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蹤如 是空 於波
 跡鳥 被无 食等
 不遊 所相 如無
 可處 行解 實積
 得空 境脫 失聚

!

Frontispiece: the calligraphy in seal script by Shi Weimiao, translated into Chinese by Shi Liaocan, reads:

*Whose āsavas are destroyed, and who
is not dependent upon food, whose realm
is empty and unconditioned release,
his track is hard to follow,
like that of birds in the sky.*

Dhammapada VII, v.93 (tr. K.R. Norman)
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EDITORIAL

This year marks the birth centenary of Étienne Lamotte (1903-83), undoubtedly one of the greatest Western scholars of Buddhism and possibly the last polymath in the field of Sino-Indian philology.

For many years he was Professor at the Institut Orientaliste of the Catholic University of Louvain (Leuven), Belgium, where he at first taught Greek Language and Literature, soon adding Sanskrit, Pāli, Indology, the History and Philosophy of India and what came under the umbrella term of 'Buddhist Languages', as well as occupying various other academic positions. However, what made his career unique was his decision systematically to translate, often for the first time in a European language, the major texts of Mahāyāna Buddhism from their originals in Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan. In turn, his authorised translator, Sara Boin-Webb, has rendered the French versions into English, notably his magnum opus, *Le Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāsāstra/upadeśa)*, in five volumes, which regrettably continues to languish in the office of Peeters Press (Leuven) in the hope that it will be published.

Lamotte's accurate, almost pedantic yet highly readable translations, enhanced by the wealth of introductory essays and illuminating footnotes, have ensured him a permanent place in the history of Buddhist textual studies. To paraphrase a popular remark in another context, everything you ever wanted to know about mainstream Indian Mahāyāna thought and practice can be found, in unequalled measure, in his writings.

To commemorate this anniversary, we are featuring Sara Boin-Webb's translation of his 'Vajrapāṇi en Inde' (in two parts), to our knowledge the only substantial study of this subject. By so doing, we wish both to keep alive the memory of Lamotte's inspiring and life and career and to encourage a greater acquaintance and appreciation of his unique literary work.

cardinal points; one of them, Vaiśravaṇa or Kubera, the Guardian of the North, is the king of the yakṣas.⁵

The second class of gods of the realm of desire is that of the *Trāyastriṃśa* 'the gods who have the Thirty-three at their head' and whose king is Śakra, *devānām indra* 'the Indra of the gods'. Their town, Sudarśana 'Lovely vista', which contains the *Vaijayanta* 'Palace of Victory', is situated on the summit of Mount Meru, on a plateau whose sides total 80,000 *yojanas*. Above the plateau, at the four corners of Meru, there are four peaks 50,000 *yojanas* high: it is there that reside the Vajrapāṇi 'Thunderbolt-wielder' yakṣas who guard and protect the Trayastriṃśa gods.⁶

Hence the Vajrapāṇis (in Chinese *Ch'ih-chin-kang* 持金剛, *Chin-kang-shou* 金剛手 or simply *Ching-kang*) form a privileged class of yakṣas removed from the authority of Vaiśravaṇa and directly attached to the Buddhist Indra whose attribute, the thunderbolt (*vajra*), they share.

The Vajrapāṇi who is the subject of the present article plays the part of first among equals among his like, and his title of *Guhyakādhipati* 'leader of the Guhyakas' emphasises this quality. If we are to believe the *Lalitavistara*, the Guhyakas are identical to the Vajrapāṇis, and 'Guhyakādhipati is so named because it was from him that the race of the Vajrapāṇi yakṣas sprang'.⁷ In fact, the *Guhyaka* yakṣas are no less known to Brahminical literature than Buddhist:⁸ as their name indicates, they are 'mysterious' yakṣas, perhaps cave spirits before having become those of mysteries.⁹ When they encountered the epithet of *Guhyakādhipati* in the Indian originals, the Chinese usually translated only the first part, *Guhyaka*, which they rendered by *Mi-chi* 密迹 'of

⁵ Cf. *Hōbōgirin*, pp.79-83, s.v. *Bishamon*.

⁶ Cf. *Lokaprajñapti*, in L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Cosmologie bouddhique*, Brussels 1913, p.323; *Mahāvibhāṣā*, T 1545, ch.133, p.691c23; *Kośa*, T 1558, ch.11, p.59c21-22 (tr. III, p.161); *Nyāyānusāra*, T 1562, ch.31, p.518c21; *Yogācārabhūmi*, ed. V Bhattacharya, p.40, 5-6: *Upari Merutale caturṣu koneṣu catvāraḥ kūtāḥ pañcayojanaśatocchrāyāhtesu Vajrapañayo yakṣāḥ prativasanti*.

⁷ *Lalitavistara*, p.66, 5-6: *Guhyakādhipati ca nāma yakṣakulam yato Vajrapāṇer utpattiḥ*.

⁸ Cf. the indexes in *Epic Mythology* by E. W. Hopkins (Strasbourg 1915) and in the *Mahāvastu* ed. É. Senart.

⁹ Cf. A. Foucher, *Art gréco-bouddhique du Gandhāra II*, Paris 1918, p.50, n.2.

‘of mysterious traces’. Further on we will see that, during his threatening interventions, Vajrapāṇi shows himself only to the Buddha and his direct adversary and remains invisible to the mass of watchers. On the other hand, he will end as the guardian of the ‘mysteries’ of the Buddha and bodhisattvas.

Finally, and as far as I know, his title of Malla is never encountered in the Indian originals but only in the corresponding Chinese versions which invariably render it by *Li-shih*. *Li-shih* is a common noun which means ‘athlete’; it is also a proper name used to designate an ancient population of northern Bihar: the Mallas of Pāva and Kuśinagara who had the honour of being present at the Parinirvāṇa of the Buddha and of performing his funeral. According to certain sources, Vajrapāṇi played an import-ant part in these ceremonies.

What should be r/emembered from the above remarks is the close relationship linking Vajrapāṇi to Indra, the great Aryan god, whose story is that of continual decadence.¹⁰

In Vedism, Indra is the most famous of all the deities: gigantic warrior, drinker and profligate, he wields the *vajra* fashioned for him by Tvaṣṭṛ. With this invincible weapon, he kills the dragon Vṛta, massacres demons, hacks the *dasyus* to pieces, releases the waters and vanquishes the light: he is the glory of the warrior caste of which he is the official protector.

Already in Brahminism, Indra slots into a hierarchy and is aligned over the Lokapālas. If he retains his *vajra* and prerogatives as a warrior, he is above all a god of the rains and his main weapon is magic. Furthermore, he is exposed to threats which impose upon him the ascetism of the Brahmins, and the slaying of Vṛta, which entitled him to great glory, is now taxed with brahminicide. In order to expiate this misdeed, he has to leave the heaven by hiding in a fibre of lotus and only regains his rule over the world on the intervention of Bṛhaspati and Agni who have discovered his hiding place.

Under the name of Śakra ‘the powerful’ (a Vedic epithet), Indra has acquired acceptance in Buddhism and, in the legend of the Buddha, there are few episodes in which he does not play his part. Śākyamuni’s birth and first bath, the return of Māyā and

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¹⁰ Cf. L. Renou, in *Inde classique* I, Paris 1947, pp.319-21 and 492-3.

Lamotte – Vajrapāṇi in India (I)

If Śakra frequently appears in the canonical writings (Sūtra, Vinaya and Abhidharma), Vajrapāṇi, who is still only his substitute, makes only a very few appearances in them. His interventions are only episodic in nature and always pursue the same aim: to force the recalcitrant to answer the Buddha's questions.

1. Two sūtras only, attested in the Pāli Nikāyas and Sanskrit Āgamas, mention Vajrapāṇi:

In the *Ambatthasutta*,¹⁵ the Buddha asks the young Ambatthā a question but the latter remains silent:

At the same moment the yakṣa Vajrapāṇi, with his great mass of iron, burning, flaming and all light, stood in the air above the young Ambatthā. If the young Ambatthā, he said, questioned up to three times by the Beneficent One on a matter concerning the Dharma, does not answer, I will instantly cause his head to shatter into seven fragments. Only the Beneficent One and the young Ambatthā saw the spirit Vajrapāṇi.

An identical scene, reproduced in the same terms, is in the *Cūlasaccakasutta*,¹⁶ when Satyaka Nirgranthaputra in turn refused to answer the Buddha.

2. The Pāli Vinaya does not breathe a word of Vajrapāṇi, and the other Vinayas, with the exception of that of the Mūlasarvāstivādins, are almost equally reticent.

In order to ensure descendents in his family, the monk Sudinna had fathered a child on his former wife. His fellow monks denounced him to the Buddha and the latter questioned the accused. This fact is narrated in all the Vinayas,¹⁷ but that of the Mahīśāsakas¹⁸ is the only one to mention Vajrapāṇi:

The Buddha, for that reason, assembled the community of monks. It is a constant rule of the Buddhas to question or not in full

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¹⁵ *Dīgha* I, p.95.8-18; *Dīrgha*, T 1, ch.13, p.83a16-21; *Fo k'ai chieh fan chih a p'o ching*, T 20, p.260b19.

¹⁶ *Majjhima* I, p.231.30-37; *Samyukta*, T 99, ch.5, p.36a15-20; *Ekottara*, T 125, ch.30, p.716a7-12.

¹⁷ Pāli Vin. III, p.231; Dharmaguptaka Vin., T 1428, ch.1, p.570b11-16; Sarvāstivādin Vin., T 1435, ch.1, p.1c2-7.

¹⁸ T 1421, ch.1, p.3b8-13.

Lamotte – Vajrapāṇi in India (I)

was purifying itself. A young man (*dāraka*) whose bodily, vocal and mental actions were bad, hid himself and fraudulently listened to the *prātimokṣa* being recited. Guhyaka, the Malla, under the super-normal impulse (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the Buddha, took his *vajrakūṭa* and reduced his head to dust. O Bhagavat, that yakṣa Vajrapāṇi was truly cruel thus to deprive that young man of his life. How, therefore, can the Tathāgata truly consider all beings as his only son Rāhula?

The Buddha said to Kāśyapa: Do not say that! That young man was only a magical creation (*nirmāṇa*) merely serving to expel immoral beings and destroyers of the Good Dharma and make them leave the community. Vajrapāṇi, the Guhyaka, was also a magical creation.

To sum up, in the early canonical texts Vajrapāṇi is merely a substitute for Śakra, and again in some Mahāyānist texts he may sometimes, but not always, reveal himself in a metamorphosed form of Śakra or the Buddha or of some bodhisattva.

It is therefore mistakenly that some authors have wanted to see the identification of Vajrapāṇi with Indra as the last stage in the evolution of the personage of Vajrapāṇi,³⁰ or the beginnings of a new religion with Śakra as its patron.³¹

III. VAJRAPĀṆI, AUTONOMOUS SPIRIT, AND HIS INTERVENTIONS

The Canon of texts, scholarly and didactic in nature, was followed by the post-canonical literature which was more populist-inspired. Reproducing and complementing the biographical fragments in the early writings, it supplied new versions of the life of the Buddha (*Mahāvastu*, *Lalitavistara*, *Buddhacarita*, etc.) and collections of stories and fables (*Avadānaśataka*, *Divyāvadāna*, etc). Part of this output was incorporated into the Sanskrit Āgamas: we find an *Aśokāvadāna* in the *Samyukta*, numbers of stories and fables in the *Ekottara* and a complete life of the Buddha in the *Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya*, the compilation of which was not completed until the second century CE.

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³⁰ Sten Konow, 'Note on Vajrapāṇi-Indra', in *Acta Orientalia* VIII, 4, 1930, pp.311-17.

³¹ C.E. Codage, 'The Place of Indra in Early Buddhism', in *Ceylon University Review* III, 1, 1945, p.52.

Lamotte – Vajrapāṇi in India (I)

Vajrapāṇi made a place for himself in this new literary bed. He appears there, no longer as a secondary form of Śakra, but as an autonomous spirit, endowed with his own personality and often juxtaposed to Śakra from whom he is completely detached. He is no longer a mere bogey destined to frighten the Buddha's adversaries: he takes an active part in events.

I shall indicate here some of his interventions in the life of the Buddha.

The Buddha's conception. – When the Buddha entered his mother's womb, Vajrapāṇi was attached to his person with other deities, including Śakra. This is affirmed by the *Lalitavistara*:³²

While the Bodhisattva was seated in this way, Śakra, the lord of the gods, the four Great Kings, the twenty-eight leaders of the army of yakṣas, the one named Guhyakādhipati from whom the race of Vajrapāṇi yakṣas sprang, having learned that the Bodhisattva had entered his mother's womb, were always and ceaselessly attached to his person.

The great departure. – When Śākyamuni left Kapilavastu to take up the homeless life, the deities, including Śakra and Vajrapāṇi, were present at that great departure. Here again, details are supplied by the *Lalitavistara*:³³

The gods of the earth and the air, as well as the World Guardians, Śakra the lord of the gods with his retinue, the Yāma and Tuṣita gods and the Nirmita and Paranirmita gods hastened ...

And the magnanimous leader of the Guhyakas, also wielding a flaming thunderbolt, stood in the air, a breastplate girding his body, endowed with power, vigour and courage, holding in his hand a sparkling thunderbolt.

The victory over the heretics and the great wonder at Śrāvastī. – Unlike the two preceding episodes, this one is not mentioned in the canonical sources. A narrative in Pāli is incorporated into the Commentaries on the *Dīgha* and *Dhammapada*:³⁴ the much more

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³² *Lalitavistara*, p.66, 4.7.

³³ *Ibid.*, p.219.

³⁴ *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* I, p.57; *Dhammapadaṭṭhakathā* III, pp.204-16 (tr. E.W. Burlingame, *Buddhist Legends* III, pp.38-47). See also *Jātaka* IV, pp.263-5.

Lamotte – Vajrapāṇi in India (I)

prātihārya). Would that not be expedient? The Buddha replied: Very well, in seven days I will engage in a bout of magic.

To the east of the town, on a vast levelled terrain, the king built two pavilions (*maṇḍapa*), adorned with the seven jewels. There he set up banners and laid mats. The distance between the two pavilions measured two *li*. The disciples of both parties settled at their feet. The king, the ministers and a great crowd assembled in a mass in order to witness the bout of magic between the two men. Kāśyapa and his disciples, having reached the foot of the pavilion, climbed up it by means of a ladder.

The king of the yakṣas named Pan-shih (Pañcika), seeing Kāśyapa's falsity and envy, raised a great wind and blew on his pavilion: the seating was overturned and the banners flew away. Sand, gravel and stones rained down to such a degree that the eye could no longer see.

As for the Bhagavat's pavilion, it remained calm and still. The Buddha and the great community approached in good order and, once close, found themselves suddenly at its summit. All the monks sat down calmly and in order. The king and the ministers, re-doubling their respect, bowed down their heads before the Buddha and said to him: We would like you to display wonders of super-normal power (*ṛddhipratihārya*) and humiliate the heretics; thus the population of the kingdom would have fervent and sincere faith.

Thereupon the Buddha vanished from his pavilion with the speed of lightning and, rising into the air, emitted great rays. He disappeared from the East only to reappear in the West, and it was the same in the four directions. His body emitted water and fire, alternately from above and below. Whether sitting or standing in the air, he performed the twelve transformations. Then, suddenly, he disappeared and resumed his place at the summit of the pavilion. The devas, nāgas and yakṣas offered him flowers and perfumes, gave great cries and shook the earth.

Pūraṇa Kāśyapa, wholly disorientated, lowered his head in shame and dared not raise his eyes. Thereupon Vajrapāṇi the Malla lifted his *vajrakūṭa* from the top of which fire issued and threatened Kāśyapa: Why, he asked him, do you not display your own super-normal wonders? Kāśyapa, fear-stricken, leaped from his pavilion and fled. His five hundred pupils ran away and scattered.

The Bhagavat remained imperturbable, displaying neither joy nor displeasure. He returned to Anāthapiṇḍada's grove in the

Lamotte – Vajrapāṇi in India (I)

Jetavana. The king and his ministers, full of joy, took their leave of him and went away.

While Pūraṇa Kāśyapa and his disciples were leaving in shame, they encountered on their path an aged upāsaka named *Mo-ni* (Maṇi).³⁹ The latter cursed them, saying: Fools that you are! Without judging yourselves, you wanted to measure yourselves in virtue against the Buddha. Mad fools and imposters, you are unaware of shame. With a face like yours, you should not present yourselves before the Buddha.

Pūraṇa Kāśyapa and his disciples reached the bank of a river and, deceiving his disciples, Kāśyapa said: I am going to throw myself into the water and I will certainly be reborn as a Brahmadeva. If I do not return, know that I have that happiness. His disciples waited for him but he did not return. They said to one another: Our master has surely risen to the sky, where should we dwell? One after the other, they threw themselves into the water, hoping to rejoin their master but, unaware of what their offence implied, they fell into hell.

2. Compiled in Turfan by Hui-chiao and his colleagues from notes assembled in Khotan, the *Hsien yü ching* was published in 445 in Liang-chou.⁴⁰ It contains a detailed account of the ‘Victory over the Six Masters’, in which events are narrated day by day. It is during the eighth that Vajrapāṇi appears alongside Śakra:⁴¹

On the eighth day, at the invitation of Śakra devendra, a lion-throne (*siṃhāsana*) was made for the Buddha. The Tathāgata mounted it; Śakra devendra stood to his left and Brahmaraṇya stood to his right. The whole community, in silence, was seated in meditation. Slowly, the Buddha extended his arm and grasped the throne with his hand. Suddenly there was a great noise, like the trumpeting of an elephant. At that moment five huge yakṣas were pushing and pulling the great pavilion (*maṇḍapa*) of six masters. Vajrapāṇi the Malla seized his *vajrakūṭa* from the top of which fire issued and threatened the six masters. The latter, terror-stricken, fled on foot and, filled with shame, threw themselves into a river

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³⁹ In the *Divyāvadāna*, p.164, 27, the role of Maṇi is played by a eunuch (*paṇḍaka*) whose name is not given.

⁴⁰ Cf. *Chu*, T 2145, ch.9, pp.67c-68a, and S. Lévi, ‘Le Sūtra du sage et du fou’, in *JA*, 1925, p.312.

⁴¹ *Hsien yü ching*, T 202, ch., p.363a1-9.

Lamotte – Vajrapāṇi in India (I)

ordered them to display supernormal powers and each time the six masters set to nudging each one after the other but, as before, they remained silent, drawing in their necks and lowering their heads. As if they had entered deep meditation, they remained unresponsive.

Thereupon Vajrapāṇi, the great yakṣa general, had this thought: 'Those six fools have long tormented Bhagavat. A means must be found to make them go away; they have no courage, they will flee and bury themselves'.

Having reflected thus, he raised a violent storm mixed with rain and hail. The magic pavilion (*rddhimaṇḍapa*) of the Tīrthiyas crumbled on the spot. The Tīrthiyas and their wicked disciples all scattered.

Some of them, terror-stricken, entered mountain hollows, trees and forests, tufts of grass and remained hidden. Others entered temples of the gods and chapels: they held their stomachs, filled with sorrow.

As for the Buddha's magic pavilion, it was not shaken even once.

display them too. At those words the Tīrthiyas, nudging one another, said to each other: 'Get up, it is for you to get up'; but none of them got up.

Now at that time Pañcika, the great yakṣa general, was in the assembly. This thought came to his mind: 'Here are foolish persons who will long continue to torment Bhagavat and the Community of monks'.

Having thought in this way, he raised a violent storm, accompanied by wind and rain. Because of that storm accompanied by wind and rain, the Tīrthiyas' pavilion became invisible. The Tīrthiyas, struck by the thunder and rain, fled in all directions.

Several hundreds of thousands of living beings struck by that violent rain, drew near the Bhagavat; and when they had arrived, having greeted his feet by touching them with their heads, they sat to one side. But the Bhagavat acted so that not even a single drop of rain fell on that assembly. Then those many hundreds of thousands of living beings who were seated to one side gave vent to these words of praise: 'Ah, the Buddha! Ah, the Dharma! Ah, the Community! Ah, how well the Dharma has been expounded'.

Pañcika, the yakṣa general, said to the Tīrthiyas; 'You, foolish persons, take your refuge in the Buddha, in the Dharma, in the Community of monks!'

But they screamed as they fled: 'We take our refuge in the mountain; we seek refuge in trees, walls and hermitages'.

only Vajrapāṇi:⁵³

Devadatta conceived a malign thought (*duṣṭacitta*): he pushed a rock in order to crush the Buddha. However, Vajrapāṇi, the Malla, with his *vajrakūṭa*, hurled the rock far away. Nevertheless, a sliver of rock flew off and injured the Buddha on the toes.

The Buddha's Parinirvāṇa. – If Vajrapāṇi was thus able to insinuate himself into several episodes of the Buddha's life, it would indeed be surprising if he did not play any part in the crucial moment of the Parinirvāṇa. However, here again the oldest sources make no mention of him; it is only with time that he carved himself a place in the legend.

1. The *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* relates that after the decease of Śākyamuni the devas and disciples uttered several stanzas. The Pālī recension⁵⁴ places them on the lips of Śakka devānam inda, Anuruddha and Ānanda; the Sanskrit version⁵⁵ on those of a 'certain' bhikṣu, Śakra devendra, Brahmā Sahāṃpati and Aniruddha. It is then that Śakra utters his famous stanza condensing the Four Noble Truths:

*Anitya vata saṃskārā utpādvayayadharmaṇaḥ
utpādya hi nirudhyante teṣāṃ vyupaśamaḥ sukham.*

'Impermanent indeed are all formations; their nature consists of arising and disappearing; having arisen, they cease; their calming is happiness'.

2. However, in the version of the same sūtra, as it appears in the *Dirghāgama*,⁵⁶ the gods and men who chant the stanzas are no less than twenty-seven in number: Brahmā Devarāja, Śakra devendra, Vaiśravaṇa, Aniruddha, Ānanda, the yakṣa Kumbhīra, Guhyaka Malla, Māyā the Buddha's mother, the deity of the two Śāla trees, the deity of the Śāla grove, the four devarājas, the king of the Trāyastriṃśa gods, the king of the Yama gods, the king of the Tuṣita gods, the king of the Nirmittavaśavartin gods, the king of the Paranirmittavaśavartin gods and, finally, several bhikṣus.

It will be noted that Guhyaka Malla, otherwise known as

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⁵³ T 1509, ch.14, p.165a2-4 (tr. in *Traité* II, p.874).

⁵⁴ *Dīgha* II, p.157.

⁵⁵ Ed. E. Waldschmidt, pp.398-400.

⁵⁶ T 1, ch.4, pp.26c-27b.

on the *bodhi-maṇḍa*. He announces to Ānanda that he will enter Nirvāṇa fifteen days later. It is then that the twenty-seven groups of deities, Vaiśravaṇa and Śakra at their head, break into tears and each utter a stanza. The twenty-fifth group consists of Vajrapāṇi Guhyaka accompanied by an hundred milliard yakṣas. The stanza he recites is further evidence of his disarray: ‘This supreme town, this great land of plenty is abandoning the Śākya clan: so where should we go?’⁶³

Then follows the famous prediction which is the subject of the sūtra: The merchant Lotus-Face, says the Buddha, will be a king with the name of Mei-shih-ho-lo-chü-lo (Mihirakula), will annihilate the Dharma and, as a true brute, will smash my *pātra*. After his wretched death, seven gods will be incarnated one after the other in order to re-establish Buddhism in Kashmir.⁶⁴

Other episodes. – Further minor incidents in which Vajrapāṇi plays a part can be found in the narrative literature.

1. When Sumāgadhā, the daughter of Anāthapiṇḍada, who was married to a heretic from the Puṇḍavardhana, invited the Buddha to her kingdom, the Master went there by means of his super-normal power, together with a group of Arhats and deities:

To the right of the Tathāgata was Brahmarāja devarāja; to his left Śakra devendra, holding a fly-whisk in his hand; behind the Tathāgata was Guhyaka Vajrapāṇi, the Malla, holding the *vajrakūta* in his hand. The devaputra Vaiśravaṇa, holding a *chattra* adorned with the seven jewels, stood in the air above the Tathāgata, for fear that some dust might sully the Tathāgata's body.⁶⁵

2. The Mūlasarvastivādin Vinaya records that one day the Bhaga-vat, taking the medicine-king Jīvaka with him, went to the Hīma-vat where all kinds of medicinal plants glittered like lamps. He asked Jīvaka to gather them, but the latter declined because he was afraid. Thereupon, at the request of the Buddha, Vajrapāṇi collected them in his place.⁶⁶

3. The *Divyāvadhāna* recounts how the yakṣa made a breach in the

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⁶³ T 386, ch.2, p.1075a21-24.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p.1075c.

⁶⁵ *Sumāgadhāvadāna*, T 125, ch.22, p.663c6-9; T 128, p.841b17-20.

⁶⁶ *Gilgit Manuscripts*, ed. N. Dutt, III, part 2, p.44, 8-13.

walls of Bhadrāṅkara so that the crowd could hasten more quickly to the feet of the Master.⁶⁷

It would be easy enough to complete this account of Vajrapāṇi's minor appearances, but next we should approach the crucial event that made the yakṣa the hero of North-West India and the permanent escort of the Buddha.

The subjugation of the dragon Apalāla. – A dragon named Sundarin ravaged the harvests. A brahmin called *Fan-shih* 梵志 'Brāhmaṇa' or *Ch'ing-chi* 祇統 (Gaṅgin?) tamed it by magical means. The king and the population rewarded him with gifts. However, a time came when the inhabitants stopped offering gifts to the brahmin. Annoyed, the latter made an aspiration to become a dragon and, since he had acquired great merit, his wish was fulfilled: he was reborn in place of the dragon Sundarin and set to ravaging the harvests of which he left only straws; hence his name Apalāla 'Strawless', transcribed in Chinese by *A-po-lo* 阿波羅, 阿鉢羅, or *A-po-lo-lo* 阿波羅羅 and translated as *Wu-tao-ch'ien* 無稻芊, *Wu-tao-kan* 無稻稈, *Wu-tao-kan* 無稻幹, *Wu-miao* 無苗, *Pu-liu-ku-i* 不留穀衣, *Wu-liu-yen* 無流涎, *Wu-kao* 無藁, etc. The king appealed to the Buddha and the latter, assisted by Vajrapāṇi or other disciples, subdued and converted the dragon.

