Thus have I heard. At one time a number of monks were living among the people of Kosala, on the slopes of the Himalayas in a group of forest huts. And they were turbulent, arrogant, frivolous, garrulous, of local talk, unmindful, uncompromising, unconcentrated, with wandering minds and uncontrolled faculties.

Then Jantu devaputta, it being the uposatha-observance of the fifteenth (of the month), approached those monks and addressed them with these verses:

'Happily the monks lived formerly, Those who disciples were of Gotama. Unlonging they sought their alms-food, Unlonging their bed and seat. Impermanence in the world they understood And hence they made an end of suffering. Now, making bad men of themselves, Like headmen in a village Hankering for what another's house contains, They eat and eat until they sink to rest.'

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1 S I, p.62.
2 Ie. the evening of the full moon.
The Community I greet respectfully,
But only some here I pay homage to;
Those (others), rejected, leaderless,
Are like corpses to be cast aside.

Those who here live heedlessly, —
It is concerning these I speak.
Only those who dwell in earnestness,
It is these I greet respectfully.\(^3\)

The variety of objects existing in the world,
These need not represent objects of desire.
Man's sensual desire is a thought of lust.
The variety of objects continues in the world.
But the wise here give up longing for them\(^4\).

The variety of objects existing in the world,
These need not represent objects of desire.
A thought of lust is sensual desire, 'tis said.
This thought is applying unskilled thinking.
A monk will forsake these sensual longings.\(^5\)

\(^3\) **S I, p.22**

\(^4\) **SnpA, p.539.**

AKĀLIKO DHAMMO

Heneepola Gunaratana (Mahantha)

In this paper I intend to examine the meaning of the phrase *akāliko dhammo* within the context of offering *dāna* to the enlightened community (Sangha). As the distinction between one state of enlightenment and another is explained in terms of *akāliko dhammo*, we should know precisely the answers to the following questions: 'How long would an *ariyapuggala* (noble or enlightened individual) remain at one stage before he/she attains the next? Is the period of time an *ariyapuggala* remains at one stage adequate for any social or spiritual interaction between unenlightened and enlightened individuals?'

Nowhere in the entire Sutta Pitaka, except in the Commentaries, do we find an explanation of this phrase in terms of the time that any particular *ariyapuggala* would remain at one stage of enlightenment or another. The only explanation we can find is in the Abhidhamma. Because of the practical difficulties in accepting the Abhidhamma explanation, it is worth examining the meaning of this phrase more closely.

The Abhidhamma teaches that the mind is changing moment by moment. Each moment consists of three minor movements — arising (*uppāda*), development (*thiti*) and dissolution (*bhāṅga*). Each of these phases occupies an infinitesimal division of time — an instant (*khāna*) — so that to every separate state of consciousness there are three instants, in which it successively becomes, exists, and disappears. These three instants — nascent, static, and cessant (or arrested) — together form one mental moment (*cittakhana*), the period
occupied by any single state of consciousness, or any separate act of mind or thought. And it pleases commentators to say that there are more than one billion of such thought moments in the time that would be occupied by the shortest flash of lightning³.

Impermanence of all forms, feelings, perception, mental activities and consciousneses is certainly central to the Buddha’s teaching. Within this reality, however, mind and body exist for many years. Moreover, social interaction between two individuals — such as giving and receiving — occurs on a much longer time scale than the microscopic scale described by the Abhidhamma. Giving and receiving simply do not take place within the span of a single mind moment.

The Visuddhimagga defines the word akālika thus:

'\text{It has no delay (lit. takes no time — } kāla) \text{ in the manner of giving its own fruit, thus it is "without delay (akāla). "Without delay" is the same as "not delayed (akālika). What is meant is that instead of giving its fruit after creating a delay (using up time), say, five days, seven days, it gives its fruit immediately next to its own occurrence (Sn. 266).}'

Or alternatively, what is delayed (kālika — lit. what takes time) is what needs some distant time to be reached before it gives its fruit. What is that? It is the mundane law of profitable [kamma]. This, however, is undelayed (na kālika) because its fruit comes immediately next to it, so it is "not delayed" (akālika)³.

This definition seems to limit the meaning of the word (akālika). Dhamma is timeless in that it is as effective today as it was at the time of the Buddha and will be effective to infinity. No matter when we practise it, Dhamma produces its own result either immediately or later, for Dhamma is eternal. The Dhamma, as exemplified by the Four Noble Truths, is always present. When it is lost to gods and human beings, the Buddhas discover it and realise it for themselves, but it is only a Supremely Enlightened Buddha who can declare it to others. The Pacceka Buddhas are unable to proclaim to others what has been realised by them.

Since this meaning of timelessness (akālikatā) of the Dhamma has not been adequately elucidated, most Buddhists are looking forward to Metteyya (Maitreya) Buddha for their own attainment of enlightenment, for they think that the attainment of enlightenment is not possible today. Even Buddhaghosa, who wrote such a scholarly thesis as the Visuddhimagga, was known to have expressed his wish in the following stanzas:

\text{By the performance of such merit  
As has been gained by me through this  
And any other still in hand  
So may I in my next becoming  
Behold the joys of Tavatiṁsā,}

Glad in the qualities of virtue
And unattached to sense desires
By having reached the first fruition,
And having in my last life seen
Metteyya, Lord of Sages, Highest
person of the World, and Helper
Delighting in all beings’ welfare,
And heard that Holy One proclaim
The Teaching of the Noble Law,
May I grace the Victor’s Dispensation
By realizing its Highest Fruit.

As this wish is found only in the Sinhalese Visuddhimagga, it is possible that it has been either interpolated by Sri Lankan Buddhists, or that the editors of the Visuddhimagga in other countries deliberately omitted this wish from the book in order to clear Buddhaghosa’s name from the belief that he, too, fell into the category of those who wish to be reborn in Samāra. The Buddha never praised Samsāra even for a moment. He said in the Anguttara-nikāya, ‘Monks, just as the smallest amount of excrement, urine, saliva, pus and blood stink, similarly I do not praise re-becoming even for a moment, not even for the duration of a finger-snap’. The fact that Buddhaghosa wished to be reborn even to see the Buddha Metteyya is an indication that he had not attained enlightenment at all, which leads us to doubt his explanation of akāliko dhammo.

Since the effectiveness of the Dhamma is timeless, attainment of enlightenment is possible at any time. The Buddha made this clear in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta, saying: ‘But in whatsoever Teaching and Rule there is found the Noble Eightfold Path, therein is found the true ascetic of the first and second, third and fourth degree of saintliness . . .; but if, Subhadda, the bhikkhus live righteously, the world will not be destitute of Arahats.

The first two verses of the Dhammapada illustrate that the Dhamma is immediately effective: ‘Our actions are all led by the mind, mind is their master, mind is their maker. If we act or speak with a defiled state of mind, then suffering follows us like the cart-wheel that follows the foot of the ox . . . And if we act or speak with a pure state of mind, then happiness follows us like a shadow that remains behind without departing.

Dhamma is ‘immediately effective (akāliko dhammo)’, and we do not have to die in order to experience the fruit of our evil thought or good thought. Almost simultaneously with a defiled state or pure state of mind, we experience pain or happiness.

4 Path of Purification, op. cit., pp.837–8:
Yaṃ siddhāṁ imāṁ puññāṁ, yaḥ cāhaṁ punāti mayā
eśe puññakammena duitye attasamabhāve
Tāvatīṁse pamoḍanto silācāragunā rato
alaggo pahca kāmesu pañāha puññaham phalam;
Āntime atakāvāvanti metteyyaṁ munipuṅgavaṁ;
lakgagurugalaṁ nātham sabbasaithahi rataṁ
Disvāna tassa dhīrassa suvā saddhammadesaṁ
adhiṣṭantā phalam aggaṁ sobheyyaṁ jinasāsanaṁ ti. — Vism., p.713.

5 Seyyathāpi bhikkhave appamattako pi gūtho duggandho hoti, . . . muttam
duggandham, khelo . . ., pubbo . . ., lokiṭam duggandham hoti evam eva kho
aham bhikkhave appamattakam pi bhavāna vaṇṇanti antamāso acchāro


7 Dhp, vv.1–2.
The other more serious problem arising from the popular interpretation of the akālikatā of Dhamma lies in the classification of the Buddha's noble disciples into eight individuals who make up four pairs. The Sangha is described in the most frequently used passage as follows:

'The Order of the Exalted One's disciples is practising well; the Order of the Exalted One's disciples is practising rightly; the Order of the Exalted One's disciples is following the right Path⁸; the Order of the Exalted One's disciples is practising properly — that is, the four pairs of persons, the eight kinds of individuals, this Order of the Exalted One's disciples — worthy of offerings and hospitality, worthy of gifts and salutation, supreme field of merit for the world⁹.

'The four who travel on the Paths,
The four who in Fruition stand,
This Brotherhood whose way lies straight,
In virtue and in insight trained:
For mankind offering sacrifice,
For creatures fain to earn reward,
Who work good deeds for life renewed;
Whate'er they to that Order give

Entails hereafter ample fruit¹⁰.

According to Buddhist analysis, there are three mutually exclusive categories of individuals. They are ten individuals, eight individuals and seven individuals. Explaining the ten individuals, the Buddha says:

'Monks, these ten persons are worthy of worship, worthy of reverence, worthy of gifts, worthy of salutations with clasped hands, a field of merit unsurpassed for the world, What ten persons?
A Tathāgata, arahant, a fully enlightened one,
a Pacceka Buddha,
one liberated in both ways, i.e. through the Jhānas and through insight (ubhatobhāgavimutto),
one released by insight,
one who has testified (to the truth) in his own person,
one who has won views,
one released by faith, and the truth devote,
the faith devotee,
one who has entered the lineage of the Noble Disciples and is no longer a wording (gotrabhū)¹¹.'

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⁸ Naṭāya paṭipanno should mean 'one who has entered the right path (ariyamagga = ariyañāṇa). See Vin. I, p.10; D III, p.120; S V, pp.19, 141, 167, 185; A II, p.95; IV, p.426; V, p.194.

⁹ Suṇatipanno bhagavato sāvakasaṅgho apiṣatipanno bhagavato sāvakasaṅgho ṅāyaṇaṅgī ṅāyaṇaṅgī sāvakasaṅgho bhagavato sāvakasaṅgho yaddiṁ cattāri purisayugāni attā purisapuggala esa bhagavato sāvakasaṅgho āhuneyyo pāhuneyyo dakkhineyyo ajjikaraṇiyyo anuttaram puṇnakkeṭtan lokassa. — A I, p.208; II, p.56, etc., etc.


The seven individuals:

The faith devotee (saddhānusārí),
the one liberated by faith (saddhāvimutto),
the body witness (kāyasakkhi),
the one liberated in both ways (ubhatobhāgavimutto),
the truth devotee (dhammānusārí),
the one attained to understanding (dīthippatto),
the one liberated by wisdom (paññāvimutto)\(^\text{13}\).

Out of these seven, the faith devotee and the truth devotee are names given to those who attain the path of stream-entry through faith and wisdom respectively. Both of them are treated as separate individuals unmixed with those who have attained stream-entry fruit. From the standpoint of their spiritual stature the seven types of noble persons can be divided into three categories. The first, which includes the faith devotee and the truth devotee, consists of those on the path of stream-entry, the first of the eight ariyan persons. The second category, comprising the one attained to understanding, consists of those on the six intermediate levels, from the stream-enterer to the one on the path of arahantship. The third category, comprising the one liberated in both ways and the one liberated by wisdom, consists only of arahants. This grouping unambiguously shows that there are individual noble ones on the stream-entry path, once-returner path, never-returner path and arahant-path.

Describing the nature of the faith devotee, the Majjhima-nikāya says: 'Here someone has not yet, in his own person, reached those peaceful incorporeal deliverances transcending all corporeality; nor, after wisely understanding all things, have the biases (āsava) reached extinction. But he has a certain degree of faith in the Perfect One, a certain degree of devotion to him, and he possesses such faculties of faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom. Such a one, O monks, is called a faith devotee\(^\text{13}\).

Although this explanation does not explicitly mention that this person is one who has entered the path of stream-entry, the description implies he is a stream-winner. However, the Puggalapaññatti explanation is much more explicit: 'What person is a faith devotee? In a person practising for the realisation of the fruit of stream-entry, the faculty of faith is predominant; he develops the Noble Path led by faith, with faith as forerunner. This person is called a faith devotee. A person practising for the realisation of the fruit of stream-entry is a faith devotee. When established in the fruit, he is one liberated by faith\(^\text{14}\).

Both the Majjhima-nikāya and the Puggalapaññatti define the truth devotee in the same way as the faith devotee, except that they substitute wisdom for faith as the predominant faculty and as the leader and forerunner in the development of the path. When he is established in the fruit of stream-entry, he becomes one attained to understanding.

Both are said to be developing the Noble Path, one led by faith and the other by wisdom. They are treading the path, but have not yet attained the fruit of stream-entry. If the path is

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\(^{12}\) See H. Gunaratana, The Path of Serenity and Insight (Delhi 1985), pp.192–8, for further details.

\(^{13}\) Nyanatiloka, tr., The Path to Deliverance (BPS, 1982), pp.182–4.

followed immediately by the fruit, then there is no time for them to practise, develop, improve, increase the path they are already in. These are two individuals entirely separated from one another by time. Even the individual who is in the path of stream-entry — practising it, developing it and trying to attain the fruit of stream-entry — changes according to the degree of attainment.

Glossing over the textual passage, the commentarial explanation states:

‘Of the one who is attained’ means the one who attained the path of stream-entry. ‘The truth devotee’ is a synonym of the path of stream-entry. When he attains the fruit of stream-entry he is called ‘the one attained to understanding’.

One who has attained the path of stream-entry by means of wisdom, with the exception that faith is replaced by wisdom, has been explained almost identically. ‘He lives strictly in accordance with Dhamma. Therefore he is called truth devotee (dhammānuśāri).’

Explaining the contemplation of the characteristics of phenomena (lakkhanāpanijjhāna), Buddhaghosa says: ‘Here, insight contemplates the characteristics of phenomena [impermanence, suffering and selflessness]. Insight’s task of contemplation is perfected by the path, thus the path is called contemplation of characteristics. The fruit contemplates the actual characteristic of cessation, thus it is called the contemplation of characteristics.

In the explanation, supramundane path (magga) and fruit (phala) are treated as two distinctive states existing longer than one thought moment. If path (magga) contemplates the characteristics of phenomena, it should occur many times before its fruit is attained. All phenomena have three characteristics — impermanence (anicca), unsatisfactoriness (dukkha) and selflessness (anattā). These characteristics, it should repeat itself at least three times. Of course a meditator would repeat his contemplation of the characteristics of all phenomena more than three thought moments before the mind reaches the fruit (phala).

Also fruit (phala) is treated separately. The commentary says that the fruit contemplates the actual characteristics of cessation. This means that the path contemplation and fruit contemplation are two different contemplations. Insight contemplates the characteristics of the phenomena at the path stage, and when it attains the fruit stage it contemplates the characteristic of the cessation. As these two — path and fruits — have two separate objects of contemplation, they must be separated by a much longer period than one thought moment apart. It is quite evident that the mind that comprehends the three characteristics of phenomena and one characteristic of cessation should at least endure four thought moments.

Commenting on ‘full understanding’ (parinibbāna), Buddha-
ghosa says: ‘And here the section on full understanding is stated for the purpose of showing the fulfilment of the development of the path (maggabhāvanāpāripūrī), the others for the purpose of showing the fulfilment of the realization of the fruit (phalasacchikiryāpāripūrī).’

This means that there are two methods to be practised — one is to gain the path and the other to gain the fruit. If the fruit is immediately preceded by the path, then the first would suffice because one who follows this method attains the path, and there would be no time left for him to devote to the second method to attain the fruit. There must be a certain time gap between the path and the fruit for one to develop the path and then attain the fruit.

Indeed, Bahiya Daruciriya wondered whether he was one of those who had attained arahantship or arahantship’s path.

This undoubtedly indicates that path and fruit were treated in early Buddhism as two separate, though not contrary, attainments which may be achieved within two inconceivably brief thought moments, within a lifetime, or anywhere between.

Explaining object-decisive support conditions (ārammaṇa-upanissaya-paccaya), the Paṭhāna points out that magga and phala are separated by some temporal interval: ‘Trainers give importance to change-of-lineage and review it. They give importance to cleansing and review it. Trainers, having emerged from a path, give importance to the path and review it.’

Here ‘trainers’ means those who have attained the first stage of sainthood (stream-enterer) through the third stage of sainthood (never-returner). They are stream-entry path-attainer and fruit-attainer, once-returner’s path-attainer and fruit-attainer, and never-returner’s path-attainer and fruit-attainer. These individuals emerge from the path attainment and review their path attainments before they attain the fruit of the respective path they attained. Therefore, there should be sufficient time for them to review their path attainment before they attain the fruit.

‘Meditation method means: some practise insight meditation preceded by tranquillity meditation, and some practise tranquillity meditation preceded by insight meditation. How? Here someone first attains access concentration or absorption concentration. This is tranquillity. He sees that and its associate factors in the light of impermanence, etc. This is insight. Thus he first attains tranquillity and then insight. Therefore this (practice) is called insight preceded by tranquillity. In him who practises insight preceded by tranquillity, the path arises. He associates with that path, cultivates it, increases it. In him who associates with that path, cultivates it and increases it, hindrances vanish, residues vanish (removed). Thus, he practises insight meditation preceded by tranquillity meditation.’


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Here someone without developing (arousing) tranquillity meditation in the manner described above sees impermanence etc. in the five aggregates. This is insight. For completing insight there arises concentration based on giving up the factors born in the insightful mind. This is tranquillity. Thus, first insight and, later on, tranquillity are developed. Therefore it is called tranquillity preceded by insight. In him who practises tranquillity preceded by insight, the path arises. He associates with that path, cultivates it, increases it. In him who associates with that path, cultivates it and increases it, hindrances vanish, residues vanish (removed). Thus, tranquillity meditation preceded by insight meditation is practised. This meditation method should be known in the manner that both the practice of insight meditation preceded by tranquillity meditation or the practice of tranquillity meditation preceded by insight meditation become dual practice at the moment of attaining the supramundane path.

This commentarial explanation demonstrates that the meditator attains the supramundane path and cultivates it, multiplies it and develops it before he attains the fruit (phala). If the path is followed immediately by the fruit, the meditator does not have any time to cultivate the path.

