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Frontispiece: the calligraphy in Sino-Vietnamese characters (Nôm) by Ven Thích Huyễn-Vi reads:

"[In Emptiness there is] no form or sound, smell or taste, objects of touch or mental processes; no realm of sense organs, [sense objects] or consciousness."

The seals engraved by Ven. Bhikkhu Dhammaviro, Thailand, convey the same meaning as the calligraphy.

SAMANA SUTTA
(Aṅguttara Nikāya, Tikanipāta, sutta 81)

Bhikkhus, there are these three obligations of a recluse. What three? Undertaking the training in the higher virtue, undertaking the training in the higher mind, undertaking the training in the higher wisdom. These are the three obligations of a recluse. Therefore, bhikkhus, you should train yourselves thus: ‘Eager will be our desire to undertake the training in the higher virtue . . . in the higher mind . . . in the higher wisdom.’ In this manner, bhikkhus, you should train yourselves.

Suppose, bhikkhus, a donkey follows close behind a herd of cows, thinking, ‘I’m a cow too! I’m a cow too!’ But his appearance is not like that of cows, his voice . . . his hoof is not like that of cows. He just follows close behind a herd of cows, thinking, ‘I’m a cow too! I’m a cow too!’ In the same way there may be some bhikkhu here who follows close behind the Order of bhikkhus, thinking, ‘I’m a bhikkhu too! I’m a bhikkhu too!’ But he does not have the desire to undertake the training in the higher virtue as the other bhikkhus have. He does not have the desire to undertake the training in the higher mind . . . in the higher wisdom as the other bhikkhus have. He just follows close behind the Order of bhikkhus, thinking, ‘I’m a bhikkhu too! I’m a bhikkhu too!’

Therefore, bhikkhus, you should train yourselves thus: ‘Eager will be our desire to undertake the training in the higher virtue . . . in the higher mind . . . in the higher wisdom.’ In this manner, bhikkhus, you should train yourselves.

Translated by John D. Ireland
THE HERMAPHRODITE IN EARLY BUDDHISM

Carl Olson

Like the ancient Greeks, the early Buddhist community held a negative attitude towards hermaphrodites, who were referred to as *ubhatovyanjanka* (i.e. having the characteristics of both sexes). There were, according to the Buddhists, three types of hermaphrodites: human, non-human and animal\(^1\). To refer to a normal human being as a hermaphrodite was to use the term in a vituperative manner\(^2\). Although the Greeks liquidated bisexual individuals, there is no evidence of this occurring among the early Buddhists, even though they held a very low opinion of them.

This negative attitude on the part of the early Buddhists towards hermaphrodites is reflected in the ordination of women. It is reported that at one time women to be ordained were not questioned about their sexual characteristics. This practice was relayed to the Buddha who said that it is permissible to question a woman intent on ordination about twenty-four things that are stumbling-blocks. An important question was whether or not one was a hermaphrodite\(^3\).

If a monk resolves to follow a path leading to *pacceka* (Suttavaṃsa), there are certain pre-conditions that are necessary. The aspiring Pacceka (‘solitary Buddha’) must

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be a human being, possess the male sex, must have the destruction of evil influences in view, act meritoriously, and possess the proper desire. The Commentary to the text explains that possessing the male sex excludes women, those without sex and hermaphrodites. In fact, a hermaphrodite can never understand the Dhamma even if it diligently practises it.

There were other important restrictions on a hermaphrodite. It has been noted that a hermaphrodite should not be ordained. If one has been ordained, it should be expelled from the Order, whilst a hermaphrodite can never be restored to it. Furthermore, the Pātimokkha is not to be recited in the presence of a hermaphrodite.

The unfortunate condition of being a hermaphrodite is conceived to be a punishment for previous wrongs. An individual named Īsīdāsī was born, for example, as a hermaphrodite to a slave woman. 'I came to birth, child of a household slave, neither of woman nor of man my sex. This dreaded condition was due to its adulterous conduct in a previous life. How can this negative attitude towards hermaphrodites be explained in early Buddhism?

This attitude appears to be related to at least three factors: the revulsion towards an unnatural occurrence in nature; the generally low opinion of women in Indian culture; and the importance of celibacy. To be born a hermaphrodite was contrary to the accepted cosmic order of things. It was an aberration from the human perspective. This is somewhat odd because there are numerous androgynous creation stories in the Indian religious tradition. This attitude is not rare, however, if one takes into consideration the ancient Greeks. Like the religious tradition of India, the Greeks ideally conceived of the state of androgyny as symbolising totality, wholeness and perfection. The physical manifestation of a hermaphrodite, however, was greeted with horror. Buddhists believed that the hermaphrodite was not truly human, and only human beings are capable of attaining enlightenment. Except for those who had attained motherhood, women were held in low esteem; they were also a source of dangerous temptation and subsequent attachment. Besides possibly producing a rapturous calm and offspring, sexual intercourse only multiplied one's cravings. A monk must hold himself aloof from the 'vulgar practice' of sex. These three attitudes appear to have influenced the early Buddhists' low esteem of hermaphrodites.

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6 The Book of the Discipline IV (Mahāvagga), 1962, 68.
7 Ibid., 136.
8 Ibid.
9 Psalms of the Early Buddhists II, PTS 1964, 442.
LOVE AND DEVOTION IN BUDDHISM

Karel Werner

When referring to bhakti we normally have in mind a religious phenomenon which is peculiar to certain theistic movements within the Hindu tradition. In the highest form of bhakti the personal relationship between the devotee and the divine personage he worships becomes so intense that its experience amounts to the total obliteration of his personal identity. He becomes one with the deity in a blissful union which may sometimes be temporary in this life, but is expected to become absolute in eternity. This experience of unification is often referred to, in the literature of mysticism, in terms of a perfect sexual union between lovers who may achieve, in their ecstatic embrace, a kind of temporary obliteration of their separate individualities and thus, in a brief moment, get a foretaste of the ultimate oneness. The ontological nature of this union is, of course, another matter.

The obvious similarity between the mythological and poetical expressions of this phenomenon in religious writings of different theistic traditions has made it possible to compare Hindu bhakti movements with certain trends in Christian mysticism and even in Islamic Sufism. But can one find them in Buddhism as well? Is there such a thing as bhakti in Buddhism?

Much has been written and heard about Buddhism as being a non-theistic, if not an atheistic, religion. It would therefore seem that in the absence of the concept or the image of the highest deity there cannot be a relationship of love in Buddhism.
as an aid or means to the goal of salvation. Yet the concepts of love and devotion are certainly most important in Buddhism both in the doctrinal context and in Buddhist practice - in the system of mind training or meditation and in the layman's outlook and observance.

The most frequently used expression for love in the context of Buddhist theory and practice is the Pāli term mettā which is usually translated as loving-kindness but, as we shall see, it designates only one particular aspect of a more complex mental conglomerate of higher feelings or spiritual emotions. For devotion there is the same expression in Pāli Buddhism as in Sanskrit-based Hindu sources, namely bhakti, but it has never acquired as high a prominence as bhakti did in Hinduism. And it can also mean belief or attachment and there are other expressions which can be translated as devotion and are used in that sense.

I will deal with the concept of devotion first.

At the time when the Buddha started his teaching mission the Brahmanic system had not yet developed the bhakti phenomenon into a specific religious path as found in later Hinduism. However, there are some indications of a certain kind of bhakti approach in the Upaniṣads, particularly in Śvetāśvatara, while the attitude of bhakti in the sense of close emotional ties between the devotee and the deity was clearly already present, at least in the context of worship, in the early Vedic system.

The Buddha, upon reaching enlightenment, clearly did not set himself up as a deity, although it would not have been impossible for him to do so. When he was once approached by the brahmin Dona who had seen unusual signs in his footprints, he was asked by him whether he was a god (deva), a ghost (gandhabba) or a lower deity (yakṣa), since he obviously could not be a mere man, and he answered that he, indeed, was not a man, but a buddha, a being far above all those beings mentioned, because he had overcome all āsavas, even those by which one would be born as a god (A IV 36; PTS II, pp.37-9).

We may have here, in this episode, an indication of the then existing belief that gods appeared among people. That could happen either in a direct encounter, a view attested from the Vedas, or in the form of an incarnation, a doctrine fully elaborated in later times which was possibly already in the making around the time of the Buddha or soon after. The evidence for the incarnation teaching are the Epics, particularly the fully spelled-out doctrine on periodic divine incarnations in the Bhagavadgītā proclaimed there by Kṛṣṇa, who thereafter became the main centre of the Hindu bhakti cult.

In the long run the Buddha did not escape this process of inclusion among the deities of the Hindu tradition and came to be regarded as the ninth incarnation of Viṣṇu in some Purāṇas, although he was not made into an object of bhakti-type worship. In the incident referred to above he, of course, gave a negative answer to the brahmin’s question as to whether he was a god and therefore to belong to an entirely different category of being not specifically known from Vedic-Brahmanic sources, although not quite unheard of outside the mainstream of the
Vedic tradition.

However, when he joined, as a mature man, the hosts of ascetic renunciates and homeless wanderers then living in the forests and roaming the plains of India, he followed a trend or tradition of independent truth-seekers which went back to early Vedic times and is testified to, in the Vedas themselves, by a portrait of a long-haired wanderer, probably an outsider to the mainstream Vedic tradition, who claimed to have joined the ranks of the immortals. The slightly older Vardhamana Mahāvīra, the originator of Jainism, came from the same background tradition which had also many other branches, schools of thought and groupings of which we know much less than about Buddhism and Jainism.

An important early component, if not the main body and source, of the later non-orthodox philosophical and religious or spiritual movements, was the Vrātya tradition centred in Magadha from where most of the later non-orthodox

movements emerged. When the mainstream Vedic tradition spread from its Saptasindhu home territory to the East into Magadha, the Vrātya tradition was absorbed by it and its lore was codified in a brahmanised form as the fourth or Atharva Veda, influencing much of the post-hymnic Vedic and Upaniṣadic thought.

The point is, however, that the phenomenon of renunciates, holy wanderers and ascetics was, at the time when the Buddha was beginning his mission, well-established and respected and due reverence was shown to those who impressed people with their teachings, behaviour or just their appearance. This attitude was based on the generally accepted theory or widespread belief that support and reverence extended towards ascetics and homeless wanderers engaged in the pursuit of truth and salvation enhanced the supporter's own chances of reaching favourable conditions for embarking on a path towards his own salvation or at least of gaining merit which would secure for him a better future life. In some cases a belief in vicarious salvation, that means in the possibility of being saved by an accomplished master to whom one has gone for refuge, may also have been present.

So the Buddha, or rather the former prince Siddhattha, would have found himself to be an object of a certain degree of respect the moment he joined the ranks of the wandering fraternity and became 'the ascetic Gotama'. This respect would turn into a deeper form of reverence once he became the

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1 The Pāli Buddhist sources themselves, however, also ascribe the knowledge of the phenomenon of buddhas appearing from time to time to the representatives of the mainstream Brahmanic establishment, as in the case of the brahmin Sela in M 92 who, having learned from the ascetic Keniya that he had invited the Buddha and his disciples to have a meal with him, asks three times: 'Buddha did you say'? And pondering by himself 'Seldom is the word buddha heard in the world', proceeds to visit the Buddha. After a conversation with him, he becomes his disciple.


Buddha and displayed whatever signs of his achievement may have been noticeable on him and were actually in some way perceived by others.

It did not work always and with everybody, though, especially in encounters with his fellow renunciates, because they often had definite preconceived ideas about the final achievement and how it shaped the behaviour and appearance of the one who strove for it or even the one who had actually achieved it. Even his first encounter with a wandering ascetic named Upaka, when the newly enlightened Buddha was on his way to Sarnāth, ended with Upaka’s failure to recognise the Buddha’s status. He said to him: ‘Your faculties are serene, friend; the colour of your skin is clear and bright. Under whom have you gone forth? Who is your teacher? Whose teaching do you confess?’ The Buddha proclaimed to him his status, adding that he himself was an accomplished teacher about to start his mission, but Upaka shook his head in disbelief, politely saying ‘May it be so, friend,’ and departed.4

This is also well illustrated by what followed afterwards, as narrated in the same sources, when he reached Sarnāth. There he approached the five ascetics who had been his companions when, prior to his enlightenment, he was practising extreme austerities which they regarded as the main or essential part of the practice aimed at the final solution. When he found, however, that severe austerities did not enhance the chances of his reaching the goal and gave them up as unprofitable, the five ascetics turned away from him disappointed. It now took considerable effort on his part to make them listen to him as he was trying to expound to them his newly-found teaching in order to help them on their way to the goal by delivering to them his very first discourse about the method of the ‘middle way’ between the extremes of thoughtless practice of severe austerities and thoughtless overindulgence in sensory enjoyments, namely the well known Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta (S V XII [LVII] 2; Mhv I).

An early example of how it worked is the reverence which the sight of the Buddha inspired in two merchant travellers, Tapussa and Bhalluka, who happened to be passing nearby as the Buddha was sitting under a tree, still in the vicinity of the place where he had reached enlightenment a week or two before. They offered him a meal of rice and honey and asked to be accepted as his followers for life.5 No doubt they hoped, as the text suggests, for great benefit in their present and future lives as a result of their offering and possibly also for enhancement in their prospect of salvation at some future date.

This episode is also highly significant as scriptural evidence of great importance which testifies from within the early Buddhist tradition that the Buddha had established the lay community of his followers (upāsakas) even before he caused the community of his mendicant followers or monks (bhikkhus) to come into being in the wake of his first discourse delivered to the five ascetics at Sarnāth.

Two important developments followed from the encounter

4 Mhv I; see Ānāgārika, The Life of the Buddha, BPS, Kandy 1972, p.40.

5 Mhv I; cf. Ānāgārika, op. cit., p.34.
of the two merchants with the Buddha. According to the
tradition recorded in later non-canonical texts, the merchants
were presented by the Buddha with a few hairs from his head.
The Burmese tradition has it that the merchants came from a
place later to become the city of Rangoon to which they
brought their treasure. Believed to have been enshrined in what
is, after several embellishments over the centuries, now known
as the Shwe Dagon Pagoda, the hairs became a focus of
devotional observance and have remained so till the present day,
although their worship has become somewhat mixed up with
the wider phenomenon of the Buddhist worship of the stūpa as
the symbol of the Buddha's Parinibbāna.

It is, of course, difficult to establish whether the ordinary
Buddhist worshipper appreciates such a subtle distinction. It can
be argued that the object of his veneration in the stūpa worship
is the person of the Buddha anyway. There is scriptural
evidence (D 16) for the belief that the original eight stūpas
contained relics of the burnt body of the Buddha. In Aśoka's
time some of them were further divided and distributed in India
and even sent abroad with Buddhist missions. This practice of
donating minute portions of the relics of the Buddha to be
enshrined in newly-erected stūpas for worship in places where
Buddhism has established itself still goes on. And even if it is
obvious that many stūpas cannot and do not contain authentic
relics, they still represent, to the mind of the ordinary
worshipper, the visible presence of the person of the Buddha
whose actual nibbānic nature is beyond his grasp. This is best
illustrated by the Nepalese practice to paint the eyes of the
Buddha at the top of the stūpa. Thus the devotional link of the
Buddhist follower to the person of the Buddha is
well-established.

The second development from the encounter of the Buddha
with his first followers concerns the refuge formula and its place
in Buddhist observance.

The Vinaya account of this encounter puts into the mouth
of the merchants the traditional Buddhist refuge formula in a
shorter form: 'We go for refuge to the Buddha and to the
Dhamma ...'. The text adds that since they were the first
followers in the world, they took only two refuges. This was
soon to be remedied. When the five ascetics in Sarnāth were
converted by the Buddha's first discourse and became his first
renunciate followers, the visible community or the order of
monks (bhikkhusangha) was thereby established. This was then
very soon followed by the establishment of the true, though
invisible, community of saints or noble disciples (ariya sāvakas)
as they either became arahants or gained at least one of the
three lower stages of sanctity, beginning with stream-entry
(sotāpatti). The Sangha which is represented in the third
member of the refuge formula is not, to be precise, the visible,
yellow-robed order of monks, that is the bhikkhusangha, but the
sāvakasangha or the invisible community of noble disciples of
the Buddha, a sāvaka being by definition always an ariya
sāvaka or a saint (M 7; PTS I, p.37). He may or may not be a
monk or a member of the visible sangha, as in the course of
time some lay followers of the Buddha reached sanctity, while
many monks did not and thus remained, strictly speaking, in the
ranks of mere 'worldlings' (puthujjanas) despite the
paraphernalia of the yellow robe. Of course, as renunciate
followers of the Buddha they do deserve reverence, but they are
not the true spiritual refuge for the laity, even if in practice it is
sometimes, inconsistently, the visible community of monks
(bhikkhusangha) which is thought of as the third member in the
refuge formula.

The impression one gets from the Pāli texts is that going for refuge to a being of a higher order was an established religious practice at the time of the Buddha and therefore not of Buddhist making. But it seems to have been assimilated into Buddhism from the very beginning. In Hinduism it is still common to regard deities, and particularly one’s chosen deity (ićsta devatā), as a refuge, although it does not appear to have such a formalised function as in Buddhism.

In Buddhism the taking of refuge in the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha, the ‘triple refuge’ (tisarana), besides being a proclamation of a follower’s religious allegiance, developed further into a fully-fledged act of worship of what soon became known as the Three Jewels or the Triple Gem (ratanattaya). Thus we have already in Pāli Buddhism a veritable Buddhist trinity of supramundane character worthy of all the devotion a follower is capable of mustering.

The importance of this phenomenon of a supramundane trinity as a focus of worship and hope in Buddhist belief and practice is not diminished by the fact that most monks and those lay followers who are sufficiently aim-conscious in the sense of being genuinely involved in the individual pursuit of Nibbāna, as well as those who stress the rationality of Buddhist doctrine and practice, tend to play down or explain away this feature of devotional Buddhist practice. Thus the well-known Buddhist scholar-monk of German origin who lives near Kandy in Sri Lanka, Nyanaponika Thera, virtually denies any existential status to the trinity of refuges and interprets it as if it were only a psychological device which helps the follower in his effort to realise the goal or make progress on the path to it:

‘The Triple Gem has objective existence as an impersonal idea or ideal as long as it is known and cherished. Even in that mode it is doubtlessly a persisting and active source of benefit for the world. But it is transformed from an impersonal idea to a personal refuge only to the extent that it is realized in one’s own mind and manifested in one’s own life. Therefore, the existence of the Triple Gem in its characteristic nature as a refuge cannot be proved to others. Each must find this refuge in himself by his own efforts. The refuge becomes and grows by the process of going to it’.

This is hardly the understanding of the average Buddhist pilgrim who prostrates himself and lays lotus flowers at the feet of the statue of the Buddha in Polonnaruwa or circumambulates a stūpa in Anuradhapura, while reciting the praises of the Triple Gem in the extended form. Rather he has a strong sense of the presence of the supramundane reality of the Triple Gem or a full belief in its hidden existence and expects definite results.