It has been suggested, not without malice, that if the Buddha required assistance this was because he was not capable of subduing the dragon on his own. This is to forget that the 'Being with Ten Powers' had peerless supernormal powers at his disposal and that, moreover, at the outset of his ministry and with no-one's help, he overcame and placed in his alms-bowl the monstrous serpent that guarded the fire-sanctuary of the jaṭila Urubilvā-kāśyapa.⁶⁸ It was only later, when he had a sufficient number of qualified disciples, that the 'Greatly Compassionate One' considered it undignified to scuffle with nāgas and appealed to his inferiors; Mahāmaudgalyāyana, the foremost of those who pos-

⁶⁷ *Divya*, p.130, 8.

⁶⁸ *Catuspariṣatsūtra*, ed. E. Waldschmidt, pp.240-4; *Jātaka* I, p.82; various Vinayas translated by A. Bareau, *Recherches sur la biographie du Buddha*, Paris 1962, pp.257-60; *Mahāvastu* III, pp.428-9; *T'ai tzü*, T 185, ch.2, pp.480c20-482c1; *Kuo ch'ü*, T 189, ch.4, pp.646a13-649b6; *Chung hsü*, T 191, ch.9, pp.958a6-960b27; *Chung pên*, T 196, ch.1, pp.149c11-151c4.

-sessed the *ṛddhibala*, subjugated the dragon Nandopananda⁶⁹ and, as we shall see, the honour of having subdued Apalāla devolved above all on Vajrapāṇi.

Certain sources locate the subjugation of Apalāla in Magadha,⁷⁰ others in North India in Gandhāra (Ch. *Ch'ien-t'o-lo*)⁷¹ or in Uddiyāna (Ch. *Wu-chang*),⁷² finally others sometimes in Magadha and sometimes in North India.⁷³ Similar divergences are explained by one of those transfers of legends which are so common in hagiography or, quite simply, by the monstrous size of the nāgas 'whose tail is still in Takṣaśīlā whilst its head is already in Vāraṇaṣī'.⁷⁴

Vajrapāṇi was perhaps the hero of Magadha before becoming that of North-West India, and the *Mahāmāyūrī*⁷⁵ no doubt has its reasons in making the yakṣa the protector of Rājagrha, with his dwelling on the Gṛhdrakūṭa. However, whether the event occurred in Magadha or in the North-West, the developments of the legend are identical: in the victory over Apalāla, Vajrapāṇi plays merely a secondary rôle and it is only in the later sources that he alone carries off the laurels of victory. His elevation over all the attendants of the Buddha occurred only gradually.

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⁶⁹ Cf. *Visuddhimagga*, ed. H.C. Warren, pp.336-8; *Jātaka* V, p.126; *Ekottara*, T 125, ch.28, pp.703b-704c; *Divya*, p.395; *Nandopanandanāgarājadamana*, T 597, p.131; *Upadeśa*, T 1509, ch.32, p.300a29 ff.

⁷⁰ *Fên pieh kung tê lun*, T 1507, p.51c15; *P'u sa pên hsing ching*, T 155, p.116c6; *Fo pên hsing ching*, T 193, p.56c19.

⁷¹ *Buddhacarita* of Aśvaghōṣa, T 192, p.40c16; *Buddhānusmṛtisamādhi*, T 643, p.679b7 (near Nagarahāra).

⁷² *Aśokarājāvadāna*, T 2042, p.102b13; *Ekottara*, T 125, p.661c23 (variant *Wu-chang* instead of *Ma-t'i*); *Fa-hsien chuan*, T 2085, p.858a18; *Lo-yang ch'ieh lan chi*, T 2092, p.1020a18 (on emerging from *Mung-chieh-li*); *Hsi-yü-chi*, T 2087, p.882b25 (on emerging from *Mung-chieh-li*, near the sources of the Swāt).

⁷³ The *Mūlasarvāstivādin* Vinaya (T 1443) locates Apalāla sometimes in Magadha (p.19b14 and 18; p.21c; p.40c6), sometimes in the North-West (p.40b6-8). – Similarly the *Upadeśa* (T 1509) first locates Apalāla in Rājagrha, the capital of Magadha (p.78a28), then in North India, in the land of the *Yüeh-chih* (p.126b27).

⁷⁴ *Abhiṅṣakramaṇasūtra*, T 190, ch.37, p.828b17.

⁷⁵ Ed. S. Lévi, *JA*, 1915, p.30: *Vajrapāṇī Rājagrhe Gṛdhakūṭe kṛtālayaḥ*.

1. *Vajrapāṇi in Magadha.*

a. The *Fên pieh kung té lun* (T 1507) is a commentary upon the first four chapters of the *Ekottarāgama*; its translation into Chinese was made by an unknown hand under the later Han (25-220) and is archaic in style. Vajrapāṇi is mentioned in it, but the merit of victory mainly devolves on the disciple Cūlapanthaka, skilled among all at creating form by mental power.

The dragon 'Leafless' 無葉 (Apalāla?) ravages the harvests in Magadha and the Buddha decides to convert it. Followed by Guhyaka, Ānanda and Panthaka, he goes to the kingdom of *Chü-ch'ih* 俱持 where the dragon dwells. The latter rains down rocks. The Buddha, turning to the left, looks at Guhyaka. The yakṣa, with his *vajrakūṭa*, makes a large mountain crumble which overwhelms the dragon's chasm. The Buddha, turning to the right, looks at Panthaka. The bhikṣu makes himself invisible and, through his supernormal power, stops up the eyes, ears, nose and mouth of the dragon; he then makes his hand appear outside the place where he was standing invisible; finally, on the Buddha's command, he manifests himself an hundred paces away. The dragon prostrates itself.⁷⁶

b. The *P'u sa pên hsing ching* (T 155), translated anonymously under the Eastern Chin (317-420), attributes the victory to Vajrapāṇi alone:

Succeeding the dragon Sundarin, in the pool of the village of *Yu-lien* 優連, in Magadha, Apalāla, his wife and one of his sons ravage the harvests. King Ajātaśatru appeals to the Buddha. Guhyaka, the Malla, strikes the mountain with his *vajrakūṭa*. All the dragons and causes of disease take refuge in the neighbouring kingdom of Vaiśālī.⁷⁷

2. *Vajrapāṇi in North-West India.*

a. A chapter in the *Buddhānusmṛtisamādhi* (T 643) tells how the Buddha, on the invitation of King Puṣpabhūti, one day went to the

⁷⁶ *Fên pieh kung té lun*, T 1507, ch.5, pp.51c-52a (tr. J. Przyluski in 'Le Nord-Ouest de l'Inde', *JA*, 1914, pp.559-62).

⁷⁷ *P'u sa pên hsing ching*, T 155, ch.2, pp.116a-119a (cf. *Hōbōgiri*, pp.10-11, s.v. *Aharara*).

the kingdom of Nagarahāra (modern Jalālābād), converted a poisonous dragon and left his shadow in the Rakṣas' cave. The dragon's name is not given, but it was probably Gopālaka and not Apalāla; and, more precisely, the Cave of the Shadow is situated 20 li to the south-west of Nagarahāra, in the village of Pālitakūṭa, near modern-day Chahr-Bagh. A Kashmirian Vinaya-master, Buddhahadra, banished from Lo-yang and staying on Mount Lu, described this miraculous shadow to Hui-yūan and it was based on that information that the master of Lu made his famous image which was unveiled in 412.⁷⁸ If, as is claimed by certain sources,⁷⁹ Buddhahadra was a native of Nagarahāra (and not Kapilavastu), he would have been able to supply first-hand indications on the folklore of the North-West. In any case, it was he who later, in Nanking, between 420 and 429 made a translation of the *Buddhā-nusmṛtisamādhi* under the title of *Kuan fo san mei ching*.⁸⁰

The subjugation of the dragon took place in the presence of several disciples: Kāśyapa, Maudgalyāyana, Śāriputra, Kātyāyana and Ānanda. The yakṣa Vajrapāṇi, making flaming whirls (*ālāta-cakra*) with his great mass, burnt the body of the nāga and the latter took refuge in the Buddha's shadow. The main rôle, however, fell to Maudgalyāyana who, transformed into a Garuḍa, made the nāga swear not to molest living beings any more and taught him the precepts.⁸¹

b. To judge from the texts analysed up to now, the legend still contains many hesitations, both as to the name and localisation of the one of more nāgas subjugated, and as to the exact role played by Vajrapāṇi in the event. It rests with the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya (T 1448) to dispel all doubts. In the Section on Medicaments (*Bhaiṣajyavastu*) this Vinaya recounts a long journey undertaken by the Buddha in central and northern India. This journey was subdivided into three parts:

First part: Accompanied by Ānanda, the Buddha journeyed in six stages: 1. Hastinapura, 2. Mahānagara, 3. Śrughna, 4. Brāhmaṇagrāma, 5. Kālanagara, 6. Rohitaka.

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⁷⁸ Cf. E. Zürcher, *The Buddhist Conquest of China*, Leiden 1959, pp.224-5.

⁷⁹ Cf. *Kao sêng chuan*, T 2059, ch.2, p.334c17; *Ch'u*, T 2145, ch.14, p.103b28.

⁸⁰ *Li*, T 2034, ch.7, p.71a9.

⁸¹ Cf. *Buddhānusmṛtisamādhi*, T 643, ch7, pp.679b-681b (tr. In Przyluski, *op. cit.*, pp.565-8.

Lamotte – Vajrapāṇi in India (I)

Chinese version neglected.

[In Rohitaka] the Bhagavat reflected as follows: The life-span at my disposal is very short: hardly have I appeared in the world than the time of my Nirvāṇa has arrived. Great work of conversion still remains for me to accomplish. If I go with the bhikṣu Ānanda into the land of North India, that work of conversion will be difficult to complete. Now, it is with the yakṣa Vajrapāṇi that I should undertake those conversions. [The Buddha then addresses the yakṣa with two stanzas in which he stresses the advantages of the *smṛti-mantṛḥs*.] He then says to the yakṣa Vajrapāṇi: Do you wish to come with me to North India to convert the nāga Apalāla? – I agree to that, O Bhagavat. – The yakṣa Vajrapāṇi and the Bhagavat, rising into the air, departed. The Bhagavat saw from afar a green forest and said to the yakṣa: Do you see that green forest? – He replied: I see it, O Sugata. – The Buddha went on: One century after my Nirvāṇa a *saṃghavihāra* will be built on that site: for those who practise *śamatha*, it will be a place of great value.⁸⁶

[Having reached the palace of the nāgarāja Apalāla, the Buddha joined battle with him.] Then, having reflected, he said to the yakṣa Vajrapāṇi: You must attack that wicked nāgarāja. Thereupon the yakṣa, obeying the Tathāgata’s order, struck the mountain summit with his *vajrakūṭa*, and the mountain crumbled, half-overwhelming the nāga’s pool.⁸⁷

Having converted the dragon, the Bhagavat saw from afar a completely green forest and he again said to the yakṣa Vajrapāṇi:⁸⁸ Do you see that completely green forest? – I see it, O Bhagavat. – That, O Vajrapāṇi, is the district of Kashmir. One hundred years after my Nirvāṇa, there will be a bhikṣu named Madhyandina, a companion of the bhikṣu Ānanda. He will convert the wicked dragon Huluṭa and then, crossed-legged, will introduce my teaching throughout the district of Kashmir.⁸⁹

The Bhagavat reached Kharjūrikā, and there he saw some young boys playing with some *stūpas* made of clay. Seeing that, he again said to the yakṣa Vajrapāṇi:⁹⁰ Do you see, O Vajrapāṇi, those

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⁸⁶ T 1448, ch.9, pp.39c21-40a7.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p.40b20-22.

⁸⁸ According to the *Lien hua mien ching*, T 386, ch.2, p.1075b16, this prediction was made to Ānanda.

⁸⁹ *Gilgit Manuscripts* III, part 1, p. xvii,1-7.

⁹⁰ According to Fa-hsien (T 2085, p.858b13) and Hsüan-tsang (T 2087, ch.2, p.879c12), this prediction was made to Ānanda.

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young boys playing with stūpas made of clay? – Yes, Venerable One. – That one, four hundred years after my Nirvāṇa, will be the king named Kaniṣka of the Kuṣāna dynasty. In this very place he will inaugurate a stūpa which will be designated by the name of Stūpa of Kaniṣka, and after my Parinirvāṇa, he will do Buddha deeds.⁹¹

This last prediction proves that the passage concerning North-West India could not have been written before the reign of Kaniṣka which, according to the latest opinions, began in 78, 128 or 144 CE.

Thanks to the Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya, three points will surface in the first or second century CE. First, Ānanda was the companion of the Buddha during the first and third part of the journey, but Vajrapāṇi alone followed him during the second. This is not a matter of a substitution of a yakṣa for a favourite disciple, as Przyluski claimed, but a juxtaposition of a great yakṣa with a great disciple according to the concepts of the developing Mahāyāna. Second, in the North-West Vajrapāṇi became the only attendant of the Buddha and no longer shared this honour with others. Third, all hesitation is removed from what concerns the subjugation of Apalāla by the powerful yakṣa: it was in the North-West (Swāt or Gandhāra) that this took place, no longer in Magadha.

This localisation is confirmed by the ‘Legend of Aśoka’⁹² which briefly summarises the whole journey to the North-West, the oldest recension of which was translated into Chinese by An Fa-ch’in in about the year 300. Furthermore, it was in *Wu-shang* (Uḍḍiyāna), near the sources of the Śubhavastu (Swāt), that is, in North-West India, that the Chinese pilgrims Fa-hsien, Sung Yün and Hsüan-tsang, who visited the holy sites respectively in 399, 520 and 630, heard of the subjugation of the ‘wicked dragon’ Apalāla.⁹³

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⁹¹ *Gilgit Manuscripts* III, part 1, pp.1,20-2, 5.

⁹² *Aśokarājāvādāna*, T 2042, ch.1. p.102b16-16 ; *Samyukta*, T 99, ch.23, p.165b-21-23 ; *Aśokarājasūtra*, T 2043, ch.2, p.135b14-16 ; *Divyāvādāna*, p.348, 20-22 (corrupt text).

⁹³ *Fa-hsien chuan*, T 2085, p.858a18-25 (tr. Legge, p.29); *Lo-yang ch’ieh lan chi*, T 2092, ch.5, p.1020a17-20 (tr. Chavannes, *BEFEO* III, 1903, p.409); *Hsi yü chi*, T 2087, ch.3, p.882b25-c13 (tr. Watters, I, pp.228-9).

moment of the Great Departure and does not definitively disappear until after the Parinirvāṇa: ‘for more than half a century he remains attached to the steps of the Master’.

Nothing, I believe, can be added to the study which A. Foucher devoted to the iconographic character of Vajrapāṇi.⁹⁷ His innumerable examples are divided into *beardless Vajrapāṇis* (with a tendency to assume, under the influence of classical memories, the bearing of a Hermes, Eros or Dionysos) and *bearded Vajra-pāṇis* (turning into Pan on the one hand, Zeus or Herakles on the other). Sometimes he appears as a Pariah, wearing a simple loin-cloth or Indian-style breeches; sometimes he is clothed antique-style in chlamydos, himation or exomis. He is never separated from the *vajra* ‘a kind of double pestle, swollen at each end and ordinarily rounded which is grasped by the middle’.

The impressive excavation campaign undertaken in the Swāt, in 1956-58, by G. Tucci and his Istituto per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente have restored to the Gandhāran school 335 new sculptures published and analysed by D. Facenna.⁹⁸ Vajrapāṇi appears on 37 of them, always closely linked to the life of the Master: presentation of the betrothed Yaśodharā (pl.162), great departure (pl.151), exchange of clothing with the hunter (pl.173), encounter with the grass-cutter (pl.23), first discourse (pl.54), Parinirvāṇa and cremation (pl.126, Nos 5 and 6). One will see (pl.107) a subjugation of the nāga Apalāla, which can be added to the representations already indicated by Foucher in his *Art gréco-bouddhique* (I, pp.544-54).

Recent research on the chronology of the art of Gandhāra also enables us to ascertain that Vajrapāṇi survived all the vicissitudes of the school. In his posthumous work *The Buddhist Art of Gandhāra*, published in Cambridge in 1960, Sir John Marshall distinguished between three periods of artistic evolution: adolescence (ca. 60-100 CE), early maturity period (100-140 CE) and late maturity period (140-320 CE). Vajrapāṇi is equally re-presented during the three phases:

- a) Period of adolescence, figures 53, 55-61, 63, 66-68 (Mardān group), 69, 70-72 (Sanghao-Nathu group), 75 and 76 (Sikri group).

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⁹⁷ *Art gréco-bouddhique* II, pp.48-64.

⁹⁸ *Sculptures from the Sacred Areas of Butkara I*, Part 2, Rome 1962.

Lamotte – Vajrapāṇi in India (I)


b) Early maturity period, figures 87-88, 96, 98, 100.

c) Late maturity period, figures 113, 115, 116, 119, 127-129.

The yakṣa appears for the first time on a bas-relief from Mardān, representing the donation of the Jetavana (fig.53), a bas-relief which Sir John Marshall considers to be ‘the earliest representation of the Buddha by a Gandhāran artist known to us’ (p.41). He is again found in the grandiose representation of the Parinirvāṇa from Swāt and Takht-i-Bahī (figs 127-129), the last products of the school before the conquest of Gandhāra by the Sassanids.

In the Kusāna empire, in parallel and simultaneously with the Graeco-Buddhist school in Gandhāra, the Indian school of Mathurā developed. The points of contact between the twin schools are many. They both abounded in representations of yakṣas, but while Gandhāra multiplied its Vajrapāṇis to infinity, Mathurā, as far as I can judge,⁹⁹ did not represent him once. This contrast clearly emphasises the northern character of the yakṣa as the Hellenic artists conceived him. We hasten to add that this northern character did not prevent Vajrapāṇi over the course of time from manifesting his presence on the carved monuments of India (particularly at Amarāvati¹⁰⁰ and Nāgārjunakoṇḍa¹⁰¹), Central Asia, China and Tibet.

(to be concluded)



⁹⁹ According to the works of J.P. Vogel, *Catalogue of the Archaeological Museum at Mathurā*, Allahabad 1910; ‘La sculpture de Mathurā’, in *Ars Asiatica* XV, Paris and Brussels 1930.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. S. Sivaramamurti, *Amarāvati Sculptures in the Madras Government Museum*, Madras 1942, p.186 and pl.57, fig.4; p.257 and pl.62, fig.2; Ph. Stern and M. Benisti, *Evolution du style indien d’Amarāvati*, Paris 1961, p.60a.

¹⁰¹ A.H. Longhurst, *The Buddhist Antiquities of Nāgārjunakoṇḍa*, Delhi 1938, pl.40, 48, 50a.

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THE PĀRĀYAṆASŪTRA IN OLD TURKISH*

PETER ZIEME

Translated from German by Maurice O'C Walshe

By chance, while I was preparing my contribution to this *Festschrift*, I hit on the Old Turkish version of a text, the Indian source of which played a certain role in the work of the recipient. In his *Bruchstücke buddhistischer Verssammlungen*, H. Bechert writes: 'The *Pārāyana* too is part of the *Sutta Nipāta* (976-1149). It is of course well known that *Aṭṭhakavagga* and *Pārāyana* can also be shown for other reasons to be originally independent texts. In addition, Central Asian manuscript fragments exist of both'.¹

In general it is the case that we do not look for, or find, possible sources of Old Turkish Buddhist texts precisely in the Pāli Canon.² Where this is nevertheless possible, as in the present case, we have to assume that the source probably existed in a lost Chinese or Central Asian version. To anticipate one conclusion: we cannot be sure from the Old Turkish remnants whether we are

* 'Das Pārāyana-sūtra in der alttürkischen Überlieferung'. *Bauddhavidyāsudhā-karaḥ*. Studies in Honour of Heinz Bechert on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday, ed. Petra Kieffer-Pülz & Jens-Uwe Hartmann. (*Indica et Tibetica* 30) Swisttal-Odendorf 1997, pp.743-59. The author expresses his gratitude to the late translator, Maurice Walshe, as well as to the *BSR* editor, Russell Webb, who encouraged me to republish this article without greater revision. It is planned to edit further fragments related to the *Suttanipāta*. Among them, a newly identified fragment, Mainz 699 of the Turfan Collection of the Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften, is of great importance as it is a complete one from the same manuscript and precedes the edited one.

¹ H. Bechert, *Bruchstücke buddhistischer Verssammlungen aus zentral-asiatischen Sanskrithandschriften I Die Anavataptagāthā und die Sthavira-gāthā*, Berlin 1961, p.11.

² On the Pāli Canon, see O. von Hinüber, *A Handbook of Pāli Literature*, Berlin-New York 1996. I would like here to thank Herr v. Hinüber for his literary references.

dealing with the remains of an independent work or not. On the whole,³ it is probable that this *Pārāyaṇa* is taken from a larger work.

It has only recently been shown by F. Enomoto⁴ that Ajita's questions (*Ajitaprasna*), which here occupy a central position, form a frequently-quoted block of texts which he can trace in numerous Hīnayāna texts, but also in Mahāyāna works such as the *Yogācārabhūmi*.⁵

The Sanskrit fragments known from the Turfan discoveries, which contain parts of the Sn, do not permit of a definite decision as to whether the *Pārāyaṇasūtra* was transmitted as a whole in Sanskrit or not.⁶ Manuscript SHT 1581 gives, in the same order, parallels to Sn 1031-43, but there are two exceptions where the wording seems to correspond to other passages in the Sn (Sn 1110 for V6, and Sn 1581 for R5).⁷ No explanation has yet been found: perhaps we can assume slight variations in the Pāli text. This seems more plausible than to surmise a completely different wording. For SHT 1582 (VI, pp.199-200), K.R. Norman presupposes that 'the fragment seems also to include a list of the thirty-two marks of a *mahāpuruṣa*, and it is possible that the

³ If we assume that the Bāvāri story is part of the collection 'The Wise Man and the Fool' (*Xianyujing* 57), we can perhaps suppose that it might have been taken into other collections. It would most likely be part of the *Daśakarma-pathāvadānamālā* collection. But that the present text might be a page from a *Maitrisimit* Ms is improbable, because it cannot be fitted into the almost complete text of the first chapters, where the Bādhari story belongs.

⁴ I would like to thank him for his references to the Sanskrit *Pārāyaṇa* text which he kindly sent me.

⁵ F. Enomoto, 'Śarīrārthagāthā. A Collection of Canonical Verses in the Yogācārabhūmi. Part 1: Text', *Sanskrit-Texte aus dem buddhistischen Kanon: Neuenddeckungen und Neueditionen*, Göttingen 1989, p.34. K.R. Norman mentions that Anesaki had already collected quotations in Chinese texts (M. Anesaki, 'Sutta-Nipāta in Chinese', *JPTS* 1906-7, p.5). Cf. K.R. Norman. *The Group of Discourses (Sutta-nipāta)* 2, Oxford 1992, p.339.

⁶ Norman, *op. cit.*, p.359.

⁷ Cf. SHT VI, p.199.

Sanskrit version of the story elaborated the statement in 1000'.⁸

The Old Turkish fragments from the Turfan Collection of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences can be pieced together as one sheet, the beginning of which is unfortunately missing. If we add the missing beginning as about three lines, we can estimate the approximate breadth of the original sheet as about 60 cm. Its height was 21 cm, the written surface 16 cm. The writing can be identified as one of the regular calligraphic variants of the classical period (11th-13th cent.?). In any case it belongs graphically and linguistically to the pre-Yuan period. Apparently, there are no other remains of the manuscript.⁹ One of the two fragments bears the provenance-mark T III M 184. It therefore comes from Murtuq in the Turfan Oasis, and was obtained by the Third Turfan Expedition.

Transliteration of the Berlin Fragments U 2029 + U 1188

(T III M 184)

recto (approx. 3 lines missing)

01	[β'	[]
02	[syz l'r	[]
03	[wnk l'r :	o	'[
04	[wykrwnc	o	lyk pwlw	[]
05	[krmy	o	pr'm'm 'wry	
06	[ykyd	o	[]'wrdy l'r :	
07	[pwl'lym	o	typ 'wytwnty	
08	[jr: twyk'l pylk' tnkry pwrq'n			
09	[pwl'r nynk qwtrwlqw yylytz y pwlwp			
10	[ykyzyk	[]
11	[m'nkyzl	[] tnkry
12	[pwrq'n q[]: 'wlvq "rx'nt	
13	[n [] tnkry	
14	[pwrq'n q[] pyr'r syzyk "yytdy			
15	[] 'r: twyk'l pylk' tnkry pwrq'n			
16	[] l'r nynk "yytmys syzyk l'ryn			

⁸ Norman, *op. cit.*, p.359.

⁹ However, cf. n.22.

