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UDĀNAVARGA

Chapter II

K Ā M A V A R G A - Desire

1. O desire, I know your root; it is from imagination that you spring. I will not imagine you, and you will not arise in me.
2. From desires springs grief, from desires springs fear; men free from desires have no grief; whence could fear (come to them)?
3. From pleasures springs grief, from pleasures springs fear; men freed from pleasures have no grief; whence could fear (come to them)?
4. At first sweet, but bitter in their maturity... desires burn the madman, as a torch burns the hand, if it is not relinquished.
5. It is not the bond of iron, of wood, of balba grass, that the venerable ones have declared solid. (The solid bond) is the attention which attaches the mind to earrings of precious stones, to children, to women.
6. This is the bond that the venerable ones have declared solid, everywhere rigid, difficult to unbind. But men without desires, even breaking that bond, devote themselves to the wandering life, renouncing the joys of desire.
7. The brilliant things of this world are not desires, man's desire is coloured by imagination. Brilliant things exist in this world, and here below, the wise tame their desires.
8. Desires are not eternal among men. And transitory are the things to which men subject to desire are attached. He who renounces this in order to avoid being reborn, I say that he will not go the kingdom of death.
9. Of the man in whom the aspiration (for Nirvāna) is born, who has escaped impurity (?), whose mind is calm, whose thought is not attached to desire, it is said: He is above the stream (urdhvasrotah).
10. Gradually, little by little, tirelessly, the wise man should cast out the defilement in himself, like the workman that in silver.
11. Like the cartwright (?) cutting out shoes from leather... as one cuts out desires, things take a more favourable turn.
12. He who seeks complete happiness, let him renounce all desires; having renounced all desires, he attains supreme happiness.

13. As long as desire is pursued, mental contentment is not found; then, those find contentment, who find it in wisdom.
14. It is better to have contentment in wisdom; for desire does not content; the man who finds contentment in wisdom does not fall under the blow of a (second) existence.
15. Men distracted by desires, in truth delight in the wrong; they do not perceive the danger, even if their life is near its end.
16. Possessions cause the downfall of the fool, but not of him who seeks by himself. The fool through his possessions and his cravings causes his own downfall as well as that of others.
17. Even a shower of karsāpanas does not bring the satisfaction of desires; there is only a faint taste of happiness in desires, the wise man knows this.
18. Even in the heavenly enjoyments, delight is not found. The Buddha's disciple finds his pleasure in the suppression of craving.
19. Even a golden mountain such as the Himālaya would not be treasure enough for a single man; knowing this, one goes in peace.
20. The man who knows what suffering is and what its origin is, how could he find delight in desire? Attachment, in this world, is wretchedness; with this thought, the wise man would learn to cast it out.

(Translated by Sara Boin Webb from the French of W.P.Chakravarti)

NOTES ON PĀLI CANONIC STYLE

A. Syrkin

Notwithstanding certain re-evaluations of the views of the older Anglo-German school on the authentic value of the Pali Canon, this preserves its importance as the most complete and consecutive exposition of earlier Buddhist dogmatics¹, the exposition presenting a source, irreplaceable both from a historical and literary point of view. Within the frames of the Canon, the Dīgha Nikāya (DN) - "the book of longer sayings" - opens the second of the three Pīṭakas - dedicated first of all to ethics and containing the best artistic specimens of Pāli. The genre of sutta is represented in DN by the longest (of the title of the book) and the relatively complex texts, as regards plot and composition. At the same time DN is evidently one of the oldest parts of the Pali Canon, compiled during the first two-three centuries after the Buddha's death.² The analysis of DN style seems, therefore, to be significant for the study of earlier Pāli artistic style and, wider, of classical Indian poetics, including non-Buddhist tradition. The language of DN excels by a rich vocabulary (surpassing in this respect some of the Hindu canonical texts - e.g. the Upaniṣads) and together with some other Tipitaka books, can be regarded as a model of classical Pāli.³

DN is divided into three parts (vaḅga) containing, respectively, 13, 10 and 11 suttas unified according to rather different principles.⁴ The first part, Silakkhandavagga ("A section referring to ethical rules"), includes I - XIII suttas⁵ with common content each of which presents certain rules of moral conduct (sīla), speaks about knowing the truth and degrees of perfection (jhāna), leading to the highest concentration (samādhi). Corresponding admonitions repeat themselves with certain abbreviations and variants (such as different refrains; addresses that change according to the personality of interlocutor; use of synonyms - e.g. sīla - carana etc.) in II-XIII, beginning with the words idha...Tathāgato loke upajjati - "There appears in the world...an arahant"⁶ (II 40 a.o.) - and ending with nāparam itthattāyāti - "After this present life there will be no beyond..." (II 98 a.o.).⁷ This repetition, divided in different suttas into a different number of paragraphs (see DRC, I) comprises II 40-98 = III 2.2 = IV 23 = V 27 = VI 16-19 = VII 2-5 = VIII 19-20 = IX 7-13 = X 1.7-2.36 = XI 9-66 = XII 19-77 = XIII 40-75. As for other parts of these suttas, some of them include independent narrations with various precepts (III, V, XIII), while some present strictly speaking only more or less original frames of the repetition mentioned (cf. below). Most of them contain in the last lines (though sometimes a little earlier) stereotype words of the Buddha's converted opponent, who sought to be accepted into the

Order. We find here this formula in 8 out of 13 suttas (II-IV, VIII-X, XII, XIII), and only three times in all the other 21 suttas of DN (XVI 5.28; XXIII 29; XXXI 35).

The next section, Mahāvagga ("A large section"), though containing less suttas than the first and the third part of DN (10, i.e. XIV-XXIII), is indeed the largest - thanks to the size of XVI Mahāparinibbāna (other suttas of this part are much shorter and approximately equal to other DN suttas). In seven of them (XIV-XVII, XIX, XX, XXII) the title begins with Mahā-, which is not used in the other parts. This definition, reflected in the title of the second part, was explained particularly by the supposition that corresponding suttas existed previously in larger versions and were abridged in the extant text.⁸ In any case, the principles of unification seems to be quite formal here. At the same time some traits differentiate XIV-XXIII suttas from I-XIII: certain developed techniques of narrative, use of mythological plots, evolution of certain concepts. We find here much more metrical interpolations (*gāthā*) than in the first part (34 to 3). Within the frames of the second part of DN, perhaps only XV and XXIII (incidentally, containing only a few verses) are more similar to the suttas of the first part.

The third part of DN, Pāṭikavagga - XXIV-XXXIV, is deliberately named after the Buddha's unsuccessful adversary from the first sutta of this part (XXIV - Pāṭika Sutta), which occurs only in this portion of DN.⁹ The narrative element is also relatively developed here and the number of *gāthā* is still larger (146). It was supposed that some traits of this part are connected with addressing rather big audiences.¹⁰ The third part is heterogeneous enough in respect of its didactics and the ways of presentation. Purely didactic texts like XXVIII, XXXIII, XXXIV alternate here with those reflecting ritual procedures (XXXII - a peculiar charm against evil forces), views on cosmogony, natural history, social relations (XXVI, XXVII). The didactics themselves are not confined to Buddhist doctrine and the Order but refer also to the life of the householder (cf. XXXI). In XXIV the Buddha's precepts are combined with a vivid portrait of his opponent, Pāṭika, and probably contain certain elements of humour (see below). XXVI and especially XXVII are perhaps influenced by legends of the Purāṇic type. In separate suttas (cf. XXX, XXXI, XXXII) the major part of the text consists of verses. On the other hand, XXXIII and XXXIV (excepting 1.1) are written entirely in prose and stand apart from other suttas of DN, with respect to their composition (see below; cf. also XXXI 8-12; 15-19; 21-25; 28-33). XXV is relatively near to the suttas of the first part (cf. VIII) whereas XXVIII presents an expanded variant of XVI 1.15-17. We shall return again to certain peculiarities, which distinguish separate parts of DN.

The verses (*gāthā*) of DN, based on the syllabic principle, are mostly represented (with certain digressions) by metres containing eight (*śloka*, *anuttubha*), or eleven (*tutthubha*) syllables in each of four (or six) parts (*pāda*).¹¹ As stated, these verses are almost absent in the first part of DN, where they serve only as a résumé of separate verses (cf. III 1.28; XI 85). They occur more often in the second and even more so in the third part, fulfilling a narrative function and freely alternating with prose (cf. e.g. in XVI). Sometimes they play an independent rôle which is confined neither to didactics nor narration and sounds somewhat emotional (cf. XIX 44: monologue of Pañcasikha in XXI 5 sq. etc.). They can constitute a prominent part of separate suttas - e.g. almost all XX (5-22), or XXXII (3-7, 10). An interesting case is that of XXX in which prose systematically alternates with verses containing metrical variations¹² (cf. also XXXI). Every part of DN is also concluded by a strophe, listing all corresponding suttas. The rôle of verses in DN and more so in some other Tipitaka books permits one to suggest that the Pali Canon is based not only on narrative prosaic texts (in particular of the Brāhmana kind) but on poetic texts as well.¹³

R.O. Franke suggests that the supposed unity and completeness of DN indicates a single man's authorship and literary redaction.¹⁴ Such unity, however, seems to be somewhat exaggerated by him and is refuted by some scholars.¹⁵ As we see, within the framework of different parts the narration is different enough with respect both to style and composition. It has already been observed (P. Bapat, G. Pande a.o.) that a lack of uniformity can be perceived not only in separate parts of DN, but in separate suttas as well. At the same time, one cannot deny certain traits which are common to the whole Book. In particular, some textual and thematic (cf. below) parallels between neighbouring suttas - cf. already mentioned repetitions in II-XIII, description of different professions in I-II, evidences on Bimbisāra in IV-V, connection between events described in XVI and XVII (death of the Buddha) etc.¹⁶ Another trait is that of consequent "fastenings" (*Verknüpfungen*) between I and II, II and III, III and IV etc. with the help of specific formulas.¹⁷ These observations are quite correct, though it remains very probable that such parallelisms were, for the major part, stimulated not so much by the redactor's premeditated unification of the text, as by more general and impersonal traits of Pali canonic style such as use of stereotype expressions, formulas, repetitions (see below) etc. These traits permit one to establish numerous textual coincidences, not only within the framework of DN but, e.g. between different Nikāyas of the Sutta Pitaka itself.

Among such common principles, important for the structure of the text, one can mention the description based on the enumeration (exhaustive or se-

lective) of logical possibilities or of qualities combined within a definite set - a device which goes beyond the Buddhist or Hindu tradition and leads us to a more general problem of the history of scientific language. For example, we find it already in I where the following possibilities are enumerated: "Whether there is another world?" - "Whether there is not another world?" - "Whether there both is and is not another world?" - "Whether there neither is nor is not another world?" and so on, concerning other phenomena (I 2.27; cf. similar constructions of the type P, not P (or opposite to P), P and not P, neither P nor not P, in VI 6 sq.; VIII 4; IX 27,31 etc.¹⁸ One can see that a major part of these enumerations is necessarily based on fourfold sets, which can be correlated with an evidently predominant rôle of tetrad and its multiples in Buddhist canonical texts. Such is, e.g., a number of precepts connected with "four grounds" (vatthūni) in I 1.30; 2.1 sq.; 16 sq.; 23 sq. etc. The 62 doctrines (ditthi, i.e. the wrong views described by the Buddha in DN 1)^{18a} classified according to these grounds are distributed thus: 18 (4+4+4+2) + 44 $\sqrt{16}$ (4+4+4+4) + 8 (4+4) + 8 (4+4) + 7 + 5. We can cite in this connection II 91; IV 4 sq.; VI 6-7; XI 67 sq; XIII 76-77; XXII 6 etc. The corresponding principle is perhaps the most important in traditional Buddhist dogmatics - cf. such concepts, often mentioned in DN, also as the four noble Truths (ariya sacca), the four degrees of perfection (jhāna), the eightfold path (aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo), the thirty-two signs of the Buddha (lakkhana) etc.

The principle of triad is relatively less important, though we can trace it on different levels as well. Apart from more general regularities (cf. division of the Tipitaka itself), we find it consecutively in the triple structure of DN, in I and in I.1 (1.7-10; 11-20; 21-27).¹⁹ This principle is used in the structure of repetitions (see below) - cf. threefold addresses in XI 1-3; XIV 3.3-6; XVI 5.24 etc.; questions in III 1.20; XI 81-83; XIII 11 etc. Concerning dogmatics, one can be reminded here of numerous references to the Three Refuges (Tisarāṇa: Buddha, Dhamma, Saṅgha), used for joining the Order.²⁰ Cf. also three kinds of self (atta) - IX 39 sq.; three bodies of doctrine - X 1.6; three kinds of wonders - XI 3 etc.