The Buddha said: 'Bhikkhus, there are eight persons worthy of offerings and hospitality, of gifts and homage, an incomparable field of merit to the world. — The stream-enterer, he who has entered the path to the realisation of the fruit of stream-entry, the once-returner, he who has entered the path of the realisation of the fruit of once-returner, the non-returner, he who has entered the path of the realisation of the fruit of non-returner, the arahant, and he who has entered the path to arahantship. When he said this, he made it clear that there are four persons who have entered the path and four who have entered the fruit of its realisation. One who enters the path should practise it, develop it and cultivate it to the point where the practice bears fruit.

The Abhidhammatthasangaha states: 'The wise man reviews the path (maggā), fruit (phala) and Nibbāna. Also he may determine (if he desires) whether or not he should review the


destroyed defilements and the remaining defilements\textsuperscript{24}.

If the thought of the path (maggacitta) is limited to only one or two thought moments, then there would not be any time for the mind to register it. Without registering it in the mind, the mind cannot recall it to be reviewed.

There is a very special knowledge which no ordinary person can attain, and that is the supramundane wisdom of path and fruit. Since there are four pairs involving eight enlightened individuals, this knowledge is divided into eight. The first of them is knowledge of the attainment of the path of stream-entry. For someone to have any knowledge of what he has attained, he should have at least some thought moments to understand what he has already attained. Now, if the fruit follows immediately after the path, without having any thought moments between attainment of the path and fruit, it is impossible for the stream-enterer to have the knowledge that he has attained the path. If there is not time for any thought moment between attainment of the path and fruit, one who enters the path cannot know what he has attained. This is true with regard to all four paths.

According to the Pāli Canon, supramundane knowledge is of three types:

1. The thought, 'I will realise the unknown' (anaññātaññassāmitindriya)\textsuperscript{25}. This is associated with the supramundane path of stream-entry (ariyapuggala)\textsuperscript{26} and forms the foundation to the attainment of holiness.

2. The faculty of highest realisation (anāññindriya)\textsuperscript{27}, which is associated with the fruit of stream-entry, and also with the path and fruit of once-return and non-return and the path of holiness.

3. The faculty of him who has full realisation of the truth (anāññātāvindriya)\textsuperscript{28} which is associated with the fruit of holiness\textsuperscript{29}.

It is very clear here that one who attains the path has time to think, 'I shall come to know the yet unknown'. If the fruit follows the path immediately within one thought moment, then there is no time for him to think that he will come to know the unknown.

If the supramundane fruit follows immediately after the supramundane path, how can one practise the following fourteen kinds of offerings listed in the Dakkhinavibhaṅga Sutta?

'Now, Ananda, there are these fourteen offerings graded as to individuals. One gives a gift to a Tathāgata, Perfected One, fully Self-Awakened One — this is the first offering graded as to individuals. One gives a gift to the one enlightened for and by himself alone — this is the second offering... One gives a gift to a Tathāgata's disciple who is perfected — this is the third offering... One gives a gift to one faring along for the realisation of the fruit of perfection — this is the fourth offering... One gives a gift to a non-returner — this is the fifth offering... One
gives a gift to one faring along for the realisation of the fruit of non-returning — this is the sixth offering . . . One gives a gift to a once-returner — this is the seventh offering . . . One gives a gift to one faring along for the realisation of the fruit of once-returning — this is the eighth offering . . . One gives a gift to a stream-attainer — this is the ninth offering . . . One gives a gift to one faring along for the realisation of the fruit of stream-attainment — this is the tenth offering . . . One gives a gift to one who is beyond and without attachment to sense-pleasures — this is the eleventh offering . . . One gives a gift to a person of moral habit — this is the twelfth offering . . . One gives a gift to an ordinary person of poor moral habit — this is the thirteenth offering . . . One gives a gift to an animal — this is the fourteenth offering graded as to individuals.

The sutta goes on to outline the results of these fourteen kinds of individual dāna:

‘As to this, Ānanda, when a gift has been given to an animal, it is to be expected that the offering (yields) a hundredfold. When a gift has been given to an ordinary person of poor moral habit, it is to be expected that the offering (yields) a thousandfold. When a gift has been given to an ordinary person of moral habit, it is to be expected that the offering (yields) a hundred thousandfold. When a gift is given to one who is beyond and without attachment to sense-pleasures, it is to be expected that the offering (yields) one hundred thousandfold of crores. When a gift has been given to one faring along for the realisation of the fruit of stream-attainment, it is to be expected that the offering (yields) what is incalculable and immeasurable. So what can be said of the stream-attainer? So what can be said of the once-returner? So what can be said of the one faring along for the realisation of the fruit of once-returning? So what can be said of the once-returner? So what can be said of the one faring along for the realisation of the fruit of non-returning? So what can be said of the non-returner? So what can be said of the one faring along for the realisation of the fruit of perfection? So what can be said of the one perfected? So what can be said of the Tathāgata’s disciple who is perfected? So what can be said of the one enlightened for and by himself alone? So what can be said of a Tathāgata, Perfected One, fully Self-Awakened One?\[30\]

The Anguttara-nikāya outlines four individuals as follows:

‘Monks, these four persons are found existing in the world. What four? The person who goes with the stream, he who goes against the stream, he who stands fast, and he who has crossed over, gone beyond, who stands on dry land — a brahmin.

‘And of what sort, monks, is the person who goes with the stream? Here in the world, monks, a certain person indulges his passions and does wrong deeds (kāme ca paṭīsevati pāpaṁ ca kammaṁ karoti). This one is called ‘a person who goes with the stream’.

‘And of what sort, monks, is the person who goes against the stream? Here in the world, monks, a certain person indulges not his passions, he does no wrong deed, but with suffering and rejection, with tearful face and lamentation, lives the spiritual life, complete and utterly fulfilled (kāme
ka na paṭiṣevati pāpañ ca kammaṁ na karoti sahā pi dukkho sahā pi domanassena assumukho rudamāno pari-puṇṇam parisuddham brahmaciyaṁ carati). This one is called 'a person who goes against the stream'.

And of what sort, monks, is the person who stands fast? Here in the world, monks, a certain person, by destroying the five fetters that bind to the lower worlds, is reborn spontaneously in a higher world and, without returning from that world, attains Parinibbāna (pañca-nanam oram-bhāgiyānāth saññojanānāth parikkhayā upapātiko hoti tattha parinibbāyī anavattidhammo tasā lokā). This one is called 'a person who stands fast'.

And of what sort, monks, is the person who has crossed over, gone beyond, who stands on dry land — a brahmin? Here in this world, monks, a certain person, by the destruction of the āsavas, realises in this very life, by himself thoroughly comprehending it, the heart's release, the release by wisdom, which is free from the āsavas, and having attained it abides therein (āsavānaṁ khaṇāya anāsavānaṁ cetovimuttim paññāvimuttim diṭṭheva dhamme sayam abhiśīnaḥ sacchikavā upasampajjā viharati). This one, monks, is called 'a person who has crossed over, gone beyond, who stands on dry land — a brahmin'.

The characteristics of the stream-winner and those of the one treading the path towards stream-entry are different from one another. The characteristic qualities of a stream-winner are unshakable faith in the Enlightened One, unshakable faith in the

Doctrine, unshakable faith in the Order and perfect morality. These are the characteristic qualities of a stream-winner (sotāpannassa angāṁ)32.

The four (preliminary) 'conditions to stream-entry' are: companionship with good persons, hearing the Good Law, wise reflection, living in conformity with the Law.

However, even one who is treading the path towards the attainment of stream-entry is called an Aryan for the reason that his attainment is certain.

There are specific functions of the path of stream-entry, and that of once-return, non-return and arahantship. Buddhaghosa makes this clear in the Visuddhimagga: Through the path of stream-entry in the case of defilements coefficient with [false] view, (a) abandoning is virtue, (b) abstention is virtue, (c) volition is virtue, (d) restraint is virtue, (e) non-transgression is virtue. Through the path of once-return in the case of gross defilements, (a) abandoning is virtue... Through the path of non-return in the case of residual defilements... Through the path of arahantship in the case of all defilements, (a) abandoning is virtue, (b) abstention is virtue, (c) volition is virtue, (d) restraint is virtue, (e) non-transgression is virtue.

A person who has attained the path of stream-entry is called 'Lesser Stream-enterer'. Elucidating this, Buddhaghosa says: 'Correct Knowledge and Right Seeing and Overcoming of Doubt... are these things different in meaning and different in the letter or are they one in meaning and only the letter is different?' Correct Knowledge and Right Seeing and Overcoming

31 A II, pp.5-6. 1. anusotagāni puggalo, 2. paṭisotagāni puggalo, 3. titātto puggalo, 4. tiṇṇo pāraṅgato thale itthakati brahmāno. — Pug, p.62.
32 S LV, 1; XLVII, 8; D (Sutta) 33.
33 S LV, 5; D 33.
of Doubt — these things are one in meaning and only the letter is different\(^{34}\).

“When a man practising insight has become possessed of this knowledge, he has found comfort in the Buddha’s Dispensation, he has found a foothold, he is certain of his destiny, he is called a ”Lesser Stream-enterer”\(^{35}\).

One who is preparing for the realisation of the fruit of stream-entry should have entered the path of stream-entry, which is the minimum requirement to make him a Noble One. Even the one who has gained the knowledge of the change of lineage is not qualified to be called a Noble Individual, although it is this knowledge that separates him from an unenlightened state leading him into the category of Noble Individuals. In other words, the term ‘Ariyapuggala’ is not used for anybody who is anywhere before the attainment of the path of stream-entry.

If the fruit follows immediately after any of the four supra-mundane paths, there is no time for any individual to give gifts to any path-attainer. If the attainment of the path is limited to only one thought moment and no more, then there is no path-attainer to receive any gift. What anybody can do in one thought moment is practically nothing. The fact that the path-attainers are separated from the fruit-attainers and that gifts can be given to them separately definitely proves that the path-attainers spend more than one thought moment before attaining the fruit of their paths. Therefore, paths and fruits are separated by a long span of time, certainly not by one thought moment.

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\(^{34}\) Vism pp.604-5.

\(^{35}\) Path of Purification, op. cit, pp.702-3.

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THE DHAMMAPADA IN THE LANGUAGES OF NEPAL

Bhikkhu Vipassī Dhammadāna

Nepal is a land of many languages. The foremost vernacular of the Buddhists has always been Nevārī, which has a rich traditional literature dating back to well over a thousand years. Nevārī, a somewhat distinct branch of Tibeto-Burman, is spoken in the Kathmandu Valley and major towns of Nepal; other languages of the Tibeto-Burman family include Tamāṅg, Gurung, Magara and Serpā. Nepālī, an Indo-Aryan language related to Hindi, is the official language. The major languages of Nepal are written today in the Nāgarī script (with the exception of Serpā written in Tibetan characters). Nevārī is still sometimes written in the ancient, traditional Nevārī scripts such as Pracalita and Ranjana\(^2\).

The Dhammapada, a collection of 423 Pāli verses, is the second book of the Khuddaka-nikāya of the Sutta Pitaka. It

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1 The present article is a revised and expanded version of a section of ‘Pāli Literature in Nepal’, the author’s (unpublished) thesis submitted for the Bachelor’s Degree at Mahimakuta Rājavidyālaya, Bangkok 1992. I am grateful to Mr Peter Skillings for his encouragement and advice on making this article more accurate and readable.

2 To clarify some of the terms: Nevārī refers only to the language spoken by the Nevāras, the ancient inhabitants of the Kathmandu Valley. Nevāra is the proper adjetival form, as in ‘Nevāra architecture’. Nepal is the country of which Nepālī is the official language whose earlier name is Gorkhāī. The English adjective Nepalese is a general, non-ethnic term, as in ‘Nepalese citizen’. Note, however, that the word Nepal is in fact derived from the word Nevāra. Nevārī books use up to four dating systems: Buddhist Era, Nepal Era, Vikrama Era and Common Era; in this article dates are given in the Common Era.
was the first complete section of the Pāli Tipiṭaka to have been translated into Nevārī and, as we shall see, it has recently been rendered into two other Nepalese languages.

1) The Dhammapada in Nevārī:

The Dhammapada was first translated into Nevārī by Dr Indramāna Balıya, and published by Sādhunāma Bhiksācārya in Calcutta in 1931. Ven Amṛtānanda published a new and more readable translation in 1941; this edition, reprinted in 1949, 1976 and 1989, has proved more popular. A complete translation into Nevārī verse (kāvya) by Satyamohanā Josi was published by Gābahāla Jirnoddhāra Sangha, Lalitapura, in 1955.

The Dhammapada with the accompanying commentary from the Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā is now complete in Nevārī. The first Vagga was published by Ven. Amṛtānanda in 1949; the remaining 25 Vaggas were published by Ven. Aniruddha and published in eight parts from 1980 to 1993.

2) The Dhammapada in Nepālī:

A Nepālī translation of the Dhammapada by Ven. Amṛtānanda was published in Nepal in 1952 and reprinted in 1969 and 1989. The same translator published the first three Vaggas with abridged stories from the Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā and included several Dhammapada verses in his encyclopaedic

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3 Selected suttas, such as the Dhammasacakappavastana, the Sigalovāda and the Jivaka Suttas were published in Nevārī between 1925 and 1930 in the magazine Buddhadharma va Nepālabhāṣā in Calcutta (Until 1951 most books for Nepal were published in India because of severe restrictions in Nepal).

4 Selected verses with the accompanying stories have been published in booklets by Bhikṣu Prajñārasmi Mahāsthavira, Bhikṣu Vivekānanda, Bhikṣu Subodhānanda, Bhikṣu Sākyānanda, Bhikṣu Asvaghoṣa and Upāsaka Rāmalāla.

The Dhammapada in Nepal

31-volume work on eminent persons connected with the Buddha.

3, 4) The Dhammapada in Thārū and Tāmāṅg:

Two important new contributions to Dhammapada literature in general and Buddhist literature in Nepalese languages in particular are the translations of that work into Thārū and Tāmāṅg. Thārū is an Indo-Aryan language spoken in rural Terai areas, for example around Lumbini and Kapilavastu. The first major book in Thārū, a life of the Buddha entitled Sākyamuni Buddha, compiled and translated by Śri Tejanāraya Panjiyāra Thārū, was published by the Dharmodaya Sabha, Kathmandu, in 1992. The Dhammapada was translated into Thārū by Attorney General (retired) Śri Rāmānanda Prasāda Singh Chaudhari Thārū and Śri Subhodhakumāra Singh Chaudhari Thārū.

Tāmāṅg is a Tibeto-Burman language spoken in the Kathmandu area and middle hills throughout the country. Like Thārū, it has almost no published literature. The Dhammapada was translated into Tāmāṅg by Lāmā Dharmarāja Tāmāṅg, General Secretary of the Lāmā committee, Nepal Tāmāṅg Ghedung (Sangha).

Both Thārū and Tāmāṅg versions were edited in the same format by Bhikṣu Mahānāma 'Kovida' as trilingual editions (that is, accompanied by the Pāli text in Nāgarī and a Nepālī translation), with forewords by Bhikṣu Sudarsana, Vice President of the Dharmodaya Sabha. They were published by the Dharmodaya Sabha, Kathmandu, in 2,000 copies each, in 1992.

The Dhammapada, whether in Nevārī or Nepālī, is one of the most popular books among Buddhists in Nepal. It is hoped that it will become even more popular now that it has been translated into Thārū and Tāmāṅg.

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THE SYNONYMS OF NIRVĀNA ACCORDING TO
PRAJÑĀVARMAN, VASUBANDHU AND ASAᦿGA

Peter Skilling

1. Synonyms of Nirvāṇa according to Prajñāvarman

Prajñāvarman’s commentary on the Udānavarga, the Udāna-varga-vivaraṇa¹, is a mine of brief citations from the sūtra literature of the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivādins. In this paper I will discuss one such citation, described by the author as from the *Sūtṛaṇa-veyāla². The citation reads as follows³:

... mdo sde be-ya la las mya ngan las 'das pai nram grangs brjod de / 'di itar 'dus ma byas dang / ita bar dka' ba dang / mi 'gyur ba dang / miha' yas pa dang / zag pa med ppa dang / gnas dang / gling dang / skyob pa zhes rgya cher gsungs so //

... the synonyms (parṛya) of Nirvāṇa are given in the *Sūtṛaṇa-veyāla, where they were taught [by the Lord]⁴:

(1) unconditioned (asamskṛta),


2 Mdo sde be-ya la: mdo sde = sūtṛaṇa (or also simply sūtra); on the evidence of the Pāli parallel discussed below, I take be-ya to be a transliteration of peyā.

3 UvViv I 243.19, commenting on Uv 4.5.

4 The Tibetan verb gsungs is in an honorific form. In an otherwise unattributed citation it usually refers to the word of the Buddha; in this case, since the citation is from a sūtṛaṇa (mdo sde), it should be Buddhavacana from a canonical text.
(2) difficult to see (durdrśa),
(3) unchanging,
(4) endless (anānta),
(5) untainted (anāśrava),
(6) shelter (layana),
(7) island (dvipa),
(8) protection (trāna), and so on (vistareṇa).

Though the meaning of all the terms is clear in Tibetan, the Sanskrit equivalents of numbers 3 and 4 pose difficulties: for a discussion of these see the Appendix.

The term peyyāla (Pāli peyyāla) is used in Buddhist texts to indicate abbreviation. The title and list given in the Udānavarga-vivarana may be compared with the list of thirty-three synonyms of Nibbāna, also starting with 'unconditioned' and given in abbreviated or peyyāla form, in the Asaṅkhatasampanyutta of the Saṃyutta-nikāya. The full list is given in Table 1A; the following seven items, in order of their appearance in Pāli, are common to both texts:

1. unconditioned (asaṅkhata),
2. unbent (anata — for this term, see the Appendix),
3. untainted (anāsava),
4. very difficult to see (sududdasa).


6 For this study I have consulted the Pali Text Society (PTS), Chaṭṭhasaṅgīti (ChS), Sāyānātha (SyR) and Nālandā (N) editions: PTS IV 359–73; ChS III 335–43; SyR Vol.18, 441–54; N IV 312–20.

(29) island (dīpa),
(30) shelter (lena),
(31) protection (tāna).

The term peyyāla is used in two main contexts in the Pāli Suttapiṭaka.

(i) In the longer suttas of the Dīgha- and Mahāvihara-nikāyas, it indicates a partial, internal abbreviation within a sutta, and refers to an earlier passage in the same sutta or in an earlier sutta, to be supplied with appropriate changes, such as the name of the person addressed, etc.