17 []yn []d[]yl[]n
 18 []yw pwrđy : twyrt ykrmy twyyn
 19 l'r qwt pwlty l'r : "cyty m'ytry
 20 []kykw q'lty l'r 'yk'kry swdwr t'
 21 'wykmys 'wlvq kwyclwk "rx'nt'l'r
 22 pwlty : pwrq'n nwmynth' wykws "syq
 23 twsw qylty l'r : m'ytry'y "cyty
 24 'y[]r []r syzyk "yytdyy
 25 l'r : pwrq'n q' wytrw "[]
 26 'ync' typ "yytdy : n'kw ywrk'nmys
 27 'wl : pw yyrtynew kyr y'm pw yyrtynew
 28 nwnk q'yw 'wl 'nkw k' y'rwm'z -z
 29 y'lnkwq l'r 'wlvq qwrqync q'w 'wl :
 30 "ny yrlyq'nk twyk'l pylk' typ
 31 'wytwnty : yyty pylyk lyk pwrq'n
 32 "[]ty "yytmys syzyk 'ync' ywr'
 33 yrlyq'dy : pylyksyz pylyk k' 'wyrtwlwp

verso (approx 3 lines missing)

01 []q[]
 02 []k[] pylk'[]
 03 []q o yrlyq'r[]
 04 []ty y o t'nkr[]
 05 ym' syzyk o "yy[]
 06 pwlm'dwq o ylnk[]
 07 nwnk t'mewq o l'ry "[]
 08 'wcywn qwrytwr : t'mewq lwq 'wyk[]
 09 nynk tydqlwq "lyn swyz l'r t'q[]
 10 [] twyk'l[]
 11 yrlyq'd[]'mewq
 12 l[]r 'wl : "ny[]'wk
 13 'wl : "p'[]m[] q
 14 l'ryq py[]ykyn tyd'r twywr : ym
 15 "cyty tnkry pwrq'n q' syzyk
 16 "yytdy : 'wykyn pylykyn tnkrym t'mm[]
 17 lwq l'ryq qwrqytmys sn []
 18 'wl 'wyk ly pylyk ly ym' "yytm'z
 19 'wqwslwq twywr l'r : n'cwkw twy'r 'yn'q
 20 ymz "ny swyzl'nk : tnkry pwrq'n

21 'ync' typ yrlyq'dy : twym'q q'
 22 kwyl'nmys 'wl twywr l'r : twym'q
 23 twys'r 'wl pr'c' 'wyc'r l'r : "cyty
 24 'wytrw 'ync' typ "yytd[]'ky
 25 []ysym'k t' ylynm's'r
 26 'wytrw twym'q twy'r : 'mk'k t'
 27 'wz'r : "cyty 'wytrw 'ync' typ
 28 'wytwnty tnkrym : syzyk tytsy l'r
 29 ynkyz pylk' pylykyk 'wytkwrmys l'r
 30 kym ym' s'kyz twyrlwk twyzwn
 31 ywl q' kyrmys l'r : kym ym' qwt
 32 pwlm'dwq tswy l'r 'wl'r n'cwkw qylz
 33 wn l'r : twyk'l pylyk' tnkry pwrq'n

Treatment¹⁰

'Ajita's Questions' (*Ajita-mānava-pucchā*) are preceded by an introduction which, in its existing form, contains greater variations from Sn than the following passages. True, in Sn also the first section (*Vatthugāthā*) of the Pārāyanavagga,¹¹ the sixteen disciples are previously mentioned (Sn 1006-1008), but no indicator is given that two of them, Maitreya and Ajita, play an important part, as appears to be the case from the Old Turkish fragment. However, we should not overlook the fact that in Sn too Ajita and Tissa-Metteya are the leaders among the sixteen disciples.

As here, confirmation of the prominent position accorded to the first two disciples appears very clearly in the Old Turkish *Matrisimit*: *anta ötrü ol tözün maitrida ulatı altı ygrmi urılar*

¹⁰ Sn quoted after the PTS edition.

¹¹ O. v. Hinüber, *A Handbook*, op. cit., pp.48-9; R.O. Franke, 'Die Suttanipāta-Gāthās mit ihren Parallelen. Teil IV: SN.V (Pārāyanavagga)', *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 66 (1912), pp.204-60; E. Lamotte, 'Problems concerning Minor Canonical Texts' in G. Dhammapala et al. (ed.), *Buddhist Studies in Honour of Hammalava Saddhātissa*, Nugegoda 1984, pp. 148-57; A.K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, Delhi 1991, pp.296, 524; H. Saddhātissa, *The Sutta-Nipāta*, Richmond 1994; D. Andersen, H. Smith, *Sutta-Nipāta* (PTS), E.M. Hare, *Woven Cadences of Early Buddhism*, London 1945; K.R. Norman, *The Group of Discourses (Sutta-nipāta) II*, Oxford 1992.

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that the sixteen youths with the Noble Maitreya at their head' (MaitrH¹ II, 1565); *antra ötrü tözün maitri qadaşı ačitida ulatı biş ygrmi urılar birlä* 'After that the fifteen youths with Ajita, the brother of the Noble Maitreya, at their head' (MaitrH II, 1693); *anta ötrü tözün maitri bodisvt ačitida ulatı biş ygrmi urılar birlä* 'After that the Bodhisattva Maitreya with the fifteen youths with Ajita at their head' (MaitrH II 1937); *tözün maitri ačitida öngisi qalmış tört ygrmi urılar* 'The Noble Maitreya, Ajita and the other remaining fourteen youths' (MaitrH II 2114).

r 01-23 = Sn 1029-1031

01 [ba]va[ri²]
 02 [] sizlär [ögrünč]
 03 [-lüg bol]ung-lar : a[]
 04 [] ögrünč-lig bolt[ïlar³]
 05 [altı y]grmi braman urı
 06 [-lar] igid⁴ [tu]yurdi-lar :
 07 [qut] bulalim tip ötünti
 08 [-lär] : tükäl bilgä tngri burxan
 09 bolar-ning qutrulyu yiltizi bolup
 10 ikizig[]
 11 mängizl[] tngri
 12 burxan q[] : uluy av[ant]
 13 [] n [] tngri
 14 burxan-[qa] birär sezik ayıtdı
 15 -[l]ar : tükäl bilgä tngri burxan
 16 [o]lar-ning ayıtmış sezik-lärin
 17 [] in [] d[t]il[tayı]n
 18 [a]yu birdi : tört ygrmi toyın
 19 -lar qut bultı-lar : ačiti maitri
 20 [i]kigü qaltı-lar ekagr sudur-ta
 21 ögmış uluy küçlüg arxant-lar

+++++!!!!!!

¹ MaitrH = Geng Shimin, H.-J. Klimkeit, in collaboration with H. Eimer and J.P. Laut: *Das Zusammentreffen mit Maitreya. Die ersten fünf Kapitel der Hami-Version der Maitrisimit 1-2*, Wiesbaden 1988.

² This reading is a very bold conjecture, but not quite impossible.

³ This addition is uncertain.

⁴ This reading is uncertain.

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22 bolti : burxan nominta üküř asiy

23 tusu qilti-lar :

(01-08) [The divine Buddha said:] '[Bā]va[ri... also] you, should be [glad]!' [And they were] glad. The [six]teen Brahmin youths aroused [the wish(?)] and requested: 'We wish to gain [happiness]!'

(08-13) The perfectly wise divine Buddha found that to be freed from this root, [... ..] to the divine Buddha [...] great cause [] .

(13-15) They each put questions to the divine Buddha.

(15-18) The perfectly wise divine Buddha deigned [to answer] the questions [asked and (?) named the cause [for ...].

(18-23) The fourteen monks attained salvation. Ajita and Maitreya both remained (behind). They became, as in the Ekāgra-sūtra, celebrated mighty Arhants. They did much good through (or for) the Buddha's teaching.

At line 20 *ekagr sudr* = Sanskrit *ekāgra-sūtra*, attested in the Skt-OTk bilingual text TT VIII H 5 (*ekāgrīsūdhar*) and 7 (*ekāgr-sūdhar*). On this bilingual text J.-U. Hartmann and D. Maue write: 'Text H (...); but quite unmistakably it contains the beginning of a commentary on the *Agraprajñaptisūtra*, i.e. on a discourse in which the Buddha, Dharma and Sangha are declared to be the foremost (*agra*) of their kind – the Buddha perhaps as the foremost among living beings. The canonical location of this sūtra has not, as far as we know, been established; but it must have possessed a certain importance in North Turkestan, because the Sanskrit version is represented by fragments in all relevant collections. The Berlin collection even preserves remains of a commentary in one of the old palm-leaf manuscripts, but since in this commentary a different section of the sūtra from that in the bilingual is treated, it is not at present possible to determine whether there is any connection between the two works'.⁵ Text H 7 speaks directly of the 'hundred Arhats with Ājñāta-

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⁵ J.-U. Hartmann, D. Maue, 'Die indisch-türkische Bilingue TT VIII G', in: *Turfan, Khotan und Dunhuang*. Vorträge der Tagung 'Annemarie v. Gabain und die Turfanforschung', veranstaltet von der Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Berlin (9.-12.12.1994), ed. R.E. Emmerick et al. (Berichte u. Abhandlungen Sonderband 1), Berlin 1996, p.149.

Kaunḍinya at their head’, who are named in the *Ekāgrasūtra* expounded by the Buddha. The title also appears in two further fragments: in an OTk alliterative poem written indiscriminately with Brāhmī char-acters, i.e. not a *padārtha* text,⁶ in a strophe alliterating on *e/i/i*: (Brāhmī) *ekāgra* (Uighur script) *sudur [...]*⁴ [in the...(?)] *Ekāgrasūtra*’ (back of Ch/U 6-11, line 14); in a panegyric or colophon text: (Brāhmī) *ekāgra* (Uighur script) *sudur içintā ögidilmiş [a]lqatmiş [...]* ‘praised and glorified in the *Ekāgrasūtra* [...]’ (back of Ch/U 7230, line 3).

In the following sections Ajita’s questions and the Buddha’s answers are framed each time by opening and closing formulas.⁷

r 24-32 = Sn 1032

*maitri’i*⁸ *açiti ik[i toyin-l]ar [birä]r sezik ayitdi-lar burxan-qa ötrü a[çiti] inça tip ayitdi*

a *nägü yörgänmiş ol bo yirtinçü*

b *kir yam bo yirtinçü-nüng qayu ol*

c *nägü-kä yarumaz yalnguq-lar*

d *uluq qorqinç qayu ol anı yrliqang tükäl bilgä*

tip ötünti

‘Maitreya and Ajita, the two monks, each asked the Buddha questions.’⁹ Then Ajita asked thus:

a With what is this world bound up?

b What is in this world filth and dust?

c Why do humans not shine?

d What is great terror? Tell me, perfectly wise one!

Thus he asked.

SktY **a** *kenāyaṃ nivṛto lokaḥ*

Pāli **a** *kena-ssu nivuti loko,*

icc-āyasmā Ajito

b *kenāyaṃ na prakāśate*

b *kena-ssu na-ppakāśati*

c *kiṃ cābhile paṇaṃ brūṣe*

c *ki ’ssābhile paṇaṃ brūsi*

+++++

⁶ On this term, cf. D. Maue, *Alttürkische Handschriften*, Teil 1: Dokumente in Brāhmī und tibetischer Schrift, Stuttgart 1996, Text 19.10.

⁷ Parallels are given for Pāli after PTS, for Sanskrit after Enomoto.

⁸ Unexplained spelling for the usual *m’ytry*.

⁹ This sentence added, perhaps by the OTk translator.

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d *kiṃ ca tasya mahad
bhayaṃ*

d *kiṃ su tassa mahab-
bhayaṃ.*

We must assume that the OTk translator did not follow the pādas exactly. Pādas **b** and **c** have been reversed, and the words *anı yrliqang tükäl bilgä* in pāda **d** belong to pāda **c**. The variant *yalnguq-lar* in **c** is noteworthy: presumably Chinese *ling* was mistranslated. According to Mathews 4043, it means not only ‘To command. To tell. To cause. An order’, but also ‘Good, honourable. A term of respect’, and it can also be used for persons. It is not impossible that the translator has made a mistake here. The verbal form, too, does not show any sign of a causative, because *yaru-* ‘to shine, radiate’ is intransitive. If my conjecture of a mistranslation is correct, this would be an indication that the source of the Old Turkish text was Chinese.

r 32-v 03 = Sn 1033

yeti bilig-lig burxan a[çi]ti ayitmiş sezik inča yörä yrliqadi

a *biligsiz biligkä [yirtinçü]*

(...)

[*jqɑ[tü]käl bilgä [tngri burxan] yrliy är[]*]

‘The Buddha with keen knowledge deigned to explain the question posed by A[ji]ta:

a With ignorance [is this world] covered.

b [Because of greed and lethargy it does not shine].

c [Idle chatter, I say, is impure].

d [Suffering is great terror].

...[That] is the declaration of the [per]fectly wise [divine Buddha].’

SktY **a** *avidyānivrto lokah*

Pāli **a** *avijjāya nivoto loka*

Ajitā ti Bhagavā

b *pramādān na prakāśate*

b *vevicchā pamādā na-
ppakāsati,*

c *jalpābhile panam brūmi*

c *jappābhile panam, brūmi*

d *duhkam tasya mahad
bhayaṃ*

d *dukkham assa maha-
bhayaṃ.*

a *örtülüp*. Whereas in the source the same verb was used, the translator here uses a different verb of similar meaning.

v 04-10 = Sn 1034

[ačit]ti tängr[i burxan-qa] ymä sezik ayi[tdi]
a bulmaduq yalang[ua]-nung tamčuq-lari
b an[] üçün quritur :
c tamčuqluy ög[üzlar]-ning tidyuluq alin sözlär
d taq[]
[tip ötünti]

‘[Aji]ta now put to the div[ine Buddha] the [following] question:
a Undiscovered are the currents of beings (?)
b For [] he causes it to be dry (?)
c He states the method whereby the floods are to be tamed.
d []
[Thus he asked.]’

SktY a *sravanti sarvatah srotāḥ* Pāli a *savanti sabbadhī sotā,*
icc-āyasmā Ajito
b *srotasāṃ kiṃ nivāraṇaṃ* b *sotānaṃ kiṃ nivāraṇaṃ*
c *srotasāṃ saṃvaram brūhi* c *sotānaṃ saṃvaram*
brūhi
d *kena srotāḥ pidihiyate* d *kena sotā pithiyare.*

a *tamčuq* ‘stream’ = Skt *srotas* id. This word, attested here more than once, cannot be found in texts hitherto published.¹⁰

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¹⁰ G. Clauson in his *Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth-Century Turkish*, Oxford 1972, has only the verb *tamčir-*, and in some languages *tamči* ‘drop’ is attested (ref. by M. Stachowski, cf. E.V. Sevortjan, *Ėtimologičeskij slovar’ tjurkskich jazykov. Obščetjurkskie i mežtjurkskie osnovny na buku “V”, “G” i “D”*, Moscow 1980, p.140). The derivation is difficult, cf. also Á. Berta, *Deverbale Wortbildung im Mittelkiptschakisch-Türkischen*, Wiesbaden 1996, p.323: *tam-*(X)g+čl+k* or *tam-či+q*. But perhaps another possibility is more likely. Because of the unambiguous form *tamčuq* here, we have to reckon with a labial vowel in the suffix, and thus the suffix *-(O)k* is probably the right one. And if we start from a reciprocal verb *tam-iš*, a noun **tamišūq* > **tamšūq* should be expected. As a parallel to the development of *š* > *č* can anyway point to the same phenomenon in Soyonic: ‘After occlusives in Soyonic the old *š* (suffix of the co-operative aspect) becomes *č*, after liquids *ğ*: *tıpčir, tıpčip, tıpči*’ (K.H. Menges, ‘Das Sojonische und Karagassische’, *Philologiae Turicae Fundamenta* [1], Wiesbaden 1959, p.654). Cf. also T. Tekin, ‘Inner-Turkic Evidence for the Correspondence Turkic /š/, Chuvash /š/ and Mongolian /č/, *Gedanke und*

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c *tidyuluq alin sözlär* ‘he says (speaks) the method of taming’ corresponds to the Skt *saṃvaram brūhi*. The OTk aorist is inexplicable, Indian sources anyway have the imperative (*brūhi*).

v 10-15 = Sn 1035

tükäl [bilgä tngri burxan inča yörä] yrliqad[i]

- a [t]amçuq-lar ol :
b ani[]ök ol
c apa[ta]m[çu]q-lariy
d bi[l]igin tıdar toyur

‘The perfectly [wise divine Buddha] deigned [to explain] :

- a [Craving in the world] is the currents
b to restrain [those] it is [mindfulness] alone.
c [I say how they can be [prevented,] the currents:
d With knowledge one checks and cuts [them] off.’

SktY a *yāni srotāṃsi lokasya* Pāli a *yāni sotāni lokasmim*
Ajitā ti Bhagavā
b *smṛtiḥ teṣāṃ nivarāṇaṃ* b *sati teṣaṃ nivarāṇaṃ*
c *srotasāṃ saṃvaram* c *sotānāṃ saṃvaram*
brūmi *brūmi*
d *prajñayā hi pidhīyate* d *paññayā’ ete pithiyyare.*

Of the OTk translation of this strophe, only the end is properly preserved. This agrees clearly with the original.

v 15-21 = Sn 1036

ymä ačiti tngri burxan-qa sezik ayitdi

- a *ögin biligin tngriṃ tam[çuq]-luy-lariy qorqitmiş-sn*
b [] ol
c *ög-li bilig-li ymä ayitmaz uyuşluy törü-lär :*
d *näcük toyar inay-ümz anı sözläng :*

‘And Ajita put a question to the Buddha:

a With understanding and wisdom, my Lord, you have frightened those in the current.

|||||

Wirkung, Festschrift zum 90. Geburtstag von Nikolaus Poppe, ed. W. Heissig and K. Sagaster, Wiesbaden 1989, pp.341-5.

b []
 ask(?) c Understanding and wisdom, also things one does not

d What concludes [those]? Tell us our refuge!

SktY a *prajñāyās ca smṛteś*
caiva

Pāli a *paññā c' eva satī ca,*
icc-āyasmā Ajito

b *nāmarūpasya sarvaśaḥ*

b *nāmarūpañ ca mārisa,*

c *ācaksya prṣṭa etan me*

c *etaṃ me puṭṭho pabrūhi*

d *kutraītaḍ uparudhyate*

d *katth' etaṃ uparujjhati.*

a The expression *tam[čuq]-luḡ-lariḡ qorqitmiš-sn* ‘you have frightened those in the current’ cannot be explained from textual sources.

c Here again we have to reckon with a transference of the pādas: *ayitmaz uyüşluḡ törü-lär* seems to represent *nāmarūpa* in **b**, for this term denotes the totality of the elements; cf. O. Rosenberg, *Die Probleme der buddhistischen Philosophie*, Heidelberg 1924, p.145.

v 21-28 = Sn 1037

tngri burxan inča tip yrliqadi

a *tuymaq-qa külänmiš ol törü-lär*

b *tuymaq tuysar ol barča öcär-lär*

c *açiti ötrü inča tip ayitd[uq]ngi[] isimäk-tä*
yilinmäsär

d *ötrü tuymaq tuyar : ämgäk-tä ozar :*

‘The divine Buddha said:

a By perception things are known.

b When one has perception they all vanish.

c When one [] through the heat asked about by Ajita,
 does not cling (to things),

d If one has perception, one is freed from suffering.’

SktY a *prajñā caiva smṛtiś*
caiva

Pāli a *yam etaṃ pañham apucchi*
Ajita taṃ vadāmi te

b *nāmarūpaṃ sa sarvaśaḥ*

b *yattha nāmañ ca rūpañ ca*
asesaṃ

c *vijñānasya nirodhād dhi*

c *viññāṇassa nirodhena*

d *atraitaḍ uparudhyate*

d *etth' etaṃ uparujjhati.*

Only in the Pāli is there an insertion with Ajita, although in a different pāda.

c *isimäk* ‘heat’ is the equivalent of Skt *uṣmagata* (BHSD 149b), the designation of the first four stages of penetration (*nirvedha-bhāgiya*, BHSD 305a). In the AbhK, *uṣmagata*, prolonged for some time (*prakarasakvāt* = *prabandhkatvāt*), has the Four Truths as its object’ (L. de La Vallée Poussin, *L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, Louvain 1925, VI, p.163). Cf. also W. Scharlipp, ‘Fragmente eines uigurischen Kommentars zur Triṃśikavijñapti-mātratāsiddhi des Vasubandhu’, *UJb* N.F.6 (1986), p.128, line 82.

v 28-34 = Sn 1038

açiti ötrü inča tip ötünti

- a** *tngrim sizing titsi-lar-ingiz bilg biligig ötgürmiş-lar*
- b** *kim ymä säkiz türlüg tözün yol-qa kirmiş-lär*
- c** *kim ymä qut bulmaduq tsui-lar*
- d** *olar näçük qılz-un-lar :*

‘Ajita then respectfully asked :

- a** My Lord! Your pupils are those who have penetrated wisdom,
- b** and who have also entered the Noble Eightfold Path.
- c** (For them:) What are the sins that prevent the gaining of salvation?
- d** What are they to do?’

SktY a <i>katham smṛtasya carato</i>	Pāli a <i>ye ca saṃkhātadham-</i> <i>māse,</i>
b <i>vijñānam uparudhyate</i>	b <i>ye ca sekhā puthū idha,</i>
c <i>ākakṣya prṣṭa etan me</i>	c <i>tesaṃ me nipako iriyam</i>
d <i>yathātatham asaṃsayah</i>	d <i>uṭṭho pabrūhi mārisa.</i>

The correspondences here are at best those of content, for the choice of words departs completely from the source. It seems that the Pāli is closest to the OTk version.

b Here there is a completely concrete reference to the treading of the Noble Eightfold Path. Cf. Sn (Nyanaponika’s [German] translation, note to 1038: ‘fighters’ or ‘practitioners’ as a term for those who have determined to tread the Noble Eightfold Path.

c The word *tsui* ‘sins, misconduct’ causes particular difficulties. We can assume that it got here through the misreading of a Chinese sign. In this passage, although in pāda d, we find the sign *shì* 釋 ‘to explain’. If, for some unknown reason, the left-hand part was missing in the source, the right-hand part could easily have been confused with the writing 辜 for the normal 罪 *zui* (> OTk *tsui*).

v 34 = Sn 1039

tükäl bilgä tngri burxan (...)

‘The perfectly wise divine Buddha (...)’

Nothing is preserved here of the Buddha’s reply but, according to the Skt and Pāli, it is to the effect that one should follow the monk’s path.

As stated in the introduction, the work from which the sheet edited here derives cannot be determined with certainty. Comparable to the parameters of this, there are several middle portions of book pages,²² which must be assigned to a different manuscript, of broad format. As the fragments have not yet been fully pieced together, these will be treated collectively on another occasion. However, we shall mention some key words which provide clear evidence of their textual affiliation. In U 2044 (recto(?) 04-06) we hear of the sixteen monks headed by Maitreya and Ajita (*bo-mātri-li : ačit[i]-l[i] []lar ikigü bašin qamay altı ygrmi [toyin-lar]*). On the reverse of the same fragment (02) it is presumably stated that they came to the Pāṣāṇaka mountain (*pašanak tay-ta*). This mountain is also mentioned at Sn 1013, and also in the *Maitrisimit*. In the following line it is said that the youths put their questions (*sezik-lär ayitip*). Fragment U 1536 is especially important because the name of the Brahmin appears here for the first time, not in the form favoured by the *Maitrisimit*, but as p’β’ry = *bavari* ‘Bāvāri’. This form of the name can be considered a further pointer excluding the possibility of a direct link to the *Maitrisimit* tradition. From a passage in fragment U

²² U 1536 (T I D), U 1539 (T I D), U 1557 (T I D 129) and U 2044 (no record of location).

1539 (verso(?) 03) we can deduce that the manuscript did not itself contain the *Pārāyaṇasūtra*, because this is quoted: *parayani ślokda körkitü* ‘in the Pārāyaṇa verses²³ [he deigned] to show’.

The *Pārāyaṇasūtra* has (whether as an independent text or as part of the Sn) a complicated history, the reconstruction of which is specially difficult. Individual verses of Sn appear as quotations in other parts of the Pāli Canon, as well as numerous Chinese translations of Buddhist texts but, as is known, there is no complete Chinese translation. The Central Asian Sanskrit fragments of the *Pārāyaṇasūtra* alone show that sometimes we have only approximate parallels to the text of Sn.²⁴ But I cannot go further into this problem here.

The fact that the story of Bāvāri was reflected both in the *Xianyujing*, the collection of Tales of the Wise Man and the Fool, and also in the *Maitreyasamitinātaka*, was already clearly stated by S. Lévi.²⁵ The *Xianyujing* version makes a very concise impression, so that we cannot be sure whether this part of the *Maitreyasamitinātaka* is an expanded and embellished version of the *Xianyujing* tale, or whether the latter is a compressed version of the former. But the relationship is unmistakable and can be proved in detail.

In the supplement to the second facsimile volume of the *Maitrisimit*, A. von Gabain summarised the conclusions to be derived from the mentions and reviews of the first volume.²⁶ Special emphasis must be laid on the parallels to the *Maitrisimit* passages. E. Lamotte, in his *History*, gave a survey of the Maitreya literature which has become the basis for further Maitreya research.²⁷

²³ The word *ślok* is derived from Skt *śloka*, but in the OTk texts it is a general form for verses.

²⁴ SHT 50, cf. I, p.34; IV, pp.236-9; SHT 1581-2, VI, pp.198-200.

²⁵ S. Lévi, ‘Le sūtra du sage et du fou dans la littérature de l’Asie Centrale’, *JA* 207 (1925), pp.318 ff.

²⁶ P. Demiéville in *TP47* (1958), pp.433-40.

²⁷ E. Lamotte, *History of Indian Buddhism, From the Origins to the Śāka Era* [tr. from French by Sara Boin-Webb], Louvain-la-Neuve 1988, pp.699-710. Many questions about the cult of Maitreya were treated in contributions to the

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Bādhari,²¹ and the OTk spelling is p'd'ry, which can also stand for Bādhari. In Sn it is Bāvārī,²² and not only in Pāli but also in the Sanskrit fragments from Central Asia.²³ The Chinese texts, which mostly have Bōpoli (or similar spellings, all Bāvārī), as well as the OTk manuscript in which the spelling p'β'ry = Bāvārī occurs (U 1536 recto(?) 05) therefore belong to this tradition.