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7 The Vision of Dhamma, Buddhist Writings of Nyanaponika Thera, ed. Bhikkhu Bodhi, London 1986, article ‘The Threefold Refuge’, p.171. An expanded version of this piece was originally published as ‘The Wheel’ No.76 (BPS, Kandy 1965).
from his act of worship and devotion, either in terms of a future possibility of reaching Nibbāna or of karmic rewards in this and subsequent lives, or both.

Of the Three Jewels it is the person of the Buddha which inspires the deepest devotion and has done so from the very start of the Buddha’s mission even among his monks. The Buddha himself did not encourage ostentatious acts of devotion towards his own person, but he did insist on certain external forms of reverence towards himself, for example when being addressed. This happened already at the very start of his mission when he approached the five ascetics, his former companions from the time before his enlightenment when he practised severe austerities. They addressed him as āvuso Gotamo, āvuso meaning ‘friend’ or ‘brother’. It was a polite way of address used by wandering ascetics to each other and that is how the Buddha was addressed also by the wanderer Upaka referred to above even after he had revealed his newly-acquired status to him, because Upaka did not, at the time, give his credence to the Buddha’s claim.

But now, in the case of the five ascetics, the Buddha, anticipating their conversion and the founding of the order of his followers, rebuked them, saying: ‘Bhikkhus, do not address a Perfect One by name and as "friend": a Perfect One is accomplished and fully enlightened’. Later on when they became more impressed by the way in which the Buddha insisted that he was bringing them a liberating message, they resorted to the reverential address ‘Bhante’, meaning ‘venerable’ or ‘reverend’, often translated as ‘Lord’.

However, despite his general attitude of discouraging ostentatious reverence towards himself, the Buddha did, on occasions, allow some of his followers or visitors to go even as far as prostrating themselves before him and did not restrain them. When he was once approached by King Pasenadi, he even allowed him to kiss and stroke his feet and only asked him for the reason of his display of such affection, whereupon the king started enumerating the excellent qualities of the Buddha (M 89; PTS II, pp. 120f.). On another occasion the one hundred and twenty year-old brahmin Brahmadeya, famous for his Vedic learning, was so overwhelmed by the Buddha’s answer to his questions that he stood up and also kissed and stroked his feet. The Buddha asked him to sit down again, ‘as your heart (citta) has been gladdened by me’, and instructed him in his full teaching. Brahmadeya then became his follower and when he passed away not long after, the Buddha said that he had died a non-returner (anāgāmi - M 91; PTS II, pp.144-6).

The Buddha always gave his most instructions on his teaching and about the way to liberation when he saw that his listener’s citta was uplifted and gladdened and thereby made receptive. He tolerated displays of high reverence towards

8 See Ānāmoli, op. cit., p.41.
9 Cf. other stories in which visitors to the Buddha, overcome by his willingness to answer questions and by the wisdom of his replies, place their heads at his feet, e.g. the wanderer Sabhiya, Sn III 6; PTS p.101, who later became an arahant. Cf. further the story of Sela and his 300 followers, Sn III 7; PTS p.112; and also of the brahmin Ajita, Sn V, Prologue; PTS p.196.
himself when they were an outpouring from the uplifted citta, because the tendencies and inclinations and other contents harboured by citta determine the future course of action, the volition or decision-making (cetanā) of the individual. That can then go in two directions: either it can enhance his resolve for and thereby his chances of reaching the goal of liberation or it could have wholesome karmic consequences for him in his future lives, or both. And that is precisely what the Buddhist worshippers at the feet of a statue of the Buddha expect even today, even if the thought of reaching liberation may be only very vaguely present in their minds and although they may often have a rather worldly notion of what would constitute wholesome karmic consequences for them. Ordinary worshippers today may, of course, expect to obtain their reward as a direct result of their reverential action, while in the specific instances when the Buddha allowed such acts it was because he saw that it would help to concentrate the mind of the particular person on the task at hand, namely to follow, by his own resolve, the specific instructions he had just given him or was about to give him. Yet there is also, in some pronouncements of the Buddha, a certain element of identification of his person with the goal or the way to it as expressed in the famous proclamation ‘Who sees me sees the Dhamma and who sees the Dhamma sees me’ (S XXII 87,13; PTS III, p.120). Therefore, total concentration of the heart on the Buddha, which is what devotion and reverence directed towards him is about, may indeed be seen as having the effect of being drawn nearer the goal. The outward expression of that devotion in the act of prostration would then be naturally replaced at other times by following his admonitions and instructions, in other words by the imitation of the Buddha in order to become like him in achievement.

This effect of concentrating on the Buddha found its full practical application also in the systematised methodology of Buddhist meditation as one of the forty objects of concentration. It is known as the Recollection of the Buddha (buddhānussati) and since the Buddha is one of the Three Jewels, there is further the meditational Recollection of the Dhamma and also, of course, of the Sangha (Vism, Ch.VII).

Thus there can be no doubt that deep devotion or bhakti/bhāti does exist in Buddhism and that it had its beginnings in the earliest days. It has not taken the form of an overwhelming passionate obsession with erotic or even sexual overtones, whether present overtly or symbolically, as it did in some medieval Hindu bhakti sects or movements. But it nevertheless represents a total devotional involvement which fully engages the emotional resources of the follower’s heart, albeit in a refined form. It certainly cannot be described as a rational or intellectual mental process; rather it probably should be looked upon as a kind of sublimation or raising of the emotion onto a higher plane, in a word its spiritualisation in accordance with its suprarational and supermundane goal. This goal is its ultimate object, just as the union of the bhakta with

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10 This can be compared with Śankara’s understanding of bhakti as full and exclusive concentration on the goal as brought out by Hirst.
his beloved chosen deity also represents for him the ultimate
goal of salvation.

There seems to be, however, a substantial difference
between the Hindu bhakti and the Buddhist bhatti in that the
former, besides involving total devotion, includes also love. And
not only love of the devotee for his deity, but also the deity's
love for the devotee. Does the Buddhist experience of
bhatti include this element of love, too?

It would be rather presumptuous to assume that the intense
personal devotion which some followers of the Buddha, both
among the monks and within the laity, sometimes displayed
towards him would be totally devoid of the feeling of love
towards the Buddha as a person despite the obvious
impersonality of his teaching and the supposed impersonality of
the Nibbānic goal.

This feeling found a particularly strong expression at the
time of the Buddha's death, as described in the Mahāparinibbāna
Sutta (D 16) and related texts, when some monks, including the
Buddha's personal attendant Ānanda, wept and lamented;
although the reason given by them was not fully explicit of that
feeling, but referred to the fact that they had not yet reached
the final goal towards which they were guided by him. Ānanda
is reported to have given vent to his feelings thus: 'Alas! I am
still a pupil with yet much to be done, and my Master will be
passing utterly away, he who was kind to me'!11

There were, however, many arahants and accomplished
teachers of the doctrine and practice in the retinue of the
Buddha at the time of his death who were fully able to help
those among the flock who still needed assistance in order to
attain arahantship. Therefore, the reason given cannot be
regarded as adequately reflecting their frame of mind. Besides,
in the case of Ānanda, it was reported soon after the Buddha's
death that he managed to accomplish the task and became one
of the arahants. And so it may well be that the very absence of
his beloved master spurred him on to increase his efforts in
order to overcome the lamented separation and reach the
Nibbānic plane of experience which all the enlightened ones
share. Can this not be construed as the equivalent of a bhakta's
effort to reach union with his īsta devatā?

Of course, the early Buddhist sources, and particularly all
the Theravāda ones, carefully avoid any reference to the
Nibbānic conditions of a departed arahant and the impression
given by the latter, first implicitly and in later commentaries
explicitly, is that there are no persons left when Parinibbāna is
reached and so there is no companionship of the enlightened
and liberated ones in the ultimate context. However, this point
is highly debatable even on the basis of the early Pāli sources,
while some later Buddhist sources, especially the Mahāyāna ones,

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present us with quite a different picture. The same can be said also about contemporary Buddhism in the Theravāda countries, even though the monks will not usually discuss the matter. But although the ordinary worshipper the Buddha may be inaccessible in his Parinibbānic state - except by proxy, as it were, through his images - he certainly is not non-existent to them; that means that they believe that he still does persist in some mysterious way which is, of course, beyond their comprehension.

I do not think that there can be any doubt even with respect to the direct disciples of the Buddha that there was a strong element of personal love felt by them for him as their teacher. The feeling of love, in addition to reverence, for one's teacher on the path towards liberation is not uncommon even in the most sober-minded Theravāda circles, whether in the past or nowadays. In fact, it is even a factor in the systematic cultivation of wholesome or divine states of mind (brahmavihāras) which starts with developing love or mettā. They are directed first towards oneself and such other persons for whom one already has feelings of love or a loving attitude and are then gradually extended in the range of beings included until they become universal.

True, the notion of mettā does not appear to carry within it so strong an emotional content as to actually merit the rendering 'love'. Therefore it is sometimes translated as 'friendliness' or, on some occasions, 'benevolence'. Buddhist writers usually prefer 'loving-kindness'.

However, mettā, as already mentioned, represents only one member out of four in the Buddhist scheme of higher or spiritualised emotions. The second one is karunā or compassion, the third one muditā, i.e. sympathetic joy which signifies the capacity to feel joy over the other person's achievement just as one can feel compassionate towards him in his misfortune, and last is upekkhā or equanimity. The fact that equanimity comes last and is regarded as the highest achievement in the process of the development of the 'divine states of mind' underlines the basic Buddhist attitude to emotions, even when they are refined or spiritualised. One must not get lost in them, otherwise one can be led astray. A sense of proportion has to be preserved so that room is left for knowledge and eventually wisdom. A balanced state of mind or equanimity as a background feeling, even while one is fully involved in loving, compassionate or sympathetically joyous acts of participation, is the prerequisite of further progress and a necessity with respect to the achievement of the final goal.

The cultivation of these four 'divine states of mind' is an integral part of Buddhist practice aimed at the final goal of liberation and is therefore included in some form and to some degree, which may differ considerably from case to case, in the

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regular efforts of every follower with the objective of making them into a permanent framework of the mind and thereby into an ever-present platform for one's actions.

But apart from that, the meditative development of the four 'divine states' represents also a meditational technique leading to the attainment of the four concrete absorptions or rūpa jhānas as a form of the highest unification of the mind called samādhi. The standard way of describing this meditational technique in the Pāli Canon (e.g. in D.13) goes like this:

‘Here, monks, a disciple dwells pervading one direction with his heart filled with loving-kindness, likewise the second, the third, and the fourth direction; so above, below and around; he dwells pervading the entire world everywhere and equally with his heart filled with loving-kindness, abundant, grown great, measureless, free from enmity and free from distress' 13.

Then follow identical passages on the three other states of mind. Later commentarial literature and the Visuddhimagga elaborate at great length the methodology of this spatial diffusion of love and the other three feelings. After permeating with it the whole earth, one should go on also to other worlds and planes of existence, both superhuman and subhuman, according to Buddhist cosmology which includes thirty-one dimensions of existence in three main subdivisions. When the fourth feeling, equanimity, is thus perfected and made universal so that the fourth jhāna is reached, the mind has a firm platform to take the final step towards Nibbānic liberation.

This method of meditational diffusion already presupposes a considerable degree of experience and ability to call into one's mind and send out even the first feeling, that of mettā, let alone the subsequent ones. So there is the device of gradual development of mettā, referred to above, by first making oneself into its object and proceeding next to one's nearest relatives and then friends. A monk who has given up family ties and involvements in worldly friendships would quite naturally turn first to his teacher or preceptor. Of course, lay Buddhists also often have personal teachers for whom they feel special affection. However, as the principle of having a personal guru on the path has never become as strong in Buddhism, especially of the Theravāda variety, as it is in the Hindu tradition, many earnestly practising Buddhists regard the Buddha himself as their teacher, as if they were his direct disciples as were those who lived during his lifetime, and they develop a strong affection for him.

This feature of the presence of affection for the Buddha in the mind of the meditator then permeates also his universal radiation of the brahmavihāras. Since the Buddha is, in Buddhist understanding, a transcendental being who far exceeds by his status even the highest deities of Hinduism, the effect of a follower's meditatively developed affection for him may not be very different from that experienced by a bhakta towards his god. In either case, it is important to bear in mind, the true aim is the enhancement and accomplishment of salvation or liberation. The main difference is that, unlike in most of the Hindu bhakti movements, there is, in the Buddhist context, no trace in this practice of the erotic, let alone sexual, element, at

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least in the earlier schools; in Tantric Buddhism, the story is, of course, rather different and complicated.

However, there is one more point to be considered. In bhakti relationships in Hinduism, as in all theistic mystical traditions, there is a two-way traffic of love. How does Buddhism stand up to this point?

The answer is: very well. Again we can start with the story soon after the Buddha’s enlightenment when he was still lingering in the vicinity of the tree under which it took place. The story, somewhat mythologically embellished, goes as follows:

"Now while the Blessed One was alone in retreat this thought arose in him: "This truth that I have attained to is profound and hard to see, hard to discover... beyond the sphere of thinking, subtle, only for the wise to penetrate. But this world of men relies on attachment, takes pleasure and relishes in attachment... It is a hard task for them to grasp the truth... And if I were to teach the truth, others would not understand me, and that would be wearying and troublesome for me."... Considering thus, his mind favoured inaction... Then it occurred to Brahma Sahampati, who became aware in his mind of the thought in the Blessed One’s mind, "The world will be lost... for the mind of the Perfect One, accomplished and fully enlightened, favours inaction and not teaching the truth".

Then... Brahma Sahampati... appeared before the Blessed One... [and after greeting him] said: "Lord, let the Blessed One teach the truth... There are beings with little dust on their eyes who are wasting through not hearing the truth. Some of them will gain final knowledge of the truth...". The Blessed One listened to Brahma Sahampati’s pleading. Out of compassion for beings he surveyed the world with the eye of an Enlightened One... [And] he saw beings with little dust on their eyes and with much dust on their eyes, with keen faculties and dull faculties, with good qualities and bad qualities, easy to teach and hard to teach..."

And so he decided to start his mission which was to last for forty-five years.

The key words, stressed by me in the quotation, are: out of compassion. What reason could a buddha possibly have to carry around his mortal body for so long and, indeed, be in any way active in this transitory world? The only reason could have been his recognition that others needed help in order to overcome their mortality and the transitoriness of their limited, imperfect form of existence. And the only conceivable motivation, on the part of a perfected being, for doing so can only be love of a special kind which must have a transcendental nature and cannot be exclusive.

This means that it cannot be the same kind of love as that of the follower, since a buddha is no longer concerned with his own needs and has nothing to gain from any such loving

14 See Nanamoli, op. cit., pp.37-9, and F. L. Woodward, op. cit., pp.4-5. I have substantially shortened and slightly changed the translations. The textual references are: M 1v 1; M 26 and 85; S V 1.
relationship. So the term which appeared best for expressing, in a human context, this feeling of perfect love was compassion, karunā. However, when we as ordinary humans feel compassion for someone who suffers, we participate in his suffering by feeling a certain degree of distress. A buddha, on the other hand, being fully liberated, cannot feel distress, but he participates in the suffering of unliberated beings by his perfect knowledge of their suffering and of suffering as such which is an integral constituent of the limited, Samsāric form of existence. His knowledge stems from his experience of enlightenment which brought him the retrocognition of his own suffering in the whole of his past Samsāric wanderings, the direct vision of the totality of the suffering represented by the Samsāra in which all other beings are caught and the certainty of his own liberation from it.

Thus his compassion is perfect and superior to ordinary human compassion, precisely because it is not a result of feeling distress at other beings' suffering, but is derived from fullest possible knowledge, i.e. from the perfect wisdom of an enlightened one. That is also why later, in the Mahāyāna context, wisdom and compassion (prajñā and karunā) appear as the two most emphasised perfections (pāramitās) characterising Buddhahood.

But the other three components of the Buddhist conglomerate of higher emotions are, of course, present as well. A buddha no doubt does have mettā for all living beings and it is in this context that often the term ‘benevolence’ is preferred in translations. The Buddha next in line is actually named Mettaya by the sources. Of course, with respect to muditā, it would not be possible to ascribe to the Buddha a sympathetic feeling of joy over some worldly achievements in the lives of people, however important they may seem to them, but there is a clear air of appreciation in his pronouncements when he refers to their achievements in virtue or on the path. At the same time his mind is, of course, unshakably established in the calm of equanimity.

Yet the concern for the final liberation is always there and so a buddha's compassion for other beings no less than the love of a god for his devotees is conclusive evidence that in Buddhism as in theistic religions there is mutuality in the relationship between the transcendent and the phenomenal, the contemplated and the contemplator, the worshipped and the worshipper. Love and devotion are a means or an aid to salvation in Buddhism as in any other tradition which explicitly emphasises the path of bhakti. An account of later developments in the Mahāyāna and Buddhist Tantric schools would furnish further and even more vivid evidence for it.  

15 A draft of this paper was read at the 15th Symposium on Indian Religions at the Cherwell Centre, Oxford, on 1 April 1989. The finalised shorter version was prepared for and presented to the XVth Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions (Rome, 3–8 September 1990, see Book of Abstracts, p.361) and will be published in the Congress Proceedings later this or next year. The present revised and extended version is published here for the first time and will be further published, with minor changes, in the collection of papers Love Divine. Studies in Bhakti and Devotional Mysticism (Durham Indological Series 3), ed. Karel Werner, Curzon Press, London 1993.
Editorial Notes

1. The latest instalment of Thích Huyën Vi's French translation of the Ekottarāgama was unfortunately not ready at the time of going to press. It is hoped to publish a double instalment in the next issue.

2. Back issues of BSR are available as follows:
   Vol. 3 (1986) 1 and 2 (£3 each)
   "  4 (1987) 2 (£3)
   "  5 (1988) 1 and 2 (£3 each)
   "  7 (1990) 1 - 2 (£7.50)
   "  8 (1991) 1 - 2 (£7.50)

There is also a limited number of copies of the final volume of its predecessor, Pali Buddhist Review, Vol. 6, 1 and 2 (1981-2) at £3 in all.
MONKS AND MONEY

Phra Khantipālo (Laurence Mills)

For people living now it is hard to conceive of a society in which money does not play an important part. It is rare for us to obtain things using the old system of barter, a great contrast to the Buddha’s days. Then, although money (rūpiya/kahāpana/māsa, etc.) was known, its use was still restricted and the system of coinage not so well developed. From accounts surviving in the Sutta [Pitaka] and other sources such as Jātaka stories and the tales of the Dhammapada Commentary we gain a picture of the economic life of ancient India. As in our society there were the rich and the poor but the former kept their wealth in stores of precious metals not always in the form of coinage, while the latter might scrape through life hardly ever handling money at all. Great merchants travelling in large caravans from place to place bartered their wares as well as selling them for money and no doubt in local markets much barter and little money was common.