Other number complexes, though not so important, were often used in Buddhist tradition²¹ - numerous examples are presented in XXXIII and XXXIV built on corresponding principles. The analysis of separate lists, however deliberate they may seem, can also show certain regularities - cf. for example, the rôle of sevenfold sets in II 20 (seven kinds of gods, of men, of demons, of great lakes etc.). Some of these examples have noteworthy parallels in other traditions.²² At the same time separate fragments can be probably regarded as a tribute to a kind of "number automatism" - for example in the exposition of

XXXIII and XXXIV, already mentioned above, where we find a consecutive gradation from 1 to 10 (relatively more regulated in XXXIV, which gives ten examples of every separate number complex - cf. also XXXI). A similar principle serves as a basis for a much larger Pāli canonic text - Aṅguttara Nikāya, compiled evidently later. We find other examples of such automatism in I 1.31 sq. where the Buddha speaks consecutively of one, two, three, four, five, etc. former births.²³

The character and rôle of number symbolism in DN is connected with another characteristic trait of the text - that of repetitions. The latter is also typical of classical Indian texts beyond the Buddhist tradition (cf. e.g. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad II 4= IV 5; Bṛhadār. Up. II 1 = Kausītaki Up. IV etc.)²⁴ and has numerous analogies in other cultures (for example, in the synoptic Gospels). One can see, however, that in Pāli canonical texts (and particularly in DN) this device is employed almost to the extent of cliché in the greater part of certain suttas.²⁵ A tendency towards repetition can be discerned in different levels of the text - from separate morphological, lexical, phraseological units to relatively long fragments including, sometimes, scores of paragraphs. E.g. a characteristic of classical Buddhist prose²⁶ is the repetition of certain words in different combinations (objects with the same verb, attributes with noun, etc.). In the very beginning of DN we find such stereotype descriptions of the Buddha, his followers etc.: mahatā bhikkhu = saṅghena saddhim pañca-mattehi bhikkhu satehi ("with a great company of the brethren, with about five hundred brethren - I 1.1 etc.); Buddhassa avannaṃ bhāsati... Buddhassa vannaṃ bhāsati ("speaking in dispraise of the Buddha, in dispraise of the Doctrine, in dispraise of the Order... in praise of the Buddha, in praise of the Doctrine, in praise of the Order... - ibid.); samaggarāmo paṇḍita = raṭo paṇḍita = paṇḍi samagga = karaniṃ vācam bhāsita ("a peacemaker, a lover of peace, impassioned for peace..." I 1.9); kāla = vādi bhūta = vādi attha = vādi dhamma = vādi vinaya = vādi ("in season he speaks, in accordance with the facts he speaks, words full of meaning he speaks, on religion he speaks, on the discipline of the Order he speaks - ibid.). Cf. also I 3.74: Attha = jālan... Dhamma = jālan... Brahma = jālan... Ditthi = jālan;²⁷ II 1: raṇṇiṃvā... ratti, abhirūsa... ratti, dassaniṃvā... ratti, pāsādikā... ratti, lakkhana... ratti; II 102: khatāyam bhikkhava rāja, upahatāyam bhikkhava vāṇi. In this connection another similar device can be mentioned - a consecutive use of words, synonymically close to each other, with possible sound repetitions on lower (particularly morphological) levels - for example: abhisandeti parisandeti paripureti paripharati ("his very body does he so pervade, stretch, permeate and suffuse with joy - II 75 sq.; cf. XXII 18 etc.).²⁸ On the other hand the antonymous pairs are

also usual - some of them enter the enumerations of logical possibilities (see above) and for their part contain certain repetitions on different levels. Cf. for example: samudayañ ca atthagamañ ca assādañ ca ādinavañ ca ("rising up and passing away...sweet taste...danger" - I 1.36 sq.); ekacca = sassatikā ekacca = asassatikā (Eternalists...non = Eternalists - I 2.1 sq.); sukhe dukkhe ("and ease and pain" - II 89); dibbe ca mānuse ca, ye dñre santike ca ("both human and celestial, whether far or near" - II 89); sa = rāgam... vīta = rāgam... ("the passionate... the calm..." - II 91-92) etc.²⁹ Such constructions, when "unfolded", can often result in a certain parallelism of separate paragraphs and parts of the sutta, which differ one from another only by corresponding elements (cf. below).

Besides certain formulas common to different texts (like e.g. evaṃ me sutam in the very beginning) DN contains numerous phrase repetitions, within the frames of separate suttas and their fragments. Such are anaphoras yathā vā pañ'eke bhonto samāna = brāhmaṇā... in every paragraph of I 1.11-27; idha bhikkhave ekacco samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā (in I 1.31-34) and so on. There are refrains like: iti vā hi bhikkhave putthujāno Tathāgatassa vannaṃ vadamaṇo vadevya (I 1.8-27); idam pi'ssa hoti silasmim (II 42-63 etc.). A stereotype description of the Buddha's qualities often is repeated: tam kho pana Bhagavantam Gotamaṃ evaṃ kalyāṇo kitti = saddo abhuggato... ("And this is the good report that has been noised abroad as to Gotama the Blessed One" - II 8; III 1.2; IV 6; XIII 7 etc.; cf. XXVI 25 etc). Some repetitions evidently fulfil certain narrative functions, ensuring a kind of retardation in descriptions of personages and situations; in admonitions, speeches and replies, which are repeated partially or in full, sometimes with certain variations - cf. for example: I 1.1-4; 2.17-20, 24-25; 3.32-44, 45-57, 58-70; II 2-7, 16, 18-19, 21-22 etc. (where in the exposition of different doctrines only intermediate paragraphs - 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32 differ more substantially); 83-84, 85-88, 87-88, 89-90, 91-92 etc.; III 1.12-13; 2.3; IV 5-6 (= V 6-7); V 12, 16 sq; VI 6-7, 8-9, 10-11; VIII 6-12; X 1.2-4; XI 67-81; XII 2, 4-6, 8, 16-18; XIII 4-5, 8 sq., 31-32, 80; XV 4 sq.; XVI 3.2-5 sq. etc. Some of these variations are, for their part, connected with certain devices. Such is the gradual addition of the elements enumerated in V 23 sq. ("perpetual gift" - "perpetual gift" + "putting up of a dwelling place" - "perpetual gift" + "putting up of a dwelling place" + "taking the Buddha and the Truth and the Order as one's guide" etc). In a similar manner VIII 22 repeats in progression (from 1 to 10) the qualities of the Buddha's sermon. As was mentioned above separate repetitions include rather large parts of the text, sometimes unifying different suttas - cf. the sīla sections in II-XIII (see above); IX 35 = XIII 19; IX 37 = XIII 21; XVI 1.16-17 = XXVIII 1-2 etc. Corresponding variations often refer to a specific set of

concepts, pertinent to the admonition. This principle was already testified in respect of other Pāli texts³⁰ and beyond the Buddhist tradition as well.³¹

The device of repetition is closely connected with the functions of the Pāli Canon and the character of its tradition. We must remember that a major part of the Canon served an admonition transmitted orally.³² To keep it in mind one had to resort to mnemonic devices, doubtlessly fulfilled by some of these repetitions - particularly of specific formulas and rules of dogmatic importance. At the same time, the repetition of separate fragments led to a certain monotony which could presumably result in a kind of "fascinating" effect and thus facilitate the listener's concentration.³³ Such repetitions, generally typical of sacred texts, can also lead to certain elements of magical practice - particularly in cases where their composition is motivated by a certain number symbolism: cf. for example: some threefold repetitions mentioned above (III 1.20; XI 1.3; 81-83; XIII 11 sq. etc.).

All this certainly does not exclude the factor of the redactor's work as the possible cause of some repetitions. In order to make the exposition more complete, the redactor could use different versions of the same text one after the other - cf. for example VII presenting an abridged variant of VI; XVI 1.15-17 and XXVIII 1-2, or beyond the frames of DN - suttas 124-126 and 191-192 of the Saṃyutta Nikāya. The material of different collections could also be plagiarised which helps to explain certain parallels between separate canonical books (e.g. between the second part of DN and separate suttas of the Majjhima Nikāya).³⁴

DN abounds with comparisons that make the Buddha's admonitions rather vivid and picturesque.³⁵ One can divide them conditionally into two classes (both are frequent enough but it is not always easy to make a fine distinction between them). The first is represented by short laconic similes close to metaphors; the second by a more or less developed situation, sometimes "unfolded" into a kind of parable illustrating a specific precept. Among the examples of the first kind one can mention the images of the lion's roar (sīhanāda - describing the Buddha's sermon: VIII 22, 24; XXVIII 1), a string of blind men clinging one to the other (about the brāhmaṇas versed in the three Vedas - XIII 15), a waterless desert, a pathless jungle etc. (XIII 36), a lotus flower (XIV 1.34; cf. XXI 5 etc.), a tangled skein, a matted ball of thread etc. (XV 1), a mirror (XVI 2.8), a lamp (XVI 2.26), a figure made of gold (XVIII 17), different animals (XXVI 20), butter, honey, comb etc. (XXVII 14), moonshine (XXXI 6), brigands (XXXII 9) etc. A number of metaphors occur among the Buddha's 32 signs - rounded shells, antelope's legs, lion's jaw, cow's eyelashes etc. (cf. XIV 1.32; XXX 1.2).

"Unfolded" comparisons are often introduced by a formula: seyyathā' pi ...evam eva... ("just...as when...just so..."). Such is the image of a fisherman (I 3.72). A man freed from passions is likened to a debtor who has paid off his debt; a patient who has recovered from disease; a prisoner who is set free from his bonds; etc. (II 69). The brāhmana who does not know the way to Brahman, but tries to speak of it, is like a man who speaks about his love for the most beautiful woman in the land, but can say nothing about her progeny or her name and does not know whether she is tall or short, dark or blonde, etc. - in other words, who loves a woman he has not seen and does not know. He is likened, further, to an architect who begins to erect a staircase at the crossroads in order to mount to the upper storey of the mansion, but does not know where this mansion will be situated, how high it will be etc. (IX 35,37; cf. XIII 19,21). We find here comparisons with products received from the cow (IX 52); with a bird that helps sailors find land in the open sea (XI 85); with crossing the river (XIII 24 sq.); with a precious stone through which a string is threaded (II 84; XIV 1.21 etc.); with a man plunged in a pit of mire (XXIII 9 sq.); with a gamester who has swallowed poisoned dice (XXIII 27); etc. Some of these comparisons are in fact similar to short tales of a parable type - cf. for example XXIII 13 - about the brāhmana wife who killed an unborn infant in her own womb; XXIII 29 - about a man seeking for treasure; etc. Such digressions can be placed in a successive line (cf. II 69 sq.; XXIII 9 sq.). Some of them are correlated, presenting positive and negative variants of the same image - cf. for example IX 37 and 46 concerning the already mentioned ignorant architect and an expert one who knows all about the building.

Apart from the artistic function of this device, one should pay attention to the cultural importance of separate comparisons. We find here interesting data on ancient Indian life, on manners and occupations of different estates - brāhmanas, warriors, merchants, artisans etc.³⁶ At the same time, the choice of certain objects is evidently not arbitrary but motivated by Buddhist symbolism. Such are the images of a lotus (II 80; XXI 1.5 etc.); the crossing of a river (XIII 24, 26, 29); a gem (mani - cf. II 84 etc.); an elephant (XXI 1.5); etc.³⁷

Suttas of DN present examples of relatively developed narrative techniques.³⁸ An important function is performed here by dialogue, sometimes rather lively and dramatic. Such is, for example, the Buddha's conversation with young Ambattha (III). It is not restricted to pure didactics, but passes through different stages in the course of which Ambattha's pride and arrogance is replaced first by fear and finally by respect. The mood of his followers changes respectively, while the Buddha's replies are, accordingly, charged with emotion

and are connected with these states. At the same time the general tendency and function of the dialogue remains the same: teaching genuine knowledge. The Buddha's discourses can be compared in this respect with the exposition in the early Upanisads - where the dialogue, likewise, develops into a monologue preaching the Truth.

Each sutta begins with the stereotype words, evam me sutam ("Thus have I heard"). According to tradition, me refers here to the Buddha's favourite pupil, Ānanda, which cannot be correct in the case of certain suttas: e.g. in X the preceptor is not the Buddha, but Ānanda himself; while in XXIII this function is fulfilled by another pupil of the Buddha, Kassapa, whom Ānanda could scarcely esteem as his teacher (cf. also XXXIII and XXXIV). Me can evidently refer here to different persons who followed corresponding traditions of the doctrine, from preceptor to pupil - a process testified by the formula itself.³⁹

The most usual initial point of the plot (especially in the first part of DN) is the arrival of the Buddha and the monks following him (their traditional number is five hundred) at a certain place - Kosala, Aṅga, Māgadha etc. One of the local inhabitants - often a certain brāhmana authority or his pupil (Pokkharasādi, Kassapa, Subha etc.); this rôle is performed also by Ajātasattu, King of Māgadha - hears of the Buddha's arrival and approaches him in order to elucidate a certain question. As a rule, he supports a wrong view. The Buddha begins to admonish him and eventually refutes his delusions, whereupon the opponent, being satisfied, asks for reception into the Order. This general scheme is subject to specific variations. Thus, in III the Buddha admonishes young Ambattha first and then the latter's teacher, Pokkharasādi. Sometimes he teaches two interlocutors at the same time: Mandissa and Jāliya in VII, Vāsettha and Bhāradvāja in XIII. As we have previously stated, the teaching in X is presented by Ānanda and in XIII by Kassapa. Usually, the Buddha is not only surrounded by pupils and attendants but by opponents as well, and the latter are not always passive - at times they react quite emphatically to the Buddha's teaching (cf. III). So, for example, some brāhmanas are discussing whether their colleague Sonadanda should approach the Buddha or not (IV 4 sq.; cf. V 5 sq.), while Sonadanda himself is afraid of their disapproval (IV 8 sq.).

In his sermons the Buddha often inserts tales about the origin of the Sakya tribe (III 1.16), the sacrifice of King Mahāvijita (V 10-20), etc. Sometimes he refers to a corresponding precedent in his own life (cf. VIII 23; XXIV 1.7 sq., 11 sq.). One can easily trace here the frame-composition which is subject to certain variations. Such, for example, is the Buddha's repeated precept of II-XIII. In II 40-98 this precept is inserted into an admonition

to King Ajātasattu; while in III 1.2 sq.; IV 23 sq.; and VIII 18 sq. it is exposed in a similar manner, when illustrating the image of the brāhmana who has reached the perfect state (cf. also X 1.7-2, 36 where the narration is divided into three parts). In other suttas we find variants ensuring additional functions of the precept repeated. In V 27 it is inserted into the tale about the "sacrifice" which is more fruitful than all other traditional sacrifices (cf. similar motifs in Upanisadic dogmatics). In VI 16-19 (= VII 2-5) it is the part of the conversation with Mahāli - the Buddha recalls here one of his previous sermons to two wanderers to whom he depicted, with the help of this precept, the state of a monk who does not ask improper questions (as these wanderers did, by questioning him about the difference between the life principle - *jīvan* and the body). IX 7-17 uses it as an exposition of self-training leading to certain states of consciousness and in the end - to the cessation of consciousness. In XI 8 sq. the realisation of this precept is the third and the highest of the Buddha's wonders (in the exposition of the three kinds of his wonders). In XII 19 sq. it serves as the admonition of a preceptor, belonging to the highest sort (in the narrative about four kinds of teachers). Finally, in XIII 40 sq. it illustrates the state of an adept knowing the way to union with Brahma and having the same signs as Brahma (in dialogue with Vaseththa where the Buddha expresses the imperfection of brāhmanas versed in the three Vedas but not knowing the right way to Brahma).