(ii) In the shorter suttas of the Saṃyutta- and Anguttara-nikāyas, peyyāla frequently indicates a virtually total abbreviation, since an earlier sutta is to be reproduced in full, with the substitution of a single word or phrase.

An example of the latter is the above-mentioned Asaṅkhatasampanyutta. The first vaggā (chapter) opens with one sutta given in full, which defines the unconditioned (asaṅkhata) as the destruction of attachment, aversion and delusion (rāga-, dosa-, moha-kkhaṇa), and the path to the unconditioned (asaṅkhata-gāmi magga) as mindfulness of the body (kāya-gatā sati). This is followed by ten suttas in peyyāla form in which a new term for the path to the unconditioned — from 'calm and insight' (samatho ca vipassanā ca) up to 'the noble eightfold path' (ariyo atthaṅgiko maggo) — is to be introduced to replace 'mindfulness of the body', making a total of eleven suttas. This completes the first vaggā, at the end of which comes a verse summary (uddāna) of eleven key phrases, one for each of the

eleven suttas: kāyo, samatho, vitakko, and so on.8

The second vagga opens with a series of peyyālas, all referring back to the first sutta, which, by making one sutta each for each individual item of the groups listed in suttas 2 to 11 — one for ‘calm’ (samatha), one for ‘insight’ (vipassanā), and so on, up to one for each of the eight limbs of the path — gives us forty-five new suttas. Thus there are a total of fifty-six suttas dealing with asankhata.

Asankhata, however, is only one of many names for the goal of Buddhist practice, Nirvāṇa or Nibbāna. There therefore follows thirty-two synonyms of asankhata, for each of which fifty-six suttas are to be made on the analogy of the asankhata suttas,9 thereby giving us another 1,792 suttas. When these are added to the original fifty-six ‘asankhata’ suttas we get a total of 1,848 suttas in the Asankhatasamyutta, condensed to a mere fifteen pages in the Pali Text Society edition, thirteen pages in the Saṃmatī edition, or nine pages in the Chattha-sangiti and Nālandā editions10. Thus the Asankhatasamyutta may justly be described as a peyyāla text par excellence. The second vagga and the samyutta as a whole end with another uddāna, listing the thirty-three synonyms.11 It is perhaps noteworthy that the uddāna contains the phrase etam sugatena desitam, ‘this was taught by the Sugata [the Buddha].

Similar examples of peyyāla collections occur throughout the Saṃyutta-nikāya; they are particularly common in each of the twelve saṃyuttas of the last division, the Mahāvagga (S V). In the Mahāvagga, several of the peyyālas are given individual names, such as Aññānī, Suriya-, Ekadhamma- and Gāndāpeyyāla; the last is common to eight of the twelve saṃyuttas.12 Peyyālas are also common throughout the Aṅguttara-nikāya, and may be said to represent a later phase of the Canon, a stage of mechanical multiplication and systemisation of the implications of the Buddha’s teachings.

In addition to that of the Asankhatasamyutta, several other lists of synonyms of Nibbāna are found in Pāli literature. The Nettapakaraṇa gives numerous similes (vevacana) of recollections of the Dhamma (dhammanusatti)13: a prose passage, followed by a part of the uddāna of the Asankhatasamyutta (Nos.1-23) and a number of untraced verses, giving 28 synonyms to total 51 (see Table 1B). The Kathāvatthu gives shorter prose lists in the context of the nirodhakathā14 and the first six kathā of the sixth script Mahāmukṭarajavidiyalaya ed. II 89.15-19, in the context of ‘recollection of peace’ (apassama-anussati), reduces the Asankhatasamyutta to four lines. 11 PTs 373.19-31; ChS 543.10-16; SyR 435.16-454.2. 12 Cf. S V, Introduction pp.v-vii. 13 BhB (Bhūmibalo Bhikkhu Foundation ed.) 80.9-82.15, ChS 473.26; PTs 55.1-24; cf. Netti-nāṭhakathā (ChS) 119.17-120.18, and Netti-tīkā (ChS) 77.11-16. 14 Kv 2:11, pp.225-6.
gives a list of synonyms (paryāya) of Nirvāṇa ‘taught by the Lord’, while Asaṅga devotes a section of his Abhidharma-
samuccaya to synonyms of the truth of cessation (nirodhasatyā),
again called paryāya. Both texts give a commentary on each

2. Synonyms of Nirvāṇa according to Vasubandhu and
Asaṅga

In addition to the Pāli parallel of the Asaṅkhatasamunyutta, there
are two striking parallels to the Udana-varga-vivaranā citation in
(originally Sanskrit) śāstra literature, as preserved in the Tibetan
translation. In his *Gāthārhasamgraha-śāstra*, Vasubandhu

17. Thai script ed., Mahāmākutārājavidyalaya, Bangkok BE 2508, p.4 (Ch.1, vv.6–9).
18. Cf the strings of near synonyms: tāna lena dipa sarana parāyana, A I 155.22, 156.17; maṇḍipā maṇḍenā maṇṭāṇa maṇḍaṇa, S IV 315.30; sarvasatītanām layanām āraṇām āraṇām parāyanaṃ, Kādaśāmukha in
Nalinakshā Dutt, Gilgit Manuscripts. Vol.I, [Srinagar 1939] Delhi 1984, p.38.2; aśokam virājam kṣemaṃ dvipaṃ lenai parāyanaṃ... nirvāṇam, in Gustav
19. For this work I have consulted four editions: Cone xylograph (C), mgon pa thub, 257a f; Derge xylograph (D) 4103, mgon pa thub, 288a f; Golden
Tanjur manuscript (G), tshoms nu, 361a4 ff; Peking (Qianlong) xylograph (Q)
5604, Vol.I19, mgon po’i bstan bcos nu, 282a5 ff. Vasubandhu is commenting
on verse 19 of his Gāthāsamgraha, which is equivalent to Uv 13. The original
Sanskrit titles of the two works are not certain, since they are not attested in
any original Sanskrit works. At the head of the texts we find Śāstra-gāthā-
sam-gra-ha-nāma (CD), Śāstrāṅga-thā (tka Q) sa-martha-nāma (GQ) = bstan
bcos tshigs su bcad pa bsdu pa zhes bya ba (CDQG). The forms with
śāstra at the beginning rather than the end are awkward and unlikely: most
probably the original Sanskrit titles were not transmitted, and at a later date
the editors of the Tanjur created new, spurious ones. Cordier (Catalogue du
fonds tibétain de la Bibliothèque Nationale III, Paris 1915, mdo ’grel LXXII §§
4 and 5) restores the titles to Gāthāsangraha-shāstra-nāma and Gāthāsangraha-
sāstrārtha-nāma. The first title presents no real problems. The essential
element is tshigs su bcad pa bsdu = gāthā-sangraha, ‘Compendium of
Verses’; the full title could be either Gāthā-sangraha-shāstra-nāma, as given by
Cordier, or Gāthā-sangraha-nāma-śāstra, in both cases ‘Treatise entitled the
Compendium of Verses’. The essential element of the second title is tshigs su
bcad pa’i don bsdu pa = gāthā-artha-sangraha ‘Compendium of the Meaning of
Verses’ — as given in the Tibetan of CD. I take the full title to be
*Gāthārhasamgraha-śāstra-nāma* or *Gāthārhasamgraha-śāstra-nāma*, in both
cases ‘Treatise entitled the Compendium of the Meaning of Verses’, (Cordier’s
placing of the extraneous śāstra between samgraha and artha is untenable;
another possibility might be *Gāthā-sangraha-artha-shāstra-nāma*, ‘Treatise
entitled the Compendium of the Meaning of Verses’, but the order of the
words in Tibetan is against this). (For the Golden Tanjur, see P. Skilling, ‘A
20. For this work — to be referred to as A-sam(T) — I have had access to two
editions: D 4049, sens tsa rim, 91b1 ff; Q 5550, Vol.I12, sens tsa lam, 108b5 ff.
The original Sanskrit of this section is lost, but the Sanskrit terms are
given in the commentary, the Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣyam (ed. N. Tatia,
TSWS 17, Patna 1976 = A-sam-bh). I have also consulted the Tibetan
translation of the latter, the Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya (Q 5554, Vol.I13,
sens tsa shi 67a5–68a8 = A-sam-bh[T]), as well as the Tibetan
Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā (Q 5555, Vol.I13, sens tsa shi, 255b6–257b7 =
A-sam-vy). Cf. the Sanskrit reconstruction of Prañhad Pradhān, Abhidharmasamuccaya...
term. Vasubandhu's list may be divided into two parts, Asaṅga's into three; allowing for differences in translation, the first two lists of the two texts are identical, and must therefore have been based on similar Sanskrit originals.

Vasubandhu opens with 'by way of synonyms (paryāya); [as taught] by the Lord (bhagavatā)'; he then lists the items given below in Groups A and B, followed by a commentary on each term. Asaṅga opens with the question, 'How [is the truth of cessation to be understood] by way of synonyms?' He then lists the 8 items of group A, followed by an 'etc.' (la sogs pa), after that he gives definitions of the 8 items, the 21 items of group B and the 5 items of group C. It is clear that Asaṅga's 'etc.' refers to the full list as given by Vasubandhu, plus the 5 'extra' items.

A. The first list consists of 6 terms which occur together in texts such as the Mānusya-sūtra (mi'i mdo), the Catusparisat-


21 Rnam grangs kyi ni ji skad du | bcom ldan 'das kyi ... gsungs pa ste.
22 Rnam grangs kyi ji lta bu the na.

23 The passage is cited by title by Samathadeva in his Abhidharmakosā-upyākṣīkā, Q 5385, Vol.III, mdo 'grel tu, 113a2, and by Skandhila in his Abhidharmāvatāra, in Marcel van Velthem (ed., tr.), Le Traité de la Descente dans la Profonde Loi (Abhidharmāvatāraāstra) de l'Arhat Skandhila, Louvain-la-neuve 1977, p.108.29-31. The Tibetan of the latter agrees perfectly with that of the Abhidharmasamuccaya. In the Mānusya-sūtra, the list begins with dukkhasya (sde gsal 'di, Abhidharmāvatāra), which applies to each of the terms. A similar sūtra is cited in Candrakīrti's commentary on Āryadeva's Catuḥśatakam: see the Sanskrit retranslated from the Tibetan in Bhagchandra Jain 'Bhaskar', Āryadeva's Catuḥśatakam along with the Candrakīrti Vṛtti and Hindi sūtra and the Nidāna-saṁyukta. These are given in Table 2.

B. The second list is a collection of 21 synonyms, starting with asamskrta and ending with Nirvāna. The beginning of the list is similar to that of the *Sūtrānta-peyāla, both in content and in order, as may be seen from Table 3. Since Vasubandhu specifies that his list was 'taught by the Lord', and since it is characteristic of Asaṅga's style to follow the sūtras closely without stating that he is doing so, it is probable that the two masters took their lists from a canonical counterpart of the *Sūtrānta-peyāla of Prajñāvarman, and that, since the latter gives only the beginning of the *Sūtrānta-peyāla list, the full text of the latter would be close to the full list of 21 items given by Vasubandhu and Asaṅga. This may be compared with the 33 synonyms of the Pāli Anāthakatassamuttha.

C. The third group, given here only by Asaṅga, consists of 5 negatives (see Table 4). Here too the terms are drawn from the sūtras. A close parallel occurs in the Tibetan Udānavarga: ma skyes pa, ma byun ba, ma bcos pa, 'dus ma byas pa, mi 'byung bā'; since Asaṅga himself cites this very sūtra in his Yogācārabhūmi, there can be little doubt that it is the source of his list. A Pāli counterpart occurs in the Udāna and the

Translation, Nagpur 1971, p.214 ad v.221 (IX. 21). For another citation by title see Pradhan, Abhidharmakosābhāṣya, 46510, 46812.

24 See the references in n.38 below.
26 The Yogācārabhūmi citation is given by Nakatani, op. cit., p.76; Nakatani's source is Lambert Schmithausen, 'Zu den Rezensionen des Udānavargah', Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Sudasiens 14 (1970), 1711 (not seen).
Itivuttaka (Ud 80.23; It 37), aṭṭām abhūtam akatam asamkhatam. Another possible parallel is a sūtra cited in Bhavya’s Tarkajalā, dge slong dag / mya ngan las ’das pa de ni ma skyes pa dang / ma byung ba dang / ’dus ma byas nyid du uyod do’27.

The same five negatives plus two more are given by Vasubandhu elsewhere in his Gāthārthasamgraha, in commenting on the word dharma in the second citation of the Gāthāsamgraha (equivalent to Udānavarga 15:10). Here he classifies dharma as ‘dharma as fruit, dharma as practice and dharma as teaching’ (phala-dharma, pratipatti-dharma, deśanā-dharma); under phala-dharma he gives the five terms listed by Asaṅga plus śānta (‘peaceful’) and gnas (‘abiding’ = sthita?) followed by definitions28. The definitions of the five terms common to Asaṅga and Vasubandhu are similar.

It is thus clear that all the synonyms of Nirvāṇa given by Vasubandhu and Asaṅga are drawn from sūtras of the (Mūla-) Sarvāstivādin: Group A from the Māṇusyaka-sūtra or a similar text, Group B perhaps from the *Sūtrānta-peyāla, and Group C from the Udānavarga. The Māṇusyaka-sūtra belonged to the *Saḍāyatana-nipāta (of the Saṃyukṭagama)29; the Sūtrānta-peyāla also most probably belonged to the Saṃyukṭagama.

3. A citation from the Saṃyukṭagama

It is likely that the structure of the sūtras of the *Sūtrānta-peyāla was similar to that of the Pāli Asaṅkhatasamuyutta. For a possible example, we may turn to the Śūtrasamuccaya, attributed to Nāgārjuna, which cites one such sūtra from the Saṃyukṭagama of an unnamed school30:

yang dag par ldan pa’i lung las kyang / dge slong dag khyod la mya ngan las ’das pa dang mya ngan las ’das par ’gro bai’ lam bshad par bya’o // de la mya ngan las ’das gang ze na / ’di i ta ste ’dod chags zad pa dang / zhe sding zad pa dang / gti mug zad pa’o // de la mya ngan las ’das par ’gro bai’ lam gang ze na / ’phags pa’i lam yan lag brgyad ’di nyid do shes gsungs so //

It is taught in the Saṃyukṭagama:

I will teach you, O monks, of Nirvāṇa and of the path leading to Nirvāṇa (nirvāṇa-gāmi-mārga). Herein (tatra), what is Nirvāṇa? It is thus (tadyathā): the destruction of attachment (rāgakṣaya), the destruction of aversion (dvesakṣaya), the destruction of delusion (mohakṣaya). Herein, what is the path leading to Nirvāṇa? It is this very (ayam eva) Noble Eightfold Path (āryaśāṅgika mārga).

According to the arrangement of the Asaṅkhatasamuyutta, Nāgārjuna’s citation is equivalent to the eleventh sutta dealing

27 Shotaro Iida, Reason and Emptiness, A Study in Logic and Mysticism, Tokyo 1980, p.191
28 Thub, 226a3; D thub, 226b6; G nu, 315a5; Q nu, 244b1: ma skyes (CD; GQ have skyed in list but skyes in definition) pa, ma gyur pa, ma byas pa, ’das ma byas pa, ma byung ba, zhi ba, gnas thes bya ba de ni mya ngan las ’das pa’o.
29 Samathadeva, (Q) thub, 43a5, skyed mched drug gi tshogs.
with Nibbāna which, when expanded, reads as follows:


I will teach you, O monks, of Nibbāna and of the path leading to Nibbāna. And what, O monks, is Nibbāna? This, O monks, destruction of attachment, destruction of aversion, destruction of delusion: this, O monks, is called Nibbāna. And what, O monks, is the path leading to Nibbāna? The Noble Eightfold Path: this, O monks, is called the path leading to Nibbāna.

Apart from a number of formal differences, the structure and contents of the two discourses are the same.

4. Conclusions

The *Sūtrānta-peyāla cited by Prajñāvarman most probably refers to an abbreviated collection of sūtras dealing with Nirvāṇa, similar to the Pāli Asāṅkhatasamyyutta and was probably parallel to the text(s) utilised by Vasubandhu and Asaṅga for their lists of synonyms of Nirvāṇa and of nirodhasatyam respectively. It might therefore have contained about 21 items, against the 33 of the Asāṅkhatasamyyutta. The structure of the individual sūtras to be expanded from the peyālas most probably resembled that of the Asāṅkhatasamyyutta suttas and of the single Sāmyuktāgama citation of the Sūtrasamuccaya; however, while the source of Prajñāvarman’s, Vasubandhu’s and Asaṅga’s citations would have been a canonical (Mūla-) Sarvāstivādin text, the school of the Sāmyuktāgama cited in the Sūtrasamuccaya is not known. Like the Pāli Asāṅkhatasamyyutta and Nāgārjuna’s citation, the source cited by Prajñāvarman, Vasubandhu and Asaṅga would most probably have belonged to the Sāmyuktāgama.

Prajñāvarman’s and Nāgārjuna’s citations are doubly interesting here since, according to Akanuma’s catalogue, neither the Pāli Asāṅkhatasamyyutta nor a single sūtra contained therein has any parallels in the Chinese Āgamas. Thus the two citations are the sole representatives of that Sāmyutta discovered in the literature of other schools to date. It is generally held that the two recensions of the Sāmyuktāgama found in Chinese translation belong to the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivādin tradition; this is the tradition of Prajñāvarman, yet no parallel to his citation is found in either of these recensions.

A cursory examination of this section of Akanuma’s catalogue dealing with the Sāmyutta-nikāya shows that while, in some cases, Pāli sāmyuttas or vaggas that consist essentially of peyālas have corresponding texts in Chinese, in many cases they do not. On the whole, the Sāmyutta-nikāya shows a much greater tendency towards the reproduction of peyāla texts than does the Sāmyuktāgama as transmitted in two Chinese versions. This might suggest that the use of peyālas found more favour with the Theravadins than with the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivādins. However, on the basis of Prajñāvarman’s and Nāgārjuna’s citations and of Vasubandhu’s and Asaṅga’s lists, it seems that parallels to the Pāli Asāṅkhatasamyyutta were indeed transmitted by the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivādins and perhaps other schools, even

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though they have not been preserved in Chinese translation\textsuperscript{32}. The parallel texts were available in the time of Nāgārjuna (second century?), Asaṅga (fourth century), Vasubandhu (fourth-fifth centuries) and Prajñāvarman (eighth century or later?).