With even this relatively limited use of money, the Vinaya [Pitaka] rejected its acceptance by monks and nuns. There are several passages which are cited showing that the danger of allowing the Sangha to become involved in money transactions was well appreciated. Though the Vinaya does not make this

1 Extracted from ‘Moss on the Stones, Buddhist monastic discipline for monks and nuns in the present day’ – to be published probably in 1992.
plain it seems consistent with the Dhamma to suppose that the danger is actually not the money itself but rather the mind's attachment to it.

Attachment to money is not an easy matter to control as we shall see from examples below and in fact the Vinaya does not legislate to control the mind but only speech and body actions. On the other hand, legislation to control the possession and handling of money at first appears more likely to succeed though we shall see that it is often ineffective.

It seems reasonable, too, to restrict access to money among those who have left the household life supposing that this would help to control attachments to the pleasures which can be bought with money. With this in mind the Expiation with Forfeiture offence of accepting and handling money was laid down. As it exists now it is phrased as the Buddha's words but this need not be taken too literally as there is a long history in Buddhist literature, from shortly after the Buddha's days - the Vinaya and Sutta - round to some of the latest Tantras appearing fifteen hundred years later, of attributing all sorts of teachings to the (variously conceived) Buddha. In the process of doing so, those ancient 'authors' who were mostly monks, did not think to falsify or forge but rather produced teachings and disciplines which fitted their times and places. The mystical - and such things as visions - without doubt played a considerable part in the collection of the various classes of Buddhist 'literature'. It may be that visions and messages received in this way are the major source of much that is now canonical literature.

The rule as it stands now is as follows: 'Should any monk/nun receive, or cause to be received, or be glad at the gold and silver (= money) kept (for him/her), this entails expiation with forfeiture' (Nis.Pac.18). It follows from this rule that monks/nuns may not accept money from a layperson (or other monastics), nor may they cause others, such as lay supporters or pupils, to accept it on their behalf. Obviously, novices of either sex cannot accept it either since it would contravene the last of their ten rules. This must mean that personal bank accounts for monks/nuns cannot be established if by that is implied that the money in those accounts belongs to a particular monk or nun. We shall see below some curious ways of circumventing this. The last phrase, 'or be glad at the gold and silver kept' is a strange phrase as the Vinaya does not legislate on mental states. The venerable author of Vin.Mukh.13 [Vajrañānavarorasa] says of this that it 'suggests that if it is only the arising of a mental state (cittupapāda), s/he would not have fallen into an offence, so it must refer to the action of receiving it and to holding the right over it'. However, it is very difficult, if not impossible, once monks/nuns have access to money, that they should not on occasion have some gladness about the goods which can be, or are being, bought for them.

Though the Vibhanga and hence the Pātimokkha take quite a strict line on this matter, it is apparent from various sources that more relaxed attitudes gradually entered the Sanghas. There is the allowance (at Mv VI 34) for a monk/nun to have a steward who holds the donations made by lay supporters. Perhaps though, 'donations' is not quite the correct word as

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2 Nissaggiya Pācittiya, in the Sutta Vibhanga section of Vinaya.
'funds made available' are said still to be the property of the 'donors' (as illustrated in the long and complex Nis.Pac.10). At the conclusion of this allowance, now known as the 'Mendaka-allowance' in honour of the rich man who prompted it, there is the text's warning: 'Monks, I do not say that gold and silver in any circumstances may be accepted or may be sought for'.

Two other precepts follow which are no doubt intended to ensure that monks/nuns keep far from the ways of money. Unlike the one above, the two, Nis.Pac.19-20, are not so clear in meaning, though it seems that 19 refers to money transactions, perhaps buying and selling, while 20 forbids barter and exchange with people not in the monastic Sangha.

So far we have learnt that monks/nuns may not accept money (nor valuables including ingots of silver and gold), nor may they arrange for others to receive them as personal accounts, nor be happy that so much money is available for their use. We have noted that the last phrase is rather impractical, while the middle one is somewhat at variance with the idea of a monk's/nun's steward. The only way round this is the unconvincing procedure of indicating money to be banked knowing full well that the lay steward will put it in an account for such-and-such a monk/nun or monastery. Even if the monk/nun does not see the monies made available, as with the procedure described below of offering monks/nuns only slips of paper detailing the amount, s/he knows that a certain sum has been given to the steward. And though that money, technically, still belongs to the 'donors', in fact it is now in the possession of the Sangha's stewards. No cases have been heard of recently when 'donors' demanded their offered monies back and in fact such an idea would seem very inappropriate to most Asian supporters.

We have also learnt that monks/nuns are not to engage in buying and selling (Nis.Pac.19). No doubt where Buddhism is well-established this will be unnecessary. However, some trading ventures are needed for Sangha support among refugee monks, such as Tibetans, in places like India, or even in Western countries where support is inadequate. In these cases it has to be considered whether the establishment of the monastic Sangha is not more important than the infraction of relatively minor rules.

It is also possible to quote a few references from the Vinaya and Sutta which uphold the Buddha's words about not accepting or using money. The first reference employs the simile of four blemishes of sun and moon which, when they are covered by heavy clouds, fog, smoke and dust, eclipse (literally Rāhu), do not shine brightly. In the same way monks and ascetics do not shine when they drink alcohol, have sex, accept money or valuables, or maintain themselves through wrong livelihood (A IV 50). This recurs at Cv XII 1 in connection with the events said to lead up to the Second Council.

A second reference is an interesting Sutta (S XLII 10, also at Cv XII 1) showing the doubts that educated people in those days had about the acceptance of 'gold and silver' by Buddhist monks. Perhaps they had seen 'offerings' of money made to the Sangha, and been unaware that it was kept for their use by a steward, anyway, they opined that 'the Sākyaputtiya [Buddhist] monks are allowed gold and silver, they agree to (such offerings), they accept (such offerings): Manīcūlaka, a Buddhist village
headman, could not convince these people that this was wrong and later went to the Buddha to ask about it. The Buddha confirmed that his monks are not allowed to accept money adding at the end: ‘For whoever, headman, money (gold and silver) is allowed, for such a person the five cords of sensuality are allowed, and for whoever these are allowed you should certainly hold that such a one has not the conduct of a monk, has not the conduct of the Sakyaputtiyas’.

After the Buddha’s days, about B.E. 100/110, the Second Council was called into session principally by reason of the Vesāli monks’ acceptance of money offerings. It is true that the Pāli account in Cv XII lists ten wrongdoings of those monks but then the first nine are such minor matters as to scarcely warrant the calling of a council. Even their terms are obscure and differently understood in the various Vinaya traditions. The issue of money (the only one mentioned by the Mahāsāṃghikas) was no doubt the real reason for calling the Council though partisan accounts of it are necessarily biased. The Pāli account upholds the rectitude of the monks who by imputation are to be taken as ‘Theravādins’. Actually no such term can possibly be used until the first schism which happened at some unspecified time after the Second Council.

The account as we have it hardly bothers with the nine misdemeanours beginning with ‘a horn of salt’ but is much concerned about the Vesāli monks’ acceptance of money. Perhaps the Venerable Yasa, whose visit to Vesāli sparked off the whole dispute, instead of saying in the presence of the Vesāli monks and their lay supporters, ‘Buddhist monks don’t accept money’, would have acted more skilfully by pointing out the correct way for money to be ‘offered’. The Vesāli monks had put out a bowl filled with water (so that heavy coins would not damage it?) and then requested their supporters to place coins in it. Ven. Yasa could have pointed out that it would be fine for lay contributions but that the monks initiating such asking for each was not correct. The Vesāli monks, it seems, were not offended by his outburst, while their supporters gave money anyway. The monks divided up the money and offered a portion to Ven. Yasa. He did not accept and only then did they become upset. Monks having their individual needs of money sounds quite like modern times.

The outcome of the Second Council, if this was really what it was all about, is quite predictable: the Vesāli monks were condemned on all their points, particularly being censured for acceptance of money under Nis.Paci. Perhaps though, in view of the impending ‘schism’ this was not really the main cause of the Council’s meeting. What we really need (and shall never have) is a fair account of what the Vesāli monks believed and did, for as it is we have only one side of the story.

There are other possibilities. As Ven. Yasa does not seem to have heard of stewards and the Mendaka-allowance (Mv VI 34), perhaps this allowance does not go back to the Buddha’s days but has been placed in his mouth by the Vinaya-compiling monks (at the First Council?) who saw the impossible situation developing of trying to organise large monastic communities when no money/valuables at all were allowed. A wandering Sangha, settled only for the three months’ Rains [retreat], requires little in the way of funds but permanent monastic residences need money for construction, for maintenance and for the monks’ support in times of sickness and so on. As some of these were no doubt established in the Buddha-time it looks
as though the Mendaka-allowance must have been allowed by him too. And in that case, why was Ven. Yasa so inflexible, neglecting to reason privately with the monks when a way was open whereby the Sangha could have monies ‘donated’ for their upkeep? Who knows, perhaps it was difficult to find honest stewards so that the Mendaka-allowance actually did not work very well.

A curious point arises in connection with a monk/nun accepting money and thereby breaking the Nis.Pac.18 rule. After s/he has confessed the offence and forfeited the money and after a lay person has declined to take it to obtain suitable provisions for the Sangha as well as declined to throw it away (an unusual thing to ask a layperson to do!), the Sangha must select a monk/nun free of bias in respect of greed, hate, delusion and fear, and one who knows what is and what is not thrown away, and agree upon him/her as a ‘money-thrower’. This monk/nun has to throw it away without having seen where it has fallen. A very strange procedure! One which has not been used for a very long time! More curious still is the Vinaya’s attitude that this money be chucked away heedlessly. Notice that it does not say that it could be given to the poor, old or crippled - and India has always had plenty of such persons. These days if an individual monk/nun accumulates significant amounts of money and later confesses it, it would be appropriate for the Sangha to ‘donate’ such wealth to people who have little.

Having reviewed the classical Pāli sources (and not much is yet available for comparison with other Vinayas), it certainly appears that the Buddha saw danger in the individual possession and use of money by monks and nuns. After examination of the past we turn now to an account of how monks relate to money in the largely Buddhist country of Thailand. Nuns will not be considered in this section as Thai nuns hold only Eight Precepts (there are small groups with Ten), and so have to use money in the ordinary way. Examining the conditions in Thailand we shall find a full range of practice, some of which accords with Vinaya but most does not.

It should be realised that Nis.Pac.18 is more ignored than practised anywhere in the Buddhist world. To take the case of Thailand, the numerically dominant group of monks called Mahānikai (Mahānikāya: great group) generally ignores this precept with the excuse that the handling and possession of money is now required in present-day society. Monks of this group can be seen any day in shops and markets buying goods and paying for them personally. They accept donations of money from supporters into their hands and often keep their own supply of money locked away.

Some monks have a practice of keeping money in their bag in an envelope so that shopkeepers can extract money from this without the monk ‘touching’ it. This effort to avoid falling into Nis.Pac.18 is a typical and rather ridiculous circumvention of Vinaya. Obviously monks are accepting money and handling it whether they have touched it or not. Such misunderstandings come about because of the convenience of doing such things but may easily end in hypocrisy. It seems better to be open and honest about handling money rather than pretend to oneself or others that virtuously one is not ‘touching’ the money in one’s bag!

Within Mahānikai there are some temples and some groups
which do not agree with these ideas, such as the disciples of Tun Acharn Chaï. The Vinaya-practice of these monks agrees with the better standard of the small group of monks called Dhammayut (Dhammayutikaniikāya = the group of those adhering to Dhamma). Dhammayut practice on the question of money is not uniform, depending on whether the town monks or the forest monks are considered. The former, though not accepting money even if offered in an envelope, do have individual stores of money and even bank accounts. Money has to be offered by donors to the monks' steward(s) while the monks only receive a piece of paper on which is written something like this: 'Money to the amount of... has been given to your steward for the purchase of the four supports'. Please request him to obtain them when you need them'. The monks' stewards may vary from schoolboys, who are also pupils of that monastery where they stay, to adult male supporters who, if the monk has wealthy donors, would open a bank account for him.

There are also Buddhist foundations which provide a kind of banking service for individual monk's monies, as well as for funds used to print books, build monasteries and so on. I have known Dhammayut monks who kept 'their own' monies locked up in a drawer in their desk but they never touched it - just indicated it to their stewards when it was necessary to use it. So much for monks not possessing money!

My practice while in Bangkok was to entrust this 'paccai' (paccaya in Pali, short for catuppaccaya: the four supports) to one of my schoolboy pupils. It happened only once in five or six years that it went astray. They kept an account of what had been spent and of incoming donations and very infrequently I checked on this. Because of the fact that there was some 'distance' between me and the money I did not think of it much (there was not much of it to think of!). Whenever I needed something I asked one of my pupils to buy it with the funds they kept, or rarely, went out with one of them to get it.

Perhaps a system like this is inevitable in the large monasteries of Dhammayut. It does seem though that some senior monks became quite rich, wealthy enough to possess marble floors or beautiful and costly Chinese furniture. Of course they can say that all this luxury - TV sets and air-conditioning - was donated by lay supporters. And rich lay supporters can be very insistent on donating to senior and famous monks the things which they think they should possess! All this makes for difficulties with the image of monks as those who have left the household life and are homeless. More difficulties still when these same monks from their comfortable abodes sally forth bowl in hand and walk mindfully past hovels and shanties where very poor people offer them a few grains of rice. When monks become more wealthy than laypeople then are they really living the life of monks? There would be some excuse for this if we were describing a culture in which the Bodhisattva attitude were promoted. Then it could be said that one has to have wealth in order to be able to help others. However, this ideal is not promoted in Thailand.

All this contrasts very sharply to the Dhammayut forest tradition. In this you find monasteries in the countryside, varying in size from one monk to up to fifty or so, where the senior monk is the Acharn (teacher and abbot) and where donors only make their donations to the whole wat (never to

4 Robes, almsfood, shelter, medicines.
individual monks) through him. That is, he directs the
donations to be handed to the wat’s steward, who will be a
devoted lay supporter. All expenses for any of his monks come
from that fund. Since such Acharns stress ‘fewness of wishes’
(appicchatā) the financial outgoings may not be great. At least
some Acharns, perhaps embarrassed at the wealth accumulated
with their stewards (for austere monks attract many donors –
how to stay poor?), have used these monies for the public
benefit building hospitals and schools. Compassion is a noble
quality of Dhamma more to be found with practitioners than
those with only book-knowledge.

In conclusion, we may consider how monks and nuns
should behave with respect to money in our own times but
outside traditional Buddhist cultures.

First, it is inappropriate for senior monks/nuns to display
their wealth while public disapproval of such display should
continue to be voiced. This was not the way Lord Buddha and
his great monastic disciples lived. It is therefore not correct
according to Dhamma and Vinaya to have a personal bank
account if one is a monk/nun or novice. It follows that
personal acceptance of money or the handling of it in business
transactions should generally be avoided.

However, this needs qualifying somewhat by adding that
refusal to accept money should not be rigid, as though money
were some sort of filth. When offered by Buddhists of other
traditions who are not acquainted with strict Theravāda practice,
as with Chinese respectfully making money offerings in small
red envelopes, it should be cheerfully accepted. Likewise when
non-Buddhists kindly offer some money there is no need to
shrink away from it as though one might be infected! In such
situations it is wrong to try and make them act like devoted lay
Buddhists. Just accept the generosity with a ‘thank you very
much’ or whatever expression is proper.

From time to time even in well-ordered Buddhist
communities events may happen which compel a monk/nun to
carry money. I remember visiting England many years ago in
order to see my mother who was living very far from the
vihāra where I stayed. At that time there was no one who
could drive me such a distance and, rigidly Dhammayut though
I was, it was necessary for me to handle the train and bus fares.
(In any case monks and nuns should really consider why
laypeople have to put themselves to such trouble in these cases.)
Visiting an old mother is far more important in terms of
loving-kindness than keep the rules strictly and so staying away
because there is no attendant to carry money! What harm will
the train and bus fares in one’s bag do?

The second principle then concerns the use to which carried
and possessed money is put. If, as is common enough, it is
carried because one wants the convenience of it, well then one
is just talking about the enjoyment of the five cords (which
bind!) of sense pleasures. But if on the other hand money is
carried because of some Dhamma-reasons which will benefit
others, is this really blamable? Only the self-righteous and
narrow of spirit will think so. There is a very hard-working
monk of a refugee Buddhist community in Australia who has to
collect every month a large mortgage payment on the new
temple-monastery building which with great effort he has
constructed. It serves the needs not only of his community but
of other Buddhist groups as well. Since people trust him so
much they like to invite him to go to their houses to collect their pledges. So he goes and usually there is no one who could be a steward. Is this wrong? What he has done would not have been achieved had he waited always for laymen who, in his community, are often at work.

Obviously, having lay stewards at a monk’s beck and call is somewhat of a luxury, in these times. If one has to depend on them this may also severely limit what monks and nuns can do in the way of propagating the Dhamma, and may also be an example of HMS of which I have written much elsewhere. It is, in money-matters, good to be strict, but not to be rigid. And of course individual monks and nuns can find out by experiment in which category they fit. Rigidity spells the decay of the Sāsana every bit as much as laxity. This should never be forgotten.

It does not appear to be counted as laxity for monks/nuns to accept cheques and postal orders but a bankcard, any ‘plastic money’, would seem to fall back to the position of having a private account. We have to remember in all situations that the Buddha’s ethic is a morality of intention. Sangha members must investigate what their intention is in using money. This of course is harder to do than merely sticking to the rule. But then with the latter, we are back to rigidity, or the snail’s retraction into its shell, while with the former there is some hope that monks and nuns may be fully reliable human beings.

RELIGIOUS CHANGES IN LATE INDIAN BUDDHIST HISTORY
(continued)

Lal Mani Joshi

III

The Aim and Aims of Religious Culture

The philosophical and theological conceptions of medieval Indians of Buddhist affiliation briefly sketched earlier are woven around a primary goal which may be called the aim of Tantric religious culture. However, not everyone in the world is always concerned with the ultimate and the vast majority of people in all countries in all ages has been primarily concerned with this-worldly problems and pursuits. We also find among these Buddhists a variety of aims of religious life and endeavour. Attention will be given to the aim and aims found in Tantric texts under two separate categories.

(i) The Highest Aim: Perfection (siddhi)

The highest aim of Buddhist thought and culture has always been Nirvāṇa or Enlightenment (bodhi). Liberation (mukti), Purification (viśuddhi), Omniscience (sarvajñatā), Supreme Bliss (paramasukha), Peace (śānti), Deliverance (mokṣa), Buddhahood (buddhatva), Dharmaḥatu, Dharmakāya, Suchness (tathatā), Emptiness (śūnyatā), Knowledge (jñāna), Transcendental Wisdom (prajñāpāramitā) and Immortality (amṛtapada) are some of its classical names. These names are occasionally used
in Tantric texts, but the siddhas invented many new names also
and these Tantric designations of the highest aim of religious
life signify a fresh understanding of what is basically beyond
our understanding. Thus it is called Great Bliss (mahāsukha),
Innate (sahaja), Perfection (siddhi), Union (yoga), Non-Dual
(advaya), Diamond-Sphere (vajradhātu), Diamond-Body
(vajrakāya), Intrinsic Body (svabhāvika-kāya) and the Diamond
(vajra). It is of the nature of Consciousness (vijñāna),
Knowledge (jñāna), Bliss (ānanda), Freedom (mokṣa) and Peace
(sānti).