The frame-composition is generally preserved in the second and third parts of DN (particularly thanks to traditional initial points and tail-pieces). At the same time, in comparison with the first part, we find here certain new traits. The rôle of narration, its specific gravity, grows here considerably. Accordingly, XIV contains the story of the Buddha's previous births (near to the genre of *apadāna*) - a new detail of dogmatics, absent in the first part. XVI speaks of the last days of the Buddha and of events that followed immediately after his death - the text being perhaps a contamination of different legends, reminds one of the genre of chronicle (separate fragments of which it probably preserved); for the dogmatics is interwoven here with narration that is somewhat dramatic and emotional. XVII is closely associated with the previous sutta. The device of a frame is executed by talk between the Buddha and Ānanda regarding the place of the Buddha's future burial. During this conversation the Buddha relates the story of one of his previous births, containing elements of a fairy tale (cf. the description of the town Kusāvati). Similar traits are found in the next XVIII-XXI suttas, where a prominent rôle is played by mythological personages⁴⁰ (in the first part such personages are introduced but rarely - cf. the appearance of the yakkha Vajira-pāni before Ambattha in III 1.21 or of different gods in XI 68). Another pecu-

liarity can be observed in the exposition of XXI, the first section of which alternates prose and verses and includes a love episode (1.6-7).

As we see in DN suttas, the mode of exposition, the development of plot, and certain compositional traits suffer considerable changes in separate parts.⁴¹ One can add that these differences concern also the principles of denomination. Omitting more specific details, we can distinguish here two particular principles: that pertaining to certain traits of the contents, and that pertaining to the hero's name. In the first part the former principle is used only in I (Brahmajāla containing a metaphorical description), II (Sāmaññaphala) and XIII (Tevijja), while in III-XII the titles are based on the names of the Buddha's interlocutors (Ambattha, Sonadanda, Kūṭadanta etc.) with a single complication in VIII (Kassapa = *sihanāda*: name + a metaphor of the Buddha's sermon). In the second part the situation is to a certain extent reversed: the majority of its suttas (6) are, in one or another way, denominated after their contents (XIV-XVI, XX-XXII - cf. above on *maha*-) and four after heroes' names (XVII-XIX; XXIII: Mahāsudassana, Janavasabha etc.). Such names are still more rare in the titles of the third part - cf. XXIV (Pātika) and XXXI (Sigālovāda). The other titles are somehow or other connected with contents, being at the same time (like the corresponding suttas themselves) rather heterogeneous. So, for example, we find here geographical names (the park Udumbarika in XXV, presumably the town Ātānātā in XXXII), figurative expressions (*sihanāda* in XXV, XXVI; cf. also XXVIII, XXIX etc.). The titles of XXXIII (Saṅgīti) and XXXIV (Dasottara) are based, strictly speaking, more on the principle of exposition than on the contents. As it was said, the parts themselves (Sīlakkhandavagga - Mahāvagga - Pātikavagga) are named after different principles.

This variety, however, is combined with a certain constancy of motifs and heroes' images, which repeat themselves throughout the whole book. Such is, for example, the motif of the quest for Truth that makes people seek the Buddha. Some of his interlocutors are full of obedience and respect from the very beginning (like Ajātasattu). Others cling to their delusions and first oppose him (like Ambattha), though in the end they are all converted by him.⁴² Certain scenes, evidently characteristic of the Buddha's way of life and his surroundings, are repeated constantly - cf. for example, greeting the Buddha, approaching him, suggesting entertainment to him and his monks (III 2.19; V 30; XVI 4.5; etc.).

The stereotype characteristic of the Buddha, already mentioned above, constantly calls him an incomparable tutor of men, full of compassion and tolerance, abounding in wisdom etc. Among typical traits of his behaviour one can note his silence (*tuphī*) as a sign of consent - cf. III 2.19; IV 24; etc.⁴³ A

certain ambiguity is characteristic of him, his benevolence sometimes alternates with threats (e.g. to Ambattha; cf. evidently a traditional spell: sattadhā muddhā phalissati - "his head splits into pieces on the spot") pronounced by the Buddha in III 1.20 (cf. also V 21; XXIV 1.22 - a scene of Pātika's humiliation). Such an attitude, traced also in some Upanisadic texts (where it is expressed even more strongly),⁴⁴ lends a kind of ambivalence to the image of the founder of Buddhism.

At the same time, different suttas of DN depict the Buddha in various different manners (though somewhat consecutively). While in the first part of the book the Buddha's image is based mainly on the traits of "earthly", "everyday" character, the second (cf. already in XIV) adds the motif of his previous births. His attitude towards wonders also varies - cf. a negative approach in XI (see also VI 5 sq.) and, on the other hand, the plot of XXIV. The second and third parts present a kind of Buddha's "deification".⁴⁵ In this process (still more typical of later Mahāyāna trends) one can suggest - apart from possible typological affinities - certain influences of more archaic (particularly Vedic) mythological motifs and concepts.⁴⁶ These details do not exclude, however, numerous signs of everyday life, with which they are interwoven (e.g. in the list of the Buddha's 32 signs - XIV 1.32; XXX 1.2; cf. above).⁴⁷ All this provides, within the frames of DN, rich material on the earlier evolution of the Buddha's image and doctrine.⁴⁸ It is worthwhile to add here that, as regards corresponding analysis, we should be careful in speaking of the Buddha's "deification", since we inevitably use here such distinctive features as "man-God" and introduce, thus, certain theistic concepts evidently alien to Buddhism. As A. Prince puts it, the Buddha is not more "sanctified" in Mahāyāna than "humanised" in Hinayāna. The concept of "Buddha-hood" as a complex of the Buddha's qualities cannot be explained by this opposition ("Manhood - godhead") - it is a specific concept, sui generis, within the frames of the corresponding system.⁴⁹

DN also contains interesting characteristics of other personages - pupils and followers of the Buddha (Ānanda, Kassapa), laymen converted by him (Sona-danda, Pokkharasādi) etc.⁵⁰, presenting a combination of stereotype and individual traits. Vivid is the image of King Ajātasattu in II, who admires the moonlight, is not satisfied with his teachers, trembles before the Buddha, adores his son, and repents of his sins. We have already spoken about the dynamics of Ambattha's image, whose change of attitude is accompanied by changes in his followers' attitude towards him, that is, from support to criticism (III 1.17-22). His teacher Pokkharasādi suffers analogous evolution - from mistrust of the Buddha to entering the Buddha's Order. Corresponding characteristics reflect the ambiguity marked above in respect of the Buddha. It has already

been noted that some images are depicted with certain humour - e.g. the son of Pātika wanting to rise from his seat and being unable to do so (XXIV 1.20).⁵¹

Some of the stylistic and compositional traits noted above seem to be typical of the earlier stage of "scientific" description in ancient Indian literature, as reflected in its ethical and philosophical texts - cf., for example, certain parallels in Vedic canonic style, particularly that of the early Upanisads.⁵² At the same time some of these devices - such as frame-composition, a system of definite metaphors etc. - are developed in later Indian literary tradition - both Buddhist (cf. genre of Jātakas) and Hindu ("framed story", certain poetic genres etc.).

NOTES

- 1 Cf. in this connection: L. Renou, J. Filliozat L'Inde classique II, Paris 1953, p. 516 sq.; C. Regamey "Le problème du Bouddhisme primitif et les derniers travaux de Stanislaw Schayer", Rocznik Orientalistyczny XXI, 1957, p. 38 sq.; E. Conze Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, New York 1968, p. 1 sq., 10 sq. See also: H. Oldenberg "Studien zur Geschichte der buddhistischen Kanon", Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften (Philol. hist. Klasse), Göttingen 1912, p. 209; R. O. Franke "The Buddhist Councils at Rājagaha and Vesālī as alleged in Cullavagga XI, XII", JPTS 1908, p. 75; idem, "Der dogmatische Buddha nach dem Dīgha-nikāya", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes XXVIII, 1914, p. 331 sq.; O. Strauss Indische Philosophie, Munich 1925, p. 87; L. de La Vallée Poussin Bouddhisme, opinion sur l'histoire de la dogmatique, Paris 1925, p. 49; T. Y. Elizarenkova, V. N. Toporov The Pāli Language, Moscow 1976, p. 22, etc.
- 2 Cf. Franke "The Buddhist Councils", p. 66; idem "Die Buddhalehre in ihrer erreichbar-ältesten Gestalt (im Dīghanikāya)", ZDMG 69, 1915, p. 455 sq.; 71, 1917, p. 50 sq.; DN, tr. R. O. Franke, Göttingen 1913, p. ix sq. (DF). T. W. Rhys Davids Buddhist India, London 1916, p. 188; A. B. Keith Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon, Oxford 1923, p. 17 sq.; B. C. Law "Chronology of the Pāli Canon", Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 12, Part 2, 1931, p. 170 sq.; idem A History of Pāli Literature I, London 1933, p. 13 sq.; E. Frauwallner The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginning of Buddhist Literature, Rome 1956, p. 65 sq.; G. C. Pande Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, Allahabad 1957, p. 16 sq., etc.
- 3 See H. Oldenberg Zur Geschichte der altindischen Prosa. Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der prosaisch = poetischen Erzählung, Berlin 1917, p. 41; W. Geiger Pāli Literature and Language, Calcutta 1956, p. 2; Elizarenkova, Toporov, p. 21.

- 4 Cf. P.V.Bapat "The different strata in the literary material of the Dīgha Nikāya", Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute 8, Part 1, 1926, p.1 sq. These principles are different in the other canonical books as well (e.g. in Majjhima Nikāya - cf. M.Winternitz A History of Indian Literature II, Calcutta 1933, p.56).
- 5 DN suttas are signified here by Roman numerals according to their order: I - Brahmajāla, II - Sāmaññaphala, III - Ambaṭṭha, IV - Sonadanda, V - Kūṭadanta, VI - Mahāli, VII - Jāliya, VIII - Kassapa-sīhanāda, IX - Potthapāda, X - Subha, XI - Kevaddha, XII - Lohicca, XIII - Tevijja, XIV - Mahāpadāna, XV - Mahānidāna, XVI - Mahāparinibbāna, XVII - Mahāsudassana, XVIII - Janavasabha, XIX - Mahāgovinda, XX - Mahāsamaya, XXI - Sakkaṭṭhā, XXII - Mahāsatipatthāna, XXIII - Pāyāsi, XXIV - Pātika, XXV - Udumbarika-sīhanāda, XXVI - Cakkavatti-sīhanāda, XXVII - Aggañña, XXVIII - Sampasādanīya, XXIX - Pāsādika, XXX - Lakkhana, XXXI - Sigālovāda, XXXII - Ātānātiya, XXXIII - Saṅgīti, XXXIV - Dasuttara.
- 6 We refer here and below to DN edition: The Dīgha Nikāya, ed. by T.W.Rhys Davids and J.E.Carpenter, 3 vols, PTS 1890, 1903, 1910 (DRC) and translation: Dialogues of the Buddha, tr. by T.W. [and C.A.F.] Rhys Davids, 3 vols, PTS 1899, 1910, 1921 (DR).
- 7 Cf. about these repetitions, DR I, p.59.
- 8 Cf. Bapat, p.3. Another traditional explanation connects this title with the "great respect" surrounding these suttas. See: The Dīghanikāya, General Editor Bhikkhu J.Kashyap, Vol.II, Patna 1958, p.ix (DK).
- 9 J.Kashyap (DK III, p.ix) remarks that a more correct title should sound pāṭīkādi (i.e. part beginning with Pātika Sutta) and that pātika is evidently used here in this sense.
- 10 Cf. Bapat, p.2 sq.
- 11 Cf. R.O.Franke "Die Gāthās des Dīghanikāya und ihren Parallelen", JPTS 1909, p.311 sq.; A.K.Warder Pali Metre, PTS 1967, particularly pp.16, 86, 94 sq., 98, 225; Elizarenkova, Toporov, p.62 sq.
- 12 Warder, 1967, p.94.
- 13 Ibid., p.226.
- 14 See DF, pp.xxx, xlii etc.; R.Franke "Das einheitliche Thema des Dīghanikāya", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes XXVII, 1913, p.198 sq.; idem, "Der Verknüpfung der Dīghanikāya Suttas untereinander", ZMG 67, 1913, p.409 sq., etc.
- 15 Cf. Geiger, 1956, p.17 sq.; Renou, Filliozat, 1953, II, p.350 sq.