**Appendix**

For number 3 of Prajñāvarman’s list, mi ‘gyur ba, ‘unchanging’, there are many possible Sanskrit equivalents: the least unlikely in the context being perhaps aviparināma which is used as an epithet of Nibbāna in the Paṭisaṁbhidāmagga (aviparināma-dhamma, II 240.17). The parallel Pāli or Tibetan texts discussed in this article do not give any other possible equivalent. The two Tibetan parallels have here mi g’yo ba / g’yo ba med pa, ‘unshakeable, unmovings’ = acala (see Table 3, No.3).

Number 4, mtha’ yas pa = ananta (‘endless’), though possible as an epithet of Nirvāṇa, is probably not an exact translation of a faulty Sanskrit manuscript of the UvViv reading amanīta, or a misreading of a correct manuscript reading anata: the single dot representing the anusvāra could easily have been added by a scribe or by the translators to make a more familiar reading. The same place in the lists of Vasubandhu and Asaṅga (see Table 3) is occupied by ‘dud pa med pa. Since ‘dud = nam, ‘to bend, turn towards, aim at’, ‘dud pa med pa = anata, ‘unbent’. Although in some cases the texts read mdud pa = grantha, ‘bond’, confusion between the prefixes ma- and ’a chung before da is very common in Tibetan texts, and I therefore take the correct reading to be ‘dud pa med pa = anata, ‘unbent’\textsuperscript{33}. The entire *Gāthārhasamgraśāstra and the section of the Abhidharmasamuccaya in question are lost in the original Sanskrit, but the Bhāṣya on the latter has been preserved and reads anata (A-sam-bh 75.3): ‘unbent: because in the absence of craving for the Sensual, Form or Formless [Worlds], it does not bend towards such forms of existence’ (anatā kāmarūpārāpāyaṁ ‘bhavena bhavesu anamāṇāt). Here the use of anamāṇa clearly shows that the reading anata, root NAM, is the correct one. With this we may compare Vasubandhu’s definition (C 257b1; D 258b5; G 362a2; Q 282b7): ‘unbent: since it is free of the three cravings: in the absence of craving for the Sensual, Form or Formless [Worlds], it does not bend towards rebirth’ (reading skyped pa with C, or correcting the sred pa = tṛṣṇā of GQ to srid pa = bhavād?) (mdud pa med pa ni sred pa gsam dang me ldan pa’i phyir te / [CDQ: ro | G] ‘dod pa dang / gzugs dang / gzugs med pa’i sred pa med pas skyped [C: sred GQ (D copy n/a)] pa la mdud pa med pa phyir ro).

Asaṅga gives a briefer definition, expanded in the two commentaries:

A-sam(T) (D 91b5; Q 109a3): ‘Why is [the truth of cessation] called unbent? Because it is free of the three cravings’ (ci’i phyir mi ‘dud pa [mdud pa med pa Q] zhes bya the na sred pa gsam dang bra’i phyir ro).

A-sam-bh(T) (Q 67b5): ‘unbent: because in the absence of craving for the Sensual, Form or Formless [Worlds], it does not

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\textsuperscript{32} While the *Śūtrānta–peyāla of the Udānavarga–vivaraṇa seems to refer to a peyāla collection similar to the Pāli Asanhatthaśāṇyutta, the title is somewhat baffling: one would expect something more specific, such as Asanhattra- or Nirvāṇa–peyāla.

\textsuperscript{33} Since mdud pa is equivalent to grantha, a synonym of kleśa, the term is acceptable in meaning — *agrantha/ nirgrantha in the sense of nikkleśa, which would roughly fit Asaṅga’s and Vasubandhu’s definitions — but I have not seen such a term as a synonym of Nirvāṇa in the early sūtras.
bend towards such forms of existence (mi 'dud pa mi 'dod pa dang gzugs dang gzugs med pa'i sred pa med pas srid par mi 'dud pa'i phyir ro).

A-sam-vy (Q 256b3): ‘Why is [the truth of cessation] unbent? Because it is free of the three existences (sriad pa = bhava; correct to sred pa = trṣṇā?): in the absence of craving for the Sensual, Form or Formless [Worlds], it does not bend’ (ci'i phyir mi mdud pa srid pa gsum dang bral ba'i phyir ro // 'dod pa dang gzugs dang | gzugs med pa'i sred pa med pas mi mdud pa'i phyir ro).

Anata is also given as an epithet of Nibbāna in the Asañkhata-samyutta (PTS, Chaṭṭhasaṅgīti and Syāmaṭṭha editions: see Table 1A, § 2). The citation of the uddāna of the Asañkhata-samyutta in the Nettipakaraṇa reads ananta in place of anata in the PTS (Nett 55.6), Chaṭṭhasaṅgīti (47.8) and Thai script Bhūmbalo Bhikkhu Foundation (80.13) editions. The Abhidhānapadipika (1.7) also has ananta in both the Thai script Mahāmukṭarājāvidyālaya (see n.17) and the Burmese script Thuddhamawadi Press editions. Here too the lectio difficilior anata could easily have been changed to anameta by the addition of anuvāra, and then to ananta. I therefore prefer anata in all cases.

### Table 1A: Synonyms of asañkhata in the Asañkhata-samyutta

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Word</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>asañkhata</td>
<td>unconditioned</td>
<td>Ps II 240.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>anata</td>
<td>unbent</td>
<td>Ps II 240.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>anāsava</td>
<td>untainted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>sacca</td>
<td>truth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>pāra</td>
<td>further shore</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>nipuna</td>
<td>subtle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>sududdassa</td>
<td>very difficult to see</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>aśājara</td>
<td>unageing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>dhuva</td>
<td>enduring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>apalokita</td>
<td>undecaying</td>
<td>Ps II 239.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>anidassana</td>
<td>invisible</td>
<td>Cp. Ps II 239.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>nippapañca</td>
<td>undiversifying</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>santa</td>
<td>peace</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>amata</td>
<td>deathless</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>panita</td>
<td>excellent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>siva</td>
<td>bliss</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>khema</td>
<td>security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>tanhakkhaya</td>
<td>destruction of craving</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>acchariya</td>
<td>wonderful</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>abbhuta</td>
<td>marvellous</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>anitika</td>
<td>freedom from ill</td>
<td>Ps II 239.10; Nid I 443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>anitikadhammma</td>
<td>the state of freedom from ill</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>nibbāna</td>
<td>nibbāna</td>
<td>S I 136.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>avyāpajjhā</td>
<td>freedom from harm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>virāga</td>
<td>absence of passion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>sudhī</td>
<td>purity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>mutti</td>
<td>release</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>anālaya</td>
<td>freedom from bias</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>dipa</td>
<td>island</td>
<td>IB 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>lena</td>
<td>shelter</td>
<td>Ps II 239.34; IB 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>tana</td>
<td>protection</td>
<td>Ps II 239.31; IB 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>sarana</td>
<td>refuge</td>
<td>Ps II 239.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>parāyaṇa</td>
<td>goal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 In the right-hand column I give a few references (by no means exhaustive) to occurrences of the terms in canonical texts, along with cross-references to the other lists.
### Table 1B: Synonyms of asañkhata in the Nettipakarana

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1-23 = uddānā of the Asañkhatasamyutta (as in Table 1A)</th>
<th>24. aṭṭhā</th>
<th>unborn</th>
<th>25. abhūta</th>
<th>unarisen</th>
<th>26. anupaddava</th>
<th>unoppressed</th>
<th>27. akata</th>
<th>unmade</th>
<th>28. asoka</th>
<th>sorrowless</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 29. visoka | freedom from sorrow | 30. anupasagga | untroubled | 31. anupasagga-dhamma | freedom from trouble | 32. gambhira | profound | 33. duppassa | difficult to see | 34. uttara | surpassing | 35. anuttara | unsurpassed | 36. asama | unequalled | 37. appaṭṭsama | incomparable | 38. jetthā | foremost | 39. settha | best

### Table 2: Synonyms of Nirvāṇa, Group A

| Vasubandhu | Asaṅga | Sanskrit
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ma lus par spangs pa</td>
<td>ma lus par spangs pa</td>
<td>aśeṣa-prahāna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. so sor spangs pa</td>
<td>nges par spangs pa</td>
<td>pratiniḥsarga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. mṭhar byas pa</td>
<td>byang bar gyur pa</td>
<td>vyantibhāva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. zad pa</td>
<td>zad pa</td>
<td>khaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 'dod chags dang bral ba</td>
<td>'dod chags dang bral ba</td>
<td>virāga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 'gog pa</td>
<td>'gog pa</td>
<td>nirodha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. nye bar zhi ba</td>
<td>mam par zhi ba</td>
<td>vyupaśāma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. nub pa</td>
<td>nub pa</td>
<td>astamgama</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4: Synonyms of Nirvāṇa, Group C

| Asaṅga | Vasubandhu
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ma skyes pa</td>
<td>ma skyes pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ma byung ba</td>
<td>abhūta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ma byas pa</td>
<td>akṛta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 'dus ma byas pa</td>
<td>asamśkrita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. skye ba med pa</td>
<td>asamutpāna</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 At this point Nett (55.17) repeats the phrase nibbānam etaṁ sugatena desītam, common to the Asañkhatasamyutta.
3 For 44 and 45, cp. D II 244.10, mani yathā vēṭāriyo akāco vimalo subho.
4 CDQ: G has mṭhar phyin byas pa in the definition.
5 Q inserts a danda (sad) after dand, not in D.
6 D 92a4, Q 109b3; Sanskrit from A-sam-bh 75.5-20.
7 References in n.28.
8 QG have skyed in the opening list, skyes in the definition.
9 A-sam DQ; A-sam-vy, skyes pa med pa A-sam-bh(T).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vastubhandhu</th>
<th>Asanga</th>
<th>UvViv</th>
<th>Sanskrit equivalents</th>
<th>S parallels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 'dus ma byas pa</td>
<td>'dus ma byas</td>
<td>1. 'dus ma byas pa</td>
<td>asamskṛta, unconditioned</td>
<td>(1) asāṅkhaṭa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. mthong bar dka' ba</td>
<td>bta dka' ba</td>
<td>2. Ira bar dka' ba</td>
<td>dūrdṛṣṭa, difficult to see</td>
<td>(7) sududdiṣa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. mi g'yo ba</td>
<td>g'yo ba med pa</td>
<td>3. mi 'gyur ba</td>
<td>acala, unshakeable</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. mdo'd pa med pa</td>
<td>mdo'd pa med pa</td>
<td>4. mha' yas pa</td>
<td>anata, unbound</td>
<td>(2) anata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 'chi ba med pa</td>
<td>'chi ba med pa</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>ananta, endless</td>
<td>(14) anata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. zag pa med pa</td>
<td>zag pa med pa</td>
<td>5. zag pa med pa</td>
<td>anāśrava, untainted</td>
<td>(3) anāśava</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. gaas</td>
<td>gaas</td>
<td>6. gaas</td>
<td>layana, shelter</td>
<td>(30) lena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. gling</td>
<td>gling</td>
<td>7. gling</td>
<td>dvipa, island</td>
<td>(29) dīpa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. skyob pa</td>
<td>skyob pa</td>
<td>8. skyob pa</td>
<td>trāṇa, protection</td>
<td>(31) rāṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. skyabs</td>
<td>mgon</td>
<td>etc.</td>
<td>śārana, refuge</td>
<td>(32) sarana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. dpung gnyen</td>
<td>dpung gnyen</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>parāśraya, goal</td>
<td>(33) parāśraya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. ma nyams pa</td>
<td>'chi 'pho med pa</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>acyuta, unfallen</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. rim pa med pa</td>
<td>rim pa med pa</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>nirvāra, absence of fever</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. yongs su gdung ba med pa</td>
<td>yongs su gdung ba med pa</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>nisparāda, absence of burning</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. bde ba</td>
<td>bde ba</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>kṣema, security</td>
<td>(17) khaṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. zhi ba</td>
<td>zhi ba</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>śīva, peace</td>
<td>(16) sīva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. gzi brang po</td>
<td>bde ba'i gzi</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>sauvāstika, auspiciousness</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. bde legs su byod pa</td>
<td>bde bar 'gyur ba</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>svastaṇya, well-being</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. nang med pa</td>
<td>nang med pa</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>īśvara, freedom from illness</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. mi g'yo ba</td>
<td>mi g'yo ba</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>śīnavi, unshaken</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. mya ngan las 'das pa</td>
<td>mya ngan las 'das pa</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>nirvāṇa</td>
<td>(23) nibbāna</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The Sanskrit equivalents are from the A-sam-bh 75.1-14.
2 See Appendix.
3 Q : mi 'dud pa D 91b5, A-sam-bh(T) 67b5 : mi mdud pa A-sam-vy 256b3.
4 mi 'chi ba in following definition, CDGG.
5 CD : GQ omit. Since skyabs is given in the definitions at G 362a5 and Q 283a3, the omission must be due to a scribal error.
6 skyabs A-sam-vy 256b7.
7 D, A-sam-bh(T), A-sam-vy. Q has cancellation mark (two dots) over the 'a chung of 'pho.
9 The A-sam-bh has here sauvāpaka, "golden" (cf. BSMD 607b), which is quite unlikely. The Tibetan of Vastubhandhu is composed of gzi = vastu + brang po = su; that of Asanga of bde (D, A-sam-bh[T]) or bde ba'i (Q, A-sam-vy) = su + gzi = vastu. Both Tibetan versions and the definition at A-sam-bh 75.11, lokottara-sukha-vastuvāt (A-sam-bh[T] 68a3, bde gzi ni 'jig rten las 'das pa'i bde ba'i gzi yin pa'i phyir ro, A-sam-vy 257a4, ci'i phyir bde ba'i gzi? don dam pa'i bde ba'i gzi yin pa'i phyir ro) suggests the otherwise unattested *sauvāpaka. Sauvāpaka (for which cf. BSMD 607b) seems probable since it is related to the following term, svastaṇya.
10 Q, A-sam-bh(T) : dge bar gyur pa D : dge bar 'gyur ba A-sam-vy.
EKOTTARĀGAMA (XVI)

Translated from the Chinese version by Thich Huyễn-Vi and Bhikkhu Pāsādika in collaboration with Sara Boin-Webb

Eighth Fascicle:
Part 17
Ānāpana[smṛti] (b)

2. "Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Sāvastī, at Jeta Grove, in Anāthapiṇḍada's Park. Then the Exalted One said to the bhikkus: It is extremely rare (śudraballha) for two persons to appear in the world. For which two persons? It is extremely rare for a Tathāgata, a Perfectly and Completely Enlightened One and for a noble universal monarch (āryacakravartin) to appear in the world. (T 2, 583a) It is extremely rare for these two persons to appear in the world. — Having listened to the Exalted One's words, all the bhikkus were pleased and respectfully applied themselves to practice.'

3. "Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying ... in Anāthapiṇḍada's Park ... said to the bhikkus: It is extremely rare for two persons to appear in the world. For which two persons? It is extremely rare for a Pratyekabuddha and for a completely passion-free (kṣinārasava) disciple of the Tathāgata, for an Arhat, to appear in the world. It is, O bhikkus, extremely rare for these two persons ... — Having listened ... all the bhikkus were pleased and respectfully applied themselves to practice.'

4. "Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying ... in Anāthapiṇḍada's Park ... said to the bhikkus: There are two things (dharma) in the worlds that are to a very great extent conducive to mental defilements (kleśa)². Which are those two? (a) That which creates roots of what is karmically unwholesome (akusala), viz. anger (krodha); (b) neglect of virtuous actions (sucarita), of roots of virtue (guna). These, bhikkus, are the two

1 The figure indicating this new section at T 2, 582c23 is 1; the following sections, however, are counted as sections 3, 4 etc. As the last, rather long section of fasc.7 is entitled 'Ānāpanasmṛti' and the following 10 sections of fasc.8 'Ānāpanasmṛti 2' (in our transl. differentiated as (a) and (b)) Hayashi (p.128) counts this first section of fasc.8 as section 2. It seems a bit odd that fasc.8 is also entitled 'Ānāpanasmṛti', for none of its sections deal with ānāpanasmṛti at all.

2 Cf. A 1, 76 Dve 'me bhikkhave puggalā loke uppajjamāna uppajjanti acchariyamanussa ... Tathāgato ca araham sammā sambuddho rājā ca cakkavati ... .

3 This expression is a key word in the Sūtrasmuccaya and also plays an important rôle in many works of the later Lam-rim literature; cf. T 32 (No. 1635), 49c14 and passim. The Sanskrit equivalent is unascertainable because a number of quotations in the Sūtrasmuccaya are at least partially extinct in Sanskrit, whereas this anthology as a whole has survived in Tibetan and Chinese only.

4 At Hayashi, p.128, the same reference to A is given as with fasc.8, section 2 (see n.2), which is incorrect. At two different places in A 1, 77, we have passages only reminiscent of this section: Dve 'me bhikkhave buddhā. Katame dve? Tathāgato ca araham sammā sambuddho pacceka-buddho ca ... Dve 'me ... asaniyā phalantyā na sanasaṇi ... Bhikkhu ca khnāsavā hatthājanīyo ca.

5 In a recent work (S. Anacker, Seven Works of Vasubandhu, Delhi 1984, p.146f.), it has been insisted that kleśa ought to be translated as ‘afflictions’ instead of ‘defilements’. While this holds true for classical Sanskrit and for the rendering of the said term by the Tibetans, according to Pāli, Buddhist Sanskrit and Chinese sources the meaning of ‘defilement’ can also be vindicated beyond any doubt.
things that are enormously conducive to mental defilements. Therefore, O bhikkhus, one must become aware of and understand these things [conducive to] mental defilements, and one must also become aware of and understand the things that are not [conducive to] the defilements. One must think of getting rid of the things pertaining to the defilements and think of practising those pertaining to what is free from defilements. Thus, O bhikkhus, you should train. — Having listened . . . all the bhikkus . . . applied themselves to practice.’

5. "Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying . . . in Anāthapiṇḍada’s Park . . . said to the bhikkus: Whatever thoughts, inclinations or any other kind of formative forces (samskāra) may be pertaining to beings who hold false views (mithyādṛṣṭi) — all that cannot be appreciated at all and is something with which mankind [cannot] be happy. The reason for this is that false views are karmically unwholesome. [Let us take], for example, seeds of bitter fruit, seeds of the nimba fruit, of the kośātaki, of the bitter bottle-gourd (tikkula-ba) or of any other kind of seeds of bitter [fruit]. Similarly, whatever bodily, vocal and mental actions may be performed by beings holding false views; whatever their thoughts, inclinations or bad behaviour (duṣcarīta) may be — all that cannot be appreciated at all and is something with which mankind [cannot] be happy. Therefore, O bhikkus, you should train. — Having listened . . . all the bhikkus . . . applied themselves to practice.’