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my conjecture that the name-form Bādhari might have arisen from a misreading (the characters for *dha* and *va* are very similar) seemed to me too bold so that I had withdrawn it, I found in S. Lévi's article the following noteworthy passage [tr.]: 'The alteration of the name Bāvārī, as it is found in the Pāli Sutta Nipāta, to Pāvārī first in the Hsien-yü ching, to Bādhari in the Karasharian, whence Badari in Uighur, is of no surprise. The Paiśācī languages of India, particularly Cūlikāpaiśācī, are apt to substitute the voiceless for the initial voiced consonant; on the other hand, the Kucha language has no voiced consonant; a twofold influence, coming both from the Indian frontier and Central Asia, caused the name Bavari to take the form Pāvārī. The aspirated dental consonant of the form Bādhari is of another origin; it certainly springs from a misreading; in writings of the Gupta type, the letters *v* and *dh* are difficult to differentiate' (S. Lévi, 'Le sūtra du sage et du fou', *op. cit.*, pp.322-3). According to this theory (and this is the problem), we have to assume that an original misreading was retained throughout, because in the one tradition the name always has *-dh-* (or *-d-*) and in the other always *-v-*.

²¹ A. v. Gabain, Supplement to *Maitrisimit II*, p.16, writes 'pādhari', but the texts themselves usually have Bādhari, cf. E. Sieg and W. Siegling, *Tocharische Sprachreste I*, Berlin and Leipzig 1921, Nos 212-16.

²² L.R. Goonesekere suggests in *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism*, ed. G.P. Malalasekera, Colombo, 11, 4, p.575a, that 'the name Bāvārī may be a representative of the famous Kātyāyana school of the White Yajurveda (Bādārī)'.

²³ Cf. also G.P. Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pali Proper Names*, 1-2, London 1937-8, pp.279-80.

ON THE INTERACTION OF BUDDHISM AND PSYCHOLOGY*

JOHN PICKERING

This article is more about psychology than Buddhism, but it deals with some changes that will help their interaction. Firstly we look at the context of these changes, then at the changes themselves and finally at what might follow from better interaction. Here 'Buddhism' does not refer to any particular tradition but to views and practices that are common to them all.

The Postmodern Context

Modern psychology, the child of a nineteenth century union of philosophy and physiology, was conceived when confidence in science was high and increasing. So much so that towards the end of the century some physicists even advised students against entering the subject since it was nearly finished. It appeared that nature could be completely understood in physical terms. This confidence was felt in the life sciences too, and since nature included life and minds, the founders of modern psychology expected the discipline would eventually become a branch of physics. Religion traditions were to be dismissed as superstitious dogmas inherently opposed to science. Thus humiliated, they would be left behind as humanity ascended into the sunlit uplands of rational acquaintance with its own condition.

This heroic programme was to be carried out from a detached, objective viewpoint. From there, it was assumed that scientific discoveries would be immune from distortion by prejudice and could thus be used to create a benign and just society. This ideal was expressed by an intellectual community stretching from the *philosophes* of the Enlightenment to the scientists of the late nineteenth century. The common objective was the systematic, rational investigation of the world for human good. This was the

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Enlightenment Project, the heroic metanarrative of the modern era.

Postmodernism is a rupture with this project. The twentieth century showed all too clearly that scientific rationality does not of itself ensure a secure and fair life for all. More conflict and ecological destruction clearly awaits us in the coming century because the forces unleashed by science and technology cannot be contained. This has led to profound skepticism towards the Enlightenment Project and similarly all-embracing metanarratives.

This is the postmodern condition of knowledge (Lyotard, 1984). The cultural image of science as the systematic, progressive and authoritative disclosure of pre-existent reality has been re-framed or even abandoned. The postmodern turn discloses: ‘... the Enlightenment's ascription to science of a prescriptive authority whereby other forms of knowledge can be humiliated is itself an illusion ... a unitary scientific method, even a scientific world-view, is merely one of the many superstitions of enlightenment cultures’ (Gray, 1995, p.154). A pluralist framework for knowledge has emerged within which science takes its place as one among many ways of discovering, as the biologist John Haldane once put it, that ‘the universe is not only stranger than we suppose, but stranger than we *can* suppose’.

The postmodern condition is one of radical pluralism in which new meaning is synthesised in conversations between different traditions. No one view or intellectual framework is final nor can its conceptual vocabulary predominate. Constructive postmodernism provides a framework within which science, including psychology, may interact with Buddhism in a new and more productive way.

Scientific discoveries during the twentieth century shook the worldview that had made physics appear so universal. Phenomena at the subatomic level demonstrate that detached observation is a special case and that what it discloses is fundamentally incomplete. The physical world has turned out to be subtly interconnected at all levels. Discoveries in systems theory and in the life sciences have likewise shown that the

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linear decomposition of organic systems only provides a limited type of understanding. Organic systems are complex wholes and their activity is intrinsically historical. They are self-organising and exhibit emergent, non-linear properties not present in any particular part of the system. Thus no inventory of parts at a particular instant, however accurate and complete, could of itself explain how the system as a whole behaves.

This realisation is particularly important for psychology. Its principal object of interest, the dynamic unfolding of human mental life, is the most complex phenomenon known to science. Within it, patterns of organic causation dialectically unite parts to the whole and the whole to its parts. Attempts to isolate particular parts or particular types of causes are strictly limited and as general epistemological framework quite inappropriate. For psychology to adopt the metaphysics of nineteenth century science is an encumbrance.

This is not to reject science's findings or its methodology. It is, however, a recognition that what they may have led us to think of as universal and absolute are actually more relative and historically contingent than we supposed. Richard Rorty, a philosopher of the postmodern turn, takes this as a sign of intellectual maturity. Like his role-model John Dewey, he feels it is naive to believe that science and philosophy are discovering eternal, pre-extant, truths. Instead, they are participants in the constantly diversifying con-versations through which human beings attempt to co-ordinate their views of the world and to lead their lives together. As Rorty puts it: truth is made, not found (Rorty, 1999).

This does not mean that enthusiasm for science has diminished. Life sciences like cognitive neuroscience and genetics, presently have the totemic role that physics and chemistry had at the start of the previous century. However, the cultural context is different. Science and technology are treated with caution rather than being uncritically hailed as progressive. One reason is increasing concern about the ecological impact of technology. Another, more directly the result of the postmodern turn, is that that scientific discoveries are not now taken to be the privileged disclosure of how the world 'really is'. Instead,

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they are more likely to be regarded as pro-visional creations suffused with cultural values. They are part of what Ernest Becker called the 'fragile fiction', the symbolic worldview which people construct in order to make sense of a world not of their making (Becker, 1971).

Rorty notes that it is no longer possible to establish what he calls a 'normal discourse'. This is a primary explanatory vocabulary to which all other ways of describing the world are in some sense secondary. The idea of a normal discourse lies at the heart of the fear of science. It is the fear that the world, and us with it, will be made too comprehensible. As Rorty puts it 'The fear of science, of "scientism", of "naturalism", of self-objectivation, of being turned by too much knowledge into a thing rather than a person, is the fear that all discourse will become normal discourse' (Rorty, 1980, p.388).

The theoretical and methodological pluralism of the post-modern turn can help to allay that fear. Practices and insights from other systems of knowledge are entering into a new and more balanced discourse with science (Griffin, 1988). This is not mere 'anything goes' relativism, but a move towards the discursive pro-duction of knowledge through dialogue. Rather than one particular tradition claiming to have the final say, new meaning is synthesised in informed conversations between traditions. Inevitably, the geopolitical facts of life will mean that from time to time some traditions will have greater influence than others. Presently globalisation distorts Eastern traditions but in time we can expect a more balanced inter-change to emerge.

Thus, and in contrast to conditions when modern psychology appeared, the interchange between Western science and Eastern traditions can proceed in a more even-handed way. This being the case, interaction between Buddhism and psychology can be looked at in a new light. Additionally, the postmodern turn has precipitated changes in psychology that are making interaction more plausible and more informed.

Changes in Psychology

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Postmodernism has diversified both the theory and methods of psychology (Kvale, 1992). The changes to be sketched here concern the decline of Cognitivism and the consequent return of con-sciousness as a central topic of mainstream research. Additionally, feeling and experience are once more accepted as primary psycho-logical data.

The two major paradigms shaped psychology in the twentieth century, Behaviourism and Cognitivism, both adopted the mechanistic metaphysics of the nineteenth. As a result, both were equally dismissive of consciousness. Behaviourism considered subjective mental processes to be methodologically intractable as they could not be observed directly or quantified. Therefore, since no properly scientific account could be given for them, thoughts, feelings, emotions and consciousness were virtually ignored. It seemed almost to be a point of honour to deny common experi-ences any place in psychology, no matter how significant they were felt to be. They were merely phenomenological illusions that would, eventually, be dispelled by more objective data.

Behaviourists limited themselves to observing the external manifestations of mental life. This was successful up to a point and the period left a legacy of effective techniques. But it also had major shortcomings. Many experiments of the era were unnatural. Animals pressing levers in cages being the paradigmatic case. Behaviourism was also unable to provide a satisfactory account for reflexive and open aspects of human mental life, such as language and creative problem-solving.

Concern about these shortcomings reached a critical mass soon after the halfway point of the century. Then Behaviourism was rather suddenly displaced as psychology's central paradigm in what is sometimes referred to as the 'Cognitive Revolution' (Gardner, 1985). Cognitive psychology, or Cognitivism as it will be termed here, approached the mind as if it was an information processing system like a computer. Computational models of mental pro-cesses were tested against human performance in more natural experiments on perceiving, remembering, making decisions, solving problems and using language.

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The conceptual vocabulary of Cognitivism has become, broadly speaking, the *lingua franca* of mainstream psychology. Significantly, in using this vocabulary it was assumed that the computational essence of mental life is separable from culture and even from biology (Gardner, 1985, p.6). Moreover, the vocabulary is primarily expressed in third-person terms, that is, how the mind seems from the outside. How it seems from the inside, the first-person world of feelings, values and experience, is secondary. This was something that would be properly understood once psychology had framed a universal theory of cognition in computational terms.

The ethos of Cognitivism, like that of Behaviourism before it, leaves psychology at a reductive *impasse*. To assume that a formal computational account might be found for human mental life is a Cartesian conceit that harks back to the Enlightenment Project. Although Cognitivism has been useful, computation *per se* no longer seems a plausible candidate for a universal psychological theory. To propose that the essence of mental life lay in computation, and hence could be formalised, was an attempt to give psychology the identity and authority of a modern science (Newell, 1991). Following the postmodern turn this restriction is easing. Alternatives to Cognitivism, such as Connectionism and the dynamic systems approach have appeared. Their significance here is that they open the way to more fruitful interaction with Buddhism.

Connectionism is a critical response to the idea that nervous activity was, essentially, computation. Brains lack the necessary functional architecture to make this biologically plausible. Instead of well-defined locations where information is stored and processed, they comprise densely interconnected networks. Their activity is far less homogeneous than formal computational theory requires. Connectionism is an attempt to understand this activity from the bottom up, as it were, by making models of the dense interconnectivity and massively parallel activity of natural nervous systems. These models have inputs from and outputs to their environment. Some of their connectivity is programmed in advance but some is the result of activity in the network. This in turn depends on the activity in world around it as well as on the

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principles of self-modification built into the network. In short, networks become actively attuned to their environment.

How well neural networks serve as psychological models, is not yet clear. Even the very largest networks so far constructed are minute when compared with natural nervous systems. They are nevertheless proving to be of practical significance in the recognition of voices and faces. Connectionism also provides a powerful conceptual vocabulary in which to re-state some enduring questions, such as the interaction between nature and nurture.

Whatever their significance turns out to be, the point of interest here is that connectionist models are necessarily historical. Cognitivism sought the essence of mental life in computational principles. These, being formal, were hence independent of the history of the mental being concerned. Connectionism, by contrast, is a psychological theory without essences. Where Cognitivism proposed rules and representations, Connectionism proposes only connections, activity and history. Any particular state of a network, and thus by extension any mental state, is explained in terms of the conditions that gave rise to it. There is a striking resemblance here to Buddhist view that mental life reflects the ceaseless arising of conditions.

Other critical responses to Cognitivism are the dynamic systems approach and theories of embodied cognition (Clark, 1999). These hold that mental life reflects the particular organic system in which it is expressed. Cognitivism treats organisms as if their nervous systems were computationally speaking identical. The dynamic systems approach by contrast takes the nervous system to be engaged in a cyclic process of adjustment to the flow of action in which organisms participate. Now different organisms act in fundamentally different ways. Accordingly, rather than treating all nervous systems as if they performed identical computational functions, the dynamic systems approach treats them as participants in unique patterns of activity. These patterns extend beyond the organism to reflect the particular conditions in which the activity occurs, activity in the whole system being a form of sensitive chaos. The similarity to Buddhist notions of inter-dependence is again striking.

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Both Connectionism and the dynamic systems approach indicate that psychology is: 'Reclaiming Cognition' from Cognitivism (Nunez & Freeman, 1999). Mental life cannot be formalised. Instead, it has to be treated as an aspect of organic action, inseparable from the biological and cultural processes which are its vehicle. With the move towards embodiment, and away from the over-rationalised approach of Cognitivism, emotion and feeling are once again being treated as the core of mental life (Damasio, 1996, 1999). This is not a new idea, William James having proposed just that when laying the foundations of the Science of Mental Life, to use his never-bettered name for psychology. That it was forgotten shows how far Behaviourism and Cognitivism took psychology from the world of everyday lived experience. There, it is patent that feeling, not reason, is the essence of psychological life.

The reclaiming of cognition has prompted an explosion of interest in consciousness, bringing psychology face to face with awareness itself (Chalmers, 1995; Shear et al., 1999). Consciousness is once again at the centre of the research arena, where William James originally put it. It is a uniquely significant phenomenon for scientific investigation since to investigate it properly, science will have to enlarge both its methods and its worldview. Phenomenological methods are increasingly used in psychology and since there is some unfamiliarity and mistrust of them, traditions where such methods have been used for millennia are recognised to have something to offer. These developments will be important in the interaction with Buddhism in the coming decades, which is the concern of the final section of this article.

Prospects, Problems and Possible Outcomes

During the eras of Cognitivism and Behaviourism, the attitude of mainstream psychology to religious traditions was essentially that of nineteenth century science. The assumption was that religious traditions, being concerned with beliefs and values, could have no real interaction with science, the latter being concerned with hypotheses and empirically established facts. Faith and reason do not mix. To compare them was regarded as a category mistake.

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Although this attitude has hindered contact with Buddhism, psychologists did occasionally note that it presents a account of mental life comparable with Western systems (e.g. Thouless, 1947, Suzuki, Fromm and De Martino, 1956). There was also an increase in contact with Buddhism in the 1960's but it suffered from the superficiality of then fashionable engagement with all things Eastern. Subsequently though there has been more informed work (e.g. Molino, 1998)

While the prospects for interaction are improving many limitations remain, some of them being distant echoes of the assumed opposition of science and religion. But, ironically, since science now provides most people with their creation myth, their image of themselves and an understanding of their relation to the rest of the universe, it has had to take on some of the cultural roles of religion. For most scientists this is unwelcome as it seems to compromise the integrity of science. But this is only true if science is saddled with being a uniquely authoritative, progressive human understanding, replacing all others.

Now science deserves a special place: it has permitted the prediction of events and their technological control to an unprecedented degree. However, the postmodern re-appraisal of science's hypotheses and methods shows that they also reflect their cultural context. To frame a hypothesis about a phenomenon is to express a belief about what sort of a thing it might be. Likewise, choosing a method of observation expresses a belief about how a phenomenon will disclose itself. The choices and beliefs expressed in science reflect their cultural context just as those expressed in religious traditions do.

It is unrealistic to propose that science is somehow outside the more universal arena of inquiry, within which cultural forms such as Buddhism also approach the common phenomena of human existence. Buddhism investigates mental life in ways that have been critically and systematically developed over millennia. There is every reason to suppose that these will complement the scientific investigation of the mind. It is un-helpful to assume there can be no interaction between them merely because of the supposed incompatibility of science and religion inherited from the last few centuries of Western thought.

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More helpful is the paradigm shift, itself part of the post-modern turn, which has seen the mechanistic worldview of the nineteenth century displaced by one based on organic processes (Griffin, 1998). Process philosophy is an enduring strand in Western thought that stretches from pre-Socratic philosophers, such as Heraclitus to more contemporary figures such as James, Bergson, Whitehead and Bohm (R scher, 1996; 2000). Although they express it in different ways, these philosophers share the view that mind is a part of, not apart from, what Whitehead called ‘the creative advance of nature’. It is significant here that process philosophy is again attracting attention since paradigm shifts actually start with a revision of implicit metaphysics (e.g. Gare, 1999, p.28).

The changes in psychology sketched above reflect just such a revision. They lessen hindrances to the interaction with Buddhism that linger on in psychology as implicit nineteenth century attitudes. With the decline of Cognitivism and the vigorous return of interest in consciousness there has come an increased contact with phenomenological traditions (Varela & Shear, 1998). Treatments of selfhood and its relation to the wider order of nature are now appearing that to a greater or lesser extent are influenced by Buddhism (e.g. Macy, 1991; Clark, 1991; Parfitt, 1987). The re-semblance to *anatta*, is again striking. Instead of a Cartesian sub-stance, selfhood is seen as dynamic, interconnected, primordially relational and essentially without essence (Pickering, 1997).

In fact, this is not a good time for essentialism in general. A worldview without essences is replacing the mechanistic metaphysics of the nineteenth century. In theories of evolution, development and cognition the systems view displacing attempts to explain the dynamics of complex wholes by attributing causal powers to their parts (Oyama, 2001). In psychology too, interaction with Buddhism has recovered from the superficiality of the 1960's and now demonstrates maturity and critical depth (e.g. Rama-krishna Rao, 2002). Cycles of contingent causality are the under-lying field of being from which organic action, human cognition and culture emerge (Rosch, 1994). These developments all enrich contact with Buddhism (Waldron, 2000).

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Questions arise here that go beyond mere methodology to the purpose of investigating the mind. Buddhism values personal, direct investigation as it is readily available and, with appropriate training, free from distortion. It is considered to be intrinsically valuable since it enables the investigator to live more skillfully. Cognitivism, by contrast, following the ethos of nineteenth century science, puts most values depersonalised investigation which, apart from logical truth-values, is otherwise assumed to be value-neutral. How skilfully psychologists themselves live is neither here nor there, although, in the spirit of the Enlightenment Project, it is assumed that investigation will help to improve the conditions of life.

However, value-laden aims are implicit in science. These are that mechanistic reduction will allow greater prediction and control and that this is desirable. Now the postmodern turn takes us beyond the unlikely distinction between an external value system and the internal concepts and practices of science which are assumed to be value-neutral. Value-neutral knowledge is a fiction. Knowledge becomes value laden by virtue of the manner and purpose of getting it. This is particularly important for psychology to take on board since it is the science that is most directly mirrors the human condition. If it denies subjectivity any significance, adopts mechanistic metaphysics and aims for prediction and control, then the outlook for human autonomy is poor. The actual experience of human beings has no place in such a science. It is as if we look into the mirror only to find we are not reflected in it.

If instead psychology's metaphysical framework was the ceaseless arising of conditions without essence, then it would more directly reflect the world of lived experience, as Husserl and Bergson as well as James proposed. That world, after all, is the world in which the psychologists themselves live, and to acknowledge this would help create a more humane and less alienating discipline. However, it is very important in Western academic *realpolitik* for psychology to appear 'scientific'. Accordingly, experience itself is downgraded as something secondary, to be explained away. In its struggle to be accepted as a science psychology needed to show that it too could do the

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reductive job on its subject matter that other sciences appeared to have done on theirs. Physicists suggested that heat was ‘just’ motion. Bio-chemists suggested that being alive was ‘just’ to metabolise. Geneticists suggested that to evolve was ‘just’ to alter the genome ... and so on. Given this, it is no surprise to find psychologists suggesting that experience is ‘just’ computation and brain mechanisms. To do so gives them the authority of science.

Psychology’s search for the status of the natural sciences explains why it presently has little more to offer than to attempt to reduce the complexities of experience to something else, which is simpler and more ‘real’. It also explains the massive preference for objective over subjective methods. This conceptual poverty and methodological imbalance are signs of the reductive *impasse*. Attempting to do for mental phenomena what natural science appears to have done for physical and biological ones sets psychology an impossible task. The formidable technology used in psychological research does not of itself give the discipline the authority to pronounce on experience. It may produce finer and finer descriptions of, say, brain activity, but what will be revealed by doing this? It will be only part of the story; a description of the vehicle for consciousness.

What is carried by this vehicle, the flow of conscious experience itself, cannot be reduced. It participates with numerous interacting factors in a system that does not stop at the boundaries of the body. This means that consciousness cannot be fully understood from a third-person description of only one part of it, no matter how accurate it may be. Events within the brain are but one such part, and it is as yet unclear what their role is in shaping the situated actions of people and other organisms within the larger systems that they inhabit.

But things are improving. The developments in psychology that have been sketched here, especially the embodied treatment of cognition and the increasing influence of dynamic systems theory, shift attention strongly towards the whole and away from the parts. Methodologically, things are also changing for the better. Phenomenology, qualitative methods and first-person

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data are becoming more acceptable in mainstream psychology (Varela et al., 1991). It is becoming clear that while third-person data are reliable and powerful, is a reductive mistake to assume that *on their own* they could provide a complete account of experience. To understand how human experience is bound up in the systems that support it will also require first-person investigation, changing science's methods and its image. This is the peculiar challenge in investigating consciousness: to preserve the integrity of scientific methods whilst at the same time broadening them to treat the world of lived experience.

Buddhism starts with that world and deals with it in ways that everyone can recognise. While scientific psychology makes a distinctive contribution, it is nevertheless a highly specialised one, tied to a particular era and cultural *milieu*. Cognitivism does not in general help people to understand their own experience, nor is it intended to do so. By contrast, the resilience and endurance of Buddhism testifies that many people from many cultures and at many periods of history have recognised in it something universal about their own lived experience.

Now the findings of science are also supposed to be universal, but this is most easily demonstrable in physics, in the life sciences it is less so and in mainstream experimental psychology, it is even more questionable. Science expresses the outward-directedness of Western thought over the last millennium. This dominates the study of the mind, despite the fact that the principal thing we know about it is our inner experience. It has meant that third-person descriptions of the outer manifestations of mental life are far more highly valued than first-person accounts, what mental life feels like from the inside. The latter have been treated with suspicion in Western psychology because previous attempts to use them have failed. This suspicion extends to meditative traditions where there appears to be no equivalent of the controlled experiments and publicly verifiable data that are the hallmark of good scientific research. Even serious research on meditation can still lapse into something akin to Orientalism by treating meditation as an anthropological curiosity – an esoteric practice of another culture, often by implication, a more primitive one.

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Those more familiar with Buddhist traditions will recognise that this is not a well-informed position. The use of meditation can be as systematic and critical as any scientific programme. As Charles Tart, a psychologist with impeccable scientific credentials as well as experience with meditation, has recently put it like this: ‘My professional and personal studies on consciousness, especially mindfulness meditation (*vipassana*) have convinced me that ordinary consciousness is quite undifferentiated and unskillful at observing its own manifestations – hence the failures of early Western attempts at an introspective psychology that was to be a science of the mind *per se*. But we can learn to become much more discriminative observers of our own mental processes. Western psychology gave up far too early trying to become a science with mental events as primary data – we simply weren’t trained’ (Tart, 1999).

But mistrust of meditation is diminishing. It was due in part the projective distortion of Eastern traditions which we are now more aware, following the work of Jung, Said and the postmodern insight into the vicissitudes of working with knowledge. It was also in part a reaction to the superficiality 1960’s, when Eastern practices became trivialised spiritual fashion-accessories. Things have improved greatly in the past few decades with better teachings and more balanced research. Many psychologists, like Tart, now have some experience of the direct engagement with mental life that meditation provides (e.g. Rosch, 1997).

However, despite the changes sketched here, the clear and important differences between scientific psychology and Buddhist traditions will need to be born in mind. There will remain a necessary tension between meditation and conventional scientific methods. Private experience obtained under special conditions and after special training does not rest easily alongside the public data of experimental science. Many psychologists, though, are begin-ning to recognise that the way forward is not too exclude any method of studying mental life but continually to enrich their synthesis.

This in turn will not only enrich psychological research but also raise broader questions about its purpose. What sort of knowledge of the mind do we want and why do we want it?

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Experimental psychologists want sort of knowledge that is produced by good scientific research. They want it because mental life is intrinsically interesting. However, this is too simple. Scientific knowledge, of the mind or anything else, is not value-neutral. Scientific ends always end up as technological means. Presently we face a serious ecological crisis, whose most basic cause is the alienation of human experience from nature by runaway science and technology. The ecological crisis is thus also a psycho-logical crisis. Accordingly, rather than technologising the mind, as Cognitivism was wont to do, psychology needs to study it within its biological and cultural contexts.

It will help this project to engage with Buddhist views of selfhood and its organic interdependence on the world around it (Macy, 1991; Hillman,1995). A synthesis of traditions will help create a more balanced science of mental life and one more relevant to the difficulties facing us. It will present its own difficulties of course. It is easy to mis-attribute to Buddhism things which are merely contemporary concerns. The genuine openness of science and its capacity for radical revision should not be under-estimated when compared with what in Buddhist traditions is rigid and authoritarian. But so long as they are recognised, these dif-ficulties need not hinder the pursuit of better interaction between Buddhism and psychology. The decline of Cognitivism and the growth of an organic worldview open the way to deeper, more informed and relevant interaction between the two traditions.