Two names, Union and Non-Dual, are of particular
importance as they stress the unity of two principles. Moreover,
several other names are constructed with a view to stressing this
unity. The two principles which are harmonised and identified
in this state of highest perfection can be distinguished in two
categories: mutually opposed principles, and mutually
complementary principles. Mutually opposed principles are the
absolute and the relative, their opposition and dichotomy are
overcome in siddhi. Hence we have such notions as the
identity of paramārtha and vyavahāra, vivriti and samvriti,
vyavadāna and kleśa, Nirvāṇa and Samsāra, and so on. It
is from this standpoint of the meeting of opposites that a siddha is
considered to be beyond good (śubha, punya) and evil
(aśubha, pápa) and the Buddhas are said to be freed from
Nirvāṇa and Samsāra. The mutually complementary principles
which are perfectly unified and fused in the state of siddhi are
Wisdom (prajñā) and Means (upāya), also called Emptiness
(śūnyatā) and Compassion (karunā) respectively. Hence we
have names like Identity of Wisdom-and-Means (prajñopāya),
or Matrix of Emptiness-and-Compassion (śūnyatākarunāgarbha).
Since imagery of man and woman, father and mother, yogin
and yoginī and so on, is introduced and used freely, we have
symbolic names like Unity-of-Two (yuganaddha) polarities of
male and female. Since these two polarities representing
compassion and wisdom jointly and simultaneously lead to
siddhi, the final result is called Co-emergent (sahaja). It is
inherent in and innate to this unity; it is understood as the
Innate (which is another translation of sahaja).

Frequently we come across a personified conception of this
final vision of spiritual perfection and, as we have seen earlier,
this vision is theistic. However, we must not forget that the
state of siddhi and mukti is the nature of that Reality (tattva)
which is viewed in personal as well as impersonal terms. It is
formless, yet has form which is cosmic yet it can be discovered
within one’s heart (hrdaya). It is like the sky (gaganopama)
and the essential nature of all phenomena (sarvadharmasvābhāva).
This Reality is both personal and
impersonal: Ādibuddha, Paramātma, Paramesvara,
Svabhāvikakāya, Kāyavākcitta, Sahajakāya, Śrimahāsukha,
Heruka, Hevajra, Vajrasattva, Vajradhara and Vajrakāya are its
different names. It is in this Reality that one finds spiritual
fullness, for it is the unity of all forms of trinity: body, speech
and mind; knowledge, known and knower; Buddha, Dharma and
Sangha; heaven, world and hell; Kāmadhātu, Rūpadhātu and
Arūpyadhātu; Dharmakāya, Sambhogakāya and Nirmānakāya;
male, female and neither-male-nor-female; here one finds the
epitome of all vehicles: Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekayāna and
Bodhisattvayāna; Hinayāna, Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna. This
Reality represents the Great Self of Selflessness.

The yogin who attains this fullness sees the triple world as
filled with the splendour of Great Bliss. He sees and marvels at
the rain of peace and bliss which is so abundant as to awaken the whole world. He marvels at the bliss of Great Bliss and enjoys it in different ways. He marvels at the majesty of Sahaja which is the essence of all things. He sees the entire world as full of Buddhas. All texts stress that this fullness is innate and can be realised only by oneself. A siddha therefore sees his own self as consisting of nothing but the Buddha (*buddhamaya*). Having attained this blessed state a siddha becomes one with the Impersonal-Personal truth:

\[\text{prabhāsāvāpade prāpte svecchārūpas ti jāyase /} \\
\text{sarvāśvanyam tathā prāpya vajrāhye pramodase} //^{57}\]

‘Having attained to the luminous position, he moves as he desires. Having attained all the sovereignties, he enjoys the Diamond-Body.’

The Tantric path of the yogin involves initiation into the mysteries of a mystic circle or ritual-map of the cosmos which transforms his/her personality. This Circle is also called the Ritual-Map, the First and the Highest Palace and the City of Great Liberation (*cakram mandalam paramādyadhvanam mahāmoksa puram iti eko arthah*)^{58}. This ‘City’ belongs to the Selflessness (*nairātma*) ever united with the Glorious One (*bhagavān*) who appears in the form of Hevajra^{59}. Because he possesses sovereignty, wisdom, fame, excellence, beauty and activity in entirety, this Reality is called the Glorious One (*bhagavān*), the Diamondholder (*vajradhara*)^{60}.

The picture of the siddha which we find in works like the Caturasitisiddhapravṛtti of Abhayadatta, the *Blue Annals* of Golo tsaba gzon nu dpal, the *History of Buddhism in India* by Tārānātha, and from the published Tantric Buddhist texts, suggests a type of person who is fearless like a lion, behaves entirely unconventionally and owns nothing yet is a master of everything. Therefore he is called mahāsiddha, a Great Adept. By perfecting the *vajrayoga*, that subtle and difficult adamantine discipline, he attains success (*siddhi*). A text describes his state in the following words:

‘He feels towards his enemy as towards himself; his mother is to him his wife; a harlot is to him as his mother; a brāhman woman is to him as a *dombī* [a female musician of the lowest caste]; the skin of an animal is to him as a garment; a blade of straw is like a precious stone, wine is like urine, food is like mud, an insult like a hymn of praise, Indra like Rudra, day like night, what he has seen is like a dream. things which exist are like those which have been destroyed, pain is

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56 Samvarodaya Tantra XXXIII.22-23. Free translation by the author.
58 Yogaratnamālā, p.123.
59 Quoted in the Yogaratnamālā, p.103.
60 A slightly different form of this verse is quoted by Haribhadra (9th C.) in his *Ālokavyākhyā* (Darbhanga ed.), p.272. For a translation and brief comment on this verse see my *Discerning the Buddha*, p.164. The source of the verse according to Vaidya’s edition is the Buddhābhūmiśāstra.
like pleasure, his son is like a rascal, heaven is like hell, and thus even good and evil are one and the same to him.\footnote{Pancakrama VI.30 ff. English transl. taken from M. Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature II, University of Calcutta, Calcutta 1927, p.396.}

The siddhas freely use erotic imagery in describing their religious experience. The obvious sense of the words of their mystic songs is practically bewildering to a modern student, but their commentators offer explanations of the hidden and intended meaning. A few examples of utterances of those who claimed to be siddhas may be cited here. Siddha Kāñhapāda sang thus:

'Samsāra and Nirvāna are the tabor and the drum, Mind and vital-breath are the flute and the cymbal. "Victory, Victory" - thus rises the sound of the kettledrum,
Kānha is going to his wedding with the dombī. Having married the dombī birth was consumed, The highest Dharma was made the dowry. Day and night pass in erotic play, In the troupe of the yoginis the night became dawn. The yogins who find delight in the embrace of the dombī, Do not leave her for a moment, being drunk with the

\textit{sahāja} (bliss)\footnote{Per Kvaerne, \textit{op. cit.}, p.155, Song No. 19. Transl. slightly modified.}.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.169, Song No. 22. Transl. slightly modified.}

Siddha Sarahapāda commented on the mystery of life and death thus:

'Itself repeatedly constructing Samsāra and Nirvāna, The people's world falsely binds itself. I don't know that which is unthinkable, How can birth and death become existence? As is birth, so is death also, There is no difference between the living and the dead! He who fears birth and death here, Let him produce the chemical in hope of an elixir. Those who roam here and in the heavens, They will not at all become free from ageing and dying. Is karma due to birth or birth due to karma? Saraha says, this Doctrine is unthinkable.

From these transcendental questions we may now turn our attention to mundane ones.

(ii) \textit{Common Aims: Happiness Here and Hereafter}

The Dharma or Buddhism was not only a means of attaining the highest aim of Enlightenment, but also of attaining happiness and prosperity in this very life, and certainly of ensuring a good rebirth. This old Buddhist conception was never forgotten; indeed it dominated Buddhist thought and
culture of our period. Śāntarakṣita had summed up the meaning, method and result of religiousness in the following words:

‘That is described as Dharma by all wise men, from which follows prosperity and the highest good; whoever properly practises the rules laid down there, regarding mantra, yoga and such things, becomes endowed even with obvious qualities such as knowledge, health, greatness, and so forth.’

‘Prosperity, knowledge, health, greatness, and so forth’ are ‘obvious’ and this-worldly qualities or gains. These were the common aims of religious life cherished by devout Buddhists during the mediaeval period. Here we can briefly review the nature of these aims. There is a Tantric text called Sarvadurgatiparīśodhakāntāmantra, ‘Treatise on the Purification of all Evil States of Existence’. As is well known, Buddhist tradition recognises six states of existence (gatis, yonis) which are distributed in different regions of Samsāra. These are the states of the 1) gods (devagati), 2) titans (asuragati), 3) humans (manusyangati), 4) animals (pāśugati), 5) hungry-spirits (pretagati), and 6) beings in hellish conditions (narakagati). The first three states of existence are good and fortunate (gagati), while the remaining states are evil and unfortunate (durgati). To be born in the human realm is considered a very rare and happy event. It is particularly favourable for making efforts to attain Nirvāṇa, the highest aim. The next best aim is to be born in one of the higher heavens. Much Buddhist religious endeavour has been directed towards this goal, although it is acknowledged that divine existence is also a part of Samsāra, the sphere of continuous coursing through the cycles of repeated births and deaths. Certainly, one must not do anything to lose one’s human status, even if one fails to attain Nirvāṇa and cannot achieve divine existence. All beings, human in particular, fear misery in all its forms. Since existence in lower forms or states is full of misery, all beings dread rebirth in those states. A treatise which expounded ways and means of avoiding birth in evil and miserable states and laid down rules and rites for obtaining good rebirths was naturally desirable and eventually produced. Several commentaries on this were also written by Indian and Tibetan Buddhist teachers.

To be born in divine and human realms was one of the most important aims of religious practice. Success in this aim naturally meant the destruction of causes leading to birth in evil states. Human life offers a mixture of happiness and misery, it is short in span and it is uncertain and full of dangers of all kinds. Disease, natural calamity, human and animal violence, old age and death are enemies of life in this world. Freedom from these dangers and hostile forces was eagerly sought by devout men and women. Long life, good health, prosperity and happiness were thus concrete goals of the devout. Since human beings have been warlike and violent since times immemorial, victory over hostile enemies was also an aim. It was an established principle of Buddhist doctrine that one’s happiness was linked to the happiness of the rest of the living world; to work for the promotion of universal happiness and universal
benefit (bahujana sukhāya bahujana hitāya) was also a tacitly accepted goal of Buddhist religious practice. Pious Buddhists often stored religious merit (punya) in order to transfer it to those whose happiness was part of their ideal. Although the technology of moral causation inherent in the doctrine of karma was held to be relentless and inviolable, being part of the law of universal order, good deeds performed in the spirit of universal loving kindness (maitri) and under the guidance of the sovereign principle of selflessness (nairātmya) or emptiness (śūnyatā) were believed to be powerful enough to mitigate the forces of evil and results of 'sinful' deeds. All the members of the Buddhist community (saṅgha), monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen, had before them one outstanding spiritual goal, that of the happiness of all living beings. The sacred name of the Buddha could not be invoked, even in this age of the 'counterfeit Law', without wishing the good and happiness of all beings. The siddhas, therefore, have constantly stressed the need of practising compassion (karunā) or mercy (dayā) under all conditions. Their conception of the highest fulfilment would be impossible without great compassion (mahākarunā) which plays so crucial a role in the history of Buddhist civilisation that we are justified in saying that the minimum spiritual ambition of every Buddhist in every age has been to be compassionate.

The tantras mention various kinds of perfections (siddhis) which may be considered the aims of Tantric religion in a specific sense. A siddhi means success or accomplishing that which was aspired for. It is both religious and secular success. The ancient Indians did not sharply distinguish between religious and secular siddhis, although success in religious effort was never confused with success in this-worldly pursuits. The highest siddhi was always distinguished from ordinary siddhis in which a magical element was clearly recognised. It would not be incorrect to say that even ordinary siddhis had a religious association in the thought of the people. The ordinary siddhis were a means of religious and non-religious aims, while the highest siddhi was the means of attaining Siddhahood or Buddhahood.66

The list of principal siddhis includes the following eight powers:

1. to be invisible with the sword (i.e. in battle);
2. to remove blindness (perhaps an ointment for the eyes in order to see hidden things);
3. to be swift of foot (perhaps an ointment for the foot to make it swift);
4. to be invisible at one's will;
5. to have the elixir of youth;
6. to walk in the sky or be able to fly;
7. to be able to shape into a ball any kind of flesh;
8. to have dominion over the things of the underworld.67

These powers are magical in nature and suggest the role of

66 Gtt XVIII.133 : Antaradhānādayah siddhāḥ sāmānyā iti kititāḥ i siddhir uttānam ity aḥur buddhā buddhavasādhanam // [Edited: Profuse thanks to Francesca Freemantle, who traced the appropriate quotation for us since the author's in-text note-reference is missing, and whose SOAS doctoral dissertation on the Gtt is being prepared for publication].
magic in Tantric religion. The idea of *siddhis* is well known in the literature of the Yoga school of Patañjali. The list of eight *siddhis* found in a commentary on the Yogasūtra of Patañjali dating from the eleventh century includes the following powers which differ from those listed above:

1. the power of becoming small like an atom;
2. the power of becoming light;
3. the power of becoming weighty;
4. the power of touching any object at any distance;
5. the power of irresistible will;
6. the power over the body and the mind;
7. the power of dominating the elements;
8. the power of fulfilling the desires\(^{68}\).

It may be noted in passing that the notion of supernormal powers was well known in classical Buddhist doctrines and practices associated with arhats and bodhisattvas, who were expert in the knowledge of these powers (*rddhi*\/\*siddhi*\/\*nāna*).

IV

**Means and Methods of Attaining Siddhi**

The *siddhas* conceptualised, experimented and transmitted to their initiated disciples a series of mental attitudes, techniques of symbolic sounds and gestures, rites of consecration (*abhiṣekā*), rituals of worship (*pūjā*) and evocation (*sādhana*) of deities, formulas (*mantras*), mystical maps or diagrams (*mandalas*) and, above all, a highly subtle and most secret rite of union (*yoga*) involving the yogin and the yogini as equally co-efficient practitioners. All these constitute basic structures of the Tantric way to success and perfection, and its methods may be described as quick-success techniques. The Way of the Great Disciples (*Śrāvakayāna*) was considered too ascetic, too individualistic and self-reliant; the Way of World-Saviours (*Bodhisattvayāna*) was too long, necessitating unlimited patience and incalculable aeons (*asamkyeyakalpas*); whereas the Way of the Siddhas or Esoteric Adepts (*Vajrayāna*) is neither ascetic nor time-consuming. It ensures, we are told, a direct approach to the City of Release (*mokṣapura*) and by following it one can attain Siddhadhāra or Buddhahood in this very life in the shortest possible time\(^{69}\).

The means and methods of attaining the aim (*siddha*) and aims (*siddhis*) fall into two different categories. The vast corpus of Tantric literature itself can be divided into two categories, one dealing with methods of attaining the highest *siddhi*, the other dealing with methods of attaining ordinary *siddhis*. The kriyātantras and caryātantras, such as the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*, *Ādikarmacaradipa*, *Sarvadurgatiparīśodhana* and the texts collected in the *Sādhanamālā*, are considered within the tradition

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itself as belonging to the lower category. Yogatantras and anuttarayogatantras, such as the Guhyasamaja Tantra, Hevajra Tantra and the Samvarodaya Tantra, belong to the higher category of tantras. Here we shall first analyse the means and methods of attaining common aims or ordinary siddhis; then we shall sum up the esoteric method of reintegration and final realisation. It should not be thought, however, that the means and methods of attaining these two types of aims are entirely disparate; they are closely related, and even those yogins who aimed at the ultimate siddhi were experts in ordinary siddhis.

(i) Elementary Religious Practices

Theoretically every follower of the Vajrayāna Mahāyāna was supposed to be a bodhisattva and therefore a candidate for Buddhahood. Elementary religious practices of a devout follower of Tantric religion are, therefore, more or less similar to those of a follower of the Mahāyāna. The following practices are common to the bodhisattvas of Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna:

Ablution and physical purity, adoration of the Triple Gem (triratna), praise and adoration of the teacher (guru), taking refuge in the Triple Gem (the Buddha, Dharma and Sangha), making formal request (adhyesanā) to the teacher (guru) or the good friend (kalyānāmitra) for instruction and training, worship (pūjā) of the Buddha and the teacher with suitable offerings of flowers and so forth, declaration of one’s moral lapses (pāpadeśanā), accepting the basic ethical precepts (śīkapāpas), production of the thought of Enlightenment (bodhicittotpāda), taking the ultimate vow (samvara) and making the resolve (pranidhāna) to become a Buddha for the benefit and happiness of all living beings, approval of and gratification over the decision and instruction (anumodanā), and transformation and dedication of all one’s efforts and merits for the benefit of all living beings (parināmanā). All these elements constitute what is called the excellent worship (anuttarapūjā)\(^{70}\).

While one starts one’s practice under the expert guidance of a qualified teacher or spiritual preceptor (ācārya, guru), one pronounces and reflects on such cardinal scriptural statements as ‘may I be the refuge of all beings; ‘may I become a Buddha; ‘all phenomena are by nature pure, I am by nature pure; ‘may I attain siddhi for the benefit of all beings; ‘I am of the nature of the diamond of emptiness-knowledge; ‘may all beings be free from suffering’, and so on\(^{71}\).