7. These three kinds of bitter fruit enumerated in the text are translated after the Pāli parallel because, among the characters standing for the various kinds of bitter fruit (T 2, 583a22–23), one does not seem to be covered in Sino-Japanese dictionaries, whilst the others are given as signifying kinds of wild grass; the last kind of bitter fruit occurs in the text as an enigmatic transliteration: bi-di-pān-chi.

7. "Thus have I heard... the Buddha was staying... in Anāthapiṇḍada's Park. Then Venerable Ānanda was dwelling in a quiet and secluded spot. While contemplating at his solitary [place] the following occurred to him: All sentient beings indulge in thoughts of sensuous greed (kāmarāga), consequent upon which greed arises and insatiably, day and night, they are obsessed with that. — As evening approached, Venerable Ānanda rose from his seat, adjusted his robes and went to the Exalted One's whereabouts. Upon his arrival, he bowed down his head at [the Exalted One's] feet and sat down at one side. The Venerable Ānanda said to the Exalted One: While staying at a quiet and secluded place, the following occurred to me: All sentient beings indulge in thoughts... sensuous greed arises and insatiably, day and night, they are obsessed with that. — It is just as you have said, Ānanda, replied the Exalted One, all sentient beings indulge in thoughts of sensuous greed which consequently increases their greed and... all night long, they are obsessed with that. For what reason?

Long ago, in times long past, there was a noble universal monarch named Māṇḍhātra who ruled with righteousness (dharmena) and absolute impartiality. He had come into possession of all the seven treasures, viz., of the wheel-treasure (cakkraratna), the elephant-treasure (hastiratna), the horse-treasure (asvaratna), the jewel-treasure (maniratna), the noblewoman-treasure (abhiṣastraīrata), the householder-treasure (grhaapariratna) and the commander-in-chief-treasure (parināyakaratna). Moreover, he had a thousand sons who were healthy and strong and so brave that all malevolent [forces] had to surrender; he ruled over the whole world in which the use of knife and stick had fallen into desuetude.

You should [further] know, Ānanda, that Māṇḍhātra, the noble universal monarch, then thought to himself: Now this Jambudvīpa is my territory whose people, [thanks to] an abundance of precious things, are affluent. I used to hear from honourable elderly persons about a western country (deśa) [called] Aparagodāniya whose people, [thanks to] an abundance of precious things, are [also] affluent. Now I should go there to incorporate that territory into [my realm]. — Immediately thereafter, Ānanda, the following sprang to Māṇḍhātra's mind: Taking with me the four sections of my military forces (catur-aṅgabala), I shall leave this Jambudvīpa. — So he went to Aparagodāniya whose inhabitants, on seeing the noble monarch arrive, all gave him a most respectful welcome, kneeling down and asking polite questions. — Welcome (svāgamata), Your Majesty (mahārāja), [they shouted], now we the people of Aparagodāniya are rich, but what we actually need is a noble monarch. Please rule over the people here and let [us] follow...
[your] code of laws (dharmaśāsana). — At once, Ānanda, the noble monarch M. took control of Aparagodāniya and became the people's sovereign.

Once, after a lapse of several hundreds of thousands of years, when the noble monarch M. was at leisure, the following came to his mind: I am the master of Jambudvīpa whose people . . . are affluent, and the seven treasures are showered upon [me] knee-deep [as it were]. And now I am also master of this Aparagodāniya whose people . . . are affluent. Furthermore, I used to hear . . . about [an eastern country called] Pūrvavideha whose people . . . are affluent. Now I should go there to incorporate that territory into [my realm] and rule it with righteousness. — Then, Ānanda, the noble monarch M. planned the following: Taking with me . . . my military forces, I shall leave this Aparagodāniya and proceed to Pūrvavideha. — When the inhabitants of that country saw the noble monarch arrive, all gave him a most respectful welcome . . . With different mouths but one voice they shouted: Welcome, Your Majesty! Now [we] the people of Pūrvavideha are rich . . . let [us] follow [your] code of laws. — At once, Ānanda, the noble universal monarch M. took control . . .

Once, after a lapse of hundreds, thousands and ten thousands of years, when the noble monarch M. was at leisure, he thought: I am in [possession of] Jambudvīpa whose people . . . are affluent, and the seven treasures. . . . I am also the master of this Aparagodāniya . . . and Pūrvavideha whose people . . . are affluent. I used to hear . . . about [a northern country called] Uttarakuru whose people . . . are affluent and said to be independent, yet not stubborn, not short-lived, but actually [noted for their] longevity, [everybody] having a life-span of a thousand years. When their long lives, [so it is said,] (T 2, 584a) come to an end, they are definitely reborn in a celestial world and are not doomed to another [lower] existence (anyagati). They wear clothes made of cotton (kārpāsā) and eat non-gluttonous rice [grown] by itself (svayam). Now I should go there to incorporate that territory into [my realm] and rule it with righteousness. — And again, Ānanda, the noble monarch M. devised the following: Taking with me . . . my military forces, I shall leave Pūrvavideha and march into Uttarakuru. — [So he went on his expedition, and when he] saw that country from afar, all green and with lush vegetation, he asked the retinue to his left and right: Do all of you not see this country — so green

14 After Hayashi, p.131.
15 After Soothill, p.232b; cf. DPPN I, p.356: 'The clothes worn by the inhabitants resembled divine robes'.
and covered with lush vegetation? — Oh yes, [we] see it, they replied. — [And again] the monarch addressed the masses of his retinue with these words: That is the soft grass [of Uttarakuru] whose softness and that of celestial clothes are exactly alike, and all the [inhabitants of Uttarakuru who are] wise and virtuous (sattvadhipa) are in the habit of sitting on it. — When [they] had gone a little further, [they] saw that country from afar, all covered with dazzling yellow, and now the monarch asked his retinue: Do you not see this country all covered with such dazzling yellow? — All of us see it, they answered, and the supreme monarch went on explaining: That is the fabulous non-glutinous rice that grows by itself, and all the [people of Uttarakuru who are] wise and virtuous habitually live on that [rice as their] food. Now, Your Excellencies, all of you will also have to eat that non-glutinous rice. — When the noble monarch [and his retinue] had gone a little further [they] saw a [large] area of flat land, and on the horizon they made out a tall palace (prāsāda) that [when they came nearer] looked quite magnificent. Once more [the monarch] asked his retinue: Do you see that [large] area of flat land? — Certainly, all of us see it, they replied, and the supreme monarch went on telling them this [area] was called Cotton Tree Garment (Karpāsavastra) and that they, [his retinue], would also be required to wear clothes made of cotton. When the inhabitants of that country, Ānanda, saw the supreme monarch arrive, all rose, came forward and gave him a most respectful welcome . . . With different mouths17 but one voice . . . [We] the [people of Uttarakuru are rich . . . let [us] follow [your] code of laws. — At once, Ānanda, the noble monarch took control . . .

However, after a lapse of hundreds . . . of years, when the noble monarch M. was at leisure, he thought: Now I am the master of Jambudvīpa, . . . of Aparagodāniya, Pūrvevidheha and Uttarakuru whose people are affluent [thanks to] an abundance of precious things. I used to hear . . . about the Trayastrimśa gods whose happiness is incomparable, whose life-span is really immense, whose clothing and sustenance are [provided] automatically and whose noblewomen are so many that one cannot tell their number. Now I should go to [their] celestial palaces (vimāna) in order to rule over [them] with righteousness. — The noble monarch’s next idea, Ānanda, was [again] to take with him . . . his military forces and to leave Uttarakuru. Subsequently [he and his retinue] climbed up to the Trayastrimśa gods18. When from afar Śakra, the chief of gods (Śakro devānām indraḥ), saw M., the noble monarch, come [nearer] he said: Welcome, Your Majesty! You may sit down here. — Hardly had M., the noble monarch, arrived, Ānanda, when he sat down on the same throne together with Śakra, chief of gods, and when the two personalities were sitting together it was impossible to distinguish [one from the other]; their features, bearing, speech and voice were exactly alike.

M., the noble monarch, Ānanda, stayed there for several thousands and some hundreds of years, and thereafter the [same train of] thought [overcame him]: Now I am the master of Jambudvīpa whose people . . . [I am] also the master of Aparagodāniya . . . of Pūrvevidheha . . . and of Uttarakuru . . .

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17 For 音 read 土 (THV).

18 Cf. DPPN I, p.1002f.: Tāvatimśa stands at the top of Mount Sineru . . .

The Jātaka Commentary mentions several human beings who were invited by Sakka, and who were conveyed to Tāvatimśa — e.g. Nimi, Guttila, Man-
dhātā and the queen Stilavatī. Mandhātā reigned as co-ruler of Tāvatimśa during the life period of thirty-six Sakkas, sixty thousand years (J II, 312f.) (Mandhātu-jātaka).
and I have even reached the heaven (svarga) of the Trayastrimśa [gods]. Now I am surely capable of harming this Śakra, chief of gods, so as to [avail myself of] the opportunity (antara) [to become] the sole sovereign of all gods. — No sooner had M., the noble monarch, conceived of this idea, Ānanda, than he could not help falling from his throne. [He fell and fell] until he reached Jambudvīpa, and with [him] fell the four sections of his military forces. Simultaneously, he lost his wheel-treasure and did not have the slightest notion of its whereabouts. [His] elephant-treasure and horse-treasure died at the same time; [his] jewel-treasure just disappeared, and likewise the noblewoman-treasure, householder-treasure and commander-in-chief-treasure passed away. M., the noble monarch, was taken seriously ill, and all close and distant relatives assembled and consoled with him on his disease. [Then somebody asked]: What shall we answer, Your Majesty, if anyone comes along and puts a question like this: What teaching has the supreme monarch M. bequeathed just before breathing his last? What shall be the [authorised] answer to such a question? — If after my death anyone puts such a question, replied the noble monarch M., [you] should announce the following: The monarch M. ruled the whole world and was nevertheless insatiable. Then he went up to the Trayastrimśa gods and stayed with them for several hundreds and thousands of years. But still he was desire-ridden and wanted to harm the chief of gods. Consequently, he [brought about] his own downfall and imminent death. —

Well, Ānanda, do not have any suspicion, do not have any doubts (mā samśaya jato bhūḥ)! Do not consider the monarch M. of the past an altogether alien person. For what reason? At that time I was the monarch M. and it was I who ruled the whole world, went up to the Trayastrimśa gods and was insatiable as regards the five [kinds of] sense-pleasure (kāmaguna). O Ānanda, by dint of this ‘skill in means’ (upvāyakauśalya) one should fully understand how one fares (gadya) [if] one yields to a mind full of covetousness and attachment and [thus always] increases thoughts dominated by sensuous greed and insatiability (asamtuṣṭi). If one really wants to [obtain] complete satisfaction (samituṣṭi), one should derive it from the wisdom of the Noble Ones (āryaprajñā). — Before the great assembly the Exalted One uttered the following verses:

Sexual misconduct is like the rainy season;
When it occurs there is just excess.
Pleasure [derived from it] is minimal
While suffering is overwhelming.
Those who understand [this] eschew [sensuous greed].
Even though one might enjoy heavenly bliss
[Or] simply the five [kinds of] sense-pleasure —
[All that] is just nothing when compared
With a heart free of desire [as realised] by
The Fully Enlightened One's Disciples.
Covetousness and attachment continuing for
A hundred million aeons exhaust
[All] merit and also lead to hell.
When [actually] does one experience [real] happiness?
In the twinkling of an eye [however one may] suffer
hellish pain.

19 Cf. Divy (V), 139, 20–1: yo 'sauc rājā Mādhūrataḥ, aham evānanda tena kālena tena samayena / In this text three versions of the akāravatins name occur: Māṇḍhātṛ, Māṇḍhātra and Māṇḍhāta. At ib., 139, 15–16, Kāśyapa is identified with Śakra, chief of gods: Kāśyapa bhikṣus tena kālena tena samayena Śakro devānām indro bhāvā /
Therefore, Ānanda, with the help of this 'skill in means' one should understand sense-desire (kama) and the overcoming of sense-desire [so that] one's thinking is rid of all indulgence forever. Thus you should train. — Having heard the Buddha's words, Ānanda was pleased and respectfully applied himself to practice.

8. Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Śrāvasti, at the Jeta Grove, in Anāthapindada's Park. Then the brähmin Shēng-lou went to the Exalted One's whereabouts. After the exchange [of greetings] (vyati-sr) and asking [polite] questions, the brähmin Shēng-lou sat down at one side and then asked the Exalted One the following question: How should one regard a false friend (kumītra)? — One should, replied the Exalted One, liken him to the moon. — And how should one regard a spiritual friend (kalānya mītra)? the brähmin went on to ask. — One should liken him, too, to the moon, was the Exalted One's reply. — What the śramana Gautama has just said, insisted the brähmin, he has put in a nutshell, without having explained its meaning in detail. If only Gautama would fully explain the meaning so as to make plain what is not yet plain. — Listen attentively, brähmin, said the Exalted One, and take heed; I shall elucidate the full meaning for you. — With the words: [Be it] so (evam), Gautama, the brähmin Shēng-lou [consented] to receive the Buddha's teaching.

Take, for instance, brähmin, said the Exalted One, the moon at the end of the month, day and night moving in orbit; she is, however, deficient in one respect: she is not at her full. As the moon is on the wane, the time will certainly come that she will be invisible and that nobody will see her. Similarly, brähmin, a false friend passes [his time] day and night, gradually losing trust (sraddhā), neglecting his moral training (śīla), his studies (śravaṇa), liberality (dāna) and being wanting in insight-knowledge (jnāna). Consequently, since the false friend is bereft of trust . . . and insight-knowledge, the time will come for him, after the breaking up of the body and after death, to go to hell. For this reason, brähmin, [i.e. as a warning], I have just compared the false friend to the moon at the end of the month.

[Now,] brähmin, let us take, for example, the new moon in her wakening phase. While she orbits day and night, her brightness gradually increases, bit by bit, [until she] is in her fullest phase. Then, (T2, 585a) on the fifteenth day (pañcadaśī, pāñcadaśika), she is absolutely at her full so that there is not a single sentient being that does not see [her]. Likewise, brähmin, a spiritual friend passes [his time] day and night, while he progresses in his moral training, in his studies and in liberality and while his trust and insight-knowledge increase. Accordingly, since the spiritual friend progresses . . . and since his trust and insight-knowledge increase, the time will come for

20 At T2, 584c (footnotes), reference is made to the verses at A III, 34 (AV, 31); the same reference is given at Akanuma, p.127, Hayashi, p.133, and at Lancaster, p.222. However, there is only partial thematic agreement between A verses and EA. The Pāli verses actually have their counterpart at MA, T1, 660b 10-21, as indicated by Akanuma.

21 Could this be a transliteration of Śaila, Śela = Pāli Sela? Cf. DPPN II, p.1288, on Sela, a brähmin of Anguttarāpa. Although formally Shēng-lou might correspond to the Sela of the Pāli Canon, it is only their originally having been brähmins which they have in common. Whilst Shēng-lou, at the end of the discourse, takes refuge as an upāsaka, Sela, according to Sn, p.112, became an arhat.

22 Lit. 'perhaps'.

23 Lit. 'come back'.
hymn, after the breaking up of the body and after death, to go to a good, a heavenly world (sugati, divyam). Therefore, brahmin, [i.e. in order to encourage.] I have just compared the spiritual friend, faring (gati) [well], to the moon at her full. — Then the Exalted One uttered these verses:

If one is greedy and full of desire,
Given to aversion and hatred, always deluded,
The karmically wholesome will slowly decline
Like the moon in her waning phase.
If one is no more greedy and full of desire,
No longer given to aversion, hatred and delusion,
The karmically wholesome will slowly increase
Like the moon in her waxing phase.

For this reason, brahmin, one should study and practise (sikṣa) just like the new moon [waxing steadily].

After that, the brahmin Shēng-lou addressed the Exalted One: Well said (sādhu), Gautama. It is just like getting something bent straightened [again]; seeing, as it were, light [after] darkness; it is like finding one’s way after having gone astray —

24 The following parallels the well-known stock conversion formula occurring e.g. at A 1, 173, 3–10: Svyathāpi bho Gotama nikkujjitaṁ va ukkujjeya. . . Upāsakaṁ mam bhavam Gotama dhāretu ajjatagge pāṇupetaṁ saraṇam gataṁ ti. For Sanskrit parallels, see, for instance, Divy (V), 44, 10–11: eṣo ‘haṁ bhagavantam saranaṁ gacchami . . . upāsakaṁ ca māṁ dāraya adyāgaṁ yāvajjivam prāṇupetam saraṇam gataṁ abhīparassanam; ibid., 301, 20–2; parts of this conversion formula are quoted in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. For text and references, see Bh. Pāsadika, Kanonishe Zitate im Abhidharmakośabhāṣya des Vasubandhas (SWTF, Beihft 1), Göttingen 1989, quotation Nos. 289, 290 (reference, under these quotations, to the present EA passage, T2, 585a 15–16, is wanting).


MĀ = Madhyamāgama, T 26.
Sn = Suttanipātā (PTS)
SWTF

CORRECTIONS — EKOTTARĀGAMA XV (BSR 10, 2 1993)
p.215, n.4: for ārakṣacita read ārakṣacitta.
p.216, l.16: for nānāvā read nānāva.
p.218, l.9: for cetassa read cetasa.
p.220, n.17: for dukkhanirdhāgāmini read dukkhanirdhagāminī.
p.222, l.17: for ni-shih-t'an read ni-shih-t'an.

SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENT

We are delighted to welcome on to our Advisory Committee Charles S. Prebish, Associate Professor of Religious Studies, Pennsylvania State University.

Prof. Prebish has agreed to act as our North American treasurer and editorial representative. To facilitate payment of subscriptions in US$, he has opened a bank account in the name of Buddhist Studies Review and invites American and Canadian readers, as well as others who would prefer to pay in US$, to renew or commence subscribing by sending their remittance to him at The Pennsylvania State University, Religious Studies Program, 108 Weaver Building, University Park, PA 16802-5500, USA. (Annual subscriptions are $11.00 for individuals or $19.00 for institutions.)

In his capacity as our editorial representative, Prof. Prebish will collate publishable material for BSR. North American contributors of items on ‘mainstream’ Buddhism (i.e. the broad Hinayāna tradition and early Mahāyāna in India, Central Asia and China) are asked to submit their typescripts or computer print-outs to him at the above address for perusal.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

Dear Sir,

May I respond briefly to Laurence Mills's comments on my abridged translation of the Majjhima Nikāya, not out of any general wish to quarrel with a fair-minded review, but because one of his points perfectly illustrates the unique pitfalls of these texts in a way which warrants further examination.