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THE ETHICS OF THOUGHTLESSNESS:
THE PROBLEM OF ETHICS IN rDZOGS CHEN THOUGHT*

JOHN PEACOCK

Buddhist thought in its many manifestations has as its desideratum the direct perception of reality and the subsequent eradication of *duhkha* through knowledge of the way things really are. Thus crucially Buddhist epistemology is directly linked to its soteriology. A clear and unmediated perception of the real is seen as vitally important in the determination of how the individual is to act. In other words, one either acts in accordance with the way things are, as revealed in an act of unmediated perception, or one acts through a partial or even distorted *idea* of the way things are. When we begin in this way to talk of acts we are led ineluctably into the field of ethics.

Through an examination of the problems of ethics in rDzogs chen we begin to confront a more general problem in the field of Buddhist ethics. The problem is this: how are ethical acts possible given the Buddhist stress on the non-conceptual apprehension of reality? Ethical acts, one might wish to argue, require the utilisation of ethical judgements and hence some form of conceptual discrimination. If this is the case what sense can be made of ethical acts arising through unmediated perception without the attendant employment of ethical concepts?

The rDzogs Chen Position

Before entering into a discussion of the problem of ethics in rDzogs chen thought let me firstly attempt a brief reconstruction of the rDzogs chen view. rDzogs chen thought, particularly as it is presented by the great fourteenth century rNying ma lama and scholar kLong chen rab 'byams pa (1308-63), can be seen as a skilful combination of the basic ideas of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka philosophy. It takes as its starting point the Yogācāra theory of

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predispositions or potentialities of experience (*bags chags*, *vāsanā*) and the Madhyamaka denial of intrinsic existence or essence (*rang bzhin med*, *niḥsvabhāva*). The *bags chags* are impressions, traces or habits that have been constructed in the course of experience and provide a habitually based ‘schemata’ for our perception of the world. What commences as an open field of experience with the potential for differentiation in early childhood is, gradually over the course of time, reduced to a world of seemingly static objects composed of individuated ‘minds’ (*don gyi bags chags*) and bodies (*lus kyi bags chags*). Thus it is experience in terms of the *bags chags* that rDzogs chen practitioners refer to as ‘mistakenness’ or ‘going astray’ (*’khrul pa*).

It is an error to conceive of the *bags chags* as lying inertly within the *ālaya-vijñāna* (the ‘store-consciousness’, *kun gzhi rnam shes*), postulated by Yogācāra thinkers, because these impressions act as ‘seeds’ (*bīja*) or potentialities for future activities. What therefore is indicated is a dynamic process wherein past impressions and influences are ‘stored’ or retained and then projected to create future experience. It is the *kun gzhi rnam shes* that creates certain horizons for meaning and understanding. However, the *kun gzhi rnam shes* is not an unconscious and should not be viewed as such, for the development of the theory of the *kun gzhi rnam shes* went together with the Cittamātra denial of the belief in an external world, a notion that is totally foreign to Western psychological theories concerning the unconscious. The Citta-mātra repudiation of the belief in an external world could be seen as a corrective to realist strands within Indian thought that appeared more concerned with theorising and conceptualising the external world than paying attention to the ‘world’ as an existential horizon of meaning. It was only by being attentive to the world in this way that human beings, so it was claimed, could begin to disentangle their participation in the world-as-Samsāra, and as a correlate, initiate a responsiveness to the world-as-Nirvāṇa.

Central to the claims of the mentalistic systems was the acknowledgement that ‘going-astray’ or ‘mistakenness’ was

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attributable to the lack of recognition of a luminous and non-dualistic form of awareness as the origin of experience. This form of aware-ness, so they claimed, was beyond the subject-object bifurcation (*gzung 'dzin*) that was involved in ordinary perceptual states. However, the Madhyamaka rejected this notion, viewing it as a mere hypothesis and thus possessing no 'intrinsic existence'. For the Madhyamaka the shape that 'going-astray' assumed was a generalised form of belief in taking things to exist in a particular way, i.e., with intrinsic existence (*svabhāva*), when nothing existed in that way. What we see within the Madhyamaka is a repudiation of the notion of all absolutes, what one may term 'an absolute absence of all absolutes'. With the obsessive concern over onto-logical issues, the Madhyamaka contended, there was a genuine forgetting of 'knowing' and 'being'. Thus, any form of philoso-phical or ontological hypostatising was deemed a limitation to the 'open-ness' (*stong pa nyid*) of experience. The Madhyamaka per-spective is forcefully demonstrated in the ninth chapter of Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. Within this chapter there is pre-sented a putative attack on the Madhyamaka claim that entities, both internal and external, are 'apparition-like'. The mentalistic opponent of the Madhyamaka claims that there must be a form of awareness or consciousness that remains undecieved by the magical show of existence (v.29-32). Furthermore, the opponent claims, if this form of awareness did not exist, we would all be like the magician who *inevitably* falls in love with the *māyā*-woman/ man that they have conjured up. What is being argued here is that if this were the case there would be no way out of our delusion if everything were an apparition. Nevertheless, Śāntideva rejects this claim and argues that the only reason that you are likely to fall in love with the *māyā*-woman/man is that your understanding and perception of *śūnyatā* is rather tenuous. If the experience of 'emptiness' were stronger there would be little likelihood of falling for the *māyā*-woman/man and taking them to be a 'real' woman/ man. Thus it is claimed there is a failure to see the woman/man as an illusion at all with the ineluctable consequence that they are apprehended as some real object. Illusoriness, therefore, becomes not simply a lack but a

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presence that is freed from the compul-siveness, obsessiveness and deceptiveness of the *bags chags*.

It is important to understand that within the rDzogs chen position there is a rejection of the mentalistic conclusions of Cittamātra thought and its theory of the *bags chags*, i.e., the unwarranted conclusion that everything is a projection of one's own mind. rDzogs chen thinkers thus claim that, although presencing (*snang ba*) may be the presencing of the *bags chags* and therefore mental (*sems*), i.e., apprehending something as an object, the apparent object is *not* mental. What is being argued for here is that, although the conditions required for the presencing of the apparent object are mental, we are not justified in assuming that the object apprehended is mental. This doctrine is strangely akin to Kant's claim in *The Critique of Pure Reason* that although he is a transcendental idealist he is also an empirical realist. The conclusion, therefore, that kLong chen rab 'byams pa comes to is that Samsāra is a mistaken mode of apprehending objects that are characterised by 'dependent origination' (*rten brel*).¹

The rDzogs chen thought of kLong chen rab 'byams pa is obviously of far greater complexity and subtlety than the above presentation. Nevertheless, I will have hopefully managed to convey something of the 'flavour' of that position, albeit in a very succinct form. The question that I now wish to address is, 'does this system provide a grounding for genuine ethical praxis?' Or, more simply, do the ethics that arise out of this system make sense?

Let us first of all examine a statement by Rig 'dzin 'Jigs med gling pa, the eighteenth-century rNying ma scholar and visionary, that is found in a small and rather condensed text

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¹ kLong chen rab 'byams pa in the *Yid bzhin rin pe che'i mdzod* says the following: 'Although entities lack reality, it is the dualistic power of the apprehendable and the apprehending that gives rise to conditioned genesis, like an apparition. So long as the dualism of the apprehending and the apprehendable remains, cause and effect will miraculously appear as the cause and result of action'.

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
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entitled gNas lugs tshig rkang. 'Jigs med gling pa claims the following:

The genuine path to action is to act on the basis of what is and the possibilities that it offers, not to act according to a set of rules or prescriptions which will always be problematic. Ethics if seen as a system encompassing symbols and sanctions will always be un-ethical for it blinds one to the possibilities contained in what is. Far from meaning that 'anything is permissible' any genuine ethical action must be based on what is, and 'what really is' is revealed through insight and understanding.

Prime facie this position has an intuitive appeal with its patent rejection of prescriptive ethical doctrines and its eulogising of an ethics based on 'what really is'. However, I would suggest that the idea of acting in accordance with 'what really is' possesses a lack of clarity that could be distinctly unhelpful when coming to know how to act in any given ethical situation.

One of the claims made by Buddhist thought in general, and rDzogs chen thought in particular, is that conceptual thought has a tendency to inhibit or block our initial apprehension of the 'real' by introducing elements of deceptiveness and falsity into our perception. What is lost, so it is claimed, is the vibrancy of our initial contact with 'what is'. The emphasis in rDzogs chen thought, therefore, is on the immediacy of perception as the foundation for ethical action and behaviour. As kLong chen rab 'byams pa states in the Shingta chen po:

The true nature of the mind is freedom from concepts and expressions ... there are no words and letters because the meaning of phenomena is beyond [the object] of mental conceptions and concepts which cause delusions ... so it should be known that all phenomena are peaceful, natural and pure and that they tran-scend all the characteristics of conceptualisation.



2 gNas lugs tshig rkang, II 35a.
3 Shingta chen po, 79b/3.

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It is this immediacy that forms the basis for all subsequent enquiry. However, words and concepts are said to be incapable of conveying this immediacy; at best words can point in the direction of this experience without ever getting to its heart. Given this emphasis on the immediacy of experience, and the deep suspicion of language and concepts, it is difficult to see how ethical actions that involve genuine ethical judgements could occur.

Let me try to outline the problem. Conventionally, we think of ethical actions as involving ethical judgements. For example, as a being in the world I am confronted continuously by situations that demand ethical responses, and thus am engaged constantly in having to make judgements how to act for the best in any given situation. Such situations require at minimum a utilisation of concepts such as the 'good'. In other words, I have to make a judgement about the good and that judgement is made via the concept of 'goodness'. Thus ethical judgement is akin to aesthetic judgement that requires the application of the concept of the 'beautiful'. Without the utilisation of conceptual structures, which at minimum deliver judgements such as 'this is good', 'this is bad', and 'this is beautiful', 'this is ugly' it is extremely difficult to conceive of a non-conceptual 'ethics'. We may be speaking of something else in this case, but would it be 'ethics' as we normally understand it? Could we, for example, make sense of ethical experience in the form of ethical dilemmas? How would we know how to act?

The rDzogs chen answer, of course, is that it is through penetrating awareness (*rig pa*) that one knows how to act, and it is through loss of intrinsic awareness (*ma rig pa*), so it is claimed, that ethically improper acts occur. However, judgement it would appear is intrinsic to an ethical or moral existence. Nevertheless, as we have seen, thinkers such as 'Jigs med gling pa within the rDzogs chen tradition appear explicitly to reject the notion of ethical judgement, based on the utilisation of ethical concepts, as we would normally understand them.

Is Awareness Enough?

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A contemporary rDzogs chen master, Namkhai Norbu, highlights the importance of awareness in conduct in the following passage:

Awareness is the only rule in Zogqen. Or, perhaps, it would be better to say that awareness replaces all rules in Zogqen, because a Zogqen practitioner never either forces himself to anything, nor submits to being conditioned by anything ‘external’ ... Awareness means one is aware of everything...⁴

However, before dealing with awareness I would like to take us back to Immanuel Kant whose transcendental idealism was mentioned earlier. Kant’s ethical position, based on the primacy of duty and universalisability, appears to be the very antithesis of the rDzogs chen stance.

For Kant a reliance on reason, that is the application of concepts, and an autonomous will are ethical prerequisites:

Reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty, that is, one which is to influence the will ... nature’s true intention is to produce a will.⁵

The by-product of this will is the conscious intent which motivates any true moral or ethical action, for without it Kant claims one is bereft of the full sense of what one is doing and why. Therefore, for Kant, one who is acting without such conscious intent would be acting from false consciousness. Furthermore, it appears that Kant is suggesting that any act performed without conscious intention is ultimately devoid of meaning.

Nevertheless, crucial to Kant’s argument is the disjunction between self and other together with the strong feeling of one’s own individual self-awareness. The affirmation of one’s own self-awareness and autonomy comes with the attendant recognition of the individual autonomy of the other. Rather than there being

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⁴ Namkhai Norbu, *The Crystal and the Way of Light: Sutra, Tantra and Dzogchen*, London 1986, pp.112-13.

⁵ Immanuel Kant, *The Groundwork of the Metaphysique of Morals*, tr. H.J. Paton, London 1968, pp.112-13.

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any sense of connectedness within the Kantian perspective, there is an almost irreconcilable division between self and other. Addition-ally, Kant claims that we are subordinate to the dictates of the universal, and that for the propagation of the moral order the universal, i.e., God, is an absolute necessity. Moreover, any moral judgement is required to be in itself universalisable.

Buddhists, of course, would view with deep suspicion the claims of any universal, as the general tenor of Buddhist thought is towards uniqueness and away from universals which always relativise that uniqueness. Universals, from this perspective, homogenise and dilute rather than lead to, or reveal, genuine autonomy. Thus there is an inhibiting of any truly authentic encounter between human beings.

With the elevation of the universal, within Kantian thought, we encounter the primacy of law – civil, moral and divine. However, from the rDzogs chen perspective, if not the Buddhist perspective in general, the primacy of law would hinder, if not completely block, truly ethical encounters between human beings. Such appears to be the thrust behind 'Jigs med gling pa's statement quoted above. 'Jigs med gling pa is not arguing for a complete abandonment of laws and rules but that one should primarily live within the awareness of the way things are. One dimension of this would be the recognition of the internal contradictions to be found within the notions of universals and the judgements that are derived from them, together with the hypothetical nature of such constructs. What 'Jigs med gling pa is asking the individual to do is to probe the conceptual nature of normalising ethical judgement to discover a genuine field of reciprocity between human beings that is based on an understanding of 'not-self'. It is with this movement that rDzogs chen thinkers would claim that we discover the glimmerings of compassion (*thugs rje*) as a responsiveness to ethical situations. This can only be discovered, it is argued, once the obstructions of conceptualisation have been removed. kLong chen rab 'byams pa, when defining the state of cessation, for example, claims:

The State of Cessation: It is the cessation of all conceptualisation (*sPros pa*) ... In the case of the cessation attained by the

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EKOTTARĀGAMA (XXXI)

Translated from the Chinese Version by
Thich Huyên-Vi and Bhikkhu Pāsādika
in collaboration with Sara Boin-Webb

Twelfth Fascicle
Part 21
(The Triple Gem)

3. ¹ 'Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Śrāvastī, at Jetṛ's Grove, in Anāthapiṇḍada's Park. Then the Exalted One said to the bhikṣus: There are three conditions (*kāraṇa*) for consciousness to receive a womb (*garbha*). Which are the three? Now there are, O bhikṣus, (a) the mother wishing to have sexual intercourse (*maithunecchā*), (b) the father and mother coming together in one place and spending the night together. However, (c) it is not the occasion for consciousness 'from outside' (*bāhyāt*) to [be instrumental in] bringing about rebirth (*gati*), and consequently an embryo cannot develop.

Moreover, if there is (a) lust (*rāga*) and if (b) consciousness ['from outside'] presents itself, but if (c) there is no union of the father and mother then an embryo cannot develop. If, furthermore, (a) the mother does not wish [to have sexual intercourse], but if (b) the father and mother come together in one place and if (c) the former is keen on having sexual intercourse whilst the latter is listless, then an embryo cannot develop. If, again, (a) the father and mother come together... and if (b) the latter is burning with lust whilst (c) the former is listless, then an embryo cannot develop. If (a) the father and mother come together..., but if (b) the father is wanting in sexual desire and if (c) the mother is frigid, then an embryo... If (a) the father and mother come together..., but if (b) the latter is wanting in sexual desire and if (c) the former is icy, then... If occasionally (a) the father and mother come together... and if (b) the former very much suffers from dropsy while (c) the latter does not, then... If occasionally (a) the father and mother come together... , but if (b) the former is looking [forward] to having offspring while (c) the latter is not, then... If occasionally (a) the father and mother (T2,

603a) come together..., but if (b) the latter is looking [forward] to having offspring while (c) the former is not, then... If at times neither the father nor mother are not looking [forward] to having offspring, then... If at times the consciousness-genius² is coming into the womb, but if the father [then] is not ready to have sex (*āgamana*) then... If at times the father and mother, as required, come together in one place, but if the mother [then] draws back from having sex then... Further, if at times the father and mother, as required, come together at one place, but if the father meets with a serious accident [even though] the consciousness-genius is present, then... If again at times the father and mother, as required, come together... and [even though] the consciousness-genius is present, but if the mother meets with a serious accident then... If, moreover, occasionally the father and mother... come together... and the consciousness-genius is present, but if both the father and mother are taken ill then... If, however, bhikṣus, (a) the father and mother come together in one place and (b) both of them are in no [way] afflicted and if (c) in the presence of the consciousness-genius the parents are looking [forward] to having a child then an embryo can develop.

These are the three conditions, bhikṣus, for [consciousness] to receive a womb. On account of that, bhikṣus, [all those who wish to overcome Saṃsāra] ought to search for skill in means (*upāyakaūśalya*) to make the three conditions end (*ud-√chid*). Thus, bhikṣus, you should train. – After listening to the Buddha's words, the bhikṣus were pleased and respectfully applied themselves to practice.³

2 識神 (cf. the above 外識, consciousness 'from outside') denoting *gandharva*, seems peculiar to EĀ. Cf. BSR 12, 2 (1995), p. 165: *gandharvas* as the retinue of the world-guardian Dhṛtarāṣṭra (Soothill, p. 341 f.); here (T2, 590b24) *gandharva* is given in Chinese transliteration.

3 According to T2, 602, n. 26, Hayashi, Akanuma and Lancaster, this EĀ sūtra parallels M I (Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhasutta), p. 265 f.: *tiṇṇaṃ kho pana bhikkhave sannipātā gabbhassāvakkanti hoti: Idha mātāpitaro ca sannipatitā honti, mātā ca na utunī hoti, gandhabbo ca na paccupaṭṭhito hoti, n' eva tāva gabbhassāvakkanti hoti... mātāpitaro ca sannipatitā honti, mātā ca utunī hoti, gandhabbo ca paccupaṭṭhito hoti, evaṃ tiṇṇaṃ sannipātā gabbhassāvakkanti hoti.* The last sentence also occurs at M II (Assalāyanasutta), p. 157. I.B. Horner, *The Middle Length Sayings I*, PTS, 1954, p. 321 f., translates: 'Monks, it is on the conjunction of three things... But if... there is here a coitus of the parents and if it is the mother's season and the *gandhabba* is present, it is on the conjunction of these three things that there is conception.' Apart from the place in the

1 See T2, 602c16 ff.; Hayashi, p. 192 ff.

4. 'Thus have I heard. At one time... in Śrāvastī... Then the Exalted One said to the bhikṣus: If there are persons [towards whom you] cultivate friendliness (*maitrī*) in your hearts, [who] think [they can] really trust [in you] and who listen [to you] respectfully, [viz.] father and mother, brothers, family members, relatives, friends or intimates, [you should] establish [them] in three bases (*sthāna*) [on which they should take their stand] unwaveringly. Which are the three? They should be encouraged (*sam-ut-thā*, $\sqrt{sthā}$) unwaveringly to take delight (*prīti*) in the Tathāgata [thus]: He is the Tathāgata who has real-

Assalāyanasutta, Horner refers to the Milindapañha and Divy in which 'the conjunction of three things' is quoted. She (*ibid.*, n. 6) also draws on the M commentary which 'explains *gandhabba* as the being who is coming into the womb... about to come into that situation, being driven on by the mechanism of *kamma*.' Cf. also Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli, Bh. Bodhi, *The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha*, PTS, Oxford 1995, rev. ed. 2001, pp. 358 and 1233 f., n. 411 on *gandhabba*.

In Vasubandhu (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, ed. P. Pradṛan, Patna 1975, p. 121, 22-3) is found a Sanskrit parallel to the M passages: *trayāṅgāṃ sthānānāṃ sammukhībhāvāt mātuḥ kuṣau garbhasyāvakrāntir bhavati... gandharvaś ca pratyupasthito bhavati*. At Bh. Pāsādika, *Kanonische Zitate im Abhidharmakośabhāṣya des Vasubandhu*, Göttingen 1989, p. 52 [163], further references are given relating to the above Sanskrit parallel: in particular see the passage at Siglinde Dietz, *Fragmente des Dharmaskandha. Ein Abhidharma-Text in Sanskrit aus Gilgit*, Göttingen 1984, p. 34, 3-8, and two passages in MĀ. T1, 666a10-2 (MĀ version corresponding to the Assalāyanasutta) and T1, 769b23-5 (MĀ version corresponding to the Mahātanhāsāṅkhasutta) parallel T2, 603a10-1 (last sentence of 2nd para. of the above transl.). Whereas the two MĀ passages are nearly uniform, the EĀ version appreciably differs. In *The Chinese Madhyama Āgama and the Pāli Majjhima Nikāya*, Saigon 1964, p. 318, in his Specimens of Comparative Study of Chinese and Pāli Corresponding Sūtras, Thich Minh Chau refers to T1, 666a10-2: '... that when 3 things came together, there would be conception, the mating (*sic*) of father and mother, (the mother's womb) not full and conceivable and the arrival of scented aggregate (P: *gandhabba*).' T1, 769b23-5 reads:

復次三事合會入於母胎。父母聚集一處。母滿精堪耐香陰已至。此三事合會入於母胎。

'But then [through] the union of three things an embryo develops in the mother[']s womb]: (a) the father and mother come together in one place, (b) the mother is 'full of essence' (= *ṛtumatī*) and 'able to bear' (healthy, ready = *kalyā*) and (c) the scented aggregate (*gandhaskandha*) has arrived. [Through] the union of these three things an embryo develops in the mother[']s womb.'

The text discussed by Minh Chau significantly differs from this latter MĀ passage only in one place: 無滿 '(the mother's womb) not full'. In all likelihood this is just a corruption of the above-cited 母滿精。

ised absolute truth (*paramārthāgata*)⁴, the Fully and Completely Enlightened One, perfect in knowledge and conduct, the Blessed One, Knower of the Universe, the Incomparable One (*anuttara-puruṣa*), the Teaching Guide [to show sentient beings] the Way (*mārgadharmasārathi*)⁵, the Teacher of Gods and Men, the Buddha, the Exalted One.

Again, they should be encouraged to direct their attention to the Teaching [thus]: The Tathāgata's Dharma is well proclaimed, inviting (*aihipaśyika*)⁶, in the highest degree (*paramataḥ*) making for exquisiteness (*sūkṣmatā*), yielding immediate results (*sāṃdṛṣṭika*)⁷ and thus to be understood by the wise (*vedanīyo vijñaiḥ*)⁸.

Similarly, they should be encouraged to contemplate and honour (\sqrt{man}) this Order of Disciples, the Tathāgata's Śrāvaka-saṃgha, [thus]: [Among them] prevails absolute concord (*sāmagrī*)⁹, they walk in the right path (*nyāyapratipanna*)¹⁰, are endowed with all virtues¹¹ and have achieved perfection in moral training, concentration and wisdom, in [ultimate] freedom (*vimukti*) and insight-knowledge of this freedom, that is to say the Order of Disciples, the four pairs [of noble persons] and the eight [kinds of *āryas*]¹². This is the Tathāgata's Śrāvaka-saṃgha, worthy of respect (*gauravārha*) and worthy of veneration¹³; this is the world's incomparable field of merit (*puṇyakṣetra*). Whoever, bhikṣus, trains in these three bases will achieve great results (*phalavipāka*). Thus, bhikṣus, you should train. – After listening to the Buddha's words,

4 至真 for the common *arhat* (cf., for example, Mahāvvy. 4).

5 無上士。道法御 for *anuttaraḥ puruṣadamyaśāratiḥ* (Mahāvvyut. 9-10).

6 Mahāvvyut. 1296; EĀ lit.: 無礙, *apratighāta*, 'without keeping back'.

7 Here the EĀ rendering (由此成果) exegetically tallies with that of PTSD (and Childers) s.v. *sandīṭṭhika*, whilst at Mahāvvyut. 1292 the Tibetan and Chinese translations are literalisms.

8 Mahāvvyut. 1297.

9 This recalls *sāmicīpratipanna* (Mahāvvyut. 1123).

10 Lit.: 'without error and confusion'.

11 As for 法法, see Karashima, p. 120.

12 See PTSD s.v. *purisa* (*purisayugāni*, *purisapuggala*) and *yuga*.

13 可貴 rendering *dakṣiṇīya*, may be peculiar to EĀ.

the bhikṣus were pleased and respectfully applied themselves to practice.¹⁴

5. 'Thus have I heard. At one time... in Śrāvastī... Then the bhikṣu Kokālika went to where the Exalted One was. He bowed down his head at [the Exalted One's] feet and sat down at one side. Then that bhikṣu said to the Exalted One: The intentions (*samudācāra*) of the bhikṣus Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana are very wicked; there are many [instances of] misconduct (*duścarita*) [on their part]. – Do not say so, demanded the Exalted One, you whose heart takes delight in the Tathāgata, [listen to me]: Śāriputra's and Maudgalyāyana's conduct is absolutely virtuous (*ekāntakuśala*) and not at all unvirtuous. – Now the bhikṣu Kokālika said to the Exalted One a second and a third time: What the Tathāgata says is true and not false (*abhūta*). However, the intentions of the bhikṣus Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana are very wicked; they have no roots of merit (*kuśalamūla*). – You are a fool (*bāla*), replied the Exalted One, you do not, alas, trust what the Tathāgata says. By claiming (*nir-√vac*) that the bhikṣus Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana are very wicked this is now [such an instance of] misconduct on your part that before long you will face the consequence [of it].

