoing dramatic and unprecedented change. It is not only Buddhism which is in the midst of it, all religions face this problem.

Three Appendices contain (1) a translation of the Sigālaka Sutta as a text on lay Buddhist ethics; (2) an audio visual bibliography which is an unusual innovative feature; and (3) a brief description of Borobudur with hints about various interpretations of its meaning. Bibliographical references in the notes are good. I
would quarrel only with the initially expressed view of the author about 'perplexed scholars'. That may be true about one or two of them in the last century, possibly also at the beginning of this one. However, even lay followers and popular writers on Buddhism in the twenties who appreciated especially the rational core of early Buddhism, such as Paul Dahlke in Germany, were aware of the 'seeming contradictions' between the ideal goal and the actual practical commitment of both monks and lay people in Buddhist countries and of the dual aspect of the canonical admonitions, the radical ones for the committed renunciates (usually monks) and the mild and ethical ones for others. The book is very useful and will extend and enrich every reader's perception of Buddhism in S.E. Asian countries, unless he happens to be a specialist in the area.

Karel Werner


Unlike the author's substantial research work *Studies in the Origins of Buddhism* (1957, 2nd rev. ed. 1974), this is just a presentation of his ideas about Mahāyāna Buddhism which he obviously developed over the years while preoccupied with problems of Indian cultural history, without getting round to producing a similar substantial monograph on Mahāyāna. (A review of his *Foundations of Indian Culture I-II* can be found in *BSR* 11, 2 (1994) pp.198-201.) It was the invitation to deliver lectures in the above-mentioned series and prepare them for publication which prompted him to formulate (he says: finalise) his ideas.

His basic position is to oppose the view that Mahāyāna is a late form of Buddhism and possibly a deviation from the original austere moral teaching and that it is backed by inconsistent metaphysical systems. It is for him rather 'a continuation of some aspects of the original Buddhism which should not be confused with Hinayāna, itself a later interpretation of original Buddhism'. Mahāyāna sūtras, although of later origin and consequently reflecting 'the cultural image of a later age' and producing 'a mixed historical impression', nevertheless show 'spiritual continuity with the original teachings of the Buddha' as 'may be seen by a close study of the older canonical fragments'. At the same time, 'Mahāyāna should be understood as the Buddhist notion of universal religion'.

Divisions inevitably occur when normal experience is confronted with spiritual vision, as happened with the interpretation of the notions of Samsāra and Nirvāṇa, and they lead to different outlooks: 'Hinayānic schools' in an attempt 'to reconcile empirical truth with religious ideals' came 'perilously near positivistic or phenomenalistic systems', while 'Mahāyāna chose the more heroic and idealistic option of denying the ultimate reality of empirical objects'.

The book is divided into three chapters. In the first one, 'Mahāyāna: Nature and Origin', the author seeks to explain his notion of Mahāyāna as a universal religion. He maintains that this notion is in fact rooted in the original Buddhism. The universality of Mahāyāna is not proven just because it is open to all (as is Christianity and also Islam), but, more importantly (and unlike Christianity and Islam), because it is also tolerant to expressions of truth in other historical traditions. Hinayāna has preserved this original and deep Buddhist feature of tolerance only outwardly (there has never been persecution of other religions in Buddhist countries), but it developed inwardly the view that the Buddha's teaching as a system of formulated truth is unique and that any other system is false. Yet the Buddha (even as reported in the Theravāda Pāli Canon) stressed the importance of grasping the essence of the Dhamma in practice, not holding to its theoretical formulation. Mahāyāna understands that 'absolute truth belongs only to the experience of Enlightenment and that all formulated doctrines have only a relative truth'. Alternative historical formulations therefore may be compatible with universal truth. In the end, however, all formulations are mental constructs and must be left behind to realise the ultimate truth. This is the difference between 'the timeless Dharma of Enlightenment and the historical tradition which seeks to indicate it diversely in diverse conditions'. This distinction is implicit in the original Buddhism and explicit in Mahāyāna, but became obscured in Hinayāna.
As to the origin of Mahāyāna, the author accepts the plausibility of the Mahāyāna view that the Buddha's teaching 'varied with the character and capability of his audience' and that he 'may have begun with simpler sermons at the outset and may have gone on to speak of profounder principles in course of time to select audiences' (some of them reportedly in other worlds). It is true that Mahāyāna as known from its sūtras is a later development, but it existed before 'as an aspect of original Buddhism' and subsequently developed its teachings in contrast to abhidharmic and commentarial scholasticism. It was 'the assertion of the deeper trust and faith in the Buddha leading to the firm resolve to imitate his career as Bodhisattva'. The author's conclusion is that the basic ideas of Mahāyāna were derived from the Buddha's experiences and from the higher aspects of his 'diversified teachings'. The popularising trends within Mahāyāna with their 'quasi-theistic devotion' need not worry us. They were not 'particularly Buddhistic or Mahāyānic', but a part of a 'general cultural movement' in post-Asokan times.