Faith, morality, liberality, wisdom and meditation play an important part in these practices. Meditation on the four ‘divine abodes’ (brahmavihāras) viz., compassion (karunā), loving kindness (maitrī), joy (muditā) and equanimity (upekṣā) is recommended. The practitioner also reflects on the doctrinal formulas such as ‘the illusory show of the world is indeed made up of the Buddha; ‘an impure mind is the cause of bondage,

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70 See Bodhicaryaavatāra, Chs I and II; Ādikarmikapradīpa, Sanskrit text with a commentary ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, Études et Matériaux, pp.186–204; Candamahāroṣana Tantra, Ch.III, Hvt 2, Lxxii, 4–51, Sādhanamālā, pp.28, 29, 38, 39, 47, 55–7 passim.

a pure mind is the cause of liberation; 'the Buddhas are teacher
of the Way, I have to walk on it', and so on. If the practitione
is engaged in the ritual of evocation (sādhana), he/she adore
his/her chosen deity (īṣṭadevatā), repeats the mantra of the
deity, imitates that deity's features and powers, and meditates on
the deity's seed-syllable until he/she has a vision of the chosen
god or goddess. During the entire period of the ritual prac
tice, the practitioner behaves fearlessly like a lion, and adopts diverse
attitudes and manipulates different means of psychophysical
discipline.  

ii) The Role of the Guru

The supreme position of the spiritual preceptor (guru, ācārya, lāmā) which we witness in all forms of religiousness in
India, Nepal and Tibet was formally started by the siddhas.
Without the kind offices of the guru neither success nor
liberation can be attained. His favourable disposition (prasāda, kṛpā) towards the pupil is absolutely necessary
without his supportive power (adhiṣṭhāna) one cannot attain
Buddhahood. The guru is to be worshipped, respected, obeyed
and pleased by a faithful practitioner. According to one text,
the guru represents the Buddha, Dharma and Sangha.  
According to another text, the teacher of the esoteric science of
reintegration who is known as the Diamond-Teacher
(vajrācārya) is the embodiment of the mystic unity of the

body, speech and mind of all the Buddhas. Even the Buddhas
adore and honour him. The immaculate favour or grace of
the guru is the key to success in religious culture. Without him
the Immaculate favour or grace of the guru cannot be destroyed, nor can the peace of Nirvāṇa be
attained. The Hevajra Tantra teaches that the knowledge of
the Innate (sahajā) can be obtained intuitively as a consequence of
the service of the guru and the prescribed
religious merits, the service of the guru and the prescribed

methods. The Guhyasamāja Tantra declares that the pupil is
liberated as soon as the guru's hand touches his head. The
pupil accepts the status of a life-long slave of his/her guru who
is wisdom-embodied; till he/she achieves Buddhahood there is
no other refuge for him/her. Those who slander their
guru never succeed in their rituals and efforts. The fierce
Mahākāla devours those who, among other things, hate their
guru. According to the Jñānasiddhi, he who has the grace of
the guru attains the Highest Reality, otherwise the fool remains
defiled for a long time. Even when one has attained siddhi,
one remains faithful and respectful to the guru if one wants

74 Gst, pp.111-12. See Saṁvarodaya XXXIII.27-28, 'abandoning all forms of
adoration, adore the guru'.
75 Munidatta's commentary on the Caryāgūti in Kvaerne, op. cit., p.71.
76 Hvt 2, I.viii.36, p.28.
77 Gst XVIII.123 : hastam datā śire śīṣya mucyate guruvaṁjñā.
78 Sekoddesa-Tīkā, p.24; see Studies in the Buddhist Culture, p.420, n.75.
79 Gst V.5.
80 Śādhanaṁa, p.586.
81 Jñānasiddhi, p.33, v.23 :
guru prasādo yasya asti sa labhet tattvanuvattanam /
anyathā kliśyate bālāḥ cirakāla vinoḥitāḥ //
to avoid going to the most terrible hell\textsuperscript{82}.

(iii) The Power of Mantras

Tantric Buddhism is often called the way of Sacred Formulas (Mantrayāna). Earlier Buddhists had been familiar with the use of dhāranīs, those cryptic and devotional texts that were memorised and recited as incantations for obtaining supernormal moral support in times of crises. During the period under discussion, dhāranīs were still in use, but mantras became increasingly popular and finally assumed a decisive role in Tantric worship and ritual. Mantras are not merely essential elements of ritually orientated techniques of meditation, they seem to constitute the very essence of the practical way to siddhi. A mantra is a tool or symbol for concentrating thought on invisible psychological forces within the practitioner; it is also a mechanism of establishing a relationship with the deity and controlling external physical phenomena. Some mantras are secret while others are public and can be recited openly and loudly. Generally a secret mantra is imparted or whispered into the pupil’s ear by the guru; the pupil maintains its secrecy. However, most of these mantras were written in Tantric manuals and those who are not trained in the esoteric theory and practice of the Tantra-vidyā may think that they are gibberish. We may assume that all mantras, even those that appear to be a compilation of meaningless syllables, have had a meaning for the initiates. He who practises the discipline of mantras (mantrayoga) is called a mantrin. Both male and female, whether ascetics or householders belonging to any social class or caste, can practise this discipline under the guidance of a qualified teacher. Great emphasis is put on correct pronunciation and flawless repetition of mantras, their repetition (japa) often being accompanied by a prescribed ritual.

Mantras may be philosophical - e.g. om śūnyatājñāna-vajra-sva bhūvāmako ḍam, devotional, e.g. om tāre tattvāre ture svāhā; in praise of a deity who is being adored, e.g. om kurukulle hriḥ svāhā or om yamāntaka hūm; whilst some are quite obscure, e.g. hrim triṃ hum phat, om jhum blum svāhā, om akate vikate nikate katamkate karote karotavirye svāhā, om hah hrim hūm hah hah and so on\textsuperscript{83}. One of the most famous mantras, which is of considerable significance, is om mani padme hūm and first appears in the Divyāvadāna\textsuperscript{84}.

Nothing is impossible, we are told by Tantric authors, through the practice of mantras when undertaken according to the rules. The mantras are like desire-yielding fruits, whilst the great power of the mantras reflects the immense optimism of the siddhas.

The power generated by a mantra is so tremendous as would astonish the whole world; the mantra can confer even Buddhahood; even an ass can memorize three hundred scriptures by muttering the dhārani of Avalokiteśvara, not to say of man. So innumerable are

\textsuperscript{82} Hvt 2, lvi.22.

\textsuperscript{83} All these mantras are reproduced from the Sādhanaṃalā. Similar mantras are found in the Hvt, Sarvadurgatipariśodhana Tantra and other texts.

\textsuperscript{84} See my Studies in the Buddhistic Culture, p.244.
the merits that accrue to the reciter of the mantra of Mahākāla, that even the Buddhas cannot count them for several days and nights. By repeating the mantra of Lokenātha are washed away even the five gravest sins, and by muttering the mantra of Khasarpana Buddhahood becomes easily accessible.\textsuperscript{85}

(To be concluded)

\textbf{THE PROBLEM OF EAST-WEST DIALOGUE}

Joan Stambaugh, \textit{Impermanence is Buddha-nature: Dōgen's Understanding of Temporality}, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu 1990. x, 146 pp. £18.00.

Richard Hunn

Prof. Lynn Whyte has been quoted as saying that future historians may well look back upon the pioneering work of the late D. T. Suzuki as a cultural watershed, as influential in its own way as the introduction of William of Moerbeke's fourteenth-century translations of Aristotle. Similarly, Arnold Toynbee has suggested that, rather than the advent of nuclear reactors or space travel, future historians will regard the encounter between Buddhism and Christianity as the single most important cultural event of the twentieth century. Certainly, the East-West dialogue is rich with possibilities, but it is not without its dangers. There is no guarantee that the meaning of terms can be made trans-culturally 'negotiable' and we may have to accept the fact that East-West dialogue requires us to open ourselves to what are, for most of us, new ways of thinking. With the possible exception of a few Christian mystics like Eckhart etc., the theocentric or metaphysical bias of the Western tradition makes East-West dialogue something of a Thorny issue and these difficulties are quite apparent in Joan Stambaugh's study of Dōgen.

Despite what might be assumed from the title, this work is not a straightforward Dōgen commentary but an attempt to 'explore Dōgen’s understanding of temporality through a dialogical approach to such Western thinkers as Plato, Aristotle,
Leibniz, Nietzsche and Heidegger. Curiously enough, the precedent here was set in Japan after Kitarō Nishida (1870-1945) discovered the nominal parallels between Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) and Dōgen’s Uji (being-time) fascicle. To what extent this dialogue can be said to be a meaningful one is open to question for, on the face of it, nothing could be further from Dōgen’s terse idioms than the heavy ‘academiker-Deutsch’ of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit. Even so, the ‘Kyoto school’ of philosophy (founded by Nishida) has worked on the assumption that this dialogue is meaningful and Stambaugh has added her own contribution, her extensive knowledge of Heidegger’s work and other Western sources providing a natural springboard for this undertaking. A list of chapter headings would be relevant here: 1. Impermanence; 2. Buddha-nature; 3. Being-time; 4. Birth and death; 5. Dialectic; 6. Time and eternity; 7. Thinking. In her preface the author states:

"If western philosophy is not to subside into the dubious role of a kind of ‘meta’ literary criticism or to pursue similar paths that seem the only way open to a philosophy and theology that have lost access to any ‘transcendence’, it would do well to listen to the voices of eastern thinking" (p.ix).

This lack of hubris bodes well but, like many scholars, Stambaugh is inclined to exaggerate Dōgen’s uniqueness, as in the opening remarks of Ch. 1:

"...instead of primarily conceiving of an ‘identity’ of the cycles of birth and death with the liberation from them, which was Nāgārjuna’s innovative insight, Dōgen’s focus appears to be primarily in the nature of ‘being-time’ (uji) and the possible experience of liberation inherent in it... Nāgārjuna’s orientation was primarily logical, that of Dōgen is experiential and phenomenological" (p.1).

Whether Dōgen’s approach was a ‘phenomenological’ one in the modern sense of the term is doubtful; his teaching was not the legacy of Western metaphysics and to a response to the problems of Western metaphysics and to overcome the legacy of Western metaphysics would be mistaken. At any rate, a careful study of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) will show that Nāgārjuna’s orientation was not ‘primarily logical’ at all - for was not the whole point of his critique to expose the contradictions inherent in all relatively conditioned concepts (drṣṭi/samvṛtti) when applied to the real (paramārtha) - be they Nāgārjuna’s or anyone else’s? Unlike Kant’s ‘critique’ which was made in order to ‘make way for faith’ or a further process outside his critique - Nāgārjuna’s critique presupposes the awakening of Prajñā as an intrinsic part of the process and, by definition, Prajñā transcends all logic. Thus Nāgārjuna’s aims were no less ‘experiential’ than Dōgen’s. In embryo at least, the basis for Dōgen’s ideas in the Uji fascicle of the Shōbōgenzō (viz. the ‘momentary’ existence of dharmas) can be found in MMK II, 1 and II, 25 and it was hardly by chance that the MMK had previously inspired Seng Chao’s fifth-century essay ‘On the Immutability of Phenomena’ (Wu pu chien lun) [cf. the Chao lun] which anticipated many of Dōgen’s ideas, particularly the notion of jūhō or things being at rest in their ‘dharma positions’. Dōgen’s ‘uniqueness’ comes up again in the back-cover blurb, where Prof. Abe refers to "Dōgen’s unique notion that ‘impermanence is Buddha-nature’. But again, this intuition had already been articulated in Seng
Chao's fifth-century essay, it appears again in Hui-neng's (d. 754) Tan ching and it would have been more faithful to the hermeneutics of the Buddhist tradition to acknowledge Dōgen's debt to his predecessors. In other ways, of course, Dōgen's idioms were very idiosyncratic and the author lists the following key-terms, attempting to elucidate their meaning by bouncing them off Western concepts:

- *genjō* - presencing; *gūjin* - total exertion; *gyōji* - continuous practice; *jūhōi* - dwelling in a dharma situation; *keige* - impeding; *kyōryaku* - taking place; *nikon* - right now, absolute now.

Trying to articulate the meaning of Dōgen's terms in any other context but his own runs the risk of making him sound far more cerebral than he really was by Western standards, but the author notes (p.4) "the 'relation' between impermanence and Buddha-nature is one formulation for a whole set of relations that can be alternatively expressed as samsāra-nirvāna or practice-enlightenment. In Western terms, we are dealing with the relation of the finite to the infinite, of the world to the absolute, or God". And later, (p.5) "The fundamental issue at stake here is a philosophical as well as a soteriological one: how to think 'identity', how to think 'difference' . . . ." Oddly enough, however, while Stambaugh acknowledges that Dōgen's world-view was shaped by ideas quite different to those embedded in Western metaphysics, she goes on to say that "Dōgen is fundamentally dealing with the same problem discussed by Tillich, Schelling and Heidegger" (p.9), but this is questionable; if Dōgen's world-view was not shaped by Western theological/metaphysical concepts, he could hardly have been dealing with the same problems as Tillich, etc. etc. Any attempt to draw parallels between Western concepts concerning the relation between 'God' and 'the world' (or man) and Dōgen's view of the relation between 'Buddha-nature' and the phenomenal world is fraught with difficulties. Stambaugh acknowledges as much in an earlier quote from Prof. Abe (p.7), who astutely observes that "neither transcendence nor immanence is predicable of the 'relation' between Buddha-nature and all beings" - which removes us from the categories of the Western tradition.

Such comments reveal the problems which pile up, once we start using the concepts of one tradition to explicate those of another. Chapters 5 and 7 (Dialectic / Thinking) are heavily loaded this way and, in fact, Dōgen's name appears but twice in the first eight pages of Ch.5. This is not to say that the reflections on Heraclitus, Hegel and Heidegger are without interest, but one wonders why Stambaugh didn't make more use of mainstream Buddhist sources. At times, she seems woefully out of touch with the kind of materials which did shape the tradition of which Dōgen was a part. This is apparent from a remark on p.10 à propos the well-known phrase from the *Fukanazazengi* fascicle of the Shōbōgenzō: 'to turn the light back upon oneself and let it shine on one's own nature'. Stambaugh goes on to say, "but to study the self is not to discover something like 'subjectivity', be it Cartesian or even the Husserlian cogito. Nor is it to probe the depths of the conscious and unconscious Mind of the Mahāyāna idealists, as found, for example, in the Lankāvatāra Sūtra". However, the seminal influence of the Lankāvatāra Sūtra upon the Ch'an (Zen) tradition is too well known to need further comment and it begs a number of questions to suggest that Dōgen was uninfluenced by or disinterested in such doctrines. Without
reference to something like the 'Mind only' doctrine (or the idea of parāvrddhi in the Lankā text) how are we to make sense of Dōgen's Sanga Yūshin (the three worlds are only mind) fascicle of the Shōbōgenzō, or his 'casting off of body and mind' (shinjūn datsuraku)? This is not 'Cartesian' subjectivity, it is true, for Buddhism would agree that the 'knowing (ego) subject' behind the 'I think' is problematic but, as the 'underlying ground' (sub-ject) which bears or carries all the phenomenal images or 'objects' projected by consciousness, Buddhism has no problem with the subject-object relationship. Dōgen rarely refers to the Lankā text but, all the same, he did not reject the sūtras and indeed he specifically castigated those who made too much of Zen as an 'ultra-doctrinal' tradition. Thus, Stambaugh has taken a liberty trying to distance Dōgen from sources of tradition which he did not wish to abandon himself.

Chapter 3 (Being-time), the longest, is probably the most sustained attempt to stick with Dōgen while drawing on Western parallels. Oddly enough, while the Uji (being-time) fascicle of the Shōbōgenzō has attracted the most attention from Heideggerians, Heidegger's magnum opus said considerably more about Sein (Being) than it did about Zeit (Time), whereas Dōgen's understanding of 'being' is unthinkable without simultaneously embracing 'time', as the uji idiom suggests. On p.25, Stambaugh notes three different concepts of time which usually figure in our thinking, none of which corresponds to Dōgen's quite different understanding of it:

1. Static container-time, or time 'in which'.
2. Time that flows from the future into the past, taking everything along with it.
3. The time of an individual life starting with birth and

progressing towards eventual death.

Stambaugh links the first with seventeenth-century scientific conceptions, the second with notions of time found in Western poetry (Shakespeare's sonnets, for example), and the third with poetry (Shakespeare's sonnets, for example), and the third with the conception of 'historical time'. As the author notes, 'what these three conceptions share is the idea that time is linear, sequential, irreversible and something separate from and independent of things or events in it' (p.25). Quite to the point, Stambaugh goes on to say, 'What Dōgen is interested in is not at what time or in what time or how long something took; rather, anything whatsoever that is happening is not in time, but is time itself. Time is the taking place (passage, kyōryaku) of all things. It is the way they are - an 'is' or an 'are' in the sense of static persistence is impossible and senseless for Dōgen' (p.26). There are many perceptive observations here and, arguably, it is in Ch. 3 that Stambaugh gets the closest to Dōgen.

As regards Chapter 4 (Birth and death), it is interesting to note that Heidegger once described death as the 'ultimate possibility of Dasein', speaking of human life in terms of 'being-towards-death' - viewing death as an event posited in the future. Stambaugh does not mention this but it seems relevant here because for Dōgen, 'conditioned temporality' (Dōgen doesn't actually use this term) is simultaneously the life of the unconditioned, right here and now, insofar as 'life' is but the momentary arising of each dharma in its unique dharma-position (jūhōi), meaning that the temporal is already the locus of the eternal, expressly because there is no 'abiding self' to await the 'futurity' of death and because there is no 'world' outside the emptiness of the Buddha-nature. Although Heidegger articulates the relation between 'Being' and 'no-thing',
there is nothing about the 'momentary' existence of the dharmas in his philosophy, which in other respects remains a 'svabhāva-bound' one. As noted above, Chapter 5 (Dialectic) contains some of the lengthier detours into Western philosophy - made, it seems, only to illustrate the significant differences between the two traditions. Perhaps we have to go back as far as Heraclitus (before Plato) in the Western tradition to find an understanding of dialectic which approximates Dōgen's.

Chapter 6 (Time and eternity) is interesting for its discussion of Augustine, Boethius, etc., on the nunc stans or 'standing now', a mediaeval concept which has always struck me as fruitful territory to look for parallels with Buddhism. The discussion of Kegon ideas is relevant but I'm not sure that Stambaugh always interprets them reliably. Equating Hegel's 'dialectical process' with the Ri in Kegon Buddhism seems a dubious proposition, for in Buddhism it is usually held to be synonymous with kūkūng/sānyātā (emptiness), which is just not there in Hegel. Moreover, to define ri ji mu ge (the interpenetration of principle and activity) as the relation between universal and particular... the last view accessible to ordinary logical thought (p.105) is misleading for, in Buddhism, it is synonymous with insight into the form-void/void-form identity of the Prajñāparamitā, and held to be far beyond the reach of 'ordinary logical thought'. Significantly, Stambaugh notes that the concept of ji ji mu ge (unimpeded interpenetration of 'thing-events' with other thing-events) is without parallel in Western culture. However, minus prior insight into the form-void identity (rīlū mu ge), ji ji mu ge is in any case unthinkable for, in Kegon/Hua-yen terms, without a thorough-going realisation of the voidness of all dharmas (nisvabhāva), our view of 'thing-events' (ji) will inevitably remain impeded. Unfortunately, Stambaugh simply fails to spot the experiential connection between these terms, a misunderstanding which appears to spring from taking Ri (Chin. Lī) in its conventional sense as 'reason', but in Buddhism it is synonymous with kūkūng/sānyātā (emptiness), while ji (Chin. shīh) is synonymous with fa (dharmas pl.) - a quite different business from all the wrangling about 'universals' and 'particulars' in the Western tradition.