Then that bhikṣu rose from his seat and his body became covered with terrible abscesses: [first] in size of sesame seeds, [then] they turned pea-sized, gradually *āmalaka*¹⁵-size, then even walnut-size and [finally] *añjali*-size¹⁶. Pus and blood gushed [from the ab-

14 For the Pāli parallel see A I, p. 222 (III, 75): *Yaṃ... anukampeyyātha ye ca sotabbam maññeyyūṃ mittā vā amaccā vā ñātī vā sālohitā vā te vo... tisu thānesu samādapetabbā... Buddhē aveccappasāde samādapetabbā... iti pi so Bhāgavā... svākhyāto Bhagavatā dhammo... supaṭipanno Bhagavato sāvakasañgho...* F.L. Woodward, *Gradual Sayings I*, PTS, 1932, p. 202 f., translates: '...one for whom you have fellow-feeling and those who think you should be listened to, whether friends or intimates or kinsmen... ought to be advised about... three particulars. ...They should be advised about... unwavering loyalty to the Buddha, thus: He it is, the Exalted One... Well proclaimed by the Exalted One is Dhamma... They walk righteously, the Exalted One's Order of Disciples...'

15 I.e. fruit of the emblic myrobalan.

16 I.e. size of cupped hands.

cesses, that bhikṣu's] body broke up, his life came to an end and he was reborn in the Lotus Hell (*padmaniraya*).

When Venerable Mahā-Maudgalyāyana heard that Kokālika's life had come to an end, he went to where the Exalted One was, bowed down his head at [the latter's] feet and sat down at one side. Instantly¹⁷ he rose from his seat [again] and asked the Exalted One: Where was the bhikṣu Kokālika reborn? – When his life had come to an end, he was reborn in the Lotus Hell, replied the Exalted One. – Now I would like to go to that hell, said Venerable M., in order to instruct that person. – You need not go to him, M., remarked the Exalted One. – I [still] would like to go... to instruct that person, repeated M. Thereafter the Exalted One remained silent and did not reply. Then, as fast as a strong man bends his arm, Mahā-M. disappeared from Śrāvastī and arrived in the Lotus Hell. Just at that time the bhikṣu Kokālika's body was all ablaze, and there were a hundred head of cattle ploughing into his tongue. Sitting cross-legged (*pariyānkam ābhujya*) in the air and snapping his fingers¹⁸, Mahā-M. signalled [his arrival] to that bhikṣu, and at once the latter, while looking upwards, asked him: Who are you? – Kokālika, M. answered, I am a disciple of Śākyamuni Buddha. My personal name is Maudgalyāyana, my family name is Kolita¹⁹. – Having recognised M., the bhikṣu spat these malicious words [at him]: Now I am sunk in this miserable destiny (*durgati*) but, alas, without being spared from your presence. – He had hardly uttered these words when, consequentially, a thousand head of cattle appeared, ploughing into his tongue. When M. had witnessed that, it saddened him all the more, [realising] that in [Kokālika] there was no change of heart making him repent.

Maudgalyāyana returned to Śrāvastī and went to where the Exalted One was. He bowed down... and stood at one side. Then he reported the whole matter to the Exalted One who replied: I told you before that it was not necessary to go to see that wicked man. – On this occasion, the Exalted One uttered the following verses:

17 According to the reading of T2, 603, n. 19, and Hayashi against that of CB-ETA.

18 See Karashima, p. 440.

19 See BHSD, p. 194b.

The man was born to have a hatchet in his mouth with
Which he cuts up himself. Through his malicious words
He has rendered both his and my breathing (*āśvāsa-*
praśvāsa)

Obnoxious (*aprāsādika*), [whereas breathing] in and out
Is [otherwise] entirely wholesome. Such [a person] is
Sunk in a miserable destiny; his action was extremely
Wicked. Such a wicked [action] directed against a
Tathāgata either of the past or present²⁰, [entails] the
Gravest [consequences]: Thirteen thousand and six
[Aeons] and [yet] one [more of staying in] the Hell of
[Hot] Ashes (*bhasmaniraya*). He who commits [wicked]
Actions by deed or word [such as] abusing noble
Persons, will go to that [hell]. –

Thereupon the Exalted One said to the bhikṣus: You should train in
three things to perfect your conduct. In which three? In virtuous con-
duct by deed, word and thought. Thus, bhikṣus, you should train. –
After listening to the Buddha's words, the bhikṣus were pleased and
respectfully applied themselves to practice.²¹

20 After Hayashi's Japanese transl. (p. 195); cf. also Hackmann, p. 115, under
盡.

21 For a parallel to this EĀ sūtra, which includes some colourful details of the
Buddha's reaction to an irremediable person, see S I, p. 149 ff.: *Sāvattī || ||
Atha kho Kokāliko bhikkhu yena Bhagavā... Pāpicchā bhante Sāriputta-Mog-
gallānā pāpikānam icchānaṃ vasaṃ gatā ti... purisassa hi jātassa || kuṭhārī
jayate* (read with Nālandā ed.: *jāyate*) *mukhe || yāya chindati attānaṃ || bālo
dubbhāsitaṃ bhanam...*

Another parallel is found at A V, p. 170 ff. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *Kindred Say-
ings* I, PTS, 1917, p. 188 ff., translates: 'On another occasion, at Sāvattī, the
Kokālikan bhikkhu, coming into the presence of the Exalted One,... Wicked,
lord, in their desires are Sāriputta and Moggallāna! They are ruled by wicked de-
sires! ...

In sooth to every man that's born
A hatchet grows within his mouth,
Wherewith the fool, whene'er he speaks
And speaks amiss, doth cut himself...'

On p. 188 f., *ibid.*, n. 4, Rhys Davids gives further places where the popular
Kokālika story is told.

BOOK REVIEWS

Summary of the Topics of Abhidhamma (Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha) by Anuruddha, and *Exposition of the Topics of Abhi-dhamma (Abhidhammatthasaṅgahavibhāvinī)* by Sumaṅgala, being a commentary to Anuruddha's *Summary of the Topics of Abhidhamma*. Translated by R.P. Wijeratne and Rupert Gethin. Pali Text Society, Oxford 2002. xxi, 415 pp. £18.00. ISBN: 0 86013 412 1.

In 1989 the PTS published in one volume a new edition of the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* (Abhid-s) by Hammalawa Saddhātissa, together with the first edition in Roman script of the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgahavibhāvinīṭikā* (Abhid-s-mhṭ), the commentary of Abhid-s.

Hearing of the imminent appearance of the edition of the *Abhid-s-mhṭ*, the late Dr R.P. Wijeratne was stimulated to start the translation of the text he had often contemplated making but had postponed again and again. When completed it was sent to the PTS. Dr Saddhātissa recommended its publication, subject to certain corrections and changes, which he undertook to make himself. He also agreed to write an introduction. Unfortunately, he died before he could begin work on either undertaking.

It was not easy for the PTS to find someone capable of doing what was needed to the translation, but eventually Dr Rupert Gethin of the University of Bristol agreed to do so. His university duties hindered progress until he was granted a University Research Fellowship in 1998, which allowed him to concentrate on completing the necessary work.

Dr Saddhātissa's two editions were kept separate, but in this translation the relevant portions of the *ṭikā* are inserted in their appropriate place after each section of *Abhid-s*, with the page numbers of Saddhātissa's editions inserted in square brackets to facilitate reference to the Pāli originals.

In his Introduction (pp.xii-xxi) Dr Gethin discusses the author and date of *Abhid-s*, and suggests that a date as early as the sixth or early seventh century is not impossible. He considers the significance of *Abhid-s* and *Abhid-s-mhṭ*, and gives his reasons for leaving the technical terms *jhāna*, *dhamma*, *kamma* and *kiriya* untranslated.

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To the translation are added lists of corrigenda to the PTS 1989 edition of *Abhid-s-mhṭ*, of preferred readings (pp.369-72), and of Abbreviations (pp.373-5). There is a Bibliography (pp.377-8), a Pāli-English Glossary (pp.379-89), and Index of Pāli, Sanskrit, and Sinhala texts cited by Sumaṅgala or referred to in the notes (pp.391-2), and a general index (pp.393-415).

When one scholar's work is corrected or edited by another it becomes impossible to assess how much of the final work represents each scholar's input. Dr Gethin states (p.x): 'What I have produced in the end must be regarded as virtually a fresh translation, one which does, however, take as its inspiration and basis Dr Wijeratne's hard and sustained work', and he generously places Dr Wijeratne's name before his own on the title page.

He repeats (p.xi) Dr Wijeratne's wish that the translation, as finally published, will provide scholars with the inspiration to work on improving our knowledge of the traditions of Abhidhamma as handed down in the Pāli texts.

K. R. Norman

Journal of the Pali Text Society, Volume XXVII. Edited by O. von Hinüber and R.F. Gombrich. Pali Text Society, Oxford 2002. 183 pp. £18.75. ISBN 0 86013 407 5.

Volume XXVI (2000) of the *Journal of the Pali Text Society* was noted in an earlier number of this journal (BSR 18, 2, 2001, pp.250-2). Volume XXVII has now appeared.

It contains:

(1) Anne M. Blackburn, 'Notes on Sri Lankan Temple Manuscript Collections' (pp.1-59). This provides a preliminary account of the manuscripts held in six Sri Lankan Buddhist temples located in the Kandyan and Kurunāla regions.

(2) Primoz Pecenko, 'Līnatthapakāsinī and Sāratthamañjūsā: The *Purānaṭīkā*s and the *Ṭīkā*s on the Four Nikāyas' (pp.61-113). This article contains a comparison of portions of the recently discovered manuscript of the Līnatthapakāsinī, the purāna-ṭīkā on the Manorathapūranī (the commentary on the Aṅguttara-nikāya), with the later ṭīkā named Sāratthamañjūsā.

(3) Thomas Oberlies, 'A Study of the Campeyya Jātaka, Including Remarks on the Text of the Saṅkhapāla Jātaka' (pp.115-46). This is an English translation of the article which was first published in German under the title 'Eine Studie des Campeyya-

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Jātaka (mit textkritischen Bemerkungen zum Saṅkhaṇḍaka Jātaka' in WZKS XXXIV (1990), pp.79-106).

(4) Heinz Braun, 'The Colophons of Burmese Manuscripts' (pp. 147-53). This is an English translation of an essay which was first published in German in *Untersuchungen zur buddhistischen Literatur*, Zweite Folge, 1997, pp.35-9.

(5) Peter Skilling, 'On a New Edition of the Syāmaratṭhassa Tepitakattakatha' (pp.155-8). This is a report on a new Thai-script edition of the Pāli commentaries which was published in Bangkok in 1992.

(6) Peter Skilling, 'Some Citation Inscriptions from South-East Asia' (pp.159-79). This is a report on recently discovered inscriptions in Angkor Borei in Cambodia, Si Thep in Thailand and Go Xoni in Vietnam which include excerpts from Buddhist texts.

(7) An Index to *JPTS* IX-XXVII (pp.177-83).

K. R. Norman

The Glorious Deeds of Pūrṇa. A translation and study of the Pūrṇavadāna. Joel Tatelman. Curzon, Richmond 2000, £40.00; Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 2001. xii, 228 pp. Rs 295.00. ISBN 0-7007-1082-5.

The book under review is 'an extensive revision of a thesis approved for the M.A. in Religious Studies, McMaster University, 1988'. Although it is not usual for an MA thesis to appear in book form the present study fully deserves publication and is a useful contribution to the study of Buddhist narrative literature. The legend studied by Joel Tatelman deals with the life of a Buddhist monk who allegedly introduced Buddhism to the land of Śronāparāntaka, largely corresponding to the present state of Gujarat. In the introductory chapter the author adduces some evidence for the history of Buddhism in this part of India and then summarises what we know about Buddhist narrative literature, especially its oldest layer. Although not entirely new, it is a balanced and readable presentation that tries to incorporate what has been written on the topic recently. Unfortunately, Tatelman repeats the old error that the date of the *Divyāvadāna*, 'generally thought to have been compiled in the third or fourth century' (p.8). The arguments proposed for this early date are valid only for the sources of the *Divyāvadāna*, not for the text itself. For the date of its compilation we do not have any reliable clue and the situation is complicated by the fact that

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the text is not uniform (cf, e.g. the catalogue of the Sanskrit manuscripts in the Tokyo University Library by Seiren Matsunome, Tokyo 1965). Likewise, Tatelman's dating of the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins ('first or second century', p.14), based on Gnoli's opinion (in his edition of the *Samghabhedavastu*), seems to be much too early.

Tatelman traces all the texts in Sanskrit, Pāli, Tibetan and Chinese that deal with the life of Pūrṇa. They are summarised and translated for the greater part in the book, even those in Chinese. Texts of a similar character such as the *Sumāgadhāvādāna* are also adduced and analysed. At the end of his introduction Tatelman offers some interesting ideas about the narrative, literary, his-torical and philosophical aspects of quasi-legendary works like the *Pūrṇavadāna*.

The translation of the longest version of the legend, that from the *Divyāvadāna* (chapter 2), is followed by an analysis that begins with the allegory of names. Another central topic is the unity of a family and the reasons why and how it can be destroyed. Next, Tatelman tries to sketch the psychological development of the hero Pūrṇa from a very clever and successful businessman and merchant to a monk. The instruction of Pūrṇa is also dealt with, although this is a part rich in stock phrases. A long, final section treats Pūrṇa's meritorious deeds for the Saṃgha which seem to reflect actual historical events. The four appendices contain two translations from the Pāli, one from the Sanskrit (Kṣemendra) and one from Chinese.

In my opinion the publication is a mature and useful work that can be consulted with great profit for study of works of a similar character. It is richly documented, well produced and almost free of printing mistakes.

I would like to conclude my review with a few philological notes on the translations:

The central text of the present study is the *Pūrṇavadāna*, the second legend of the *Divyāvadāna*. The author provides us with a complete English translation. His textual basis is the *editio princeps* by Cowell and Neil (Cambridge 1886), the slightly revised edition by Vaidya (Darbhanga 1959) and the 'Notes on the *Divyāvadāna*' by Shackleton Bailey (*JRAS* 82, 1950-51). These latter notes are based on the Tibetan translation of those parts of the *Divyāvadāna* that can also be found in the *Vinayavastu* of the Mūlasarvāstivādins (MSVV), which was most probably the direct

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source of the *Divyāvadāna*. The text of the MSVV is obviously better than that of the comparatively late Mss of the *Divyāvadāna*, its Tibetan translation is very good and reliable, and therefore Shackleton Bailey was able to propose a great number of convincing emendations. Tatelman has made full use of the notes and has occasionally suggested additional emendations that bear testimony to his careful reading of related passages and texts. His translation is good and pleasant to read. The places to be corrected are few and not particularly significant.

– p.46.20: Bhavatrāta means ‘protected by Bhava, i.e. Śiva’, not ‘Bhava’s Protector’. Cf. Tatelman’s incorrect analysis of the compound on p.98!

– p.49.34: Here Tatelman has changed the transmitted text *kātarāḥ* ‘timid, discouraged’ to **cāturāḥ* ‘clever’ on the basis of one of the few mistakes by Shackleton Bailey, who read the Tibetan translation wrongly as *snar ma rnams*. In fact, the Tibetan has *sdar ma rnams* which renders *kātarāḥ*. Therefore, no alteration is required.

– p.50.8-9: Tatelman translates *yad idānīm nirastavyāpārās tiṣṭhāmah* as ‘if we now give ourselves up to that which should be regarded as unimportant’. Why not simply ‘if we stay idle’?

– p.51.7: I would prefer ‘in a good mood’ for *saṃmodamānāḥ* instead of ‘conversing amiably’.

– p.54.1-2: For ‘Now what sort of king is he in whose home there is no yellow (“ox-head”) sandalwood?’ the Tibetan has ‘Who is he in whose home there is yellow (“ox-head”) sandalwood?’ I find this at least as sensible as the transmitted Sanskrit text of the *Divyāvadāna*.

– p.63.20: Tatelman’s emendation *sauratya* for *saurabhya* is certainly correct, although I would prefer the translation ‘friendliness’ over ‘compassion’. Edgerton has ‘gentleness, mildness’, which is more or less the same. The usual Tibetan equivalent is *des pa*. The translation ‘compassion’ occurs again on p.64.

– p.63.3-10: The name of the metre, Śārdūlavikrīḍita, does not mean ‘Tiger’s Roar’, as given in note 80, but ‘the playfulness of a tiger’.

– p.65, line 2 from bottom: Instead of ‘these fearless ones’ for *vigatabhayā* as an attribute of the gods invoked in the situation of danger, I would prefer the rendering ‘by whom this danger disappears’.

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– p.66.3: The translation ‘assailed’ is based on the emendation *-daṣṭhāh* (for *-dasthāh*). Did Tatelman mean *-daṣṭāh*?

– p.69.3-8: The Sanskrit text of the two stanzas contains two metrical mistakes. In *vapuṣmattayā* the syllable *-ma-* has to be short and in *nipīditayauvaniāh* instead of the two short syllable *-dita-* only one short syllable is required. In other places Tatelman has successfully corrected the defective metrical portions.

– p.92, note 153: Read *pratyekabodhi* instead of *pretyakabodhi*.

For whatever reason Tatelman writes ‘Darukarṇin’ for ‘Dāru-karṇin’ throughout.

Another laudable addition is the translation of Kṣemendra’s version of the Pūrṇa legend that can be found as story No.36 of the *Bodhisattvāvadānakalpalatā*. Again, Tatelman’s translation is good and very readable. It is a great pity that De Jong’s paper ‘Notes on the Text of the Bodhisattvāvadānakalpalatā, pallavas 7-9 and 11-41’, published in *Hokke Bunka Kenkyū* 22 (1996), pp.1-92, has escaped Tatelman’s attention, since it contains a substantial number of very good corrections. Thus the translation of stanzas 1, 6, 10, 12, 22, 24, 60, 69, 80 and 82 has to be altered slightly. Apart from that I would translate *upanīṣat* in st.17 as ‘cause, basis’ (cf. BHS), not as ‘secret knowledge’. In st.29 I suggest translating ‘cooling even fire’ instead of ‘which imparts coolness even to that which is on fire’, Skt *dahanasyāpi śītadam*. In st.59 *udīrṇa* means ‘grown, risen’, not ‘generated’. In st.68 ‘awaited’ is not so felicitous an addition by Tatelman. In st.44 and 56 De Jong’s emendations have to be rejected.

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Madhyamakahrdayam [sic] ***Bhavyakṛtam: Madhyamakahrdayam of Bhavya***. Edited by Chr. Lindtner. The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Adyar (Chennai) 2001. liii, 169 pp. \$75.00. ISBN 81-85141-40-1.

The *Madhyamakahrdaya-Kārikās* (MHK), Bhavya’s major independent treatise on the Madhyamaka or ‘Middle [Theory]’, are one of the masterpieces of the literature of this school of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism. Its author – known also as Bhā(va)viveka and Bhāvin – lived in the sixth century and was the source of the so-called Svātantrika, or ‘Autonomist’, branch of the Madhyamaka. Unlike several other masters belonging to the

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Madhyamaka school, Bhavya insisted that the use by the Mādhyamika philo-sopher-practiser of autonomous (*svatantra* 'independent') infer-ences (*anumāna*), inferential signs (*liṅga = hetu*) and formal proofs (*prayoga* or 'syllogism') was required not only for estab-lishing his religio-philosophical position against opponents, but also for arriving at the understanding (*jñāna*) of reality (*tattva*), – i.e., *svabhāvaśūnyatā* 'Emptiness of (hypostatic) self-existence' – and hence for attaining liberation (*mukti, mokṣa*). In this way Bhavya's school has closely and very interestingly linked together the logical, epistemological, soteriological and gnoseological sides of Buddhist thought. Although opposed by Candrakīrti and his 'Apagogist' (*Prāsāngika) branch of the Madhyamaka, Bhavya was highly respected by Mādhyamikas in general as a major inter-preter and thinker in the line of Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka. He indeed composed a seminal exegesis of Nāgārjuna's *Madhya-makakārikās* (the *Prajñāmūla*) entitled *Prajñāpradīpa* (now avail-able only in Tibetan and Chinese translations), on which there exists a voluminous and valuable sub-commentary by Avalokita-vrata (available only in a Tibetan version).

Bhavya introduces his *MHK* through the two topics of the *bodhicitta*, the bodhisattva's 'Thought of Awakening', and the *munivrata*, the ascetic's vow. Ch. 3, the 360-verse centre-piece of the treatise, is then devoted to the search for the knowledge of reality (*tattvajñānaisaṅgā*). As a major Buddhist thinker, Bhavya considers in the following two chapters the doctrines of (4) the Śrāvaka in relation to the Mahāyāna, and (5) the Yogācāras (i.e., the Vijñānavādins). As a critical philosopher and also as a doxographer, Bhavya next discusses in four chapters the Brāhmanical schools of the (6) Sāṃkhya, (7) Vaiśeṣika, (8) Vedānta, and (9) Mīmāṃsā. Finally, in Chapter 10, he establishes that the Buddha was an omniscient being (*sarvajña*). Bhavya's work closes with two verses eulogising the Buddha and one characterising the treatise as the *hrdaya* 'heart, essence' of the Madhyamaka. Curiously, the work is referred to in the Sanskrit colophon of the manuscript as *tarkajvālā nāma sūtra*. The great commentary (*vṛtti*) on the *MHK* entitled *Tarkajvālā*, which is ascribed to Bhavya himself, is avail-able to us only in a Tibetan translation.

The Sanskrit manuscript serving as the basis of the present edition of the *MHK* was formerly kept at the Ža lu monastery in Tibet where it was photographed by G. Tucci, and where Rāhula

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Sāṅkrtyāyana made a hand-copy (from which V.V. Gokhale later made a further hand-copy). The manuscript was later removed to Beijing, where another set of photographs was then made; these have been published as an appendix to the first volume of *Papers in honour of Prof. Dr Ji Xianlin on the occasion of his eightieth birthday* (Beijing 1991). The present edition has been prepared from prints of this second set of photographs which Lindtner compared with prints from Tucci's earlier and less satisfactory photographs.

The publication under review is the first edition in a single volume of all eleven chapters of the *MHK*. Previously, individual chapters of the *MHK* had been edited by Lindtner's predecessors as well as by Lindtner himself, in some cases accompanied by an English translation. Annette Heitmann also carried out preparatory work on the *MHK* for her proposed Copenhagen doctoral thesis (cf. p.xiv of the present publication); and she compiled a useful 'Bibliographie zur Bhavya-Literatur' extending to 1995 and covering the dauntingly intricate history of research on Bhavya. Heitmann's bibliography has been published in K.N. Mishra (ed.), *Glimpses of the Sanskrit Buddhist Literature* (Sarnath 1997), pp.106-54.

The damaged Sanskrit manuscript of the *MHK* presents a number of gaps and some illegible places, so that the Tibetan version (made in the eleventh century by Atiṣa Dīpamkaraśrījñāna and Nag tsho Tshul khrim s rgyal ba, the translators also of the *Tarkajvālā*) is invaluable both for filling lacunae in the manuscript and also (notwithstanding Lindtner's restrictions on pp.xlvi-xlvii) for interpreting the Sanskrit text. Where there are more or less extensive gaps in the Sanskrit manuscript of Chapters 3 and 5, Lindtner has very usefully printed the corresponding Tibetan translation. But in a large number of other cases he has not done so without, however, explaining why he has proceeded in such different ways in his edition. Thus, parts of Chapters 6, 7, 9, 10 and 11 – and also several places in Chapter 8 – are missing owing to lacunae in the Sanskrit manuscript, but the corresponding portions of the Tibetan have nevertheless not been reproduced in this edition. This text in Nāgarī script may be intended as an *editio minor*, on which a fuller *editio maior* in Roman transliteration is to follow (see the dust jacket of this volume).

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The text-edition is preceded by Lindtner's introduction in which he provides an outline of its contents. He also mentions several other works ascribed to Bhavya – in particular the *Prajñāpradīpa*, the *Tarkajvālā* and the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* – but without hinting even in passing at the philological and historical problems that attach to the attribution of the last two works to the author of the *MHK*. (Aspects of this thorny problem as concerns the latter works and the *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha* have been discussed by the present reviewer in D. Seyfort Ruegg and L. Schmithausen [ed.], *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka* [Leiden 1990], pp.59-71; and, with regard to the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* alone, in our *Buddha-nature, Mind and the problem of gradualism* [London 1989], pp.206-9.) The reader is thus told nothing of the many important, and very interesting, historical and philosophical questions that continue to surround our understanding of Bhavya's thought. Lindtner's allusions on p.xii to Bhavya's contemporaries are also elliptical. As it stands, the formulation on p.xvi according to which the Mādhyamika admits the existence of a *bhāva* 'entity' on the surface-level of *saṃvṛti* would hardly be acceptable to Mādhyamikas of Candrakīrti's school. For it leaves unclarified the philosophically highly significant questions as to whether, even on the *saṃvṛti*-level, *bhāvas* can properly be said to be produced, and consequently whether the qualification (*viśeṣana*) '*paramārthataḥ*' ('in absolute reality') should at all be affixed to Nāgārjuna's statement negating the arising of *bhāvas* (as Bhavya and his followers have maintained). For Candrakīrti, such a qualification by Bhavya of statements relating to reified entities in fact proves to be philosophically incoherent and unintelligible (see *Prasannapadā* i.1).

The edition of the *MHK*, beautifully produced by the Vasanta Press at Adyar, is followed by an index of half *ślokas*, and by an Apparatus criticus (for which the Tibetan version has been only partially exploited for reasons advanced by Lindtner at pp.xlvi-xlvii). Regrettably, on p.149, no bibliographical details have been provided for several of the earlier (partial) editions to which reference is made by various *sigla* in the Apparatus criticus.

This edition of the *MHK* in a single handy volume will doubtless give a new impulse to the study of this great monument of Madhyamaka thought and its renowned author.

D. Seyfort Ruegg

Śāṅkaranandanas Īsvarāpākaranasaṅkṣepa mit einem anonymen Kommentar und weiteren Materialien zur buddhistischen Gottespolitik, Teil I: Texte; Teil 2: Annotierte Übersetzungen und Studie zur Auseinandersetzung über die Existenz Gottes. Helmut Krasser. (Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asien Nr 39) Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna 2002. xix, 127 & 378 pp. Pb. ISBN 3-7001-3024-4.