Chapter II, 'Mahāyāna: Vision and Philosophy', rejects the view that Mahāyāna was derived from a critique of Hinayānic ideas and suggests that it is 'intimately connected with its own spiritual experience'. It expresses this experience within 'a suitable philosophical framework' and also 'in terms of myth and symbol'. It goes thereby beyond the 'Hinayānic philosophy' which 'aims at providing the self-absorbed and ascetical monk with an analytical tool' for detachment; but that is an unwORLDLY and cloistered philosophy which 'may be charged with encouraging soteriological egoism'. Mahāyāna, on the other hand, suggests positive perfection and uses skilful means (upāyakausālya) for achieving it. It even looks on faith or doctrine as just pragmatically useful and therefore relative and can thus easily reconcile diversity of faiths and doctrines. The notion of the two levels of truth is one example of skilful development of a doctrine implicit in original Buddhism; it has both dialectical and soteriological purpose. Mahāyāna philosophical vision transcends critical philosophy and helps spiritual seekers. It enables them to see beyond common sense which is beset by belief in the reality of an independent material world and it thus exorcises the spectre of their dependence on it, because this dependence is an illusion. Once this is seen, 'the task of treading the path actually arises'.

Chapter III: 'Mahāyāna: Ideal and Practice', centres around the concept of the Buddha. In the Hinayāna the Buddha is 'only a guide who points the way', but in the Mahāyāna he is 'the way and the goal'. Predicates of existence and non-existence (or both or neither) may not apply to him, but he 'becomes an essentially immortal and supernatural being'. The seeds of this concept again go back to the ancient texts which speak of the Buddha as unparalleled by man or god or any other being and refer to him as brahmabhūta, dharmabhūta and dharmakāya. There was in this development both popular yearning and theoretical compulsion. For philosophers he is the ultimate reality, suchness devoid of ontological and conceptual particularities, and for devotees he represents 'infinite illumination overflowing into love or grace (mahākarūṇā). These transcendental forms become manifest in compassionate Bodhisattvas and devotion to them is the popular aspect of Mahāyāna which extends hope and assurance to the common man. Nevertheless it is only the dedicated practice of the Bodhisattva path which brings the final achievement beyond the illusion of forms. An accomplished one will even then wait 'to retain a transformed bridge from Buddhahood to the world of illusion... to help the transformation of other beings'.

This is only a selective account of the contents of the book, but I hope that I have succeeded in conveying some of its flavour. As indicated at the outset, the book represents the author's ideas about Mahāyāna, and I would not say that they are really finalised. They flow freely from his pen nourished with a stock accumulated during long years of his preoccupation with Buddhist and general Indian cultural developments, but he has not given them systematic form. Nor is his style always unambiguous. Some of the ideas he expresses have been around for some time and were presented by others with greater clarity, substantiated by research and accompanied by detailed documentation. Other, more controversial ones, would need to be supported by more thorough analysis of sources and more careful argumentation. The idea that Mahāyāna should be viewed as the Buddhist notion of universal religion would particularly deserve further elaboration. The view
that Hinayana is a later interpretation of original Buddhism may be acceptable to many and the view that Mahayana is a continuation of some aspects of original Buddhism also has something to be said for it, but if it can be seen by a close study of the older canonical fragments, one would like to see it demonstrated or to get a reference to such a close study. Some portions of the book are just summaries or paraphrases from the sutra literature. The author himself admits in his Preface that 'in view of the extensive compass of the work' he neither engaged in the detailed presentation of historical evidence nor in the detailed refutation of alternative philosophical opinions'. So, although learned, it is not, strictly speaking, a scholarly work. But it can still be regarded as stimulating reading and alert one to some problems in the development of Buddhist thought that one was not fully aware of, even if it does not contribute to their solution.