To my mind, Chapter 7 (Thinking) is the most disappointing here. Stambaugh seems to be pushing the parallels between Dōgen and Heidegger too far. At any rate, Buddhist readers will question the wisdom of comparing Dōgen's 'non-thinking' (p.114) with Heidegger's Andenken or Besinnung. For a start, 'non-thinking' is hardly the best equivalent for Dōgen's hitshiryo. The latter is synonymous with samādhi (ō-zamnai) and has a very specific Buddhist context but Stambaugh seems to be taking up Kim's lead (p.114) that Dōgen held zazen to be a form of 'thinking'. In context, what Dōgen probably meant was that zazen (samādhi) is neither a negative nor even a neutral state (avyākṛta = dead-emptiness) but that the wisdom-function is always active in it. However, we must not forget that Dōgen was a Buddhist who advocated zazen as a focus to 'actualise' everything hinted at in his Shōbōgenzō and, minus this essential praxis, Dōgen's ideas become something else. That contemporary existentialists are reclaiming the value of 'pre-reflective awareness' is promising, but the kinship between Heidegger's notion of 'presencing' (Prasenz) and Dōgen's actualisation of the genjō-kōan in and through zazen, remains a moot point. Buddhism acknowledges different levels of pre-reflective awareness and it does not follow that they are all 'enlightened' ones in the Buddhist sense. Dōgen's
hisshiryo presupposes an intuitive actualisation of inner energies with an invisible centre which is yet tangible through its effects and transforming power. It is part of a common vocabulary of ‘understanding’ among Japanese steeped in Zen and its allied arts (dō). On the empirical level, it is rooted in the hara (Chin. t‘an-t‘ien) and there is nothing arbitrary about it. However, on p.116, Stambaugh seems to go out of her way to distance Dōgen’s understanding of zazen from any formal praxis at all and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that this was done in order to make Dōgen’s ideas seem more congruent with Heidegger’s than the facts really warrant, and to do so is as unfair to Dōgen as it is to Heidegger. Generally, this chapter is so loaded with ‘Heidegger’ that it is intrusive (given the title of the book). For all of Heidegger’s apparent divergence from traditional Western metaphysics, his ideas are still individualistic/subjective in a distinctly Western sense. Watsuji Tetsurō’s ‘Ethics’ (Rinrigaku, vols 10 and 11 of his Zenshū) illustrates some significant differences; where Heidegger posits the individuality of Dasein (the being-in-the-world of an individual), Watsuji stresses the collectivity of Mitsein, showing that the Japanese model is only able to posit the existence of the ‘individual’ within the context of his relatedness-to-others (ningen). This is not meant to be a criticism of Heidegger, we are simply pointing out areas where the Japanese model differs from Heidegger.

A final point: Heidegger once spoke of language as ‘the house of Being’ - but it is hard to imagine Dōgen doing the same, despite his recognition of the need to give expression (dōtoku) to the Dharma, and at this point, I think the dialogue breaks down, or rather, it just ceases to be relevant. Stambaugh’s extensive use of parallels drawn from the Western tradition leaves precious little room to appraise Dōgen’s ideas against the general background of Mahāyāna Buddhism and, as such, this work provides us with a peculiarly foreshortened view of Dōgen’s teaching. The facts are that Dōgen was not a ‘thinker’ in the Western sense at all and, in the final estimate, the only way to assimilate his ideas is to utilise that essential praxis recommended in his teachings. Inevitably, however, the kind of dialogue that Stambaugh has in mind will continue to grow and, so far as it goes, this book is a genuine attempt to explore dialogue between the two traditions and well worth reading.

CORRIGENDA & ADDENDA TO BSR 8, 1-2 (1991)

1) THE ŠĀLISTAMBA SŪTRA translated by John M. Cooper, pp.21-57

p.27, l.18: for p.00 read p.53.

p.29, l.3: for ‘independent’ read ‘dependent’.


p.37, l.12: after ‘elements’ insert ‘are present’.

p.39, l.2: for ‘person born’ read ‘born one’ (Tr. not necessarily human).

l.3: for ‘aging’ read ‘aged’; after ‘death’ add ‘Or: the annihilation of the worn-out body is death’.

p.49, l.13: delete ‘small’.

p.51, l.5: delete ‘being who shall we become’ and replace by ‘being who shall we become’.


p.54, l.2: for ‘section iii’ read ‘section ii’.

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BOOK REVIEWS


It is certainly time that we had a new translation of the Udāna, as the only available version is to be found among the Pāli Text Society's series originally published in 1935. The BPS presents this new translation with an attractive cover, good paper and a clear modern typeface, quite an achievement in Sri Lanka considering the troubled times there.

The translator has rendered the Pāli prose and verse into free-flowing English as well as brought out the deep meaning of these brief sayings. As an example of this, readers should look at the account of Bāhiya (1.16), perhaps comparing it with the older translation. We are fortunate that the translator of this book is a Buddhist who has practised for many years.

He provides us with many notes drawn from Pāli traditional commentaries by way of explaining some matters in the text which are unclear. These notes are usually based on the explanations of the Commentaries, though in a few cases he offers us other possible interpretations. For instance, the Corin always shows disdain for brahmans who are described as uttering the sound HUM, said to be a mark of their pride. The translator accordingly translates hukumka as 'haughty'. The verse ascribed to the Buddha (1.4) also mentions being 'without Hum Hum', as though the Hum-repetition were an evil. So it is interesting to reflect that later Buddhists have valued the practice of sounding Hum and not seen it as anything to do with caste or pride.

3) NEWS & NOTES, p. 148

The contact address for the Fundación Instituto de Estudios Budistas is now: Olazábal 1584, 3° "C", 1428 Buenos Aires, Argentina.

2) THE KĀŚYAPAPARIVARTA (KP) BIBLIOGRAPHY by Bhikkhu Pāsādika, pp.59-70.

Only when the latest issue of BSR was in the press and while I was writing another paper on KP ('Remarks on Two Kāśyapaparivarta Translations'), I remembered the publication of two fragments of Central Asian Sanskrit manuscripts of KP by Vorob'ev-Desjatovskij to which J. W. de Jong refers in 'Sanskrit Fragments of the Kāśyapaparivarta', pp.251-3. As for bibliographical particulars, I am much obliged to Prof. O. v. Hinuber of Freiburg University who was so kind as to fill the lacuna in the bibliographical remarks by sending me the following piece of information wanting at loc. cit., p.61 (between Item Nos 15-16):


3) NEWS & NOTES, p. 148

The contact address for the Fundación Instituto de Estudios Budistas is now: Olazábal 1584, 3° "C", 1428 Buenos Aires, Argentina.
In another place (3.9) it seems likely that the Comy is correct when it glosses muddha-sippam with 'hand-gestures'. The translator's guess that it might have something to do with signaling commands in a battle is rather unlikely, given the importance attached to the Buddha's hand-gestures in early Buddhist art and their later elaboration in Buddhist practice.

Occasionally the translator offers his own alternatives to passages which are obscure and which the Comy does little to illuminate. There is an example of this at 2.4 where some difficult lines are given meaning:

'Contacts affect one dependent on clinging.
How can contacts affect one without clinging?'

It is not that Awakened Ones have no contact; they have, of course. But they are not affected by them because there is no clinging. This makes a great deal of sense and prevents the depiction of arahants as some sort of inhuman robots living out their remaining life-spans. Compare though with Nyānavīra's translation which points out this deadening direction:

'Contacts contact dependent on ground - How should contacts contact a groundless one?'

This is very literal and must make an arahant's life seem unattractive. Phassanirodha (cessation of contact) surely refers to the introspective experience of arahants and not to their whole life.

Arahants, however, are very far from being the kind of stilted saint cast-all-in-the-same-mould of the popular imagination (backed up by Buddhist art in Sri Lanka and Thailand which allows none of them even individual facial characteristics. What a contrast to the very individual Lohans (= rahan = arahan) in China! In fact, the Udāna shows one of them doing rather non-conformist things (3.6) when he calls the other monks 'outcastes' (vasala), an action the text ascribes to

the monk's rebirth 500 times (= many, in Pāli) in the brahmin caste. Elsewhere, in the Jātaka, we have Ven. Sāriputta hopping like a rabbit, more vāsanā (dispositions), a term the Comy finds to cover these eccentric patterns of conduct. Of course, the Mahāsāṃghikas suggested subsequent to the Second Council that vāsanā might account for behaviour in arahants (or those who were so known) that would be rather more blamable than the abuse recorded here. This is an area in which Pāli commentators have been concerned to whitewash arahants and disguise as far as possible their human failings. But why is it that saints in the Theravāda have to be inhuman to be worshipped? An interesting question.

This book will be an adornment to my collection of suṭta translations. May it adorn yours too and be frequently consulted.

Phra Khantipālo (Laurence Mills)


The Therīgāthā is one of the earliest extant examples of religious poetic composition by women and, as such, it caught the attention of certain women scholars in England around the turn of the century. Mrs Rhys Davids published her complete translation of the Therīgāthā in 1909, while as early as 1893 Mabel Bode had written an article entitled 'Women Leaders of the Buddhist Reformation' in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, in which she gave an edition and translation of portions
of the Manorathapūrāṇī (the Commentary on the Aṅguttara-Nikāya) dealing with some of the therīs whose verses are included in the Theri gāthā.

After the First World War, with the battle for the women's vote won in England, such demonstrations of feminist fervour tended to become less frequent, although I. B. Horner wrote Women under Primitive Buddhism in 1930. Since the Second World War, however there has been considerable interest in Women's Studies, and Diana Y. Paul published her Women in Buddhism: Images of the Feminine in the Mahāyāna Tradition in 1979 (second edition, 1983). There has also been a renewed interest in the Therīgāthā, at least in translation. This has led to a difficulty for readers, for Mrs Rhys Davids' Psalms of the Sisters is now only available bound together with Psalms of the Brethren, under the title Psalms of the Early Buddhists, at a cost of £28.00, while the present writer's Elders' Verses II costs £15.75.

To meet the situation the Pali Text Society has reprinted both these translations in one volume under the title Poems of Early Buddhist Nuns, as part of its paperback series, but without introduction and footnotes in the case of the former, and without introductions and notes in the case of the latter. The two works, with their very different, even at times contradictory, translations, may seem strange bed-fellows, but they prove to be surprisingly complementary, especially since Rhys Davids gives lengthy extracts from the Commentary, which put the poems in perspective, although not necessarily the correct one.

The editor of this book, Dr Steven Collins, provides a brief Introduction and a Bibliography for further reading. There is an Index of Names which occur in the verses and commentarial stories. Dr Collins has incorporated the corrections to Mrs Rhys Davids' translation which have been detailed in various reprints, and has removed some of her more extravagant phraseology, although not all - what can 'captive once more to fear' (viii on p.55) mean? - while Elders' Verses II has been shorn of some of its most un-English turns of phrase, passive constructions etc., which the translator incorporated in an attempt to help those who knew Pāli to understand the way in which he was construing the sentences. Such features are not likely to be helpful to the type of readership for which this paperback edition is intended.

K. R. Norman


This book has been a long time appearing. Dr Masefield started work on it soon after finishing his translation of the Petavatthu-aṭṭhakathā (published as Peta Stories in 1980), and the Preface is dated 1980. The printing of a book of its size - well over 600 pages - was beyond the Pali Text Society's financial means at the time, and its publication had to be shelved temporarily. It was then decided to make use of a computer in the hope that this would save time and reduce costs, but this introduced various technical problems which the Council of the PTS had not foreseen, each of which further delayed the date of publication. That the volume has finally appeared is due in no small measure to the author himself who,
when the delays seemed interminable, speeded things up at the end by producing camera-ready copy for the indexes and word-lists. The financial problems in publication were overcome by a generous bequest from the late Mrs Irene Quittner, to whose memory the volume is dedicated.

In the preface the translator acknowledges the great help he received from Professor N. A. Jayawickrama, who read through the whole typescript of the work and made many suggestions for its correction and improvement. Where these refer to matters in the notes acknowledgement is made by inserting his initials (NAJ), although for the most part it did not prove possible to indicate where his guidance led to a change of interpretation in the text itself.

In the long Translator’s Introduction (pp.xix-lvii) Dr Masefield describes the nature of the Vimānavatthu which, like its companion the Petavatthu, urges upon lay-followers the need to perform merit and describes the rewards of doing so, while the Petavatthu describes the punishments meted out to those who fail to do so. One result of the delay in publication is that it has become possible to include some reference in the notes to the Introduction and the translation to works published after 1980, in particular to Dr Masefield’s own Divine Revelation in Pāli Buddhism (1985), although no general updating has been attempted. Those, for example, who wish to know this reviewer’s views on the languages of early Buddhism are referred (p.266) to an article in Buddhism and Jainism, published in Cuttack in 1976 and consequently hard to come by, although a revised version of the article appeared in the rather more accessible The Languages of the Earliest Buddhist Tradition, published in Göttingen in 1980.

The Council of the PTS have for many years been conscious of the need to produce translations of the commentaries upon the canonical texts. Such works are essential for a full understanding of the way in which the early Buddhist community understood the canonical texts, but their style is so difficult that only those scholars who have studied them in great detail can hope to master the difficult Pāli in which they are written. Everyone will welcome this addition to the small number of such translations, and it is good to hear that Dr Masefield is now devoting his attentions to a third commentary by Dhammapāla, this time the Udāna-aṭṭhakathā. We can only hope it will appear rather more quickly than the volume whose publication is noticed here.

K. R. Norman


The importance of the Abhidhammatthasangaha, one of the nine texts called ‘Little-finger Manuals (Let-than)’ in Burma, was recognised in the West and an edition of it by T.W. Rhys Davids appeared in the JPTS for 1884, and a translation by S.Z. Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids (The Compendium of Philosophy) was published in 1910. The shortcomings of both these works, made at a time when Pāli studies were still in their infancy, have long been recognised and, at one time, it was hoped that a new edition of the text by R. E. Iggleden would replace Rhys Davids’ pioneering effort, but that hope was frustrated by Mr Iggleden’s much-lamented untimely death.

For some years Ven. Dr Hammalawa Saddhātissa had been preparing an edition of the Abhidhammatthavibhāvini-tīkā, and
an article which he wrote about the Abhidhammatthasangaha and its tīkā in Studies in Indian Philosophy (L. D. Series 84, Ahmedabad 1981) suggested to scholars that publication was imminent. There were, unfortunately, delays but the edition has now been published, and to it Dr Saddhātissa has prefixed a new edition of the Abhidhammatthasangaha itself. In both texts the paragraph numbers and headings from the Burmese Chattasangāyana editions have been included, to facilitate study and make cross-referencing easier. The pair of editions has been printed from camera-ready copy prepared on a word-processor. Such a method of publication has many advantages, since by obviating proof-reading it saves both time and money, the latter of which can be reflected in the retail price. Sadly, however, the system also has its defects. Unless the word-processor has a very high quality printer there is a chance that the reproduction may not be as consistently good as might be hoped. So it is with this volume, and the Council of the PTS has had to insert an apology for defects on a small number of pages which only became apparent after printing was completed.

The Abhidhammatthasangaha covers, in nine chapters, the whole field of Abhidhamma. It is attributed to Anuruddha, who lived somewhere between the eighth and twelfth century, when a Sinhala paraphrase of his work was written by Sāriputta, the Saṅgharāja during the reign of Pārakramabāhu I (1153-86 C.E.). The tīkā was written by Sumangala, the pupil of Sāriputta, and was probably based upon his teacher’s paraphrase. In the Introduction Dr Saddhātissa discusses these matters and gives information about the sources he employed for his editions. Indexes of words explained in the tīkā, of gāthās in both the Abhidhammasangaha and the tīkā, and of works referred to in both texts, complete the volume.

K. R. Norman


In 1904 the British Museum purchased the Hugh Nevill collection of Sinhalese manuscripts. Numbering 2,227 items, the collection had been built up by Nevill between his starting service in Ceylon in 1865 and his death in 1897. Lionel Barnett prepared a handlist in 1908 and a more complete list in 1909. A study of the Sinhala verse (kavi) works in the collection was published in three volumes in Colombo 1954-5. Mr K. D. Somadasa, formerly University Librarian in Sri Lanka, began, while Curator of Sinhalese Manuscripts, Oriental Collections, of the British Library, the task of producing a detailed catalogue of the whole collection, and he has continued with the task after his retirement.

Volume 1 is the first in a projected series of five. It describes in an exemplary way over 300 manuscripts of texts written from mediaeval times to the nineteenth century, in Pāli, Sinhalese or Sanskrit. Most of these mss date from the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, although the earliest was copied in the fifteenth or sixteenth century. The main categories of religious literature represented in it are sūrasanna (Sinhala paraphrases of Pāli sermons), banakaṭhāvastu (collections of didactic religious stories selected from classical Sanskrit texts), Vinaya (disciplinary) and bhāvāna (meditation) texts. Each entry includes a description of the manuscript, the name of the text, extracts from it, references to printed editions, if any, comments by Mr Somadasa and quotations from Nevill’s own catalogue which, in eight hand-written volumes, is now with the collection in the British
Library. There are indexes of titles of texts, authors, and proper names in the colophons, and there is also a chronological index of the manuscripts.

While the catalogue was in preparation it became clear that the task of publishing such a work could only be achieved if modern methods of production were adopted, and Vols 1 and 2 have been prepared on a word processor. Even so, it became obvious while in the press that the British Library would have difficulty in meeting the cost of production. In view of the fact that many of the works described in Vol. 1 included Pāli or were commentaries on Pāli texts, and there is sufficient Pāli content in the mss described in Vol. 2 to justify it, the Pali Text Society decided that it would be quite in keeping with the purpose for which the Society was founded to make a contribution towards the cost. The first two volumes of the catalogue therefore appear under the joint imprint of the PTS and the British Library.

Volume 2 contains descriptions of 266 mss and completes the Pāli and Sinhala prose section of the Nevill collection termed ‘Non-canonical Buddhist works of devotion, doctrine and narrative’. The Sinhala verse portion of the narrative section could not, because of its bulk, be included in this volume and will appear in Volume 3. The general pattern of the entries follows that of the first volume. Similarly to Vol. 1, each entry includes a description of the manuscript, the name of the text(s) it includes, extracts from it, references to printed editions, if any, comments by Mr Somadasa, and quotations from Nevill’s own notes. However, as a change from, and an improvement upon, the first volume, Nevill’s notes are given in a smaller size of print to distinguish them from the rest of the entry. They are augmented, whenever necessary, by references to the standard authorities on Pāli and Sinhala literature. As with Vol. 1, there are indexes of titles of texts, authors, and proper names in the colophons. There is also a chronological index of the mss, showing that most of them date from the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The oldest to which a tentative date can be given [Or.6603(91), not (92) as the index states] is a copy of the Karma vibhāgaya (a Sinhalese text probably composed in the thirteenth century), which was probably made in the sixteenth century.