The author of this scholarly publication is a seasoned researcher into Buddhist epistemological and logical texts in the post-Dignāga tradition of Dharmakīrti (c.600-660); another of his publications (1991), on the validity of knowledge as expounded by Dharmottara (c.740-800), was belatedly reviewed in this journal in 1994 (BSR 11, 2, pp.190-2). This time he has turned his attention to the arguments brought forth within Dharmakīrti's tradition against theistic 'proofs' of the existence of God as discussed in the 'Summary of Refutations of God' by Śāṅkaranandana (c. 940/50-1020/30) on the basis of nine stanzas from Dharmakīrti's work *Pramāṇavārttika* (Exposition of Means of Knowledge). These few verses represent, remarkably, the beginning of Buddhist anti-God polemics on logical grounds. Dignāga (fifth century), the founder of the Buddhist school of logic, does not appear to have been pre-occupied with this problem.

The rejection of the idea of a Creator God goes back to the oldest Buddhist sources (cf. *Āṅguttara-nikāya*, PTS, I, 174 = III, 61, 3). Helmuth von Glasenapp (*Der Buddhismus - eine atheistische Religion*) dealt with this theme quite extensively already in 1954, including also Mahāyāna sources up to Nāgārjuna, although he was criticised for his terminology. It is probably preferable to employ the term 'non-theistic' for Buddhism, which accepts the existence of the category of (non-eternal) gods. The author points out further sources which reject the idea of a Creator God, such as Aśvaghōṣa, *Abhidharmakośa*, *Abhidharmapradīpa*, Bhāvaviveka, Śāntideva and others. He also lists a number of earlier academic researches into this theme.

In order to put Śāṅkaranandana's work into perspective and enable better understanding of his terse text, which presupposes knowledge of earlier polemics, the author includes extracts from other authors who wrote commentaries on Dharmakīrti's nine

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stanzas. Of great value is his introductory study in the second volume, which contains the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of the nine stanzas with a translation and copious explanations and the reactions to Dharmakīrti's arguments from six representatives of the Nyāya school of Hindu logic in the form of extracts in Sanskrit, again with translations and copious explanations.

Both volumes are immaculately produced with extensive notes, references and indices. All texts are, of course, romanised, but there is also a reproduction of a manuscript of Śāṅkaranandana's text. This is a piece of specialised research into a little known period of development of Buddhist logic in India which should eventually be made available to a wider readership in a comprehensive survey. Works of this kind will hopefully one day encourage someone to undertake the task.

Karel Werner
(SOAS, London)

Sarvāstivāda Buddhist Scholasticism. Charles Willemen, Bart Dessein and Collett Cox. (Handbuch der Orientalistik, HO2, 011), Brill, Leiden 1998. xvii, 341 pp. \$109.50. ISBN 90-04-10231-0.

Prime facie this book is presented as the collaborative work of three scholars, Charles Willemen, Bart Dessein and Collett Cox. In fact Willemen's only substantive contribution to the volume appears to be the two and a half pages (xi-xiii) that comprise the preface, at the end of which he indicates that the bulk of the text (three of the volume's four chapters, comprising 167 pages) are Dessein's work, while Chapter Three (116 pp) is the work of Cox.

Dessein's opening chapter, 'About the Dharma' begins with the death of the Buddha and the first 'council' (*samgīti*), here dubbed the 'First Synod', and a brief discussion of the formation of the Sūtra, Vinaya and Abhidharma Piṭakas, before turning to 'Sarvāstivāda Philosophical Basics'. Dessein presents these as (1) the existence of dharmas in relationship to the three time periods of past, present and future, (2) dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) in terms of four different methods, (3) causality in terms of six types of cause, and (4) intermediate existence (*antarā-bhava*) between death and rebirth. The Sarvāstivādin account of the Path is only very briefly mentioned (pp.31-2). Dessein's method in each case is largely descriptive, setting out the basic ideas, citing passages and concluding with an illustrative quotation from the **Samyuktābhidharmahr̥daya* of

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Dharmatrāta, a text of which he has since published a complete translation and study (Bart Dessein, *Samyuktābhīdharmahr̥daya: Heart of Scholasticism with Miscellaneous Additions*, 3 vols, Delhi 1999). His brief account of Sarvāstivāda thought cannot be recommended for the clarity of its insight, though it is useful for tying certain ideas to specific textual sources. These sixteen pages are the only deliberate attempt in the volume to provide some sort of account of Sarvāstivādin ideas, so despite its title the volume contains very little exposition of Sarvāstivāda Buddhist thought as such; instead it concentrates on presenting the history of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma literature: the seven canonical works, and the commentarial and exegetical tradition of the *Vibhāṣā* compendia and various treatises (*śāstra*).

Dessein's second chapter, 'History and Sarvāstivāda', is just over 100 pages long, and is divided into two parts, 'The Mauryan Empire' and 'Bactria and Gandhāra'. The first part considers the councils of Vaiśālī and Pāṭaliputra and splits within the early Saṃgha, and then moves on to consider the formation of the Sarvāstivādin Canon. The second part focuses on the development of the Sarvāstivāda school in Bactria and Gandhāra, and considers the formation of the various groups and sub-schools within the Sarvāstivāda – the Dārstāntika Sautrāntika, Mūla-Sarvāstivāda, and the Vaibhāṣika. (Incidentally, sub-section three on p.121 is entitled 'Doctrinal Evolution', but given as 'Vaibhāṣika Orthodoxy' in the general contents on p.viii.)

Dessein's purpose in these two chapters is not entirely clear. It would seem that he is aiming at a critical survey and summary of the relevant scholarship. The problem with these two chapters is twofold. In the first place Dessein's style is somewhat dense, such that it is not always easy to follow just what he wants to say about the material he is presenting. In the second place, his consideration of the scholarly literature tends to rely rather heavily on the pioneering work of Bareau, Demiéville and Frauwallner, while ignoring more recent scholarship, especially that concerned with the Southern tradition and Pāli sources. Dessein furnishes his text with numerous references to the primary and secondary literature, yet his interpretation of these is hardly a model of clarity. And when he does offer definite interpretations they do not always inspire confidence. Thus, in considering the various reasons for the first split in the Saṃgha between the Sthaviras and Mahā-sāṃghikas, Dessein, following

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Bareau, favours the conclusion that the schism came about as a result of the five points of Mahādeva (p.48), simply ignoring more recent scholarship that suggests otherwise (e.g. J.J. Nattier and C.S. Prebish, 'Mahāsāṃghika Origins: The Beginnings of Buddhist Sectarianism', *History of Religions* 16 [1976], pp.237-72; and L.S. Cousins, 'The "Five Points" and the Origins of the Buddhist Schools', *The Buddhist Forum* 2 [1991], pp.27-60). And when dealing with the third council of Pāṭaliputra he again follows Bareau in suggesting that this event should be seen as concerned with a dispute between the Sarvāstivādins and Theravādins, although such a view has no clear justification in the sources which, as K.R. Norman has pointed out in his 'Aśoka's "Schism" Edict', *Collected Papers* III (Oxford 1992), pp.191-218, appear to conflate two quite different events, the first addressing the issue of people masquerading as Buddhist monks without being properly ordained or following the prescriptions of the Vinaya, and the second a communal recitation of the scriptures including Moggaliputta Tissa's exposition of the *Kathā-vatthu*. While Dessein's first two chapters do succeed in providing a useful source of reference if approached cautiously, it has to be said that the overall result is a somewhat confused and confusing account of both the primary source material and the scholarship relating to the origins of the early Buddhist schools.

By way of contrast, the third chapter of this volume, Collett Cox's 'Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣika Orthodoxy', is a model of clarity and good judgement and can be recommended without reservation as an introduction to the history and literature of Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma. The chapter falls into two main parts, the first of which seeks to sketch out the background against which the development of Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma literature should be seen. The following observation deserves to be quoted in full:

The circumstances in which Abhidharma emerged caution that an accurate reconstruction of its early history would be much more complex than the surface picture projected by the extant textual record. As with the emergence of any new literary genre, we can find predecessors or texts that anticipate Abhidharma style and content not included within the corpus of Abhidharma texts. Therefore it seems more reasonable to define Abhidharma not as a set of individual texts, but rather as a type of exegesis that gradually developed in tandem with distinctive content, and

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eventually resulted in an independent branch of inquiry and a concomitant and separate genre of texts. (p.142)

Cox goes on to suggest that we should be wary of seeing the early canonical Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts as originally sectarian compositions; rather ‘it is probable that they predate, at least in some incipient form, the arising of sharply delineated groups and that they circulated in use among many groups’ (p.145).

The second and greater part of Cox’s chapter considers the structure and content of in turn the seven works of the canonical Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma, the subsequent exegetical *Vibhāṣā* compendia (which define the received interpretations and positions of Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma), and three late treatises of the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣikas that were composed partly in response to Vasubandhu’s auto-commentary to the verses of his *Abhidharma-kośa*, namely Samghabhadra’s **Abhidharmasamayapradīpikā* and **Nyāyānusāra* (which survive only in Chinese translation), and the *Abhidharmadīpa* by an unknown author.

In the fourth chapter of the volume, ‘Bactria and Gandhāra’, Dassein backtracks chronologically to consider a number of treatises that predate the *Kośa* and only survive in Chinese translation, as well as the *Kośa* itself. In the first section he discusses the titles, authors, dates and structure of ‘three *Hṛdaya* works’ – Dharmasrī’s (or, according to Dassein, who gives due weight to the phonetic rendering of this name, Dharmasreṣṭhin’s) **Abhi-dharmahrdaya* and two works that expand on this, Upaśānta’s **Abhidharmahrdaya-śāstra* and Dharmatrāta’s **Samyuktābhi-dharmahrdaya-śāstra*. In the second section he turns to the *Kośa*, providing tables comparing its structure and doctrinal positions with that of the **Samyuktābhidharmahrdaya-śāstra*. Much of this material has been subsequently published as the introduction to Dassein’s English translation of the latter work. Finally, Dassein turns to two further treatises, Goṣaka’s **Abhidharmāmṛtarasa* and Skandhila’s **Abhidharmāvatāra*.

As with Dassein’s earlier chapters, while there is valuable reference material here, the presentation is not always exactly coherent. Thus, at one point (p.259) in the course of consideration of the *Hṛdaya* works we are told that Upaśānta’s **Abhidharma-hṛdaya-śāstra* is ‘the first work after the work of Dharmasreṣṭhin’ and that it was probably composed in the third

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century CE; a few pages later (p.278) we are told that Ghoṣaka's **Abhidharmām-rtarasa* is likewise based on Dharmasreṣṭhin's **Abhidharma-hṛdaya* and was composed in the second century CE.

The volume is furnished with a bibliography, divided into primary and secondary sources, and two indexes, one general and one of Sanskrit technical terms. The bibliography of secondary sources includes a considerable number of items by modern Japanese scholars; indeed, the account of Japanese scholarship is one of the useful features of this book.

While the contemporary student of Buddhist thought does not want for expositions of Madhyamaka and, though to a lesser extent, Yogācāra, a full account of what must be regarded as the basis of these Mahāyāna systems, Abhidharma – and especially the Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivādins – remains a desideratum for the proper appreciation of Buddhist thought. The present volume's title suggests that one might have expected to find in it a rather more sustained exposition of Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāsika Buddhist thought than it in fact contains, and it could have been more accurately entitled 'A History of Sarvāstivāda Buddhist Literature'. In sum this is a rather uneven volume which nevertheless contains some very useful material and, despite its shortcomings, in the present state of our knowledge and appreciation of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma can only be welcomed.

Rupert Gethin
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The Eminent Monk: Buddhist Ideals in Medieval Chinese Hagiography. John Kieschnick. (Studies in East Asian Buddhism 10), University of Hawai'i/Kuroda Institute, Honolulu 1997. vii, 218 pp. ISBN 0-8248-1841-5.

This is an engaging study of the three medieval hagiographical collections collectively known as 'The Biographies of Eminent Monks'. The 'Biographies' were compiled by the scholar-monks Huijiao (497-554), Daoxuan (596-667) and Zanning (919-1001), and have become a standard source of information for modern scholars working on medieval Chinese Buddhism.

Two pioneering articles on this topic were published by Arthur Wright some fifty years ago and they were still considered a standard reference until quite recently. Wright considered Huijiao's attitude to his materials comparable to that

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of a modern 'historian'. He wrote that he 'was motivated by a desire ... to res-cue Buddhist biography from the limbo of the exotic, the bizarre, and give to the lives of the monks a place of honour in the cultural history of China' ('Biography and Hagiography: Hui chao's *Lives of Eminent Monks*' in *Silver Jubilee Volume*, Kyoto University 1954, p.385). Shinohara Koichi, among others, later challenged these views and emphasised Huijiao and the other compilers' keen interest and dependency on miracle stories and the powerful notion of 'cosmic response' (*qiantong*). Kieschnick too moves away from the attempt to establish the 'Biographies' as 'historical' sources. Throughout the book, he questions the use of categories such as 'history', 'historiography' and 'hagiography', and looks instead at the 'Biographies' as 'representations of the image of the monk, of what monks were supposed to be' (p.1). As he puts it in the introduction, this is a study of the 'monastic imagination'.

The book consists of three chapters, plus an introduction and final reflections. In the rather brief introduction, Kieschnick offers some background information as to the motivations for writing the 'Biographies', their sources, structure and reception. He then proceeds to examine the stories by dividing them into three main categories representing monastic ideals: asceticism, thaumaturgy and scholarship. Chapter One, 'Asceticism', discusses the 'monastic distinction', namely those very behaviours and material aspects that characterise a monk's life. While discussing clothing, sex and dietary regimes, Kieschnick rightly counterpoints the acceptable norm with its many accepted exceptions. The larger socio-religious context is called in to explain the creation of a pattern. In the case of the adoption of vegetarianism, for example, which has become a fundamental feature of Chinese Buddhism, he observes that it was also because of 'social pressure from non-Buddhists as from monks and laypeople that diet became such an important part of the Chinese monk's identity' (p.27). In the final section of the chapter Kieschnick examines some of the more extreme acts of asceticism based on instructions in the *Lotus Sūtra*, such as self-mutilation and ritual suicide, and convincingly argues that 'as the language of self-sacrifice reveals, in these incidents the monk or layman through self-mutilation drew on the power of the relic in an attempt to transfer or internalise the sanctity of the sacred object' (p.44).

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The second chapter, 'Thaumaturgy', examines the stories concerned with techniques of wonder-working, such as rain-making, prophecy, fortune-telling, spell-casting, and the specialist body of knowledge about the spirit-world. These techniques were taken for granted, and accepted as a feature of clerical accomplishment. Kieschnick interestingly observes that 'in general, these abilities were linked to the perceived alien character of a monk', particularly in the case of spells, since 'monks reputed to have mastered spells were almost always foreigners' (p.110). This is certainly a very complex topic. The late Michael Strickmann devoted some attention to it (see, for example, *Mantras et mandarins: Le Bouddhisme tantrique en Chine*, Paris 1996), and I suspect his insightful comments about spells, mantras, dhāraṇīs, the use of the human voice, and the power of the Sanskrit language in a ritual context might perhaps have enriched the discussion herein.

The third chapter, 'Scholarship', illuminates some aspects of the academic training of the scholar-monk. Indeed, as Kieschnick rightly points out, 'many if not most important thinkers in medieval China were monks' (p.112). An intriguing section of this chapter deals with the undeservedly little studied topic of monastic debate. Kieschnick shows that a monk was not only expected to be an expert orator, but also to be able to refute all kinds of challenges. The medieval debates, it emerges, were rather turbulent affairs, full of malice, jokes and slander. In this, Kieschnick suggests, the Song 'Biographies' hinted at the rise of a less sombre and austere cleric, and at the humour and irreverence of Chan hagiography.

The final reflections summarise the salient points of the book. The index is extensive and quite useful. The bibliography contains a good range of primary and secondary sources, the majority of the latter in English and Japanese with some Chinese and a few French ones. Apart from some minor mistakes in the bibliography, the text is generally very well written and edited. In conclusion, this is a well-researched and carefully argued book. Not only does it contain refreshing perspectives on Buddhist medieval hagiography and translated some fascinating stories, but it also opens up new research avenue on a wide range of topics.

Francesca Tarocco
(SOAS, London)

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Mount Lu Revisited: Buddhism in the Life and Writings of Su Shih. Beata Grant. University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu 1994. 249 pp. \$36.00. ISBN 0-8248-1625-0.

This monograph is part of a recent attempt by American academics to re-evaluate the role of Buddhism in post-Tang China, and particularly its importance among literati of the Song period. During the past decade, studies by Robert Gimello, Daniel Stevenson, Peter Gregory, Yü Chün-fang, Daniel Getz and Miriam Levering, among others, have contributed immensely to a radical reassessment of the place of Buddhism in Chinese culture during the late medieval and early modern period. In fact, far from being a declining or spent force, as the author of *Mount Lu Revisited* also indicates, 'Buddhism played an extremely vital role in the literary, cultural, and religious life of the Sung dynasty' (p.2).

The volume focuses on the Northern Song literatus Su Shi (1037-1101), arguably one of the most fascinating and complex personalities in the whole of Chinese history. The aim of the book is to 'explore the many different levels - intellectual, aesthetic and existential - at which Su engaged the Buddhism of his time' (p.10). The book consists of nine chapters, of which the first is a prologue and the last an epilogue. In Chapter 2, Grant offers a brief survey of eleventh century Chinese Buddhism. This picture is somehow dated and has been largely superseded by more recent publications, such as *Buddhism in the Sung* edited by Peter N. Gregory and Daniel A. Getz (Honolulu 1999). The core of the book (Chapters 3-8) is a chronological treatment of Su's life through his literary activities. In fact, each chapter is named after a line of a poem such as 'Of Arhats and Altruistic Monks' and 'In Buddha Country' and contains large excerpts of poems in translation as well as a discussion of their supposed 'Buddhist' background.

Su Shi is best known among students of Chinese culture as an outstanding painter, poet, calligrapher, critic and essayist. Moreover, he was also very competent in other fields, spanning from engineering to political administration to gourmandise. These facts alone make him a very complex subject for a monograph. In the realms of thought and 'religion', Su was not only conversant with Confucian literature and exegesis, but also well versed in Buddhist as well as Daoist scriptures. In fact, before he became

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interested in Buddhism, he had already studied parts of the Daoist Canon and made pilgrimages to Daoist sites. Thus, it would be dangerous, as Grant herself consents, to construct Su Shi as a 'Buddhist', as much as it would be to construct him as a 'Con-fucian' or a 'Daoist'.

However, even if this is not the author's stated aim, the exclusive search for 'Buddhist sources' can ultimately run the risk of obfuscating the degree of inter-textual references and cross-religious metaphors present in Su Shi's writings, let alone clarifying his religious practices in the context of the contemporary religious landscape. In this, the volume is disappointing, particularly, I imagine, for a Su Shi scholar and for a student of Chinese religious history.

For these and other problems of a more technical nature, the volume was negatively reviewed by Curtis Dean Smith in the *Journal of Chinese Religions* 24 (1996), pp.193-5. This said, the book is not entirely unrewarding for a student of Chinese Buddhism. For example, one can profit by learning something about the use and appropriation of Buddhist themes by medieval literati, even if specific references to primary sources in the Buddhist Canon would have enhanced the scholarly value of the book. More detailed information on the interactions with the contemporary monastic milieu would have also been welcomed. Furthermore, in a very insightful recent study, Daniel Stevenson pointed out that Su Shi had been a patron of the *shuilu fahui* (see Daniel B. Stevenson, 'Text, Image and Transformation in the history of the *Shuilu fahui*, the Buddhist Rite for Deliverance of Creatures of Water and Land' in Marsha Weidner [ed.] *Cultural Intersections in later Chinese Buddhism*, Honolulu 2001, pp.30-72). This ceremony being arguably 'the most spectacular liturgy in the Chinese Buddhist repertoire', it is remarkable that the verses written by Su Shi are still 'displayed in *shuilu* altars today, much as they were a millennium ago' (Stevenson, *op. cit.*, p.60). This fact alone grants Su Shi a special place in Chinese religious history and deserves much more attention than it has received so far. Grant touches on the subject of *shuilu* poems (pp.144-9), but her treatment of the topic is far from exhaustive.

In conclusion, although Chinese and Japanese scholars have made much progress in illuminating the religious motives in Su Shi's life and work, Beata Grant's book still stands, to my knowledge, as one of the few English-language sources for assessing

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the complex topic, and this can still be of some interest to those who do not have access to Asian sources.

Francesca Tarocco

The Origins of Buddhist Monastic Codes in China. An Annotated Translation and Study of the *Chanyuan qinggui*. Yifa. (Kuroda Institute, Classics on East Asian Buddhism) University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu 2002. xxx, 352 pp. \$60.00. ISBN 0-8248-2494-6.

As the title of this book indicates, the work traces the origins of the monastic codes in China and mainly concentrates on the *Chanyuan qinggui*, 'Rules of Purity for the Chan Monastery'. The *Chanyuan qinggui* is the earliest extant Chan monastic code and was compiled by the Chan monk Changlu Zongze in 1103. The code contains a detailed overview of all aspects of daily life in public Buddhist monasteries and delineates the administrative hierarchy and the various ranks of functions within such monasteries.

In the first part of the book, the author focuses on the indebtedness of the *Chanyuan qinggui* to the Indian Vinayas and describes the Chinese historical and cultural contexts in which the code arose. Doing so, she successfully demonstrates a clear line of continuity between the Indian Vinayas, the compilation of Sangha regulations by Chinese monks, such as Dao'an (312-85), Huiyuan (334-417), Daoxuan (596-667) and Yijing (635-713), and the compilation of various 'Rules of Purity'. The influence of the latter rules in Japan are also discussed. In an interesting and original way Yifa further points out the external factors that influenced the composition of the *Chanyuan qinggui*. The text proves to conform to state decrees concerning such matters as travel permits, the sale of certificates and the creation of monastic offices. Court protocol, popular customs and Confucian books of rites also exerted some influence. For her study, the author relies on a remarkable knowledge of primary and secondary sources, especially Chinese and Japanese, but also Western. Still, it is a pity that a quite recent work on the Chan 'Rules of Purity' has not been taken into account: Claudia Fritz, *Die Verwaltungsstruktur der Chan-Kloster in der späten Yuan-Zeit, Das 4. Buch der Chixiu Baizhang qinggui, übersetzt, annotiert und mit einer Einleitung versehen*, Bern 1994. The latter work focuses on a code compiled in the fourteenth century. Another good tool on disciplinary texts missing in the bibliography is Akira Yuyama's

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A Systematic Survey of Buddhist Sanskrit Literature, Erste Teil: Vinaya-Texte, Wiesbaden 1979.

The second part of the book offers a biography of the author of the *Chanyuan qinggui* and a meticulously annotated translation of the text. Again, the author traces back the influence that Changlu Zongze experienced, pointing out his debts to both the Indian and Chinese traditions.

Yifa's work provides the reader with an excellent overview of the first ten centuries of Buddhist monastic discipline in China. On the one hand, the author perfectly shows how the monastic codes adapted to the cultural and administrative context of the Chinese empire and, on the other hand, the work strongly emphasises how these codes are indebted to the Indian Vinayas and to the commentaries upon the latter. The Indian origin of many rules of daily life is pointed out in a detailed way, making extensive use of all available Vinaya texts and commentaries. Inevitably, however, a few points seem to have been overlooked or misunderstood. When, for instance, the three earliest Vinaya texts traditionally said to have been translated into Chinese in the third century are mentioned (pp.3-4), the reader is correctly warned that two of these works – the two extant Dharmaguptaka works – probably were not translated in the third century. However, no doubt at all is expressed concerning the third work, a Mahā-sāṃghika text translated by Dharmakāla. Since this work is not mentioned in the earliest extant catalogue compiled by Sengyou in 518, it is not certain that it really existed. Moreover, given the fact that, contrary to the Dharmaguptaka works, the Mahāsāṃghika text is no longer extant, no real indication to prove its origin is available. Another work mentioned without any warning among the Vinaya texts introduced into China is a text on the nuns' precepts said to be translated by the monk Mili (p.5). This no longer extant work was most probably compiled in China and has always been considered as apocryphal, even in the earliest catalogue available to us (Sengyou, *Chu sanzang jiji*, T 2145, 15a1, *passim*).

On p.7, the author states that 'Emperor Zhong of the Tang (r,684) enacted a decree prohibiting the use of the *Ten Section Vinaya*' (i.e. the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya). The emperor indeed issued an imperial order, but probably not during the six weeks that he was in power between the end of 683 and the beginning of 684. At that time, he was completely under the domination of his

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wife, the empress Wei, and of his mother, the dowager empress Wu. In 705 he resumed the throne. As a devout Buddhist, he stimulated Buddhism throughout the empire. He died in 710. It seems therefore probable that it must have been between 705 and 710 that the monk Dao'an (654-717) requested the emperor personally to impose by imperial order that the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya (as promoted by the monk Daoxuan) be followed throughout the whole empire. The emperor agreed to the request (Zanning, *Song gaoseng zhuan*, T 2061, 793c25-27) and issued a decree imposing the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya. Although this surely excluded the use of any other Vinaya, the emperor in fact never explicitly forbade the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya.

A few misunderstandings concerning the Indian Vinayas have slipped into the text. This is, for instance, the case when, on p.13, the *poṣadha* ceremony is explained. At this fortnightly ceremony, the list of precepts (*prātimokṣa*) is recited. All fully ordained members of the Saṃgha have to be present. The author presents the ceremony introduced in China as a confession ceremony. Although confession was certainly its main purpose at the time the Buddhist community first installed it, the Indian Vinayas translated into Chinese clearly say that if a monk or a nun has committed an offence, he or she has to confess it before the start of the ceremony. If not, he or she cannot even participate (see, for instance, the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya, T 1428, 825c23-827b6). The author also states that, before the recitation of the precepts, representatives of monks and nuns unable to attend the ceremony express the wishes of the absent parties. This is most probably a misunderstanding of the term *yu* 欲, commonly translated as 'to wish'. In the above context, however, *yu* is a rendering of the Indian term *chanda*, 'consent': anyone not able to join in a formal procedure must either remain outside the boundary (*śīmā*) of the monastery or send his or her consent (*chanda*, 欲) through another monk or nun. No wishes can be expressed.