In Discourse 26 there are virtually identical passages covering Gotama's period of tutelage under, first, Ālāra the Kālāma, and then Uddaka Rāmaputta. However, at the end there is a
follow suit. If they do, executive and clerical officers also are righteous. This being so, the subjects are righteous too. Sun and moon always move smoothly [in their circuits], winds and rain are timely, catastrophes do not occur. The gods are pleased, and the five species of grain (sāṣa) 26 flourish. Sovereigns and ministers [work together] in harmony and with mutual respect, regarding each other as brothers; altogether, there are no [feelings of] either superiority or inferiority. [Everyone's] digestive system is in perfect order 27, and everyone's complexion shines, betraying good health. There are no calamities, and [people's] life expectancy is very high indeed. People respect and love each other. — Then the Exalted One uttered these verses:

Let us take, for example, buffaloes crossing a river. If their leader strays all [the herd] is led astray; [This deviation] is due to the leader. As for people, they also need a leader. But can we expect ordinary people [to be upright], If their leader is upright? On account of the sovereign's righteousness the masses suffer. Thus one should know that [his] righteousness also affects each and every subject [of his]. If the leader of a [herd of] buffaloes crossing a river, For example, fords at the exact [place], all [the herd] following him is on the right track thanks to his leadership. The people, too, need a leader. If he is righteous,

26 Viz. after Monier-Williams, dhānya (rice or corn), mugḍa (beans), tīla (sesame), yava (barley), svatārṣaṇa (white mustard) or mūga (pulses).
27 Lit. 'food digests itself'.

The ordinary people all the more [try to follow suit]. On account of the sovereign's setting an example of righteousness the people, without exception, [follow it] and live happily. Thus one should know that [his] righteousness also affects the people as a whole. Therefore, bhikṣus, one should forsake unrighteousness and be upright. Thus, bhikṣus, one should practise. — After listening to the Buddha's words, the bhikṣus were pleased and respectfully applied themselves to practice.'

Additional Abbreviations


CORRECTIONS — EKOTTARĀGAMA XVI (BSR 11, 1 1994)

p.50, 18 and passim : for ānāpana[smṛti] read ānāpāna[smṛti].
p.50, n.3. : for 'unascertainable' read 'ascertainable'.
p.53, l.14 : for pranīta read prānīta.
p.65, l.18 : for '1987' read '1897'.

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Dear Sir,

May I respond briefly to Laurence Mills’s comments on my abridged translation of the Majjhima Nikāya, not out of any general wish to quarrel with a fair-minded review, but because one of his points perfectly illustrates the unique pitfalls of these texts in a way which warrants further examination.

In Discourse 26 there are virtually identical passages covering Gotama’s period of tutelage under, first, Ālāra the Kālāma, and then Uddaka Rāmaputta. However, at the end there is a
small variation where Álāra offers to treat Gotama as an equal, whilst Uddaka sets him above himself as his teacher. The reviewer rightly observes that Horner has not differentiated the two outcomes and that I repeated the mistake. He also surmises that this may mean that I have sometimes resorted to a précis of her version.

Not so — I can re-affirm the claim made in my introduction that 'all vocabulary and grammar have been independently checked', but I did rely on her text to signpost divergences within parallel passages. Here the signpost was missing because Horner herself missed the variation in the original. In short, this is a collation error, and it was her collocation not her translation that I was following.

Reversion to the Pāli shows how daunting this aspect of the work can be. The two descriptions are not on facing-pages and run to over fifty lines each. Apart from the difference in the names there is a variation of one word some third of the way through (where the two teachers claim different attainments) and a slightly more substantial one in the third sentence from the end, where the oversight occurs. No wonder Horner's concentration sometimes slipped, or that others avoid the problem by anthologising.

One could consider the possibility of computerising Pāli texts so as to collate passages automatically. In practice though that would simply add input errors to those of copiers and printers. On the other hand one can preserve translations indefinitely on floppy discs and revise them continuously. If some kind of agreed core text could be stored in this way, and with a sensible amount of abridgement, it's not impossible that a panel of revisers might eventually arrive at something approaching an 'authorised' version. The prospect may be remote, but it's worth thinking about.

David Evans (Leeds)

NEWS AND NOTES

The Fifth J.B. Horner Memorial Lecture (sponsored by the Pali Text Society) was delivered at the School of Oriental and African Studies (London Univ.) on 1 October 1993. Prof. Dr Oskar von Hinüber gave an illustrated appraisal of 'Buddhist Monks and their Libraries in Ancient Northern Thailand: the Beginnings of the Pāli Manuscript Tradition'.

Also at the School of Oriental and African Studies, K.R. Norman (Prof. Emeritus of Indian Studies at Cambridge) delivered a series of lectures on 'A Philological Approach to Buddhism'. Interspersed with this was a course of ten seminars on Dharma-pada Literature.

Buddhica Britannica is essentially a monograph series published by the Institute of Buddhist Studies in collaboration with the School of Oriental and African Studies, and aims to produce well-researched and original academic material on Buddhist religion, philosophy, history, art and other related subjects. Four issues have appeared to date: T. Skorupski (ed.), The Buddhist Heritage (conference papers from the SOAS symposium in 1985) and Indo-Tibetan Studies, Ian Astley-[Kristensen], The Rishukō. The Sino-Japanese Prajñāpāramitā in 150 Verses (Amoghasvāra's Version), and Martin Boord, The Cult of the Deity Vajrākīla. According to the Texts of the Northern Treasure Tradition of Tibet (Byang-gter).

Further details may be obtained from the Institute, P.O. Box 443, Tring, Herts HP23 6PX (Tel. 071-323 6248 or 0442 890882; fax 071-436 3844). The other distributors are Otto Harrassowitz, P.O. Box 2929, D-65019 Wiesbaden, Germany, and South Asia Books, P.O. Box 502, Columbia, Missouri 65205, USA.
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Manuscripts and enquiries are invited. Contact: Prof. Charles S. Prebish [Editor-in-Chief], c/o East Asian Books Inc., P.O. Box 691465, Orlando, FL. 32869-1465, USA (Tel. 814/865-1121, Fax 814/863-7840; E-Mail cspl@psuvm.psu.edu).

'Fragile Palm Leaves'. Until the last century, Theravādin Buddhist literature was transmitted in the form of the palm-leaf book. Today, the palm-leaf mss of Sri Lanka, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia are generally safely stored in libraries and temples. They are rarely seen on the market. In Burma [Myanmar] mss are preserved at the National Library and in temple collections, but not all of them are safe. They have begun to show up in antique markets outside the country.

After nearly three decades of isolation under the totalitarian Ne Win régime, Burma has opened up, in an ad hoc manner, to trade and travel. Trade contacts have introduced new attitudes towards religious objects. In the past, a manuscript or an image was created as a result of a transaction between a sponsor and a scribe or artisan. After it was offered to the temple, it no longer had a price tag; it was a sacred object, outside the market system. It could then exist for centuries with no one ever dreaming of selling it. This has now changed: economic materialism dictates that everything has a price, everything can be bought or sold, including now especially antiques and sacred objects. One of the many tragic results of this new 'ethic', in combination with the general disruption and uncertainty in Burmese society, is that antiques, religious objects and cultural artefacts are pouring out of the country, in the main to the markets of neighbouring Thailand.

A few concerned individuals, led by Peter Skilling (Canadian scholar and former bhikkhu), have undertaken to purchase these mss with their own funds. A preliminary survey of the approximately 200 mss obtained so far shows that they are in Pāli or in Burmese mixed with Pāli. They contain canonical texts and commentaries, commentaries and nissaya composed in Burma and grammatical works. While some texts are well-known, others could not be traced in available literature or catalogues. Given the enormous literary output in Burma over the centuries, it is quite possible some texts are unique or very rare.

Why collect and preserve these mss? The book — of any form or culture — is precious. The palm-leaf ms is a type of
book, prepared with great care, that will never be produced again. The mss contain ancient Pāli literature (important for the study of Buddhism) and original compositions by Burmese writers in Pāli and Burmese (important for the study of Burmese literature). The intricate designs that adorn the Kamma-vācās are important for the study of Burmese design, since they change with the decades and reveal various (outside) influences. When the mss are sold to private collectors, they are lost to the scholarly world. Even when purchased by museums or galleries, sets are broken up and the mss are dispersed around the world to numerous institutions, where they are displayed as objets d'art rather than treated as literature.

There is an urgent need to preserve these materials and for funds to purchase mss as soon as they reach the market. The urgency lies in this very historical moment: the disturbed economic and social conditions that have led to the export of the mss are now in the ascendant. The project will continue as long as the flow of mss continues. It is now in a preliminary stage; the primary concern is to collect the texts before they are dispersed forever. Later stages will include cleaning, preservation and cataloguing.

The mss are a part of Burma's religious and literary heritage. They belong to Burma. The ultimate aim of the project is to return the bulk of the collection to Burma when democracy is restored and conditions permit. At this point financial support is urgently needed. Please contribute to the preservation of the Buddhavacana and the literary heritage of the Burmese Sangha. Donations should be sent by direct bank transfer to: Mr Peter C. Skilling, Acct. No. 101-019807-3, Bangkok Bank, Head Office, Silom Road, Bangkok, Thailand, along with a separate letter to Mr Skilling, c/o The Siam Society, 131 Asoke Road (Sukhumvit 21), Bangkok 10110, so that the donations may be acknowledged and a report sent.

BOOK REVIEWS


Paul Harrison has already established a formidable reputation for his work on the Pratyutpannabuddhasamkhavasthitamādhi Sūtra. This is a sūtra which prior to Harrison's work had been studied by few Western scholars (except, of course, the ubiquitous Étienne Lamotte), and the importance of the Pratyutpanna Sūtra in helping our understanding of early Mahāyāna Buddhism and its origins — thanks very much to Harrison's careful labours to the highest scholarly standards in editing and translating the Tibetan texts in the light of their Chinese versions — has finally begun to be appreciated.

Harrison has now turned his attention to the Druma-kinnararāja-pariprcccha Sūtra, another sūtra neglected by Western scholarship yet datable among the very earliest Mahāyāna sūtras since, like the Pratyutpanna Sūtra, it was translated into Chinese by Lokakṣema during the second century C.E. This medium-length sūtra appears to be important, with material on emptiness and the perfections, but particularly on skillful means (upāya-kauśalya), also the use of a mantra and, according to Harrison, clear reference to the content of another Mahāyāna sūtra, the Ajāṭaśatrukṣāryavīnodaḥ Sūtra. No doubt of lively contemporary interest also is the discussion of women and why and
how they need to be reborn as men in order to become enlightened. As with his work on the Pratyutpanna Sūtra, having established a clear and properly critical edition of a text of the Drūma Sūtra, Harrison promises to follow it with a future translation.

Harrison's excellent mastery of the Chinese and Tibetan sources (not to mention modern Japanese scholarship), and his detailed concentrated work on particular sūtras, has enabled him to make major contributions to the important and rather specialised scholarship now taking place on the editions of the Tibetan Kanjur, their interrelationships and relative precedence. Harrison's edition of the Drūma Sūtra — which he prints in clear Tibetan script with the stated and laudable intention that it might be of additional use to students studying Tibetan — is prefaced by a long, rich and stimulating essay on what editing this particular text tells us about the relationships between different versions of the Tibetan canon. Harrison convincingly shows the importance of access to a range of Kanjurs in order to do textual work with any degree of critical awareness, and he shows which Kanjurs are worth considering in this enterprise and which (including the Lhasa) are not. He also demonstrates — I think convincingly — that what he calls 'Recension A', which stems from the so-called 'Western Kanjur tradition', is in fact probably the standard revised translation of the Drūma Sūtra produced as a result of the translation reforms associated with the Mahāvyutpatti in the ninth century. How this relates to Recension B, associated with the Eastern Kanjur tradition, is complex, and the whole issue of the relationship between Western and Eastern traditions is much more complex than was previously thought. Among Harrison's conclusions in an essay which makes a major contribution to comparative Kanjur studies (pioneered by scholars such as Helmut Eimer) is that the search for the original (or even relatively original) archetype text is doomed, and there is no such thing as 'the canonical Tibetan text' of a sūtra. Moreover — and this should be noted — it is not appropriate in editing a Tibetan sūtra text to combine Western and Eastern traditions into a single hybrid version (p.xlviii).

The work of Dr Harrison represents some of the most important contemporary research on the early Mahāyāna sūtras, and must therefore be of interest to all concerned with the origins of Mahāyāna and its early doctrinal and social profile. Harrison is extraordinarily well-qualified to engage in this research, and he works to scholarly standards as desirable as they are regrettably rare. The publication of this critical edition of a recension of the Drūmakinnarājaparipṛcchā Sūtra is very well received, indeed, not only for advanced researchers but also, as Harrison wishes, for those engaged in teaching and studying Tibetan. Others without Tibetan will soon be delighted no doubt by the publication of its translation.

Paul Williams


The 'Tibetan Sautrāntika' referred to here is broadly speaking the tradition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti as presented by writers identified as representing the dGe lugs school of Tibetan Buddhism. Often seen (by Edward Conze, for example) as little more than sophists seeking fame, fortune and cleverness rather
than liberation, Dignāga and Dharmakirti were enormously influential figures on the history of later Buddhist thought in India. Their approach and tenets were studied extensively in Tibet long before Tsong kha pa in the late fourteenth/early fifteenth century and the subsequent founding of a dGe lugs perspective which developed a vision of the Buddhist tradition that integrated the logic and epistemology of Dignāga and particularly Dharmakirti into a complete system where it had a definite soteriological role to play. The emptiness referred to in Mādhyamika sources — the cognition of which can lead to insight, wisdom (prajñā) — is a particular sort of negative entity (an absence of inherent existence) which needs initially to be known through inference. Yet inferential awareness depends on words and is apparently conceptual, whereas direct and supremely liberating insight into emptiness is said to be non-conceptual. The relationship between knowing emptiness through analytical inference, and direct non-conceptual awareness essentially involves epistemological issues which consequently are seen by many Tibetan thinkers not as extras to the spiritual path but an integral part of it. Sometimes in the background to Klein's book, and sometimes treated explicitly, is the role of a particular Tibetan vision (identified as ‘dGe lugs pa’) of Dignāga and Dharmakirti’s thought (‘Tibetan Sautrāntika’) as integral to the supreme purpose of insight into an emptiness which is articulated in the highest tenet system, that of Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. The different tenet systems of Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Cittamātra, Svātantrika Madhyamaka and Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka are thought to be sequentially more accurate as true understandings of the way things really are, but each has its role to play in the spiritual path and in terms of that role none is to be left behind.

Tibetan discussions of Dignāga and Dharmakirti are almost invariably among the most difficult in Tibetan thought. Yet an intimate knowledge of this material is necessary to appreciate many aspects of Tibetan writing from Tantra through Madhyamaka to Vinaya. Standard older works such as Stcherbatsky's *Buddhist Logic* are still valuable, but as Klein shows there are a number of rather unusual features found in the dGe lugs approach to Dignāga and Dharmakirti (which may or may not turn out to be unique to the dGe lugs) which are not treated by Stcherbatsky's pioneering but now dated volumes. In *Knowing, Naming and Negation* Klein translates pieces from three extremely difficult works which represent different literary genres and were among those used in writing her previous book *Knowledge and Liberation* (Snow Lion, 1986). The two books thus complement each other and form a set.

Our author has chosen first to translate from a topical exposition on 'Specifically and Generally Characterized Phenomenon' (Rang mthshan spyi mthshan gyi rnam bzhag) by the eighteenth-century Mongolian lama bsTan dar lha ram pa treating perception and conceptual thought, which in the system of Dignāga and Dharmakirti are intimately related to issues of ultimate and conventional truths, and also the role of language in reaching or distorting in our experience what is really there. She also translates from a basic manual for monastic debate, the 'Collected Topics' (Sras bs dus grva) of Ngag dbang bkra shis (1648-1721) concerning positive and negative phenomena, and the longest translation consists of most of the Sautrāntika section from the well-known *Grub mtha* by lCang skya rol pa'i rdo rje (1717-86), a splendidly valuable survey of all the characteristic tenets associated by Tibetan scholars with the Sautrāntika. Klein has also included the Tibetan texts photographically reproduced from sources published in India, which is very much to be welcomed, and she claims to have edited the relevant text
of the lCang skya Grub mtha'. However, she gives no discussion of the principles behind her edition, which could scarcely be called a proper critical edition and in fact consists of a few corrections inserted into the photographic reprint or variants noted based on one other reprint of the text (while looking up the text almost at random I immediately noticed a missed correction — p.131, l.3; read sangs rgyas for sangs rgyal).

These texts contain some wonderfully valuable clarifications of certain important elements of the dGe lugs vision, such as the relationship between language, reality and conceptualisation, and emptiness as a permanent phenomenon which is nevertheless an emptiness of inherent existence of a particular entity and is dependently originated and therefore, of course, itself empty of inherent existence. The inclusion of explanatory comments by a number of eminent contemporary Tibetan lamas is also very much to be welcomed, and they often help enormously in clarifying these difficult texts. One should be careful however. Tibetan lamas come from within a specific tradition and give a particular synchronic perspective on the texts but are often not fully aware of the Indo-Tibetan history and context of these ideas. Are the disputes with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which provided the setting for many of the theories of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's tradition, fully appreciated when the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts are not available in Tibetan? Tibetan lamas can also make mistakes (for a longer discussion of some of these points in a very similar context, see Leonard van der Kuijp, 'Miscellanea à propos of the philosophy of mind in Tibet: Mind in Tibetan Buddhism', The Tibet Journal X:1 (1985), 32-43). While Klein with the aid of her Tibetan informants has done some extremely valuable work in unravelling for us these obscure texts, she shows little sense of critical acumen, and her awareness of contemporary philosophical issues could be better.

She often omits to trace quotations and rarely shows any sign of comparing the cited quotations with the original versions in Tibetan and Sanskrit (where available). One sometimes feels that she is all too often working in intellectual isolation with only these texts and her informants. There is little by way of discussion of the historical ancestry of the ideas presented, not much contextualisation in Tibetan or philosophical thought. It is made clear that these are dGe lugs interpretations of e.g. Dharmaññika, although how Dharmakīrti himself differs — and scholars from other Tibetan traditions — is in this book (although not so much as in her other book) rather ignored. Van der Kuijp indicates problems historically in such units of discourse as 'dGe lugs', problems Klein has an awareness of but I am not sure she addresses adequately. Her sources come from very different periods and one might hope for some sharper probing of what it means to say they represent one system.