The length and value of the texts contained in these mss vary greatly. Some of the devotional works are short Pāli texts, with or without a Sinhalese translation or commentary, which are intended to give subject matter for sermons. Other works are translations or paraphrases of Pāli texts, including the Jātaka-aṭṭhakathā, the Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā, the Milindaṇāṇa, and many individual Jātaka stories, or commentaries upon Pāli texts, including the Bodhivamsa. Some are Sinhalese compositions extolling the virtues of listening to the Dhamma or giving alms to the Sangha. There are some very old Sinhalese works, including the Amāvatura which gives an account of eighteen damanas (subjugations), the Butsaraṇa which gives many illustrations of the excellence of taking refuge in the Buddha, and some from which Pāli versions were subsequently made, e.g. the Dhātuvamsaya from which the Pāli Lalāṭa-dhātu-vamsa seems to have been compiled. One of the most interesting works contained in this volume is the Detis Karmaya, an account of thirty-two wrong acts of the Buddha, in previous existences, as a result of which he suffered penalties even after becoming a Buddha. Nevill surmised that this was one of ‘the heretical books, probably of the Dhammarmukha sect of the Vajjiputtaka heresy, which was adopted by the Abhayagiri fraternity’. 
It is to be hoped that some other sponsor may be found to help bear the cost of subsequent volumes so that the whole catalogue of this most important collection of manuscripts may be published. Mr Somadasa concludes his Introduction to Volume 2 with the hope that the next three volumes will surmount the difficulties which have beset the first two and will appear at regular intervals - a hope that will be shared by all those who are eagerly awaiting the conclusion of this great project.

K. R. Norman


It is good to be able to report that the supply of publishable material in the field of Pāli studies, which enabled the Editor of the Journal of the Pali Text Society to produce Vol. XII within a year of the appearance of Vol. XI, has continued, so that Vol. XIII has appeared within a year of so of the publication of Vol. XII.

The first article in the volume (pp.1-31) is a catalogue by Dr William Pruitt of the Pāli manuscripts in Burmese script in the Library of Congress, Washington. In the second paper (pp.33-81) Mr Ole Holten Pind examines the grammatical references in some of the commentaries ascribed to Buddhaghosa, and shows fairly conclusively that early Pāli grammatical thinking was based upon Pāṇini, or on something based on Pāṇini. The greater part of the volume (pp.101-217) is given over to the text portion of the edition and translation of the so-called Patna Dharmapada, which Dr Margaret Cone successfully submitted to the University of Cambridge for the Ph.D degree in 1987. Although this work is not technically speaking in Pāli, it is in a dialect of Middle Indo-Aryan which closely resembles that language, and it is of the greatest importance for the understanding of the structure and language of the Pāli Dhammapada and of the way in which individual verses were made up.

In a fascinating paper (pp.83-100) Dr Gregory Schopen deals with the mysterious absence of any reference in the Pāli Vinaya to a cult of the stūpa which is found in every other Vinaya known to us. In his survey of Pāli Literature the present writer rather favoured an explanation based upon a belief that the cult of the stūpa concerned laymen, so there was no need for rules for monks. Other scholars have suggested that the Pāli Vinaya includes no reference to such a cult because it predates it, and is therefore the oldest in its present form of all the known Vinayas. Dr Schopen puts forward the intriguing explanation that certain references in Buddhaghosa and elsewhere seem to indicate that at one time there were references to such a cult in the Pāli Vinaya, and he suggests that all such references have at some time been removed. This causes a difficulty, because we would suppose that if those references were in the Vinaya at Buddhaghosa’s time, then he would have commented upon them. There are no such comments in the Samantapāśādikā as we have it, so that we should have to assume that all the relevant comments had been removed from that work also, and moreover so skillfully that no signs of the removal are detectable. Dr Schopen’s paper will certainly instigate further investigation, as scholars try to find evidence of excision having taken place in both canon and commentary. The final article in the volume is a set of Pāli
lexicographical studies (pp.219-27) by the writer of the present notice.

The volume ends with notices from the Council of the Society inviting suitable people to apply for the Society's Research Fellowships in Pāli Studies, of which four have been awarded since the scheme was instituted, and from the Editor soliciting suitable articles, preferably in camera-ready form, for publication in further numbers of the Journal.

K. R. Norman


This is a book that should be required reading for anyone interested in Buddhism as well as for all Buddhists, especially those who cannot resist the urge to divinise the founder of their religion, thus indulging in the all too human tendency to evade personal responsibility for one’s fate through devotionalism and reliance on mere rules and rituals.

As the title makes clear, the purpose of The Historical Buddha is to give us a faithful, unvarnished picture of the actual human being who, on the basis of specific personal experience and thanks to outstanding (but not, in any metaphysical sense, supernatural) gifts, was able to overcome the unsatisfactoriness of the human condition and to impart to others the knowledge and skills necessary for this achievement, while eschewing, and this is perhaps his truly unique achievement, all metaphysical and religious dressing up.

This does not mean that Dr Schumann's view is in any way a reductionist one. On the contrary, setting the Buddha's life work in its genuine historical, cultural and geographical context both illuminates our understanding of it and highlights the extraordinary human quality of the teaching.

To make its scope and intention clear from the very beginning (clarity and precision are, indeed, the outstanding characteristics of this work), the book also carries a subtitle: 'The Times, Life and Teachings of the Founder of Buddhism'. This is a wide-ranging programme and the contents, though necessarily concise owing to the limited format, fully live up to it.

In eight carefully articulated main chapters we are given a thoughtful, well-informed account of the Buddha’s youth, quest and enlightenment (Ch. 1), the beginning of his mission, with special reference to the dynamic first twenty years (Ch. 2 and 3), the basic aspects of the doctrine, the development and structure of the Order and its relations to the laity (Ch. 4), the later years and their crises (with an informative description of Devadatta's attempt to take over the Order), and rival philosophies, especially Jainism, as reflected in Buddhist sources (Ch. 6), and finally (Ch. 7), the last journeys, the Master’s death and cremation, and an epilogue (Ch. 8) with a brief outline of the process of fixation of the Pāli Canon through the first three Councils. Halfway through (Ch. 5: ‘Gotama - Psychological Aspects’), Dr Schumann pauses to consider the Buddha’s character and appearance, the development of his personality, how he regarded himself, his emotional disposition, his dealings with lay followers and, as Master, with the members of the Order.

All this is set within the framework of a lively account of social and daily life in the towns and countryside of ancient India, political systems and diplomatic relations in the northern
states where the Buddha was born and pursued his life work and, most importantly, the religious context of the ongoing confrontation between the old Vedic sacrificial cult and the spiritual and philosophical movements (followers of the Upanisads, materialists, ascetics, wandering mendicants) that, from the seventh century B.C.E., developed as a reaction against the increasingly formalistic Brahmin establishment.

The author brings to this many-sided task a strikingly apt combination of academic qualifications and practical familiarity with the Indian world. Having studied Indology, Comparative Religion and social anthropology at Bonn University (with a Ph.D thesis on Buddhist philosophy) and taught for some years at Banaras Hindu University, he joined the Foreign Service of the Federal Republic of Germany and spent seventeen years in consular and diplomatic service in Asia, where he was Consul General in Bombay at the time of the publication of The Historical Buddha. He has lectured on Buddhism at Bonn University and published, among others, Buddhismus - Stifter, Schulen und Systeme (1976) and Buddhistische Bilderwelt (1986), an iconographical handbook.

The Historical Buddha is a remarkably well organised presentation of a complex subject in simple language. Dr Schumann carries his erudition lightly: all his points are abundantly supported by precise references, mainly to the Pāli Canon, but this is not allowed to hinder the easy flow of narrative and comment, enlivened by brief evocative descriptions (e.g. of an Indian forest, p.50; the coming of the rains, pp.80-1; the now abandoned park sites of the famous monasteries so often mentioned in the discourses: Veluvana, Jetavana, Ghositārāma, p.177) and helpful accounts, often with plans and sketches, of important locations, as presently found (Sārnāth, pp.67-70) or archaeologically reconstructed (the city of Kapilavatthu, pp.13-18).

On the Buddha himself, Dr Schumann concentrates on the information contained in the Pāli Canon, judiciously avoiding all later hagiographically inclined material. He thus produces an entirely credible, well-rounded biography of a real, yet most exceptional figure in whom the qualities of a mystic, a skilful manager of affairs and a leader of men were harmoniously blended to a unique degree. From time to time, like any biographer endeavouring to put together a coherent narrative on the basis of patchy material, he has to make certain assumptions or inferences, but these are never far-fetched or arbitrary. He is fully aware of the scholarly issues involved on matters such as textual reliability, dating, etc. (see for instance his ‘Note on Chronology’ at the beginning of the book), and outlines them clearly enough without getting disputatiously involved in them. This is consistent with his purpose to produce a work of what the French like to call ‘haute vulgarisation’, i.e. a solid and reliable, yet readable account written by a specialist for the benefit of the intelligently interested reader. In this he succeeds brilliantly, and he has been extremely well served by his translator, M. O'C. Walshe, who is himself a Buddhist practitioner and a scholar of no mean stature.*

*One small quibble: ‘great family’ (p.43), a literal translation of the German ‘Grossfamilie’ is, of course a slip of the pen and should be rendered as ‘extended family’ in English. And I am puzzled by the meaning of ‘town attendants’ (p.28) at the end of a list of trades and crafts but, not having seen the original German, it is difficult to guess. Perhaps ‘town officials’ (Stadtbeamte)? - Ed. In fact, Stadtbüttel.

Amadeo Solé-Leris

"When you have a cold, get an aspirin. When you have a court case, get a lawyer. When you have a feeling... what then?

Many people find emotions or feelings confusing. In our civilization they are still regarded as something not entirely decent. For a long time, we tried to control emotions and feelings and hide them in order to protect ourselves from the insensitive and hostile actions of others. Today's psychoboom tries to make a profit on this fact, and there are many recipes for working with emotions on the market. To 'have the feeling that...' has become a fashionable expression and is unfortunately also often used by persons in positions of power to give emotional emphasis to their desires. Someone who says 'I have the feeling that' (often continuing 'that you...') goes on to express speculative points of view about others that are perhaps laden with fears, hopes, and even aspersions. In such a case, what is such a 'feeling' really composed of?

There are, however, also people who really feel. They do not 'have' feelings. Rather they experience through their emotions the qualities of their own state of mind and can also feel other people's situations. They experience the constant transformation of the world and of their own attitudes through their feelings. They value emotions as indicators of well-being. And yet we human beings are equipped with more than just feelings. It is the purpose of this book, in a dialogue with you, the reader, to discover, develop, and enjoy the inner factors leading to well-being and happiness. Thus your personal experiences and reactions as you read are very much sought after" (pp.xv-xvi).

This quotation from the 'Introduction' to The Art of Happiness aptly illustrates the author's qualities: a practical down-to-earth approach, and a relaxed, wide-open manner. Both, it is worth recalling, typical of the Buddha's own way of teaching. This is not accidental for, below this laid-back surface, there is a bedrock of sound knowledge of the Buddha's teaching, as expounded in the Abhidhamma (special teaching), the third of the major divisions of the Tipitaka, the Canon of Buddhist scriptures.

The basic point of The Art of Happiness is staggering in its simplicity: we all want to be happy, but tend to go about it the wrong way. This comes as no surprise to anyone familiar with the Buddha's teaching, as enunciated originally in the Four Noble Truths and elaborated in many discourses. The Abhidhamma, in developing the principles of this teaching, offers a systematic array of epistemological, ethical and psychological strategies and techniques that can be used to achieve the elimination of suffering by pursuing happiness in the right way.

What Dr Fryba has done in this excellent book is to suggest a variety of ways in which these strategies and techniques can be applied in a modern context. This, of course, is far from being as simple as it sounds. A Czech-born Swiss psychotherapist with vast experience in institutional and private practice, and many years of study and practice of Buddhism (including prolonged periods of residence in India and Sri

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Lanka), he is well able to translate the age-old wisdom of the Abhidhamma into terms and exercises which are easily accessible and helpful to us today, while preserving the specificity of the teachings.

All too often, when modern Western psychologists resort to Eastern traditions, the tendency is to 'explain' them in terms of Western paradigms. This, of course, facilitates conceptual understanding, but tends to annul or minimise their real benefits, which can only be gained by overcoming established Western mental habits and categories. We need to restructure our thinking and, most importantly, our experiencing, and this can only be done by learning to open up to these - to us - new ways on their own terms, instead of reducing them to our own.

Dr Frýba avoids the reductionist trap. He rightly stresses the practical nature of the Abhidhamma which, for all its forbiddingly dry and seemingly pedantic manner of presentation in the old texts, is very much concerned with living results here and now, in true Buddhist fashion.

This accounts for the universal character and contemporary relevance of its analyses and techniques:

"The Abhidhamma is only indirectly concerned with the contents of thought and with cultural ideas. Its subject matter has more to do with ways of experiencing and psychological laws. For that reason, one can no more call the Abhidhamma Asian or Buddhist than one can call the relativity theory of physics or psychoanalysis Jewish, even though their creators were Jewish" (p.24).

Putting into practice the Abhidhamma spirit, Dr Frýba gets down to brass tacks straightaway. The bulk of the book is devoted to the introduction and explanation of some thirty practical exercises which can be used in one's everyday life, on one's own, in training groups or in the context of meditation exercises. Theoretical information is included only to the extent necessary for the reader to understand the exercises and to be able to reflect usefully on the results achieved.

The Art of Happiness can rightly be described as an exercise manual, providing methodical instruction on what to do and how, yet it is very far indeed from the cut-and-dried approach of a standard textbook. Every page bears the imprint of Dr Frýba's own living experience in working with people. The tone is lively, conversational, and the reader is constantly being directly involved in working out open-ended suggestions and following up ideas. As the author says right at the beginning:

"This book is written for intelligent persons, who, though they may not necessarily possess scientific training, nevertheless wish to develop their own personal potential in a practical fashion" (p.xiii).

Being given the means of experiment here and now with the ancient teachings of Buddhist psychology, readers can see for themselves their astounding relevance to our most immediate problems, and are encouraged to nurture and develop their own capacity for happiness and their independence from set conditioning. From the Abhidhamma, Dr Frýba selects a variety of ways and means suitable for all kinds of cases and situations, including particularly difficult ones. At the same time, he makes it quite clear that everyone is free to adapt the proposed strategies to the specifics of their own situation, or to use them as a springboard for their own carefully considered initiatives. His avowed purpose is 'to stimulate the creativity of the reader, arouse unusual thoughts, and promote personal growth' (p.2.). In all this he succeeds excellently well. The Art of Happiness is one of the most stimulating books I have read in a long while, and I am sure it will do a lot of good to a lot
of people.

A word of appreciation is due to the translator, Michael H. Kohn. I am familiar with the original German text of the book and, being myself a professional linguist, I am only too well aware of the difficulties involved. Mr Kohn has overcome them brilliantly in producing an English rendering which combines scrupulous accuracy with an easy, idiomatic flow of language.

Amadeo Solé-Leris


It is only in recent years that one or two Western scholars have started to examine Svātantrika Madhyamaka thought, so long the neglected dimension of Madhyamaka studies. Jñānagarbhā wrote very few works, and his Satyadvayavibhanga with its autocommentary, both translated here, are certainly the most important. He is clearly a Svātantrika, and he was always classed as such by Tibetan scholars from the time of the Svātantrika/Praśangika distinction was first expressed in Tibet, probably during the eleventh century. Jñānagarbhā takes up several themes familiar from the writings of Bhāvaviveka, such as the distinction between an expressible (saparyāya) and inexpressible ultimate (aparyāyaparamārtha) and Eckel devotes some space to showing the significance of the logic tradition of Dharmakīrti in Jñānagarbhā's orientation and formulation.

Particularly striking in this text is the importance for Jñānagarbhā of reason (nyāya / rigs pa) in determining what is the ultimate. The ultimate truth in the final sense, he says, 'is truth that is consistent with a rational [cognition]' (Eckel's transl., p.71: de ni rigs pa'i rjes su 'gro ba can gyi bden pa nyid). The perennial problem of validation of (religious) experience is solved through subordination in one sense to analytic reason. In this respect, as elsewhere, we find Svātantrika precedents for features sometimes associated in particular with the dGe lugs tradition in Tibet. For Jñānagarbhā conventional truth (Eckel's 'relative truth') is 'only what corresponds to appearances' (ji ltar snang ba 'di kho na), 'whatever appears even to cowherders and women' (p.71). For Candrakīrti, of course, and one can presume Jñānagarbhā too, what appears to cowherders and their ilk is seen as inherently existent (Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya on 6.28). Since for Candrakīrti inherent existence (svabhāva) does not exist even conventionally it follows that Jñānagarbhā's conventional truth is for Candrakīrti not true at all, and Tsong kha pa is surely right in seeing the existence or non-existence of inherent existence conventionally as one of the characteristic distinguishing marks (for Tsong kha pa the distinguishing mark) of Svātantrika from Praśangika Madhyamaka.1 Eckel, incidentally, following David Seyfort Ruegg, suggests that this text by Jñānagarbhā may contain the clearest and perhaps the only Svātantrika response to the criticisms of the Svātantrika position made by Candrakīrti. Candrakīrti is not mentioned by

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name, and whether it is the Prāsaṅgika master who is being criticised awaits more detailed examination. The case may well be inconclusive.

While it is clear that Jñānagarbha is a Svātantrika, it is by no means clear whether he should be classed as a Sautrāntika or a Yogācāra-Svātantrika. He is said to have been the teacher of Śāntarakṣita, to whom is attributed a Pañjikā to the Satyadvayavibhāṅga from which Eckel includes substantial selections. As an eighth-century writer, one might expect Jñānagarbha to be part of the new move towards a rapprochement between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. The dGe lugs tradition, on the other hand, sees him as a Sautrāntika-Svātantrika, and Tsong kha pa argues that the Pañjikā is in fact not by the great Yogācāra-Svātantrika Śāntarakṣita. Eckel gives coherent reasons for thinking that Tsong kha pa has not supplied sufficient grounds for denying conclusively Śāntarakṣita's authorship. More important, Eckel is keen to stress the problematic nature of attributing to the fluid doctrinal situation in India distinctions crystallised and clarified by later Tibetan scholars with the benefit of hindsight and their own doctrinal concerns. It is not clear whether Jñānagarbha should be classed as a Sautrāntika or an early Yogācāra-Svātantrika because, during the period of evolution of what later came to be called 'Yogācāra-Svātantrika' a fluid situation, experiments in thought, mean that such clear-cut categories are not always applicable. Even where clear emergence of new directions has occurred, not all follow the new vogue.

Jñānagarbha's Satyadvayavibhāṅga and commentaries are short texts which have been almost completely ignored by modern scholars. And yet they are of central importance in understanding the interpretation and development of Madhyamaka thought. These are fascinating and enjoyable texts on a crucial theme in Madhyamaka philosophy and soteriology. Through this work it is to be hoped that they will gain their rightful place in Madhyamaka studies. These pieces are of importance not only for understanding eighth-century Madhyamaka but also the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka critique of Yogācāra, supplementing the well-known work of Bhāvaviveka on the same theme. Eckel offers clear accurate translations and a valuable edition of the Tibetan texts of the Satyadvayavibhāṅga and autocommentary. For good measure he also includes a reproduction of the Derge text. My only regret here is that he did not include at least the Derge edition of the Pañjikā, since he translates some quite long sections from the latter, and anyone needing to refer to the Tibetan text of the Satyadvayavibhāṅga and Vṛttī is also likely to need the Pañjikā as well.