On p.54 (and in the translation on pp.112 and 245), the author does not make a clear distinction between the seven categories of precepts (*pārājika*, *saṃghāvaśesa*, *nihsargika*, *pātayantika*, *pratideśaniyā*, *śaikṣa* and *adhikaraṇaśamatha* – of all these Indian terms I mention only one variant) and the seven categories of offences (*pārājika*, *saṃghāvaśesa*, *sthūlātyaya*, *pātayantika* [*nihsargika pātayantika* and *pātayantika*], *pratideśaniyā*,

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duṣkṛta and *durbhāṣita*). This is rather confusing. Moreover, the term *pārājika* is without any remark translated as ‘defeat’ following Ī.B. Horner’s translation of the Pāli Vinaya. Yet, ‘defeat’ is to all prob-ability not the correct etymology of the word. On the *saṃghā-vaśeṣa* offence, the author says that it can be atoned for by immediate confession before the assembly. This explanation of ‘immediate confession’ is very strange since, according to the Vinaya texts, a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offence is always followed by one or two periods of penance. A monk who has concealed the offence first has to undergo a *parivāsa* period, the duration of which cor-responds to the number of days that he has concealed it. In such a case, there is clearly no ‘immediate confession’. Afterwards, a short *mānatva* penance is inflicted upon the monk. Only then can he be rehabilitated. A monk who has never concealed his offence only has to undergo a *mānatva* penance. For a nun, there is no *parivāsa* period of penance.

Finally, it is a pity that in a few passages, especially in the first part of the work, some incorrect renderings or misspellings of Indian terms disturb the picture, such as the term *bhikṣuṇī* that is consistently misspelled. On p.73, an enumeration of phonetic tran-scriptions (*alile pixile amole* , Dharmaguptaka Vinaya, T 1428, 875b2-3) is translated in the following way: ‘*harītakī*, *pixile*, *āmalaka* fruit’. No explanation is given. Besides the fact that it would be interesting to provide the reader with some information on these trees, the fruits of which are often used as medicine, the correct translation should be ‘*harītakī* (or -ka), *vibhītakī* (or -ka; cf. U. Wogihara et al., *Kan ’yaku Taishō Bonwa Daijiten*, Tokyo 1974, p.1232), *āmalakī* (or -ka).

It is important to note that the above remarks only concern details and that they should therefore not be overemphasised. Instead, Yifa’s work presents a thorough study of the complex origins of the ‘Rules of Purity’, as well as a carefully annotated translation of the *Chanyuan qinggui*. It is a valuable instrument for all those interested in the Chinese monastic codes.

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The Dalai Lama’s Secret Temple: Tantric Wall Paintings from Tibet. Ian A. Baker. Photographs by Thomas Laird. Thames and Hudson, London 2000. 216 pp, inc. 150 colour illus. £36.00. ISBN 0 500 510032.

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This lavishly produced volume features excellent colour plates of the imagery decorating a small temple (Tibetan, *klu khang*) dedicated to the *nāga* spirits, situated by a lake in the vicinity of the Potala Palace in Lhasa. Before the Chinese invasion of Tibet, the lower storeys were opened annually for public offerings to the *nāgas*, while the upper storey remained a private chapel reserved for the Dalai Lama and his closest teachers and attendants. The temple and its images have suffered considerable damage in recent decades and, as well as direct neglect or destruction, the temple and the lake have now also been made into a Chinese tourist attraction. Thanks largely to the Shalu Association, some restoration work is currently underway but, given the total undermining of the site's original purpose and the possible threat to its future preservation, it is unsurprising that the present Dalai Lama, who left Tibet before he was shown his private chapel or had its esoteric teachings explained to him, seems to have enthusiastically welcomed the project to publish photographs and commentaries on the paintings.

Other lamas appear to have been more cautious; Baker admits (p.209) that the eminent Chatral Senge Dorje (= Bya bral sangs rgyas rdo rje?), the principal lama to have explained the imagery to Baker, only 'warily' gave his consent. The book is clearly a feature of the contemporary tendency not only to open previously esoteric traditions to wider audiences but, more dramatically, to release them into a non-Buddhist market place, where they risk receptions ranging from the superficial or ignorant to the actively hostile. A major issue here is that of loss of control on the part of the previous custodians of the traditions, yet since that loss stems mainly from political events which now seem irreversible, publications which at least attempt to reflect the knowledge and concerns of traditional religious authorities may be considered acceptable. In this case, the result has been a book with a fascinating illustrative guide to Tantric meditative techniques and accomplishments.

The book is divided into four sections. After an introduction by the Dalai Lama, which includes his own reminiscences, the first section begins with a chapter describing the temple's environment, architecture, and lower storeys. The following chapters supply some Tibetan historical, cultural and artistic background. This is followed by three sections, each devoted to a

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single wall of the upper storey's private chapel, and each containing separate sub-sections of description, Tibetan transcription of the legends accompanying the paintings, translation of these legends, and colour photographs of the original artwork. The book's structure deserves some comment. While the material is organised in a reasonably coherent fashion, there are two issues raised about the layout. First, the integration of the descriptions of the temple's lower storeys into the introductory chapters, with fewer photo-graphs and no accompanying Tibetan or translation of the legends of the artwork of these floors, points to a comparative neglect of this clearly interesting material. Here we find images of the *nāgas* protecting the area, to whom local Tibetans still make offerings despite years of Chinese rule, and the walls are also decorated with scenes from the Tibetan opera, Padma 'Od 'bar, including an expedition into a *nāga* realm to recover a wish-fulfilling jewel. It is unclear whether the limited attention devoted to this imagery is due to the greater damage inflicted on the more accessible areas of the temple during the early decades of Chinese occupation (indeed, the Dalai Lama notes, p.11, that most of the original statues and religious artefacts were removed), or whether it reflects Ian Baker's own relative lack of interest in this more 'popular' Tibetan religious material. The latter appears more likely given that the few colour plates which are provided of the murals still adorning the walls suggest that at least some superb paintings have survived.

Secondly, the ordering of each of the three chapters devoted to the upper chapel poses some navigational problems. Since the descriptions, text, translation and photographs are separated, it requires considerable effort to locate the relevant information on each specific image, and this effort is hindered by a lack of page numbers on most pages with colour plates. Furthermore, since in many cases the illustrations do not have a clear or sequential order, the monk who transcribed the Tibetan legends has had to make his own educated guesses to render a single text of the Tibetan writing, and the translator has not always followed the same order! In the photographs of larger areas, even the reader of Tibetan script is unable to make out the writing. Certainly, it would have been far more helpful to all readers to have had each colour plate accompanied by its text, translation and commentary, and this would have had the added

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benefit of not needing to impose what is in some cases a slightly artificial order onto paintings which are occasionally arranged spatially (for instance, a group of figures depicted in a circle around a central figure) rather than strictly consecutively.

The imagery on the northern, western and eastern walls of the upper chamber respectively corresponds to the rNying ma tradition's division of Base, Path and Fruit (*gzhi, lam, 'bras*). Thus, we find the theme of conversion and transformation highlighted on the northern wall, with paintings of the establishment of the religious tradition in Tibet, along with Tantric representations of the body, the mechanisms of rebirth, the Buddha figures symbolising the true nature of worldly phenomena, and the potential for transformation through Vajrayāna techniques. The western wall focuses on the specific *rdzogs chen* techniques of *khregs chod* and *thod rgal*, while the eastern wall depicts a series of realised adepts, including Indian mahāsiddhas, the disciples of Guru Padma who are associated with the early transmission of the rNying ma teachings in Tibet, and the famous Tibetan masters dating to the renowned gTer bdag Gling pa, who was a master of the Fifth Dalai Lama in the seventeenth century.

For a popular book aimed at a non-specialist readership, the introductory and commentarial material is generally useful and rarely inaccurate; indeed, Baker draws in parts on some of the best current scholarship in Tibetan studies. However, scholars in Buddhist studies might find questionable the numerous parallels drawn with Western cultural sources, such as Blake, and with scientific or pseudo-scientific sources. Specialists might also be slightly irritated by some of the general comments or quotations accompanying the colour plates, which are frequently not specifically related to the imagery concerned and, in the case of quotations, which sometimes have attributions such as 'The Buddha' with no further source supplied. Nonetheless, Baker's personal familiarity with some of the *rdzogs chen* traditions described along with his use of teachings and translations by contemporary authorities in the tradition, does help to communicate the overall ethos of the *rdzogs chen* meditations described. At the same time, while the presentation as a book targeted principally at a general audience may excuse the omission of precise referencing, it is more problematic that it is not always immediately obvious which sections are solely the author's own work. For instance, it is necessary to examine the

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small print within the Acknowledgements in the final pages to discover that the sections of translation were in fact the work of Ani Jinba of Shechen monastery in Kathmandu. The same small print informs us that Erik Pema Kunsang and Matthieu Ricard provided 'contributions' to the glossary, but there is no indication of whether these were minor editorial suggestions or whether the glossary was in fact substantially their work.

The Tibetan legends were transcribed by a monk formerly associated with the temple, whose name we are not given in the text. It is presumably P.N. Dhumkhang, who is credited for his 'Tibetan calligraphy' in the Acknowledgements, although the Tibetan writing in the book appears to reproduce printed rather than hand-written Tibetan. There are a few errors in the rendition of the original Tibetan or, in some cases, perhaps deliberate corrections. For instance, the inscription 'rtsa ba yengs med gangs shar gnyen pos gcod pa' (photograph, p.78) is amended to 'rtsa ba **g**-yengs med gang shar gnyen pos gcod pa' (p.60), while more radically, 'ngag smyon pa lta bu' (p.131) becomes 'ngag smyon pa **ston pa**' (p.124). There are a number of similar examples elsewhere. Ani Jinba's translation of the captions on the western wall (pp.127-8) appears to contain some repetition (unless there is in fact repetition on the walls themselves). As a result, it is unclear whether the series of analogies in which the experience is, for instance, likened to someone cured of smallpox, or a bird caught in a snare, applies to the *thod rgal* visions outlined in the sequence of paintings translated on p.128, or to the *khregs chod* practices presented in an earlier sequence of images (translated on p.127), or indeed, to both. Other than this instance, her translations throughout are extremely helpful in clarifying the place and purposes of the meditative exercises and other imagery depicted.

Finally, although some images are dwelt on, and are presented both in detail and included in photographs of larger sections of murals, other sections appear to have been entirely omitted, such as the depictions of a number of Guru Padma's disciples, and of some later masters of the tradition. It may be that these sections have been damaged considerably, but it would still have been useful to provide photographs. Furthermore, since the overall layout and design are not altogether clear from the rough outline sketch plans provided, a

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few photographs which could be pieced together to see each wall as a whole would have been a helpful addition.

Despite my reservations concerning the presentation of the material, there is no doubt that the publication of these rich and detailed images, text and translation represents a valuable source for the study of Tibetan Buddhist meditative traditions.

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Ancient Angkor. Michael Freeman and Claude Jacques. Thames and Hudson, London 1999. 232 pp. £16.95. ISBN 0 500 97485 3.

Michael Freeman is a well-known and highly competent photographer who started his career among the Khmer temples of Thailand before turning his attention to Cambodia itself. His early books, such as *A Guide to Khmer Temples in Thailand and Laos* (1996) and *Prasat Phimai* (1998), are familiar to any traveller keen to take in a few cultural sites after their Thai beach holiday has begun to pall. More recently he has teamed up with Claude Jacques, a leading French epigraphist and Director of Studies at the École Pratique des Hautes Études who, for three decades, has been pondering what the inscriptions can tell us about ancient Angkor. In a range of works, starting with his *Études d'épigraphie cambodgienne* (1969-72), he has both extended and critically engaged with the monumental labours of George Cœdès in an attempt to provide an overview of the historical development, religious ideas and practices, political content and aesthetic achievements of this important South-east Asian civilisation.

This is not the first book on which Freeman and Jacques have collaborated. Their *Angkor: Cities and Temples* first appeared in 1997 and the work under review could be regarded as a spin-off from this project. Given its intended purpose as a lavishly colour-illustrated guidebook covering all the main sites within the central Angkorian complex, Jacques, nevertheless, manages to situate Angkor within the greater South-east Asian historical and cultural context. His depth of knowledge ensures that the reader leaves the work with a fair insight into the nature of the brahmanical religion expressed in extant materials still preserved within the complex, but on the Buddhism that also flourished at various stages within the Angkorian period Jacques is less expansive. Having said that, it would be wrong to be

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pedantic since this book is not intended for a scholarly readership.

Short accounts of architectural styles, building techniques and the inscriptional record are complemented by a brief discussion of daily life in Angkor and the modern efforts to restore and interpret some of the principal sites. However, the bulk of the book consists of reasonably detailed descriptions, often with good ground plans, of the principal temples in and around the great city Angkor Thom. Angkor Wat, the Bayon, Preah Khan and Ta Prohm are naturally given greatest prominence but most other important structures are covered. Since most of the target audience are unlikely to spend more than a few days in the region, the authors are probably correct in concluding that interest in visiting outlying temples, with the exception of Banteay Srei and some of the structures at nearby Rolous, will not be high. The disadvantage of the approach is that it fails to convey the true extent of Angkorian civilisation. The result is that many important sites outside the central area, such as Beng Mealea, Preah Khan of Kompong Thom, Phnom Chisor, Koh ker, Preah Vihar, and Banreay Chhmat, to name but a few, may appear beyond the Angkorian pale.

There can be little doubt that, as a guidebook, *Ancient Angkor* has already proved itself in the marketplace. When I was last in Siem Reap several months ago it was selling like hot cakes. The illustrations are well-chosen and technically superb, the maps are clear and uncluttered and the suggested itineraries provide helpful guidance. Advice on travel and accommodation, however, is very much oriented towards the more opulent end of the market. I wonder, for instance, how many readers of this journal will be staying at the Grand Hotel d'Angkor at \$360-510 per night for a double room when they next land in north-western Cambodia! The book also suffers one major difficulty from the purely practical perspective: it is too large to put into a small rucksack. In terms of convenience, detail and coverage I would prefer to stick to Maurice Glaize's, admittedly antiquated, *Les monuments du groupe d'Angkor* (1948). It may not be quite up to speed when it comes to contemporary scholarship but it still takes some beating when one is walking around trying to interpret the sites them-selves. And where else can you stumble on useful advice about where to hunt for tiger?

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The Jesus Sutras: Rediscovering the lost religion of Taoist Christianity. Martin Palmer. Piatkus, London 2001. xvi, 270 pp. £17.99. ISBN 0 7499 2250 8.

The book's title derives from a collection of Christian scrolls, written in Chinese, which were purportedly found in Dunhuang. In the words of Palmer, 'The Jesus Sutras bring together the beliefs of the Eastern world of Buddhism and Taoism with those of the Western Judeo-Christian world' whose synthesis created 'an astonishing, accessible, vibrant practice of Taoist Christianity within the context of Confucian China some fourteen hundred years ago' (p.2). Palmer's quest has been to relate the lost story of Chinese Christianity and present new translations of the Sutras. At the very beginning of the Acknowledgements, Palmer notes that the texts were translated twice before, in 1930 and 1937, but justifies his new translation with the claim that much of the meaning and nuances of the texts, which derived from Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism, escaped the notice of Moule and Saeki, the earlier translators. Given the importance attached to the Sutras, it seems an oversight that the book has no photographs of them, especially since these documents are mainly in private collections and also in the light of the problems surrounding the authenticity of much of the Dunhuang material. At the very least, readers would be interested to see what they looked like. As such, the core material, which forms the heart of the book, is inaccessible and thus does not allow comparative readings to be made with the translations of Moule and Saeki to highlight major differences between the interpretations.

As well as using the Jesus Sutras to illustrate the syncretism of Taoism and Christianity in Tang China, Palmer strives to acquaint the reader with the rich background of the Church of the East and its mission to China. Chapters about the history of the Church of the East are interspersed amongst his translations and discussions of the Sutras. In this comprehensive approach, the juxtaposition of contents in some chapters can appear somewhat piecemeal with the relationship between them not being explicit. In Ch.4 sections entitled 'The Indo-Greek Cultures' and 'Buddha and Apollo', 'Christianity meets Buddhism' immediately follow sections describing Christianity in the

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Sassanian (Persian) empire. The chapter continues by discussing the presence of St. Thomas in India and, finally, there is a section on the Church in Tibet. More-over, Palmer's arguments are often highly conjectural, conveying an impression but tending to gloss over details and definitions which would lend substance. In some instances, the text may lead to misinterpretations, an example being on p.99 where Palmer claims that Antioch was once the heart of the Church of the East. Antioch was certainly the seminal centre of theological argument for the emergent Church of the East, but the patriarchate was always located in Mesopotamia, from 424 CE at Seleucia-Ctesiphon and subsequently in Baghdad. The association of Antioch was foremost with the Syrian Orthodox (Monophysite) church.

Equally, Palmer's treatment of the relations between the Church of the East and the Church of the West, the latter being his title to cover the Latin and Greek Churches, needs to be clarified. On p.99 he sums up the outcomes of the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon, respectively held in 431 CE and 451 CE, with the statement 'as the Church of the West sought to impose its model of theological agreement on the various Christian Churches of the Middle East, some went off to join the Coptic Church and others found welcome in the Sassanian Empire'. In doing so, he does not distinguish between the various branches of the Monophysite Church which included the Copts. His following statement that the 'Church of the East never sought to enforce agreement in the way the Church of the West did, mostly because, as a confederation of Churches, it could not have done so' is at best misleading, suggesting an amalgamation of the Monophysite Churches with the Church of the East which followed Nestorius. Only on the next page does Palmer correctly identify the Church of the East. On p.48 he claims that the descendants of the Church of the East, the Assyrian Christians, are 'so called by the Western Churches to distinguish them from Protestant and Catholic Christians in modern-day Iraq and Iran'. The epithet was coined within the Church of the East during the nineteenth century, inspired by the archaeological discoveries of the Assyrian empire.

Palmer points out the great spread of Christianity but his suggestion on p.96 that the Churches of the Sassanian empire were more a loose confederation of churches fails to emphasise that, despite the vast distances which were covered by its

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dioceses, they fell under the direct aegis of the patriarchate which was based at Seleucia-Ctesiphon. Source material is sparse, but still surviving today in the Vatican is the correspondence of Timothy I, the greatest of patriarchs to oversee the expansion of the Church of the East throughout Central Asia, Tibet and China. This correspondence clearly shows that the Patriarch in Mesopotamia was responsible for the consecration of metropolitans in his far-flung territories. Indeed, Palmer makes an oblique reference to this material on p.45 when he says 'it is only later, in the eighth century, that specific references to bishops and churches in China began to appear'. A discussion of Syriac primary sources and the administration of their Central Asian dioceses appears in my article 'The Church of the East in Central Asia', *Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester* 78: 3 (1996) which Palmer cites in n.29. He postulates on p.45 that Aluoben, whom the Xian Stele credits with introducing Christianity to China, may have come from one of the great cities of Central Asia. This could be so, but a Mesopotamian connection may also be possible, and a direct parallel to consider would be that the bishops and senior hierarchy of the St. Thomas churches in India were often drawn from Mesopotamia.

Palmer's interest primarily lies in the presence of Christianity in China during the Tang dynasty. The famous Stone Stele which is at Xian initially aroused him and led him to discover the Da Qin pagoda and the adjacent monastery. Palmer seems unclear what their relationship may be and makes several contradictory statements. On pp.18-23 he suggests that the pagoda is synonymous with the monastery, but on p.207 opines that the pagoda was added when, as he believes, the Xian Stele was erected at the site in 781 CE. He suggests that monuments were often erected to celebrate major building projects, but such evidence is, at best, circumstantial. Indeed, especial caution should be exercised since there are intrinsic differences between Chinese accounts and those of seventeenth century Europeans as to the actual place of the stele's discovery. Rather than just claim that it was found at Da Qin, Palmer might have discussed the various witnesses to its purported provenance; in itself this would be a fascinating story. At Da Qin, Palmer makes much of his discoveries, but does not mention the finds of the Chinese scholars who were there in 1933. These items, which included an

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iron bell cast in 1444, may have been subsequently lost or destroyed in the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese also recorded the clay sculptures but, in contrast to Palmer, offer a Buddhist or Taoist interpretation. They found several inscriptions, but did not note the inscription on the third floor of the pagoda which was written in Syriac script which Palmer suggests is actually Greek.

The main thesis of the inherent syncretism of Taoism and also Buddhism with Christianity in Tang China has much to recommend it and on the whole, despite the aforementioned shortcomings in his usage of the Jesus Sutras, Palmer appears to handle the overall idea convincingly. However, in the rich matrix of Tang China, it is enigmatic that Manichaeism is mentioned only sporadically, especially when Manichaeism shared startling similarities with Christianity, and appellations such as 'Religion of Light', 'Religion of Illumination' which Palmer cites on p.42 as titles of Christianity, were equally applicable. Indeed, as he says on p.220, Manichaeism had entered China earlier than Christianity. It co-existed with Christianity during the Tang dynasty and several centuries later in the Yuan dynasty even appears, on occasion, to have become fused with Christianity. A remarkable Syriac inscription in the National Maritime Museum at Quanzhou (Zaitun) records that there was at Quanzhou a bishop who served both the Manichaean and Christian communities. The remarkable synthesis that was the hallmark of Chinese Christianity is also exhibited in the Yuan dynasty in the beautiful iconography of the medieval tombstones from Quanzhou which juxtapose symbols of Christianity and Buddhism. These tombstones are graphic examples of enculturation and are the subject of an Australian research project to reconstruct the profile of Christianity at Quanzhou during the Yuan dynasty.

Returning to the graffito at Da Qin, it is possible that its language is old Turkic or Mongolian which used the Syriac script, which could suggest a Christian presence at this site as late as the thirteenth century. This may endorse a suggestion made by Palmer on p.241 that, despite the suppression of Christianity in 845 CE, it survived, albeit in a clandestine form, perhaps re-emerging along with the influx of Mongol Christians during the Yuan dynasty. A travelling Uighur or Mongol Christian may have stayed at the Da Qin complex where there was still a Christian presence. Of course, such a proposal might only be answered

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when the inscription is deciphered and when a scientific archaeological excavation and analysis of the Da Qin site can be undertaken. As Palmer has conveyed in his book, the pagoda and adjacent monastery site are extremely interesting, but their history over the centuries is undoubtedly complex and a palimpsest of religious affiliations, perhaps more so than he has acknowledged. Palmer writes in his Postscript on p.252 about ventures which hopefully will realise the excavation of the site and the creation of a joint Museum of the West in Ancient China besides the ruins. This welcome initiative would go far in answering many questions about the site and also about Christianity in Tang China as well as the intriguing possibility, which is of interest to the Chinese authorities today, of whether there was a continuous Christian presence in China to the Yuan dynasty. A scientific study is sorely needed not least to redress some of the tantalising shortcomings of Palmer's book.

Palmer has written a popular work that depicts the rich heritage of Christianity in Tang China. His prose is arresting and conveys the sense of occasion, particularly in the first chapter when he describes his visits to the Da Qin pagoda, although there is a tendency to overlook the achievements of other scholars. Ch. 2 outlines the beginnings of the Church in China and introduces the first of the Sutras which is called *The Sutra of the Teachings of the World-Honoured One*, followed by the text of Matthew 6 and 7. Ch. 3, 'Panorama of the Early Christian World', surveys the rise of Christianity in the Middle East while Ch.4, 'The Church of the East', discusses the erstwhile domains of that church. Palmer outlines the mosaic of religions in Tang China (Shamanism, Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism) in Ch.5, 'The Multicultural World of Seventh-Century China'. Ch.6, 'The Early Church in China', is largely devoted to the translations of the second Sutra: *The Sutra of Cause, Effect and Salvation*, as well as the third Sutra: *The Sutra of Origins*, and the fourth Sutra: *The Sutra of Jesus Christ*. Four liturgical Sutras are the subject of Ch.7, 'The Fruits of the Church: the Great Liturgical Sutras'. Ch.8, 'The Way of Light: the Stone's Teaching', returns to the Stele of Xian to examine its contents, whereby Palmer upholds his thesis of Taoist Christians. The final chapter, 'The Fate of the Church', discusses the decline of Christianity in the Tang dynasty and its resurgence under the Mongols in the Yuan dynasty.

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The brief Bibliography introduces a good variety of works on the subject. However, it might have been expedient for Palmer to consult some old works such as F.S. Drake, 'Nestorian Literature of the T'ang Dynasty', *Chinese Recorder* 66 (1935), and *id.*, 'Nestorian Monasteries of the T'ang Dynasty', *Monumenta Serica* 2 (1936-7), especially in the light of the discoveries which were made at the Da Qin complex. There is a good sprinkling of maps throughout the book which are useful accompaniments to the text, although it would have been more helpful to list these separately rather than under the general List of Illustrations. There are some beautiful colour photographs of the Da Qin pagoda and other localities, but the quality of the black and white photographs of the sculptures within the pagoda leave something to be desired. It would have been highly advantageous to have published better quality photos in order to facilitate discussion of the iconography. Indeed, this detail needs to be considered much more carefully given Palmer's arguments that the sculptures represent en-culturated scenes of the Nativity and Jonah. Similarly, the photograph of the Syriac script inscription is of too poor quality to allow any realistic decipherment to be attempted. Overcoming these technical desiderata may open a vital window on the presence of Christianity in China about which Palmer has written so enthusiastically.

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