For an example of where Klein may have been misled by her contemporary informants, together with a mistranslation, we can look at pp.149-50. This example really is drawn at random, as I happened to look up one small section of lCang skya's Tibetan text for a different purpose, not suspecting any particular problems:

\[ \ldots \] if exclusions are divided, there are two types: exclusions which are non-affirming negatives (med dgag go sel ba, *prasajya-pratisedha (sic) -apoha) and exclusions which are affirming negatives (ma yin dgag gi sel ba, *paruyu-dasa-pratisedha-apoha). The first of these consist of objective phenomena and mental phenomena. These are mentioned by the master Sāntarakṣita [in his Ornament to the Middle Way):

Here, exclusions are of two types:
- Affirming and non-affirming.
Non-affirming [negatives] are of two types
Because they are divided [into] mental and objective
[phenomena].

In an article on ‘Identity and referential opacity in Tibetan Buddhist apoha theory’ (B.K. Matilal and R.D. Evans ed., Buddhist Logic and Epistemology, Dordrecht 1986, pp.207-27), Tom Tillemans has referred to the same section from ICang skya and commented that he failed to trace the quote from Śāntarakṣita (p.222). Klein’s reference in square brackets to the Madhyamakālaṃkāra must come either from herself or her Tibetan informants. I suspect the latter. As usual Klein gives no verse citation, and her reference to the Madhyamakālaṃkāra is wrong. The quote cannot be found in the Madhyamakālaṃkāra but is in fact verse 1003 (Dwarikadas Shastri edition) of Śāntarakṣita's Tattvasamgraha, for which the Sanskrit is: rathā hi dvividho pohah paryudāsanisedhataḥ / dvividah paryuddośi buddhyātmārthatmabhedataḥ //. Moreover, Klein has mistranslated the verse and indeed ICang skya’s introduction in a way that suggests that she was either translating unf reflectively or perhaps she was not very clear what was going on. The Tibetan of the whole section reads: . . . de la dbay na / ma yin dagag gzhany sel dang med dagag gi gzhany sel gnyis / dang po la don chos dang blo chos gnyis rnam su yod de / slob dpon zhi ba ’tshos / dir ni sel ba rnam gnyis te / ma yin pa dang med pa’o / ma yin pa yang rnam gnyis te / blo dang don gyi dbye bas so / zhes gang gsungs pa’o // In the section introducing the quote Klein has inexplicably reversed the order of the two exclusions, placing the non-affirming negative before the affirming negative. She has then continued with ICang skya’s reference to ‘the first’ being divided into two types, implying that it is the non-affirming negatives which are divided into two types. That this is wrong should have been realised by the

quote from Śāntarakṣita, which makes it quite clear that it is the affirming negatives which are of two types (dvividah paryuddośi / ma yin pa yang rnam gnyis te). Klein has translated the two negatives in the correct sequence in the quote, but then in order to fit with her previous mistranslation, she continues with ‘Non-affirming [negatives] are of two types’. This is of course quite wrong as a translation of the Sanskrit or the Tibetan (incidentally, Klein normally cites Sanskrit words in stem forms throughout, which has led to an unnecessary peculiarity when she attempts to illustrate an explanation of a dvanda compound with sabdasamanya arthasamanya cha (p.129), omitting all sandhi).

Many of the themes discussed in the texts translated by Klein are familiar from recent philosophy — particularly analytic and linguistic philosophy — and this material (much more than any other aspects of Buddhist philosophy) would be accessible and of interest to those with training in academic philosophy wishing to broaden their horizons. Unfortunately Klein shows little philosophically sophisticated awareness, and this is exemplified perhaps by her use of the common translation ‘meaning’ for the Sanskrit artha, Tibetan don. Thus we get ‘generality-meaning’ for arthasamanya and ‘meaning-of-the-term’ for sabdartha, and we are told that ‘the image which is the explicit object of thought’ is called meaning-of-the-term [since the term directly refers to it] (p.113). Thus the don of a word is in some complex sense the word’s referent. Although Klein mentions Frege at one point, she seems to be completely unaware of Frege’s well-known distinction between meaning (sinn - sense) and reference, a distinction which was indeed largely ignored until restated by Strawson in 1950. Quite simply, the issue of verbal reference is not to be confused with that of meaning. For a word to refer it
must first have meaning, and some words (such as 'unicorn') have definite meaning even though they appear not to refer at all (how this can be, and what explanation one might give of their reference or lack of it, is another matter). This is all quite familiar to philosophers, and the translation of don by 'meaning' represents a completely out-of-date translation of artha which occurs in works on Indian philosophy of language reflecting (as writing on Indian philosophy often does) ideas current in Anglo-American thought sixty or so years ago. One of Strawson's main points was that Russell — who appears still to be an influence on the study of Indian philosophy in India — had failed precisely to make the distinction between meaning and reference. The material Klein has translated cries out for a philosophically sensitive treatment and one might question whether, without such an understanding, her translation can be very adequate. Philosophers reading that the meaning-of-the-term is 'the appearing object' (p.49) would be puzzled or amused and then discard Indo-Tibetan thought as itself lacking sophistication. Tom Tillema, one of the few scholars working in this field with a proper philosophical background, has discussed a number of the issues relating to these texts in his paper cited above. In a footnote he also discusses Frege's distinction between meaning and reference, and the inadequacy of thinking of the 'object-universals' (arthasamanyadon spyi = Klein's 'meaning-generality') as verbal meanings (p.222). Unfortunately Tillema's work appears to be unknown to Klein. I too have had occasion to point out elsewhere where the inadequacy most of the time with translating artha don in a linguistic context by 'meaning' — at least unless a very clear view has taken place on what is meant by 'meaning'. The linguistic sense of artha is usually the referent (whatever that may turn out to be), that which is aimed at or intended, and this connects with other meanings of artha in Sanskrit as goal or purpose.

Anne Klein's volume of translations — particularly when taken with her other book Knowledge and Liberation — is a pioneering work in an area (Tibetan philosophy) where we have very little information and understanding. Like all pioneering works it should be taken as a valuable resource to be used and even used enthusiastically but not the final word. To produce a work like this at our present stage of knowledge involves great risks, but I incline to Popper's view that it is being willing to let go and take risks that leads to great achievements. Incidentally that, I suspect, is also the outlook of a Mādhyamika.

Paul Williams


This volume presents twenty-nine papers collected from the first Chung-Hwa International Conference on Buddhism, held at Taipei's National Central Library in 1990. The Chung-Hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies was established in 1985 by Ven. Sheng-Yen who, upon completing his Ph.D in 1975, moved to the United States for a number of years before returning to Taipei.

Predicated on the presumption that 'purely academic discussion of Buddhism does not damage the dignity of Buddhist belief' (p.xiii), more than one hundred scholars, selected around the theme of the conference and irrespective of their personal religious commitment or academic background, participated in the conference. The papers were organised into Chinese, Japanese and English language sections with much success. In the interests of the 'global revitalization of Buddhism' (p.xiv),
Charles Wei-isun Fu and Sandra A. Wawrytko were invited to edit the conference papers in two volumes, one in Chinese (published by the Tung-ta branch of the Sanmin Book Company of Taipei) and one in English under review here.

Following an Introduction by the volume editors, the book opens with a brief Prologue including essays on 'Buddhist Tradition and Modernity' by Ven. Sheng-Yen, Kōshō Mizutani and Lewis Lancaster. In his opening essay, Sheng-Yen underscores the importance of the role of the Sangha in Buddhist history, noting the function of sīla/Vinaya in Buddhist society and arguing for the necessity of a consequential, renewed vigour of ethical observance in today's culture. Mizutani's essay is more technical and textual. Without compromising the ethical maxims demonstrated in the early Pāli texts of the Nikāyas, Dhammapada and Sutta-nipātā, he instead focuses on the ethical components in the writings of Tetsuō Watsuji, especially including 'The Practical Ethics of Early Buddhism' and 'The History of Ethical Thought in Buddhism'. Mizutani thus expounds on the relation between pratiyayasamutpāda and sānyatā as well as the six pāramitās. He locates karunā at the heart of Buddhist ethics and relates these overarching Mahāyāna themes to contemporary society. Lancaster's essay, barely a page in length, is essentially a salutary introduction to the conference, citing the importance of the Chung-Hwa Institute in encouraging the study of Buddhism.

The first major section of the book is called 'The Past: Traditional Roots', and includes nine papers on a variety of topics ranging from 'The Ethics of Mahāyāna Buddhism in the Bodhicaryāvatāra (by Ryōjun Mitomo) to 'The Three Treasures as the Basis of Buddhist Ethics and Their Application in Daily Life' (by Kodo Matsumari). If one could identify a unifying theme for the papers in this section, it would necessarily be Vinaya in a variety of applications, contexts and cultures.

The volume's second (and longest) section, 'The Present: Current Issues', presents fifteen papers that are essentially topically pointed and, with some exceptions, reflective of Theravāda perspectives. Consequently, essays in this part of the book consider such issues as 'The Religious Position of Women in Thailand' (Chatsumarn Kabilsingh), 'Buddhist Ethics and Modern Politics: A Theravāda Viewpoint' (Sulak Sivaraksa) and 'Buddhist Ethics in the Practice of Medicine' (Mettānando Bhikkhu, but also "The Buddha or the Bomb": Nishi Kenji's Zen View of Science' (Steven Heine). The most provocative essay in the section is Charles Fu's 'From Paramārtha-satyad to Šāmvarisatya: An Attempt at Constructive Modernization of (Mahāyāna) Buddhist Ethics'. It carefully distinguishes between sīla and Vinaya, discusses the role of each and then argues that 'On the theoretical level, a new ethical theory based on the Middle Way of paramārtha-satyad/sāmvarisatya can meet the challenge of modern times by establishing a proper mean between the supreme morality of Mahāyāna-orientated Dharma and the micro-morality of modern societies' (p.327).

The third section, 'The Future: Buddhist Ethics in a Pluralistic World', includes five articles. To this reviewer, the two most interesting offerings are the ones that place modern Buddhist ethics in the widest possible context: David W. Chappell's 'Buddhist Responses to Religious Pluralism: What are the Ethical Issues?', and Kenneth K. Inada's 'Buddhist and Western Ethics: Problematics and Possibilities'. The volume is concluded by a Glossary, Index and biographical sketch of each editor and contributor.

Like virtually all edited volumes, especially in consideration of the wide range of the subject matter and the diversity of training and emphases of the contributor, this book presents
significantly uneven reading with regard to style, scope and content. Nevertheless, in this case, the presentation lends a breadth and vitality to the subject. Its approach is panoramic, expansive and engaging. More often than not the articles challenge the reader, uncovering or extracting some new viewpoint or perspective not previously considered. The ongoing development of the ethical tradition is one of the most difficult dilemmas facing world Buddhism today. That a generally scholarly and important book devoted to this investigation should also be fun to read and ponder is a testament to the vision of the conference’s convener and a tribute to the volume’s editors.

Charles S. Prebish


One of the most fruitful and sustained initiatives to promote an informed knowledge of the Buddhist tradition in the West has been developed, in recent times, by the Italian quarterly *Paramita — Quaderni di Buddhismo*, which has now been flourishing for twelve years. The merit — never was the term more aptly applied — of this endeavour lies entirely in the single-handed efforts of Mr Vicenzo Piga, founder and editor of the magazine.

Mr Piga came upon the Buddha’s teachings back in the seventies. A journalist by profession, he felt that the best way for him to do something about them was to start a journal which would provide a forum for information and discussion. This he did most successfully, nurturing the fledgling publication from its inception in 1982, not only with a lot of personal effort, but with repeated injections of his own funds, to bring it to splendid fruition as a now self-supporting publication of high professional quality with a well-established, broad readership.

The stated purpose of *Paramita* is to bring before the Western — and, more specifically, Italian public the whole range of living traditions of Buddhist spirituality, so as to encourage a properly informed meeting of minds between East and West, focussing in particular on interreligious dialogue, and to facilitate a mutually profitable encounter between Western schools of psychology and Buddhist meditative practices.

This latter field of interest is, as the title indicates, the subject of the present volume, issued by one of Italy’s major commercial publishers in their special series ‘Uomini e Religioni’ (Men and Religions), which is an anthology of articles published in *Paramita* in the three years from 1987 to 1989, covering various aspects of the far from simple relationship between psychotherapy and meditation.

The selection has been judiciously carried out by Adalberto Bonecchi, a leading Italian psychoanalyst, member of both the International and the Italian Associations for Transpersonal Psychology, and Vice-Director of the Association for the Study of Psychoanalysis and Religions.

The anthology comprises twenty-six essays, not only by Italian authors but, in many cases, translated from English and
other languages, demonstrating thus the broad receptiveness of the review from which they were culled. It is articulated in four sections: 1. The Practice of Meditation, 2. Psychology and Mental Development, 3. Beyond the Ego, and 4. The Inner Experience.

It is not possible, in a brief notice like this, to go into details of the contents of individual essays, or of Dr Bonecchi's substantial introduction, especially since the book is not available in English. Suffice it therefore to say that it brings together an impressive array of highly qualified authors including, from Italy, Prof. Corrado Pensa of Rome University and the International Meditation Society in Barre; Mariangela Falà, the leading Pàli scholar in Italy and Deputy Editor of Paramita; Laura Boggio Gilot, President of the Italian Association of Transpersonal Psychology, and several renowned Italian psychotherapists. Among the non-Italians we find many well-known names, such as Ajahn Sumedho, Head of Chithurst Buddhist Monastery and the Amaravati Buddhist Centre in Britain; American authors such as John Welwood and Ken Wilber; the late Ajahn Buddhadasa, who was a leading teacher of the Thai forest tradition; Prof. Donald W. Mitchell of Purdue University in the U.S.A., a specialist in Christian-Buddhist dialogue; the late Swedish psychologist and Buddhist teacher Rune Johansson; the Gelugpa teacher Dagyab Rinpoche; the Jesuit father and renowned authority on Zen the late Hugo Enomiyam-Lasalle; Gerard Du Pré, then President of the Scientific Buddhist Association; the Japanese Zen specialist Abe Masao, and the American bhikkhuñi Connie Miller.

The different authors bring, as might be expected, a variety of attitudes and specialised knowledges to bear on their common theme. Two points of convergence, however, emerge quite clearly. Firstly, the need for a clear-sighted distinction between the uses and purposes of psychotherapy and of meditation, so as to avoid the pitfalls inherent in the all-too-common quasi-identification of one with the other (especially the misconception of meditation as a form of psychotherapy). Secondly, the awareness of the need — if anything lasting is to result from the East-West spiritual encounter — for a genuine kind of inter-religious dialogue, untainted by more or less deliberate proselytising notions (all too deliberate, alas, in the case of the Catholic Church, with a few honourable exceptions, such as Fr Raimundo Panikkar²) or by simple-minded yearnings for exotic experiences and would-be esoteric knowledge.

All in all, this is a very stimulating collection of essays, which throws much light on current endeavours to bring psychology into proper focus as an adjuvant to, and not as a substitute for, the spiritual quest of the human mind.

Amadeo Solé-Leris


It may at first sight seem strange that so little is really known about the actual practice of Ch' an or Zen and particularly of its essence, the intensive retreat practice of sesshin. Perhaps the reputation for severity that sesshins enjoy deters those

interested in the theory from exposing themselves to the practical experience. Anyhow this book, one of the very few on the subject, will probably give as good an idea of the practice (perhaps not quite as frightening as the nervous may have feared) of a Zen retreat as is possible without actually attending one.

The main part of the book is a transcription of talks given by an eminent Chinese master at a six-day Ch'an retreat (Ch'an is Chinese, Zen the Japanese version) held in Wales in 1989. The talks are not intended to be scholarly but deal with what one might encounter in Zen practice — possible difficulties and suitable methods for dealing with them, views of reality not presented as interesting philosophical speculations but as practical aids to meditation, and so on. There is also a selection of reports by retreatants, written soon after the end of the retreat, on their experiences together with short comments by the master. In the final chapter the editor gives the report of an interview with the master about his life and, in a general introduction, provides useful background information on Ch'an/ Zen and on the master.

The master gave more talks than he would normally have done on a retreat because this was his first visit to Britain and he did not know when, if ever, he would return. So he wanted to pass on as large a body of teaching as he could to carry the students through the time ahead when there would be no teacher.

The main talks, given at the same time every evening, were thoughts on the poem 'On Calming the Mind', a work by the sixth century master Wang Ming. This is one of the earliest Ch'an works written very much under Taoist influence. It has always been considered a good meditation guide. The other talks, which were shorter, were given at regular intervals throughout the day, for instance just before meals, and dealt with whatever the master perceived as appropriate to the needs of the retreatants at that particular moment. These talks are also of general value. The transcripts were made from tapes of Ming Yee Wang's translations delivered sentence by sentence as the master spoke.

Master Sheng Yen had an unusually wide training — interrupted by ten years war service — as a monk. He was trained in Ch'an/Zen in both T'sao-tung/Sōtō and Lin-chi/Rinze traditions, and in T'ien t'ai, Hua-yen, Wei-shih and Vinaya teachings and, for physical exercise, in Tai-chi and Chinese boxing. His formal training finished with six years solitary retreat and he then took a doctorate in Buddhist literature at Risshō University in Tokyo. He now directs an institute and monastic temple in Taiwan and another institute and meditation centre in New York.

Master Sheng Yen follows the usual Ch'an/Zen lines. For meditation practice he recommends watching the breath to start with and then either gives a kōan (usually as a hua-t'ou) or recommends the practice of Silent Illumination/shikantaza. He decides from an initial interview which method is appropriate for a particular student. For individual problems he may also prescribe, for instance, a large number of prostrations or of mantras — the latter one of the later Pure Land practices that had not entered Ch'an at the time the two main schools were brought to Japan.

The aim of these practices is to calm the mind and to allow natural insight to manifest. He sometimes refers to the Zen paradox that wanting to achieve enlightenment is a sure way of not achieving it but not practising is no use either. This dilemma is to be resolved by practice for the sake of practice — in one place he uses the metaphor of the mountain climber, 'a true climber climbs simply for its own sake; he climbs for the experiencing of climbing. And this is an experience no one can
have without setting foot upon the path'.

This book is a good practical guide to a well-worn path for those who would like to set foot on it, particularly for those who have to start the journey without a teacher. The editor deserves our gratitude not only for putting together an excellent compendium but also for arranging and hosting Master Sheng Yen's visit in the first place.