There are inevitably going to be some points of criticism in detail. The Pañjikā refers to Buddhas and bodhisattvas remaining 'as long as there is samsāra (khor ba ji srid bar du bzhugs pa); from the perspective of relative truth they remain [in samsāra] (pp.107-8: kun rdzob kyi bden pa la brten nas ni bzhugs pa). The material added in brackets by the translator is unnecessary and misleading. Buddhas and bodhisattvas remain, but they do not remain in Samsāra. As Kamalaśīla makes it clear in his first Bhāvanākrama, the Buddhas - and therefore in the last analysis bodhisattvas - attain an apratīṣṭhītanirvāṇa which entails that they are in neither Nirvāṇa nor Samsāra. They have a body form, pure land and so on which results from means such as giving and so forth. Thus they are not in Nirvāṇa. They are not in Samsāra since through wisdom they have abandoned perversity (viparyāsa). 'Perversity', Kamalaśīla says, 'is the root of Samsāra' (Tucci ed.,
§ 82. Samsāra in Buddhism is not another name for the world, but is unenlightenment, the realm of cognitive and moral obscurations. Buddhas and bodhisattvas remain in caring relationship to the world, but they do not remain in Samsāra for otherwise they would not be enlightened. The point is minor in itself, but it is related to an understanding of what is going on in Mahāyāna Buddhology and, in particular, to the oft-stated but generally misunderstood view that in Mahāyāna Buddhism bodhisattvas through compassion turn back from enlightenment.

If Samsāra is misunderstood as the world, then bodhisattvas remain in Samsāra. If Nirvāṇa is misunderstood as the utterly transcendent (the supramundane) then bodhisattvas must turn back from Nirvāṇa to Samsāra in order to be compassionate. Both, however, are misleading and result from a tendency to see Nirvāṇa and Samsāra in (quasi) cosmological terms rather than as gnosis and ignorance and their concomitant mental states. How can the Buddha remain in ignorance?

At one point Eckel offers a retranslation of Donald Lopez Jr.'s version of a section from Icang skya Rol pa'i rdo rje's Grub mtha', which may as a consequence be rather misleading for those unfamiliar with dGe lugs thought. Icang skya speaks of the 'actual ultimate' as object, which is emptiness seen in direct non-dualistic concentrated insight. He also speaks of the 'actual ultimate' as subject, which is the non-conceptual awareness of a saint in concentration focused on emptiness. 'Thus this [non-conceptual awareness] also is the actual ultimate' (Eckel, p.112). It should be clear, however, that dGe lugs thought does not maintain that for Madhyamaka there are two ultimate realities, one of which is consciousness. This is a particularly sensitive issue in dGe lugs philosophy. Emptiness alone is the actual ultimate. Icang skya's Tibetan has no word for 'also' (and of course the Tibetan has no word for 'the'); it simply reads don dam dangos - [as a result it is an] actual ultimate. He goes on to explain, in a section not translated by Eckel, that consciousness is a conventional truth and not an ultimate truth. It is clear that consciousness is called an actual ultimate here not in the sense that it is a real ultimate truth, like emptiness, but inasmuch as it is being distinguished from another consciousness which is not the 'actual' ultimate in the context under discussion. 'Thus this [non-conceptual awareness] also is the actual ultimate' makes it look as though there are two types of real ultimate truths, or two ways of speaking about the ultimate truth.

Generally the book has few misprints. Something seems to have gone wrong with the footnote numbering on p.70, where there are two numbers 8s, the first of which should be 4 and the second 6. On p.157, I noted some misprints in the Tibetan texts mthing for mthong and gno for ngo. There are probably others. Footnote 173, p.149, reads from the Panjiṅka 'it [in the phrase 'its Manifestation Body'] is the body of the Tathāgata in the form of the Enjoyment [Body]'. The text commented on has 'The

2. It is sometimes said that the apratīṣṭhātanirvāṇa applies only to the status of bodhisattvas. Note here, however, that Kamalaśīla makes it quite clear that the apratīṣṭhātanirvāṇa applies also to Buddhas. In this passage he actually refers not to bodhisattvas at all, but to the Bhagavat and, according to the Tibetan version, the Tathāgata.

3. For further comments on the misleading but common idea that bodhisattvas in the Mahāyāna turn back from enlightenment, see Paul Williams, Mahāyāna Buddhism: The doctrinal foundations, London 1989, pp.52-4.

Conqueror (jina) uses it to accomplish all that the world must accomplish. It is his Manifestation Body...'. Both 'its' refer to the Manifestation Body and not the Enjoyment Body. My edition of the Cūṇa text reads 'dī'ī, which must be 'his' here. So read "His' [in the phrase 'his manifestation Body'] refers to the body of the Tathāgata in the form of the Enjoyment [Body]."

The recovering of an important text from obscurity must always be a cause for rejoicing. Malcolm Eckel has produced a neat, clear translation and edition. The detailed assessment of this text in the wider context of Indo-Tibetan thought and perhaps also religious and mystical writing remains to be done. For the moment we must express gratitude to Eckel for a work which makes a very welcome contribution to the textual study of Buddhism.

Paul Williams


This is a very welcome book on a subject which rarely receives the attention it deserves outside of specialist publications and travellers reports. Not only is Central Asia an ill-defined area with a largely unknown history, it is also an area in which Indian Buddhism was transplanted and where it flourished for centuries. It is therefore greatly to his credit that Dr Puri has focused on this area and has brought together a wealth of material in a condensed and compact form. It is compact but comprehensive for, in just over 300 pages, we are given detailed data (names, dates, events, politics, art and economics) concerning the whole area, mainly covering what used to be called Eastern Turkestan as well as parts of Afghanistan and Russian Turkestan. The span of this survey stretches over at least eleven centuries, from the Greek incursions of the fourth century B.C.E. to the Uighur supremacy of the ninth century C.E.

The establishment and development of Indian Buddhism in Central Asia has interest and importance, not only in its own right, but also for its influence upon and its transmitting function for early Chinese Buddhism. By far the main avenue for the flow of Buddhist elements into China were the various trade routes crossing the deserts and high passes of Central Asia. The trade routes, or caravan links to be more precise, took Chinese produce, particularly silk, across Central Asia, Persia and the Middle East to the Mediterranean ports of Antioch, Alexandria and to Byzantium; from thence onward to the rest of the Roman world. This is the celebrated 'Old Silk Road' which features in the glossy travel brochures of today, but which in its heyday was often tenuous, always dangerous, sometimes lethal. It could be the means of making fortunes for the successful merchant traveller or it could decimate the caravan and it frequently caused the deaths of all the travellers.

In the reverse direction, and for a period of four or five centuries, this same route carried Buddhist monks, teachers and lay believers through the same dangers and hardships to the various city states along the several tracks. Otherwise they went on into China itself where most found a warm welcome and encouragement to translate their texts, to teach, or just to recite what they knew for others to convert into a medium understandable to the Chinese.

Before long the Chinese themselves were wending their way along these same difficult caravan routes, but their
destination was India, for them the Holy Land of Buddhism. They set out, not for trade, but to gain first-hand knowledge of the Buddha’s Teaching from the great Indian teaching centres such as Nālandā, Taxila and elsewhere. Or else they hunted out copies of Buddhist texts which they regarded as vital to their own developing Buddhist community. Some of them made the arduous and life-threatening journey simply to visit the holy places of the Buddha’s ministry. Perhaps the most famous of these Chinese pilgrims and one who combined all those purposes, was Hsuan-tsang, who made a successful return trip in the middle of the seventh century.

From the point of view of Central Asia itself, Buddhism was well-established among the various city states which lined the several routes skirting the Taklamakan desert and around the Tarim Basin. Here, great centres of Buddhist piety, art and learning developed at places like Kashgar, Kucha, Khotan and their environs; so much so that certain Chinese travellers found it unnecessary to journey further than those centres to find the texts or the teachers they sought.

One of the most interesting aspects of Central Asian Buddhism is the fact that the whole area eventually became multi-cultural. Towards the latter end of its Buddhist history it acted like a crucible wherein blended to produce, during the ninth and tenth centuries of our era, strange hybrids of religious culture and practice.

Dr Puri’s work informs us of all these aspects, particularly in his Chapters III and VI. Chapter IV deals specifically with literary activities and here he mentions many of the titles of the Buddhist texts which were in vogue during the Buddhist period and he also informs us about the finds which have been made by the great archaeologists of recent times. Chapter VI describes the enormous range of Buddhist art which has been found among the desert ruins of the area. Among these are notable fresco paintings, bas relief sculpture and the remnants of architectural structures like ruined stūpas and monastery buildings. And it is here that the diverse influences can be detected which brought about the striking fusion of styles. There are Buddhist motifs and portraits in Persian, Indian and Chinese style; some presenting a blend of more than one style.

Despite an enormous wealth of data of all kinds, for which the general reader must be grateful to the author, this reviewer was rather disappointed not to find some presentation or discussion concerning the actual form of Buddhist practice and studies characteristic of the several centres. Certainly we are told that a certain centre was Hinayāna or Mahāyāna, but what kind of Mahāyāna for example? And why, for instance, did certain places gain a reputation for particular types of Buddhist teaching; the Sarvāstivāda in Kuchā and the Mahāyāna in Khotan? We are given the eye-witness reportage of famous Chinese pilgrims such as Fa-hsien and Hsuan-tsang at various places but there is no description or elaboration of what actually took place in the primary monasteries, such as we have for Nālandā. Nor have we any indication of how the general populace practised or adhered to Buddhist ideals. Perhaps the accessible material is so far silent on these matters; even if that is the case, it would have been helpful to have been told so. This is especially noticeable in Chapter III ‘Buddhism and Buddhist Savants of Central Asia’. Certainly we are presented with an impressive roll-call of Buddhist teachers and translators who originated from Central Asia and who eventually went to China. But this is not what one was led to expect from the title. The ‘Buddhism . . . of Central Asia’ seems to be conspicuous by its absence.

Unfortunately, this otherwise useful and admirable work
contains numerous typographical blemishes and certain errors of fact. Firstly, and in addition to such mistakes, this reviewer thinks that the map opposite p.17 leaves a lot to be desired. It is little more than a sketch and those unfamiliar with the geography will find it difficult to distinguish between some of the rivers and the trade routes, since both are depicted by unbroken lines. The subject deserves a map with more clarity of topographical detail.

Two errors of fact need correction. At p.174 the Mahāsāṅghika school is referred to as belonging to the Mahāyāna. It has been known for some years, and established by such scholars as Bureau, that the Mahāsāṅghikas were one of the so-called eighteen schools of the Hinayāna, despite their highly developed doctrines. Much more serious are the erroneous components of the important Mahāyāna practice formula, the six Pāramitās. At p.198, n.61, five of these are listed but only two of the five are correct. The full list of six should be: dāna, sīla, kāma, viśva, dhyāna and prajñā: a set of six which is attested through the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras and other Mahāyāna texts.

The printing lapses are so numerous as to suggest little or no competent proof-reading. These errors reach such a frequency that the reader begins to have doubts about the rendering of names and words that he is unfamiliar with, because of the mis-spelling of those which he does know. A few samples now follow to indicate how some of them actually misinform as well as misrepresent.

p.148, n.182: ‘Noernle’ for Hoernle (an error compounded by the fact that this author is listed in the Bibliography under his first name, Rudolph).

p.110: ‘Suraṅganasūtra’ for Śūraṅgamamādhisūtra (not listed at all in the Index).

p.130: ‘Yogīkarabhumi’ for Yogācārabhumi. Also, ‘... enough for salutation’ - presumably intended for ‘... enough for salvation’.

p.175, n.1: ‘... A von le Cog’ for A von le Coq (also at p.179, n.11).

p.182: ‘Uighur’ and ‘Uigur’ within three lines of text.

p.295: The place-name ‘Pjendzikent’, while at p.296: ‘Pendzhikent’ and then ‘Pendzikent’... which is it? And no entry at all in the Index.


This is but a selection, there are numbers of others which it would be too tedious to inflict upon the reader. It does add up, however, to the need for a thorough revision of the text, not the substance, but the basic accuracy of the wording and spelling.

Notwithstanding its many discrepancies and some disappointing lack of address to substantive matters, Buddhism in Central Asia is packed with data about Central Asia and its important centres and native teachers. As a convenient handbook for the general reader it must be highly rated.

Eric Cheetham

Ed.: Most literature in this field appears in German and Russian, followed by French. In English, apart from travelogues, ancient and modern, surveys of the regional art and archaeology, almost the only available and relevant materials on the subject comprise Kshanika Saha, Buddhism in Central Asia (Calcutta 1970), B. A. Litvinsky, ‘Central Asia’, and Lore Sander, ‘Buddhist Literature in Central Asia’ (both in Encyclopaedia of Buddhism V, I (Colombo 1979). See also C. S. Upasak, History of Buddhism in Afghanistan, Sarnath 1990.

Though hardly more than an extended monograph, Eugen Herrigel's (d. 1955) Zen in the Art of Archery has exerted an influence quite disproportionate to its size and is now regarded as something of a classic in its field. Hence, a reprint of this companion volume, The Method of Zen, compiled posthumously from unpublished notes and mss will be welcomed by many. As a German professor who visited Japan and taught philosophy at the University of Tokyo in the 20's and 30's, the source of Herrigel's abiding enthusiasm is evident in his work: like his well-known peer, Karlfried Dureckheim, Herrigel possessed a rare empathy which enabled him to absorb and assimilate the spirit of Zen, neither indulging his European prejudices nor becoming a pitiable imitator, but as one who knew the power of vocal silence - that the truth of Zen cannot enter in where a 'for' or 'against' still operates as resistance against 'what is' - in the deepest and most intrinsic sense.

Herrigel's opening note is of interest, relating to the circumstances of his first encounter with a Japanese Zen Buddhist - in a restaurant on the seventeenth floor of a Tokyo hotel during an earthquake. While most of the guests present panicked, Herrigel's Buddhist colleague simply joined his palms together and withdrew into an unassailable inner centre, resuming the thread of his conversation once the fearful tremors and rumblings had ceased. Herrigel describes the compelling effect this exerted upon him, overcoming his urge to panic or take flight, inducing calmness. It was this manifestation of 'Zen cool' that finally clinched Herrigel's decision to find a rōshi and take the path of Zen' or 'to be on the way of Zen', hinting that the path to the goal and the goal itself are intrinsically related. Despite the English title, The Method of Zen, Herrigel's work makes clear that any idea of methodically setting out to edit a better version of ourselves - as if we could stand behind ourselves and push - would be doomed to failure. No, Zen is a question of allowing ourselves to be 'worked upon' by attuning ourselves to a new centre, or rather, according with the one true centre which is always there, beyond the centripetal dictates of the ego which forever throw us off balance while claiming to be the only master in the house.

"The more a human being feels himself to be a self, tries to intensify this self and reach never attainable perfection, the more drastically he steps out of the centre of being, which is no longer his own centre, and thus the further he removes himself from it ..." (p.8).

"For the Zen Buddhist everything that exists, apart from man - animals, plants, stones, earth, air, fire, water - lives undemandingly from the centre of being, without having left it or being able to leave it. If man, having strayed from this centre, is to know security and innocence of existence as they live it, because ultimately they live without purpose, there is no alternative for him but a radical reversal. He must go back along the way whose thousand fears and tribulations have shown it to be the way of error, must slough off everything that promised to bring him to himself, renounce the seductive magic of a life lived on his own resources, and return home to the 'house of truth' which he wantonly left in order to chase phantoms when he was scarcely fledged. He must not 'become as a little child', but like forest and rock, like flower and fruit, like wind and storm" (ibid.).
fateful comments for an epoch wherein man has set himself against nature and the very elements to such an extent that the very survival of his habitat is now in question. In Herrigel's time, this was less evident than it is today but still, in the face of dire warnings, we rub our hands and say, 'What to do?' - failing to comprehend that this fate is but a mirror-image of our own alienation from the greater life within us. The beauty of Herrigel's little book is that it is nothing more than a series of obiter dicta relating to the Zen-life; no academic pretensions, no sectarian plumage, just the personal testimony of one who moved within the orbit of those who knew what it meant to be 'on the way of Zen', until he found its resonance permeating his own life, beyond the claims of 'mine' and 'thine', 'self' and 'other'.

Herrigel knew how to 'listen' to his Japanese mentors, not just with his ears but from the heart (hsin / kokoro), with the hara and his whole being. Hence, although brief, this little book probably says more about Zen just because it doesn't try to say it all. Herrigel's thoughts touch on a variety of topics (the work is divided under twenty-four sub-headings) - remarks on classical Zen training, the role of the kōan, reflections on how Zen appears to Western eyes, how the Master sees whether the pupil has satori, remarks on Japanese acting, man's fall and fulfilment, etc. - the author always orbiting a central point, leading us to an appreciation of its presence in our own lives, sure measure of Herrigel's receptivity towards his teachers. Since the introduction of Zen transmission lines to our native shores, much has been made of the ethnic problems encountered with the task of adapting Zen to Western needs and, while there is something to such arguments (not that Japanese rōshis have ever suggested that we ought to live like Orientals), Herrigel's book is singularly free of them because he concentrates upon the 'one living fact' which is always there, before and after such questions have been posed.

"Mysterious, unfathomable, and unutterable as the mystic experience itself is, the road that leads to it should not be. It is meant to be accessible to anyone of good will, if only in stretches, as measured out to him by fate. Thus there is a practicalness about Zen which inspires confidence' (Zen as it appears to western eyes', p.11).

Quite appropriately, Herrigel's reflections on Zen hint or point, rather than explain - thus compelling us to participate. However, perhaps a bit more precision and substance could have been given to the discussion (pp.59-60 of Tozan Ryōkai's (ninth cent.) verses on the 'five ranks' (go-i)). Only two of the 'five ranks' are mentioned, almost parenthetically, before Herrigel's comments are cut short. The Zen tradition has produced a considerably large body of commentarial literature on the 'five ranks' - and, once committed to a discussion of this topic which is really the Zen appropriation of Kegon (Hua-yen) ideas - a certain amount of follow-through is required to make proper sense of it. Of course, the problem here was that a whole book could have been devoted to this theme - the complex inter-related meaning of the go-i verses. Hence, the net result of such brief discussion is that Herrigel merely succeeds in whetting our appetite without coming up with the goods. This

2. Alfonso Verdu, Dialectical Aspects in Buddhist Thought, Center for East Asian Studies, University of Kansas, 1974, which provides a very readable account of the go-i verses and commentarial sources by Hui-hung and Yuan-hsien etc.
book was compiled after the author’s death, and it may well have been his intention to revise his Ms or otherwise add to it, so why cavil about this shortcoming? Taken as a whole, there is a fresh and uncluttered directness about Herrigel’s work which reminds us that Zen does not make its call to the ‘temporal man’ alone or concern itself with the accidents of time and place, but encourages us to see our temporal activities grounded in a timeless ‘presence’. Those not called to the task need not undertake it; those who know its value will not resent paying the price.

Richard Hunn
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