Karel Werner

Die Morgen- und Abendliturgie der chinesischen Buddhisten.

This is profound study based on fieldwork as well as philological research focussing on the texts of the morning and evening recitation in Chinese Buddhism. The author divides his study into three parts: in the first he describes the history of this genre summarising earlier studies on this topic and putting his subject into a broader context. When discussing the poetic aspect of recitals by early Buddhists (p.12) reference could have been made to Richard Bodman's doctoral thesis, 'Poetics and Prosody in Early Medieval China: A Study and Translation of Kukai's Bunkyo Hifuron' (Cornell 1978). When the author discusses (on p.13) the earliest extant editions of the texts for daily recital which had been revised by the monk Zuhong (1535-1615), one wonders why he does not mention Chumfang Yu's monograph, The Renewal of Buddhism in China. Chu-hung and the Later Ming Synthesis (Columbia Univ. Press, New York 1981). The author gives us, in an admirably meticulous manner, a survey of the relevant texts and their tradition including commentaries.

The descriptions by Holmes Welch and Kamata Shigeo of the morning and evening recitations are enriched by experiences the author himself encountered during his long stay at the Shenglingsi Monastery in Taipei, Taiwan (p.233 ff.). These texts are described and analysed. After underlining the importance of these recitations in the second part, the author provides us with comprehensive translations of the texts transmitted partly in an Indian language, partly in Chinese (pp.47-173), and he adds long explanations and notes. These texts were in use in Buddhist monastic life for more than four centuries.

The third part consists of a translation with commentary of the 'introduction' to the Chinese edition of these old texts (pp.175-200).

This work is impressive and represents highly sophisticated scholarship. However, for the non-specialist it would have been helpful if more of the existing secondary literature had been mentioned. The recent literature on, e.g., the monk Zuhong, who is referred to several times in the book, is not cited. The Bibliography, photostatic reproduction of the central texts in Chinese and an index make the volume not only a very interesting result of research but will hopefully lead to frequent consultation of this study by all those who are interested in the religious ritual of East Asia.

Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer


Here are two further excellent publications in a series, by now well known to the readers of the review section of this journal,
which is useful for supplementing one's picture of modern developments in Buddhism.

The first one is about the eventful life (bewegtes Leben is not easily translatable into English) of the pioneering monk of German origin who entered this life in Wiesbaden as Anton Walther Florus Gueth in 1878 and lived out his closing years as a renowned scholar and revered teacher of the Dhamma in the Forest Hermitage in Udawattakele jungle above Kandy. He moved to the house of the Lanka Dhammaduta Society in Colombo for health reasons in 1956 and died there the following year. He was given a state funeral attended by Prime Minister Solomon W.D.R. Bandaranaike, the German Ambassador, many monks and hundreds of the local population. His ashes rest in the Island Hermitage, Polgaduwa.

The first part of the book gives his autobiography brought up to the year 1926 and written by him in 1948. The manuscript, in parts eaten by termites which were responsible for a few missing lines here and there, was rescued from its shelter in the Forest Hermitage in Kandy only shortly before 1990 by the editor of this fine publication. It covers his young days in Germany and how he became acquainted with Buddhism and decided to go East and become a monk, his travels as a violinist in Europe and to Algiers, and meetings with remarkable people. In 1902 he started his progress East paying his way as a violinist in Egypt and eventually reaching Ceylon via Bombay. Intent on meeting the well-known English monk Ananda Metteya who was then in Burma, he arrived in Rangoon via Madras and was ordained in September 1903 by a Burmese theravada. Having lived with a few other monks in a cave in north Burma practising meditation under an experienced teacher, he returned to Ceylon in 1906 to embark on the systematic study of Pāli texts. His first publication was The Word of the Buddha which came out the same year and is still in print, also in translations into many languages.