- 16 Franke "Der Verknüpfung", p.414 sq. (cf. his commentary in DF).
- 17 Ibid. pp.419-461.
- 18 Concerning similar enumerations see also A.Syrkin "On the beginning of the Sutta Piṭaka (Brahmajāla Sutta)", Buddhist Studies, Ancient and Modern, ed. P.Denwood and A.Piatigorsky, London 1983, p.158. The device of such combinations is characteristic of other classical Indian treatises beyond the Buddhist tradition as well (cf. A.Syrkin "Notes on the Kāma Sūtra", Semiotica 11, No.1, 1974, p.35 sq.).
- 19a See T.W.Rhys Davids Buddhism. Its History and Literature, New York 1896; repr. Calcutta 1962, pp.31-33. Cf. A.Syrkin "On the beginning of the Sutta Piṭaka", pp.157-8.
- 19 Cf. Franke "Die Buddhalehre", 1917, p.98.
- 20 See B.C.Law "Three refuges (tisarana) in Buddhism", The Maha Bodhi 61, 5-6, 1953, p.155 sq.
- 21 Cf., for example, numerical lists in E.Conze Buddhist Meditation, London 1956, p.174 sq.
- 22 Cf. A.Syrkin, V.N.Toporov "La triade et la tétrade", Tel Quel, 1968, No.35, p.27 sq.; A.Syrkin "Čislovyje komplexy v rannix upanišadax", Trudy po znakovym sistemam IV, Tartu 1969, p.83 sq. (particularly analogies to Buddhist number symbolism).
- 23 See B.Heimann "Significance of numbers in Hindu philosophical texts", Journal of the Indian Society of Oriental Art VI, 1938, p.88 sq.; Syrkin, Toporov, p.30. Cf also notes on the structure of the Kumārapāṭha (Khuddakapāṭha), where similar gradation (1-10) is found, and some other texts - V.N. Toporov "Iz nabljudenij nad strukturoj nekotoryx buddijskix tekstov", Materialy po istorii i filologii Central'noj Azii 3, Ulan-Ude 1968, p.56 sq.
- 24 Cf. H.Oldenbergh Die Lehre der Upanischaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus, Göttingen 1923, p.302 (Anm.114); B.Heimann Studien zur Eigenart indischen Denkens, Tübingen 1930, p.181 sq.; T.G.Mainkar Some poetical aspects of the Rgvedic repetitions, Poona 1966; A.Ja.Syrkin "Zametki o stilistike rannix upanišad", Vestnik Drevnej Istorii, 1971, No.2, p.95, etc.
- 25 See Renou, Filliozat, II, p.338 sq.; E.Lamotte Histoire du Bouddhisme indien de l'origine à l'ère Śaka, Louvain 1958, p.157 sq.; Ju.M.Alixanova "Piṭaka", Literatura drevnego Vostoka, Moscow 1971, p.167 sq.
- 26 Cf. Oldenbergh Zur Geschichte, p.42 sq.
- 27 Cf. Syrkin "On the beginning", p.163.
- 28 Cf. Alixanova, p.168

- 29 In this connection one can mention another characteristic trait of the Buddha's didactic style - that of negation. The latter is displayed in phraseology and techniques of discourse (cf. anaphoras in I 1.8, refrains in I 1.11 sq., II 97; IX 16 etc.) and can be traced in separate important concepts (nibbāna, anatta etc.). Cf. R.O.Franke "Der Negativismus in der alten Buddhalehre", Aufsätze zur Kultur- und Sprachgeschichte Vornehmlich des Orients E.Kuhn...gewidmet, Breslau 1916, p.336 sq.; M.Walleser "Der Buddhistische Negativismus", Zeitschrift für Buddhismus und verwandte Gebiete V, 1923-4, p.168 sq.; C.A.F.Rhys Davids "Buddhism and the Negative", JPTS 1924-27, p.237 sq.; M.Winternitz "Gotama the Buddha, what do we know of him and his teachings?", Archiv Orientalní I, 2, 1929, p.238; G.Grimm La religion du Bouddha, la religion de la connaissance, Paris 1944, p.161; G.H. Sasaki "The historical evolution of the concept of negation: nekkhamma and nāskramya", JAOS 83, 1963, p.477 sq.; A.Wayman "The Buddhist 'Not this, Not this'", Philosophy East and West 11, 3, 1961, p.99 sq. See also concerning noteworthy parallels in the Upanisads (e.g. na iti in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. II 3.6; III 9.26, etc.; cf. ibid. III 8.8; IV 3.22; Śvetāśvatara Up. III 9-10, etc.), Śāṅkara, Cāndrakīrti and other traditions (beginning with Heraclitus) - B.Heimann "The significance of negation in Hindu philosophical texts", B.C.Law Volume II, Poona 1946, p.408 sq.; A.Ja.Syrkin Nekotorye problemy izučeniija upanišad, Moscow 1971, p.157 sq., etc.
- 30 See Toporov, p.54 sq. in respect of Dhammasaṅgani I 1.1. Cf. more detailed exposition in Syrkin "On the beginning", pp.161-2.
- 31 E.g. in description of "vital forces" (prāṇā) in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. IV 3.23-30; in Īśā Up. 9-14, etc. (Syrkin, "Zametki", p.94-5).
- 32 Cf. Geiger, p.11-12; A.Coomaraswamy Buddha and the Gospel of Buddha, London 1916, p.260; 274, etc.
- 33 Cf. Oldenberg Zur Geschichte, p.46 sq.
- 34 Geiger, p.12; cf. also concerning parallels in verses: Franke "Die Gāthās", p.311 sq.
- 35 See corresponding lists in: C.A.F.Rhys Davids "Similes in the Nikāyas", JPTS 1906-7, p.52 sq.; cf. also K.Hoppenworth Buddhistische Gleichnisse, speziell die Wievergleiche nach dem Majjhima-nikāya I, Hermannsburg 1972.
- 36 Winternitz A History II, p.75 sq.
- 37 Cf. in this connection: R.Sewell "Early Buddhist Symbolism", JRAS 18, 1888, p.364 sq.; G.Mensching Buddhistische Symbolik, Gotha 1929; C.A.F.Rhys Davids "Zur Geschichte des Rad symbols", Eranos Jahrbuch 1914, Zürich 1935, p.153 sq.; W.Kirfel Symbolik des Buddhismus, Stuttgart 1959; T.B.Karunaratne

- "Le symbole bouddhique de la roue", Samādhi. Cahiers d'études bouddhiques VI, 1, 1972, p.31 sq.; 3, p.120 sq.; B.G.Gokhale "Animal symbolism in early Buddhist literature and art", East and West N.S. 24, 1-2, 1974, p.111 sq., etc.
- 38 See Winternitz A History II, p.68 sq.; Law A History II, p.644; E.L.Clancy "The Buddha's teaching as literature", Vesak Sirisara Buddhist Annual 1959, Vol.XXIV, p.58 sq.
- 39 Cf. H.Kern Manual of Indian Buddhism, Strassburg 1896, p.2; L.de La Vallée Poussin Bouddhisme, opinion sur l'histoire de la dogmatique, Paris 1925, p.34; Geiger, p.10; J.Brough "Thus have I heard", Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies X, Part 2, 1956, p.416 sq.; S.Dutt The Buddha and Five After-centuries, London 1957, p.3 sq.
- 40 Cf. Bapat, p.2 sq.; E.Thomas The History of Buddhist Thought, London 1933, p.265 sq.
- 41 Cf. particularly corresponding characteristics in DK I, pp.xxii-xxvi; II p.xxv-xxvi; III pp.xx-xxii.
- 42 Cf. Franke "Das einheitliche Thema", p.198 sq.; 276 sq.; idem, "Der Buddha als 'ernst-bedacht und vollbewusst'", Beiträge zur Literaturgeschichte und Geistesgeschichte Indiens. Festgabe H.Jacobi, Bonn 1926, p.327 sq.
- 43 It can be connected also with well-known abstention from discussing metaphysical questions. See: Franke "Die Buddhalehre", 1915, p.456 sq.; T.W. Organ "The Silence of Buddha", Philosophy East and West 4, 2, 1954, p.125 sq.; K.Jaspers Die grossen Philosophen I, Munich 1957, p.225; Yoshinori Takeuchi "The Silence of Buddha", Philosophical Studies of Japan VI, Tokyo 1965, p.43 sq.
- 44 One can note that Ambaṭṭha does not perish like Śākalya in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. III 9.26 (possibly because the former repented at the right time). Cf. Syrkin "Zametki", p.99.
- 45 Cf. Bapat, p.2 sq., 12. R.O.Franke ("Der dogmatische Buddha", p.355) suggests that the Buddha embodied the concept of the Deity participating in men's everyday lives. See also on the corresponding aspects of the Buddha's image: E.Senart Essais sur la légende du Buddha, son caractère et ses origines, Paris 1882; H.v.Glasenapp Brahma und Buddha, Berlin 1926; idem, Buddhismus und Gottesidee, Wiesbaden 1954; E.Lamotte "La légende du Buddha", Revue de l'histoire des religions 34, 1947-48, p.37 sq.; A.Bareau "The superhuman personality of Buddha and its symbolism in the Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra of the Dharmaguptaka", Myths and Symbols. Studies in honor of M. Eliade, Chicago 1969, p.9 sq. Cf. in this connection the notes of A.Prince (below, n.49).

THE PLACE OF AHIMSĀ IN BUDDHA-DHAMMO

Bhikkhu Nānañjivako

(In memory of Richard Abeyasekera)

Nekkhamma-saṅkappo avyāpāda-saṅkappo
avihimsā-saṅkappo, ayam vuccati bhikkhave
sammā-saṅkappo.

Mahāsatipatthāna-suttantam (D XXII 21)

The intention of renunciation,
 the intention free of ill-will,
 the intention of non-violence,
 this is called, bhikkhus, the right intention.

I

In Pāli, non-violence is designated by the term ahimsā, as in Sanskrit (cf. DhP 225, 261, 270, 300; D XXX 1, 6; S I 165, etc.), or by a-vi-himsā, an etymologically stronger term of the same stem, as in the definition of the second component of the Eightfold Path Leading to the Cessation of Suffering, quoted above (cf. D XXII 21; D XXXIII 1.9,10; 2.1 (XXIV); Sn 292; It IV 4,8, etc.).

In the short definition quoted above and most often in other texts on the Noble Eightfold Path, ahimsā is the climax of a threefold gradation of the same basic virtue of right intention.

In Jainism, the religion closest to Buddhism, considering itself to be the oldest on the high level of universal cultures (as it is still extant also in the pre-Biblical and pre-Islamic tradition of the ancient Arabia Felix), "ahimsā is the highest law" (ahimsā paramo dharmah). This is the only essential tenet which could be considered as its exclusive dogma. All the rest of its normative teaching are maxims deduced from this categorical imperative, tolerating also exceptions, since Jainism is the religion of extreme tolerance, defined as the "toleration of many modes of truth": "The faith in one truth or even in a plurality of truths, each simply given as determinate, would be rejected by it as a species of intolerance."¹

The eightfold path of the Buddha starts from the stance taken against "the pursuance of views, adherence to views, jungle of views, contortion of views, vacillation of views, fetter of views" (M 2 and several other texts).

This critical prerequisite is the reason why the sifting of world-views (ditthi) and dogmatism is placed before ahimsā as a preliminary step on the

eightfold path of the Buddha. His "right views" do not consist of any dogmatically infallible propositions and beliefs, such as are dismissed in the oft-repeated warning against the affirmation "this only is true, all the rest is false". The best analysis of the shortcoming of his authoritarian opponents is given in Caṅki-suttam (M 95). The basic definition of "right views" (sammā ditthi) in our context underscores the purely existential restriction of the problem to which the intention of this first decisive step refers: "The understanding of suffering, the understanding of the origin of suffering, the understanding of the cessation of suffering, the understanding of the path leading to the cessation of suffering. This, bhikkhus, is called right view" (D 22 and other texts).

The Buddha often warned his worldly minded interlocutors (putthujjanā) against "untrustworthy teachers" who are used to "take and apply the correct criterion in such a way that, while it extend only to one side it excludes other...right criteria concerning good bodily conduct, good verbal conduct and good mental conduct". The Buddha taught the method of detecting such "unripe criteria" by independent mature thinking (Apānaka-suttam, M 60) - the best known instance of such advice is contained in the Kālāma-suttam (A III 65), in the Buddha's answer to the complaint:

- Some samaṇā and brāhmaṇā...expound only their own tenets while they abuse and rend and censure and rail at the tenets of others.
- Kālāmā, do not be satisfied with hearsay or with tradition or with legendary lore or with what has come down in your scriptures or with conjecture or with logical inference or with weighing evidence or with liking for a view after pondering over it or with someone else's ability or with the thought "The monk is our teacher". When you know in yourselves "These things are wholesome, blameless...then you should practise them and abide in them.

Such was the original teaching of the Buddha's Noble Truth on acquiring correct standpoints in an historical epoch of Indian culture considered still by modern scholars in comparison with the highest standard of European culture as an age of "Renaissance".

Swami Vivekananda, in a talk on "Buddha's Message to the World" (in San Francisco, 1900) boldly affirmed that 600 years B.C. "Indian civilization had already completed its growth".² A few decades later the same assessment was confirmed by the best known European sociologist, Max Weber, who considered the atheist and caste-free Jainist and Buddhist movements at that time as "intellectualist heterodox soteriology" characteristic of the "drawing-room" elitist ideology in the cultural ambience of royal courts and cities.³

In the later twentieth century a new and most brutal wave of Western penetration to the Asian East, reaffirming with its authoritarian dogmatism that "this only is truth, all the rest is false", often threatens with a direct attack the first step of our Noble Path. At the other end, the last and highest eighth step and attainment of samādhi is being sapped by the new wave of Western fashion in "meditation", advertising "shortcuts to Nirvāna" by eliminating not only the beginning but also the end of this Noble Path for the convenience of hippies. The next immediately endangered steps are the second - ahimsā - and the sixth, in the concluding section of the Path dealing with the contemplative attainment of jhānam, "right effort" - sammā vāyāmo. On this point I wish to underscore a recently ripened statement (apannaka dhamma) of one of the eldest gurus (or rather anti-guru in up-to-date anti-cultural terms), Krishnamurti: "Meditation is hard work. It demands the highest form of discipline - not conformity, not imitation, not obedience - but a discipline which comes through constant awareness.... Without laying the foundation of a righteous life, meditation becomes an escape and therefore has no value whatsoever. A righteous life is not the following of social morality, but the freedom from envy, greed and the search of power." ⁴

II

Historically, on the ground of several discourses of the Buddha, I consider the origin of Buddhism as an apostasy of Jainism at the time of Mahāvira's conservative reform aiming at a purely formalistic rigorism. In the Buddha's discussions with and about Jains, a resolute break with their overloaded tradition is always strongly underscored, not to speak of the often obsessive commentarial expatiation on background stories. In comparison therewith, the Buddha's criticism of brahmanic traditions appears most often as a mild irony or rebuke for some more or less dangerous stupidity. ⁵

On the other hand, the Buddha's renunciation of the same kind of ascetic penances, described even in formal details in terms identical with the practices of Jain munis, ⁶ is still today most often superficially understood and discussed as an episode of exclusively negative and even misleading Jain influences on the samaṇa Gotama, who before he became a buddha, had to break through them and liberate himself from this last "error" after all the aeons of strenuous endeavours to attain his ultimate perfection.