Richard Bancroft


The sole purpose of reviewing this bibliography, which the writer deeply regrets purchasing, is to warn readers against making the same mistake.

Compiled by a graduate of Delhi University and former student of Prof. Sanghasen Singh (who unwisely contributed a Foreword in pidgin English), one assumes that the 2,749 listed entries are based exclusively on the holdings of the University's Department of Buddhist Studies. If so, then this fact should have been made clear in the book's sub-title. As it is, the prospective buyer should think twice before laying out such an outrageously high retail price for such a shoddy and deficient return. Shoddy because there are either printing or factual errors on almost every single page; deficient in that Pāli and Sanskrit diacritical marks, text translations and classic secondary works are conspicuous by their absence. Moreover, either reprints have been omitted or reprinted editions entered as though they were first editions. In many cases the same book entry appears in two different places but with varying details.

It would be tedious to list every single mistake, but attention should be drawn to the following:

0004  ‘Basu, Mitra’ — correctly ‘Vasumitra’.
0154  C.G. Vladimirov = V.Y. Vladimirov.
0176  What is ‘Carya-padas’ doing under ‘Cariya-pitaka’?
0191 ff  Dhp — see definitive surveys by H. Hecker (Universität Konstanz, 1993) and the reviewer's rev. ed. of An Analysis of the Pāli Canon (BPS 1991).
0377-9  (VKN) How can these be subsumed under ‘Niddesa’?
0494-5  Miscategorised under ‘Sarvāstivāda’.
0570  Arthur Waley's The Real Tripiṭaka hardly warrants inclusion under surveys of ‘Tripiṭakas’.
0693  As made clear in 0843, this entry should be listed under ‘Foucher’ rather than the translator.
0850  Similarly, ref. 1132, ‘Mizuno’.
0908  "    "  0786, ‘David-Neel’.
0791  should appear after 0789.
1101  The author belongs to the next entry.
1233  The author, B.R. Ambedkar, omitted.
1312 ff  The author is correctly Sangharakshita to distinguish 1321.
1867  The author is correctly L.M. Joshi.
1997  is only in German!
2164  correctly appeared under 2058.
2294  The author is correctly R.H. Robinson.
2310  "    "    "  I-chih.
2502  "    "    "  Dicken.
2652  "    "    "  D.S. Lopez.
2684  "    "    "  F.A. von Schiefer.
2689-95  are all listed under ‘Rinpoche’ rather than the authors’ personal names.
should be listed under the translator’s name.

The book is subdivided into supposedly clear-cut subjects but ‘Classics’ seems to be reserved for Pāli and Sanskrit texts whilst ‘General Works’ arbitrarily includes almost anything excluded from the remaining sections (including texts not listed under ‘Tantric’ and ‘Zen Buddhism’). Indeed, one of the most frustrating aspects of this enterprise is frequently to see items that should either belong to other sections or, because of their irrelevance, be omitted altogether.

Under ‘Buddhism in Modern World’ it was nice to come across (the old kingdom of) Khotan (2523-8) but the prize for the best howler goes to entry 1998: Lazlo Gerevich’s study of his country’s artistic heritage, ‘Art of Buddha and pet in the Middle Ages’, Budapest 1971!

A work which needs to be completely overhauled before being allowed to see the light of day again. The sole redeeming feature is the unique survey of ‘Theses and Dissertations’ at Delhi University (1461-1663).

RBW


The small book certainly covers a subject neglected by many other Buddhist works and on the face of it would seem to be a useful addition to any library on Buddhism. However, there are a number of matters to be considered which the authors have not really investigated.

On p.4, the authors remark that the character analysis which they intend to expound has its origins in the Pāli Canon. The relevant categories there are the three wholesome roots: non-greed, characterised by renunciation; non-hatred or loving kindness and compassion; and non-delusion, insight or understanding; together with the three unwholesome roots of greed, hatred and delusion. However, the authors do not pursue this theme, mentioned so often in the suttas, but rather analyse Buddhaghosa’s classification as found in his Visuddhimagga: the three unwholesome roots, plus faith, intelligence and speculation’. According to this scheme, a greed-type practitioner is supposed to grow into a faith type — and similar transformations are to be expected for the other types. But where did these classifications come from? Faith, intelligence and speculation seem rather poor substitutes for renunciation, compassion and insight, so why does the Visuddhimagga analyse in the former, rather limited way?

At this point, we could embark on a critique of the Visuddhimagga as a reliable guide to meditative practice. Such a large undertaking would be out of place here, but it is worth recording that a meditator soon senses the scholastic limitations of this treatise. It is a work put together by an author with an intricate, scholastic mind, one fond of categories and inter-locking groups, certainly an author erudite in the Abhidhamma, but a meditator? It is very doubtful. Buddhaghosa has classified and docketed all the information he could obtain on meditation, but his work does not show the living spark of a meditator. We may therefore legitimately cast doubt on his categories and analyses.

The authors of this book have adopted one of these categories. On p.8 they propose the rather startling translations ‘efficient’ and ‘inefficient’ respectively for kusala and akusala. Such a rendering (presumably based on ‘skillful’) does not bring out the moral component of these terms, and seems to emphasise a utilitarian approach.

On p.11 the authors try to confront the complexity of
human behaviour with the assertion that it may be reduced to 'a mere six or even three types'. They say this may seem simplistic, in which assertion they are, of course, quite correct. Reduction of complicated people to these limited categories, even allowing for changing mind-states and impermanence over longer periods, is very inadequate. Even astrological classification is to be preferred, for this offers many more permutations. The authors state (p.11), 'When faced with an object of whatever kind, we can only move towards it, away from it or not know which way to move'. In upholding the triple category of greed, hatred and delusion types, they have failed to consider compassion as a motivation — but then neither did Buddhaghosa.

From p.13 onwards, there is a section on 'How to Analyse Character', and the authors remark that it is indeed difficult to analyse one's own correctly. The question therefore arises whether this book is concerned with analysing others' characters. What use will this be except to increase one's own pride? I remember many years ago visiting a great Buddhist scholar at his home in Dorset [Ed., Edward Conze]. He took perverse pleasure in analysing each one of us in astrological terms and telling us our weak points — perhaps very good for us but rather a disaster for him. If, armed with the information in this book, we now go around and proclaim to others, 'I've got your number, laddie — that's a greed characteristic', we shall speedily run out of friends.

The Visuddhimagga devotes quite a number of sections (III, 74-94) to the subject of temperaments and their characteristic actions. One weakness of this scheme, beyond the general inadequacy of subsuming all human types under six headings, is that actions such as sleeping or sweeping are only identified for those of unwholesome temperaments. It is said that the actions of wholesome types will correspond. Obviously, this is nonsense, as it does not follow that an intelligence type will eat in the same manner as a hate-type. While this book does update the actions used to identify the various human types, mentioning such things as window-shopping and driving, it has not mentioned other matters also neglected by Buddhaghosa, who was writing for monks, not laymen, wherefore we should not expect much mention of human relations. Still, it would have been interesting to consider these types' behaviour in friendship and love — perhaps one would find a marked preference for particular coital positions in certain personality types.

In terms of the sutta list cited above, no doubt there are three wholesome and three unwholesome roots, but when we examine Buddhaghosa's wholesome types, 'faith' is not invariably wholesome, as exemplified by the slaughter and torture perpetuated by those who have faith in one thing or another; while 'speculation' — not the best translation of vitakka — can hardly be called wholesome at all. Too much thinking equals distraction.

Although the authors of this book do state that these types change into each other as conditions vary, there is often the suspicion that types are viewed as fixed categories. Buddhaghosa, after all, views dhammas in exactly the same way. They all have qualities and are effectively hypostasised: a far cry from sabbe dhammadāna atavī. In the Abhidhamma tradition, dhammas become little solidified events, somewhat comparable to atoms as viewed before the discovery of subatomic particles. It is no wonder that Mahāyāna sūtras, particularly the Prajñāpāramitā texts, continually emphasise the emptiness of all dharmas.

Were character types viewed in this way, it would be seen that nothing solid or established could be found. There is no
fixity in such matters simply because there are no fixed characters. The weakness of such typology is revealed by the changefulness of people, by the assumptions which tend to be made about oneself or others. Let us take the authors' highly dubious statement on p.120: 'Northern India where the Buddha lived and taught is certainly one of the hotter areas of the world and very broadly speaking, the majority of his students would have been cravers . . . Try shipping the Buddha's teachings wholesale to the West, to the colder regions where the hate root is more prominent . . .'. Such generalisations are simplistic in the extreme.

Human types are vastly complex — as reflected in the very complicated world they have created — and no system of human types will adequately sum up all their possibilities. Ultimately, this is a failure of all Abhidhamma/Abhidharma systems.

*Laurence Mills*


In recent years the SUNY series in Buddhist Studies has gained a reputation as one of the most important publication avenues for Buddhist scholars, practitioners and activists. It is a reputation largely earned and deserved, initially through the editorial efforts of Prof. Kenneth Inada and now through those of Matthew Kapstein. Although in some respects Kraft's little volume is as much a popular as scholarly enterprise, this detail is certainly not a liability in this case, and the book will add to the general status of the series.

Socially engaged Buddhism has become an extremely im-

portant topic for Buddhism in the 1990s. Fueled by the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama, Kraft and others have begun to question whether the early interpretation of Buddhism as a religion that 'often appears to promote personal transformation at the expense of social concern' (p.3) presented at best a questionable explanation of Buddhist doctrine. Kraft's Introduction is anecdotal, lively, expansive, and perhaps more far-reaching in perspective than this reviewer would have expected from a scholar who has published highly specialised material on Zen. As such, Kraft's professional and editorial expertise is impressive.

Kraft also authored the first of eight essays included in the volume: 'Prospects of a Socially Engaged Buddhism'. Although drawing on the history of Buddhism as a world religion, this opening chapter focuses especially on engaged Buddhism in North America. He identifies the important issues and personalities operative, ranging from the foundation of the Buddhist Peace Fellowship in 1978 to Thich Nhat Hanh's on-going efforts. It provides reasonable specificity in treating the endeavours of various American Buddhist groups. Additionally, he doesn't dodge the issue of confronting what has become known as the 'two Buddhism in America', namely, the Buddhism practised by largely Asian-American Buddhists as opposed to that practised by American Buddhists of European ancestry. In this regard, Kraft suggests that 'If engaged Buddhists in the First World sometimes seem to be talking to themselves or looking around for direction, it may be due to a lack of direct exposure to suffering, especially in international contexts (p.24). He goes on: 'Buddhism's new Western adherents are predominantly white and well-educated, from middle class and upper class back-

grounds. Aspiring Buddhist activists who enjoy such advantages have discovered that concern for others, however sincere, can


mysteriously resist translation into action' (p.24). Kraft's chapter is an important general prelude to the more specific chapters that follow.

The next several chapters consider early and/or Theravāda Buddhist issues. Luis O. Gómez discusses 'Nonviolence and the Self in Early Buddhism' in a rather technical, well-documented consideration of ahimsā. It is textually orientated, with most but not all citations taken from Pāli sources. It is followed by Christopher Chapple's 'Nonviolence to Animals in Buddhism and Jainism'. Moving beyond early Buddhism, Chapple discusses animal protection in Buddhism in China and Japan, as well as animal use in scientific research. Donald Swearer next writes on 'Exemplars of Nonviolence in Theravāda Buddhism'. Beginning with Āsoka, Swearer also considers Prince Vessantara, the merchant Jotika and Acharn Buddhadasa. This last figure is developed more thoroughly than the others, reflective of Swearer's long-standing, important interest in him.

The fifth essay is Robert A.F. Thurman's 'Tibet and the Monastic Army of Peace'. Undoubtedly, most scholars have read Thurman's excellent translation of the Vimalakirtiśūtra (Penn. State Univ. Press, 1976; repr. Delhi 1991) and appreciate his erudite work on Tibetan Buddhist philosophy. In recent years, though, Thurman has written extensively on topics related to engaged Buddhism, based on both scholarly and popular sources. This essay spans Buddhist figures from Śākyamuni to the Dalai Lama and texts from the Bodhisattvabhūmi to the Kālacakratantra. It concludes with an explanation of the Dalai Lama's poem entitled 'A Prayer of Words of Truth', written shortly after the Dalai Lama fled to India in 1959.

Chapters six and seven present comparative materials on the issue of Buddhism and nonviolence: Cynthia Eller's 'The Impact of Christianity on Buddhist Nonviolence in the West' and Gene Sharp's 'Nonviolent Struggle: An Effective Alternative'. At the time of this edition, Eller was an adjunct member of the Philosophy Department at Farleigh Dickinson University, while Sharp was Senior Scholar-in-Residence at the Albert Einstein Institution. The final essay is a short text entitled 'Buddhism and Contemporary International Trends' by Sulak Sivaraksa. He is of course well-known and well-published in America. His essay considers a variety of topics loosely structured around the five precepts, with the theme of building a peaceful world as an undercurrent throughout. Sivaraksa weaves the notion of peace and freedom as interdependent issues into the larger fabric of Buddhism as a global enterprise. There is a special entreaty for Western Buddhists to 'appreciate the broader dimensions of the tradition' (p.136). Indeed, Sivaraksa's final sentence is an important summary for the main thrust of the entire volume: 'By building up communities of people with inner spiritual strength, moral courage, and concerned awareness of the world, Buddhists and non-Buddhists have already begun to restructure consciousness and reconstitute society for the future benefit of humanity'.

Charles S. Prebish


Evidence of developments on the scene of religious involvement, some of them along the lines of Buddhist tradition, in the countries under Communist rule was reaching the West before the collapse of the 'evil empire'. A remarkable book on Buddhism (The Spiral of the Buddha's Teaching), written by a disabled Czech author and circulated in Czechoslovakia in typescript copies for more than four years before the velvet revolution, was reviewed by me in BSR 4, 2 (1987), pp.168-71.
(The author was pleased when he saw the review, but has since passed away.)

This time I would like to report on another Buddhist author's achievement. It comes in the form of a collection of original Czech Zen verses in the Japanese style of haiku poems. The author circulated them in the usual unofficial way for some time while adding to them and, now that the country has joined the free world, they can be published in the normal format. The author, now in his seventies, survived a Nazi concentration camp during the War and left his country after the Communist putsch in 1948, but returned in 1956 to look after his widowed mother, taking advantage of an amnesty but knowing that he would be allowed to make his living only as a manual worker. While in West Germany he had made contact with Buddhist and Yoga movements there and learned about clandestine groups in East Germany. With these he kept in touch after his return to Czechoslovakia (and still does, now openly, in Leipzig and Dresden). When, after unsuccessful attempts to be allowed to found a Buddhist society, I managed to start a Yoga club in Brno in 1964 (which also accommodated some clandestine Buddhist activities of mine), the author, then already deeply involved in Zen Buddhism, joined me and was later instrumental in rescuing the club after my emigration to Britain in 1968 in the wake of the Soviet invasion. He still continues giving talks and conducting Zen meditation classes.

The book is beautifully produced. Each page is subtly dominated by a drawing made with a brush in pale olive colour, quite original, but clearly inspired by Chinese-Japanese painting, and into each of the pictures is integrated one haiku, its three lines printed in red italics. There is a clear relationship between each haiku and its illustration — straightforward or symbolical, surreal or humorous; it is clearly a result of a meeting of two artistic minds. It is, of course, impossible to convey adequately in an English review some of the contents and flavour of Japanese Zen-style haiku verses written in Czech. A mark of Zen poetry, I think, is to give the impression of simplicity and spontaneity which are achieved, however, only as a result of previous discipline, study and effort until a point is reached when they are no longer cultivated or even thought of, but bear fruit as if by a natural process. This is the impression one gets from many a verse in this little book. Perhaps it is worth trying to give some indication of their contents. Sometimes Zen verses appear to describe an ordinary happening, yet a profound Buddhist insight can lurk behind their imagery and get through to one's feelings. On reflection it may also be, of course, rationalised and expressed discursively, even if it may lose its effectiveness in the process. Consider the following:

The wind blew away clouds,
the exposed moon lit up
a falling leaf.

Does it say that an enlightened mind clearly perceives impermanence? — Another verse may seem to be overdoing it:

I blew away a seed from my palm,
the whole universe
shook with anxiety.

Of course, as everybody knows, everything is connected with everything in the panplectial web of karmic correspondence. And how big must be the last straw to precipitate a world-shattering event? Zen Buddhism is believed to have been transmitted by other means than words and has no scriptures in the full sense, because the ultimate is inexpressible. Still, there are many Zen texts and more books have been written on Zen than any other school of Buddhism. Besides, if non-verbal
transmission is really taking place, there is an even greater abundance of it than in texts, one example being the following:

The golden sun, on a frosty night,
embroiders on windows with a silver thread
a secret message beyond grasp.

The answer to all questions is simply around us in everything, not for the taking, but just for looking:

What is life?
What is death?
Swallows chirp in flight.

So let us rejoice that one more country can now live in freedom and peace and that people there can freely choose their own path to truth (i.e. dhammapada).

Karel Werner

CORRECTIONS — Review of Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden (BSR 10, 2, 1993)
p.234, l.21 for kramenāyajanmātāresv read kramenāyajanmātāresv.
p.235, l.4: for ‘pleonastische’ read ‘pleonastisch’.
p.236, l.11, p.237, l.2: for aranyaka(s) read āranyaka(s).
p.236, l.8: for ‘words’ read ‘word’.
p.236, n.3: for 蓬读 read 蓬
p.237, l.10: for gentivus read genitivus.
p.237, l.11: for ‘hindernisses’ read ‘hindernisse’.

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

Dhammapada, Lao-French-English, (Bangkok 1990), from the Buddhist Relief Mission, Nara, Japan;
Cestak k Pravdě (Dhammapada in Czech), tr. K. Werner (Prague 1992);
Dhammapadam Put ispravnosti (Dhammapada in Serbo-Croat), tr. C. Veljačić (Zagreb 1990);
Vajracchedikāpriyāpāramitāsūtra, comprising Zaya Pandita’s trans. from Tibetan into old Kalmyk, A.V. Badmaev’s trans. into modern Kalmyk and V.P. Androsov’s trans. from Sanskrit into Russian (Elista 1993);
Abhidharma kośa III (in Russian), tr. E.P. Ostrovskaya and V.I. Rudoy (St. Petersburg 1993), from E.A. Tortchinov;
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The Life of the Buddha, Patricia E. Karetzky (Univ. Press of America, Lanham, MD, 1992);
Le Bouddhisme, Peter Harvey, tr. from English by Sylvie Carteren (Ed. du Seuil, Paris 1993);
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