From then on it was a life of both inner practice and tireless external activities as writer, translator, teacher, Dhammaduta monk and organiser on an international scale. His travels took him back to Burma and Europe, to Tunisia and Sikkim, and internment during the First World War brought him to Australia.

When released, still during the War, he went to China via Honolulu and after the War again to Europe and then to Japan, Java and Thailand. During long years in Japan he taught at universities. His situation (he was formally still a citizen of defeated Germany) was not always easy and he was allowed to return to Ceylon only in 1926.

The second part covering the less eventful remainder of the venerable theravada's life is the editor's compilation on the basis of various documents, including the Visitors' Book of the Island Hermitage, and particularly the communications of Nyanatiloja's friends, acquaintances and disciples. Among them are some well-known names, e.g. Lama Govinda, Paul Debes, Nyanaponika, Nyanasatta and Nanamoli. The Second World War meant internment again, this time lasting from 1939 till 1946, first in Ceylon and, after the fall of Singapore, in the Dehra Dun camp in north India. It was possible for him, though, to continue his literary and research work there. Back in Ceylon, soon to become independent, his literary activities continued to bear fruit even in Germany where the publication of his writings and translations was taken up by Christiani Verlag in the 50s. The high point of the closing years in his life was his participation in the Sixth Buddhist Council in 1954 in Burma. The third part of the book contains various documents, many as photocopies, and numerous photographs. The list of Nyanatiloja's pupils who became monks contains forty-two names, the list of publications twenty titles.

The book is thorough but readable, and contains a wealth of detailed information on many topics, personalities, events and episodes. In places it makes fascinating reading. The editor has performed an outstanding service by commemorating in this way an exceptional servant of the Dhamma.

Unusually, the second book under review is dedicated to the life and work of a living Buddhist, not even commemorating his 80th birthday in 1994 (which he spent in Thailand). But Helmut Klar is one of the few surviving Buddhists closely associated with the fortunes of Buddhism in Germany since before the rise of Nazism, having been brought to it already in his teens through the writings of Paul Dahlke, the founder of the Buddhist House in Berlin, who had been, like Klar later on, a
medical doctor. However, he took his studies of the Dhamma very seriously and even learned Pali so thoroughly that, besides translating from it, he compiled a German-Pali dictionary. All his life he has dedicated his efforts to his medical research and practice and to the study and practice as well as propagation of the Dhamma.

The book contains a brief life-portrait of Dr Klar from the pen of the editor and selections from his former writings pertaining to the history of Buddhism in Germany and to the way of life of German lay Buddhists. Among the former there is one of particular interest, covering the time of Nazi rule. The second group begins with a piece tackling the question whether a Buddhist can be a member of a Christian denomination. The answer is: he should not be, he ought to stand up and be counted. While living (with his wife) and practising medicine in Iran for six years after the last war, Dr Klar had the opportunity to travel frequently to other countries (India, Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, Japan) and take part in local and international Buddhist events. He developed a special relationship to Thailand, learned the language and visited it many times. He and his wife virtually adopted a Thai student who lived with them in Heidelberg for nearly seven years. She eventually married a German and this occasioned his interest in the Thai community in Germany which amounts to some 100,000. Their life there, especially of women in mixed marriages, is not without problems and the next condensed article in the book is on Ausländerfeindlichkeit gegen Thailänderinnen (xenophobia against Thai women), targeting both sides with advice and trying to involve especially Buddhists in practical help to create understanding and tolerance towards Thais in the rest of the population.

The picture of Buddhist developments in Germany and Klar’s involvement in them is further supplemented by four accounts of his contemporaries and rounded off with the editor’s interview with the man himself. As in all his writings and activities he proves himself in the interview to be both informed and informative, interesting and truly given to incorporating principles of the Dhamma into daily living. Lukewarm Buddhism and flirting with meditation without this practical commitment does not achieve much, nor does any amount of exotic rituals. Dr Klar has published three books, edited Dahleke’s translation of the Dhammapada, adding an introduction, and has written a large number of articles, some of them for English magazines, besides a substantial number of expert medical papers. The book also contains a number of interesting photographs.