Richard Abeyssekera, in the course of 25 years of his dedicated work for the Buddhist Publication Society in Kandy, has published only one tiny booklet of his own. His recent death evoked in me the value and relevance of this meditation on "The Master's Quest for Light" for the subject of my long years of studies of the historical relations between Jainism and Buddhism.

The origin of the bad faith, praising Buddhism as an anti-ascetic religion appears at our time to be prevalently, though not exclusively, of "modern" Western origin. R. Abeyasekera begins his "Reflections" with singling out "amidst the great characteristics of the Bodhisatta... his boundless compassion, his indomitable courage and his unswerving allegiance to truth. To achieve the supreme knowledge of the Buddhas, the Master had to perfect himself through severe ordeals of suffering in his innumerable past lives."

All this superman's power personified in ascetic heroism was essential and imperative for the attainment of "firm control of mind" with which "he checked all inclinations to indolence..." Only through a relentless increasing of the ordeal of such self-inflicted penances "right through those long years of trial, this power to surmount every obstacle on his path to Enlightenment grew stronger in him".

R. Abeyasekera quotes a discourse with Sāriputta in which the Buddha confesses "to have practised the four kinds of ascetic life and discipline. Rigorous have I been in my ascetic discipline, rigorous beyond all others, Repulsive have I been in my ascetic practice; repulsive beyond measure. Scrupulous have I been in my ascetic life; I have practised the height of scrupulousness. Solitude have I sought in my practice of asceticism; the utmost extreme of solitude."

Unlike our age of backsliding degeneration, when all non-pleasurable efforts to improve one's character are labelled as the worst disease of "masochism", while its opposite, "sadism", is considered as the safest and preventive "panacea" against all suffering, the age in which the Buddha was born is sketched also by R. Abeyasekera as "an age of intense intellectual and spiritual activity. A time of religious unrest,... of bold investigation and high achievement in the realm of man's thought. Materially too it was no backward age. But it was essentially a time when the things of the spirit ... ranked higher than the seen, the material and the gross.... It was in fact the sight of an ascetic in yellow garb that showed the Master the way to solve life's misery and urged his renunciation.... His courage in these experiments (as described in the Mahā-saccaka-suttam, M 36) was marvellous... Then followed the supreme expression of strength in that last act of his struggle for light", when he realised to have attained the utmost limits of asceticism and "courageously abandoned them in the face of ridicule of his erstwhile admirers" (an allusion to the Dhammacakkapavattana-suttam, S V xii 11). And then "he took his seat of grass under the Bodhi tree at Gaya and boldly resolved: 'Let my flesh, bones and skin shrivel and whiten and my blood dry up, yet I shall not lose strength in my endeavour. Never from this seat will I stir until I have attained full Enlightenment!'"

Obviously the result of his attainment was strictly proportioned, up

to the last moment of his struggle, to the climax of extreme efforts in ascetic self-mortification of the Bodhisatta "who had to perfect himself through severe ordeals of suffering in his innumerable past lives" - and not simply realising of his worst "mistake" at the last moment. This was explicitly admitted and underscored as the essential prerequisite in the Buddha's discourse on braving "the fears and terrors" of the forest-life (Bhayabherava-suttam, M 4):

"Suppose some monk or brahman is unpurified in bodily, verbal or mental conduct, ... is subject to fright and horror, ... unconcentrated and confused in mind, devoid of understanding ... - when such a monk or brahman resorts to a remote jungle-thicket abode in the forest, then owing to those faults he evokes unwholesome fear and dread. But ... I have none of those defects. I resort to a remote jungle-thicket in the forest as one of the Noble Ones, who are free from these defects. Seeing in myself this freedom from such defects, I find great solace in living in the forest... I thought: But there are the specially holy nights... suppose I spent those nights in such awe-inspiring abodes... which make the hair stand up - perhaps I should encounter that fear and dread. And later I thought: Why do I dwell in constant expectation of the fear and dread? Why not subdue that fear and dread while maintaining the posture I am in when it comes to me? And while I walked... sat... lay down..., the fear and dread came upon me; but neither I stood nor sat... till I had subdued that fear and dread." 7

In the archaically deepest and most beautiful (and therefore most neglected) poem ascribed to the Buddha, on the symbol of "The Rhinoceros", the first, middle (21) and last (41) stanzas form the essential knots on which the whole texture is harmoniously knitted and woven. The climax is reached on the central point in the statement:

Escaped from the exhibitions of views,
arrived to the clearing, take the straight way:
"I have attained the wisdom not guided by others".
- Go alone as the rhinoceros.

(Sn 55)

Without having reached this point of clear orientation at the end of the thorny and tortuous pathless passage through the "jungle of views" and of misleading opinions, one will necessarily still remain with the lost orientation within the vicious circle of eternal reproduction and renewal of interdependent causes and intricate relations of patioccasamuppāda; torn by all the currents of the stream of samsāra, unable to swim across and ultimately stranded "pine away like old cranes in a lake without fish" (Dhp 155). Even a casual

visit to a buddha and a talk with him will remain useless and annoying - as in the classic case of Māluṅkyāputta (M 63), or recently in the most famous and romantically most attractive model skilfully shaped for the taste of our hippie youth by Hermann Hesse in the bodhisattva ideal of his Siddhartha.

III

(1) In the Buddha's discourses on the subject of ahimsā with Jain niganthā (followers of his opponent Mahāvīra) the most conspicuous topic of discussion was the question of "the modes of action in doing evil deeds, namely: action of body, of word and of mind" (analysed most extensively in the Upāli-suttam, M 56).

Dīgha-Tapassī, the naked ascetic, a follower of Nigantha Nātaputta, the Mahāvīra, on one occasion visited the Buddha in Nālandā, and the latter asked him:

- Well, Tapassī, how many modes of action does Nigantha Nātaputta declare there are in evil acting and behaving?
- No, friend Gotama; the performed action is not declared by Nigantha Nātaputta to be an action, it is declared to be an offence.
- Well, Tapassī, how many modes of offence does he declare there are in evil acting and behaving?
- ... offence of body, of word and of mind.... Of these three offences... bodily offence is the most blamable. Verbal offence and mental offence are not so blamable.

On the contrary, according to the Buddha,

- Of these three actions (kammāni), thus analysed and differentiated, mental action, I declare, is the most blamable. Bodily action and verbal action are not so blamable....

When, on a later occasion, another follower of Mahāvīra, Upāli, insisted again on the same standpoint as Tapassī, the Buddha asked him:

- What do you think, householder? Suppose there were a naked ascetic with the four kinds of restraint; restrained as regards all evil.... He, while walking up and down, inflicts destruction upon many tiny creatures. Now, what does Nigantha Nātaputta declare is the result of this?
- He declares that what is unintentional is not blamable....
- And in which offence does Nātaputta recognise intention?
- In mental offence.
- Householder, householder, think carefully before you reply. This latter does not agree with your former statement that bodily offence is the most blamable, and not so the mental and the verbal offences....

In my attempts to verify this statement on the gradation of evil deeds in Jaina scriptures or oral tradition I have never come across any confirmation of the sequence insisted upon by Dīgha-Tapassī in the quoted text and repeated in other Buddhist references. The sequence confirmed in the subsequent Jaina tradition is always just the same as the Buddhist: mind-word-body, and there is no mention of its debatability at any time. As this was the time of deep religious reforms in several Jaina communities (among whom that of Pārśvaha, preceding Mahāvīra only about two centuries was the most authentic), we should not exclude the possibility that such discussions with the Buddha and his followers might have influenced the contemporary Jaina reformers - a problem that still might be worthy of further investigation in comparative studies of these two closely related and therefore historically antagonistic religions of ahimsā.

In the Jain Āyāranga-sūyam (Sk. Ācāraṅga-sūtram)⁶, in the first book, Bāmbha-cerāim (3,4,3), dealing with the training in ascetic discipline (brahmācaryā), the concluding statement - "There are degrees in injurious act, but there are no degrees in non-violence" - indicates, in its context, a deeper approach to the whole problem discussed in our context from the standpoint of the vicious circle of morally reprehensible effects.

(2) The Dhammapadam is the most popular collection of aphoristic verses attributed to the Buddha, occasionally taken out of his more extensive discourses. Like the Jātaka tales, some of these verses convey the archetypal symbols and their meaning from ancient Indian wisdom applied to Buddhist contexts. In Jainism, the Uttarajjhayana-sūyam (Sk. Uttarādhyayana-sūtram) in its 36 chapters comes closest to the genre of both the 26 chapters of the Dhammapadam and the more extensive collection of 1149 stanzas, interwoven with tales and dialogues, in the Sutta-nipāta. Some of these verses, contained sometimes in chapters under analogous headings in both the Dhammapadam and Uttarajjhayana-sūyam, correspond to each other not only in analogous but also in homologous sequences of several stanzas. In the following selection of Dhammapadam verses we shall begin with a few examples confirming this analogy.

The title of the eighth chapter of the Dhammapadam is "The Thousands" (Sahassa-vagga). The following stanzas correspond closely to the same style and contents of utterances ascribed to King Nami, a patteya-buddha (Pāli pacceka-buddha) of Jaina tradition, after his pavvajjā (Pāli pabbajjā, 'escape' from the world) at the beginning of chapter IX of Uttarajjhayana-sūyam:

<u>Dhammapadam</u>	<u>Uttarajjhayana-sūyam</u>
If a man were to conquer in battle a thousand times a thousand men, and another conquer one, himself,	Though a man were to conquer thousands and thousands enemies, greater will be his victory

he indeed is the greatest of conquerors. if he conquers only himself.

Conquest of self is indeed better than the conquest of other persons; of one who has disciplined himself, who always practises self-control.	Fight with yourself; why fight with other enemies? He who conquers himself through himself, will obtain happiness
(103-4)	(34-35)

If a man month after month for a hundred years should sacrifice a thousand offer- ings, and if he only for one moment would honour a man with a developed self, that honour is, indeed, better than a century of sacrifice.	If a man should offer every month thousands and thousands of cows, better will he be who controls him- self, though he gives no offering.
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(106)

(40)

Let a fool month after month eat his food with a <u>kusa</u> -grass blade; nevertheless he is not worth the sixteenth part of those who have well understood the Truth (<u>dhammam</u>).	If a fool should eat with a <u>kusa</u> - grass blade, the merit of his penance will not be equal the sixteenth part of his who possesses the Truth as it has been taught.
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(70)

(44)

The last, XXVI, chapter of the Dhammapadam (Brāhmana-vagga) contains a sequence of stanzas ending with the refrain: "Him I call a brāhmana" (tam aham brūmi brāhmanan). In the XXV chapter of the Uttarajjhayana-sūyam a sequence of 16 stanzas (19-34) end with the refrain: "Him we call a brāhmana". The following few samples are characteristic for our analogy:

Him I call a brāhman who does not hurt by body, speech or mind, who is con- trolled in these three things. (391)	Him we call a brāhman who thoroughly knows living beings, whether they move or not, and does not injure them in any of the three ways (by thoughts, words and acts).
Him I call a brāhman who has laid aside the rod with regard to beings, whether weak or strong, who neither kills nor lets others kill.	

(405)

(23)

Independently of such implications the word ahimsā occurs in the following aphorisms of the Dhammapadam:

The silent sages abstaining from violence (ahimsakā),
always restrained in body, go to the state
from which they never relapse, whither gone they never grieve.

(225)

He in whom dwell truth, virtue, non-violence, restraint, control,
he who is free from impurity and is wise, he is called an elder
(thera). (261)

A man is not noble because he harms (himsati) living beings.
He is called noble because he does not harm any living being.
(270)

The disciples of Gotama are always well awake;
their mind, day and night, delights in abstinence from harm
(ahimsā). (300)

- (3) In the Dīgha-nikāya the following references are worthy of being singled out:

In the Lokkhana-suttantam (D XXX 1.6), on "the marks of the great man" (mahā-purisa-lakkhanāni), it is stated in the first section of verses praising the virtues of a buddha:

Harming no living being (pāne ahimsāya), not violent,
delighting in almsgiving, with no violence (ahimsā),
shunning force, consistent in principles,
wholehearted in action, he always proceeds impartially...

In the second part of the same discourse (D XXX 2.7) it is said that "in whatsoever former birth, former state of being, former sojourning, such a man (tathā-gata), as a human being acquired the virtue of not harming any living being, either by hand or club or rod or sword, he by the doing and by accumulating of that kamma, by its fulfilment and abundance, after his death was reborn happily in a heavenly world".

The last two discourses of the Dīgha-nikāya, XXXIII and XXXIV, "chanted in concord by all" the Buddha's disciples under the guidance of Sāriputta. "are compiled as catechisms".⁹ The first, Saṅgīti-suttantam, from which the tenets on ahimsā are quoted in the sequel, was recited in Pāvā soon after the death of Mahāvīra, when his followers "have become divided and have fallen into opposite parties and into strife". To prevent a similar misfortune of the Buddha's disciples after his death, this recapitulation of his basic teachings was performed.

In the group of "double doctrines" (1.9), containing 23 tenets, ahimsā and moral purity (soceyyam) are praised as two perfect virtues. In the group of "triple doctrines" (1.10) "three good thoughts" form the sixth triplet: "thoughts of renunciation, thoughts free of ill-will, and thoughts of non-violence (avi-himsā). In the group of 26 "fivefold doctrines" the group of 24 contains "five elements tending to deliverance (nissāraṇam)" from sensuous desires, ill-will, cruelty, external objects (rūpaṃ) and egotism (sakkāyaṃ). The third of these five

elements refers to a-vi-himsā (avihesā in this text):

"When a bhikkhu contemplates violence (vihesā), his mind does not rush violently into it, nor enjoy it, nor remain seized by it. His mentality is properly directed by him, well developed, well turned away and detached from violence, he is freed from those destructive, passionate intoxicants which break out due to violence. He is not affected by such feelings. This is called the deliverance from violence."

- (4) In Saṅyutta-nikāya VII (Brāhmaṇa-saṅyuttam), the title of the fifth discourse is Ahimsā-suttam:

"The brāhmaṇ Bhāradvaja, dedicated to non-violence (ahimsaka) visited the Blessed One ... and said:

- I am dedicated to non-violence, friend Gotama, I am dedicated to non-violence.

The Buddha's answer was:

- In accordance with your name, may you be non-violent! He who does not commit violence either by body, or by word, or by mind, is non-violent; he does not hurt any other being".

- (5) Itivuttakam IV 3 describes three bad (akusalā) and three opposite, good, thoughts (kusala-vitakkā). This group is the same as that quoted in D XXXIII in section (3) above. The context in Itivuttakam is the following:

"Three virtuous kinds of thought do not cause blindness, but sight, knowledge, strength of wisdom. They are not on the side of destruction, but leading to extinction (nibbānam). These three thoughts are the thought of renunciation, the thought of goodwill and the thought of non-violence (avihimsā vitakka).

Three virtuous thoughts should be pondered over, and three unvirtuous should be avoided.

Who in this way is able to appease his grasping and eliciting thought, as a rain-shower lays down heaped up dust, with a mind able to allay the thought, even so will reach the state of appeasement."

- (6) In Sutta-nipāta II, the seventh section contains the Buddha's sermon to the brāhmaṇs from Kosalā who wished to know better the traditional way of righteous living as it was followed by brāhmaṇs (brāhmaṇa-dharmikā) at the time of "rishis of old, austere, restrained of self". Their virtue of ahimsā is praised in stanza 292: "They praised chastity and virtue and righteousness, ascetic ardour, gentleness, non-violence (avihimsā) and forbearance."

- (7) Some Jātaka tales were also motivated by the same virtue and intention to illustrate the application of ahimsā in daily life.

NOTES

- 1 Cf. K.C.Bhattacharya The Jaina Theory of Anekānta in his Studies in Philology I, Calcutta 1956. § 30, p.343.
- 2 The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda VIII. 3rd ed., Calcutta 1959, p.92.
- 3 Max Weber Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie II. Hinduismus und Buddhismus. Tübingen 1921, pp.170-250. (Cf. a recent English translation.)
- 4 J.Krishnamurti Meditations, Madras 1980, p.6.
- 5 My main Yugoslav work on "the medians of Asian philosophies" (Razmeda azijskih filosofija I, Part 2 on "Jainism and Buddhism", chapter 5 a-c, pp.173-95. Ed. "Liber", Zagreb 1978) contains a survey of Pāli texts on the Buddha's discussions with Jains and some texts characteristic of his attitude to brāhmins. Suttas most characteristic of the sharpness of their controversy are: M 56 Upāli, M 58 Abhaya-rājakumāra, and M 104 Sāmagāma (on the occasion of Mahāvīra's death). Discussions and critiques of the Jaina doctrines of unlimited and always present absolute knowledge of a tirthakarah (kevala-rānam) and the extreme limits of ascetic restraint (saṃvara) are described in M 71 Tevijja-vacchagotta, M 76 Sandaka, M 101 Devadaha and some minor texts in Aṅguttara and Saṃyutta-nikāyas. Characteristic of the Buddha's ironic rebuke of brāhmins are, amongst others: M 51 Kandaraka - on the four types of men (the first, "torturer of himself" is the Jain ascetic, the third, "torturer of both himself and others" is the brāhman performing sacrifices for a king and the king himself); D 31 Sigālovāda (the stupidity of literal understanding of ritualistic texts), and D 4 Sonadanda (the self-conceit of a mighty brāhman).
- 6 Most of the specific penances practised by the Buddha immediately before his spiritual awakening at Uruvelā were specifically and peculiarly according to the Jain tradition. They are described in M 12 Mahā-sīhanāda-suttam and other texts from the same period of his struggle for awakening. The similarities of both teachings, Jain and Buddhist, are most strikingly presented in two beautiful poems included in the Sutta-nipāta: "The Rhinoceros" (Khaggavisāna) and Muni suttas - describing the ascetic attitude of a Jain muni (silent sage) as opposed to the traditional and institutionalised Buddhist "priest".
- 7 This and some of the preceding quotations are from Bhikkhu Nānamoli's The Life of the Buddha (BPS, Kandy 1972). Underlinings are mine.
- 8 The texts in the sequel are taken from H.Jacobi Jaina Sūtras, SBE 22 and 45, 2nd ed., Delhi 1964. Discrepancies between translations from Prākṛit and Pāli in analogous texts are partly due to my impossibility of consulting original Prākṛit editions.
- 9 Cf. T.W.Rhys Davids, SBE, Part III, p.198. PTS, London 1921.

UDDAKA RĀMAPUTTA AND RĀMA

Peter Skilling

The story of the Bodhisatta's quest for Enlightenment is related in identical terms in four Pāli discourses of the Middle Collection: the Discourse on the Exalted Quest (Ariya-pariyesana-sutta), the Greater Discourse to Saccaka (Mahāsaccaka-sutta), the Discourse to Prince Bodhi (Bodhi-rāja-kumāra-sutta) and the Discourse to Saṅgārava (Saṅgārava-sutta) (Majjhima Nikāya 26, 36, 85 and 100.¹) An important section of this account deals with the Bodhisatta's meeting with and study under two contemporary teachers of yogic or ecstatic techniques, Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta. The similarities of the accounts of these meetings in the Pāli have led several translators to gloss over important differences between them and treat them as virtually identical, with a mere substitution of names. Such is entirely the case with the late I.B.Horner's English translation of the Discourse on the Exalted Quest (Middle Length Sayings I, PTS 1967, pp. 207-210), and, to a lesser degree, with Bhikkhu Nānamoli's translations of the Discourse to Prince Bodhi and the Discourse on the Exalted Quest (A Treasury of the Buddha's Words, Mahāmakut Rājavidyālaya Press, Bangkok: I pp.273-6, III pp.201-4 - see book review on p.117).

The main difference is one of tense change: while in the account of the first meeting Ālāra Kālāma is spoken of in the present tense, in the account of the second meeting Uddaka Rāmaputta is spoken of in the present, but Rāma is spoken of in the aorist or past tense. This tense change makes it clear that Uddaka Rāmaputta and Rāma are not one and the same person, as given in the above-mentioned translations, but that Uddaka is the disciple, either the spiritual or real son (putta) of the deceased teacher Rāma.

In the passage in question, the Buddha relates how he, as a bodhisatta, met Ālāra Kālāma, mastered his teaching - the attainment of the plane of nothingness - and then, because it did not lead to Enlightenment, rejected it. He then went to Uddaka Rāmaputta; on being accepted into Uddaka's community, he quickly mastered the teaching verbally and intellectually. The Buddha then goes on to relate - the whole account is in the first person - as follows: "I, then thought, 'It was not out of mere faith that Rāma taught (pavedesi/pavedeti²) this dharma, saying "I dwell having attained, having realised by my own direct knowledge"; I am certain that Rāma dwelt (vihāsi/viharati) knowing and seeing this dharma'. I then went to Uddaka Rāmaputta and asked, 'What is the extent, sir (evuso, vocative), of the dharma that Rāma (Rāmo, nominative³) taught, having attained it, having realised it by his own direct knowledge?' On being asked this, Uddaka Rāmaputta instructed me in the plane of neither perception nor non-perception.

I then thought, 'Rāma had (ahosi/atthi) no monopoly on faith: I too possess faith; Rāma had no monopoly on energy, mindfulness, concentration or wisdom: I too possess energy, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom. Let me then exert myself in order to realise the dharma that Rāma taught, saying "I dwell having attained, having realised by my own direct knowledge." And not long afterwards, indeed quickly, I dwelt having attained to that dharma, having realised it by my own direct knowledge, I then went to Uddaka Rāmaputta, and asked, 'Is this the extent, sir (āvuso, voc.), of the dharma that Rāma (Rāno, nom.) taught, having attained it, having realised it by his own direct knowledge?' When he answered in the affirmative, I said, 'I too dwell having attained to this dharma to the same extent, having realised it by my own direct knowledge'. (And Uddaka Rāmaputta said,) 'It is a blessing, sir, it is indeed a blessing that I should meet with a companion in the spiritual life such as you! You now dwell having attained to, having realised by your own direct knowledge, the dharma that Rāma taught, having attained to it and having realised it by his own direct knowledge ...the dharma that Rāma knew (aññāsi/jānāmi), you know...as was (ahosi/---) Rāma, so are you....Come then, sir: may you lead this community!'"

A difference in status between the two individuals, Ālāra and Uddaka, is revealed in the concluding parts of the accounts of the two meetings, where another important difference occurs. When the Bodhisatta informs Ālāra Kālāma that he has mastered the latter's teaching, Ālāra, after proclaiming the Bodhisatta to be his equal, says, "Come then, sir: let the two of us lead this community together". In his narration of this event, the Buddha remarks, "Thus Ālāra Kālāma, my teacher (ācariya), set me, his disciple (antevāsīn) on equal footing with himself, and honoured me with the highest of honours". In the account of the second meeting, however, after Uddaka has proclaimed the Bodhisatta to be the equal of Rāma, he says, "Come then, sir: may you lead this community" (see translation above). Of this the Buddha remarks, "Thus Uddaka Rāmaputta, my companion in the spiritual life (sabrahmacārin) established me in the position of teacher (ācariyatthāne), and honoured me with the highest of honours"⁴. This implies that, while Ālāra was accepted as a teacher in his own right, Uddaka was simply the leader of a community through succession, by virtue of his teacher's death.

The relationship between Uddaka Rāmaputta and Rāma is borne out by two accounts of the second meeting preserved in Chinese. The first, from a discourse of the Sarvāstivādin school, describes Rāma as the father of Uddaka; the second, from the Vinaya of the Dharmaguptaka school, describes Rāma as Uddaka's teacher, and states specifically that Uddaka started teaching after the death of his teacher, Rāma (both passages translated and discussed by A. Bareau in Recherches sur la biographie du Buddha dans les Sūtrapitaka et les Vinayapitaka anciens I,

EFEO, Paris 1963, pp.23-27).

Of the extant Sanskrit texts dealing with the Bodhisatta's meeting with Uddaka, who is variously referred to in Buddhist Sanskrit texts as Udaka, Uddaka, Udraka and Rudraka, the Mahāvastu of the Lokottaravādin school, in what is certainly an ancient passage, also makes this relationship clear. While the Bodhisatta addresses Uddaka as "bho Udraka" ⁵("good Udraka"), the latter speaks of "the good Rāma" in a way that clearly implies that Rāma was his teacher. Thus he says, "Just so much, good Gautama, was attained, realised and taught by the good Rāma (bhavatā Rāmena): the plane of neither perception nor non-perception". When the Bodhisatta announces that he has also attained to this plane, Uddaka replies, "Then the good Gautama knows that same dharma which the good Rāma (bhavām Rāmo) knew (jānāti: third person, "historical present"). (Mahāvastu Avadāna 2, ed. R. Basak, Sanskrit College, Calcutta 1965, pp.167-9.) Unfortunately, the English translation of this passage is faulty, and implies that Uddaka and Rāma are one person, as do the translations from Pāli (J. Jones The Mahāvastu 2, SBB, London 1952, p.116-7).

The account given in the Lalita-vistara (ed. P. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, Mithila Institute, Darbhanga 1958, p.180-1) seems to have undergone the same confusion as that of some modern translators. When the Bodhisatta asks Uddaka (here Rudraka), "Who is your teacher, whose teaching do you profess?", the latter replies, "I do not have any teacher: I have realised (this teaching) correctly by myself and on my own". This account differs widely in style and content from the Pāli, Chinese and Mahāvastu accounts, which are generally similar, and is clearly later.

Two accounts, virtually identical in their translated form, are preserved in Tibetan translation in the Abhiniskramana-sūtra of an unknown school (but, because of the close agreement of this and other passages with the following, presumably Sarvāstivādin or Mūla-sarvāstivādin) (P 967, vol.39, p.16.3.4f.) and in the Vinayavastu of the Mūla-sarvāstivādins (P 1030, vol.42, p.34.4.1f: ch.17, Saṅgha-bheda-vastu). Although older than that of the Lalita-vistara, and closer in style to the other early accounts, the narration of the two meetings in these texts fails to preserve any differences: the two meetings are described identically, the only difference being the names and attainments of the two teachers.