Karel Werner


By the author’s own account this study of two Theravada temples — one in Chicago and one in Los Angeles — is poised at a midlevel of sociological analysis, somewhere between micro-sociology (study of small groups) and macrosociology (study of whole societies). This position reflects the author’s concern to capture the inward and outward orientation of the actors in his study and the new institutions they are creating. In doing so he brings together two theoretical perspectives. The first draws on a type of sociology of immigrant religions in the United States that concentrates on the function of religion for resettlement and assimilation within immigrant communities. Numrich refers to this approach as Americanization ‘in its classic’ sense.

The second approach is demanded by the author’s plentiful data, which adds a fresh element to the classical model by revealing the influence of American converts whose religious motivations and aspirations dictate a specific agenda of their own. As Numrich rightly points out, researchers have tended to locate such converts in a ‘field of vision’ that characterises the study of New Religious Movements as it has evolved since the 1960s. Numrich regrets the tendency to employ ‘the NRM category to explain U.S. Buddhism in general’, though he chooses not to ‘overcompensate... by making too little of the NRM influence on immigrant Theravada Buddhism’. His project, therefore, is to include and explain the inter-relationship between what he terms two ‘parallel’ temple ‘congregations’. The largest congregation consists of Asian immigrant families and the smaller congregation is made up of individual Americans with Christian and Jewish
backgrounds. It is the presence of this last group which makes the case of the Theravāda Buddhist temples so different from previous studies of the Americanization of immigrant religions.

According to Numrich there are nearly 150 ethnic-Asian Theravāda Buddhist temples in the United States. Most of them have been established since 1970 as a response to the growth in immigration in the USA by people from South and South East Asia. The pace of growth increased during the 1980s and the author suggests that the 1990s might produce more Theravāda Buddhist temples in America than did the previous decade. The two temples that are portrayed in the book are the Thai Wat Dhammaram in Chicago and the Sri Lankan Dharma Vijaya Buddhist Vihāra in Los Angeles. Like the majority of Theravāda temples in the USA they are situated in urban environments where, at street level, they tend to be architecturally indistinguishable from the local surroundings. Both temples selected serve scattered populations of devotees, most of whom live at a distance.

Dharma Vijaya ‘shares a slightly depressed neighborhood with mostly African Americans, Koreans and Hispanics’ where its patrons and monks distributed food after the riots in 1992. Wat Dhammaram is in ‘a problem area’ but also maintains congenial relations with its neighbours. Numrich cites the ‘decision to allow neighborhood youth access to vending machines in the temple hallway’ as an intriguing example of the temple’s response to its immediate social setting. One of the few disappointments of the book is that it does not investigate how the temples have contrived to fit so successfully into their culturally diverse and economically strained surroundings. Successful neighbourhood integration is all the more interesting in the light of the apparent disharmony resulting in the experience of religious schism by both the Thai and Sri Lankan communities.

The schisms were brought about in each case for a complex of reasons to which the author devotes an entire chapter. In it he discusses how in each of the temples the same question arose, that of how ‘Asian’ an immigrant temple ought to be. In the event, the Dharma Vijaya temple is taking the biggest strides in the ‘divorcing of religion and culture’. Wat Dhammaram is more conservative and houses a Thai cultural centre, but the two further institutions that were spawned during the period of schism in 1986 include the Natural Buddhist Meditation Temple of Greater Chicago, which rejects the ‘cultural centre’ model of a temple, and where the programme represents ‘overriding devotion to meditation’.