Of the extant texts as a whole, the concluding portions of the Pāli version bring out the difference in status between the two individuals the most clearly. The Mahāvastu version, though briefer than the Pāli, is also quite clear. There the Buddha relates that Ālāra Kālāma suggested that the two of them lead the community of disciples together, and thus set the Bodhisatta on equal footing with himself (samānārthatāye sthāpayet), while Uddaka asked the Bodhi-

satta to take over the community of disciples, and thus established the Bodhisatta in the position of teacher (ācārya-sthāne sthāpaye)⁶. The two Chinese versions are less clear, but still preserve some differences. The Lalita-vistara, in its account of the second meeting, combines elements from both meetings, generally using the vocabulary of the Mahāvastu: Uddaka says, "Come then, let you and I lead this community", thus setting the Bodhisatta on equal footing with himself (samānārthe sthāpayati) and establishing him in the position of teacher (ācārya-sthāne sthāpayati). The Abhiniskramana-sūtra and the Vinayavastu again fail to preserve any difference whatsoever.

Finally, it should be noted that Uddaka Rāmaputta is never addressed or referred to as Rāma, as is given in the English translations of the Pāli and implied by the English translations of the Mahāvastu: in Pāli he is addressed simply as āvuso, in the Mahāvastu as bho Udraka or simply Udraka, in the Lalita-vistara as mārṣa; in Pāli he is referred to as Uddaka Rāmaputta, in the Mahāvastu as Udraka Rāmaputra, and in the Lalita-vistara as Rudraka Rāmaputra or simply Rudraka. Elsewhere in Sanskrit texts he is referred to as Udraka, not Rāma (Divyavadāna, ed. P. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, Darbhanga 1959, p. 250; Śikṣāsamuccaya, ed. C. Bendall, Indo-Iranian Reprints, The Hague 1957, p. 105.17; etc.). In the Pāli commentaries as well he is referred to simply as Uddaka (Dhammapada-atthakathā, Mahāmakuta Rājavidyālaya, Bangkok, Vol. 1, p. 77; Buddhavaṃsa-atthakathā, Bhūmibalo Bhikkhu Foundation, Bangkok 1979, pp. 12, 34, 529.)⁷

The material given above is sufficient to make it clear that Uddaka Rāmaputta and Rāma were two different persons, and that Rāma, Uddaka's teacher, had died by the time of the Bodhisatta's meeting with Uddaka; it does not, however, tell us whether or not Uddaka was the actual son of Rāma, as implied by his name and one Chinese translation. It is also not clear whether or not Uddaka had himself attained to the plane of neither perception nor non-perception. The texts that treat Uddaka and Rāma as different persons, and give the difference in status between Ālāra and Uddaka, imply that he had not: otherwise, why the difference in status? Thus the sub-commentary on the Pāli version of this passage states that only Rāma had attained to this samāpatti, not Uddaka⁸. The other texts imply that Uddaka, as a teacher in his own right, had attained to the state that he taught; on their side is the fact that in Indian yogic systems attainment is held to be one of the prerequisites of teaching. Later Sanskrit Buddhist traditions certainly held that Uddaka had attained, and give him as an example of one who had reached the summit of existence (bhavāgṛa = the plane of neither perception nor non-perception) and been reborn there, but was bound, because of past karma, to fall once more into the realm of Māra, to the animal- or even the hell-planes. For example, the Saundarananda-kāvya of Aśvaghoṣa states that "even though the sage Udraka attained to the formless summit of exist-

ence, he will depart from there when his karma is exhausted, and fall to the animal-plane"⁹.

As regards the age of the passages studied here, the Pāli and the Mahāvastu accounts are clearly the oldest; the latter, as simpler and less stereotyped, may be the older of the two. The Lalita-vistara, like the Mahāvastu in general, contains material from various strata mixed with verse; thus the bulk of the account of the meeting with Ālāra, given in the first person, is quite early in style, and strongly resembles that of the Mahāvastu, while the account of the meeting with Uddaka, given in the third person and opening with an explanation of how the Bodhisatta studied under Uddaka only as an expedient (upāya), in order to demonstrate that mundane meditations do not lead to release (laukika-samādhinām-anihsaranatā), is clearly much later. The accounts of the Abhiniskramana-sūtra and the Vinayavastu, though preserving a relatively ancient style, underwent alteration at a later date.

NOTES

- 1 In the PTS edition only the account of the Ariya-pariyesana is given in full; the others are virtually abbreviated out of existence. The Thai, Burmese and Nālandā editions give the account in full in each case. M 26 omits the sections on the three similes and the austerities.
- 2 In order to show the difference of tense clearly, the past forms of the verbs in the account of the second meeting are given in parentheses, followed by the present forms that occur in the account of the first meeting, that with Ālāra.
- 3 In the account of the first meeting, Ālāra is addressed in the vocative by his gotta name as āvuso Kālāma: cf. Paṇḍita-sūdanī (Mahāmakuta Rājavidyālaya, Bangkok, Vol. 2, p. 229): Ālāroti nāmaṃ...Kālāmoti gottam. Unfortunately, the commentary does not give any such information for Uddaka.
- 4 While Bhikkhu Nānamoli has translated this portion of the narrative correctly, I. B. Horner has simply repeated the passage dealing with Ālāra with the names changed.
- 5 The text of the Mahāvastu is somewhat corrupt. In Basak's edition, p. 168.12, correct bho Udrakena to bho Udraka; at p. 169.1 correct saṃjñānāsamjñāyatanam to naiva-samjñā-nāsamjñāyatanam: the whole phrase should probably read yaṃ-īdam naiva... (cf. 168.13). A lacuna occurs in the account of the meeting with Ārāda, p. 166.8-10, and should be corrected on the basis of the account of the meeting with Udraka, p. 168.8-11; cf. also Lalita-vistara 174.19-22.
- 6 This portion of the narrative has been mistranslated by Jones (loc. cit.):

samāna here is a present participle belonging with the preceding tathā-darsanam ca (cf. 167.6 where samāna occurs twice: evam-darsanam ca samānam (= pres.part.) samāna (= equal) arthatāye sthāpayet, and 173.9 sa khalvahaṃ bhiksavaṃ tathā-darsana-samāno....)

7 The Thai script versions of the passage dealing with Uddaka are corrupt, and do in fact give the vocative Rāma in place of the nominative Rāmo; furthermore, the aorist pavedesi occurs as the present pavedeti. Other verbs, however, remain in the aorist: vihāsi, ahosi, aññāsi. According to the notes on variant readings in the Burmese script Chattha-saṅgīti-piṭaka, the vocative also occurs in the Sinhalese and Khmer script versions, as well as in some Burmese versions (Mūla-pannāsa-pāli, p.221, n.4; Majjhima-pannāsa-pāli, p.281, n.4, and Nānā-pāthā, p.451). The note given at the first occurrence of the variant, that is M 26, is by far the lengthiest note in the entire Burmese script Majjhima, which demonstrates that the confusion of the identity of Uddaka and Rāma is one of the major textual problems of that collection. The full text of this valuable and interesting note is as follows: "Āvuso Rāma: Sīhalapothhake, Syāma-pothhake, katthaci Maramma-pothhake dissamāna-pātho. Mahāsatto Rāmaputtam-eva avoca, na Rāmaṃ. Rāmo hi tattha gaṇācariyo bhavēyya, tadā ca kālaṅkato asanto. Tenevettha Rāmāyattāni kriya-padāni atīta-kālavasena āgatāni. Uddako ca Rāmaputto mahāsattassa sa-brahmacārī-tv-eva vutto na ācariyo-ti. Tikāyam ca 'Pāliyam Rāmasseva samāpatti-lābhītā āgatā na Udakassā-ti' ādi paocchābhāge pakāsitā." (Mūla-pannāsa-pāli, p.221, n.4). Unfortunately I did not obtain the Burmese script edition until after the article was completed, so could not refer to this note in the body of the text. Another point worthy of note is that the Burmese and Thai editions prefer the spelling Uddaka, which is one of the variant spellings of the Mahāvastu.

8 Mūla-pannāsa-tīkā, part 2, Burmese script ed., Rangoon 1951, p.139.

9 The Saundarananda of Aśvaghoṣa, ed. and tr. by E.H.Johnston, repr. Delhi 1975, p.155 (note at text verse 56) and translation p.65, note at verse 56. Although Johnston excludes verses 56 and 57 from the body of the text as "undoubtedly spurious", I see no cogent reason for doing so. The two verses fit the context admirably, and bhavāgra is not, as Johnston would have it, particularly "a late word": it occurs at least once in the Pali Canon in the same meaning as in the later non-canonical Sanskrit texts: atthāvuso neva-saññā-nāsaññāyat-anūpaṇā devā: idaṃ bhavānam aggaṃ (A III p.202). Cf. also Suvikrānta-vikrāmi-pariprocā, in Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 17, ed. P.Vaidya, Darbhanga 1961, p.60.

THE THREE SIMILES

Peter Skilling

After leaving Uddaka Rāmaputta, the Bodhisatta went to Uruvelā, where, on the banks of the Nerañjarā river; three similes (upama) occurred to him. These similes are given in three of the afore-mentioned discourses of the Middle Collection: the Greater Discourse to Saccaka, the Discourse to Prince Bodhi and the Discourse to Saṅgārava (M 36, 85, 100)¹. Here an error in the romanised Pāli text (M I p.241), though noted by the editor himself (ib., p.550), has led to errors of translation. The initial reason for assuming that there is an error is one of context: three different similes are given, but the applications of the first two similes are exactly the same, with only the last being different. The error in fact occurs in the application of the second simile, which fits neither the simile itself nor the progression of thought. Another problem involves variant readings in different versions of the Pāli text; here it is less simple to speak of "error", a point which will be discussed below. To start with, a translation of the corrected Pāli text, in which some of the variant readings have been adopted, will be given, with the correction and the variants underlined.

"Three similes, Aggivessana, never heard before at any point in the past, came to me spontaneously:

(i) Suppose there is a piece of wet, sappy² wood lying in the water, and someone happens along with a fire-stick, thinking, 'I will make a fire and produce heat'. Do you think that he will be able to do so, by rubbing the fire-stick against this piece of wet, sappy wood, lying in the water?"

"Certainly not, good Gotama, for that piece of wood is wet and sappy, and, more than that, is lying in the water: the person in question would only end up wearying and frustrating himself."

"Such is the case, Aggivessana, with samanas and brāhmanas who dwell neither physically nor mentally withdrawn³ from sense-pleasures, and whose tendency towards sense-pleasures, desire for sense-pleasures, infatuation with sense-pleasures, thirst for sense-pleasures, and burning for sense-pleasures is neither inwardly well-abandoned nor well-subdued: even if, as a result of their striving⁴, these respected samanas and brāhmanas undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, they will be incapable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment, and even if they do not undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, resulting from their striving, they will still be incapable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment. This, Aggivessana, is the first simile, never heard before at any point in the past, that came to me spontaneously."

(ii) "Then, Aggivessana, another, a second, simile, never heard before at any point in the past, came to me spontaneously. Suppose there is a piece of wet, sappy wood, lying well away from the water on dry land, and someone happens along with a fire-stick, thinking, 'I will make a fire and produce heat'. Do you think that he will be able to do so, by rubbing the fire-stick against this piece of wet, sappy wood, lying well away from the water on dry land?"

"Certainly not, good Gotama: even though it is lying well away from the water on dry land, that piece of wood is wet and sappy: the person in question would only end up wearying and frustrating himself."

"Such is the case, Aggivessana, with samanas and brāhmanas who dwell only physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures, but whose tendency towards sense-pleasures... (as above)... is neither inwardly well-abandoned nor well-subdued: even if, as a result of their striving, these respected samanas and brāhmanas undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, they will be incapable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment, and even if they do not undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, resulting from their striving, they will still be incapable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment. This, Aggivessana, is the second simile, never heard before at any point in the past, that came to me spontaneously."

(iii) "Then, Aggivessana, another, a third, simile, never heard before at any point in the past, came to me spontaneously. Suppose there is a piece of dry, sapless⁵ wood, lying well away from the water on dry land, and someone happens along with a fire-stick, thinking, 'I will make a fire and produce heat'. Do you think he will be able to do so, by rubbing the fire-stick against this piece of dry, sapless wood lying well away from the water on dry land?"

"Indeed he would, good Gotama, for that piece of wood is dry and sapless, and, more than that, is lying well away from the water on dry land."

"Such is the case, Aggivessana, with samanas and brāhmanas who dwell both physically and mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures, and whose tendency towards sense-pleasures, desire for sense-pleasures, infatuation with sense-pleasures, thirst for sense-pleasures and burning for sense-pleasures is both inwardly well-abandoned and well-subdued: even if, as a result of their striving, these respected samanas and brāhmanas undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, they will be capable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment, and even if they do not undergo unpleasant feeling, sharp and harsh, resulting from their striving, they will still be capable of knowledge, vision and unsurpassed enlightenment. This, Aggivessana, is the third simile, never heard before at any point in the past, that came to me spontaneously."

In the application of the second simile, the PTS edition reads, as in the application of the first simile, kāyena c'eva kāmehi avūpakatthā viharanti, "and do not dwell physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures"; however, as noted by Urenckner himself and as given in the Thai edition, the reading should be kāyena c'eva kāmehi vūpakatthā viharanti, "and dwell physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures". This is demanded by the context: here the piece of wood, the mind, though still wet, saturated with sensual desire, is on dry land, that is, withdrawn physically from sense-pleasures. This error in the PTS edition has given rise to faulty translations in I.B. Horner's Middle Length Sayings I (op. cit., p.296) and in A. Bareau's Recherches... I (op. cit., p.42-3).

The second problem, that of variant readings, is more complex. The Thai script edition and the corrected PTS edition give the part of the applications of the three similes under discussion as follows:

- (i) do not dwell physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures (kāyena c'eva kāmehi avūpakatthā viharanti)
- (ii) dwell physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures (kāyena c'eva kāmehi vūpakatthā viharanti)
- (iii) = (ii)

This suits the context and could stand as it is; however, the Burmese and Nālandā editions, introducing a further element, read as follows:

- (i) dwell neither physically nor mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures (kāyena c'eva cittaṇa ca kāmehi avūpakatthā viharanti)
- (ii) dwell both physically and mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures (kāyena c'eva cittaṇa ca kāmehi vūpakatthā viharanti)
- (iii) = (ii)

Here again, only the first and the last statements fit the context: "not being mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures", in the first simile, summarises "their tendency towards sense-pleasures ... is neither inwardly well-abandoned nor well-subdued"; "being mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures", in the third simile, summarises "their tendency towards sense-pleasures ... is both inwardly well-abandoned and well-subdued". But in the second application, "being mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures" contradicts "their tendency towards sense-pleasures is neither well-abandoned nor well-subdued, and further contradicts the simile itself, for the piece of wood, the mind, is still wet, that is saturated by sense desires.

Equivalent Sanskrit-Tibetan texts (according to A. Bareau, op. cit., p. 43; the Chinese texts studied by him do not give the passage on the three similes) give the following readings:

A. Lalita-vistara (op.cit., p.161-2, Sanskrit; the Tibetan translation gives the same readings)

- (i) dwell neither physically nor mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures
(kāmebhyo'navakṛṣṭa-kāyā viharanti sma kāmebhyo anavakṛṣṭa-cittāśca viharanti sma)
- (ii) dwell both physically and mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures
(kāmebhyo vyapakṛṣṭa-kāya-cittā viharanti)
- (iii) = (ii)

B. Mahāvastu 2 (op.cit., pp.169-173, Sanskrit only)

- (i) dwell neither physically nor mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures
(kāmehi avyapakṛṣṭa-kāyā viharanti avyapakṛṣṭa-cittā)
- (ii) dwell physically withdrawn but not mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures
(kāmehi vyapakṛṣṭa-kāyā viharanti avyapakṛṣṭa-cittā)
- (iii) dwell both physically and mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures
(kāmehi vyapakṛṣṭa-kāyā viharanti vyapakṛṣṭa-cittā)

C. Abhiniskramaṇa-sūtra (op.cit., p.18.5.2f, Tibetan) and Vinayavastu (op.cit., ch.17, p.37.1.2, Tibetan)

- (i) dwell neither physically nor mentally withdrawn (thaṅ sring ba-vyapakṛṣṭa?) from sense-pleasures
- (ii) dwell having abandoned (spong ba-prahīṇa?) sense-pleasures physically but not mentally
- (iii) dwell both mentally and physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures.

Firstly, it may be noted that all Sanskrit-Tibetan versions give both body and mind, as do the Burmese and Nālandā editions; the Lalita-vistara agrees entirely with the latter two texts - with the same vocabulary but different phrasing - and thus does not solve the problem of the application of the second simile. The Mahāvastu, the Abhiniskramaṇa-sūtra and the Vinayavastu versions, however, fit both the context and the progression of thought: in the second simile, "physically withdrawn from sense-pleasures" is equivalent to "on dry land", out of the "water" of sense-pleasures; "mentally not withdrawn from sense-pleasures" corresponds to the piece of wet wood, the mind still saturated by sensual desires.

The main problem now becomes whether or not the Pāli text should include the phrase "(not) mentally withdrawn" in addition to "(not) physically withdrawn", and if so, how to resolve the application of the second simile. It may be argued that the addition of "mentally withdrawn" is redundant, since it is difficult to take it as anything other than an equivalent of the list of near-synonyms beginning with "tendency towards sense-pleasures". However, redundancies abound in both Pāli and Sanskrit texts; it is given in the majority of

texts studied and may be further supported by other canonical texts, which, both in Pāli (D III 285 = A IV 152; S V 67) and Sanskrit (Daśottara-sūtra, ed. K.Mittal, in Dogmatische Begriffsreihen im Älteren Buddhismus, Berlin 1957, p. 84), mention physical and mental withdrawal (kāya-, citta-vūpakāsa/ - vyapakāsa) together. Non-canonical texts of the Sanskrit traditions also deal with these two, but give them broader definitions (cf. Abhidharma-kośa, Bhāṣya and Vyākhyā, 6:6a; Artha-viniścaya-sūtra-nibandhana, ed. N.Samtani, Patna 1971, p. 202; Śrāvaka-bhūmi of Asaṅga, ed. K.Shukla, Patna 1973, p.362). Further, one of the Pāli discourses that contains this passage, the Greater Discourse to Saccaka, opens with the question of "physical and mental development" (kāya-, citta-bhāvanā). Thus it seems likely that both physical and mental withdrawal should be included in the Pāli text.

It is, however, difficult to include both in the application of the second simile as it stands. Adhering as closely as possible to the extant manuscript tradition, the only possible reading would be kāyena v'eva na cittena kāmehi vūpakatthā viharanti, which sounds unidiomatic. The only acceptable solution for the time being is to omit the reference to mental withdrawal in the application of the second simile, a solution which is not entirely satisfactory, but at least can be supported by available manuscripts. Thus we get, as translated above,

- (i) kāyena c'eva cittena ca kāmehi avūpakatthā viharanti
- (ii) kāyena c'eva kāmehi vūpakatthā viharanti (see PTS ed. p.550 and Bhikkhu Nānamoli, op.cit., Vol.3, p.195, notes, for other suggested readings; Nānamoli suggests the same readings as here for (i) and (iii))
- (iii) kāyena c'eva cittena ca kāmehi vūpakatthā viharanti.

Numerous other differences occur in the various versions of this passage. While the Pāli texts situate this incident at Uruvelā, Senānigama, on the banks of the Nerañjarā river, after the Bodhisatta has left Uddaka Rāmaputta and before his practice of self-mortification, the Abhiniskramaṇa-sūtra and the Vinayavastu situate it "south of the Gaṅgā" (Abhiniskramaṇa, doubtless an error for the following) or "south of Gayā" (Vinayavastu), at Uruvilvā-Kāśyapa's (Kāśyapa, given by both texts, probably an error) Senā-nigama, by the Nairāñjanā river, after the practice of austerities (Abhiniskramaṇa) or after the practice of the bulk of the austerities (Vinayavastu). The Mahāvastu and the Lalita-vistara situate the event on Gayāśīrsa mountain, after the Bodhisatta has left Uddaka Rāmaputta; after the three similes have occurred to him he then proceeds to Uruvilvā Senāpatigṛama(ka) and the Nairāñjanā river, and begins his practice of austerities.

The latter two texts, which agree with the Pāli in situating the three

similes before the austerities, give a passage, not found in Pāli, after the similes but before the austerities, which connects the two: "Then, O monks, I thought, 'I dwell both physically and mentally withdrawn from sense-pleasures, and have thoughts about sense-pleasures, desire for sense-pleasures, burning for sense-pleasures and attachment to sense-pleasures well under control (prati-vinīta); even if I should undergo unpleasant feelings - acute, harsh and racking, that torment the self and torture the body - I will yet be capable of knowledge, insight and understanding of that which transcends the human state'" (Mahāvastu 2, op.cit., p.173; Lalita-vistara gives a similar passage, worded differently).

Another difference is in the string of synonyms for sensual desire, beginning in Pāli with "tendency towards sense-pleasures", and in the participles denoting their (non-) relinquishment; these differ from text to text, but need not detain us here as the differences do not affect the meaning. The similes themselves are also worded differently in the various texts; the only significant difference here being that in the Abhiniskramana and Vinayavastu the first two similes are exactly the same - "a piece of wet, soggy wood, taken from the water and placed on dry land" - which raises the reverse of the main problem dealt with above: the same simile with two different applications. Another difference which does not affect the meaning concerns the order of the material: while the Pāli, the Abhiniskramana and Vinayavastu give the similes first, followed by their applications, the Mahāvastu and Lalita-vistara give the "applications" first, followed by the similes, then by a repetition of the applications (the Mahāvastu gives the text in full throughout, with one omission in the first simile, probably a lacuna or misprint, while the Lalita-vistara abbreviates the second and third similes considerably). Further, in the Pāli and the Mahāvastu, no doubt the most ancient versions, the narrative is in the first person; in the other texts it is related of the Bodhisatta in the third person.

All the texts studied here give a follow-up passage, after the practice of self-mortification, that refers back to the applications of the three similes. The Pāli version (M I, p.246.20) reads as follows, "Then, Aggivessana, I thought, 'This is the limit (etāva-paramaṃ) of unpleasant feeling - acute and harsh, resulting from striving - undergone by any samanas or brāhmanas in the past, the future, or the present: there is nothing beyond this'" (summarised translation). The Mahāvastu (p.182.3) reads "Then, monks, I thought, 'This is the limit of unpleasant feeling - acute, severe and harsh, that torments the self and tortures the body - undergone by any respected śramaṇas or brāhmanas in the past or at present: no one is capable of surpassing this'"⁶.

The one major difference that occurs in the applications of the similes

is that all Sanskrit-Tibetan versions mention only that, even should the śramaṇas and brāhmanas be tormented by pain as a result of their self-mortification, they will or will not be capable of enlightenment, while the Pāli version alone introduces a second alternative: whether or not they are tormented by pain as a result of their self-mortification, they will or will not be capable of enlightenment. Although the Pāli version cannot be rejected offhand, it seems unnecessary to include this second alternative. The general application of the similes, here as well as in other contexts (cf. M 119, III p.95; M 126, III pp.141-144; Petakopadesa, p.1-2) is impossibility/ possibility: in this context only when the mind, the piece of wood, is both physically and mentally withdrawn or removed from sense-pleasures can it give birth to the "spark of enlightenment"; thus the practice of self-mortification can only be effective when the practitioner is so withdrawn. It would seem that, had the Bodhisatta further realised that enlightenment could be realised without the practice of self-mortification - the second alternative to the third simile in the Pāli - he would not have embarked upon such practice, for no less than six years, according to common tradition. That at that point the Bodhisatta believed the practice of austerities to be necessary, is clearly given in one of the Pāli discourses that contains the passage in question, the Discourse to Prince Bodhi (M 85, II p.93), where the Buddha introduces the narration of the quest for enlightenment and the practice of self-mortification with the statement, "before my enlightenment, when I was an unenlightened bodhisatta, I thought that 'happiness is not to be attained by means of happiness: happiness is to be attained through suffering'". The relation of the austerities itself confirms this: it is only when the Bodhisatta realises that he has reached the limit of suffering to be attained through self-mortification that he sees that this practice has not led him to enlightenment. Wondering if there is another path to enlightenment, he reflects upon a past experience of meditation (jhāna, dhyaṇa), and realises that this is the path. He then reflects, "Why should I fear a happiness that is free of sense-pleasure and free of unhealthy states of mind?", and goes on to reject self-mortification, adopt a healthy diet, practise meditation and attain enlightenment. (M I 246-7; the Sanskrit-Tibetan texts studied here all contain this passage, with the usual differences of phrasing.) Thus the second alternative given in the Pāli seems unlikely, and may well be a later interpolation; it brings to mind the interpolations in the Lalita-vistara, where it is said that the Bodhisatta already knew the futility of self-mortification but practised it to the limit in order to demonstrate this futility (op.cit., p.182-3, etc.).

In this case the Mahāvastu seems to give the most ancient and the clearest version of this event; the other versions all present difficulties and appear to have become corrupted with the passage of time.

NOTES

- 1 As in the case of the discourses dealing with the meetings with Ālāra and Uddaka, only the first discourse of the PTS edition (M 36) gives the text in full; the Thai, Burmese and Nālandā editions all give the full text in each case.
- 2 After the commentary, Papañca-sūdanī (Vol.2, Mahāmakuta Rājavidyālaya, Bangkok, B.E.2463, p.387): sa-snehan-ti sa-khīraṇa.
- 3 Papañca-sūdanī, loc.cit.: avūpakatthā-ti anaparatā; cf. Kōsa 6:6a vyapakarsa = dūrikarāṇa.
- 4 Papañca-sūdanī, loc.cit.: opakkamikā-ti upakkama-nibbatthā.
- 5 Papañca-sūdanī, p.388: kolāpan-ti chinna-sinehan nivāpam.
- 6 The Mahāvastu is here very corrupt; see Edgerton's suggested corrections, which are followed here (Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, repr. Delhi 1972, p.155b, ettāvāt). Whatever the original may have been, the general idea is confirmed by the Pāli, Lalita-vistara (p.192.25), Abhiniskramana (19.1.7) and Vinayavastu (37.5.2), and Jones' rendering (op.cit., p.125) is certainly wrong. I.B.Horner's translation from the Pāli (op.cit., p.301), though perhaps not literally wrong, is unhappy and fails to bring out the meaning clearly; Bhikkhu Nānamoli's rendering (op.cit., Vol.1, p.280, Vol.3, p.191) is much preferable.

ABBREVIATIONS AND TEXTS USED

Pāli: the PTS (Pali Text Society, London), the Burmese script Chattha-saṅgīti (Rangoon), the Thai script (Mahāmakuta Rājavidyālaya, Bangkok) and the Nālandā (Nālandā, Bihar) editions have been consulted for the passages dealt with here; of these the Burmese gives the best readings, which are mainly followed by the Nālandā edition, which adds modern punctuation. References to other Pāli texts, except when otherwise noted, are to PTS editions, with standard abbreviations.

Tibetan: the Peking edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka (P), Suzuki Research Foundation reprint, Tokyo-Kyoto, has been used; references are to catalogue number, followed by volume number, page, folio and line.

Names: for the sake of consistency, the Pāli forms (bodhisatta, Uddaka, etc.) have been used, except in direct citations from the Sanskrit.