The Thai and Sri Lankan lay people in the United States have exerted considerable influence on the direction of events and questions of temple administration. However, the monks, whom the Asian-American laity support and from whom they seek ritual and pastoral services, are also attending to the different requirements of the convert congregations. It is possible for members of these different congregations to have little contact with one another, though more usually they interact to varying degrees at certain festivals, or share some responsibilities in the overall life of the temple. With the inevitable exception of certain individuals who act as cautionary examples to social scientists looking for tidy categories, the interests and needs of the two congregations diverge. The immigrant congregation associates with its temple for ritual purposes and to establish cultural continuity with the country of origin. The converts attend the temple to receive teaching and guidance in the practice of meditation and to refine their understanding of philosophical Buddhism. In a questionnaire 63% of the convert respondents designated meditation as ‘their most important religious practice, to only 11.5 percent of Asia-immigrant respondents’. While these findings hold no surprise, it is necessary for those who may wish to make use of them to avoid the trap of oversimplifications leading to the formation of stereotypes. Numrich found that despite their intellectual interest the American converts were not always as well informed as they judged themselves to be. Their enthusiasm for Theravāda Buddhism, on the familiar, but shaky, ground that it represents a pristine form of Buddhism, sits ironically with their demonstrable tendency towards religious syncretism. It was also the case that classes conducted in English and designed to meet the needs of the American converts are attended by some Asian Buddhists. Numrich detects signs that more students of Asian origin will
attend in the future. Second and future generation Buddhists from immigrant families who continue to practise their religion may come to resemble the American converts more than they resemble the ancestors who founded their temples.

Monks such as Ven. Piyananda and his colleagues at Dharma Vijaya are eager to bring more converts into the Buddhist fold. Even the more cautious monks of Wat Dhammaram promote activities for members of the general public who want to learn about Buddhism and meditation, and in this they are encouraged and assisted by their long-standing lay converts. Members of the Thai and Sri Lankan immigrant communities demonstrate a reluctance to encourage their sons to ordain as monks. Boys are most likely to be steered towards a career that will improve the family’s economic and social prospects. Monks are brought from Asia to serve the temples. American converts also show little enthusiasm for taking up the robe, so for the time being both congregations rely on a supply of monks from abroad.

The lack of recruitment to the Sangha among its supporters in America presents a problem, because there is a felt need for educated, English-speaking monks who possess an understanding of American society. Monks with this kind of profile and willingness to live abroad are hard to find. One response is to expand the instrumental role that lay people can play in internal operations of the temples and in acting as spokespersons capable of addressing a wider public. Various experiments in increasing the range of lay participation in both spiritual and organisational terms are being carried out, especially at Dharma Vijaya where the monks have developed a kind of lay ‘ordination’ among the convert congregation. So far the experiment is in its infancy, but Numrich believes that it could result in the creation of a ‘quasi-monastic order, a tertiary order of men and women religious somewhat analogous to the Roman Catholic traditions’.

It is interesting to make a comparison with Britain, where the number of Asian immigrant Theravāda Buddhists is much smaller. Here the history of conversion to Buddhism is marked by the establishment of a Sangha whose members include those from Britain and other European countries, as well as from North America and Australasia. Yet, in Britain too there are indications

that the instrumental role of lay people is growing in significance, as instanced by the British Forest Sangha’s recent creation of an upāsikā network. The profile of converts in Britain is very similar to that provided by Numrich for America, where converts are little interested in the merit-making rituals that characterise lay religiosity among the immigrant Buddhists.

Numrich is not given to detailed speculation about the future shape of Theravāda Buddhism in the United States, but he does suggest that the influence of the American-convert congregations will lead temples ‘to place emphasis on vipassana meditation and to continue experimenting with quasi-monastic status for lay members’ thereby moving immigrant Theravāda Buddhism in the direction taken by Buddhist modernism in Asia. As Buddhist modernism is itself a product of historical forces that brought Theravāda Buddhism to a meeting with Western influences, the complexity of the cross-cultural encounter is apparent. Numrich, to his credit, is not daunted by these difficulties. The clarity of his account probably owes much to a long acquaintance with his material, since he began his research at Dharma Vijaya in 1987. Those readers who are familiar with some of the ground covered in his timely book will value the author’s careful attention to detail, combined with a coherent synthesis of its theoretical themes. While those students seeking to begin a study of Buddhism in America can do no better than to start with Numrich’s research.

Sandra Bell
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